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I think this helps clarify where we diverge. You’re treating “number of elements” as a notion whose inferential rules must be fixed by finite counting...

I see what you’re getting at, and I agree that bijection strictly extends our ability to reason about size — especially once infinities are in play. I...

Cheers. I largely agree with you that formal language is not something alien to natural language, but a tightening of it — making explicit commitments...

I agree that this is now a question about how the debate has been traditionally framed, not about skepticism or justification. I don’t deny that many ...

Point taken. I agree that once infinite collections are treated as completed totalities, the intuitive, remainder-based concept of size becomes incons...

Your reply nicely clarifies the remaining disagreement. You say the minor “premise” “I am seeing orange” is not truth-apt but can still function in an...

Thanks — that clarifies your position. I don’t deny that many historical formulations of direct realism build in the conditional you cite: if percepti...

I agree that everything I described — coherence, responsiveness to further experience, success in inquiry — could in principle occur in a hallucinatio...

This is helpful, because now the skeptical pressure you’re worried about is fully explicit. I think the crucial step where we diverge is here: you’re ...

Thanks for making the definition explicit — that helps a lot. I don’t accept that a perceptual belief should be defined as “the belief that the world ...

Thanks, this helps clarify where the disconnect is. I think the issue is that your formulation of (1) already presupposes a particular conception of j...

Thanks — this is very helpful, because it makes the structure of your view explicit. I think the disagreement now turns on a single point. You want st...

I think the recurring confusion here comes from a difference in what we take the core epistemological problem to be. As you frame it, the dispute betw...

I agree that propositions like “I am experiencing such-and-such phenomenal character” are truth-apt and can function as premises in reflective reasoni...

I agree that background knowledge plays an essential role, and I also agree that differences in phenomenal experience help explain why different hypot...

I think part of what’s driving the disagreement here is that two different notions of “same size as” are in play, and they come apart precisely in the...

Thanks for laying this out so carefully — this helps clarify exactly where we disagree. I want to focus on the role you assign to your stage two, sinc...

I can only speak for myself on this, but I do not reject the idea that knowledge is mediated by the senses. What I reject is the idea that sensory con...

That’s a fair point — you’re right that, for Aristotle, the Unmoved Mover functions as a final cause of cosmic motion, even though it is not an effici...

That’s true, although it’s worth noting that Aristotle’s unmoved mover does not function as a source of the world’s intelligibility. As ??????? ??????...

Excellent job on the OP, as usual. I think your critique of the “pre-history” objection is largely successful. In particular, I agree that appeals to ...

Yes, and I’ve acknowledged that. I’ve also acknowledged that my own view does not count as traditional naïve realism. My point is that it does not cou...

I see what you mean, but I’d suggest that the position you describe differs from indirect realism as it was classically articulated by Locke, Hume, an...

That's interesting. I was thinking along opposite lines. While I agree that it gets many things right, I think it has some substantial problems. Here ...

Yes, that’s broadly how I see it. Phenomenal experience is particular and non-conceptual, and for that reason it isn’t the kind of thing that can repr...

Thanks, that’s helpful. I think where we still differ is that the argument you quote builds in a phenomenological notion of “direct presence” from the...

Thanks for the clarification. I should just note that my earlier point wasn’t meant as a defense of indirect realism of any sort, nor as an argument t...

Yes, I’m familiar with Davidsonian triangulation, and I agree it’s crucial for explaining how content and interpretation get off the ground at all, so...

My understanding is that, traditionally, indirect realism has held that phenomenal experience (1) does not justify our knowledge because (2) it functi...

That's a nice reference. Perhaps we could say the debate here turns on how one interprets the role of the "favour of Nature" within regard to knowing....

:up:

I’m glad to see that we agree on something. It makes sense to me that you would also reject any appeal to the phenomenal as epistemically foundational...

I agree that our practices are world-embedded and constrained by reality. My worry isn’t about whether reality plays a role, but about how. On your pi...

Let me push this a little further. I would argue that not only is phenomenal experience not truth-apt, it is not even conceptually articulated. Raw ph...

I think your last reply makes the disagreement as clear as it’s going to get. On your view, certain judgments are constitutive of what is the case, no...

I think your reply helps make the divergence between us very clear. You’re treating phenomenal character as something like an epistemic instrument - a...

I agree with you that (1), (2), and (3) can all be true, and I also agree that in that context “red” and “orange” refer to phenomenal character rather...

I see what you are saying, but I would argue that indirect realism has traditionally claimed something a bit narrower than that. I don't think indirec...

You say: "What is judged to be the case and the presupposition are the very same." I say: "The judgment and the fact that satisfies it are still disti...

Thank you for the clarifications with regard to the existence of mental imagery. I think this will help us hone in on the core issue. Thanks for confi...

I don’t think it’s correct to say that sensory content is a mental representation. Representations, in the epistemic sense relevant here, have a norma...

Yes, and I agree. Where I would push back is on the idea that imagery itself is the object of judgment. Take the example of hallucinating a ship. We h...

I think it is a problem for @"Clarendon" specifically because the way that he leverages them in his model undermines his commitment to direct realism....

I'll take a stab at this, since I think that @"Richard B"'s critique is on the right track. You've introduced "mental images" into your model in order...

I think that’s a helpful way of putting it. If we restrict the discussion to rational inquiry - inquiry aimed at truth rather than persuasion, express...

I think your reply helps move the discussion forward, so thank you for spelling it out. I don't think the “reading” case provides a counter-example to...

I agree with most of what you said here, especially at the level of psychology and development. People clearly differ in temperament, in how much they...

I think you’re right about contradiction doing real work here, and I agree that it shows our judgments are not sovereign over reality. Where I’d want ...

I’ve already addressed this point several times. Briefly: judgment presupposes answerability to how things are and the intelligibility of error. I don...

Not at all! I'm glad that you jumped in with a response. Yes, it does, thank you. I actually agree with you on this; we do not have access to a god's ...