Plato's Metaphysics
Plato’s metaphysics is not systematic. It is problematic. It raises questions it cannot answer and problems that cannot be resolved. It is important to understand that this is a feature not a defect or failure.
Plato’s concern is the Whole. Forms are not the Whole. Knowledge of the Forms is not knowledge of the whole.
In the Philebus, Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad.
These dyads include:
Limited and Unlimited
Same and Other
One and Many
Rest and Change
Eternity and Time
Good and Bad
Thinking and Being
Being and Non-being
Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.
Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.
And yet we do separate this from that. Thinking and saying are dependent on making such distinctions.
We informally divide things into kinds. Forms are kinds.
Forms are both same and other. Each Form is itself both other than the things of that Form, and other than the other Forms.
The Forms are each said to be one, but the Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, one and many.
The indeterminate dyad raises problems for the individuality and separability of Forms. There is no “Same itself” without the “Other itself”, the two Forms are both separable and inseparable.
Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms.
Things are not simply images of Forms. It is not just that the image is distorted or imperfect. Change, multiplicity and the unlimited are not contained in unchanging Forms.
The unity of Forms is subsumed under the Good. But Socrates also says that the Good is not responsible for the bad things. (Republic 379b)
The Whole is by nature both good and bad.
The indeterminate dyad Thinking and Being means that Plato’s ontology is inseparable from his epistemology.
Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought.
The limits of what can be thought and said are not the limits of Being.
Plato’s concern is the Whole. Forms are not the Whole. Knowledge of the Forms is not knowledge of the whole.
In the Philebus, Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad.
These dyads include:
Limited and Unlimited
Same and Other
One and Many
Rest and Change
Eternity and Time
Good and Bad
Thinking and Being
Being and Non-being
Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.
Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.
And yet we do separate this from that. Thinking and saying are dependent on making such distinctions.
We informally divide things into kinds. Forms are kinds.
Forms are both same and other. Each Form is itself both other than the things of that Form, and other than the other Forms.
The Forms are each said to be one, but the Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, one and many.
The indeterminate dyad raises problems for the individuality and separability of Forms. There is no “Same itself” without the “Other itself”, the two Forms are both separable and inseparable.
Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms.
Things are not simply images of Forms. It is not just that the image is distorted or imperfect. Change, multiplicity and the unlimited are not contained in unchanging Forms.
The unity of Forms is subsumed under the Good. But Socrates also says that the Good is not responsible for the bad things. (Republic 379b)
The Whole is by nature both good and bad.
The indeterminate dyad Thinking and Being means that Plato’s ontology is inseparable from his epistemology.
Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought.
The limits of what can be thought and said are not the limits of Being.
Comments (228)
It’s fascinating how much of that carries over to subsequent metaphysical renditions.
Just goes to show....humans haven’t changed that much, from then to now.
I think the first problem with that statement is that it ignores the fact that Plato's philosophy is primarily a way of life based on ethical values, the metaphysical justification for which (immortality of the soul, divine judgment in the afterlife, etc.) is clearly laid out in the dialogues.
Plato's metaphysical statements need not be "systematic" in the modern sense. The dialogues are not comprehensive philosophical treatises. A more detailed discussion of metaphysical questions could be carried out in the Academy for anyone interested.
There is nothing "problematic" about the Forms at all. They are comparable to universals. Particulars instantiate universals, but this doesn't mean that particulars and universals are one and the same thing.
There is no need for the Forms to be the Whole. It suffices for them to be steps leading to the Whole, or component elements by understanding which we understand the Whole.
And, of course, everything can be "problematic" if we want it to be. Take Marxist concepts like "the dictatorship of the proletariat" or "the withering away of the state" .... :smile:
I agree that it is a way of life. The question of the best life is of primary concern.
Where we disagree is that what you take to be a fact is not a fact but an interpretation. There are two different concerns here: how people ought to live and how I ought to live. The philosopher is not satisfied with what others say is the best way to live. She wants to figure that out for herself. Plato addresses both these concerns.
Metaphysics is not in the business of justification. It is free inquiry. It does not aim at a goal. But ethics involves persuasion. The story of the soul has proven to be very effective. But the philosopher asks whether it is true. Plato's metaphysics addresses the philosopher differently than he addresses others.
Quoting Apollodorus
The history of philosophy shows that 'universals' is not a problem free solution.
Metaphysics serves to form a theoretical framework through which the world is better understood and can be used to support ethics making it more persuasive. If you say that the Good is the first principle, this has a bearing on ethics.
Being a practical system, Ancient Greek philosophy focuses on living a righteous life. Metaphysical "problems" obviously come second.
Plus, if metaphysics "does not aim at a goal" and "is just free inquiry", then why worry about it not being systematic???
Quoting Fooloso4
There is no "problem free" philosophical system. In addition to the fact that Plato's system is more sketched than laid out in great detail, it is no worse than other 4th-century BC philosophies.
I will take issue with the term "indeterminate" used here. As Socrates describes in The Philebus, The combination of the two parts of what you call a "dyad", such as the limited and the unlimited, produces a balance, an equality, which constitutes an existing thing, a particular. I don't think there is good reason to believe that this equality is "indeterminate". Further, Socrates insists that there must be a cause of these instances of balance, or equality, and it doesn't make sense to say that a caused thing is indeterminate. Once a thing has been caused, it has a determined existence as the thing which it is.
This is exactly what I am arguing cannot be done. There is no theoretical framework for a world that is indeterminate.
Quoting Apollodorus
Not a worry. A statement of fact:
Quoting Fooloso4
If people believe in the Good as a higher principle and live their lives in harmony with what is good, then obviously it can be done. In fact, I think most people do something like that anyway.
Quoting Fooloso4
If it is not a worry then there is no need to discuss it. And you can always create your own system that is more systematic if you so wish.
Where in the Philebus does Plato say "indeterminate dyad"? And where does he say that it is a "problem"?
That the world is indeterminate is not a Platonic principle.
The term indeterminate dyad is Aristotle's. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In the Timaeus two kinds of cause are identified:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/601558
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not that it cannot be determined to exist. The intelligible world of Forms is fixed and determinate. What is unlimited cannot be determinate. It is without boundaries.
OK, if you want to switch to Aristotle's metaphysics, let's do that then. But why title the thread "Plato's Metaphysics"?
Quoting Fooloso4
Aristotle demonstrated that "the unlimited", as prime matter, is physically impossible.
Of course people can live lives that are regarded as good!
Quoting Fooloso4
More precisely: shit happens.
Quoting Apollodorus
There is a very good reason to discuss it. If there is no systematic account of the whole that is a very big idea. It points to the limits of human understanding. The limited cannot comprehend the unlimited. Know yourself!
I see. This reminds me of the other canard about Plato's supposed phrase "a noble lie" that of course is NOT Plato's phrase! :grin:
But it's good to see you admitting that "indefinite dyad" is Aristotle's term not Plato's.
And nor does Plato say that it is a "problem". It is YOU who says that!
It is not Aristotle's metaphysics, it is Aristotle discussing Plato's metaphysics.
Exactly. They can and they do!
Quoting Fooloso4
The limited may indeed be unable to comprehend the unlimited fully. But it may still comprehend some of it.
And of course, Plato says that the Good is knowable.
Perhaps you could provide a reference as to where Aristotle refers to Plato's metaphysics as being concerned with an "indeterminate" dyad. "Indeterminate dyad " appears oxymoronic to me, as a "dyad" consists of two defined terms, and therefore cannot be indeterminate. I haven't come across anywhere where Aristotle refers to Plato's metaphysics as concerning an indefinite dyad. Maybe you can point me in that direction.
One place is at 987b:
Also:
???????? ???? (aoristos dyas) is indeed in Metaphysics:
However, I think it is fair to say that, judging by past performance, “Fooloso4” is not only suggestive of “fool”, but it may be indicative of an agenda to “fool philosophers”. Therefore caution is advisable.
He has already admitted that "indeterminate dyad" is Aristotle, not Plato.
And he has still not produced any evidence of Plato's alleged phrase "a noble lie"! :smile:
At this point Aristotle explains how Plato differs from the Pythagoreans. Plato assumed a duality (dyad), of sensible objects, and ideas, as two distinct types. The Pythagoreans, Aristotle says, believed that all sensible things were composed of numbers, ideas,
Quoting Fooloso4
Here is an argument against the notion that a number is an object. If two is an object, it must be a distinct type of object from the two units which make up the two parts of the two. This makes two a different type of thing from one, and three would be a different type of thing from two, etc.. But in mathematical numbers, each number must be the same type of thing. This makes two, if it is an object, and the rest of the numbers if they are objects, something different from what mathematical numbers are supposed to be.
I think it is important to note that these are Aristotle's arguments against various proposals as to what kind of existence numbers have. There is no direct reference to Plato here, and the points listed by Aristotle, which he argues against, could very well be straw man points.
There is a good point made here by Aristotle. If a two is composed of two units, a three composed of three units, and four composed of four units, then these are all determinate, mathematical numbers. But fi two is itself a unit, then when four is composed of two twos, these two units are not mathematical units, because the four is only made up of two. And we cannot say what value these units have, so they are indeterminate. Two of these units together (these units could be numbers of any value) could produce any number whatsoever, hence two as an object is termed an indeterminate dyad.
I think it is obvious that in the Philebus Socrates (or Plato) simply introduces the principles of Unlimited or Infinite (apeiron) and Limited or Finite (peras) to explain how the construction of substances and qualities occurs according to the imposition of the Limited on the Unlimited.
This imposition cannot be random, it must happen by means of well-defined proportions, hence the third “Mixed” (meikte) principle that completes the "Triangle of Being" (or "Intelligible Triad"). This may be represented by a triangle with the angles Unlimited (A), Limited (B) and Mixed (C) where the latter is the apex. It is at this point that the Forms come into play. From this point, reality is organized by means of Forms which are manifestations of the Good.
A Form is the ideal Proportion, Ratio, or Measure whereby the two opposite principles, or “poles” of the continuum are combined to generate something that is beautiful, fitting, just, etc. The Good which is the principle of Goodness as well as the One is present in the Form which is at once unique and good, whilst also transcending it, in the same way the Form is at once present in and transcendent to, sensible particulars.
The Form of Triangularity, for example, is analyzable into the principle of Unlimited and the principle of Limited and their interaction which is Proportion or Measure. The Form is the ideal Ratio or Proportion that makes the ideal triangular shape that is instantiated to various degrees of perfection in all mathematical triangles and triangular objects.
In other words, it is Measure (metrike) that brings about numbers, geometrical magnitudes, speed, etc. that are discussed in the Republic as part of the mathematical education necessary as a preparation for dialectic, i.e. logic and philosophical inquiry proper.
Aristotle may discuss the “indeterminate dyad” for his own purposes but this is his problem not Plato's. Plato’s own position is perfectly logical and clear. There is nothing mysterious or “problematic” about it at all.
The problem is with number, but it is with number as understood by the Greeks, which is not the way we treat number.
Aristotle identifies three kinds of number:
Odd as it may sound to us, the Greeks did not regard one as a number. One is the unit, that which enables us to count how many. How many is always how many ones or units or monads that are being counted. Countable objects require some one thing that is the unit of the count, whether it be apples, or pears, or pieces of fruit.
Eidetic numbers are not counted in the same way sensible numbers are. Eidetic numbers belong together in ways that units or monads do not.
The eidetic numbers form an ordered hierarchy from less to more comprehensive.
In the Sophist the problem comes up of how to count the eidetic two.
To count rest, change, and being as three would be mistaken. Being is a higher order than rest and change. It is not a third thing to be counted alongside them.
The Stranger identifies five Kinds. In addition to change, rest, and being, there is sameness and difference (Sophist 254c)
Sameness and difference is the most comprehensive indeterminate dyad.
Contrary to Parmenides, the Stranger says that it is not possible to give an account of being without introducing non-being. Non-being is understood as otherness or difference.
There can be no comprehensive account of being without a comprehensive account of non-being. But what is other is without limit and cannot be comprehended. On the one hand this means that there can never be a comprehensive account of the whole, but on the other, it encourages an openness to what might be; beyond our limits of comprehension.
Plato’s statements should not be taken out of context. Of course there is an openness to things that are beyond our limits of comprehension. The whole point of Plato’s philosophy is to expand our understanding of the whole!
These so-called “problems” must be seen within the general system of principles in which the One or the Good is the ground of all knowledge.
This is why Plato urges the philosopher to strive to acquire direct knowledge of the One, not indulge in idle speculation about it.
A comprehensive account of the whole is impossible in ignorance of the One. Therefore the philosopher must rise to the perspective of the One where a grasp of the whole becomes possible. This is why Plato speaks of philosophy as “the upward way”, (ano odos), i.e. the way of vertical ascent (Rep. 621c).
See also:
Everything is a matter of perspective. Without the right perspective and attitude of mind there can be no comprehension and everything seems forever “problematic” ….
Correct.
It is absolutely imperative to understand that, as stated in the Republic, the purpose of mathematics as applied by Plato is not to lose ourselves in endless speculative calculations but to constantly elevate and refine our thoughts toward the One.
If we are saying that one is a unit, then we must put two and two (or one and one) together.
The Indefinite Dyad may be described as a principle of complexity through which the One manifests multiplicity. However, like everything derived from the One, the Indefinite Dyad also has an element of unity. Thus the Dyad becomes the Number Two which represents at once (1) two units (2 x 1) that make up the number, and (2) the number itself that is a unity.
As Aristotle says, Plato teaches that from the Great and the Small, by participation in the One come the Forms and the Numbers:
In other words, the "Mixed" (Meikte), the third principle of the "Intelligible Triad" (Noete Trias) that combines the Great and the Small or the Unlimited and the Limited, is the function of the One whereby the One imposes limitation on itself in order to manifest multiplicity from Forms to Mathematical Objects to the multitude of Particulars that make up the sensible world.
We have a multitude of different kinds of numbers as well, natural numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, to name a few.
Quoting Fooloso4
I don't see your point
I suspect that is a no parking zone.
With that important note out of the way, there is something very alluring about Plato's forms. I am not speaking of mathematics here, which I know is extremely important, but more so of ideas. The ideal horse or tree or river and down the line with all the objects we categorize.
In a modern-ish context, it could be said that we are born with certain ideas latent in the mind, which grow as we grow up, both as a biological creature and as persons. The idea would be that if there exist other creatures capable of thought, they would have these objects "in them", only waiting to come to fruition as they develop.
Of course, there's the overwhelming possibility that minded creatures may have a nature that differs from ours and thus would not have exactly the same conceptions we have, but similar. This cannot be proved and resides outside of science - not in principle - but in our limits of understanding we bring to bear when we encounter the world as we are.
It's a beautiful train of thought - on the whole - and could even be useful to develop further with modern day knowledge being used.
The temptation to Straussianize, Maimonidize, or Farabize Plato is understandable. But I think it must be resisted. I believe that Plato should be read on his own terms.
The One is Infinite or Unlimited. We may ask, Infinite or Unlimited what? Being, Life, Intelligence (Einai, Zoe, Nous). How can limited human intelligence grasp what has no limit?
Well, Plato tells us how. The only way of doing it is by letting go of whatever is limiting our intelligence, that is, concerns with limited and limiting things such as the body and other material objects and thoughts about them; by lifting our gaze upward; and by opening our heart, the eye of our soul, to the Light of the One, that it may flood, pervade, and take over our whole being and lift us from darkness to its infinite, ever-present, all-illumining, and life-bestowing radiance.
In other words, the Intelligence Plato is talking about, is no abstract concept! It is a live, living force, it is Life itself. Try saying “dead intelligence”. It doesn’t make sense! Intelligence IS Life and Life IS Intelligence. And because it is Life itself, not "my life", "your life", or “our life” but Life in its absolute, irresistible, brutal, and devastating totality that sweeps all individualism away, we cannot control or manipulate it, try to do so, or even think of trying.
Plato uses the dialogues to convey a unified metaphysical framework that is hierarchical and that leads from complexity to simplicity, culminating in the absolutely simple first principle of the One which is autoexplicable and unhypothetical, but also ineffable and unfathomable.
Being Goodness, the One also serves as the guiding principle in Plato’s ethics. So, the philosopher can start living an ethical life straight away, without waiting for a vision of the One that, at the end of the day, may or may not come.
However, Platonism is “the Upward Way”, the process of ascent to ever-higher levels of being and experiencing. Whilst we are living a righteous life, or as righteous as possible, Plato gives us something even higher to aspire to. He explains how the One creates multiplicity by first imposing limit on the unlimited, i.e., on itself, and then forming it into ideal building blocks that are harmoniously arranged to provide the ordered structure of the Cosmos.
This is all that can be said (for now) about the One because the One, as already stated, is beyond the grasp of the human mind. However, though beyond our grasp, the One is knowable to us. This is very important to understand and to always remember. Remembrance (anamnesis) in Platonism is absolutely essential. And there is One thing that must be remembered at all times, even when we are asleep.
The same applies to the Forms. Though normally beyond our grasp, they can be known. Indeed, the Forms are the very essence of cognition, they stand at the threshold of the Unmanifest to the Manifest, at the apex of the “Intelligible Triad”. And for Plato (as for Ancient Greeks in general) cognition is “seeing”. When we see something we see a “form” or “shape”. Hence “Form”, eidos, which means “that which is seen”, i.e., the form or shape of an object of sight, something that is “seen”, “grasped”, “understood”, or “known”.
To begin with, we can think about Forms. There is nothing wrong with that. And I am not talking about wild speculation or fantasizing. I am talking about cool, rational, methodical thinking along the lines suggested by the dialogues. Thinking about the Forms opens us up to the experience of them. The Forms lead us to the Good and knowledge of the Good leads to knowledge of the Forms.
Socrates says that the philosopher, i.e. the lover of wisdom or seeker after knowledge, can hit upon reality only by hunting down that reality alone by itself and unalloyed (Phaedo 66a).
The Forms are like the tracks of an animal we are hunting. Though we may have heard of it, we do not know the animal. All we see at first are clues that something has passed by through the forest: we notice changes in the behavior of other animals, we see broken twigs and leaves, trodden grass, etc. We may even hear some unfamiliar sounds in the distance, all pointing in the same direction.
Suddenly, we see prints left in the soil and something inexplicable happens within us. Our heart skips a beat, our hair stands on end, and deep down we know that we are on the right track. From that moment, we can no longer let go. As Socrates says, the philosophical quest “takes possession of our soul” (Phaedo 82d). We must follow the clues day and night. Eventually, though, after days, weeks, months or years, we see the animal itself and how it makes those prints. This enables us to fully understand the clues that led us to the quarry.
In his dialogues, Plato provides a description of the One, tells us what the tracks are that lead to the One, and gives us many other clues by means of myths, analogies, and logical arguments. I think we can hardly ask for more!
But the most important clue that Plato (or anyone else can give us) is the need of self-knowledge. Lack of self-knowledge means that we don’t know who or what we are. And this can only mean that we are not who or what we think we are! We must be something else.
As Plotinus says, to know ourselves we must know our Source: the human mind is a microcosm of the Cosmic Mind, the Supreme Intelligence and Ultimate Reality, and what we are hunting or looking for – or at least part of it – is already and always present within us. This is why we will never find it by looking for it in distant places, and even less by denying its existence.
What is at issue is not that there are different kinds of number, but what is different about the eidetic kind:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The point is that Being belongs to a higher intelligible order.
In the Timaeus, the qualities of Being and Becoming are starkly differentiated:
In the Theaetetus, the dyad of motion and rest is found to be insufficient to counter Protagoras' claim that 'man is the measure of all things.' Starting at 179c, an effort is begun to find an alternative to accepting the either/or of 'all things change' (as expressed by Heraclitus) against 'being never changes' (as put forth by Parmenides). As the dialogue proceeds, it is found that beings are encountered through the organs of perception but knowledge of those beings is different from perceiving them (186e). While that development puts Protagoras' claim to doubt, the problem of what knowledge is, in the realm of becoming, is not thereby resolved. The remainder of the dialogue tries out different explanations but finds none of them adequate to the challenge.
How does this sort of careful separation of different arguments relate to grand claims of explaining what is happening? It seems like Plato did both.
Isn't "one", by its very definition, a unit and therefore limited?
Quoting Fooloso4
I think that this is just like the modern difference between ordinal numbers and cardinal numbers, ordinals demonstrating an order, while cardinals count a quantity.
Quoting Fooloso4
Sure but if it's a higher order than rest or motion, how does this make it not simply a third category?
Also, remember that this is the position of "the Stranger" which is being expressed, not the position of Socrates or Plato, and usually Socrates ends up demonstrating how the positions of the others are faulty. So I would not attribute a lot of significance to what the Stranger says, as it's most likely just another form of metaphysics, popular in the day, which Plato is dismissing.
I agree. This is something I have said to you many times over the months!
And yet you say:
Quoting Apollodorus
Where does Plato say this?
If you are referring to what Gerson says, he says that according to the Platonic tradition, (not Plato) , the One imposes limit on the indefinite dyad, thereby producing Forms and Numbers. The One, according to this, does not impose a limit on itself, but on the indefinite dyad.
He also says that Plotinus rejected this because the One cannot be a principle of limitation. It is the Intellect that imposes limit on the One:
The last point is important. For Plato the Indeterminate Dyad is "an irreducible first principle of unlimitedness."
Quoting Apollodorus
Such stories may be inspiring and suitable for spiritual contemplation, but they should not be mistaken for Plato's metaphysics.
I think we agree that noesis is higher than dianoia, contemplation is important, as is the imagination, and that what is at issue is not an abstract intellectual exercise. However, in discussing Plato's metaphysics we cannot simply fly away to the land of One.
We spin our stories about things we do not know. You take the story you put together from other stories and take it for the truth.
Not necessarily. There is a difference between "unit" and "unity". The former refers to one among many, the latter to something that is one in the sense of simple or non-composite.
As unit, one is limited. As unity, it can be unlimited.
As usual, you are not paying attention. It isn't Gerson, it's Aristotle I am talking about. You started quoting him, did you not?
What I said is this:
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting Fooloso4
I think Plato says very clearly that the philosopher must rise to the source of everything and then draw conclusions about everything else in the light of that:
Basically, there are two kinds of people. Some try to make their way out of the cave to the world outside and some stubbornly insist that the cave is the only reality there is without even considering any other possibility. If you insist on belonging to the latter, that is your problem, not other people's :smile:
One of the first distinctions I learned in comparative religion was between monism and non-dualism. Monism posits a One, but a One can only exist in relation to another. So 'one' already implies 'two'. Whereas 'non-dualism' means 'not divided' or 'not two' - which is subtly but crucially different. (Consider that a footnote.)
Quoting Fooloso4
I think it's more that Plato is being looked at through the prism of Christian Platonism, which is difficult not to do. (Another footnote.)
I think another possibility is that there are similarities between Platonism and Christianity just as there are similarities between Platonism and Buddhism or Hinduism.
How would you look at Plato in such a way as to avoid all appearance of looking at him through a "Christian Platonist" prism?
More like @Fooloso4, and less like Apollodorus!
That said, I'm more drawn to the 'spiritual Plato' myself, and consequently find a lot of what you say congenial. But I think Fooloso4 does a good job of presenting what the dialogues do and don't say on their own merits and is clearly knowledgable about them. I'm also aware of my own lack of education in 'the Classics' (although I sometimes think had I had them beaten into me by the old school approach I would probably detest the whole subject.)
I do feel Folloso4's interpretation is lacking in some respects, but I don't feel obliged to try and set it right all the time. It's valuable to have a knowledgable contributor making such comments as it obliges me to think it through and also shows me very many interpretive points I never would have considered on my own reading.
My approach is more synoptic and thematic - there are particular ideas and themes that I'm trying to understand through the discipline of 'history of ideas', which is more like the approach employed by comparative religion than by the academic study of philosophy as such. And I will acknowledge that mine is an existential quest, not an academic one. Anyway, enough about all of that, this is a great thread, let's stick to the topic, I won't digress further.
Plato, Republic 7.527
That's a very good point. As Plato says, the ignorant multitude just can't think of anything outside the cave and insist on staying inside their little world of shadows ....
Plotinus may say whatever he pleases. It does not mean that Plato says it.
It is important not to confuse one author with another.
Besides, according to Plotinus, the One acts through the instrumentality of Intellect.
(A). The One acts through the instrumentality of Intellect.
(B). Intellect imposes limit on the One.
(C). Therefore the One imposes limit on itself (through the Intellect).
The Intellect is nothing but the Indefinite Dyad that is generated by the One!
In other words, (1) the One generates the Indefinite Dyad, (2) the Dyad is formed into Intellect, (3) Intellect in turn produces intelligible matter by manifesting the Forms that already exist in the One.
Pretty elementary IMO.
This is why I quoted Aristotle (Meta. 978b), above, which Plotinus himself quotes in support of his interpretation of Plato.
Quoting Fooloso4
That's not what the text says. Are you sure you can read?
At first glance, prima facie, I thought dyads were opposites (one and many, same and other, good and bad, being and non-being, limited and unlimited) and then these (thinking and being, rest and change, eternity and time) come along to disrupt the yin-yang pattern unless...thinking is non-being or being is unthinking and change is regarded as motion and eternity is timelessness.
Raises some interesting possibilities:
1. Thinking = Non-being & Being = Unthinking.
[quote=René Descartes]Cogito ergo sum [I think. Therefore, I am (being)][/quote]
2. Is change = motion? There seems to be something fundamental about movement. Is it the examplar of change or does it carry a deeper meaning in that all change is motion?
3. Eternity = Timelessness. In a sense, yes; after all, if something is eternal, time is meaningless for that thing. To live forever is to, in a sense, be outside of time.
Indeed the whole defies predication (is indeterminate) for it is, as an example, both "this and not this" and on pain of contradiction, necessarily that we must divvy up the whole into parts but then we're no longer talking about the whole.
:joke:
Well, I don't accept any of this. I see no reason why a "unit" must be one among many, and not just a defined "whole", without the need for others to validate the definition. And I see no possible way that "unity" could be unlimited, as necessarily limited by that which unites.
Quoting Wayfarer
As above, in the case of "unit", I do not agree that One implies two. "One", as commonly defined (as distinct from mathematically defined), is a fundamental unity, an individual, a whole. To describe, or define a unity, individual, or whole, does not require reference to others. It is only when "one" is defined as referring to the first, in an order, or succession, that there is a second implied. This is the mathematical way, based on "ordinals". But in this definition the second is not actually necessary, it is implied as possible, the possibility of something following the first. In other words, the position of the first is defined by allowing for the possibility of followers, and it does not require actual followers.
We discussed this issue in another thread on the difference between cardinal numbers and ordinal numbers. Modern mathematical theory derives cardinals from ordinals, so the primary definition of "number" places "one" as having a position in an order, thereby implying others. But this does not make "one" refer to a unit, individual, or whole, because that requires a different definition. It makes "one" refer to a position in an order.
But if this is the case, then "one" is not a unit, or individual, but a place, and we cannot truly derive the cardinal numbers in the way that mathematicians do, because they count these places as if they are objects, when by definition they are not objects but places. In reality therefore, cardinal numbers cannot be derived from ordinal numbers, because the two rely on distinct definitions of "number".
I understand your concern. However, the issue arose from your previous objection:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"One" as unit, i.e, one among other units, is indeed limited.
"One" as a whole consisting of parts would be many and therefore limited.
"One" as unity, in the sense of simple or non-composite, need not be limited.
Indeed, Plato says quite clearly that the One is not a whole consisting of parts and that it is "unlimited" (apeiron). This is precisely why there is nothing else like the One.
And unfortunately, we can't go against the text!
The ordinal numbers are orders of numbers. It applies to anything that is ordered in some way as first, second, third.
Eidetic numbers are relations of eidos or Forms. Their order is determined by kind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you are counting categories then it is a third, but what is being counted are Forms at some level of order. Rest, Change, and Being are not at the same level of order and so are not counted together.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are making a lot of assumptions about the Stranger.
Why would Plato write this long, detailed, difficult dialogue if the point is to just to dismiss the Stranger?
What the Stranger says should not go unquestioned, but what Socrates says should not either.
Right, and Plato's metaphysics must address both sides of this differentiation. On way side there is the vertical order of Forms. On the other side, the order of beings. The order of intelligible being is timeless and unchanging, the order of beings is changing and indeterminate.
Quoting Valentinus
This gets back to the radical openness of Plato's metaphysics. There is always what is other and outside whatever account is being given.
The indeterminate dyad is two, and yet is together with its Other, the One, in unity and divisiveness, sameness and difference.
Such a sense of "One" is definitely limited. If it was not limited there would be nothing to maintain its status as simple or non-composite. That is a limitation, whatever prevents it from being a mixture.
Quoting Apollodorus
I never saw a clear and coherent definition of "the One" in Plato, perhaps you could show me where this is stated. Nevertheless what I did see stated about the One seemed confused and incoherent, so I tend not to agree with it. I have the same problem with what Plotinus said about the One, though it seems much clearer than what Plato said, it still appears to me to be inconsistent.
Quoting Fooloso4
So eidetic numbers look very similar to ordinal numbers to me, as an ordering of Forms. Numbers are Forms, and orders are relations. Differences of "kind" is insufficient for determining an order, because relations between the kinds is what order is.
Quoting Fooloso4
I don't see how you can justify this claim. What puts being at a different level from rest and change?
Quoting Fooloso4
Have you not read many Platonic dialogues? That's what he did with them. He wrote long difficult dialogues to show the faults of, and dismiss the views expressed by the people taking part in the dialogues.
You seem to be very fond of the word “indeterminate” even though it is very rarely used by Plato.
And you still haven’t explained what your actual point is.
You have told us that:
“Being belongs to a higher intelligible order than rest or motion”.
“Eidetic numbers are relations of eidos or Forms. Their order is determined by kind.”
“If you are counting categories then it is a third, but what is being counted are Forms at some level of order. Rest, Change, and Being are not at the same level of order and so are not counted together.”
Of course Being comes first as it consists of “all moving and immovable things” (Sophist 249d), for which reason it blends with Rest and Change but the latter do not blend with one another.
