Kripke had no problem with contingent necessities. A metre is a rigid designator, as I understand him, and hence the same in all possible worlds. It's...
I think we agree; I just would not use the distinction between metaphysical possibility and epistemological possibility. It seems to me to conceal mor...
Perhaps. I'm not too happy with introducing a distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. So strikes me as strictly incorr...
We see Venus at one time, and call it "Hesperus". At another time we see Venus, and call it "Phosphorus". Three names for the same thing. Not a proble...
So Hesperus turns out to be Phosphorus. Yet "Hesperus", being a rigid designator, refers to Hesperus in all possible worlds. But Hesperus is Phosphoru...
Anyhow, there is this book, by a guy called Kripke, about names and necessity and stuff. And around page 102 he starts to talk about Hesperus and Phos...
What if I can't. Does that make the question "Who is Hitler?" not about Hitler? I say no. And of course you are presenting a theory. Kripke shows that...
It does not make sense. Stipulation and quantification are not the same thing. Instantiation is not just referring to things in the actual world. Thes...
Yeah. That just doesn't make sense. So, if you want to go off on a tangent and learn modal logic, this is not the place. It's a formal discipline; you...
Ah. Good. I suspect that something misleading has happened in Creative's writing. If you are going to include accessibility in your thinking, then you...
I want to say that the Standard Metre is one metre long; it has a length, so one must be able to say how long it is... To measure the length of anythi...
I'm going back to §49because of its relevance to another thread I'm working on - Kripke. In that thread there is much discussion of the relation betwe...
Me too. i find myself needing to read quite a bit. The next few pages are setting up the issues around identity and necessity. We have Hesperus is Pho...
I gather that you and Andrew have history. I'm not interested in playing. Yet. The errors shown in this thread strike me as a result of too casual a r...
Well that's a bit rude. So you don't like his writing style. Given his background I think it worth allowing him to play with the form of academic writ...
You are right, except for the "needs", which should be a "can". An informal comparison of Kripke and Lewis should also show the inelegance of counterp...
Actually, I've found the critique in this forums quite helpful in developing ideas. And what you have to say might well be interesting; in order to fi...
Perhaps we could find out the rules (beyond those of grammar and logic) which operate beneath Witti's consciousness and define a system of conceptual ...
Possibly. (See what I did there?) The arguments in N&N stand by themselves. I studied it, then went to modal logic. The formal arguments by themselves...
Quite a bit. If you are really interested, i would commend any of the innumerable introductions to formal modal logic. It's really outside of the scop...
When is a theory undone. At what point is it unreasonable to keep believing in a theory. It's commonly understood that any theory can be kept from rej...
And of course this falls in directly with the discussion of Wittgenstein's dismissal of ostension as the basis for language - found in the Witti readi...
Reference takes place within a definite description, even if that description fails. The deeper point is that even in order to set up a definite descr...
P.95. Another example, and one which shows nicely the methodological tool Kripke introduced, and which puts an end to descriptive theory. The tool is ...
I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is alread...
My emphasis. The disjunction is your Get Out Of Gaol Free card. Multiple arguments against the second disjunct were produced over the last twenty-odd ...
Historically, it was thought hat descriptions explained reference. Drawing attention to the falsity of this picture of reference was good for philosop...
That is correct. And yet he might have been born on April 27. Also, I'm unsettled when folk treat time as a special case. It's also true that he was b...
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