@"Hypericin" I see that you are not yet a member of the new site. I will hold off on posting a reply until you join, unless you would also like to bri...
Understood. I'm fine with bringing it to a close as well. If you're ready to be done, then I can either try to delete the thread on the new site, or y...
@"Hypericin" @"Michael" I have decided to move the discussion over to the new site in consideration of the fact that this site will be made read-only ...
I think there's a crucial equivocation running through your response that's worth surfacing, because it's doing a lot of the heavy lifting. You're rig...
Taking your points in order: The burden-shifting move here doesn't quite work. The question isn't whether we can talk about the world — of course we c...
I actually fully acknowledge the representationalism of the user-facing visualizations in Michael’s VR goggle-scenario. Likewise, I fully acknowledge ...
Yep, I mean this is how most people I know feel about philosophical debate in general. And to be honest, I often feel this way myself (especially afte...
I don't think it's hair splitting to contest your claim that qualia are the direct objects of perception, or to press the point that determinate objec...
I agree that the “problem of perception” is partially a problem of identity (who the subject is supposed to be). If the indirect realist says the imme...
Nope. I'm suggesting that insofar as someone posits a world in which nothing exhibits identity, persistence or modal stability, then perception as we ...
Again, what does it mean to “hear voices,” “see colors,” or “feel pain” in a world where nothing exhibits identity, persistence, affordance, or counte...
I’m much less certain about this than you seem to be. What does it even mean to say that we could perceive anything in a world where nothing meets the...
On godless subjective idealism: I think perception becomes very difficult to sustain without some ground for normativity — whether that's mind-indepen...
I don't think so. Take George Berkeley as an example. He's the paradigmatic subjective idealist, but he would not deny that perception is normative an...
This was something that was discussed at length earlier in the thread. The TLDR is that, on my view, perception is an intrinsically normative and publ...
Good question — and no, nothing in what I said guarantees that there will always be only one uniquely correct interpretation, at least not in any stra...
Yes, indeed. In fact, I think I mentioned the Pittsburgh School as a major influence in a previous response somewhere. Of the three you mentioned, McD...
Cheers! For me, the diversity (and fallibility) of thought is a reflection of our finite situatedness rather than a reflection of the unintelligibilit...
Not entirely. I think Braver is hitting on something important with his insight that reality can disrupt established conceptual frameworks. I also agr...
I hope you don't mind if I press you on this point a bit. Consider the statements: (1) Reality is chaotic (2) Being is not inteliigible How would you ...
True, but I'd argue that there is still an irreducible asymmetry at the bottom of inquiry. To re-quote Braver: So yes, the criteria are subject to int...
I agree that much of understanding is interpretive, but I think this actually sharpens the realist point rather than weakening it. Interpretation is a...
I'm not saying there is a contradiction, I'm saying that no good reason has been given for treating "experience" itself as the object of perception, w...
I think we’re actually very close here. I’m completely on board with the idea that intelligibility isn’t “added from outside,” and that the world is a...
I think there's a distinction being compressed here that's worth pulling apart. You're right that "knowable" implies a relation to a knower — nothing ...
I think you’re running together causal intermediacy with epistemic/intentional intermediacy. 1) Glass/fog/glasses don’t make perception “indirect” in ...
I don't think my view has trouble accommodating indirect awareness. I am indirectly aware of a crime scene through eyewitness testimony; indirectly aw...
Yes, we have now restated our divergence (once again): you see a vacuous terminological dispute, I see a substantive metaphysical disagreement. I thin...
This is the core of our disagreement, and I think it's worth flagging that it's a metaphor, not an argument. It pictures the mind as an enclosed space...
1) On "type coercion" and inference Your framing is interesting, but it assumes what needs to be argued. You say perception produces a perception, but...
I would want to say something stronger than this: that intelligibility is there to be discovered — that being is the kind of thing that can be underst...
Braver is interesting, and I think "transgressive realism" captures something phenomenologically real — the way experience can disappoint anticipation...
That's fair — "subjective" and "imposed" were poorly chosen on my part. Kant's categories aren't psychological or arbitrary; they're the universal con...
That’s a very fair critique, and I agree my “reality pushes back” phrasing can sound Popperian — as if there were a clean dualism between framework on...
I agree that deductive implication is a matter of semantics: to grasp validity is to grasp what is being said. But I don’t think that dissolves the no...
The difference is that Kant’s transcendental idealism isn’t just the claim that inquiry has conditions; it’s the stronger claim that the fundamental i...
I agree that validity is formal and conditional: logic doesn’t force assent unless one is already committed to the premises. But once one takes the pr...
I agree: the brain does all the metabolic work. I agree: without brains, no qualia. I agree: qualia can occur endogenously — hallucination, dreaming, ...
Whereas I see two mutually incompatible accounts of perception that both happen to reject naive realism — one reifying phenomenal character into an in...
Group B is not a single position. It contains at least two very different interpretations: B1 (your view): phenomenal qualities are inner mental items...
I think we directly perceive the distal object as colored and shaped. You seem to think we directly perceive colors and shapes (as mental phenomena) a...
On like and unlike types: Your reversibility argument is interesting, so let me engage with it directly. You say that in memory, the act and target ar...
I agree with the call for circumspection — but I don’t see circumspection as being at odds with metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism, at least i...
I think that’s a very clear statement of your stance, and I get the appeal: naturalism (or Neoplatonism) functions more like an orienting picture than...
Hart is using the word "normative" in a different way. To say reasoning is "normative" is to acknowledge the possibility of error. The distinction bet...
Good post. I think your argument is a bit overstated, but I agree with the spirit of what you've said. Philosophers overstep when they try to legislat...
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