Therefore, it may be said that Being is a Kind (Genos) that is followed by Subkinds (Rest and Change) followed by Changeless Things (Forms), followed by Changing Things (Particular Instantiations of Forms), etc. On its part, the One from which Being is derived is above being.
So, we have three levels of reality: (1) the One above Being, (2) Intellect and Forms which represent Being, and (3) the sensible world of Becoming.
In any case, it’s a well-known fact that Plato’s metaphysics is a hierarchy. Its technical details may or may not be debatable. But its general structure, which is what really matters and which needs to be grasped first, has nothing mysterious about it.
I agree that we should not agree with things that are confused and incoherent.
However, the critical question is how the world of multiplicity, expressed as the gradations of Being, arises from the absolute One.
Plato suggests the three principles or functions of the One, viz., (1) Unlimited, (2) Limit, and (3) "Mixed". Limit imposes limitation on the Unlimited, and the Mixed uses the other two in order to "shape" the substance of the One into Ideal Intelligible Objects (Forms).
The One, the Supreme Intelligence, by means of the Unlimited and Limit, becomes the Universal Intellect (Nous Kosmou) that organizes Unmanifest Intelligence into classes of Forms, Individual Forms, and Particular Instantiations of Forms, bringing about the multiplicity of the world of manifestation.
In other words, Intellect is nothing but Unformed Intelligence “shaped” by the Forms which are its objects. Without Forms, there is no Intellect and no cognition. There is just "blank" Intelligence or Awareness. This is why the Forms are the very essence of cognition, the One (the Good) being their ultimate source.
And “unity” with reference to the One is in the sense of "henad" (henados), i.e., opposite of multiplicity. This particular "unity" or "henad" is unlimited.
The One is unlimited (apeiron):
The One is creative, all objects of knowledge deriving from it:
Unfortunately, in order to better understand Plato, we sometimes need to turn to Aristotle, Plotinus, and other authors to fill the lacunae. But, whatever we do, we cannot go against Plato's text. Sometimes it is preferable not to know something than to make things up ....
Makes perfect sense to me.
[quote=Terry Eagleton] God and the universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot constitute a pair of objects.[/quote]
There is a lot more to the dialogues than Socrates pointing out the weaknesses of the arguments of others.
I do not think it is a case of Plato dismissing the views of others, but of you dismissing the dialogues of Plato.
In "The Sophist", the stranger, from Parmenides' school, is of the opinion that there is a difference between, a sophist, a philosopher, and a statesman, as three distinct intellectual capacities. What is demonstrated by Plato, is that the stranger, who thinks of himself as a philosopher, really behaves in the way that he describes a sophist. So the stranger is therefore the sophist, the namesake of the dialogue.
Why else is the dialogue called "The Sophist"?. It is clear that Plato is not supporting what the stranger is arguing, as the dialogue is presented as an example of the sophistry coming from the Eleatic school.
I don't understand the basis for calling the Stranger a Sophist. Can you point to one of the arguments he makes by way of example?
The same Stranger speaks in the dialogue of Statesman. Are you suggesting that dialogue is also an example of 'sophistry?'
Is he mistaken in his opinion? If not, then what is the difference? Why is there a dialogue the Sophist and a dialogue the Statesman, but no dialogue the Philosopher. Where is the philosopher? Are they three?
In the third dialogue of the trilogy, the Theaetetus, the sophist Protagoras plays a role through his claim that man is the measure of all things. Since Protagoras was dead Socrates plays the part of the sophist (165e). The Stranger too plays a part in the dialogue.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Have you noticed how often Socrates' behaves like a sophist? Aristophanes was not simply mistaken when he called Socrates a sophist.
What is it about a sophist that you think means he must be wrong? The sophists were not all the same, to simply to be dismissed. Their arguments must be attended to, as Socrates did. It should also be noted how often Socrates incorporates parts of what the sophists he is arguing with say.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He was, as you said, from Parmenides' school. It was not a school of sophists.
That’s a very good point.
I think it is instructive to note that Plato’s detractors often resort to arguments that Plato himself would have rejected as arguments employed by Sophists, not by genuine philosophers. Sophists, of course, deny the existence of the Forms, and in particular, of the Good. Therefore, their arguments, well-crafted though they may be, lack real substance.
More generally, the reason why some Plato readers lose track of Plato’s narrative is that they fail to pay attention to the general structure of Plato’s metaphysics or ethics and tend to become lost in a labyrinth of unexamined assumptions.
They fail to see that Plato has a larger picture in mind and as a result they cannot understand the inner logic of his system. Instead of taking Plato’s teachings as a whole, they get bogged down in discussions about details and deny that he has a system or even a philosophy!
If we think about it, Plato's students would have had some general knowledge of his teachings before attending his classes. They would not have started from scratch and certainly not from unconnected details.
IMO the correct approach is to first acquire a reasonable grasp of the larger Platonic picture, and then see how the details combine with each other to fit the whole.
This doctrine may not be worked out in every single detail, but I think that where Plato leaves a question unanswered, he does so for two reasons, either (1) the issue is less important to his bigger picture than it seems, or (2) he wants us to do some thinking and fill in the gaps ourselves, always of course, following the larger picture.
To begin with, Plato’s doctrine is hierarchical. It begins with the observation that ordinary, unphilosophic man is unable to see the truth, or himself, because his vision is blurred and deceptive and his thought lacks order and is confused. The only solution is to organize our thinking and look upward, beyond and above appearances.
This is why Plato refers to philosophy as “The Upward Way”. The Platonic Way is an upward journey from the lowest to the highest levels of knowledge, that passes through several stages: (1) opinion, (2) belief, (3) reason, and (4) intuition or insight.
(1). Eikasia, fancy, illusion, or conjecture. This is the stage of ordinary man who lives in an illusory world of conjecture, unexamined opinion, and habitual patterns of thought and behavior.
(2). Pistis or faith. At this stage the would-be philosopher begins with a more structured worldview based on reasoned belief in the immortality of the soul, afterlife, divine beings, and divine judgment in the afterlife that results in a happy or unhappy existence in the other world in accordance with one’s conduct on earth. The deities at this stage are the Olympian Gods of established Greek religion.
From the above, there follows an ethical system that revolves on happiness, goodness, and justice: in order to be happy not just momentarily but in the long term, including in the afterlife, man needs to be good and just. In order to be good and just in relation to his fellow citizens and to himself, he needs to cultivate the four virtues of self-control, courage, wisdom, and righteousness.
Up to this point, the philosopher has inhabited the world of sensible objects where thought was based on sensory perception. This is now left behind and the philosopher enters the intelligible world of pure thought.
(Plato’s Analogy of the Divided Line given in the Republic (509d–511e) illustrates the continuum of knowledge by a line divided into two main sections representing the Sensible and Intelligible World, respectively. However, the two are not to be understood as literally separate and independent but logically divided into classes of reality.)
(3). Dianoia or reason. The cultivation and practice of virtues having resulted in a purification of the soul and a clear intellect, this is further developed and refined through the study of mathematical disciplines in a philosophical sense, which results in a greater capacity of abstract thought.
At this stage the philosopher’s perception of the world is not only mathematized and abstracticized but also spiritualized. The focus shifts from the Olympian Gods to the impersonal Planets which are seen as ensouled bodies among which the Sun occupies a central role. Indeed, the whole Cosmos is to be seen as a living being endowed with soul and intelligence.
The soul being the intelligent part of man, looking on heavenly bodies as having a soul is a step toward looking on intelligence (nous) as the underlying substratum of the universe.
(4) Episteme or knowledge. Finally, having passed through the preliminary stages, the philosopher can now turn his attention to higher forms of knowledge, or knowledge proper that has Forms, etc. as its objects, using his faculty of intuition, insight, and contemplation (noesis). The Deity at this stage is the One in its aspect of Creator God (Demiurge) or Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos).
So, we can see that, though Plato’s dogma is not presented in a strictly systematic manner, with a little reflection the reader’s mind can systematize it in thought without much difficulty.
The Platonic Way is a process of gradual elevation of human thought from the most primitive or unconscious to the most evolved or conscious, culminating in a direct experience of nothing less than the very source of all knowledge and all thought, the “Ineffable One”.
The key to the successful completion of the journey is a clear understanding of the need to constantly transcend lower forms of thought and ascend to the next-higher level to the very end.
And the first step on this long journey is to dislodge our intellect and our entire psychology from ordinary, unexamined, and unphilosophical patterns of thought, behavior, and experience tied to material things, and literally, as Socrates says, turn around and turn our gaze upward.
It must also be said that, though there is a general tendency to dismiss some of Plato’s statements as “myth”, it is important to understand that (1) speaking mythically about something does not make it "mythical", and (2) nothing in Plato is accidental or superfluous. His whole narrative serves the specific purpose of providing the reader with the intellectual framework or ladder necessary for the ascent.
In contrast, the Sophist uses elaborate arguments, including superficially convincing ones, to claim that there is no higher goal, no means of attaining it, and no need to even think of leaving the cave ....
Point to an example of that.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates refuses to trash talk Parmenides because Socrates had met him when he was young and had witnessed his sincerity. That is a clear reference to Plato's dialogue of Parmenides where the theory of Forms is critically examined. The Sophist makes more sense as the continuation of that review rather than a caricature of what to avoid.
Socrates asks the stranger at the beginning, about the difference between engaging others in the discussion, and simply making a long speech. The stranger claims to respect this distinction. But the entire dialogue turns out to be a long speech made by the stranger. Sure, the stranger pretends to engage Theaetetus in the discussion, but it's really only to ask him to agree at certain points, it's never to ask for his opinion. You can read the dialogue without paying any attention to what Theaetetus says, and it reads like a big long speech from the stranger. So this is just a pretense, to engage Theaetetus, and that is one of the things the stranger says a sophist is, an imitator.
Further, there is throughout the dialogue, many subtle indications that Plato (in writing the dialogue) is having the stranger do exactly the things that he says are characteristic of the sophist. For example, at 254, the stranger says "The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not...". Then, by the end of 256 the stranger is talking about "that which is not"... "So it has to be possible for that which is not to be..."
Remember, what is stressed over and over again throughout the dialogue, is that the sophist is hard to catch, appearing just like a philosopher, but really a poser, a pretender. The dialogue has to be read very carefully to see that Plato is portraying the stranger as a sophist, pretending to be a philosopher.
Another indication is that the stranger is not named. The Eleatic school was highly regarded by the Greeks, and respected even by Socrates. Plato could not name a member of the school, and portray him as saying the things which the stranger says, because none of them would have actually said those things the way Plato presented them, so he'd be guilty of libel. The stranger from Elea is presented in a way which is less than flattering, as a sophist, and this is a serious attack on the Eleatic school, so it is disguised. As such, you might say it is itself a work of sophistry. Nevertheless, Aristotle later continued with this attack, more openly.
Quoting Fooloso4
It's not that he is mistaken in his opinion, but the stranger behaves in a way which he himself says is the way of the sophist. In other words, Plato has the stranger describe what a sophist is like, while the stranger is behaving in the described manner.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes, as the stranger says, it is very difficult to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist, so just as the sophist appears like a philosopher, the philosopher will appear like a sophist. The way that they differ is that one is a pretender, an imitator.
One of the key differences mentioned is what I said above, that the sophist hides in the concept of "that which is not". It is a common ploy of sophists, mentioned by Aristotle, to produce a dichotomy of being and not being, that which is, and that which is not. Once this dichotomy is produced, there is no place for becoming, which is neither being nor not-being. This is the result of adherence to the law of excluded middle. From this platform, the sophist can "prove" all sorts of absurdities.
Quoting Fooloso4
Unlike philosophy which has one goal, described as a true desire to know, sophistry works toward many different ends. That's why "sophists were not all the same". But since it works toward an end, and that end is not true knowledge, as is the case with philosophy, the sophists arguments are designed toward proving whatever is seen as conducive to the end. The end is what Plato called "the good".
Quoting Fooloso4
That is your opinion. The question is whether it was Plato's opinion or not. Notice my quote above, from 254, where the stranger says that the sophist runs off and hides in "that which is not". Doesn't Parmenides' school have a lot to say about "that which is not"?
Absolutely. As clearly indicated by the title, the Sophist is about sophistry.
The serious reader of Plato should by now have sufficiently refined his intellectual abilities to perceive the subtle (and sometimes plain obvious) differences between Socrates and the Stranger.
The Stranger is a fake philosopher and a second-class imitation of Socrates.
Of course, both genuine philosophers and sophists use similar techniques of argument, which is the point Plato is making.
However, there are crucial differences. For example, the sophists' sole concern is to "win the argument" regardless of truth. They use argumentation "to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger" which is contrary to reason and to philosophy, i.e., inquiry into truth.
Another striking difference that ought to be pretty obvious is that Socrates’ philosophy serves a higher purpose which is to attain a vision of the Good, whilst the Stranger’s sophistry is for its own sake.
In sum, we can see why they refuse to answer the perfectly legitimate question as to why Plato calls the dialogue "The Sophist" (O Sophistes): an honest answer would demolish their case and would leave them without a leg to stand on!
This is why they are trying to turn Plato on his head and construct Socrates as the "sophist" and the Stranger as the "philosopher". Needless to say, an attempt doomed to failure from the start .... :smile:
This is an important point. Plato came across the importance of "the good" in his attempts to understand the reality of ideas. In The Republic, "the good" is described as that which makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun is what makes visible objects visible. We can say :the good" is the reason for the intelligibility of intelligible objects.
Aristotle then proceeds with a much better definition of "the good". "The good" is that for the sake of which, "the end", as what is intended.
In seeking philosophical knowledge it is of the highest importance that "the good", meaning what is sought, the end, (in Aristotelian terms), or that which illuminates the ideas making them intelligible to the person (in Plato's terms), is real understanding, and truth. Without this true goal of real understanding, any goal, such as financial gain, honour, the pride of vanity, etc., might take the place of the true goal, real understanding, and serve to illuminate ideas as intelligible, instead. And the ideas which serve such goals, though they are highly intelligible to a person who has that goal, will not be intelligible to the person who has the highest, true goal of real understanding.
This is the position of the sophist. The sophist has some goal, a good, which is other than the goal of truth and real understanding. So the principles which the sophist argues appear to be highly intelligible to anyone else who has a similar goal. But these principles are seen as unintelligible to anyone looking for the real good, the true goal of real understanding. Therefore Aristotle proposed a distinction between the real good, and the apparent good.
The philosopher appears to be what he is not. If the Stranger is a philosopher then he may appear to be what he is not. It is only by successfully identifying the philosopher that we can identify the imitator.
The Stranger proposes that begin with the sophist. He warns them against doing the very thing you are doing:
The Stranger's concern is with Kinds, with what is same and different. The limits of his approach is found in the Statesman:
The Stranger's method abstracts from value, it treats such differences as the same. His concern is not Socrates' concern for the good. But this does not mean he should simply be dismissed as a sophist. If the search for the good is the mark of philosophy then Socrates would be the first philosopher. He was not.
As Socrates said, the class of the philosopher is not the class of the gods. Philosophy is never complete. It is dialogical. Rather than dismiss the Stranger, the investigation of the dyad same and other is part of the quest for truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It does. The Stranger is identified as a member of that circle. (216a) How do we reconcile Parmenides' denial of not-being with the Stranger's affirmation? The solution is in the dyad 'same and different' or 'same and other'. In this case, what is and is not being.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you maintain the distinction between being and becoming then you maintain the distinction between being and not-being. As you say, becoming is not being.
The Stranger reaffirms the Parmenides denial while presenting the dyad of 'same and different' during the discussion of false statements:
The Eleatic Visitor has only conceded that language can deceive when used a certain way. He has not overturned the school of Parmenides.
But the stranger appears to be a philosopher, he doesn't appear as a sophist. The question is whether he really is a philosopher, or a sophist.
Quoting Fooloso4
To treat differences as the same is sophistry to me. It is contradiction.
Quoting Fooloso4
It is very clear from Plato, that he believes that the search for the good is the mark of philosophy. Also, it is clear that Plato did not believe that Socrates was the first person ever to have concern for the good.
Quoting Fooloso4
Being concerned with "that which is not" is the mark of a sophist (254).
Quoting Fooloso4
In the context I was using it, "not-being" was a shortened form of "that which is not". Here, you use "not being" to indicate something which is other than being. "Becoming is not being". Equivocation is a tool of the sophist.
Exactly. The Stranger is the “philosopher” who will be exposed as a sophist! Hence the title.
Correct. This is how the sophist is easily identified and exposed.
Plato states that the greatest lesson (megiston mathema) is the Idea of the Good (Rep. 505a). He also tells us why: the Forms that make up the Intelligible World which is the real world, can be fully understood or known only by knowing the Good.
Plato draws a clear line between (1) mathematicians who use discursive thinking (dianoia) and take as hypotheses their definitions and axioms and (2) true dialecticians who have full understanding (noesis) or true knowledge (episteme) of the Forms after ascending to the first unhypothetical principle, viz. the Good (Rep. 510b).
He later reiterates that the dialectical method is the only process of inquiry that rises above hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there” (Rep. 533c).
The Stranger himself says:
I think it is clear that if any of the two “pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness”, i.e. for the right purpose and using the right means, it is undeniably Socrates, not the Stranger.
The Stranger identifies the Socratic, i.e. the genuine philosophical school, as the "friends of the Forms" (oi philoi ton eidon) (Sophist 248a).
Obviously, the only way he can attack the genuine philosophers is by shifting the debate from the reality of that which is (the Forms) to that "which is not". As history shows, it was Socrates' teachings that ultimately won. Indeed, why would anyone believe in that which is not?
The question of whether he is a sophist or a philosopher cannot be adequately addressed until the question of who the philosopher is has been answered. But:
we have not, despite the claims being made about the philosopher, answered that question.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then we are all, including the philosopher, sophists. Five apples are five whether they are red or green or yellow. Unless we want a particular color apple we treat that difference as the same.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Which of the pre-Socratic philosophers make the good the focus of their philosophy?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And yet Plato is evidently concerned with "that which is not".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is the context in which it is being used in the dialogue that is at issue. The way the Stranger uses it.
If the question of who the philosopher is, is answered, then the question of who the sophist is no longer arises.
And since you have not answered the first question, you have not adequately addressed the other question which is the same as the first question .... :smile:
Quoting Fooloso4
If the solution is in the dyad, then the problem has been solved. And it has been solved by Plato who wrote the dialogue!
Quoting Fooloso4
The point is that the Stranger exposes himself as a sophist by using distinctions and other things borrowed from Socrates for his own agenda which is “to win the argument”. But of course he has NOT refuted the Theory of Forms, which is the critical point.
Therefore the Stranger has failed to defeat the genuine philosopher.
Plato’s classification of things, for example, is not as mysterious as some are claiming.
His Theory of Forms is not (pace Strauss) “very hard to understand”, “utterly incredible”, or “absurd”. The human mind has a natural tendency to look at things in a way that unifies separate entities into categories in order to provide ordered relations within a harmonious and meaningful whole. This enables us to process reality in ways that are essential to life. The Forms reflect the mental processes that make things “intelligible”. As such they are the very essence of cognition and the basis of “intelligibility”. Hence their utmost importance in Plato’s scheme.
According to Plato we can see reality as it is only by bringing our sense-perceptions, emotions, and thoughts in order and acquiring an ordered perception of the world within us and outside us.
In the same way our own intelligence keeps our mental and emotional processes in harmonious working order, Plato says that the universe itself is ordered by a higher intelligence:
Plato also tells us that his view merely “confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind always rules the universe” (30d).
And because there are these two intelligences, one in the world we live in and one within us, it makes sense to try to establish a connection between them, and for the lower, human intelligence to endeavor to learn about the higher, universal intelligence.
Moreover, in order to understand, and eventually obtain direct knowledge of, the higher intelligence, we need to learn how to think about the world and perceive it in as ordered a way as we possibly can. In other words, we must make our mind as much like the Cosmic Mind as possible.
By understanding the world, the philosopher comes to understand the intelligence behind the universe which is the ultimate source of all intelligences.
In contrast, the sophist, anti-Platonist, or antiphilosopher, makes no attempt to rise above his own sophistry.
The text of that passage is:
Aristotle appears to be referring directly to this part of the Sophist during his explanation for why there can be no science of 'accidental' being:
The passage connects to both the distinguishing between kinds and the use of 'same and different' being discussed in the dialogue. This also points to the indeterminacy being discussed in the OP since Aristotle argues that without accidental being, every thing that occurs would happen by necessity.
Aristotle also frames the matter of sophistry as a bait and switch operation:
In this context, the role of the Sophist as a whole dialogue can be sought after. In what way does it impart the art of the philosopher?
Thank you.
Excellent question! Seeing in what way it does puts the dialogue in its proper perspective.
Of course it is the whole dialogue that matters. The question as to who the philosopher or sophist is is secondary, especially in view of the fact that the attempt to construct Socrates as the sophist has failed.
What Plato is doing in the dialogue is to show that logical argumentation can be used by philosophers and sophists alike and that both can advance arguments that contribute to the discussion
However, we must not forget that, at the end of the day, the writer is Plato, and what really matters is Plato's teachings. On the whole, the dialogue does not contradict what Plato says in earlier dialogues.
For example, philosophers are said to be "divine", they "look on the life of men from a higher region", they "devote themselves through reason to the Idea of Being", etc. (Soph. 216c; 254a-b).
No we don't necessarily treat them as the same. "Five" to me, implies five distinct and different objects. They cannot all be the same or else there would not be five but only one. It's only if you think of "five" as implying five of the same, "ones", that you treat the different as the same. But that way involves contradiction, because there cannot be five of the same thing.
Quoting Fooloso4
Many of the ancient myths which Plato refers to are concerned with the good. The difference between good and evil has been an issue for thousands of years.
Quoting Fooloso4
I know, that's the point, the stranger switches meaning, equivocates, because the stranger is a sophist.
Quoting Valentinus
I don't think The Sophist as a Platonic dialogue was intended by Plato to "impart the art of the philosopher", I think it was meant to expose the Eleatics as sophists rather than honest philosophers. That's what I've been arguing. The stranger is an anonymous person from that school, who is portrayed as behaving in a way which is consistent with his description of how a sophist would behave. So what is imparted is a lesson, by way of example. Imagine if there was a dialogue where a person described what it was to be racist, and in the process of that description demonstrated themself to be just like the description.
The "art of the philosopher" would be to see through the stranger's disguise, and see him as the sophist which he is. So the lesson to be learned from Plato here, is that the sophist is well disguised, and the logical arguments of sophistry may appear infallible, but the sophist is best revealed as a hypocrite, behaving in a way which he would say is not a good way to behave.
The visitor's use of "kinds" is the chief indicator that he practices sophistry. We might call this the theme of The Sophist. That mode of argumentation, which is to divide things into kinds, is extremely defective, and is actually just sophistry. This is because the division of a kind into further kinds may be extremely subjective, arbitrary, or done solely for the purpose of bringing about a particular desired conclusion.
The evidence that this is sophistry is thus. Socrates asks the stranger if he recognizes philosophers, sophists, and statesmen, as three distinct kinds. The stranger says yes, these are three distinct kinds. However, throughout the stranger's discourse, we see that each of the three shares characteristics of each of the other. So such a division of kinds is really just random, or proposed for a purpose, of producing a desired conclusion.
This fact is further demonstrated by our discussion here, some of us say that the visitor is a sophist, and some of us say that the stranger is a philosopher, and neither of us is truly correct, because such a division of kind is not a true division. We say he is a sophist (he is of that kind) for the sake of discrediting his argumentation. Fooloso4 says he is a philosopher, for the sake of claiming that Plato is supporting the metaphysics he professes. In reality though, Plato is demonstrating that this form of argumentation, to divide things into "kinds", the various kinds being created solely for the purpose of the argument, is a very defective form of argumentation.
Any close examination of the proposed "kinds" will show that the divisions are defective. As demonstrated by the dialogue, the division between sophist, philosopher, and statesman, is an untenable division. And if we look at some of the other divisions which the stranger proposes, hunting, angling, trading, etc., we'll see the very same problem. Many instances cross the proposed boundaries, and the divisions are just created for the sake of producing the desired conclusion. Close examination, and understanding of the proposed kinds, and boundaries is required to expose the deficiencies. those deficiencies are what we've come to know through the existence of category mistakes.
This form of argumentation is what supports the stranger's metaphysics. The deficiencies of it are exposed more clearly in The Parmenides. But the proposed kinds, boundaries, and consequent category mistakes, expressed by Parmenides are extremely difficult to following, requiring great attention to detail. It is evident therefore, that Plato is rejecting this metaphysics, as based in faulty arguments, rather than supporting it.
The "thing" is apples. They are all the same in that they are all apples. They are all the same kind of thing.
I see from another of your responses that you reject 'kinds'. You seem unaware that Forms are Kinds.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I did not say he is a philosopher. What I said is:
Quoting Fooloso4
We have not identified the philosopher. In your opinion the philosopher would not divide things into kinds. In your opinion then Socrates was not a philosopher, for he asks "What is the just?" and rejects all examples of justice as an adequate answer. He is asking about the kind of thing it is that makes all those examples examples of the just. He is asking in what way they are all the same and come under the same name.
An argument that employs any -- what shall we call it? "technique"? "method"? "approach"? -- that can be misused is sophistry? And by "misused" there I guess I have to mean something like "making the weaker argument seem the stronger", or perhaps deriving false conclusions from true premises. I don't really know what to put there.
The usual modern view is that the forms of inference we rely on, or should rely on, are merely truth-preserving, so an argument yields truth only by being founded upon truth. If you make a proper inference from what purports to be truth but is not, or if, in an informal argument, you rely on true premises that you have stated and untrue premises that you have not, you are abusing or misusing inference.
Do you have in mind an alternative, a means of reasoning that cannot be abused in such a way?
Correct. There is no doubt that “good” (kalon or agathon) was central to Greek thought, together with truth, justice, and beauty. Hence “good and beautiful” (kaloskagathos) as the Greek ideal of human perfection.
Diogenes of Apollonia, whom Socrates probably knew of, taught that everything was disposed for the best by divine dispensation. The very concept of a Cosmos was based on the idea of a cosmic order that was good and upon which everything else depended.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So well disguised that some may even mistake him for a “philosopher” and a “god”.
As we have seen, the philosopher is described as divine and as looking on the life of men from a higher place (Soph. 216c). And as we know from the Republic, it is through contact with real being that the philosopher has understanding, truth, and knowledge (Rep. 490b).
In contrast, the sophist is a disputer (antilogistikos) and one who imitates those who have knowledge, i.e., the genuine philosophers, but has no knowledge himself (Soph. 268e). This is confirmed by his name which, as pointed out by Theaetetus, is a derivation of “sophos” (“wise”).
Another important point is that the philosopher uses hypotheses to elevate his thought out of the confusion of nonphilosophical existence to abstract or “mathematical” concepts and render it sufficiently refined to grasp higher realities. Ultimately, however, he transcends all hypotheses to arrive at the unhypothetical first principle, the source and cause of all knowledge.
On the other hand, the sophist, who is a “disputer” (Soph. 232b), not only becomes lost in the multitude of philosophical questions but multiplies them by means of hair-splitting arguments and counter-arguments. And this goes against Plato for whom the questions raised by intelligence are just the bridge or ladder that takes the philosopher to intelligence itself.
Being an obstacle to that which is at once the truth and the good, the sophist and his method may be described as the opposite of good, i.e., evil.
While there can be no doubt that having the Eleatic visitor do the talking in the Sophist and the Statesman involves a markedly different approach than when Socrates is in charge, stating that what Plato thinks is entirely absent from the dialogues and that they are only demeaning caricatures of Parmenides is a proposition that does not fit with other circumstances.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates rips the Heraclitean thesis that "all things change" to shreds. When asked give the 'whole of things are at rest' thesis the same treatment, Socrates says:
I see that Aristotle referring approvingly to what was said in the dialogue has left no impression upon you. He does, however, refer to the ideas as belonging to Plato. In the beginning of On Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle again refers to the language of the Stranger when noting:
What is one to make of the Eleatic visitor being so warmly welcomed the next day by Socrates in the opening of the Statesman? That dialogue does introduce views of the Polis not expressed in the Republic but the author Plato is not setting the two dialogues against each other.
I will address the use of division and kinds in Plato in another post to avoid conflation with your proposition regarding Plato's intent here.
I think that to say that a Form is a kind, is a misunderstanding of Forms.
Quoting Fooloso4
I am not saying that a philosopher would not divide things into kinds. I am saying that an argument which proceeds in this way could be deceptive. Because of this we have to be very careful to analyze, and carefully understand the proposed divisions, and boundaries, to ensure that they are appropriately created.
To ask in what way are all the things which are called by the same name similar, is a completely different process than to divide things into kinds. Do you see this difference? Take the strangers example of "the hunter". The stranger says, lets divide "hunters" in to type A and type B. Then we can take type B and divide that into B1 and B2, and further we can divide B2, etc.. The Socratic method is to look at all the different examples of people who are called "hunters", to see what they all have in common, so that we can glean an idea of what it means to be a hunter.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
The type of argument I am talking about here is the type which attempts to prove the truth or falsity of a premise. This is the issue, how do we determine whether premises are true or false. So, for example, in the dialogue The Sophist, there is a premise that the sophist, the philosopher, and the statesman, are three distinct types. But then in the course of the dialogue, it is demonstrated that this premise is not true. Therefore the stranger, who was introduced as a true philosopher, might also be a sophist, because the premise that the philosopher is a distinct type from the sophist has been shown to be false.
Quoting Valentinus
That Heraclitus is wrong does not mean that Parmenides is right. That would make a terrible argument. You are wrong, therefore anyone who says something different from you, must be right.
Yet, Socrates was born, was a tot, grew into a brave young soldier, went on to "corrupt" the Athenian youth, was impious, was tried, was found guilty, was sent to the gallows, drank hemlock and passed away in 399 BC. No change at all. Denial of the obvious must have its merits but you'll have to explain it to me, if you don't mind. Please.
Agreed. Earlier today I was thinking a bit about the several "What is philosophy?" threads around, and thinking that the choice of terms, of the categorization of data, the work you do before engaging in inference, is a domain to be governed by reason but not logic, and thus a domain for philosophy distinct from both logic and science. (Certainly science is very much concerned with classification, but in a quite different way.)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And I agree with this too, and precisely because this work is not covered by the rules of inference, it certainly presents an opportunity for deception, but also for simple failure. Philosophers do seem to spend a lot of their time re-classifying things.
