Why say that we experience either? The story you are telling (and incidently it is just a story, not an argument) is a familiar one to me, it's just a...
Why? For me, the research is constrained to the fundamental case - the results from the fundamental case will have consequences for all cases based on...
My interest is in the fundamental metaphysics of the theory of vision that Klinko is outlining and whether it reveals any such thing as the "hard prob...
Well, it certainly is my opinion that John's mother is deceiving herself, and the mistake she is making is not taking seriously evidence that ought to...
This might be right, but care needs to be taken to understand where the mistake lies. Deceiving yourself that some proposition P is true (or false) do...
Even those who hold the view that all politicians lie probably do not find it acceptable that they should do so, so the deceiving politician can still...
"Red" is perhaps giving too much leeway to veer off the metaphysical point that Klinko is trying to hammer home. Let's go with "cadmium orange" instea...
But this is precisely the claim that needs arguing for, not assuming. You are telling a story about vision that may or may not lead to a hard problem,...
There is something wrong in being self-deceptive, one is doing something one should not be doing. Note that there is a difference between one person b...
As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) migh...
I think our disagreement, then, is that for me self-deception exists as I described, but does not involve lying to oneself if we consider lying to one...
That seems along the right lines to me. The "splitting of selves" approach (I think it goes by the term "psychological partitioning" in the literature...
But the direct realist usage conforms precisely to the main dictionary definition under which (in the example given on the link you gave) lips are red...
Self-deception - which I presume is the focus of this thread - is perhaps best not modelled on the binary relation of A deceiving B (even where A and ...
It depends what you mean by that question. Are you asking me whether I am a metaphysical realist about photons? If that is the question then the answe...
What I mean by "instantiation of red" is just "instance of red" i.e. a datable locatable occurence of a property. In that sense, mass is instantiated ...
And if I say, "Yes, red would remain in the absence of human beings" what is your argument to prove me wrong? Also let us get something clear, insofar...
Hello - yes, that's right: my position is that red is first and foremost a feature we discover, by sight, as part of the world. When I genuinely see a...
Regarding whether or not seeing a red snooker ball involves representation, my inclination is to say no. The red snooker ball is just there before me,...
Do you mean to say that there are things which 1) are the case and which could be known, but which 2) no one currently knows? I presume not, since tha...
You still have to convince your opponent that in cases (1) or (2) that there is any occurent instance of redness that a person is aware of when a pers...
That is the source of your confusion I think - the scientific perspective you are trying to adopt is incoherent. It requires on the one hand that red ...
If the only way to motivate a problem is to make unargued assumptions that lead to that problem, then there is good reason to be suspicious of the una...
In ordinary language 1) "if that were true, then I'm a monkey's uncle" and 2) "if that were a fact, then I'm a monkey's uncle" are pretty much equival...
In this statement lies the crux of the issue: At one and the same time you imply that "something is red" (i.e. the something I might see in the world ...
You'd need to read up on Quine's writings on ontological commitments and how to avoid them to get the details. Basically, Quine's idea was that the "i...
T: Trump=POTUS and P: POTUS=Trump. You talk about meaning being added by carrying out the change of position from T to P, so let us assume that meanin...
I've just been reading through the posts on this topic again and I think @"MetaphysicsNow" made a point you seem to be evading. The last definition of...
If I am missing a distinction of any importance it is not between a human seeing the colour red and a machine "measuring" electromagnetic radiation. T...
Agreed, but it is not the experience of seeing colour that the kind of account of vision SteveKlinko sketches threatens to remove from the world, but ...
The blog site is specifically targetted at the account of colour vision you sketched out and does not deal with dreams at all. As regards dreaming, th...
Appearance-talk, at least some appearance-talk, probably is derivative from is-talk, but I'm not sure that kind of ordinary language analysis does any...
If there is a distinction between propositional attitudes, on the one hand, and something's appearing visually to one to be a certain way, on the othe...
I don't think it is common knowledge, more like common jumping to conclusions. The picture you go on to paint in the subsequent part of your response ...
Perhaps you need to rephrase this, as we do not see radiation, we see coloured snooker balls and the like. "Red" is a label we give to a visible featu...
@"SteveKlinko" First, the research on visual cortical stimulation that I am aware of doesn't warrant such a claim to knowledge. For ethical reasons, t...
I think @"Wayfarer" probably hit the nail on the head, but also - although I do not think MN needs any help from me - simply to respond "No" to your q...
Yep, tom missed the point - but I cannot say I'm surprised. To be explicit, the issue is this: if I cannot distinguish between my seeing the redness o...
1) I see the redness of the snooker ball. 2) I consciously see the redness of the snooker ball. In what kind of circumstances could the truth of these...
I see MetaphyicsNow got there before me, but your question seems a little unfair since I don't believe you have really said anything substantive about...
Or perhaps better What is possible depends on what is actual. What is actual changes. Anything that depends on something that changes, itself changes....
So is the argument something along the lines of Possibility depends on actuality.. What is actual changes. Anything that depends on something that cha...
No, I'm suggesting that the phenomena modelled by the equations of a law such as the Bronsted Law of Catalysis have no currently settled quantum model...
@"tom"@"MetaphysicsNow" Ladies and gentlemen, place your bets for round 4 of tom v MetaphysicsNow. MN has a clear 3-0 lead (two knock outs in the so-c...
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