Kripke did not fill out his theory of reference. Never did. It was offered only as an example of how references might be fixed apart from a definite d...
Yep. Guilty as charged. I'm trying to discuss Possible World Semantics, and the three interpretations of it that are listed in the SEP article. But ag...
And yet, here it is. If that is what Aristotle claimed — and that reading is itself highly questionable — then Aristotle was wrong. He lacked the reso...
Since @"Ludwig V" quotes this, I might address it. In Lewis' system, each world is spaciotemporally distinct - that is how they are defined. SO there ...
Not within the logic. We might do that when we give the edifice an interpretation. Yep. Have a look at your question. See how it is about Aristotle? t...
Not mine. Standard definitions for modal logic. "Meta-worlds" sounds like virtual reality? Not too familiar with it. The question of 'where"possible w...
Might not be a bad idea to go over the terms being used, since it seems there is some confusion. Exists A thing exists if it is in the domain of a wor...
Well, no. What you have offered, a set of assertions, isn’t a theory on a par with possible-worlds semantics. It doesn't provide a formal semantics. P...
Well, I do't see an argument that has as it's comnclusion: So we agree that for Possibilists reality includes possibilia, things that could exist but ...
Pleased someone notes the drollery! :grin: Yep. Hence the sometime definition of truth simpliciter as "true in w?"... All of our modal logic is "true ...
How? Here's what I think you did: summarises the SEP article on actualism vs possibilism. bring in Lewis’ supplementary discussion, noting that Lewis ...
Irreducible Modality and Intensional Entities For @"frank", by way of moving along... Put simply, and no doubt losing a whole lot of import thereby, h...
Oh, yes - I emphatically agree - natural language comes first; indeed I'd suggest that formal logic is just a game within our natural language, and no...
I haven't been replying to you, . Doing so didn't look productive. Is it illegal in NZ for folk without a disability to use a disabled toilet? That wo...
Not peculiar, but part of the make up of the language game around its use. I'm certainly using this discussion to show the many problems with thinking...
It might be better - and here I go against my desire not to multiply terms unnecessarily - to say that Lewis thought all possible worlds were concrete...
Yes, cheers - understood. I find it easier to answer these odd little objections than to move on with the harder stuff of the article, so I find mysel...
This shows very clearly and precisely, in a nutshell, the significant and substantial problem with your understanding of possible world semantics. In ...
Treat "actual" as an indexical, and this dissipates. It is as if you were arguing that "over there" is meaningless, because it can be made to refer to...
As regards water and H?O; Kripke pointed out that if water is H?O, if they are indeed identical, then necessarily, they are identical. If they are the...
Yeah, and it doesn't help when folk throw "concrete" into the mix... Seems to me that the answer is to understand "actual" as an indexical. It's our w...
Chomsky misunderstood Kripke. He got it arse about. Kripke starts with a formal modal logic which fixes individuals across possible worlds in order to...
Yours is a good account. That's why I have come back to it - it's close enough to what I understand that I can use it in these explanations. However I...
Logical pluralism rather than pragmatism. The challenge is to use formal grammar to exhibit the incoherences and inconsistencies in our philosophical ...
In standard modal logic there is exactly one actual world. Meta's supposing otherwise is another misunderstanding. We've a set of possible worlds, W, ...
Clarifies, would be a better word. Your is pretty much right. Contingency is modal, potential is causal, such that if we mix the two, then we ought ke...
For those reading along, the standard definition of contingency is roughly just that an event is contingent if it is true in some but not all possible...
No, not with that, I think. I'm just picking on "includes a's existence". So it's "possible world" that the Abstractionist sets out to define, and use...
This thread is now somewhat superfluous... But here's a question for you @"Jamal", nevertheless. Top left, under my profile picture, says I've made 29...
Wouldn't this be better expressed as "Individual a exists in possible world w =def w includes a in its domain"? Point being much the same as my aside:...
More parochial stuff. Yes, your education system is a bit fucked. As are your health and social security systems. Other nations are progressing, if sl...
So I'll move on to Abstractionism. We might take it as granted that we say things such as "Anne Might be in her office", and that in doing so we are t...
Cheers, . Glad to hear that this has been of use to some. Possible World Semantics provides a coherent structure to our modal considerations, a struct...
Logic learned to free itself from ontology. Not entirely; the domain, and the notion of "something", remain. That's no bad thing. Those who cannot see...
The alternative, as has been pointed out, is that for Meta the actual world is impossible. The rest, again, mischaracterises and misunderstands modal ...
Yes, although in a way very different to others hereabouts. An individual's essence, for Kripke, consists in those properties that the individual has ...
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