Very glad you brought this up.
I am not saying anything of the kind. You proposed that the Sophist was written specifically as a refutation of Parmenides. I spoke of why that is doubtful.
Socrates was not denying things change. He was saying that if nothing stayed the same, there would be no knowledge.
Plato is not content with Parmenides' position either. The dialogue of that name has old man Parmenides schooling young Socrates on how difficult it will be to speak of a world of becoming to be connected to a realm of eternally present Being. This frames the career of Plato as one of attempting to do exactly that.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates seeks the 'nature of knowledge' that can refute Protagoras' appeals to the immediacy of experience on which to say 'man is the measure of all things.' This approach requires accepting the world of becoming as a starting place for the inquiry. At 178b, Socrates points particularly to predicting the outcome of future events where Protagoras is hiding. So at 179d, Socrates says:
While Socrates declines to address Parmenides directly in his inquiry he is looking to establish a third way that is not premised upon either absolutely stated position. Parmenides is not sufficient for his needs.
The modern view of knowledge takes into account the ever-changing, dynamic, nature of knowledge - no aeroplanes back in Socrates' time but now round the clock flights to and from Athens. Of course, the laws of nature don't seem to be that flexible but you never know. Mathematics, an altogether different story.
As for the dispute with Protagoras, my hunch is Socrates and Plato were on the back foot rather than making any sorta headway in refuting Protagoras' subjectivism. If Protagoras was/is right, Plato's allegory of the cave and with that all of philosophy goes out the window as utter tripe.
The subjectivity is not refuted. The very portion of Theaetetus I am referring to is the acceptance of personal immediate experience. In the effort to address it, Socrates inquires into perception and knowledge and on what basis they encounter other beings. It is through making a distinction between perception and knowledge that Socrates seeks to defend himself against Protagoras.
Basically, Plato's allegory of the cave.
The misconception of Forms as “kinds” or even “universals” is a standard device employed by anti-Platonists who use Aristotle to attack Plato. Lloyd Gerson correctly calls it “an enduring urban myth in the history of philosophy”.
Moreover, if we pay attention to Plato’s wider theoretical framework we can see that he uses all fields of human knowledge and activity in the service of a higher goal, which is “to become godlike (homoiosis Theo) as far as possible”:
Plato uses religious beliefs and ethical principles to elevate the would-be philosopher’s mind to an intellectual and moral level where he can begin his philosophical practice. Similarly, mathematical disciplines are not studied for empirical purposes, but with a view to acquiring an ability for ordered and abstract thinking. The same is true of logic or dialectic. The ultimate telos or goal is always the One. The philosopher can fully understand the world and himself only in the light of the One which is the source of all knowledge and all truth.
If the philosopher is to become “as godlike as possible”, then he must make his mind as similar to the mind of God as he can. The intellectual training he has undergone in the preparatory stages has served the purpose of lifting him out the morass of ordinary human condition. But that training itself must be transcended. He must leave logic and everything else behind in order to have an experience of intelligence itself.
We can see why some forms of logic may be fruitful. Trying to grasp how divine intelligence creates the world, for example, by means of Ideas or Forms that impart their properties and, therefore, being to particulars that make up the sensible world, may help the philosopher to understand how divine intelligence works.
But other forms of logic may be less helpful in what the Platonic philosopher is aiming to achieve. Doing too much dividing and classifying, asking too many questions, raising too many doubts, etc., does not seem to be the best way to make one’s mind godlike.
In other words, there must come a time when thinking or any other mental activity becomes counterproductive. If a higher intelligence does exist and it is changeless, then, in order to catch a glimpse of it, it is necessary to make our mind equally changeless and still, as Socrates says in the Phaedo:
It is the wisdom acquired through a grasp of the One that enables the philosopher to approach philosophical problems by appealing to ?rst principles. And we can arrive at Plato’s One only through a process of simplification or reduction: the multiplicity of sensible particulars is reduced to intelligible Forms, and Forms are reduced to the One. This is the inner logic of Plato’s metaphysics. Hair-splitting mental exercises may be intellectually interesting, but they lead in the opposite direction, i.e., the direction aimed at by the sophist who (covertly or overtly) denies the existence of metaphysical realities ....
The Theaetetus does not claim that. The dialogue ends without finding an adequate account of knowledge. The 'paradigmatic' role of the Forms, spoken of in the Republic, is not on display in Socrates' argument against Protagoras' measure being able to be a judge of possible future events (178b).
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon
?????:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3Dei)%3Ddos
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Socrates often warns against those who are not properly suited and prepared from doing philosophy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Both sameness and difference are necessary for intelligibility. Human beings are similar, but they are not only similar to each other, they are also similar to pigs and other animals. If we are to identify the sophist and the philosopher then it is not enough to note that they human beings.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is the coupon cutter a hunter? Is a fisherman a hunter? Treating them as if they are the same or similar leads to some comical images. Fish and game requires separate fishing and hunting licenses, but no shopping licence for bargain hunters.
This is an important point. The Forms do not play an essential part in this Socratic dialogue on knowledge.
What "Socratic dialogue"?
You were talking about The Sophist just a minute ago.
In the Sophist, the Stranger identifies the Socratic school as the "friends of the Forms" (oi philoi ton eidon) (Sophist 248a).
So, obviously, Forms are important. Plato never mentions anything for no reason, least of all Forms.
Plus, the Forms are central to Socrates' philosophy.
And you raised the issue of Forms yourself:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
And in the OP:
Quoting Fooloso4
Forms may or may not be the "Whole". But they are an important part of it, and an important part of Plato's metaphysics!
And they are definitely not "kinds" or "universals".
E???? (eidos) comes from the verb "to see" and its primary meaning is "that which is seen", i.e. shape or form:
E???? - Wiktionary
This is precisely why eidos is translated as "Form"!
The text refers to the use of Kind and Form in the following way:
The Greek from the Perseus site for the first line by the Stranger (with the words in question underlined by me) is:
?????
?? ???? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ????????? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ??????????? ??????? ????????? ?????;
Are there examples of division and recognition of forms in the Dialogues that depart from this use?
What use?
Fowler's translation has;
He is talking about the division of things by classes or genera (gene).
That is hardly an answer to my question regarding the use of division in other dialogues.
Cornford does a better job than Fowler of relating the use of ????? in the passage.
Well, I disagree. The Stranger is talking about dividing things by classes or genera.
Here is Jowett’s translation (p. 179):
And it doesn't say that Forms are "kinds".
It is important not to confuse one with the other. That's why the Stranger emphasizes the importance of the art of discrimination (diakritike) (Soph.226d) ....
The Greek includes ?????, the word that is used for Forms, as an essential part of the description. The description does not turn 'kind'; and 'form' into one word. But to deny the close link made between them in the passage is odd. It is like you are trying to use alternative translations of the text to be used as changes to the text.
I thought Socrates defined knowledge as justified, true belief? The future is within our grasp given the laws of nature are universal and constant - a good basketball player can, if he's skilled enough, score.
Also, if the future can't be known isn't Heraclitus right?
Nonsense. It is the other way round.
You deliberately cherry-picked Cornford which is one of the worst possible translations.
As you can see for yourself, "eidos" can mean "form" as well as "kind", "species", or "class", depending on the context.
E???? - Wiktionary
It is very obvious that he Stranger is talking about the division of things by classes or genera (gene), NOT by Forms. Dialectic is about things in general, not exclusively about Forms.
How can he talk about classes or genera and suddenly bring Forms into it?
No, I said that the arguments purportedly made by Parmenides, as expressed in Plato's "Parmenides", are deficient, i.e., contain category mistakes. This is consistent with what you say here:
Quoting Valentinus
Quoting Fooloso4
It is a mistake to put sameness and difference in the same category. "Similar" is a type of difference, but "same" is fundamentally different from similar. So it is a mistake to assume sameness and difference as both necessary for intelligibility. Sameness, when analyzed, is not a part of intelligibility. Just ask yourself what does "not different " mean, and you'll see that "same" is unintelligible. "Difference" is defined by change, and so is intelligible as such. "Same" is defined by lack of change, so same defines the category of "eternal", which we cannot relate to because we have no experience of it. So "same" is some mystical unintelligible category of "eternal", which people claim to have knowledge of, when this is not really knowledge at all. It's like "God", purported to be the most highly intelligible, but also completely unknowable.
Quoting Fooloso4
They all have things in common, and there is nothing comical here. It only becomes comical if we try to say that they are "the same". But that's because "the same" is unintelligible.
Quoting Valentinus
Yes, this is the stranger's way of talking, to equate forms with types. Now proceed to his examples "rest" and "change". In no way does "rest" or "change" refer to a kind. A "kind" is a class of things, as Appollodorus has been pointing out, and neither "rest" nor "change" refers to a class of things. We can still say that "rest" and "change" signify forms though, as intelligible ideas, but neither signifies a class of things (a kind). Therefore there is a difference between "kinds" and "forms".
Now the stranger starts the discussion by referring to kinds of things, and dividing them, hunters, fishers, etc.. Then he (falsely) proposes an equality between "kind" and "form", as you've quoted, and proceeds to talk about some forms, "rest", "change", "being", "different", "same", as if they are kinds. But these words do not refer to kinds, the stranger has made a category mistake, and so the argument is faulty.
By the way, Valentinus, you seem to be very adept at pulling up the most highly relevant and significant passages from Plato. How do you do this? What supports that skill?
The passage you quoted above is completely different in my translation, Nicholas White, and there is a footnote proposing an alternative translation, which is completely different from yours as well. In any case, we do not need that passage, where the stranger explicitly attempts to equate "forms" with "kinds", (but is so highly ambiguous that translation consensus cannot be obtained) to see that he makes a category mistake when he proceeds to talk about the forms which follow from this point onward, as if they are kinds,
Correct. And if he asserts that "Forms are Kinds", then he should (1) define "Kind" and (2) show that a Form is a Kind.
Otherwise, his assertion is meaningless. After all, everything is a "kind" of something! :grin:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think there is a long history of providing dodgy translations as we have seen on the other threads on Plato's dialogues. Let's not forget he picked the passage he wanted and the "translation" he wanted to back up his claims. No one invited him to do so. Could this be the sophist's trademark technique of evasion, diversion and misdirection?
And he still hasn't shown us where Plato uses the phrase "a noble lie" ....
That proposition is addressed and deemed inadequate in the Theaetetus starting at 200d.
Quoting TheMadFool
That observation is also made by Socrates to note that Protagoras' use of each person's experience as an adequate measure does not account for differences in ability amongst men.
Quoting TheMadFool
According to the Fragments of Heraclitus, you would not be able to affirm or deny the proposition:
And you would be too busy fighting to care:
Together with terms such as 'class', 'genus', 'species', 'look', 'shape', 'type', and others they give the scope of the meaning of the Greek term ?????. And of course the English terms have a scope of meaning as well. There is no one term that is a perfect match.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not difference that makes things similar. Things that are similar are in some way or ways the same and in others different. Rather than show it is mistake to assume sameness and difference as both necessary for intelligibility, your example shows why they are necessary.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Things can be classified according to those that are at rest and those that change. This distinction is essential to the difference between Forms and things, being and becoming.
Thank you for making that observation.
I have read a lot of Plato, some parts many times. I still possess The Collected Dialogues of Plato which I started reading 45 years ago. I have extensively annotated the texts and the index over the years. My copy of Liddell and Scott's lexicon was acquired at the same time.
I am mostly using the Cornford translation because it is easily at hand. You are quite right to notice the wide range of translations. How to understand the Greek of Plato's later dialogues is one of the most fiercely debated issues amongst classical scholars. Cornford has many worthy challengers. In the text under discussion, and throughout this dialogue, he at least displays the virtue of being consistent in translating Kind for ???? and Form for ?????.
I will have to think more about your charge of a 'category mistake' in this context. The method of division is used throughout the dialogues. Socrates has been charged numerous times for being sophistical on account of it. See the Greater Hippias at 301 for a particularly exquisite example of the style.
"Consistently" translating Kind for ???? and Form for ????? is complete nonsense for the obvious fact that meaning changes according to context!
Besides, I don't see why any serious reader of Plato would insist on sticking to Cornford who really belongs to a different era (1874 – 1943). The world has moved on since Cornford, has it not? IMO, precisely because Plato is so difficult to translate into modern English, different translations should be consulted, especially more recent ones that tend to avoid the pitfalls of their predecessors.
Anyway, the indisputable fact is that the Greek passage starts with “to kata gene diaireisthai”, “the division by genera (classes, or kinds)” and is part of the general discussion of the Method of Division or diairesis.
As can be clearly seen from the previous pages (252e-253b), the topics discussed are the three arts, grammar, music, and dialectic, and how their objects, viz. sounds, letters, etc. combine or not with the others. So, it is imperative to read the passage in its proper context.
The objects of dialectic are the Genera or Kinds (gene). Hence “division according to genera” (253d).
Of course, the Division Method may be applied to Forms, and Forms (eide) are, indeed, mentioned in the dialogue.
However, (1) gene does not refer to Forms and (2) focusing exclusively on Forms misses the whole point of the dialogue.
Plato’s central intention is not the application of Division to Forms, but to the distinction between philosopher and sophist, in order to avoid misidentification. Hence the title of the dialogue. Therefore, individual passages must be read in light of the whole, not in isolation.
The Sophist begins with division or distinction between people who may be “gods” or “mere strangers”, and then proceeds to discuss sophists, statesmen, and philosophers, and the difficulty of classifying them. And classification involves identification, in this case, how can we tell a sophist from a philosopher.
Plato uses the phrase in the Republic 414b-c. I gave the Greek text for it here, in Shawn's OP, An analysis of the shadows.
I supported my interpretation of the passage here by quoting the Lexicon's entries for the words in question.
Then you challenged my use of the lexicon because the forms of the words were not the same as how the lexicon generally lists the basic word it defines. I explained that parts of speech are indicated by means of changing the forms of words.
Having come to the point of demonstrating your ignorance of a fundamental element of the language, I stopped trying to make my interpretation more clear to you.
Can't be because of Gettier cases.
Quoting Valentinus
Isn't that putting the cart before the horse? The differences in ability amongst men explains/supports Protagoras' stand that "man is the measure of all things".
Quoting Valentinus
So, "every day is like every other"? In a certain sense, yes (cyclical aspects) but in a different sense, no (acyclical aspects). I guess it depends on how we look at it aka perspective. Protagoras?
Quoting Valentinus
Basically, the world is chaotic, pulling us in all directions. [quote=Heraclitus]Change is the only constant.[/quote]
This is a preposterous claim.
The text you provided was this:
Quoting Valentinus
As I pointed out to you, quoting a line of 17 Greek words (!), does not amount to showing the phrase "a noble lie". You might equally post the whole dialogue and say "look, it's here!" :smile:
As a matter of fact, Plato does not use the phrase. Were this not the case, you would be able to show us the three Greek words that together form the phrase "a noble lie". But you can't do that because it's not there.
This is why I suggested to you that more recent translations like Desmond Lee's offer a better reading. But it seems that you prefer to reject any translator other than Cornford - except when it suits your agenda.
If there are variations of ability between men then there must be some means of comparing them to each other beyond the horizon of personal experience.
Quoting TheMadFool
You will have to show how that problem of epistemology relates to Plato's actual argument in the dialogue. I don't see why I have to be the only one reading the dialogue in our discussion.
Quoting TheMadFool
From the perspective of immediate experience, past, present, and future are what is most familiar to us. To accept Heraclitus' view of the universe is to accept that our experience is an illusion.
Quoting TheMadFool
Well, Heraclitus was pretty specific about the fighting part. The next Fragment is:
Relativism is the nemesis of absolutism. :confused: I don't understand how the former could coexist with latter?
Quoting Valentinus
Sorry, I should do my homework.
Aristotle said one gave rise to the other:
I will leave off from further replies for today. My wife is beating me with the chalk board the task list is drafted upon.
It makes sense though to claim that relativism/subjectivism (?) is self-refuting: Subjectivism/relativism itself must be relative/subjective, sawing off the very branch that supports it but only if relativism/subjectivism claims to be objective/absolute. Does it?
We already know this. But that is beside the point.
The issue is not finding a "perfect match". The issue is your statement below:
Quoting Fooloso4
If you think that you are aware of things others are not aware of, then you should be able to explain what you mean by your statement.
So, I think you should either:
1. a) define "Kind" and b) show that a Form is a Kind.
or
2. Retract your statement.
Otherwise you are talking meaningless gobbledegook IMO.
Once again, this is how it is defined by Liddell & Scott with bolding since you apparently missed it the first two times:
The sensible world certainly seems to be fairly chaotic and confusing. This is why Socrates says:
I think there is an element of Heraclitus there.
Awareness of the confusing chaos of ordinary experience must have been what has led philosophers like Socrates and Plato to look to a more stable reality that can bring some order, stability, focus, and sanity to everyday life ....
I know how Liddle & Scott defines "?????", thank you.
However, Liddle & Scott does not say "Forms are Kinds". That is YOUR statement:
Quoting Fooloso4
So, since you made that statement, presumably you know in what sense "Forms are Kinds"? And if you know, then it should be not too difficult for you to explain in a few words what you mean, so that we all know what you are talking about?
They translate ????? as form and as kind. Why does this confuse you?
Previously, I had given the first part of the sentence that expressed the intention to lie, expressed by ??????? (bring into being) a ?????? (a contrivance) of ?????? (false things), in order to point toward the unambiguous meaning of the word ?????? in this context. A deliberate attempt to deceive.
What you are looking for is in the remainder of the sentence. The grammar requires four words but the phrase you are asking for is underlined. The ???????? (true to one's birth) modifies the noun ??????????? (a single lie). The grammar of ?? ?? says something like 'put forth a particular thing'. The thing being referred to is the lie.
??? ?? ??? ????, ?? ?? ???, ?????? ??????? ??? ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????????, ?? ?? ??? ????????, ???????? ?? ?? ??????????? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????? ???? ????????, ?? ?? ??, ??? ????? ?????;
Of course they do. However, "form" and "kind" do not seem to be the same thing.
Normally, "form" refers to shape or the visible aspect of something. "Kind" refers to species, group or class. They are not one and the same thing.
For example, English "Form" is given for Greek "eidos" and "kind" for Greek "genos" (Republic 435b). So, Form and Kind cannot be the same.
"Form" also seems to have a particular meaning in Plato's philosophy. For example, "there is one Form (eidos) of excellence or virtue" (445c), etc. I don't think "Kind" can be substituted for "Form" here.
Besides, you started a thread on "Plato's Metaphysics" and I have heard that according to scholarly opinion Forms are central to Plato's metaphysics. So I thought maybe you wanted to share your views on the subject with us.
Well, that's where the problem is.
1. How would you say "a noble lie" in Greek?
2. The English phrase "a noble lie" is only three words. It should not require 4 (four) Greek words when translated back into Greek. There is no grammatical requirement for four words to translate "a noble lie".
3. ??????????? (pseudomenous) cannot be "a single lie" because it is plural.
4. The four words you have underlined there are not one phrase, and they don't translate "a noble lie".
Yes, the form is a plural neuter accusitive participle. What makes the reference to a single lie is the ??, which is a singular neuter accusative pronoun. Otherwise, the form would have been ???? if the reference referred to many lies.
Quoting Apollodorus
Wow. That is a spectacularly ignorant comment. That principle does not work in modern languages, even those sharing many rules of word order to give parts of speech. To apply it to an inflected language borders on the moronic.
I will no longer respond to claims you make about Greek texts. Life is too short.
I don't think so, Mr Valentinus (Fooloso4?). ??????????? is masculine. Nothing whatsoever to do with what you are claiming there!
Quoting Valentinus
Really?! How about the following inflected languages???
[b]French: un mensonge noble
German: eine edle Lüge
Spanish: una mentira noble
Modern Greek: ??? ??????? ???? (ena eugenes psema)
Ancient Greek: ?? ???????? ?????? (hen gennaion pseudos)[/b]
IMHO the principle seems to work very well in most if not all European languages. In fact, far too well for what you are claiming to be true.
So, dodgy translations, invented “grammatical rules”, false statements ... accident or design?
I would appreciate it if you did not accuse forum members you disagree with of lying.
I can appreciate it more forcefully if need be.
Each thing is different. The "way" that it is similar can be said to be "the same way", but there is no need for "same" here, there is simply a way in which they are similar. And the "way" is artificial, as what is said about the things. Therefore sameness is not part of the things themselves, but only what is said about the things which are said to be similar, in a way. However, to say that they are similar, is to say that they are different, and this is to say that they are not the same, so this is a false form of sameness, which you propose, as property of the judgement rather than property of the things, which are said to be in some way, similar. Aristotle's law of identity, on the other hand attributes true sameness to the thing itself, by saying that a thing is the same as itself. But this means that no two things are "the same", and "the same way" is a completely different meaning of "same", because a way is not a thing. It's a superfluous use of "same", which serves no meaning.,
Quoting Fooloso4
No, it just demonstrates that by some corrupt and undisciplined meaning of "same" , which allows that any two things are "the same" in some way (even if just by the fact of being things), and they are therefore similar, then any two things can be said to be the same kind. This sort of ambiguity is a feature of unintelligibility rather than intelligibility.
Quoting Fooloso4
This is very obviously another feature of the unintelligible metaphysics you are promoting. Any thing can change from being at rest to being in motion at any moment. So any thing which might be classified as a thing at rest will also be classified as a thing which can change, unless that rest is eternal. Since "rest", to be distinguished from "change" requires that change is impossible, your classifications would be better stated as "eternal" and "temproal". But the classification of the eternal cannot be said to consist of "things" because no things are eternal. Therefore the category of "eternal", or "rest" cannot consist of things at rest, and the eternal cannot be a "kind", as "kinds are how we classify things. Nor can "at rest" be a kind of thing. Of course you just need to look at relativity theory to see that there is no kind of thing which is at rest.
Quoting Valentinus
The mentioned argument in Greater Hippias is not that type of argument at all. Hippias had said that if the same thing is true of each of us, then it is true of the both of us. But Socrates demonstrates that this is not the case, because it is true that each of us is one, but also true that both of us is two.
The category error I referred to, can be understood better through the premise of The Symposium. Remember when Socrates tells about his teacher, in love, Diotima? Diotima teaches him to see beauty in all sorts of different things. First, the beauty in bodies, then the beauty in souls, then in activities, customs, laws and institutions, and finally the beauty in knowledge and wisdom.
Now, if we were proceeding by the method of division, we would take the kind, "beautiful things", and divide it into further types, bodies, souls, institutions, etc.. And of course, each of these could be divided again. The problem is that with this method we are always dealing with things, dividing them into kinds, and we do not ever approach, or apprehend the idea of beauty, or form of Beauty itself.
So the method of Diotima differs because it goes in the opposite direction from dividing, Diotima proceeds in what is called the upward direction. Instead of dividing, Socrates is taught to see that in all these different classes of things, there is one thing in common, which unites them all. This is Beauty itself. Then the "Idea", or "Form" of beauty is apprehended as what all beautiful things partake of.
[quote=Symposium 211c]This is what it is to go aright, or be led by another, into the mystery of Love: one goes always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to leraning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful[/quote]
That, in itself, is a beautiful description of the method of Platonic dialectics. Dialectics, in the Platonic sense, is not a matter of dividing things into types, in a downward direction, as if we might find the Forms in that way. It is a matter of starting with particular individuals, following what they have in common, in an upward direction, until one grasps the reality of the Form itself, which accounts for the reason why they have such in common.
Understanding of the Idea itself is derived from observations of the things which partake in that Idea, but the Idea is not a thing which can be divided, like a class, or a kind is said to be divided. Socrates explains this in The Parmenides, but I don't have the reference off hand. The Idea is like the day. No matter how many different places are taking part in the day, it is never more or less than what it is, i..e. the day. Likewise, the divisions which we make of kinds, are not divisions of the Idea itself, they are divisions of the things which partake in the Idea. To say that the Idea itself is what is divided is a category mistake, the groups of things are divided.
As a matter of fact, it was they who accused me of being "ignorant" (and of lying) and not for the first time:
Quoting Valentinus
I didn't accuse anyone of anything. I simply asked what they would call the obviously incorrect statements they keep making. Hence the question mark.
1. There is no grammatical rule that says that to translate English "a noble lie" into inflected languages like Greek requires four words.
2. ?? ?? does not mean 'put forth a particular thing'.
3. ??????????? (pseudomenous) cannot be "a single lie" because it is plural.
4. ??????????? (pseudomenous) is not "neuter".
5. ??????????? (pseudomenous) does not refer to ?? ??.
6. ???????? ?? ?? ??????????? (gennaion ti hen pseudomenous) is not a phrase and it does not translate as "a noble lie".
7. As I repeatedly pointed out, the phrase "a noble lie", Greek ?? ???????? ?????? (hen gennaion pseudos) is not in the Greek text of the Republic or anywhere else in the Platonic corpus.
8. As I repeatedly stated on the thread "An analysis of the shadows", the Wikipedia article has the following correct translation:
Noble lie - Wikipedia
9. As can be clearly seen, the translation does not contain the phrase "a noble lie" and the relevant section of the text stops before "pseudomenous" (???????????). The obvious reason for this is that the participle "pseudomenous" means neither "lie" nor "lies" and does not refer to the preceding "some noble one".
As anyone with some knowledge of Ancient Greek can confirm, "a noble lie" is not in the Greek text. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that it is.
Correct. For the previously stated reason(s) the answer to the question "what are Plato's Forms?" cannot be "Kinds".
So, Forms and Kinds are not the same thing.
I think it is important to eliminate misunderstandings, otherwise no meaningful discussion is possible.
If Forms are not Kinds, what should we call them? Any suggestions?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I think it is important to see the difference between how or what things are and how the human mind classifies them.
"Kinds" are a posteriori classifications, Forms exist prior to human cognition. Therefore, Forms cannot be kinds.
I think this issue demonstrates the area where language does not serve us well, at the fringes of our knowledge. The reason for this is obvious, what we do not know, we cannot talk about. However, philosophy is the desire to know, and this desire inspires us to expand what is known, beyond the currently existing boundaries, thus expanding the evolving body knowledge.
Our knowledge of Forms is such a thing. Some participants in this thread seem to think that a Form is a kind, and I have been saying that "kinds" are the way that we divide things, and I put Forms into a different category, as something other than a group of things. Now there is a clear need to distinguish between a group of things, divided by kind, and the principle itself, which supports the division of groups of things. Without this distinction here is much ambiguity and confusion in philosophical discussions.
The issue is well exemplified, and exposed in discussions of set theory in the philosophy of mathematics, particularly in reference to "the empty set". If there is such a thing as an empty set, then "set" cannot refer to a group of things, because it's incoherent to say that there's a group of things which consists of no things. This means that in the case of the empty set, "set" must refer to the defining principle, which allows that we might define a 'type", a "kind", and talk about that that "kind", as if it is itself, some sort of "thing", independently from any members which are supposed to be of that kind. This is the only way that we can have an empty set, if the thing referred to as "the set" is something completely independent from the members which compose the set. However, we find in the philosophy of mathematics, some people will assert that "set" refers to the group of things itself, but also assert that there is such a thing as an empty set. This is incoherent.
In relation to understanding "Forms" now, if "Form" refers to the defining principle of a group of things, then we must allow that the Form is independent from the group of things, as evidenced by "the empty set". Someone might propose "a kind" which has no members of the group This makes the Form itself something which needs to be understood as something independent from the group of things which serve to exemplify it. Therefore no degree of analysis of different groups of things can give us an adequate understanding of Forms themselves. To understand Forms, we need to separate the Form from the group of things, and grasp its independent existence. If we deny that a Form is something independent from the group of things, we will never understand how it is that there could be an empty set.
1. We are, all of us, ignorant and stupid, and have to expect others here will point out where we have shown that we are. (Our patron saint is famous for proclaiming his own ignorance.) We are not, all of us, liars.
2. "He did it first" is a an excuse, not a justification.
Quoting Apollodorus
Uh huh.
It's right here in the guidelines:
Quoting TPF Site Guidelines
Accusing your interlocutors of lying, no matter the grammatical form of the accusation, is not "respectful and moderate".
I respectfully ask you to reconsider whether, upon reflection, you want that accusation to remain in the record of this otherwise vigorous and valuable discussion.
I think one of the factors leading to the misconception of Forms as "kinds" may be the tendency of looking at them through Aristotle's categories.
In terms of how Forms are seen by Plato himself, at least as evident from the dialogues, I think "paradigm" (paradeigma) would be a much more accurate description of Form than "kind".
Essentially, Forms are paradigms of the generated world as indicated in the Timaeus and elsewhere:
Incidentally, Aristotle himself says that being a paradeigma is "especially characteristic of Ideas".
Plato's concept of participation (metoche) is particularly enlightening. Sensible objects exist by participation in a Form's property. On this subject, Proclus distinguishes between (1) that which participates, (2) that which is participated in, and (3) that which is unparticipated.
The Form's being a Form is its being a paradeigma whose property or properties are participated in by sensible objects. In other words, a Form is the eternal paradigmatic cause of the things that are eternally constituted according to nature:
As the Timaeus shows, the Form is perfect, the sensible objects fashioned after it are not so. The Form itself is the perfect paradigmatic original which is "unparticipated" and therefore transcendent. Its image, on the other hand, is an imperfect version of the perfect paradeigma or model, is "participated" and therefore immanent.
Personally, I would have preferred the discussion to remain free of any accusations. Unfortunately, given some participants' persistent claim that certain statements are true when they patently are not, I think my "accusation" was not entirely unfounded. If it is not "mendacity", then what shall we call deliberately and knowingly making inaccurate statements? I am open to suggestions.
Meantime, if they retract their uncalled-for and evidently false accusations of "ignorance", I am prepared to retract mine. In fact, I think this would be the ideal solution and I have already removed the "compulsive mendacity" bit.
I do not understand the Stranger to be saying that "proceeding by the method of division, we would take the kind, "beautiful things", and divide it into further types, bodies, souls, institutions, etc."
