Banno

The referent of the word "metre" can be fixed by "the length of that stick in Paris". But "The length of that stick in Paris" is not a rigid designato...

See p.127.

Well, I suppose that's the end of that line of thought.

Well, it seems to work. What's the problem? (Edit: Indeed, I'm not too sure what it is we are talking about here. But that's been the case for most of...

Seems to me you are missing this.

Can't see why that's a problem, considered extensionally. Which is what Kripke is doing.

Not as I understand it. A rigid designator picks out the very same individual in all possible worlds. But a description might change from world to wor...

Not conflate... but they are treated in much the same way. Kripke openly says this.

SO you claim that Kripke is wrong?

Did you notice how this video does not actually reach a conclusion? It does not explain how the Trinity is logically coherent. But it was quite funny....

I can quite believe that cats are little demons...

P.125... So, how is it wrong?

Kripke discusses heat. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNGJ0WHXMyE The phenomenology and the science are not so clear... Just saying.

Hm. I'm no expert on Quine. Given that he went so far as to deny individuals that were anything more than clumps of properties, while Kripke made the ...

Quine rejected essentialism and necessity because they clouded other philosophical issues. Has Kripke's grammar removed the clouding?

I'm not at all comfortable with this reemergence of essences. SO water was first identified by a bunch of "phenomenological" characteristics. Then it ...

Could Nixon be a golf ball? "Could Nixon have been a golf ball" is still about Nixon. Even if the answer is "No".

Seems you might have been right with regards to your exegesis.

No. The important part is something like the origin or cause of the individual's having that property. A Nixon who had not won the election could stil...

SO Kripke is claiming: Once we know that cats are animals, then it is not possible that cats not be animals; and, once we know Nixon is human, it is n...

Does Kripke treat kinds differently to individuals? He says that it is not the case that cats could turn out to be robots. That if it turned out that ...

SO someone takes a dog and uses CRISPR to add a pouch to its offspring. That's not a marsupial. It's a dog with a pouch.

Yeah. Better to say that the Thylacine could never have been a dog, because dogs are not marsupials. Despite the similarity in appearance, it's not a ...

Why not? Is there a reason?

Giant and red pandas are both Arctoidea. Giant Pandas are bears; Red Pandas are Musteloidea, along with skunks and weasels. So is a weasel a panda, to...

And how is that? That they have a common ancestor?

http://www.timfaulkner.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Tasmanian-Tiger.jpg Might the Thylacine have been a type of dog?

AT some stage folk differentiated between pyrites and gold. Presumably they looked at the stuff in the sheep's wool, and separated out the dense, lust...

If B is made from A, then in every possible world B is made from A; To propose that B might have been made from D would be contradictory; yet instead ...

Hence there is a sort of inheritance of individuality... If B is made from A, and C from D, in no possible world is B the very same as C. SO part of t...

The Queen. around p.112. In some possible world, the Queen was the daughter of the Trumans. But, says Kripke, that is not a case in which Elizabeth wa...

A comment on the discussion over the last few pages, first. Seems to me that there has been considerable loose play between truth and belief in the pr...

And yet we can; and yet we do, map series of infinite numbers, one against the other. So this comes down to Meta vs. mathematics. @"MindForged" is rig...

why? Actually, I take that back. Mapping an infinity of one sort against anther is a common mathematical practice. So you are wrong, or talking about ...

Ah. I just saw this. You may be right.

Where?

Singular attributions of existence (p.110) Throughout this, the existence of individuals is pretty well assumed. But of course this needs some thought...

The introduction of "schmidentity" is methodologicaly not dissimilar to "quus" from Wittgenstein on rules and private language.

Perhaps. @"Devans99" is trying to make sense of infinity. There is a vast background of material they are missing, that sets out ways of talking reaso...

I don't understand your criticism. In the quotes you cite, he is setting out the theory he then shows to be mistaken. His point is that there is a dif...

Not so much. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elvOZm0d4H0 There's a lot of cute maths around infinity. But your OP depends on continuity. Check out htt...

So it's an assumption. Let's release one photon at a time through a double slit. Each will go through either the left, or the right, slit. There is no...

Then perhaps the length of your garden shed changes with the temperature in Paris.

Well, the "if" is important. If the meaning of "one metre" is the length of the stick, then it makes no sense to ask if the stick is one metre long. B...

Yep.

But plainly that is wrong; and that's why the physicists involved went to great lengths to isolate the stick and to maintain its environment. Perhaps ...

(my bolding). But it does make sense to ask such a question. Perhaps the swatch fades minutely each time a comparison is made; or some chemical reacti...

Yeah, that's thought provoking. SO, for Kripke as well as for Wittgenstein there is a special role for the stick in Paris. For Kripke the stick is use...

The next part reiterates his rejection of identity as a relation between names. Again, it would seem that this should be a simple point; the relation ...

The next paragraph (starting bottom of p.106) I see as an explanation of his attitude towards the length of the metre stick in Paris, again. He is tal...