Banno

Do you think the analysis concluded here works? Sure, the actual world is a possible world. And we and Kripke happen to live in the actual world. What...

Just to make it explicit, we have a choice. We might claim that "cat" refers to the very same thin in the actual world and in KatWorld, and hence that...

This is where we came in. SO now we have two possible worlds. In one, the word "Cat" refers to a type of animal, and in every possible world, cats are...

OR is it that the folk of Katworld are not talking about the same thing as we are, when they use the word "cat"?

Yep. Because... But for us, the folk of katworld think that cats are machines in every possible world. So are cats machines or animals?

So it's a necessary fact, for the folk of Katworld, that cats are machines. And if it is a necessary fact, for the folk of katworld, that cats are mac...

OK. I don't see how that fits, but let's keep it as moot. SO taking that as agreement, lets call this world "Katworld" for convenience. Every cat in K...

And again you want to go off on a fucking tangent. Answer the question for yourself.

(Notice the detail in the argument here. That's much better than the shit in the last few pages @"Janus". I'm not too sure where this discussion with ...

So, for the folk in that world, anything that is not a machine is not a cat.

and they find that all the cats they cut up have machine parts. What next? The term "Cats" has been found, a posteriori, to refer to a machine. Yes?

Well, let's go through it together.... Imagine a possible world in which, when someone first cut up a cat, it was found to be full of machinery instea...

I think we are done, Janus. IF all you can do is attack me instead of what I said, that's it.

Which I have done.

Think that through for yourself. Set up a possible world in which cats were found to be demons. Follow through on the consequences. Think like Kripke,...

So you want to assume bad faith. Then we will get nowhere. Try this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/241441 gives an example of a wo...

Here's a thing. If you think that Kripke is wrong, first explain what it is you think Kripke is arguing, then tell me where it is wrong. Otherwise, it...

Nuh. It's the nub of the issue. You really should read the book.

In some possible world, Clinton is president. In that World, there are a bunch of pseudo-philosophers stipulating a possible world in which Trump is p...

...and to my eye this shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of modality. Yes.

Then your conclusion: does not follow from your argument. After all,

The actual world holds no special place in the logic of possible worlds.

No, not following at all.

And as Kripke argued in several places, this is not a case in which Trump is not Trump, but a case in which some other individual has taken on the nam...

I don't understand the question.

Hm. So if P in the actual world, then, in any possible world, (P in the actual world)?

As @"Snakes Alive" points out, that's not right.

But all words are spoken within possible worlds...

SO what? Detail. Take this back and link it to what I said. Sure, Trump might have been president. But he would remain trump. But no individual is pic...

Nor am I. Seems irrelevant.

I get the actual part. But I don't see that you have given any reason that someone else might not have actually been president... After all, they do i...

OK. Something is a rigid designator only if it applies to the very same individual in all possible worlds. 'The man who was president of the US at suc...

Well, your objection is now spread over a dozen or so pages. If you cared to summarise it, I will give you a more considered answer. Perhaps we can ac...

P. 139. Names for kinds - for species - are passed along a chain in much the same way as proper names. The name is not fixed to its referent by a conc...

P. 138. Kripke makes the point that science identifies more robust, necessary criteria for inclusion.

Curious, that you seem to think me under some obligation to you. Our conversation is now just tit-for-tat, and hence rather pointless. I don't see you...

I see it as important that we see this as the overall approach - that Kripke is offering one way to look at how we might use modal language, but not t...

http://www.bryankramer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ten-expressions-horsetowater.jpg

Yep.

Because there are better fish to fry in the third lecture.

But not a priori; we may have found that cats were demons, but we didn't, we found that they are animals. So the possible world demon-cats are not cat...

The trouble with any extensional definition is always the stuff around the edges. So 'Heat = that which is sensed by sensation S'; but it is 28º outsi...

That is, if there evolved from the line of the canines a creature with all the characteristics of a thylacine, Kripke would have us say that it is nev...

Then the essence of a kind can be thought of in terms of accessibility. If B is made from A, and C from D, in no possible world is B the very same as ...

Again, this looks to me like a rejection of intensional meaning in favour of mere extension...

Seems to me you need to go back and read Lecture one.

Perhaps we can take on board Searle's point that a definite description might be indexed to the actual world to produce a sort of rigid designator. Ex...

Your point?

I'm thinking of this extensionally. So the referent of "Elizabeth II" is Elizabeth Windsor, with no connotation, description, properties or whatever i...

Yep.