I realize just now that I failed to type in the full quote from the Stranger. My apologies. Let me try again:
So there is a limit to proper division and designating what combines into wholes. That relates to the Hippias passage of how a whole relates to the parts it unifies. Socrates distinguishes a difference between the whole and its parts. Hippias says Socrates is needlessly dividing things to say that.
The matter does relate, as you say, to the Parmenides where it is asked if a unity is like a sail covering particulars or a day they occur within.
The Stranger's statement in the Sophist can be compared to the issue raised in the Theaetetus:
The comparison between Socrates and the Stranger does show an important difference. When Socrates ends the dialogue, he declares as a midwife that none of the births survived. When the Stranger comes to an end, he doesn't say that he had made no progress.
Thank you, Fooloso4, for all the challenges you have given me and others.
Je pars, TPM.
The Forms are at rest and eternal. Being may be eternal but is not at rest.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The Forms are said to be eternal and at rest. The category things that are eternal and at rest consists of Forms. Beauty itself is unchanging but things that are beautiful are not. The Small itself is unchanging but things that are small are not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, according to your argument no two things are the same. No two dogs are the same dog, but all dogs are the same in so far as they are dogs. It is this sameness that is fundamental to Forms. To be the same does not mean to be identical. Things of a certain Form are not just similar, they are, by virtue of being of the same Form, the same. Second any two things may be the same in some way are not thereby the same kind of thing. Dogs and cats are the same in some way but dogs are not the same as cats.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are confusing the Forms 'Rest' and 'Change' with things that are at rest or change.
I am truly sorry to hear that.
Dialogic quickly degenerates into quarrelous disputation when some are more concerned with staking out and defending their views through heedless attack on whatever and whoever does not fit the parameters of those views.
We are all impoverished when such tactics have their intended effect and a valuable member of the forum is silenced.
I hope you will reconsider. When time allows I will be introducing some other elements of Plato's metaphysics that have not been addressed yet. I and others would miss reading your carefully considered comments. Perhaps by judiciously ignoring deliberate provocation and endless disputes you can avoid the worse of what the forum has to offer and retain what is best.
Of course different things are the same as others to the degree they share the same property or properties with them, and different to the extent they do not. It may also be said that a thing is the same as itself but different from others, etc. There is nothing new about it.
Quoting Fooloso4
However, Forms may be said to be "at rest" in relation to the sensible world, but being themselves outside the spatio-temporal dimension, Forms cannot ultimately be susceptible to rest or change. So, it is a mater of perspective or point of view.
This is why Plato insists that the Forms can be fully understood only in the light of the One (or the Good). We cannot selectively critique some aspects of the Forms in isolation of the Whole.
This is where Neo-Platonism can become inconsistent with Aristotle. Aristotle's description necessitates that forms, and therefore Forms. are actual. And actual as active is distinct from potential, which is passive. In the theory of participation, material objects (actively) participate in the Forms, which (passively) are participated in. This problem is evident in Plotinus' description of the One. He describes the One as pure, or absolute potential, but he also says that everything else follows from the One as the cause of everything. But in Aristotle's metaphysics, pure absolute potential cannot have any actuality, and therefore cannot be the first cause (cosmological argument), a cause necessarily being active..
This is the problem with the theory of participation, as addressed in the Timaeus. Forms, as prior to the material things which follow from them in creation, must be actively involved in the act of creation, as causes. Therefore we cannot accurately describe the Forms as passively being participated in, they must be described as actively creating the material things.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is why Christian theology has adopted a distinction, based on Aristotelian principles, between perfect independent Forms, and the forms, or ideas, created by the human mind. The latter are imperfect, being derived from, and therefore dependent on, the material existence of the human being.
Quoting Valentinus
As I said already, I find that passage in The Sophist to be very ambiguous and confusing, subject to many different translations. I don't think it's a good indication of what Plato says about ideas, that's why i gave what I thought was a better one, from The Symposium. I think that passage in The Sophist represents what the stranger (who is a sophistic philosopher) is saying about forms, intentionally creating ambiguity to make it look like Forms are the same thing as kinds.
Quoting Valentinus
But Socrates' point here is valid and very important. There is a fundamental difference between a part and a whole, involving dependence and independence, such that parts cannot be treated as wholes, and wholes cannot be treated as parts. This important difference is almost completely ignored in modern scientific enquiry, as atoms, electrons, protons, etc., which are fundamentally parts, get treated as wholes. But a part, by the definition of "part" is necessarily dependent on the whole which it is a part of, while a whole, by the definition of "whole", is in itself complete and independent, and cannot be a part of something else.
So in Socrates' example, if each person is "one", then they are described as independent individuals which are not part of any further whole, but are themselves, in themselves, whole.. But if two people are described as "two", then each of the two are necessarily parts of a whole. Then each , therefore, is not an independent whole, but a part. And, we cannot call each of them "one", because we'd have to call each of them "half" or something like that.
Quoting Fooloso4
This is the problem I address above, in this post. Forms are described by Plato in the Timaeus as causally active in creation. Therefore to say that Forms as conceived of By Plato, are eternal and at rest is a mistaken proposition. We must account for the reason why a thing comes into being as the very thing which it is, and not something else. The Form must be prior to the material thing and play an active, causal, role in making the thing be what it is. Therefore Forms cannot be in the category of "at rest". Forms are active causes.
Further, eternal things must be actual and therefore cannot be passive . This is what is exposed by Aristotle's cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual (Bk9,Ch8, 1050b). So Aristotle straightens out all this confusion caused by the deficiencies of the theory of participation, by placing forms in the category of active, or actual. This inclines the Christian Theologians to posit active independent Forms, like God and the angels.
Quoting Fooloso4
By the law of identity, "same" refers to the very same, particular thing. A thing is the same as itself. That's what "same" means by the law of identity, one and the same, no two distinct things are the same.
Quoting Fooloso4
Again, I really think that this is a mistaken proposition. Any particular thing has a form unique to itself. This is what Aristotle describes with the law of identity, This form which a particular material thing has, is complete with accidentals (what the human description, using kinds, or "forms" in that sense does not include". This means there are two distinct meanings of "form", the form which a particular has, and the form which a human being attributes to the thing in description. The latter being a description of kinds. What the latter does not include is what we call accidentals. So the latter sense of "form" does not involve "sameness", it involves similarity. And "similar" indicates a type of difference, not sameness, which by the law of identity is a things relation to itself.. So "sameness" in the philosophically disciplined sense, is reserved for the former sense of "form", what an individual has unique to oneself.
Quoting Fooloso4
This is a typical example of Parmenidean sophistry. Next you will say that 'Change" is at rest, because change is some eternal unchanging form, and argue some absurdity from this contradiction.
Good point. However, to begin with, we need to establish what is meant by “create” or, rather, who creates.
The way I see it, it is not the Forms that create the material things. According to Plato, the Cosmos was created by the Creator-God by means of Forms. If the Forms were to create anything then there would be a multitude of creators and this is not what Plato is saying.
The creator of the Cosmos is God’s Creative Intelligence or the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos):
To say that the Creator-God creates by means of Forms, is not to deny that the Forms are themselves active causes. In fact, the tools, in this case the Forms, must be themselves causes, or else they would have no role in the creative process. The human being creates through the means of machinery and all sorts of tools, but that does not mean that the tools are not active causes. And, if there is a multitude of tools being used, as distinct causes, this does not imply that there is more than one person using those tools.
That is correct. I am only saying that the Forms cannot properly be said to create - in any case not on their own - as it is the Creative Intelligence which creates by means of Forms. Humans, do indeed, create things through tools and machinery but it is still the humans who create, not the tools or machinery.
As regards Forms, they certainly are one of the causes involved in creation. The question is their exact role in the process or their relation to the actual creator, viz., the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence.
In other words, if they cooperate in creation, which appears to be the case, in what capacity do they do so?
One way of looking at it is that Forms exist within the Intellect in which case they are inseparable from it and if they act at all, they do so in conjunction with Intellect.
Plato mentions various types of causes, among which the primary are always associated with Intelligence:
OK, but the point that I was making was that the theory of participation proved to be inadequate because it represented the Forms as passively participated in, when in reality they are active in causation. This is relevant to what Fooloso4 was saying about Forms being eternally at rest. When Forms are understood as being passively participated in, they appear as something eternally at rest. But when they are understood as active in causation, it is impossible that they are at rest.
Quoting Apollodorus
It is doubtful that Forms are inseparable from the intellect, in an absolute way. In the act of creation, the form which exists in the intellect comes to exist in the material object. So for example, the form which a building has, is in some way "the form", which was in the architect's vision. But here we have to be careful about the use of "same", as I explained to fooloso4. Even so, a material object has a "form" proper to itself, as stipulated by the law of identity, and it appears like that form, being the effect of the Creator's act of creation, rather than a cause in the act of creation, is independent from the Creator's intellect.
Quoting Apollodorus
That's a very relevant passage. Notice how he says the causes which most men consider as primary (the efficient causes dealt with in science), are really secondary causes. They are secondary because they do not act with reason, like Soul does, so Soul employs these as auxiliary causes. The first causes belong to the Intelligent Nature, causing what is good, whereas accidents are attributed to the secondary type of causes
Sure. But I’m not saying that Forms are “at rest”. On the contrary, Forms seem to be nothing more than a particular function of intelligence (in which case they are not separable from the Intellect within which they have their existence). And, personally, I find the idea of “motionless intelligence” hard to imagine, a bit like “dead soul”, really.
At the same time, as I pointed out earlier, something that is outside the spacio-temporal realm cannot be susceptible to either rest or motion in a conventional sense. Presumably, there is some form of "activity", but it wouldn’t be what we normally understand by that term.
In any case, Forms and Intellect seem to stand in a relation of cognitive identity to one another. At the end of the day, Forms are not ultimate realities and they depend on an ultimate principle. They have no separate existence.
As regards the theory of participation, I tend not to find it quite as problematic as others do. After all, we are talking about things that humans have no direct experience of. And I can see no evidence that Plato’s views on the Forms have been conclusively refuted by anyone.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That’s what I meant. There are causes that operate with Nous and others that don’t. The real issue is how to classify or prioritize them. According to Proclus and others, there are at least six different causes of which some are primary and others are contributory.
Primary Causes (aitiai):
Productive/efficient (poietikon)
Paradigmatic (paradeigmatikon)
Final (telikon)
Contributory causes (synaitia):
Formal (eidos)
Material (hyle)
Instrumental (organikon)
But what Plato is really saying is that the ultimate cause (aition) of the Cosmos or Universe is the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence, but that for a more precise human understanding several causes (aitiai) are introduced.
Obviously, the Absolute has no need of human explanation for its activities or existence. Explanation(s) is for the sake of man that he may grasp a higher truth and elevate himself to its level. Otherwise put, for lower intelligence to understand the higher intelligence that is its source and return to it. In Plato, everything starts with intelligence and ends with intelligence.
In fact, the Parmenides (127e ff.) expressly states that the purpose of introducing Forms is to solve the puzzle raised by things being both one and many, and like and unlike. The puzzle is a human one and different solutions may be deemed satisfactory or otherwise by different minds. So, it all boils down to how we choose to classify the causes and how we, humans, think they relate to one another. But this is not necessarily how things are from a higher perspective ....
For the sake of argument, I'll assume that forms are dependent on an intellect for their existence, and cannot be separate. You know that's problematic, because each individual person has one's own intellect, therefore one's own forms, which are proper to one's own understanding of things, and so we have no "Forms", the capitalization signifying something independent from individuals, and proper to humanity as a whole.
From this principle you propose, we have no unified human "body of knowledge", only the knowledge which each individual has. Furthermore, the communication of ideas becomes a very difficult problem, because we cannot say that one idea is shared between us through the means of communication. So to be consistent with what you propose, we need to deny the reality of what is represented by our common way of speaking, that we share ideas, we all have the same idea of "two", the same idea of "square", etc..
This proposal of yours, may or may not be consistent with Plato, depending on how you account for the reality of independent Forms. Plato was concerned with independent Forms, and the difficulty he approached was the effort required to bring your perspective, that forms are properly dependent on an intellect, to be compatible with the idea of independent Forms. As much as Plato elucidated this problem, and pointed the direction toward resolution, I tend to believe as Fooloso4 has said, that Plato exposed the problem, but did not resolve it.
This is why, following Plato, we have a division, the direction taken by Aristotle, and the direction taken by Platonists and finally that of Neo-Platonists. Aristotle assumed to have a solution, which involved two distinct definitions of "form". We have "form" in the sense of formula, and this is dependent on the human intellect as you say, but he also proposes that every particular thing has a "form" which is proper to the thing itself. The latter sense signifies a form which is independent from the human mind, so we could capitalize "Form" and we can conclude that if these independent Forms are dependent on an intellect.it is a divine intellect.
This is the direction Christian theology took, following Thomas Aquinas. There are two types of forms. The forms of the human intellect are deficient, because the human mind is dependent on the soul's union with the material body. This dependency on the material existence of the body inhibits our capacity to know the true form of the particular, the individual, the whole, the one. On the other hand, the separate or independent Form, which is the form of the particular, one or individual, is dependent on a divine mind of an angel, or God Himself, for its existence.
Quoting Apollodorus
I don't think it is possible to conclusively refute Plato's views on Forms. This is for the reasons that Fooloso4 points to, Plato does not propose a coherent theory of Forms. He exposes problems with the theories which were current at his time, pointing to incoherencies and incompatibility with the scientific knowledge of his time, but does not propose a solution. This is why Aristotle claims to refute Pythagorean idealism, and what he calls "some Platonists". What is taken to be "Platonism", at that time, has already become divided, dependent on interpretation, and this is prior to the problem we have today with translation, which only increases the divide. One might argue that the true followers of Plato (Platonists) adopted a position of skepticism, and because of this we cannot claim that they have a "view on the Forms" to refute.
Quoting Apollodorus
As far as I can tell, you have still not demonstrated to me, where you derive this idea from Plato, that "the One", is the creative force of the Cosmos. He refers to a divine mind, and a creator, but I don't see that it is consistently called "the One".
Correct. “Intellect” means the Divine Intellect. The Divine Intellect contains the Forms, the human intellect thinks or philosophizes about the Forms (until it has elevated itself to a level from where it can directly grasp or “see” them). The Forms are independent of human intellects but dependent on the Divine Intellect of which they are a part. The Creator-God who creates the Cosmos is the Divine Intellect.
Individual human souls are each endowed with an intellect (nous) of its own that contains something of the Divine Intellect within it. In addition, according to Plato’s Theory of Recollection (anamnesis), due to its pre-existence, a soul possesses latent knowledge or memory of knowledge it once had, including of Forms, and this is reactivated in the right circumstances and under the right stimuli.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If we look at some of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s teachings, it can immediately be seen that they make no sense.
For example, Forms are supposed to be causally inert and so cannot explain change or generation:
The obvious answer is the Creator-God or Divine Intellect (Plat. Tim. 28c, 29a).
However, the point Plato is making is that a Form is a paradigmatic characteristic or property.
So, it does look like Aristotle’s criticisms refer to earlier, incomplete teachings of Plato, or indeed, to positions held by different currents within the Academy. Or he may have had other reasons.
But you are quite right, we cannot “refute” any of Plato’s supposed theories without an exact knowledge of what those theories entail. A small missing detail can cause even the most credible “refutation” to fail. A large dose of caution seems advisable and not too much emphasis should be placed on Aristotle’s criticisms – unless there is some anti-Platonist agenda. :smile:
Besides, what matters at the end of the day is not whether an argument is 100% watertight but what Plato is trying to tell us. Logic for Plato is just a means to an end. Logic is a particular modification of intelligence. And Plato is not particularly interested in particulars. What counts in the Platonic project is the Absolute or the One. The Platonic philosopher must go beyond logic which is a product of the human mind and elevate himself to the plane of Universal Intelligence or Divine Intellect itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is entirely possible. There is some evidence to suggest that under Arcesilaus and others the Academy took a turn in the direction of skepticism. This does not necessarily mean that Plato himself was a skeptic, though. Only that his school went through a period of skepticism.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For obvious reasons, Plato cannot be expected to give a detailed account of the One, and he tends to refer to it indirectly, using the language of analogy and myth. His intention is not to provide his readers with an exact description of the One, but to point them in its direction. Still, I believe that he provides sufficient information for us to form a fairly clear idea of what he is talking about.
1. The One is the First Principle which is “beyond being” and “beyond essence”.
The One cannot be many (Parm. 137c).
The One is without parts, without beginning or end, unlimited, formless, etc. (Parm. 137d-e).
2. The Good is One over many Forms (Analogy of the Sun) and beyond being. Therefore it must be fully real and creative (Rep. 509b).
The Forms are good in virtue of the Form of the Good.
Plato predicates “good” and “one” of all the Forms.
Therefore the Good is the One.
3. The Good is the cause (aitia) of knowledge and therefore a form of intelligence.
The Creator-God who is called Maker and Father of the Universe (Poietes kai Pater toude tou pantos, Tim. 28c) and endows the Universe with intelligence is identical with Intellect or Nous: “All the wise agree that Nous is king for us of heaven and earth" (Phileb. 28c6-8). Nous or Intelligence arranges, orders, and rules the Cosmos (Phileb. 30c), etc.
I think that when all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have been put together, the logical conclusion is that what Plato is describing is one ultimate reality that is the cause of the Cosmos or Universe. Accordingly, a hierarchy of causes may be identified as corresponding to the various aspects or manifestations of the One:
The One is (a) efficient cause as the One, (b) paradigmatic cause as Intellect and Forms, (c) final cause as the Good, (d) formal cause as Creator-God (e) material cause as the Dyad, etc.
The One, which is infinite and formless, imposes limit upon itself by means of the Dyad of (1) Unlimited (apeiron) and (2) Limit (peras), and then through (3) the interaction of the two (“Mixed” or meikte), it produces Ideal Ratios or Proportions (Forms) that become the content of (4) Intellect (Nous). The Intellect, the fourth element, which is nothing but Creative Intelligence with Forms, brings forth the Universe (Phileb. 27b-31b).
So, Intelligence is the creative force of the universe and the three basic aspects or levels of reality are:
1. The One a.k.a. the Good.
2. The Creator-God or Creative Intelligence.
3. The Cosmos or Universe which is a living being endowed with an intelligent soul.
This is entirely consistent with the inner logic of Plato’s metaphysical system. Plato says that whenever inquiring into intelligible things (e.g., Forms), the philosopher must always rise to the first principle (arche) and apprehend everything in conjunction with that. He reduces the Forms to the transcendent first principle of the One and then deduces all things from that (Rep. 511b-d).
Plato inherited Socrates’ constant quest for the truth, but whilst Socrates’ main concern was ethics having the Good as final end, Plato focuses on metaphysics which has the One for its ultimate goal. But the Good and the One are the same one ultimate cause and creative force of the universe.
Here's the problem I have with these principles. The "intellect" which we know about is the human intellect. And this intellect is a property, or attribute of the soul. The human intellect is deficient in its capacities because of the soul's union with the material body, as explained by Aquinas. But there is also a need to account for the reality of the independent Forms, as we've discussed.
The question is, why would we assume an "intellect" to account for the independent Forms? The "intellect" as we know it is something which follows from the soul's union with the material body, it's posterior to that union, and dependent on it, but here we are talking about "Forms" which are prior to the soul's union with a material body. So why would we think that this is a type of "intellect"? When we look back in time this way, we see the soul as prior to the intellect, and we see that the soul somehow takes part in the independent Forms. To move further, and look to see what supports the independent Forms, why would we turn back around, to look toward an "intellect", when "intellect" refers to something posterior to the soul, not prior to it?
Quoting Apollodorus
So this doesn't really make sense to me. The human soul has an intellect as an attribute. And the human soul has a connection to something Divine, the independent Forms. We might even say that the soul uses the intellect as a means toward understanding the Forms. But the connection is between the soul and the Forms, not the intellect and the Forms, and this is why the Forms are so hard for the intellect to understand. Furthermore, the intellect creates its own forms, which are categorically different from the independent Forms, and since they both have the same name "forms", this confuses the matter. So as much as the human soul has a direct connection to, or relation with, something Divine, which we call "Forms", I don't think it's correct to call this Divine reality an "intellect".
Quoting Apollodorus
I wouldn't say this. I would say that it takes a lot of work to understand Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, but once the effort has been made they make a lot of sense. For me, it required a lot of reading of Thomas Aquinas, someone who made that effort. Then I had to return to Aristotle to reread and confirm that Aquinas' interpretations actually were consistent with Aristotle's words in context, and in some instances right back to Plato.
The problem is that the idea of independent Forms was a new idea at Plato's time, so it was very confused and not well worked out. Prior to Plato there was an idea of an independent soul, which was supposed to be immortal. But the immortal soul needed logical support (substance), and this was proposed with eternal "Forms". But the issue was very confused by the fact that human ideas, "forms" are not eternal. So now there was two distinct types of ideas, human ideas, dependent on human minds, and independent ideas which are supposed to be eternal. This is what Aristotle describes in the passage from 1033 which you refer to. Independent forms are the forms of particulars, and if independent "Forms" are supposed to be something other than particulars, these "Forms" cannot account for the reality of particular things.
Quoting Apollodorus
Don't you see this as a contradiction? The "One" by the fact that it is one, is a particular. So to say that Plato was interested in the One, but had no interest in particulars cannot be true.
Quoting Apollodorus
The character in Plato's dialogues named Socrates, was definitely a skeptic.
Quoting Apollodorus
There are two very distinct meanings of "one", as the first in an order or hierarchy, and as a unit, particular, a whole, or individual.
Quoting Apollodorus
Here, the two are conflated, and called the One.
Quoting Apollodorus
Plato does not equate "the good" with "the One" at this point in The Republic. There is no mention of "the One". That's a blatant misrepresentation.
Quoting Apollodorus
Nor is there any mention of "the One" here.
There is no need to explicitly mention the One everywhere. The point is to follow the logical process suggested in the dialogues. Once a principle of inquiry has been established that reduces everything to a first principle, then we must logically arrive at an irreducible One. Of course, we are under no obligation to do so. It is a matter of personal choice.
In terms of the relation between intellect and Forms, the intelligibility of sensible objects consists in their samenesses and differences, and these are explained by Forms.
Plato defines the relation between sensible objects and intelligible Forms in terms of “to echein” (having) and “to metechein” (having a share in or “participating”), i.e., “having” and “co-having” (meta + echein, “to have with”).
A further distinction can be made between that which participates (to metechon), that which is participated in (to metechomenon), and that which is unparticipated (to amethekton).
A beautiful girl, a beautiful horse, and a beautiful lyre are beautiful by reason of their co-having, having a share, or participating in the Beautiful (or Beauty) itself (Hipp. Maj. 287e-289d).
The girl, horse, and lyre are things that participate; beauty is the property or attribute they participate in; Beauty itself is the unparticipated, transcendent Form to which the property or attribute properly belongs.
The difference between “having” and “co-having” or “sharing in”, is that (1) the properties that make up the co-having particulars do not belong to the particulars but to the Forms, and (2) the co-had properties are distinct from the Forms.
Plato distinguishes between a property, e.g. Beauty, “itself” (auto to kalon), and beauty in beautiful things or in us (en hemin kalon) (Phaedo 102d). Beauty itself is perfect, eternal, transcendent and “unparticipated”. It is not for having. It cannot be co-had. What is co-had is an imperfect, transient, immanent and “participated” or “shared in” version or likeness (homoiotes) of Beauty, also referred to as “enmattered form” (enulon eidos).
This explains how Forms can be at once transcendent to and immanent in sensible objects, and suggests how Forms play a role in creation: they are the paradigms used by the Divine Intellect to shape the objects of the Cosmos. In other words, sensibles are nothing but a blend of matter and likenesses of Forms formed into things by the Divine Intellect.
The Forms’ paradigmatic status also clearly shows that they are not universals. They are ontologically prior to the creation of the things that share in their properties.
We can also see why the objects presented to our senses have no existence of their own, being mere combinations of likenesses of Forms without which they would not exist. Therefore, they are “not real” (or “less real”) when compared to the eternal, unchanging, and therefore real Forms.
The distinction between the status of Forms and sensible objects is also reflected in the way we cognize them. As indicated by their designation, sensibles are things we perceive by means of sense-perception. We see things like “girl”, “horse”, “lyre”, and we see “beauty” in them. The process of cognition begins with the data presented to the mind by the faculties of sensory perception, e.g., “girl” and “beauty”. But when we make a predicative judgment as in the statement “the girl has beauty (or is beautiful)”, then we transcend the level of sense-perception and rise to the level of intellection.
It is this ability of the human mind to rise above the particularity of sensory data to the universality of thinking that enables us to use language and build thought constructs from the most simple to the most complex. And the mind does this on the basis of Sameness, Identity, and Difference, i.e., the Forms that Plato is talking about and without which thinking and communicating would be impossible.
So, Plato’s Forms perform a dual explanatory function in respect of both (1) human cognition and (2) cosmic creation. Human intellect generates predicative thought in conjunction with principles such as sameness, identity, difference. Divine Intellect generates the sensible world in conjunction with Forms of which the said principles are “likenesses”. This means that the Forms are the ontological basis for predicative thought. However, in both cases the creative agent or efficient cause is intelligence (nous).
If we use the four-stage model described in the Analogy of the Cave, we can identify four phases of cognition:
1. Eikasia (sensory data accepted uncritically): We see a beautiful girl.
2. Pistis (belief accepted on trust): The awareness arises in our mind that the girl’s beauty is not perfect and that a more perfect beauty must exist. (As Socrates puts it, even the most beautiful girl will be “ugly” when compared to the Gods (and Goddesses) - Hipp. Maj. 289b)
3. Dianoia (knowledge based on reason): We conceive in our mind the concept of perfect beauty.
4. Noesis (intuition or insight): We have a direct experience of the Form of Beauty itself.
We can see from this that all elements of cognition from sense-perception to Form are rungs in the ladder that takes us from the lowest forms of cognition to the highest and, ultimately, to Ultimate Reality (the One) itself. The agent of this process of ascent is intelligence, in the same way Intelligence was the agent in the process of descent (or cosmic creation).
This is the position normally taken in Platonism. But, as I said, it is by no means mandatory.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Personally, I see the One as not comparable to a particular sensible object. To begin with, it is not an instance of a universal. So it is not a particular. :smile:
OK, so you define "the One" with "first principle", so that passages which are translated with the use of "first principle", you interpret as "the One".
Quoting Apollodorus
Why do you first say here, that they are participating in Beauty itself, then you say Beauty itself is the unparticipated?
Quoting Apollodorus
I disagree with this. I think it's very clear in The Symposium that the Idea of Beauty, which is Beauty itself, is participated in. And I can't find your reference in Phaedo. In any case, this discrepancy points to the problems of the theory of participation which I described earlier.
Quoting Apollodorus
A particular is not necessarily an instance of a universal. That is the conclusion of a judgement
But it can be one, no?
My point is that you choose to see the One as a “particular”. I choose not to. And I doubt that Plato does.
You asked me to “demonstrate” that the One is the Good.
I explained to you how I see it. And this is how it is normally seen in the Platonic tradition.
The One is mentioned in the dialogues and it was well-known within the Academy that Plato believed in a first principle of all called “the One”. We have the testimony of Plato’s successor Speusippus and Aristotle among others.
Aristotle himself says:
(A) The One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms are the cause of everything else.
(B) There are only two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause.
(C) There is a material principle called the “Great and Small” and an essence or formal principle called “the One”.
(D) The “Great and Small” or “Dyad” is traditionally identified with what is elsewhere called the “Unlimited and Limit” and with the One.
(E) Therefore the One is the ultimate cause of everything.
The mainstream Platonic position is that: (1) there is a first principle of all and (2) Plato reduces sensibles to Forms and Forms to a first principle called “the Good” or “the One”.
This is also the scholarly opinion:
- L. Gerson*, From Plato to Platonism, p. 117
[* Executive Committee, International Plato Society (1998-2004); Board of Directors, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies (2004-2010); Board of Directors, Journal of the History of Philosophy, (2007- ).]
As regards the Divine Intelligence, Plato makes the following statements:
The Creator-God is ever-existing and possesses the powers of joy, will, thought, and action (Tim. 34a, 37c).
He is “good” and the “supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos” (29e).
He desires that all should be, so far as possible, “like unto Himself” (29e).
He uses an “Eternal Model” that is “self-identical and uniform” (29a) to create the Soul of the Cosmos from a mixture of the Same, the Other, and Being (35a) which are the basic ingredients of intellect.
Having created the Soul of the Cosmos, the Creator-God creates the Corporeal part and fits the two together. And the living Cosmos “began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life lasting throughout all time” (36e).
So, to begin with, I think it is reasonable to regard the Creator-God as a form of Intelligence. And since he creates the Cosmos from the Same, Other, and Being, and according to certain eternal patterns such as Goodness, Order, and Beauty, it stands to reason that these patterns or Forms are within this very Intelligence itself.
The way I see it, it is the Divine Intellect that holds within itself all the Forms in a unified and ordered whole. Without this, the creation of a living, intelligent and ordered Universe emulating a perfect divine model, would be impossible.
As regards the identity of the One and the Good, both are described as “beyond being” or “beyond essence”.
In addition, Aristotle says:
(A) The Creator-God is above the Cosmos.
(B) The One/the Good is above the Creator-God.
(C) The One is the first principle and cause of all.
(D) Therefore the Creator-God is a manifestation of the One.
Of course, it is arguable that the One being ineffable, unfathomable, and above Being, the designation “the Good” is, strictly speaking, inappropriate for it and that the One becomes “the Good” only in relation to Being and Becoming. In this sense, the Good may logically be said to be subordinate to the One. Ultimately, however, the two are one and the same thing.
It follows that:
When we speak of the Ultimate on its own, we may refer to it as “the One”.
When we speak of the Ultimate in relation to Being and Becoming, we may refer to it as “the Good”.
When we speak of the Ultimate in relation to the Cosmos or Universe, we may refer to it as “Creative Intelligence”, “Divine Intellect”, Creator”, “Father”, etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They participate indirectly through the likeness of Beauty itself. Beauty itself remains unparticipated, in the realm of intelligibles. The only thing that is participated in in the sensible world is the visible likeness or "enmattered form".
