Metaphysician Undercover

I would say that in as much as people desire to be understood, they desire to be consistent. Plato, I think it is clear, had a desire to be understood...

This really does not address the issue. Your claim that you can sense change through a single sensation without the requirement of comparing a number ...

I think that premise 1 here needs to be justified. If you can explain how change can be sensed by one sensation, rather than needing a number of sensa...

He doesn't explicitly say he cannot "know", but if you think 'whatever seems right to me is right', is a description of knowing what "S" refers to. th...

Luke, we've been through this. He has no criterion, there is no such thing as "right". Therefore it is impossible that he could identify and "know" th...

I went through this. At 243 "private language" requires that what the words refer to is "known" to the user of the language. This is shown to be incoh...

Luke, I told you the way I feel about secondary sources. They are an invalid form of appealing to authority, because the only true authority is the au...

Clearly, at 270, "my blood pressure is rising" is not verified by others, so it remains a private principle. And if the individual refuses, it cannot ...

Thread still open?

I don't think we can make this conclusion about Platonic Forms, because Forms account not only for the existence of qualities, but also of types. So t...

Obviously, choice is a significant factor if we consider "private language" in any real way. The "private language" at 243 is fundamentally incoherent...

Read what is written! It is "I" who uses the manometer, and "I" who can then say 'my blood pressure is rising'. There is absolutely no public verifica...

Espousal does not require unreasonableness. But if the view espoused is unreasonable, that's another matter.

This is such a blatant misreading, I think it must be intentional. "I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatu...

Sure it gets "off the ground", keep reading, by 270 "S" has a use. The meaning of "S" cannot be known by the person. There is no disagreement between ...

Aristotle makes a separation between "Platonists", and "Plato". I even saw at one point where he referred to. "some Platonists". Your quotes are quite...

No it doesn't presuppose any such thing, it is the example at 258, where the person is establishing a use for the sign "S". The person privately devel...

That definition of :"language" at 7, is itself logically incoherent, by a fallacy of composition. It is incoherent to have the whole, and the parts wh...

Sorry Lujke, I don't follow your logic. What makes the "private language" described at 243 incoherent is the condition that the speaker "knows" what t...

You can take it as another condition if you want, that might be best way. Where's your proof of this? If a language consists of a multitude of languag...

I pretty much agree with all this. Where I disagree with you is in how you present this aspect of Platonism, as being "committed to certain Forms". Th...

Just like any logically incoherent proposal can have two conditions. That's why I presented the square circle example. In this example, the one alone ...

Let me reply to this in a way which might be more clear to you Luke. A person could have a language, which oneself does not know or understand the usa...

They don't want to be spammed. I'll wait to see your posts, try them one at a time.

Luke, the concept of "a private language" is incoherent from the outset, so there is no point in trying to determine what Wittgenstein means by "priva...

That is the second condition. You see the two as one, because you think that the second necessarily follows from the first. But the second does not fo...

This premise is the one shown to be incoherent, at 258. Remember, there is no "right" here, so a person using a private symbol cannot be said to "know...

Isn't the best answer to this question years of institutional education?

Of course there is another possibility. This possibility is that what you call "Plato's general framework", is not consistent with what Plato has writ...

Yes, the question Wittgenstein asks at 243, is can we imagine a language such as the one described . Do you see this question at 243? Wittgenstein is ...

Maybe you ought to reread this, starting at 596, Bk 10. "There are many beds and tables...But there are only two forms of such furniture, one of the b...

Yes I agree, but "known" is being used as indicated by258, as I explained. To know the sensation called S is to to be able to identify it and correctl...

What I tried to explain, is that I really don't agree with your way of conflating singularity and multiplicty within both, the thing measured, and the...

Right, that is what he is asking, if we can imagine such a language. Is it logically possible that a language which refers to inner sensations would m...

I can't grasp the comparison because a now is like a point, while a person is a thing. There;s a categorical difference here. A magnitude is anything ...

I don't know how one might split a now into a smaller now. Can you think of a way to split a point into a smaller point? I really don't understand wha...

This is highly doubtful. Before and after require the application of a 'now', and the 'now' divides the time so that it is not a continuity. Therefore...

Those are the exact words of the translation I am using. The complete passage is: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only...

You're misreading again Luke. The phrase "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" ;means only the person speaking can know what the wo...

What does magnitude have to do with "now"? The point was that Heidegger wrongly portrayed Aristotle's conception of the continuity of time as a contin...

You Luke, are the one not accepting "all of 243". You don't seem to recognize that 243 is asking a question, and that the question contains two parts....

I think that this is contrary to what Plato describes in The Republic. He says that when the carpenter makes a bed, as a material thing, he holds in h...

This is not really the case, because Aristotle distinguished two senses of "time", the primary sense as a tool of measurement, and a secondary sense a...

The problem which Aristotle demonstrated is the fundamental incompatibility between the two distinct ways of describing what you have named as "enduri...

I believe the separation between what you call "the vulgar conception of time", and the modern conception of time, is initiated by Hegel. He's the one...

You haven't been addressing anything I say, only tediously repeating that nonsense, so it appears there's no discussion here.

Luke you're being ridiculous, the quote from 256 is a reference to what was meant at 243. Do you think that 256 is referencing a different type of pri...

You're just being tedious Luke. He does mention "inner". "256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myse...

I suggest that you consider the passage in The Symposium in the following way. There is a separation described by Diotima between the good and the bea...

I can't believe how you stubbornly resist understanding something so simple. Words can refer to internal things or external things. That the proposed ...