Diotima in the Symposium is talking about the philosopher who has reached the highest level of knowledge. Only he can "see" Beauty itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The reference was to the Quality "itself" (e.g. Greatness or Largeness) as opposed to the quality "in us".
Substitute Beauty for Greatness/Largeness.
A Form is not only "one over many" but also "one and many", hence its explanatory function. As itself in itself, the Form is one. As likenesses, copies or instantiations of itself in the particulars, it is many. By analogy, the Sun is one, the reflections of its light in water and other light-reflecting objects are many.
In the Timaeus, Plato clearly distinguishes between (1) imperceptible "self-subsisting Forms" that can be grasped by reason only and (2) their visible counterparts or "copies" (mimemata) in the sensible world that are accessible to the senses and to opinion based on sense-data. The original Forms are eternally unparticipated:
[quote]This being so, we must agree that One Kind is the self-identical Form, ungenerated and indestructible, neither receiving into itself any other from any quarter nor itself passing anywhither into another, invisible and in all ways imperceptible by sense, it being the object which it is the province of Reason to contemplate; and a second Kind is that which is named after the former and similar thereto, an object perceptible by sense, generated, ever carried about, becoming in a place and out of it again perishing, apprehensible by Opinion with the aid of Sensation (Tim. 52a).
According to Aristotle, at your quoted passage, Plato differentiated between three categories, sensible things, Forms, and numbers. Numbers come from participation in "the One". But Forms are prior to Number, as Number is the medium between Forms and sensible things.
You have the order reversed, putting One, and therefore Number first, as prior to the Forms. But that's the way Aristotle describes the Pythagoreans, as saying that all things are Number. But he distinctly says that Plato differs from the Pythagoreans in this respect, placing Forms as prior, (being based in definition). The One, and Numbers, follow from the Forms, and finally sensible things.
[quote} Further, beside sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position...
..
...by participation in the One come the numbers" [quote]
I understand that "the One" in Plato, refers to a type of Form which is responsible for the existence of numbers. But "the One" is not necessarily the first principle, or first Form. For that position we must look to "the Good".
Quoting Apollodorus
I agree that from Plato's metaphysics we'd have to go this way. But I was saying that this does not make sense to me, for the reasons explained, so I would not follow Plato at this point.
Quoting Apollodorus
Placing the One as the first principle is inconsistent with the passage from Aristotle. Aristotle describes Plato as positing the One as the first principle of Number, but Number is in a place intermediate between the Forms and sensible things. So the Forms are prior to the One, and Number.
Quoting Apollodorus
The One, is a Form. And it is the cause of Number. But the good is not itself a Form. It transcends the Forms, as described in The Republic. The good is what makes the intelligible objects intelligible, as the light which shines on them. Therefore the good is prior to all Forms.
As I said, I was looking at it from a Platonic perspective. Of course the Good is prior to all Forms. I just don't see why the One should be a Form, or a Number.
But maybe we should look into this first:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that calling the Divine reality an “intellect” does not seem right. Personally, I think “intelligence” or “mind” (cf. French “intelligence” or German “Geist”) would be preferable. But even better would be to leave the Greek nous untranslated. After all, Plato has been read in the original language for many centuries, and it can’t do any harm to familiarize ourselves with a few Greek words.
Unfortunately, in the English-language literature it tends to be translated as “intellect”, probably under the influence of Latin “intellectus”. Another typical example is translating “phronesis” as “prudence” which not only sounds like cringe-making Victorian nonsense, but in some cases it amounts to an unacceptable distortion.
Having said that, the Greek “nous” itself, as used from the time of Homer and others, has two main meanings that are relevant here. It can mean something like (1) the faculty of “intuition” or “insight” in the sense of direct inner vision or grasp of a thing or situation or (2) the faculty of reasoned thinking.
Plato describes the human soul (psyche) as having three basic aspects:
1. Logistikon: reasoning aspect.
2. Thymoeides (thymos): volitional and emotional aspect, responsible for states like anger; shame; outrage; offended sense of justice; desire to assert oneself and to be effective; self-esteem; courage; sexual passion.
3. Epithymetikon (epithymia): the seat of basic bodily needs and urges such as hunger, thirst, sexual desire.
However, this is not the whole story. There is something missing there and this is that aspect of the soul that is responsible for the five sensory faculties of sight, smell, taste, hearing, and feeling by touch.
There is an additional aspect responsible for motor faculties such as locomotion, etc. But the relevant part here is the sensory or sensual aspect that we may provisionally call “aisthetikon” (from aesthesis, sensation).
And, of course, the nous which is often used interchangeably with logos. Though according to Plato, it is the faculty that perceives the Forms, it can also mean the reasoning faculty.
This suggests that the two are actually one, with the nous as the higher, “spiritual” part, representing the innermost core of the soul, responsible for intuition or insight. This being a more fundamental form of intelligence than thinking, the nous is that part of the soul that could be termed awareness or consciousness.
So, basically, the soul or psyche refers to the whole psycho-mental apparatus with the nous at its very center and therefore inseparable from it. Otherwise said, the nous is the soul proper and reason, etc. are an extension of it.
In terms of Divine Intelligence, it is evident from the Timaeus that the Creator or Maker (ho Poion) of the Universe possesses the powers of consciousness, joy, will, knowledge, and action. This logically makes it an Intelligence in the first place, though it does have some characteristics normally ascribed to the human intellect.
By analogy to the human soul, I think it wouldn’t be wrong to say that the One is something like pure, infinite, and undivided awareness that at the time of creation first becomes consciousness, i.e., self-awareness, as a form of “duality” or pair of opposites (Dyad), followed by multiplicity.
This would correspond to Plato’s Dyad of “Unlimited and Limit” that gives rise to the third principle of “Mixed”, completing the “Intelligible Triad”, i.e., the Creative Intelligence that in turn brings forth the world of multiplicity.
This Intelligible Triad is analogous to “the Same, the Other, and Being” from a blend of which Plato in the Timaeus tells us that the Creator-God made the Soul of the Cosmos, and from a diluted form of which he made the human souls (Tim. 35a, 41d).
The human soul being a creation of Divine Intelligence, it has something of that within itself. And that something is the nous. This means that the soul’s primary connection with Divine Intelligence is the nous.
Naturally, the Forms are another connection. Though they are not the ultimate reality, they may take the soul to the Divine Intelligence that contains them, and from there it may attain a glimpse of the infinite awareness of the Absolute or the One.
Bearing the above in mind, the hierarchy of intelligence may be arranged in the following order:
1. The One or the Good.
2. Nous as Divine Intelligence containing Forms.
3. Nous as human intelligence capable of directly grasping the Forms.
4. Logistikon, “reason” or intelligence capable of conceiving mathematical or ideal objects like the Forms.
5. Aisthetikon, intelligence capable of sensory perception and imagination.
The same human nous that is capable of grasping the Forms is equally capable of recognizing its essential identity with the highest Nous that is its source. It is the essential identity between the two that makes the soul’s return to the One possible: if the Divine Nous contains the Forms within itself, then the human soul by means of its own nous is potentially capable of grasping the Forms - once it has freed itself from the limitations of body, mind, and the material world.
And the path to freedom, that is, the Platonic Way Upward, is dialectic or the art of “dividing and collecting” (dieresis) discussed in the Philebus, that is based on the principles of Sameness, Identity, and Difference, and that elevates the soul to the original Intelligent Triad which is the gateway to the One, the first principle of all.
Aristotle says:
(A) A Cause is prior to that of which it is the cause.
(B) The One is the cause of the essence in the Forms.
(C) Therefore the One is prior to the Forms.
If (A) The Forms are distinct from the Good
and (B) The Forms are the causes of everything else (apart from themselves),
then (C) The Forms are the causes of the Good.
If we take Aristotle’s statement, “the Forms are the causes of everything else” in an absolute sense, then they will be the cause of the Good, not only of the One.
Therefore the Forms are not the causes of absolutely everything else, only of what is posterior to them, i.e., the sensibles.
Why do these need to be "aspects" of the soul, and not simply the soul itself which is responsible for these things? Otherwise, we could start naming every activity of a living body, like the heartbeat for example, and ask what is the aspect of the soul which is responsible for this. That's how Aristotle greatly simplified this type of description, in On the Soul, by naming these activities as potencies of the soul. So he lists some of them, self-nutritive, self-movement, sensation, intellection. He argues that the powers of the soul are each one, a potentiality, because each one is not active all the time. Since they are potentialities which need to be actualized, he claims the soul itself as the first principle of actuality, which is responsible for actualizing the various potencies.
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes, I saw this, and it is inconsistent with what he said about Plato the very page before, what I quoted. It makes me wonder how accurate this account of Plato's metaphysics, which Aristotle presents, really is. Aristotle presented it to refute it, so it's likely a bit of a straw man.
Quoting Apollodorus
Since Aristotle's statement directly contradicts what he said just the page before, I don't think these statements are reliable in any sense.
I think Aristotle was genuinely struggling to understand as much of Plato as he had read and (mis)understood as well as insisting that one or another of his own reductions was sufficient to explain all. Since Plato was a self-publisher, much as today's bloggers are, he was free to adjust and amend his previous books on the run, as he saw fit. If this was the case, then Aristotle who had divorced himself from Plato and the later books, would have been left in confusion when faced with the Theaetetus' psychology and the Timaeus' atomism and cosmology. With the Parmenides, Plato had already refuted and abandoned his middle-period metaphysics in favor of the much more complex Sophists and Philebus.
Incidentally, this is very like what Platonists have suffered with throughout the ages to varying degrees depending on how deep they are in Aristotelean reductionism, whether that be on the 'universal' or 'material' side. The vast majority (all?) of translations are metaphysically wrong-headed, and interpretation based on Aristotelean mis-translation then become next to worthless. As old as the Cornford works are, they are still invaluable because of their depth, and because he made the fewest gross errors.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct. Plato provides his “tripartite division” of the soul by way of explanation and because it serves his purpose of comparing the soul’s three aspects or elements (eide) to the three social classes of the ideal city. Aristotle himself calls them “parts” (moria), which can give rise to all kinds of misunderstandings.
However, we need to use our judgement and see that the soul really is indivisible. We may classify its functions logically, but in reality, they are simply the soul’s powers, or activities of the soul (psyches energeiai), by means of which it perceives and interacts with itself and the world. In other words, they are the means by which human intelligence manifests its powers in the same way Divine Intelligence manifests its own. This is why intelligence in the Platonic perspective is the underlying substratum to look for.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, Aristotle definitely needs to be taken with a grain of salt. And the problem is compounded by the fact that anti-Platonists tend to use Aristotle to attack Plato and Platonism, so extra care is needed to avoid being dragged down murky side alleys from where it may be difficult to find our way back to the safety of the main road.
Fortunately, the problem has been taken up by a number of scholars who have thrown a lot of fresh light on Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato, especially his “Theory of Forms”. Gail Fine’s On Ideas, named after Aristotle’s Peri Ideon, is one of the classics that offer a valuable analysis of the subject.
This does not mean that Aristotle’s testimony is valueless, though, only that we need to read him carefully, avoid falling into the trap of questionable translations, and use our own judgement.
After all, even someone who is lying will normally say some things that are true or otherwise provide you with subtle clues that together with other clues may amount to an actionable lead. And I’m not suggesting that Aristotle is lying.
As Socrates puts it, if we want to find the truth we must actively pursue it like a hunter hunting down an elusive quarry - no easy task and requires lots of effort and skills! Sometimes we may have to proceed like a police detective or military intelligence officer. :smile:
In any case, I believe that Aristotle can throw some light on certain aspects of Platonic doctrine, but only to the degree that his testimony is supported by that of other authors.
In the context of what has been discussed, he does make some important statements, e.g.:
Here we can clearly see the equivalence of the One and the Good which is supported by other sources showing that the One and the Good are not only identical but prior to nous and ousia. If to this we add statements to the effect that the One is the cause of the essence of Forms and Forms are the cause of everything else, i.e., sensible particulars, then everything begins to fall into place.
We also need to take things in the right context.
For example, the word “one” (hen) can have many meanings. The most important of these is “One in the sense of ultimate principle beyond being”. The second-most important is “One in the sense of Monad as a principle of Number”. The third is “one as a number”, etc.
Obviously, these are not identical meanings. “The One” (to Hen) is not the same as “a one” or “a henad” (he henas).
Numbers may, indeed, be said to be “between Forms and sensibles” but only in the sense of abstract mathematical ideas, i.e., in the domain of reason, which is certainly not what the One as ultimate principle is.
It is true that there are Pythagorean elements in the dialogues but it is important to remember that (1) for Plato everything is a means to an end and (2) he is under pressure to show that his own system is superior to others. So, what Plato is doing is to incorporate from other systems what he thinks is not only the best but also most consistent with his own views, and most useful in enabling the philosopher to attain his goal.
But it is clear that despite the Pythagorean aspects of Plato’s doctrine, numbers are not the key to understanding Plato. The key is intelligence itself, how it works, how individual intelligence mirrors a higher intelligence, and how it makes Plato’s philosophy a practical method of elevating human cognition from the most basic to the highest possible:
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If there are “numbers in themselves”, there must be awareness of them. And that awareness can only be the Divine Intelligence that contains them.
Plato is a very complex writer who uses metaphor, allegory, myth, logic, mathematics, astrology, harmony theory, and even humor to convey a message. But his personality and life show that he also is a writer who is dead serious about his overarching philosophical project. And I think those who take him seriously have more to gain than those who don’t.
There is no reason for you to insert "the Platonists" here. I see footnotes mentioning Pseusippus in this section, but it's well known that he was not consistent with Plato.
If you read what Aristotle says about this idea, the equivalence of the One and the Good at this part of the text, and also what Aristotle says about how Plato related the One to Number, and to the Forms at other places (like your previous reference), you ought to come to the understanding that this is not a position held by Plato.
Quoting Apollodorus
It is evident from what Aristotle says, and also from what Plato wrote, that Plato held "One" in the second sense, a principle of number.
Quoting Apollodorus
Do you see the problem which you are developing here? Plato clearly used "One" in the sense of a principle of number, ("abstract mathematical idea"). And, "ultimate principle" clearly refers to "the good", for Plato. Nowhere do we find Plato using "One" in the sense of "ultimate principle".
Quoting Apollodorus
This is definitely true.
The reason for my insertion is the translator's (Hugh Tredennick's) own note:
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 14, section 1091b
Tredennick actually says "Plato".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, "one" can and does mean different things in different contexts.
However, the fact remains that Aristotle says that:
1. According to Plato the One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms the cause of everything else.
2. According to Plato the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the One (Meta. 978b).
3. Some (presumably Plato and his followers) say that the One itself is the Good itself. The Greek text is “???? ?? ?? ?? ?????? ???? ?????” (auto to hen to agathon auto einai) = literally, “the One itself is the Good itself”. This sounds very much like Platonic language to me.
Additionally, Plato himself says that the One is without beginning nor end and unlimited:
The way I see it, this can only mean that the One is the first principle of all. Like everything else, the numbers too ultimately derive from the One. The one does not exclude the other.
The problem arises only when we take the One to be the cause of numbers and nothing else. IMO it is a stance that tends to turn everything upside-down and muddle the issue instead of solving anything.
You'll see that your footnote refers to your previous reference. And here, Aristotle discusses the difference between the Pythagoreans, and Plato. When Aristotle says "some", and Tredennick refers back to this part of the text, we must take this "some" to refer to the Pythagoreans rather than Plato, because it is explained that Plato distinguished Numbers from Forms, whereas the Pythagoreans did not. Also, it is explained that for Plato the One is the first principle of Number. Therefore it is clearly a mistake of Tredennick to say that "some" here refers to Plato, because it was the Pythagoreans, not Plato, who did not separate Numbers from Forms, thereby equating the Number "One" with "the good".
Furthermore, consider that "some" is plural, and Plato is an individual. Plato excluded himself from "the Pythagoreans" by proposing a very unique and distinct perspective, so it is impossible that "some" refers to the unique Plato. Your previous proposal, "the Platonists", allows for the reality of "some", but the "Platonists" at that time, taught by Pseusippus, were closer to the Pythagoreans than Plato.
Quoting Apollodorus
Let's get this straight. At 987b, Aristotle very explicitly says that Plato placed Number as intermediary between Forms and sensible things. Further, Forms are the causes of all things, and from the Form of "One" come the numbers. Then Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things.
The key to understanding Plato's real position is the way that he treats Number, as explained by Aristotle. The infinite is not "one" as a number (Pythagorean), but a multitude, as "great and small". That's how Aristotle explains the important difference. This perspective is a product of Plato's analysis of definition, his dialectics, which the others did not use.
Notice now, that under Plato's dialectical principles, "the infinite" is a Form which transcends "the One", as referring to the multitude of great and small, rather than a unity "one", or "one as a principle of number. Plato then uses the difference between the dyad and the One, to demonstrate that not all things can be produced from Number, "one" for the Greeks was not a number. This places Forms as prior to numbers.
Then Aristotle proceeds at 988a with "Yet what happens is the contrary...", and he proceeds to discuss the problem of creating a multitude of individuals from one Form. But this is a misrepresentation of what he has already stated that Plato said. Plato has placed Forms, represented by "infinite", into the category of the multitude, great and small, not into the category of One. So there is no such problem of creating a multitude out of one Form, because One is not the first principle of Forms, great and small is, which implies a multitude rather than One.
Aristotle then states what you claimed, Forms are the causes of all things, and the One is the cause of Forms. But this is clearly inconsistent with what he has painstakingly described as Plato's position.
Quoting Apollodorus
You are making the mistake which Fooloso4 made earlier with The Sophist. Fooloso4 presented the argument of the visitor as if it were Plato's argument, when in reality Plato was demonstrating the deficiencies of the visitor's argument, as sophistry. Here, you present the argument of Parmenides as if it is Plato's argument, when in reality Plato is demonstrating the deficiencies of such a sophistic argument.
There is no reason to think that Plato would have held different views at the time.
"The Platonists" is not my proposal. It is in the English translation at 1087b:
Aristotle himself refers to Plato at 988a25.
Aristotle says that Plato recognizes only two basic causes:
1. The cause of essence which is the One.
2. The material cause which is the “Great and the Small”, a.k.a. the “Indefinite Dyad”.
Aristotle also says that according to Plato the One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms are the causes of everything else.
I see the character of the sophist differently. My position is somewhere between yours and Fooloso4’s.
Plato deliberately blurs the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist to make a point. And for this purpose, he must reverse some of the characters' claims, in order to show that the philosopher can appear as a sophist and the sophist as a philosopher.
Accordingly, the three basic alternatives in order of correctitude are:
1. Some of the things the sophist says must be right.
2. The philosopher is always right.
3. The sophist is always right.
The art of philosophical discrimination or discernment (diakritike) is to identify the statements that are most likely to be consistent with truth as seen by Plato.
This is what makes the issue as presented in the dialogues appear so complex. However, if we work on the premise that (a) Plato’s philosopher is committed to finding the truth, and that (b) the truth is one, then it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the One is the ultimate truth.
You are willfully ignoring what I wrote, how Aristotle describes what Plato said, at 987b. This is where the detailed report of what Plato said on this issue is found. You also ignore the fact that at the lead in to 988a, Aristotle states without logical support, "Yet what happens is the contrary...". Then he proceeds to state what you say he says about Plato at 988a, which is contrary to what he says Plato said at 987b. This is simply Aristotle's unsupported conclusion of "what happens" according to Aristotle, if we follow Plato's principles. But there is no logical support for this claim of "what happens".
I am not ignoring it. I am simply making the point that we cannot automatically dismiss all the statements made in the dialogues or elsewhere on the grounds that they are "not Plato's teachings". After all, Socrates himself often agrees with his interlocutors. So, the latter are not always telling lies or talking nonsense.
This is particularly evident in dialogues like the Sophist and we need to think twice before dismissing something just because it comes from the mouth of a sophist. As I said earlier, ever liars may say some things that are true.
At the end of the day, the actual author is Plato, using his characters to convey a message to his readers. Hence the need to focus on him at all times, not get distracted by the characters or anything else.
The way I see it, Plato’s idea of reducing sensible particulars to intelligible Forms and intelligible Forms to one irreducible first principle makes perfect sense. This idea was taken up by Speusippus, who certainly believed in the One as a first principle of all as acknowledged by Aristotle (though he may have disagreed on other points).
Aristotle mentions Speusippus at 12.1072b and repeats his views several times. At 5.1092a he says:
Gerson comments:
- From Plato to Platonism, pp. 135-6
When Aristotle says:
this could well be a view held in the Academy.
I think the belief in one ultimate first principle followed by Forms followed by sensible particulars is compatible with Plato.
Once we admit this principle, the main problem that presents itself is the precise relation (1) between the First Principle and Forms, (2) between Forms themselves, and (3) between Forms and particulars (or Being and Becoming).
As we have seen, Plato taught that particulars have no existence (or essence) of their own. They depend for their existence on “copies” of Forms whose properties they instantiate.
He later developed this idea, introducing the view that sensibles result from the interaction of “form-copies” (homoiotes) and the “receptacle” (hypodoche), which is a form of all-pervading space that serves as a medium for the elements out of which material objects are fashioned. So the objects are made of primary elements shaped by form-copies.
The Forms themselves first seem to be separate both from the material objects and from each other, but are later said to combine with each other in various ways that are classified under certain groups or genera that are in turn subordinate to a higher principle.
Finally, the principles of Limit and Unlimited are introduced to explain how the material Universe or Cosmos is generated: Limit imposes Ideal Ratios (Forms or Shapes and Numbers) on uninformed or unlimited Primordial Matter (the “receptacle” containing the precosmic elements).
However, this is done “through participation in the One”, which may be interpreted to mean that the One, the ultimate first principle, imposes limit upon itself in order to bring forth the world of multiplicity.
Plato may or may not have explicitly held this position, but his teachings, as far as they are known, seem to point in this direction and they were interpreted in this sense by later Platonists.
The writings of Aristotle and other authors indicate that Plato was a serious philosopher, not a novelist, and that members of the Academy took the wider Platonic project seriously.
At the same time, the apparent plurality of views within the Academy suggests that Plato was not a dogmatic teacher and that he allowed some freedom of interpretation.
Given that Plato’s own teachings were not static but were developed by him over time, there is no reason why they cannot be further developed by Plato’s followers, provided that this is consistent with Plato’s own general views.
Certainly, the people who first domesticated the horse would not have objected to the introduction of saddles and stirrups. The inventors of the wheel (originally a solid disc) would not have objected to the introduction of spokes. The inventors of the stone ax would not have objected to the development of axes made of steel, etc.
What Plato really believed is impossible to know with absolute certitude. But the Way Upward he sketched in his dialogues clearly tells us that philosophy consists in inquiring into truth through a constant transcendence of knowledge and experience, whilst always aiming for the absolute highest.
Plato shows us the way or direction and offers us his philosophy as a vehicle for making the journey. It is for us to learn how to drive it, to make improvements on it as required, and for us to decide how far we travel ....
What does that say about Gerson's credibility as an expert on ancient philosophy?
Since Plato incorporated and synthesized almost all philosophy of his time into an extended multifaceted corpus, he can be claimed by followers any one of those philosophies to be of their own limited persuasions.
Metaphysically speaking, Aristotle's position was looked at and rejected by Plato except in the narrowest sense.
The Cratylus rejects the view that words or the world are the source of the Forms, and the notion that material objects have reality was abhorrent to Plato.
Instead, the basis of Plato's participatory realism is in fleeting appearances that come and go, are and are not, in a moving dynamic world of objects+chora.
Well, he also says that Aristotle was a Platonist.
However, this needs to be understood in the right context. What Gerson is talking about is what he calls "Ur-Platonism".
He argues against some scholars' opinion that there is no philosophical position in the dialogues, and proposes that Plato does have a philosophy, that the dialogues are the best evidence of this, and that Plato's philosophy is part of broader philosophical developments that were already underway before Plato. Hence "Ur-Platonism".
He describes the elements of Ur-Platonism as "antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism", i.e. tendencies that coalesce to form the basis of Plato's own philosophy.
After all, Plato did incorporate and synthesized much of the philosophy available at the time, but he did not do so uncritically or indiscriminately. On the contrary, Plato was widely recognized as a philosopher precisely because he offered a reasoned rejection of some philosophical positions and modified others in a way that made sense to his audience.
Let's not forget that Aristotle himself was a member of the Academy and developed his own ideas of "Unmoved Mover", "soul", etc., that do show Platonic influence despite differences.
In any case, Gerson expressly says that his proposal is a "theoretical framework for analysis" not a history of philosophy.
Plato's Metaphysics? I thought the idea was first thought of and the expression coined by Aristotle. How can someone refer to something that was invented several decades after his death?
You can argue over that.
Because the reason I am joining this conversation is different. I just wanted to find Fooloso4.
This is my question and its explanation:
Socrates in Plato's books always argues with everyone else, and always wins the arguments. (Not so, but that's the the general consensus around here so I'll ride along.) This made me thought: if people argued against his ideas differently; that is, if the arguments were different in their very essence, then would Socrates have developed a different philosophy that would be different from his actual - historical? I mean, if one argues that the grass is blue, then Socrates would need to respond and convince the poor sap who argued, that the grass is yellow; whereas if the sap argued that the grass is red, then Socrates would pounce on his words and make the sap agree that the grass is green. (I honestly believe that the grass is green due to this very effect by Socrates. Even nature knows better than to argue with Socrates.)
So would Socrates' philosophy be different in essence and detail, if people disagreed with him on different grounds than the specific examples described in the books?
I am still here, but for reasons that may be obvious to you and some others I have decided not to respond to what has transpired in this thread.
Quoting god must be atheist
I don't think Socrates argued in order to be argumentative, but his arguments were at times sophistic and rhetorical. The difference between him and the sophists he was critical of was a matter of intention. His concern was to determine what in each case is best. Unless someone persuaded him that his views on a subject should be changed, the difference in his response to different opinions would not represent a different philosophy, but the arguments he used would be different. As a result, what some took to be his philosophy might be, at least to some extent different.
I learned more than what I bargained for in your answer. What I learned is that a philosopher may have different overlays of philosophy concurrently. Some overlays in Socrates, as shown in your answer, was for instance the Forms, and the fact that his intention was to find the best outcome of a logical stream. Not just any good outcome, but the possible best outcome.
My philosophy (not that anyone would be interested) is atheistic materialism, and the overlay is strict adherence to logic and reason. I have instances of philosophy, and one that is different from that of others; But I have not have had the chance to test that one out because nobody cares to find fault with my two articles on the development and state of morality.
If I may ask (no intention to argue, just curious) Fooloso4, what are your overlays of philosophy? If too numerous to mention, just name some of your overlays that concurrently effect themselves.
What do you mean by overlays? You give an example of one of your own, strict adherence to logic and reason. While I see them as important, I think they are limited. Perhaps that is an adherence of Socratic ignorance.
When I divide a cloud then I have two clouds.
When I split an idea then I have nothing.
We are talking about 4th-century BC. I don't think we can apply modern standards to Ancient Greece.
Besides, Plato is using logical argumentation and other devices for the purpose of conveying a moral, political, and spiritual message. If the message gets through to the reader, then the writer has done a good job IMO.
Quoting magritte
That may be due to the fact that you'd need to catch the idea first before splitting it.
I bet you haven't caught any yet.
As for Plato, I think he is not even trying .... :smile:
Can you give some examples?
We can try this one:
This is a crucial problem in the Forms. If the opposites (complements or contraries?) 'greater than' and 'smaller than' are relative terms then everything and everyone participates in each of Greatness and Smallness to some degree. But to what degree? Only in context can this be determined, otherwise these terms and all other Forms are in danger of collapsing.
[Edit] What makes such problems especially challenging is that it is wise to assume that Plato's conception of participation to explain particulars and predication is fundamentally sound. This way, the quest becomes more formal in search of gaps and logical flaws in his model.
The belief in one ultimate first principle, is distinct from the belief that the One is the ultimate first principle. I think the former is compatible with Plato, the latter is not. This is because Plato believed in "the good" as the ultimate first principle, and in his writings he treated "the One" as something other than "the good".
Quoting Apollodorus
To say that particulars result from an interaction between forms and a receptacle is not the same as saying that particulars have no existence. "Existence" and "essence" are Latin terms, and there is a clear distinction between them. To say that a particular could have no essence is not to say that it would have no existence, and vise versa.
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But as Aristotle demonstrated it makes no sense to talk of a being (existent) without a form (essence). so if Plato thought of particulars as beings (existence) without form or essence, Aristotle cleared this up. Matter without form is unintelligible, but form without matter is logically coherent.
Overlays: two or more surfaces or layers of reasoning, imagination or description of observed systems, which are independent from each other, and both can be false or true without affecting the other's false or true nature.
I believe in atheist materialism, and in the usefulness of logic and reason. Logic and reason can be present while atheist materialism is not true, and atheist materialism can be present while logic is faulty, or invalid; but in the world of my own mind, the two are always true and useful together at the same time and in the same respect.
I think the resolution to our disagreement is to see that "the good" as described by Plato, chiefly in The Republic, is not a Form. This places it in another category from the One, which is a Form. If we make the good a Form, we are talking about the Form of Good, and this is something distinctly different from the good itself. But the One cannot be anything other than a Form.
Greater and smaller are relative terms when describing particular things, not the Forms themselves. Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, but Greatness itself is not greater or smaller.
Quoting magritte
Plato raises serious doubt about this:
Quoting Fooloso4
In the Phaedo Socrates also says that the Forms are an hypothesis.
And:
See also my discussion of the city at war in my discussion of Timaeus. The static Forms cannot account for a world that is active, a world in which there is chance and indeterminacy.
As already stated, the word “the One” (to Hen) can have many meanings. Aristotle himself points this out at the very beginning of Book 10.
The way I see it, not just Platonism but philosophy in general as inquiry into truth, must lead to an ultimate first principle or arche which, by definition, is one. Therefore, it is not incorrect to call the first principle “the One”, in the same way it is not incorrect to call the Good “one” or “the One”.
Once an ultimate first principle of all has been admitted, everything else is secondary. The ontological structure from the first principle down and the nomenclature can be debated and in fact it was debated within the Academy and has been debated within the Platonic tradition and among scholars ever since.
However, for the above reasons, the first principle must remain non-negotiable and non-debatable. And I think Plotinus and others are correct in (a) calling the first principle “the One” and (b) in identifying it with the Good.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct. The Greek terms are einai (“existence”) and ousia (“essence”). The fact that a thing has no essence does not mean that it has no existence.
The Form and the sensible object both exist, but not in the same way. The Form is a thing that is what it is in virtue of itself, i.e., in virtue of being its own essence. The Form is an auto kath’ auto thing, a thing that is just itself.
In contrast, the sensible object is what it is in virtue of participating in a Form’s essence. Therefore, the sensible object is dependent or relative, pros ti.
This is why Forms have ontological and metaphysical priority (and greater reality) in relation to sensibles.
Aristotle’s objections may or may not be valid. If they are valid, then they are so from Aristotle’s perspective, not necessarily from Plato’s.
For example, Aristotle’s objection that if Forms are paradigms (which they are), then they are useless as they cannot act as paradigms of their own accord. But this objection is baseless as it is not the Forms themselves that act as paradigms but the Divine Creative Intelligence that uses them as paradigms to give shape to material objects as suggested in the Timaeus. The agent is the Divine Intelligence, not the Forms.
The objection makes sense and may be valid from an Aristotelian perspective that rejects a Creator-God. From a Platonic perspective that admits a Creator-God/Creative Intelligence, it doesn’t make sense and it isn’t valid.
This is why anti-Platonists use Aristotle to attack Plato, as we have seen. It is a strategy designed to blur the distinctions between Plato and Aristotle and to propagate Aristotle’s misinterpretations of Plato in an attempt to denigrate Plato, Platonism, and Western philosophy in general. I think there is a clear political and ideological agenda there.
Metaphysical issues are strewn about throughout the Dialogues, seemingly after the fact as revisions of the initial publication perhaps to forestall facile reading and criticism (from within the Academy by people who thought they had better ideas). Everything must be read and remembered (haha) or else one must have an index of where relevant suggestions are hidden. To our great fortune, we have online search engines and easy access to professional explorations with bibliographies. With the aid of these, even we can take a stab at some of Plato's deepest thought.
The key to Plato's metaphysics is the Line. One must take seriously all four levels of division which are at a finer resolution than the two that are usually focused on by Aristotelian readings Plato. Four is minimal to allow sufficient intermediate steps required to get from the lowest level to the highest and back again, or as people would have it, the other way around.
It is hard to discover any description of the lowest level other than what Plato says dismissively, but this is the physical world, the one physics studied and studies, (see Kant's noumena). Participation connects this unknowable world to the real absolute Forms to momentarily produce ''objects' as appearances, (see Kant's phenomena). Since this is not logically possible then how can it be? That's the puzzle. Mathematicals can tell us about the Forms or some Forms, and about the physical world, but can they tell us what the connection is and how it might work?
Quoting Fooloso4
The Forms are not relative but absolute, Greatness and Smallness. Something greater has more Greatness and less Smallness, that's how Plato's relatives work. The conversion is flawed, as Plato knew, because Forms are point objects outside of space and time while relatives are along a common line. To work, an origin or standard for comparison would also be required. In the passage, Simmias is measured against two competing standards; at different times he is great and small. But if we lined all three up then Simmias would be both great and small at the same time.
Quoting Fooloso4
And so they are. Forms cannot be deduced from any source nor can they be directly observed which leaves only scientific hypotheses by the way of divine inspiration which happen to be the 'likeliest' and therefore should not be doubted. This may seem farfetched until we recognize that modern theoretical science works the same way.
Quoting Fooloso4
A two-tier metaphysics can't work because it is static and too dissimilar to be directly related. The relationship top-down one-many lacks both motivation and mechanism therefore nothing can happen, nothing can be caused. Plato's particulars can be neither static (Aristotle) nor in flux (Heracliteans) but exist momentarily (Bradley).
Quoting Fooloso4
Agreed. Forms as simples cannot be causative in the world.
Aristotle says philosophy is an inquiry into first principles. And if there is an equality in principles of a hierarchy then it might not be possible to give priority to one "first principle".
I think it might be incorrect to call the good "one", because the good is defined by what is sought, desired, and this is always a complexity rather than something simple. So the good is complex rather than simple.
But it isn't necessarily impossible.
The way I see it, in Plato’s metaphysics everything is secondary to intelligence and knowledge which presupposes a subject. Starting with the dictum “Know thyself”, Plato proceeds from the philosopher’s own individual intelligence to that intelligence which encompasses everything and is the cause and source of all knowledge and all intelligence. And this ultimate source and cause must be one. If it isn’t one, the philosopher must carry on his quest until he discovers that which is the ultimate one.
So, I think it is important to understand that despite the originality of later Platonists, they had the highest regard for their master and took great care to make sure that their own developments of Plato’s ideas were in line with the fundamental metaphysical principles found in the dialogues.
Philosophers like Plotinus not only spoke Greek and studied Plato’s works in the original (as did all philosophers in antiquity and even in later times), but also were in close touch with interpretative traditions going back to Plato himself, and, crucially, had access to texts that are now lost.
It would be beyond the scope of this thread to demonstrate that Plotinus correctly identifies the Good with the One, but I think it can still be briefly shown that he is more likely than not to be right. Moreover, Plotinus, following Plato and Aristotle, proposes an integrated metaphysical hierarchy that traces both the “Indefinite Dyad” and the “receptacle” to the One as the ultimate case of all things.
As already stated, Aristotle says:
Personally, I think he is referring here to the Platonists (and Plato) and this is confirmed by a number of scholars. But even supposing that he isn’t, there are other statements that when taken together, amount to the same thing.
Aristotle:
“The One, then, is the first principle of the knowability for each thing” (Aristot. Meta. 5.1016b20)
Socrates (Plato):
Further evidence is provided by the Parmenides:
It must be remembered that in the dialogue, Parmenides takes young Socrates to task over the Forms (129e-130a). Socrates can’t answer all the questions. It is Parmenides who saves the day by declaring that there must be Forms, because otherwise we will have nowhere to turn our thoughts to and this will totally destroy the power of dialectic (135b-c3).
The discussion eventually turns to the One and comes to the following conclusion:
So Plato, through Parmenides, is saying that nothing can exist without the One.
The “Others” are what Aristotle refers to as the “Indefinite Dyad” or “the Great and Small”. In Metaphysics, he says:
I think it is obvious that Aristotle here is referring to the Parmenides where the discussion of the participation of “the Others” (hoi Alloi) in the One takes place:
It follows that Plato sees the One as the ineffable ultimate first principle, followed by the Dyad of the “Unlimited and Limit” a.k.a. the “Great and Small” or “the Others”.
As stated by Aristotle, the One is the essence and formal cause and “the Others” are the material cause.
The Forms, Numbers, and the material universe are derived from the material cause (“Dyad” or “Others”) by participation in the efficient and formal cause (the One) that generates and gives shape and life to all things:
1. The One (= the Good).
2. The Dyad (= “the Others”/”Great and Small”/”Unlimited and Limit”).
3. Divine Creative Intelligence containing Forms.
4. Ensouled Material Universe.
5. Embodied human soul.
I think the confusion or misunderstanding stems from overinterpreting Aristotle, underinterpreting Plato, and failing to see (a) that the criticism presented by characters like Parmenides is ultimately constructive and (b) that Socrates actually agrees with the points made by the critics.
IMO Socrates’ approval and the inner logic of Plato’s philosophy (which is reflected in the solutions proposed) are the key to the correct understanding of Plato’s true message.
I started doing this long before online search engines. Most of the books on my shelf are not available online. Although an online search is a valuable source, it can give an illusion of knowledge. The same can be true of books and teachers too though. Given the plurality and diversity of interpretation one must still determine which views seem most insightful. In the Phaedrus he gives us a guide as to how to read his works. Like a living animal, each part is to be understood as it functions in the living whole.
Quoting magritte
As important as the divided line is, it is not the whole of Plato's metaphysics. It is part of political dialogue, both in the public sense and with regard to the politics of the soul. Socrates acts as a guardian of the truth, or, more precisely, against nihilism. But as he acknowledged, he does not know the truth of the Forms. He creates an image of the philosopher that is contrary to the lover of wisdom. The philosopher in the Republic is someone who possesses the true. The lowest level of the divided line is not transcended or abandoned. It is our abode, the city, the cave.
I do not agree that the Line is the key. It is a key element but it fails to present the indeterminate whole.
Quoting magritte
But this in not because the amount of Greatness he has changes, only that amount is greater or smaller than that of someone else. I don't see how this is an example of Plato's insufficient grasp of logical argument.
Quoting magritte
The hypothesis of divine inspiration is not a good reason to accept without doubt the hypothesis of Forms.
Reading Plato is like a quantum mechanical view of the physical world. What we see is an interaction between the reader and the text. Who we are and what we look for is half the interpretation of a (somewhat wrongly) presumed authoritatively objective source. Would-be politicians might read the Republic and the Laws, theologians seek God and the eternal in the Timaeus.
But Forms and particulars are only hypothetical constructs that are literally nonsense unless shown to be logically related as parts of a greater edifice. Sure, the Line is just the scaffolding but without it everything collapses whether that be ontology, ethics, politics, psychology, and even God.
In The Republic, the good is compared to the sun, in the sense that the good makes intelligible objects intelligible, in the same way that the sun makes visible objects visible. Since intelligence is dependent on intelligible objects, and the intelligibility of intelligible objects, we ought to conclude that in Plato's metaphysics, intelligence and knowledge are secondary to the good.
I think that recognizing this is key to understanding Socrates' and Plato's approach to the sophists who claimed to teach virtue. Plato demonstrated that knowing what is good or right, will not ensure that a person will do it, as people commonly choose to do what they know is bad, or wrong. So the old adage, "virtue is knowledge", along with the claims of the sophists, to teach virtue, are proven wrong. This problem was dealt with in great depth by St. Augustine, but the reality of it, demonstrates that the good is higher than, and distinct from, knowledge. I believe that this is the most important lesson to be learned from Plato, and it is central to a number of the dialogues. How is it that knowing what is good, is insufficient to inspire one to actually do what is good? But Plato's recognition of this reality means that he placed knowledge and intelligence as secondary to the good.
Quoting Apollodorus
See, the subject here, is "the Good", not "the One". And "the Good" transcends both essence and existence. The One is always reducible to an essence.
Quoting Apollodorus
See, it is proposed here that the One is the essence of "unlimited".
Quoting Apollodorus
Please reread the quoted passage and pay extra attention to the first line: "It is impossible to conceive of many with one". So what is shown is that "One" is first in conception, it is the first "form", but this does not demonstrate that it is the first in existence. "The Good", as required for, and cause of, conception, is prior to "the One" which is the result of conception.
Quoting Apollodorus
"The good" is the final cause in Aristotle, and is prior to all the other causes. That you relate "the One" to formal cause is further evidence that the One is distinct from the Good. The good is the final cause.
"Final cause" simply means the purpose for which something is caused.
The same thing can logically function as efficient cause, material cause, formal cause, and final cause.
Like the Good, the One provides essence to the Forms, but is itself above essence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sure. Intelligence may be dependent on intelligible objects in ordinary experience. But this is not the case with regard to the One or the Good. The One or the Good may perfectly well be a form of "objectless" intelligence.
For example:
1. Pure objectless Awareness.
2. Consciousness or Self-Awareness.
3. Intelligence or Awareness of intelligible objects perceived as part of itself.
4. Intelligence or Awareness of intelligible objects perceived as other than itself.
If we think of the ultimate first principle as pure objectless awareness, that at the time of creation becomes first consciousness or self-awareness, i.e. awareness having itself for object, and then intelligence, i.e. awareness containing and organizing intelligible objects, e.g. Forms, then we can see that there is a big difference between Divine Intelligence (levels 1, 2, 3) and human intelligence (level 4).
I think the easiest way to understand Plato and Platonism is to look at Creation as a diversification or “multiplification” of what is absolutely one.
Therefore, to discover the absolutely one or “the One itself” we must apply a reverse process of simplification or reduction of multiplicity to its first causal principle.
The literal meaning of arche is “beginning” or “origin”. To obtain true knowledge of anything, the philosopher must rise above assumptions or hypotheses to the first principle itself. In relation to knowledge, the philosopher must rise to its very origin or source.
Hence we are told that the Good is the source of all knowledge:
Here we have all the elements of knowledge (and of reality):
Object of knowledge.
Knowledge of the object.
Means of knowledge.
Knowing subject.
(Human) knowledge itself consists of (a) sensory data and (b) reasoned thinking that uses the principles of Sameness, Identity, and Difference, to organize the sensory data in a way that makes the world intelligible.
These principles enable us to classify everything according to certain essential and immutable universal properties called Forms.
The various classes of Forms are known by the Form of Knowledge (to Eidos tes Epistemes) itself (Parm. 134b).
But (as we are told in the Parmenides) we do not possess the Form of Knowledge.
Therefore, the Form of the Good and Beauty and the others that we conceive as Forms themselves are unknown to us, even though our knowledge depends on them.
And if anything partakes of Knowledge itself, there is no one more likely than God to possess this most accurate knowledge.
[This is consistent with the Timaeus where God is the Divine Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms and creates the universe using the Forms as a model.]
But if God has Knowledge itself, he will not have knowledge of human things if there is no relation between the world of Forms and the human world.
Therefore he who hears such assertions is confused in his mind and argues that the Forms do not exist, and even if they do exist cannot by any possibility be known by man; and he thinks that what he says is reasonable, and he is amazingly hard to convince.
Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and only a still more wonderful man can find out all these facts and teach anyone else to analyze them properly and understand them.
On the other hand, if anyone, with his mind fixed on all these objections and others like them, denies the existence of Forms, and does not assume a Form under which each individual thing is classed, he will be quite at a loss, since he denies that the Form of each thing is always the same, and in this way he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion or dialectic.
To train ourselves completely to see the truth perfectly, we must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true.
For example, we should inquire into the consequences to the One and the Many on the supposition that the One or the Many exist or not.
The conclusion, as we saw, is that “If the One is not, nothing is” (Parm. 166b).
In other words:
Intelligible Forms must exist in order for the Material World to be intelligible to us.
There must be a relation between the Forms and the Material World.
The relation between Forms and material objects is one in which the latter participate in the former.
Similarly, the Forms participate in the One and the Dyad.
The Dyad participates in the One.
The One is the ultimate first principle of all.
Otherwise said:
The One generates the Dyad.
The One and the Dyad generate the Forms.
The One, the Dyad, and the Forms generate Creative Intelligence.
The One as Creative Intelligence generates the Material Universe consisting of Soul and Matter.
Soul derives from the One, Matter derives from the Dyad or Receptacle, a form of Primordial Matter that the Creative Intelligence, using the Forms as patterns, forms first into the four primary elements, fire, water, earth and air, and then forms these into the objects of the universe from heavenly bodies to a lump of earth.
The One itself and all its products being a form of Intelligence, the Material World consists of various forms of intelligence from the World Soul down to the souls of intelligent living beings to inanimate things.
It follows that Intelligence is the only reality. Or, Reality is intelligence. And because it is one, it is called “the One” (to Hen). Because it is good, it is called “the Good”, etc.
So, we can see that the theory in its fundamental principles is not unsound. What remains to be addressed is whether any of this can actually be known to us. Plato in this regard clearly states that the Form of the Good which is the source of all knowledge can be known:
When Plato says that truth is “unknown” or “unknowable” to us, he does not mean this in an absolute sense. If he did mean it in an absolute sense, then philosophy as inquiry into truth would be futile. Therefore, what Plato obviously means is that truth cannot be known by ordinary means such as sense-perception.
As Socrates (Plato) puts it in the Phaedo:
Detaching itself mentally and emotionally from the material world, physical body, sense-perceptions, and thoughts associated with these, the soul’s (or man’s) pure intelligence (nous) uses dialectic, recollection, and contemplation to obtain a direct experience of reality.
And because reality itself is intelligence, it stands to reason that intelligence can know reality. In fact, human intelligence already knows this subconsciously or intuitively. All it needs to do is to bring this latent intuition to the fore so that it becomes an actual experience.
To take an illustration from physics, matter is said to consist of components that are not only increasingly smaller and therefore “immaterial”, but that also behave in an ordered and “purposeful” manner that resembles a rudimentary form of intelligence.
If we break cognition down into its primary components, we obtain a similar result leading to intelligence, consciousness, or awareness itself. This is the objective of Platonic philosophy.
No, it's distinctly called "a cause". So a purpose acts as a cause, through intention and free will. Do you understand, and believe in, the reality of free will? If so, you'll see that purpose, as intention is, a cause. This is what Plato meant by "the good", what Aristotle called final cause, the reason why things are brought into being, from not-being. Some potential is seen to be good, so it is brought into existence, caused to be. And this applies not only to material things, but Forms as well. This is why the good is prior to all Forms, as their cause, including One, and Dyad.
Quoting Apollodorus
We obviously have very different understandings of Plato.
Quoting Apollodorus
Right, we are in agreement here. and "the Good" is not only the source of all knowledge, but of all being, and beings, Forms and everything, as the cause, final cause of their existence. Things have been caused to exits because their existence is good.
Yes. Seen to be good, brought into existence, caused to be, etc. by the same one Reality that acts as efficient, material, formal, and final causes. There is nothing else apart from that one Reality. Referring to the One as “formal cause” does not preclude the possibility of its being the other causes, including the ultimate cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed. Very different and very obvious. :smile:
You possibly read Plato through a more Aristotelian lens than I do.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct. They have been caused by the Good a.k.a. the One.
Anyway, as I was saying, it was a well-known fact among the Ancient Greeks that the essence of wisdom was knowledge of oneself. This was encapsulated in the celebrated maxim “Know thyself” (gnothi seauton) that was inscribed at the Apollo temple of Delphi.
Plato himself mentions the Delphic maxims in the Hipparchus (228e) and the Protagoras (343b), and says that they “are on every tongue”.
[Indeed, the Delphic maxims (numbering 147 in total) were known as “the Commandments of the Seven Wise Men” and were taken to other parts of the Greek-speaking world, as far as Egypt and Afghanistan, by none other than Aristotle’s notable pupil Klearchos of Soli. As a testimony to their enduring importance to Greeks, including Christians, the maxims served as a first school book for the Greek world into modern times. See Sentences of the Seven Sages]
The Platonic equivalent to the Delphic maxim, that itself became famous throughout the Greek and Roman world, is “to become as godlike (homoiosis Theo) as possible” (Theaet. 176b).
As Plato (through Socrates) explains, to be godlike means to be “righteous, holy (sinless), and wise”.
Being a thoroughly Greek philosophical school, Platonism combined the two goals into one: for Plato, to know oneself is to know the divine within us. To be truly good we need to know the Good. To know the Good absolutely means to be the Good. And the Good is God, the possessor and embodiment of all knowledge.
Therefore, the Platonic philosopher’s goal is to be righteous, holy, and wise like God himself. In the Greek tradition, all Gods are wise.
Accordingly, the philosophical quest in Platonism revolves on knowledge of the Good which in the absolute sense means being the Good.
As stated in the Republic, the Good is the source of all knowledge. Therefore the Good is the “highest lesson” or the “highest thing to learn”.
By definition, philosophy is love of wisdom (philo-sophia). This means that the philosopher is a lover of and seeker after wisdom or knowledge. The philosopher is one who, having become aware of his own ignorance of higher things, undertakes the journey from ignorance to the highest wisdom.
Similarly, in the Symposium, the goal of philosophy is to attain a vision of the highest. But the journey that takes the philosopher to his goal here is powered by the love of Beauty. Beauty evokes in us a feeling of wonder or amazement (thaumazein) and, as Socrates says, “wonder is the only beginning of philosophy” (Theaet. 155d). The love of Beauty is really an expression of the love of the Good which is the same as love of Knowledge or Truth.
The journey has six stages:
1. Love of one beautiful body.
2. Love of all beautiful bodies.
3. Love of beauty in souls.
4. Love of beauty in institutions and laws.
5. Love of beauty in sciences.
6. Love of beauty in one single knowledge.
This enables the philosopher to attain a vision of a single thing, Divine Beauty itself (Sym. 211c) which is the goal of the philosophical quest.
However, it is important to understand that the Greek word “beautiful” (kalos) also means “good”. The Greek ideal of human perfection is “good and beautiful” or, rather “beautiful and good” (kaloskagathos). Beauty is inseparably connected with Good and Good is inseparably connected with Knowledge. Beauty leads to the Good and the Good is Knowledge or Truth.
We can see that the philosopher’s ascent described in the Symposium takes a subtle turn from love of beauty (step one) to love of knowledge (step six). And Knowledge has the Good as its source (as has Beauty). Indeed, the Symposium’s subtitle proposed in antiquity was “On the Good” (Peri ton Agathon).
Contemplation or knowledge of Beauty itself enables the accomplished philosopher to know the Good. And knowing the Good itself in the absolute sense means being the Good. By being good as much as humanly possible, the philosopher “touches” or “grasps” the truth (cf. Timaeus 90c). He becomes good, real, and true, and everything he does from now on is by participation in the truth which is the Good.
He has achieved his goal and has become godlike and immortal. He is also perfectly happy, as the limited happiness he earlier derived from beautiful bodies has given way to the infinite and unceasing happiness derived from contemplating and being the Good. Human happiness has been replaced with divine Happiness. He is now perfectly and eternally happy like the Gods.
We can get an inkling of this from the psychological fact that when we are good in any sense, we feel good about ourselves and are accordingly happy. This happiness that derives from our own goodness is more direct, more powerful, and more real than happiness that is derived from any external things (i.e. things other than ourselves) such as material possessions.
As Socrates’ teacher Diotima puts it:
Incidentally, Greek telos (“goal” or “end”) is related to teleos (“accomplished” or “perfect”) which is what the mystery rites are called (telea or teletai, literally, “perfections”) that enable the initiated to attain perfection. (telos can also mean “death” in the literal sense or in the sense of “death to ignorance”.) Diotima refers to the philosopher ascending the ladder of philosophical love (the ladder to Truth) as one who is properly initiated in the rites (telea) and aims to attain the final goal (telos).
The Republic itself is constructed in the style of an Orphic mystery rite: it begins with Socrates’ descent to Piraeus and the vision of the Thracian Goddess, proceeds through several key allegories (of the Sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave), and ends with the uplifting vision of the column of light at the center of the world (616b).
Mystery rites are also mentioned in the Phaedo in connection with philosophy and are, of course, about union with the God or Truth which is one. Everything in Plato suggests a hierarchy of meaning, experience, and truth, culminating in the singular reality of the One.
The Republic’s Analogy of the Sun, that compares the Good with the Sun, points in the same direction of a single absolute Reality (one Sun, one Truth, one Ultimate Reality).
When Plato says that the Good is the “source of all knowledge”, or “above essence”, etc., this cannot be taken to mean that the Good is above the One, given that the One is not knowledge but pure, objectless Awareness, and as we have seen, the One is unlimited, without beginning or end, and without it nothing can exist (Parm. 137d, 166c).
This is also evident from the fact that One and Being are inseparable and that everything that has being participates in both Being and One, which includes all the Forms, even the Form of the Good.
So, I think there can be little doubt that the Good is just another name for the One, the ultimate first principle and supreme cause of all. The main difference is that “the One” properly applies to Ultimate Reality in and of itself, and “the Good” to Ultimate Reality in relation to Creation and the World of Becoming.
For Ultimate Reality to conceive the will to create a universe that is good like itself, this presupposes some form of consciousness or self-awareness and intelligent activity. But at the highest level of reality there is no such activity or consciousness, there is just pure, non-relational awareness, comparable to an infinite, perfectly still ocean of living light.
That infinite mass of luminous awareness must first become aware of itself. This is what produces the first subject-object dichotomy, or the One and the Dyad, where subject and object are experienced as one yet “distinct”.
Next, by the interaction of the One and the Dyad, the Forms are produced like currents within that ocean of awareness, and with them, the Divine Intellect or Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) that contains, holds them together, and organizes them into a coherent whole that is to serve as a model for the Material World.
In the final phase, the Creative Intelligence produces the Material World shaped according to Forms, like waves on the surface of the ocean that are at once “separate” from it and one with it. “Separate” as seen from the “external” world of appearance or Becoming, one with it as seen from the inner world of reality or Being. And this means that the unity or oneness of Reality remains One at all times.
Plato has left us the sketch of a general metaphysics that is for us to complete by following its inner logic.
We could, of course, take the One and the Good to be two distinct realities if we really wanted to. But (a) there is no evidence that this is what Plato does and (b) I don’t see what could be gained from it.
But these are different things. These distinct causes are described, and named, as distinct and different things, To say that different things are one, requires a principle of unity. It's like if you say the One is a house, but being a house doesn't preclude the possibility of it being a car as well.
You create that unity with "Reality". You claim there is one reality, and all these different causes are unity within that one reality. But I don't see how this claim, that reality is one, and not itself a multitude, is supported.
Quoting Apollodorus
I would differ with #6. I would say: Love of one single Beauty (the Form), rather than "one single knowledge". But this just shows that "one" is ambiguous, and it's not clear what its role is. Then Beauty is one of many Forms. Now if we are to unite this multitude of Forms within one Knowledge, we would be inclined to make Knowledge itself a Form. But if Knowledge is a Form, then it is just one of the many. Therefore the thing which unites the Forms as one, must be something other than a Form.
Quoting Apollodorus
I don't agree. I believe Plato recognized a distinction between good and beautiful, even if they were sometimes expressed by the same word. This is why you say "good and beautiful", which wouldn't make sense if they were both the same word with the same meaning.
There is an old metaphysical division between aesthetics and ethics, which I believe Plato had some understanding of. In one way, we place beauty at the top of the hierarchy, in another, we place good at the top. Beauty can be given a higher place than the good because it is desired simply for the sake of itself, whereas, as Aristotle demonstrated, we always find that the good is desired for the sake of something else, until we reach the final end, which is simply stipulated. He stipulated happiness as the final good.
I think that Plato worked more to create a separation between the two than to dissolve the separation. He clearly worked toward a separation between pleasure and good, but it may be the case that good is a special type of pleasure. Then good might be a special type of beauty. But this would divide the unity of Beauty.
Quoting Apollodorus
Knowledge has the Good as its source, but I don't think that we can say that Beauty has the Good as its source. If pleasure is derived from the actuality of beauty, and there are pleasures which are not good, then Beauty cannot be sourced from the Good. This is why some metaphysicians place beauty as higher than the good, it's desired for its own sake, as pleasure is, whereas Good must be supported by reason.
But this points to an ambiguity, division, in the Good. If knowledge is derived from the Good, then the Good must be higher than knowledge and to say that the Good must be supported by reason would be contrary to that. So the Good, which serves as the source for all knowledge cannot be supported by any knowledge, or reason, and it becomes more like a simple desire for Beauty, or pleasure. The other sense of Good, the one supported by knowledge and reason cannot be the source of knowledge. This is the distinction between the apparent good, and the real good first formulated by Aristotle.. The real good is supported by reason and knowledge, whereas the apparent good is what actually inclines us to act, being what moves the will. The separation between the two is the reason why we can, and often do, what we know is bad.
We can say that the goal of moral philosophy is to create consistency between the two forms of "Good". We are taught that the Good which is supported by knowledge and reason, the real good, is the highest principle, and the apparent good, which moves the will must be shaped to conform with the real good. However, we can see from Plato's principles, that the truly highest Good, the one which is the source of knowledge, must be what is called "the apparent good", being what is prior to knowledge. So the true goal of the moral philosopher is to shape and conform the real good, so that it conforms with the higher, apparent good.
This inversion is the result of the fact that the will truly is free. So the free will cannot be made to conform to principles of "good" which it does not agree with. So the individual will continue to do what one knows is wrong, or incorrect according to the laws and rules of the community, when one believes oneself to hold higher principles. Therefore we must structure the hierarchy to reflect this reality, that what we call "the apparent good", supported by beauty, pleasure, and desire, as sought for the sake of itself, is truly higher than what we call "the real good", as supported by reason and knowledge.
Quoting Apollodorus
I think that this "knowing the Good" which you refer to is an understanding of the reality of the free will. It is to recognize that what moves the individual self, person, or soul, to act is what one believes to be good, not what is said by others to be good. So the true Good is found within, not in the conventions of the culture. As you say: Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting Apollodorus
Here is where you and I have disagreement, as to Plato's positioning of "the One". I believe Plato rejects the One as a true first principle, subjugating it to mathematics (as Aristotle described Met. 987b), being a first principle of epistemology, not metaphysics. The quotes you bring up represent the position of sophists who are trying raise the logically necessary "One", to metaphysical relevance. However, you can see that with Beauty and Good, we are dealing with principles prior to any knowledge, as the source of knowledge, whereas the need to assume "One", is derived from the imperfections of knowledge. So "the One" is not basic, fundamental, or foundational to knowledge, as there is knowledge which necessarily precedes it, the knowledge required for the individuation of particulars.
Quoting Apollodorus
See, Being and not-Being, from which the One is derived, is a Parmenidean logical structure. If One and Being are inseparable as you say, then One is also inseparable from not-One, as Being is inseparable from not-Being, being defined one by the other in that logical structure. To proceed from here to the Good, which is supposed to be prior to any logic, therefore prior to such logical structures, we must see all as unindividuated, therefore no such thing as One. You might insist that this means seeing all as "One", but that is not true. "One" comes about from individuation, and does not exist prior to that individuation, which might be a sort of first act of intellection. But One does not exist prior to that first act of intellection, though Beauty and Good are relevant here.
Quoting Apollodorus
Do you see that Beauty and Good, as the motivation for action, exist prior to this first becoming aware of itself? And this is why Beauty and Good are prior to One.
They are described and named by us, humans, when we want to logically analyze reality. Reality itself does not do that because if it is aware of itself it is also aware that it, and no one else, is the ultimate cause of all things.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct. The One or the Good is not a Form. It is the "cause of the essence in Forms and the Forms are the cause of the essence in all other (subordinate) things", as Aristotle quotes Plato as saying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First of all, "kaloskagathos" ("beautiful and good") is not used to draw a clear distinction between "beautiful" and "good" in general, but to stress the fact that both beauty and goodness are harmoniously combined in the same one person.
"Beautiful" and "Good" may be distinct, but they also overlap. Something that is beautiful is also good in some practical sense. This is why in Ancient Greek "beautiful" can also be used in the sense of "good".
In fact, beautiful and good have a lot in common, both being associated with right proportion, order, harmony, etc.
This is why the Divine Creative Intelligence or Creator-God wants the world to be "as beautiful as possible" (Tim. 30a). "Beautiful" here is clearly identical with "good".
Regarding ontological and metaphysical priority, the way I see it, the correct order is: (1) awareness itself, (2) self-awareness a.k.a. consciousness, and (3) intelligence or intellection.
Beauty and Good are properties that logically belong to stage (3).
Regarding the perceived "distinction" between the Good and the One, I think that if we insist on it, we will find it very difficult to place the One in Plato's hierarchy.
So, I think this is a misunderstanding like the distinction between the Receptacle and the Ultimate Cause (the Good or the One).
The Receptacle's mistaken "independence" arises from reading the creation story in the Timaeus as saying that principles like the Receptacle are prior to everything else.
A more careful reading shows that this is not the case.
The actual text reads:
What Plato is saying here is that the creation myth is only a narrative or “likely account” and that the first principle (that is not expounded in the dialogue) is to be ascertained through philosophical inquiry.
Given that the first principle – the One or the Good – is left out of the discussion, the affirmation that the Receptacle existed prior to creation, does not mean that it has independent existence of the first principle.
Aristotle clearly states that Plato employs two causes, the formal, which is essence and is the One, and the material, which is matter and is the “Great and the Small” a.k.a. the Dyad.
He also says that (in descending order) there are Forms, mathematical objects, and physical or sensible objects.
He further says that the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, i.e., mathematical objects and physical objects, and that the One is the cause of the essence (ousia) in the Forms.
The One being the first principle or cause of essence, it must itself be above essence and above Forms.
As for the Receptacle, Plato’s description of it indicates that it is actually the space that contains the fundamental stuff of Matter and that is governed by Necessity.
Obviously, if there is Matter, there must be Space where Matter is located.
And this Space must operate in conjunction with Time in order to make cosmic creation possible.
But before creation, i.e., before Time and Space, there are the Forms which are themselves contained within the Creative Intelligence that generates the Cosmos or Universe.
As we saw earlier, the One, the principle of essence, is unlimited and without beginning or end.
In order to bring about the physical Universe which is limited, certain limitations must be imposed on what is unlimited. Hence Limit, Time, Space, and Necessity.
There being no other reality than the One, it is the One itself that imposes Limit on the Unlimited. The interaction of Limit and Unlimited results in the third principle, the Mixed (= Being). Together, the three constitute the Intelligible Triad.
This Intelligible Triad is nothing but the One divided into (1) formed Matter and (2) formless Spirit or Intelligence. As Intelligence must have a content, the content of Intelligence are the Forms (Ideal Ratios or Proportions).
Therefore, the Triad is simply the One’s aspects of Matter, Intelligence, and Forms.
The Creative Intelligence, i.e., the One as Nous, is the efficient cause of the Universe:
Intelligence (Nous) uses both Matter and Spirit to create the Material Universe. It forms Soul by blending the Greatest Genera, Kinds, or Categories of “Same”, “Other”, and “Essence” (or “Being”) into a living, intelligent being (Tim. 35a, 41d). The ability to cognize identity, difference, and being, is what characterizes all souls and forms the basis of all intelligibility.
The Divine Creative Intelligence also forms material bodies and objects by shaping the primordial material stuff of the Receptacle into the four primary elements, fire, water, earth and air, and then forming these into bodies and objects using the Forms as paradigms.
In other words, the whole Material Universe consists of five primary elements: fire, water, earth, air, and space. The latter being at once the stuff of which the first four are composed and the medium in which they have their existence, it has ontological priority over the others.
An important thing to understand at this point is that the Primordial Matter of the Receptacle is not unqualified matter. As stated in the Timaeus, it has a certain motion like a kind of “shaking” (seismos) or vibration comparable to that produced by a winnowing basket or sieve that makes particles separate or coalesce according to certain patterns (Tim. 52e). And for Plato, motion is always associated with soul or spirit.
This means (1) that everything, from Ultimate Reality down to inanimate objects is a manifestation of the One and, in consequence, is endowed with at least traces of spirit, soul, or intelligence, and (2) that the One in its different aspects is the efficient cause, material cause, formal cause, and (as the Form of the Good) final cause. Otherwise said, the One uses the Creative Intelligence as its instrument, and Creative Intelligence uses Soul as its instrument.
Soul is nothing but embodied intelligence. Pure, Creative Intelligence, referred to as “Creator-God” or “Maker of the Universe” is intelligence without body a.k.a. nous. When intelligence is embodied, it is referred to as “Soul” (psyche). This can be (1) the Soul of the Universe, (2) the souls of the Cosmic Gods (e.g., the Sun), demigods, and other spiritual beings e.g. nymphs etc., and (3) the souls of humans and other living creatures.
We must also bear in mind that the Greek word psyche has a much wider connotation than English “soul” and includes the totality of a living being’s vitality.
In any case, what the Divine Creative Intelligence does is to place an increasingly greater limit on Intelligence in order to generate intelligences that are subordinate to itself in the ontological order. As indicated in the Timaeus, the Divine Creative Intelligence possesses the powers of Being, Joy, Will, Knowledge, and Action. These powers are incrementally limited or reduced in the case of the Cosmic Soul and all other souls lower down the hierarchy until the stage of “inanimate” matter is reached.
It follows that the One is the first principle of all things. The One is not only unlimited and without beginning or end. Together with Being, it is the reality on which all things depend. Therefore, the One is at the top of Plato’s ontological hierarchy that describes the various aspects of the One and Only Reality.
Whilst the Republic deals primarily with that aspect of Ultimate Reality referred to as “the Good” and its ethical import, the Parmenides deals with the metaphysical aspect proper and accordingly focuses on “the One”.
In the Parmenides, Plato presents Eight Arguments or Deductions designed to establish the status of the One as an example of philosophical inquiry leading to truth.
Four of the Arguments are based on the proposition that “the One is”, and four on the proposition that “the One is not”.
Among the conclusions, the following are of special interest.
When investigated “itself by itself”, the One is neither a whole nor with parts; it has neither beginning nor end; it is beyond limit, shape, time, movement or rest; it is beyond description, knowability, or belief (Parm. 142-143).
When investigated in association with Being (“One-Being”), the One is the reality of which all other things that have being partake and on which they therefore depend (Parm. 160).
When investigated without the One (“If the One is not”), the others have no existence.
“If the One is not, nothing is” is the final conclusion (Parm. 166c).
This establishes the pivotal position that the One occupies in the Platonic ontological order.
In fact, we may even say with the Eleatics that “the All is One” or with the Sicilians, that "Being is both Many and One" (Parm.128a; Soph. 242e), without contradiction.
I believe that what is demonstrated by Parmenides, in the Parmenides, is that the concept of, "the One" is logically incoherent. No matter how it is presented the result is contradiction. That is why I say Parmenides is represented as a sophist, providing a logical demonstration which makes the Form of "the One" appear to be full of contradictions. It makes no sense that you assign "the One" a "pivotal position" in Platonic ontology.
I think Plato reject this nonsensical sophistry concerning "the One" and moved on to a much more intuitive principle, "the good".
You could be right. However, if Plato thinks it is “sophistry”, why would he write a whole dialogue on it? Why would Aristotle say that for Plato the One is the cause of the essence in the Forms and the Forms are the cause of the essence in the other things?
Moreover, how is it sophistry to say that the One and the Good are identical?
It is generally acknowledged that Plato is an eclectic writer and that much of his philosophy is borrowed from others.
I think the influence of Orphism, Pythagoreanism, Heracliteanism, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Socrates and others on Plato’s writings is quite clear.
It is true that Plato in the dialogues tends to be hostile toward the Sophists, but there is no reason to believe that his general rejection of Sophist teachings and practices means that he rejects absolutely everything they say.
Certainly, the Stranger’s claims in the Sophist are not refuted. His classification of things according to Being, Rest, Change, Sameness, and Difference, etc. is not unsound. This is what the mind does with things in general, anyway. There is no reason why it cannot be applied to Forms. Discussing the relation of Forms to one another is not “sophistry”. Becoming lost in endless discussions about the Forms is, of course, another story.
But the fact of the matter is that, though on the whole correct, Plato’s original Theory of Forms (as presented in the Phaedo) that defines particulars as things that participate in the properties of the Forms, is not sufficient to explain the exact nature of particulars. Plato, therefore, introduces new concepts like Limit, Matter, and Receptacle (Philebus, Timaeus).
There is no denying that Forms do have some common characteristics such as One and Being. So, it is not incorrect to say that the One is the cause of the essence in all Forms and, therefore, above both essence and Forms.
This also leads to the question of how the first principle of all can be both One and Many. The problem of One and Many is a key issue discussed in the Philebus. And the whole purpose of it is to explain how the Good, which is one, or undifferentiated unity, can generate multiplicity.
This is explained by introducing the Dyad of Limit and Unlimited that is at once “One and Many” and, through its interaction with the One, brings forth multiplicity. Limit being that which imposes form on what is unlimited, is the principle of Form. Unlimited is the principle of Matter. The two are used by Creative Intelligence (which is a manifestation of the One or the Good) to impose Form on Matter and thereby generate the Physical Universe.
Incidentally, Creative Intelligence itself is both one and many or “one-many”. As a self-directed activity proceeding from the One or the Good, it is one. As Intelligence consisting of many Forms and performing various acts of cognition in relation to the Forms, it is many.
Plato himself makes Socrates say:
The Finite (peras) and the Infinite (apeiria) or Limit and Unlimited are later said to be the principles that Intelligence (Nous) uses to arrange and order the Universe (Phileb. 30c).
Plato here uses a Pythagorean theory that he barely modifies to fit his own system.
So, it is clear that when Plato takes up a theory that appears to be inconsistent with his own, he does not necessarily do so in order to eliminate one of those two theories. On the contrary, his tendency is to combine them into a new or improved theory that is superior to both and serves to provide additional support to the general Platonic framework.
The very same procedure is employed by Plato’s later followers like Plotinus in their attempt to develop and systematize Plato’s philosophy. We may or may not always and unreservedly agree with all their innovations, but we must concede that they are, after all, Platonists. And it is the Platonists, not the Sophists, that identify the One and the Good.
The fact is that one is prior to many. When we reduce a multiplicity to the absolute minimum, we reduce it to one, not to “good”.
So, Ultimate Reality is One.
The One is characterized by Being and Awareness. First is must Be, and second it must be Something. Prior to Universal Creation, when nothing else exists, the One cannot be anything else aside from Being and Awareness or Consciousness.
This is why Plotinus says that the One (or the Good) has (or is) a kind of awareness or consciousness. For the same reason, Plato calls it the source and cause of all knowledge: knowledge presupposes awareness or consciousness. This ultimate Awareness or Consciousness that is the source and cause of all knowledge, is the One or the Good.
Though being good, it is not the One (or the Good) that desires the Good. The Good has no reason to desire itself. It is the Intellect that, having proceeded from the Good, desires the Good and wishes to make the Universe as beautiful (and as good) as possible.
At the same time, though being beautiful and good, creation represents a departure from real being. Things can only be truly real when they are identical with the Real. Having proceeded from the Good or the One, all things ultimately desire to return to the Good or the One in accordance with the triadic cycle of abiding-procession-return (mone-proodos-epistrophe). The One always abides in itself. The Many proceed from the One and eventually return to the One which is their source.
The desire to return to the One is the root of “love”. We love things that make us feel one with them and with ourselves. This is why we call them “beautiful” and “good”. But their beauty and goodness come from the Forms which in turn come from the One. Therefore, our love must be redirected to its true object. Love of the beautiful and the good, when practiced as indicated in the Symposium, takes us to the direct vision or experience of the Good or the One that is the Higher Self of all.
In other words, intelligence comes to rest and is truly at peace and happy only when it is at one with itself.
As Socrates puts it:
I might agree that the One is the same as the Good, in the sense of "the first" principle. This provides a clear defining feature of the One, as meaning the first. But Plato has Parmenides attributing all sorts of ridiculous properties to the One in the Parmenides. That's what happens if we just choose a name "the One" without any definition, and allow ourselves absolute freedom in describing it. We end up with a completely contradictory description. However, if we start with a limiting feature, such as "the first", or "the good", then we come up with a completely different description than the one which Plato represents Parmenides as providing.
Quoting Apollodorus
Direct logical refutation was not Plato's method. His way was to provide a very clear and accurate description of different perspectives, revealing the flaws, and allowing the reader to determine the parts of the perspective which were inconsistent and problematic, thereby requiring replacement or revision. So it is definitely as you say, that we are not advised by Plato to reject everything a particular individual is saying, absolutely, but we are to analyze critically, and reject the parts which produce unresolvable logical problems, while accepting the parts which are reasonable.
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes, that's what I said earlier in the thread. Plato reveals through the method described above, that the theory of participation, as presented, is deficient, flawed, and needs to be revised or rejected.
Quoting Apollodorus
If One is defined as the first, then it can be the cause of others. But there is a problem here with a difference between logical priority and temporal priority, as the defining feature of "the first". Temporal priority is required for cause, as "cause" is a temporal concept. However, logical priority does not necessitate temporal priority. And the Forms are related through logical priority. So if "the One" is related to other Forms as "first" in the sense of logical priority, we cannot necessarily conclude that it is first in the temporal sense, therefore we cannot conclude necessarily that it is the cause of the others.
Quoting Apollodorus
Here, One is defined as distinct from Many, and that is a completely different definition from "first". To make the two consistent it is necessary to show how One is logically prior to Many. But the demonstration that One is logically prior to Many, does not show that One is temporally prior to Many, It is only through the introduction of "the Good", as a causal principle, in the sense of final cause, that we derive the temporal priority which is required for causation.
Now it is required to show whether the Good is more compatible with One or with Many. And as I explained earlier in the thread, I believe that The Good is better described as a multiplicity than as a single, the good being complicated and complex. Therefore Many appears to be temporally prior to One, when One is defined in relation to Many. So temporally, Many is first rather than One. But when we define Many logically, it must consist of individuals, so One is logically prior to Many. This implies that "Many" is not a good defining term for One, as that which One is distinct from or opposed to. We would be better to define One with unity, and the opposing term would be ununified, as this does not necessarily imply distinct particulars like Many does, making the Many dependent on One. It makes Many dependent on ununified instead, and the ununified are not necessarily distinct individuals, or ones.
Quoting Apollodorus
Limit and Unlimited is another proposed way to deal with the difference between logical priority and temporal priority. But the mathematical conception of unlimited is distinct from the philosophical conception, and this method gets lost in sophisticated confusion. That's why Plato moved to "the Good" instead. And Aristotle demonstrated that "infinite" in the mathematical sense has the nature of "potential", while anything eternal must by "actual" which is a distinct category from "potential". This drives a wedge between "infinite" (unlimited), and "eternal" (the principle of temporal priority), making it impossible to speak of "unlimited" or "infinite" in a causal application.
Quoting Apollodorus
Right, this is the matter of critically analyzing the theories, and accepting the good, while rejecting the bad.
Quoting Apollodorus
This, what you call a "fact" provides a clear demonstration of what I described above, the division between logically prior and temporally prior. One is logically prior to many, as you say, a multiplicity is defined as consisting of ones. One is a defining feature of many, and is therefore logically prior. But this does not give us what is required to make any statements about causation, because of the gap between logically prior and temporally prior. If we want to make statements about causation we need principles of temporal priority rather than logical priority. This is where the principles derived from mathematics, one and many, limited and unlimited, fail us. They do not provide temporal principles.
So, to get a principle of temporal priority Plato turned to "good", as a motivating feature, the cause of activity. here we have the basis for a temporal priority. But now we have a problem of establishing compatibility, or commensurability, between temporal priority and logical priority. If, the real "fact" is, as it appears to me, that good is more compatible with many than with one, we have a reversal between temporal priority and logical priority.
Quoting Apollodorus
Using your own common sense and intuition, don't you find that awareness and consciousness is more compatible with Many than with One? Isn't the world full of distinct instances of awareness and consciousness? Why would we say that the many consciousnesses which make up the reality of human existence is One, when it is very clear that it is Many?
Quoting Apollodorus
See, you have this backward. each of us is a one, an individual, a self. The desire is not to return to the One, because we already are, each one of us, the One. The desire is to return to the many. This is the problem with the theory of participation, as exposed by Plato. It is backward. It portrays the Many as actively participating in the One, which is a reversal of the active/passive reality. This is caused by the inversion between logical priority and temporal priority. When we turn this around, to give us the clearer perspective of reality, provided by giving the Good priority, we find that the One participates in the Many. Now the One is causally active within the Many, as participating in the Many, because the One is defined by temporal priority, (Good), rather than logical priority (mathematically One is prior to Many).
I don’t find that “awareness and consciousness is more compatible with Many than with One” at all. On the contrary, my common sense and intuition is that awareness and consciousness is one, not many. So, unfortunately, this is where we will have to disagree.
Of course, we experience many moments of sensory perception that involve many brain cells, but the brain itself is one.
Similarly, there are many instances of awareness and consciousness, but they are at the level of human cognition. What I am talking about when I say “the One”, is the Divine Awareness or Consciousness prior to the creation of the universe, i.e., in its role as First Cause of all, when no world full of distinct instances of awareness or consciousness existed. At that stage, Knowledge itself is One as there is nothing to divide it into many.
As we have seen, philosophy for the Ancient Greeks in general, and for Plato in particular, is a quest for knowledge.
Knowledge is of three kinds (1) knowledge of the world, (2) knowledge of oneself, and (3) knowledge of a higher reality that may be referred to as “the Good”, “the One”, “the Highest”, “Truth”, etc.
Real knowledge starts with self-knowledge. Therefore, the “self” (2) and the “higher reality” (3) may be regarded as situated at the two extremities, one lower and one higher, of the same cognitive continuum.
Taking the “self” to be the lower extremity, we must ask the question of Who or What is the “self”?
Plato identifies the human self with the soul (psyche) which uses the body as an instrument.
The soul or self has three different aspects which in descending order are:
1. Noetic self or nous, the divine part of the self, which is the subject of intellection, intuition, and contemplation.
2. Dianoetic self or logismos, the reasoning “man within” (entos anthropos), the “we” of ordinary human identity.
3. Physical self or “beastly” (theriodes) aspect of the self, that is tied to the physical body and is the subject of bodily impulses and concerns.
Man’s true self is the noetic self which is essentially identical with the Divine Intellect.
As Socrates puts it:
And:
Socrates next makes a very important point in which he connects human soul with Universal Intelligence.
In the Timaeus, it is said that God or Creative Intelligence created the Universe as a living being endowed with body and soul and that he made human soul from the same stuff as the Soul of the Universe:
Socrates now draws attention to the fact that human soul derives from Universal Soul:
Socrates also points out that Zeus himself, the supreme Olympian God, whose titles include “King of Kings” and “King of the Gods”, has a kingly soul (basilike psyche) and a kingly mind (basilikos nous) given to him by the Divine Creative Intelligence or Universal Cause:
Plotinus (Enn.V.3(49)4,1) draws the logical conclusion by saying that “We, too, are kings” (or “We, too, rule”). In other words, we too are rulers of our own body and mind. This is the first lesson to learn. Equally important, however, given our descent from the King of the Universe, we too are royal and divine.
“Royal” (basilikos) and “divine” (theios) imply a higher nature or status. Moreover, our descent from the Universal Intelligence can only mean that our own intellect (our true self) is essentially identical with the Intelligence of the Universe.
It is worthwhile recalling at this point that according to Plato, the telos or goal of human life is to become as “godlike as possible” and that “to be godlike is to be righteous, holy, and wise”. The word “wise” connects us with the Universal Intelligence which is also said to be “Wisdom” (Sophia).
It is this essential identity of the personal and divine nous that makes it possible for man to elevate himself to the highest plane of experience or level of intelligence.
Plato uses similes, allegory, and myth, to constantly remind us of this fact.
The “Ladder of Love” of the Symposium, the “Allegory of the Sun”, “the Cave”, and the “Divided Line” of the Republic, etc., etc. all point in the same direction.
In the Republic Plato provides us with another illustration. Socrates and his interlocutors have come to the conclusion that their arguments and other proofs (discussed in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, etc.) have shown that the human soul is immortal. Socrates says that if we use our reason to consider the soul once it has been cleansed of all mental and physical impurities, it will be more beautiful than it currently appears.
He then compares the soul with the Sea-God Glaucus who is so covered in barnacles and seaweed and his body so mutilated by the waves that he appears much “wilder” than he actually is.
Similarly, Socrates says, the soul has been marred by countless evils. But if we consider its innate wisdom, its immortality, and its divinity, then we might see it as it really is.
The cleansing process consists in the development of basic civic virtues (self-control, courage, wisdom, righteousness), followed by intellectual virtues or skills such as discrimination or discernment (diakrisis), logic, intuition or insight, and contemplation.
For Plato, of course, the importance of virtues lies not only in their moral and civic value. They are a form of knowledge and, therefore, they are conducive to knowledge.
Plato tells us that material objects cannot be known because we know about them only through our senses and the senses are unreliable. He believes that the materialist approach that aims at attaining knowledge by studying matter proceeds in the wrong direction.
Therefore, the only way to attain knowledge is by turning our attention inward and examining the realities within us.
Initially, our thought processes turn out to be as chaotic and unreliable as our sense-perceptions. In order to see with any degree of clarity, we must first bring some order to our inner life. We must control our physical urges, our emotions, and our thoughts.
When we have done that, and the wilderness within has been cleared, we discover a totally new world illumined by a new light, and crucially, we acquire a new identity and a new experience of life. Our center of gravity shifts from physical objects and preoccupations with them to the intellect and abstract thought and, beyond that, to an intuitive grasp of the primary building-blocks of cognition (the Forms) and their source, Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) itself.
So, starting from the level of sense-perception, the philosopher must rise to Awareness itself.
This is why it is important to understand that consciousness or awareness is higher than knowledge.
Not knowledge, but that which knows, the subject of the known objects (whatever and however many they happen to be, including Forms), is the highest reality which is One. This is the true focus of Plato’s philosophical quest and the true meaning of “source and cause of knowledge”.
The cleansing or purification process (katharsis) is nothing but the elimination of everything that is not “us”. This is the only way to discover our true self. If we mentally strip or chisel away all the accretions of sense-perceptions, emotions, and thoughts, we arrive at a new type of non-discursive, image- and concept-free, intuitive knowledge.
But it is important to understand that this knowledge itself must be transcended. And as we transcend it, we get to the consciousness we have of this knowledge, and beyond that, to pure awareness itself. It is this awareness that is the ultimate self, not the knowledge. The knowledge belongs to the self but is not the self. It is at the most an extension of the self in the same way thoughts, emotions, and sense-perceptions are extensions or “accretions” of the nous.
The key to the correct understanding of this is provided in the First Alcibiades.
Already in the Charmides (164d ff.) Socrates discusses the Delphic inscription “Know thyself” and the possibility of there being any such thing as knowledge of knowledge (episteme epistemes).
The discussion is carried on in the First Alcibiades (132c ff.) where Socrates proposes substituting “see” for “know” and gives the example of seeing oneself in a mirror.
He next compares this with seeing oneself in the eye of another, the only part of another person in which one can see oneself. The same is true of the soul: if it wishes to see itself in another soul, it must look at that part of it that most resembles it, namely the seat of wisdom (sophia).
Socrates and Alcibiades agree that the seat of wisdom (the nous) is the most divine part of the soul, and that a soul can truly know itself only by looking at God himself:
It follows that true knowledge of oneself is, in the first place, awareness of oneself as a divine soul, i.e., as a higher form of intelligence.
Indeed, if knowledge has a source, then the source is different from and higher than knowledge. This source can only be Intelligence. And Intelligence as the source of all knowledge is the Good or the One.
In itself, this supreme Intelligence that we call “the Good” or “the One” must be Awareness. Awareness on its own is motionless. However, when Awareness sees itself reflected in itself as in a mirror, it is stirred into activity that is creative, resulting in the Creative Intelligence that brings forth the Universe.
The Universe is brought into being by Creative Intelligence according to Forms or Ideas. The term “Form”, “Idea” or Eidos (lit. “thing seen”) suggests that the Universe is “seen” into existence by Creative Intelligence.
As Awareness, the supreme Intelligence is “the Same”. As its own reflection in the mirror of itself, it is “the Other”. Seeing oneself in the other is “the best knowledge of oneself”. And that self-knowledge is the source and cause of all knowledge and all things.
The concept of a pair of opposites resulting in a harmony that is creative is deeply ingrained in Ancient Greek thought. In Greek mythology, Ares, the God of War, is coupled with Aphrodite, the Goddess of Beauty and Love. Zeus and Mnemosyne beget Harmonia who in turn gives birth to the Muses, the Goddesses of artistic creativity, etc. (Different versions exist.)
Plato expresses the very same idea put in philosophical language. Ultimate Reality, Being or Existence, first manifests itself in two ways, as Unlimited and Limited, Indivisible and Divisible, Same and Other.
The same Reality next unifies Sameness and Otherness into a harmonious whole. As Plato states in the Timaeus, the Creator-God (Creative Intelligence) makes the Soul of the Universe and the human soul from a blend of “Same”, “Other”, and “Being” (Tim. 35a, 41d).
Intelligence (which is what Being or Reality ultimately is) itself is the medium that brings Sameness and Otherness together. Similarly, in the human soul, the rational part controls and organizes the emotional and sensual aspects (corresponding to the Same and Other on the Cosmic plane) into a harmonious, healthy, and happy whole. The human self, which is one in itself, is literally a mirror image of the Divine Self, which also is One.
As Plato says, the higher, rational aspect of the soul must rule over the other two (Rep. 441e). And in the Phaedrus he compares the intellect with a charioteer whose control over two winged horses (the emotional and sensual aspects) enables him to rise to the world of the Gods:
The ascent to a higher mode of experience enables the soul to attain to the Good or the One, which is One Reality.
How do you account for the fact that there are many different people with consciousness and awareness, when you say that consciousness and awareness is more compatible with One?? And each of these different people is a distinct instance of consciousness and awareness, making Many rather than One. Clearly, consciousness is Many, and not One.
Quoting Apollodorus
You never did demonstrate why the "First Cause" ought to be consider to be some sort of awareness or consciousness. All we have to go on, is that the so-called First Cause, is a movement toward a good, a final cause. But we see that all sorts of living creatures, with or without consciousness and awareness, engage in this type of movement toward a good.
Quoting Apollodorus
Look at the inconsistency you have presented here. You start off saying, "Not knowledge, but that which knows, the subject of the known objects", and you call this "One". Then you proceed to talk about "us". But "us" does not refer to one, it refers to many. Further, you talk about a soul seeing itself in another soul. Obviously this is not a feature of one soul, but of a number of souls.
So you start with an assumption of One, but everything which follows concerns Many, rather than One. Your assumption of One is totally out of place here.
Quoting Apollodorus
Again, this "seeing oneself in the other" requires more than one. So if this is "the source and cause of all knowledge", then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it must be derived from Many.
.
Very simple. Take the example of the five fingers of one hand. They are different extensions of the same one hand. Different intelligences are products of One Supreme Intelligence as Plato says in the Timaeus.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Plato’s Creator-God is clearly an Intelligent Being. As he has no body, he is just Intelligence. And intelligence presupposes awareness:
1. Awareness, state of being awake or watchful, ability to directly know or perceive. E.g., heightened or dimmed awareness.
2. Consciousness, self-awareness, awareness of oneself, awareness of one’s surroundings, etc.
3. Intelligence, capacity for understanding and information processing.
As a general term, intelligence can be used in senses 1, 2, and 3, individually or collectively.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I see no inconsistency whatsoever.
Human cognition involves a cognizing subject and a cognized object. This doesn’t mean it is two human beings.
Similarly, the Good or the One which is Awareness, can have awareness of itself.
However, at the stage prior to creation, the Good or the One is simply Awareness, without even self-awareness. So, it is absolutely simple and One.
As regards “we”, I am following Plotinus and other Platonists in using “we” (hemeis) in the sense of “I” taken collectively, because this is how it was mostly used in Classical Greek. What is meant is the feeling of self-identity which refers to one entity only. You could call it “I”, “ego”, “individual persona” or whatever you prefer.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can see no connection between your first sentence and the second.
Of course seeing oneself in the other requires more than one. But this is just a metaphor.
Plato uses metaphorical language, e.g., the Cave, the Line, the Sun, etc. Reflection points to a higher truth. The Sun reflects itself in many reflective objects but it remains one Sun above all objects.
The focus is on the seeing subject which is one.
The point Plato is making is that by seeing itself reflected in a being that is similar to itself, the soul becomes aware of its own identity.
What matters is the soul’s identity as a divine being. In other words, if the human soul were to see God face-to-face, it would recognize its own divinity reflected in the Divine and, ultimately, its identity with the Divine.
Regarding Knowledge and the One, Knowledge is derived from the One indirectly if you will: Knowledge is derived from the One via the Many. But the “Many” are just a manifestation of the One.
The One (1) starts as Pure Undivided Awareness, then (2) divides itself into Awareness and Self-Awareness or Consciousness in a kind of self-reflexive cognition, and next (3) through the interaction of the two, knowledge is produced in the form of Intelligence and Forms or Ideas, etc.
You could think of it as an infinite expanse of Awareness comparable to the ocean or sea:
1. Ocean itself (= the One).
2. Invisible Currents within the ocean (= Forms within Divine Intellect).
3. Visible waves (= individual human beings).
4. Drops of water, mist, etc. (= physical bodies and inanimate objects).
You might say that the drops are derived from many waves, but the waves are derived from the ocean. In fact, they are part of the ocean.
So, Many products of the same One Source.
The Good or the One is the ultimate cause of all things (hapánton arché).
The analogy doesn't work because a hand is something different from a finger. Five fingers does not make one finger, it makes something different, one hand. So by your analogy a multitude of intelligences would not make One Supreme Intelligence, it would make something different.
Quoting Apollodorus
Well, if "seeing oneself in the other" is metaphorical for something which involves only one, that would be very very strange.
Quoting Apollodorus
So, do you not agree that this, "seeing itself reflected in a being that is similar to itself", requires more than one being? And if this, "seeing oneself in the other", is, as you said, the source of all knowledge, then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it requires more than one.
That's standard stuff. Plato however, assumed that the metaphysical world from which the light shines into ours, is occupied by mathematical structures only. The objects are eternal and invariant. They interact and move through the metaphysical realm, like immutable elementary particles move through spacetime (Plato's view is a common one with to elementary particles, insofar the math is supposed to be the "real", unknowable "stuff"). All shadows in our world are reducable to mathematical entities, so Plato conjectures0 and hypothesizes, after which both the conjecture and hypothesis are turned in axioms.
The problem will be obvious: who says mathematical structures (like the cube, tetrahedron, dodecahedron,etc.) are the basic ones? No true knowledge of these forms can ever be attained, only approximated. The equation for a circle is not the form an Sich. Plato places more forms in his heaven, like the form of the Good, and knowledge about these forms can be approximated only, by rational thinking. But who says what the Good truly looks like, or any other forms. He claims math comes closest to the true nature of the kingdom, but this only shows his love for math, placing it in an objective, non-disputable domain.
Aristotle didn't agree. The cube as we see in salt crystals is the cube. A mother caring for a small boy, is "the" good.
I wrote the the OP. If you have questions, I will try to answer, but by giving an explanation I might simply be repeating myself and not addressing what it is you are having difficulty with.
A dyad is a pair of opposites. As Jacob Klein puts it:
Two in a double sense. Both one and one, and in their "twoness" each belongs together with its other.
It is this otherness that makes the dyads indeterminate, that is, not fixed or fully determined.
Yes, but it is not just the dyad particular and universal.
To follow-up:
Rather than see it as a contradiction, I think it felicitous to view each of the dialogues as presenting a part of a story of the whole that cannot be completed. The hypothesis of Forms (which is not, contrary to the typical textbook version, a doctrine of Forms, addresses certain problems while leaving others to be examined elsewhere.
Particular and universal are not opposite to each other, they are categorically distinct. For example, hot and cold are opposite, and these opposites are within the category of temperature. But temperature is not the opposite of size, they are categorically distinct. Likewise, particular is not opposite to universal, it is a different category.
Neither is many opposed to one, as I explained to Apollodorus above. Many consists of a multitude of one's, so "one" is included in "many" as part of many, therefore not opposed to many but a part of many.
When people propose different dyads and dichotomies, we must be cautious, and analyze them carefully to determine whether or not they are reasonable proposals. Otherwise the person might proceed with a logical argument, using the unreasonable proposition as a premise, and the result might be an absurd conclusion.
Fingers are part of the hand (or extensions of the palm). The multitude of individual intelligences are part of the Supreme Intelligence or extensions of it just as fingers are of the hand. The analogy may be less than perfect but I think it does give an idea of what is meant.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In his dialogues, Plato uses the imagery of reflection multiple times to point either to the individual self or to the Universal Self/Ultimate Truth.
For example, in the Phaedo, he compares looking for truth in theories and arguments about things, to studying the image of the Sun reflected in water “or something of the kind” (Phaedo 99e). The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account.
The metaphor refers to one seer or cognizing subject. Hence the illustration of the mirror. What Plato is saying is that the philosopher must look at himself, i.e., at his own intelligent soul, using his own intelligence as a mirror. This is the path to self-knowledge as well as the path to knowing the Ultimate.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That which “sees itself in the other” and "is the source of all knowledge", is Ultimate Reality which reflects itself in itself. The “Other” and resulting “Many” here is conceptual. When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself.
In the world of Being, the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, for example, is cognitively identical with the Forms and is aware of this identity. The sense of real difference only arises in the world of Becoming, where things are not perceived as different manifestations of one cognizing intelligence but as separate and independent of one another and of the cognizing subject.
But the point I was making was that as Plato does not present his philosophy in a very systematic manner, it is essential to systematize our understanding of it starting from a few basic principles.
In the first place, we need to familiarize ourselves with the wider cultural, religious, and philosophical background behind the Platonic project.
As shown by Lloyd Gerson, Plato and his followers operate within the framework of “Ur-Platonism”, a general philosophical position that combines antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism.
Though it emerged before Plato, Ur-Platonism was given shape by Plato and was further developed by later Platonists, especially Plotinus, in line with the blueprint sketched by Plato.
Platonism does not offer a decisive answer to all the problems raised either by itself or by its opponents. However, it does offer a theoretical framework within which philosophical inquiry and practice can be conducted along the lines suggested by Plato in his dialogues.
If we follow the pattern established by Plato and developed by later Platonists, we can avoid most of the misunderstandings or misinterpretations that have arisen especially in more recent times.
The relation between the Good and the Beautiful is a case in point, showing how two apparently distinct things can be ultimately one.
In Ancient Greek, the word “beautiful” (kalos) was already often used not just in the sense of “aesthetically pleasing” but also of “good” in the sense of “useful”. Plato himself states that the divine is Beauty, Wisdom, and Goodness and that by these qualities the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, enabling it to ascend to higher planes (Phaedrus 246e).
This is exactly the meaning of the “Ladder of Love” described in the Symposium. Though the ascent starts as a quest for Beauty itself, what the philosopher ultimately attains is the Good which is Ultimate Truth:
Now, if “beautiful” were to mean “aesthetically pleasing” and nothing else, then “seeing the Beautiful” would be the final goal. But this is obviously not the case. Having seen the Beautiful, i.e., the Good, the philosopher must now “beget virtue”, i.e., good. Only then will he or she become loved by the Gods.
Beauty here is treated as an expression of Good. This practical value of Beauty and its identity with Good is consistent not only with Ancient Greek Weltanschauung but also, and above all, with Platonic philosophy.
Having come into contact with Beauty which is also Good and Truth, the philosopher becomes “pregnant in the soul” with things that are beautiful, good, and true, and “gives birth” or produces them.
Thus birth itself has a dual meaning. The philosopher is born to a new world of beauty, goodness, and truth, and in turn, gives birth to things that are beautiful, good, and true.
Socrates himself must somehow be in contact with Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, because he acts as a midwife to those whose minds are “pregnant with fine ideas” (Theaetetus 150b ff.) and (according to Alcibiades) begets beautiful speeches about virtue.
It follows that, as Diotima says, love of Beauty is really love of Good (Symp. 206a): We love Beauty because it is in some sense Good. Love of Beauty is the desire not only to behold Beauty, but to hold it for ever and to manifest it in everything we do in every way we can. The Gods do not judge man by what he sees but by his actions.
Plato clearly equates Beauty with Good and with Truth. Hence the quest for Beauty, Goodness, and Truth and their practical application become central to Platonic philosophy. The philosopher who has attained this triple goal becomes “beloved of the Gods” (theophiles) and “immortal” (athanatos).
The question of Plato’s causality is another problem that can prove intractable if we ignore the wider Platonic framework.
As discussed, Aristotle says that Plato recognizes two causes only: formal and material. The formal one is represented by the One and the material one represented by the “Great and the Small” a.k.a. “the Dyad” (which despite its name is a single principle of materiality).
But this is not supported by the dialogues where there is an efficient cause as well as a final cause. The Forms seem to be efficient causes in the Phaedo, but in later dialogues the efficient cause is Soul, Nous, or Creator-God (Laws 896a). Indeed, it stands to reason that the efficient cause of the Universe is the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, rather than the Forms themselves. And the Good is the final cause.
So, Plato has at least four causes. In fact, Proclus identifies six causes: three primary (efficient, paradigmatic, final) and three accessory (material, formal, instrumental) and believes that a detailed analysis would yield as many as 96 (a number with cosmological connotations).
However, all causes are closely interconnected and ultimately one. As Proclus himself puts it:
This is why Platonic tradition refers to Ultimate Reality (or first principle and cause of all) as “the Good” or “the One”. Identifying Ultimate Reality with the Ultimate Good and the Irreducible One is consistent with Plato’s commitment to the reduction of fundamental principles of explanation to the absolute minimum. Insisting that they are not identical, tends to unnecessarily raise problems that are difficult to resolve. Hence even Proclus (who often likes to make complicated analyses of everything) uses the Homeric golden chain as a symbol of the hierarchy of reality ultimately depending on one Supreme Cause.
In any case, it is clear from Socrates’ statements in the dialogues that sciences like mathematics are not to be studied for their own sake but for a higher purpose. The same applies to logic and to philosophy itself.
The Platonic project is not about becoming lost in endless discussions about details. It is about elevating human knowledge and experience to the highest possible plane.
What is particularly interesting about Plato in this regard is the fact that his dialogues can be read or interpreted on more than one level.
For example, we know that seeing occupies a central place in the Ancient Greek worldview where it is closely connected with knowledge.
Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with the following statement:
Plato’s Forms are literally, “things seen”. Not seen by sense-perceptions, imagination or thought, but by pure intelligence. And since according to Plato Creative Intelligence generates the Universe by means of Matter and Form, it may be said without exaggeration that Creative Intelligence “sees” or projects the Universe into existence.
Another important faculty is the faculty of hearing, i.e., of perceiving sound. Plato calls the primary elements of matter (fire, earth, water, air) that make up the material world, “stoicheia”. “Stoicheia” also means elements of knowledge in general, as well as units of speech (including the letters of the alphabet), in particular.
Speech is a form of sound and sound is the product of motion. Plato tells us that the Primordial Matter of the Receptacle has a certain motion like a kind of “shaking” (seismos) or vibration comparable to that produced by a winnowing basket or sieve that makes particles separate or coalesce according to certain patterns (Tim. 52e).
Since for Plato, motion is always associated with soul or spirit, i.e., intelligence, this subtle, inner vibration of Primordial Matter must be caused by the Divine Consciousness itself.
In other words, though motionless, the Universal Consciousness produces an imperceptible vibration and sound that crystalizes into the fundamental elements that form the objects first of intellection and then of sense-perception, that together make up the Universe: the Universe is a manifestation of sound which in turn is a manifestation of the imperceptible inner vibration of the living Divine Intelligence.
However, these are concepts that take human intelligence to the limit of thought, to a point beyond which there is no thought and no language.
This is why Plato refuses to be dragged into details. In the Timaeus he explicitly leaves the first principle of all out of the discussion. Having described the primary elements of matter, he says:
For the same reason, later Platonists like Plotinus refer to the Ultimate as “above being” (hyperousios) and “ineffable” which can mean “forbidden to be spoken”, as in the secrets of mystery rites (Phaedo 62b) or “inexpressible” (Soph. 238c).
At this point, some may be inclined to dismiss Platonism as “mysticism” or whatever. However, if we think about it, there is no reason why we should expect the human mind which deals with limited, measurable, and expressible things, to grasp something that is ultimately unmeasurable, at least by normal standards.
So, Plato’s dialogues are not treatises of pure or formal logic. They are literary pointers to higher truths that the reader must discover for himself and using his own intelligence.
I look at the reflection metaphor as something more specific, something more scientific. We see in the mirror image, an inversion, right is shifted to the left. So looking at a reflection does not give us a true representation, but it is so close to being true that it fools us. So while you say "The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account", I look at Plato as saying the reflection itself is not a true representation. So much of Plato's work involves informing us of ways to distinguish reflections from reality, so that we can be aware of the inversion which occurs in reflection, and not accept it as a true representation. That a reflection contains an inversion, and is therefore not a true representation is a key point.
Quoting Apollodorus
Based on what I said above, I think that this is incorrect, especially the last sentence. "When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself. " There is no such thing as "reflects itself in itself". A reflection is always external to the thing reflected, so there is already an Other implied by "reflection", the thing which reflects. Otherwise there is no reflection. And, I believe this is critical to understanding Plato, because this Other is the cause of the deficiency and misunderstanding in knowledge. If we ignore the Other, then we think we have pure, true knowledge, ignoring the role of the Other, and the inversion of the reflection, thereby deceiving ourselves.
So your statement is really self-deception, which can be apprehended as self-deception when analyzed and seen as self-contradicting. The Intelligence which sees itself in the reflection must see the reflection as Other, to see the true reality, because the true reality is that the reflection is Other than itself, as it is an inversion. It's contradictory to say that the reflection of a self is itself. And if we fall for that self-deception, to think that the reflection of oneself is oneself, and not recognize that it is Other than oneself, this is self-deception.
Even when we look inward, what we call "introspection", or reflecting on one's own existence, it is imperative that we recognize a division between the outer self, and the inner self. This is why we have a dualism. To deny this division, and make the thing reflecting the very same thing as the thing reflected on, is to wrongly dissolve dualism, and fall for the illusion that the reflection is the true reality.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is simply an unsupported speculative proposition concerning the nature of the "Creative Intelligence". As I I explained already, and exemplified with your finger/hand analogy, we have no reason to believe the Creator is an "Intelligence", just like we have no reason to believe that the unity of five fingers is a "Finger": A hand is something completely different from a finger, therefore we ought to also believe that the Creator is something completely different from an intelligence.
So you simply ignore the separation I described above, which is an essential part of "intelligence", (dividing the reflecting self, in the case of introspection, from the thing being reflected on), to say that the Creative Intelligence is identical with the Forms. But if the Creator was truly an intelligence, we'd have to respect this separation which is an essential feature of "intelligence". It is respect for this separation which creates the need for Plato's tripartite soul, and the Trinity of Christianity. The separation between the two aspects of a dualism requires a third thing which maintains the division. I believe this situation is touched on in the Parmenides.
The reality of Becoming impresses itself onto any intelligence in a way which cannot be ignored. This results in a division between the "beings" which we know, and are intelligible to us, always being contingent as the result of a becoming, and the "Being" which is assumed as prior to contingent being. This division cannot be ignored in any introspection (self reflection) as it separates the introspecting self as the activity of a contingent being, from the Being of the so-called "Creative Intelligence" (which I argue is not properly called an intelligence).
Quoting Apollodorus
This idea, that the Good and the Beautiful are one, is itself a misunderstanding.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is a misrepresentation of what is presented by Plato at Symposium 206. Notice, at 206a, that the object of Love is the good. This is what Diotima gets Socrates to agree with. People love the good, and they want the good to be theirs forever. There is no mention of Beauty here. Then Diotima proceeds to discuss Beauty. Beauty is described as being consistent with the gods, harmony with all that is godlike.
So we have Aristotle's distinction here between apparent good (the good which a person loves and wants to keep forever), and what is called by A as the real good, harmony with all that is godlike, what Diotima calls "Beauty". What Plato has set up therefore, is the division between "the good", what people desireor love, and "the beautiful", what is godlike.
Now we proceed to the end of 206, where Diotima states "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'."
So the point made by Plato at 206 is actually the opposite as to what you propose. Diotima is actually establishing a separation between the good, and Beauty, and proposing that the good is what is desired and wanted by people, "loved", and this may be very inconsistent with what is beautiful, i.e. what is godlike, Beauty.
I think I see what you are trying to say. However, I see it differently.
The reflection may not be a true representation in a scientific sense, but it is sufficiently true for everyday purposes.
For example, if you see a moving shadow getting closer to you, you know that something or somebody is approaching even if you don't yet know exactly what or who it is. So it is wrong to describe the shadow (or reflection) as "deception" in all cases.
When Plato speaks about the philosopher's need to see himself in another soul, this is meant metaphorically, as one soul cannot directly see the other soul. But it can see qualities such as intelligence, and recognize its own identity as intelligence, etc.
The Creator-God possesses faculties associated with intelligence, such as awareness, joy, will-power, knowledge, action. As he has no body, he must be Intelligence only. And the content of that Intelligence are the Forms.
Consciousness has two elements, a subjective and an objective one. The objective element is the content of consciousness. The Forms are the content of the Creator-God's Consciousness.
The Forms cannot exist independently of one another or of the Intelligence that organizes and holds them together.
When we imagine something, e.g., a series of images, it is our own intelligence that creates, organizes, and observes the images, and we know this to be the case.
In the case of the Supreme Intelligence, which is (ontologically and conceptually) above the Creator-God, the content of its consciousness is itself. The "mirror" in which it sees itself is Intelligence itself.
Before "dividing" itself into a subjective and an objective element, the Supreme Intelligence is simply Awareness. After dividing itself, it becomes the Creator-God (consisting of Creative Intelligence as the subjective element and Forms as the objective element) who generates the Universe consisting of Spirit (subjective element) and Matter (objective element).
In other words, Ultimate Reality or the One is Undivided Intelligence. The Creator-God or Creative Intelligence is ontologically and metaphysically below Ultimate Reality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The "separation" is only apparent. What Plato means is that Beauty is an expression of the Good. It cannot be otherwise as the Form of the Good contains all the Forms that participate in it. By pursuing Beauty, the philosopher arrives at the Good. This is the true meaning of Diotima's instruction.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Of course the unity of five fingers is not a Finger. And the hand may or may not be "completely different" from a finger. However, five fingers are still part of the same one hand. And they are made of the same stuff, viz., skin, muscle, bone, blood, etc.
Similarly, individual intelligences are made of the same stuff as the Creative Intelligence. It doesn't mean that they are identical with it in all respects.
I've told you a number of times now, "the good" as Plato uses this, is not a Form. This idea seems to really skew the way that you read Plato, resulting in your misunderstanding of Symposium 206. The passage is very explicit. It is said that Love wants the good. Then it is said: "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'." Clearly what is described is a separation between Beauty and the good.
Quoting Apollodorus
But this is wrong, and a problem which philosophers have grappled with for millennia. It is well described by Aquinas. The human intellect is deficient because of its dependency on the material body. The supposed Creative Intelligence has no dependence on material existence, being prior to it. Therefore individual intelligences cannot be made of the same stuff as the Creator Intelligence.
The passage may be explicit, but I think you misinterpret or misread it.
If (a) “what Love wants is not beauty, as you think” and (b) “Love wants the good”, this can only mean that (c) what the philosopher really loves (or craves) is the Good.
The Good manifests itself as Beauty. Man craves Beauty. But when he comes to see Beauty itself, he really sees the Good, which is within himself. This is why he becomes able to give birth to things that are beautiful, good, and true. You can’t give birth to things from outside yourself, giving birth, producing, or creating is always from within.
The Platonic “Way Upward” (he Ano Odos), the way of vertical ascent, is a process of interiorization, elevation, and unification of consciousness, that proceeds from the exterior to the interior, from the lower to the higher, and from the manifold to the simple.
Accordingly, the point Plato is making is that many beauties lead to one Beauty and Beauty leads to its source which is the Good.
We feel attraction for beauty because it is a reflection of the beauty within us and beyond (above) us.
At first, we are unaware of our soul’s beauty, therefore we crave the beauty in the external other.
But as we turn our attention away from physical beauty to beauty in institutions, laws, and knowledge itself, we interiorize, elevate, and unify our experience of beauty, and begin to realize the presence of beauty within us in the form of knowledge.
Eventually, we realize the beauty of the knowledge-holder, the soul itself, and we understand that the source of all knowledge is intelligence which is the essence of life in general, and of our soul in particular.
So, what Diotima’s Ladder of Love does is to turn the philosopher’s focus of attention from external material things to inner spiritual realities in order to live his life from that inner center, which is the creative wellspring of life, experience, and all things beautiful, good, and true.
In the final stages of philosophical endeavor, the seeker after truth no longer derives beauty from sources outside himself, but with his gaze fixed on the Highest, he manifests beauty externally from within. At that point, he becomes like the Gods and is loved by them for being divine, like themselves.
Becoming as godlike as possible or “likeness to God” (homoiosis Theo - Theaet. 176b), is the central aim of Platonism and Plato’s dialogues must be read with this aim in mind.
The accomplished philosopher creates things that are beautiful, good, and true following a higher model in the same way the Creator-God creates the Universe after a perfect divine model.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, philosophers can grapple all they want if they have nothing better to do. :smile:
Personally, I think the “problem” is artificial and stems from reading Plato through an Aristotelian or Christian Platonist lens. I am taking the traditional Platonic view here.
On this view, Plato has a clear hierarchy of intelligences:
Ultimate Reality a.k.a. “the One” or “the Good”.
Divine Creative Nous a.k.a. “Creator-God”.
Cosmic Nous.
Cosmic Gods.
Olympian Gods.
Minor Deities and semi-divine beings (nymphs, daemons, etc.).
Humans.
Subhuman animals and lower forms of life.
However, all intelligences are forms of Intelligence. Intelligence or Spirit does not depend on Matter, but Matter on Spirit.
Plato says that the Creator-God first made the Soul of the Universe and then its Body, and the same is true of the human soul which preexists the physical body.
It follows that if human intellect is in any way deficient, this is neither because it depends on material things nor because it is made from something other than Intelligence, but because it is a limited form of Intelligence.
Were human intelligence essentially different from Divine Intelligence, it would have no chance of ever becoming godlike or knowing anything higher than itself.
But Plato tells us not only that the human intelligence is essentially divine but that it has innate latent knowledge of divine realities like the Forms.
When the soul follows the Platonic Way Upward, it acquires full knowledge of the Forms, it sees God’s Creative Intelligence face-to-face, and realizes its identity with it.
Creative Intelligence or Creator-God (Demiurgos) is Intelligence cognitively identical with the Forms it contains within itself. It is the Paradigm of Knower with which human intelligence is essentially identical.
Knowledge begins with God’s Creative Intelligence which knows the Forms it contains within itself and the Universe it creates according to the Forms.
Before Knowledge, there is no knowledge. There is just Intelligence and Consciousness, i.e., the Self-Awareness Supreme Intelligence has of itself:
1. Ultimate Reality = Pure Undivided Intelligence.
2. Consciousness = Intelligence divides itself into two in an act of Self-Awareness, becoming Divine Mind.
3. Knowledge = Self-Awareness further divides into a more defined subjective element (Creative Intelligence) and its objective content (Forms).
So, the highest knowledge is at the level of Creative Intelligence or Creator-God. But the source and cause of a thing is prior to or higher than the thing itself. Therefore, the Source of Knowledge is above Knowledge and above the Creator-God, at the level of the One or the Good which is Pure Intelligence and Consciousness.
It follows that Ultimate Reality or Supreme Intelligence has two aspects, (1) a higher one which is Pure Intelligence and Consciousness (i.e., Self-Awareness), and (2) a lower one which is Creative Intelligence or “Creator-God”.
To these we may add a third aspect, the Cosmic Intellect or Soul, which we may take to contain all other souls, including human souls.
This way we obtain three items comparable to Plotinus’ three hypostases - (1) the One (the Good), (2) Intellect, and (3) Soul – if we wish to harmonize Platonism with Christianity.
But from a Platonic perspective there is no need to do so, not least because Plato’s, Plotinus’, and Christianity’s sets of three principles or hypostases are not exactly identical.
This is not consistent with what is written at 206. What people crave is the good, and there is no mention of "Beauty" at this particular section of the discussion.
"In a word then, love is wanting to possess the good forever" Symp. 206a.
Then Diotima proceeds to describe Beauty as something godly:
[quote=The Symposium 206 c-d] Now no one can possibly give birth in anything ugly; only in something beautiful. That's because when a man and a woman come together in order to give birth. this is a godly affair. Pregnancy, reproduction---this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do, and it cannot occur in anything that is out of harmony, but ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly. Beauty, however, is in harmony with the Divine. Therefore the goddess who presides at childbirth---she's called Moira or Eilithuia---is really Beauty.[/quote]
It is very evident that there is a separation made here by Plato, between the mortal animal's (man's) wanting to possess the good, and Beauty, which is godly. Hence the conclusion:
"'You see, Socrates', she said, 'What Love wants is not Beauty as you think it is."
What you don't seem to grasp Apollodorus, is the proper relationship between these two, love, as the desire to possess the good forever (immortality), and Beauty, which is the actualized immortality, made real by reproduction. What Plato goes on to explain, is that the actual immortality, which is reproduction, and the real presence of Beauty, manifests itself in the animals as a sort of disease, called Love. This drives them to do all sorts of "sick" things for intercourse, and to nurture and protect their young.
So you have the relationship backward. The Good does not manifest itself as Beauty, Beauty, as the Divine, manifests itself as a desire for the good. What is important to understand here, why this inversion is the reality, is the role of Necessity. There is no necessary relationship which would make the desire for the good necessarily cause the existence of something beautiful. The desire for intercourse, for example, does not necessarily bring about birth. So we cannot say that childbirth (which is beautiful), is the necessary result of the mortal desire for intercourse. Therefore we cannot say that Beauty is the manifestation of the good. We are lacking the required necessity. On the other hand, if we posit Beauty as the cause of love, and the mortal desire for intercourse, we have a necessary relationship, and therefore the mortal desire for the good can be apprehended as the manifestation of Beauty.
I think this point is important if one is to understand the supposed causal role of the Forms. The Form is prior to the material manifestation. The material manifestation is what we know and accept scientifically as "reality", the behaviour of animals and stuff like that; but the Forms are prior to this, as the true cause of that behaviour. That's why the cave dwellers just see the material manifestation as reality, when that material "reality" is really just a reflection, or representation, being what has been caused by the true reality of the Forms.
Quoting Apollodorus
So this is really the opposite of what Plato indicates in "The Symposium". The true source is Beauty, as the Divine. Then the good is the means by which the mortal animals relate to the Divine. "The good" for Plato is fixed to desire, as the object which is needed, wanted, the end, represented here as immortality. And this reality, that human animals have desires, needs and wants, is a manifestation of the Divine, Beauty, which is the cause of it. The desire for the good is a manifestation of, i.e. caused by, the Divine Form, Beauty.
So what you describe here is the process of learning, the logical process, which is established on the basis of logical priority, but it is actually a reversal of the temporal priority of causation. We see many beauties, and this leads logically to a necessity to assume one Beauty, and the one Beauty appears as if it must be temporally, or causally prior to the many beauties. But it occurs as an unintelligible dilemma, as to how the one Form, Beauty, could be the cause of the many beauties. This dilemma is only resolved by placing "the good" (love and the desire for the good, described as immortality), as the medium between the many beauties and the one Beauty. Then the one Beauty may be apprehended as the cause of many beauties, through the intermediary, which is the desire for the good. This is why "the good" is the fundamental principle, because it allows us to apprehend the Forms as causally active.
Quoting Apollodorus
Again, this displays your backward approach. You completely misrepresent "intelligence". The source of all knowledge is not intelligence, intelligence is the product of knowledge. The source of knowledge is the desire for the good, the desire for immortality, which is a manifestation of the Divine Form, Beauty. As the Form Beauty is the cause of that desire for the good.
Quoting Apollodorus
The problem here, is that your "traditional Platonic" view is an off-shoot, a perspective which is not consistent with Aristotle and the majority of western readers of Plato (Christian Platonists). So we have a relatively small group of so-called traditional Platonists, who adhered to the Pythagorean principles which Plato actually rejected, and directed Aristotle away from, such as yourself, and you claim to have the true Platonic metaphysics. However, as evidenced above, this off-shoot is just a misunderstanding of Plato.
If the Platonic tradition is an "off-shoot", then surely so are the Aristotelian and Christian Platonist traditions which, of course, are different from each other and from Plato’s own tradition.
In other words, Christians may have an interpretation of Plato but there is no logical necessity for it to be the right one.
So, I don’t see that as a valid argument at all. More like an ad populum fallacy, to be quite honest.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If we atomize the dialogues and divide them into thousands of separate and unconnected statements, then I think what is going to happen (and quite predictably so) is that we will fail to see the wood for the trees.
The fact of the matter is that the Symposium consists of speeches dedicated to the God Eros. And, as Socrates says, Eros is the son of Aphrodite, the Goddess of Beauty and Love, and he is always “scheming for all that is beautiful and good” (Symp. 203d).
There is an explicit connection between desire and the beautiful and the good from the start.
So, the matter is very simple:
(A). Philosophy is a quest for Knowledge.
(B). The source of Knowledge is the Good.
(C). Therefore, the end (telos) of the philosophic quest is the Good.
(D). But man loves Beauty.
(E). And Beauty culminates in the Good.
(F). Therefore, the path to the Good is through Beauty.
There is nothing unclear about it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Plato’s basic forms of knowledge and their corresponding faculties are:
Faculty of sensory perception (aisthetikon) => Sense-perception
Faculty of forming mental images (phantastikon) => Imagined objects
Faculty of thinking or reasoning (logistikon) => Thoughts
Faculty of intuition and insight (nous) => Intuitive knowledge
Divine Nous a.k.a. Creator-Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) => Forms, etc.
The Good a.k.a. the One (to Hen) => Totality of Knowledge
It can be seen that the faculties of knowledge are prior, not posterior, to knowledge.
As I said before:
It follows that it is wrong to claim that intelligence is the product of knowledge just as it is wrong to claim that imagination is the product of the imagined image. Intelligence and imagination are the faculties, knowledge and imagined image are the products of, and therefore posterior to, their respective faculties.
Were this not the case, we would have to say that the Source of Knowledge (the Good or One) is the product of knowledge. This is certainly not what Plato is saying. Knowledge has a Source and that Source is the One which is Intelligence.
Of course there is a connection, or relationship, the point though is that Beauty and the good are not the same.
Quoting Apollodorus
I see what you mean, "intelligence" is ambiguous. You are using "intelligence" as synonymous with "intellect", and I thought you meant "intelligence" in the sense of the property of an intellect
Early Christians understood Plato well because they were Platonists. All educated citizens of the Roman Empire, especially in the East, spoke Greek and were familiar with Platonism. St Paul himself spoke Greek and was conversant with Greek philosophy.
It was the Platonist belief in the One that led Pagan intellectuals to Christianity, as stated by St Augustine (who had read Victorinus’ Latin translations of Plotinus and Porphyry).
Even though they embraced Christianity, Platonists remained Platonists at heart. When Synesius of Cyrene, originally a Platonist, was made bishop in 411 AD, he asked to be replaced by someone else because as a bishop he couldn’t find the time to practice contemplation as required by his Platonist beliefs.
Platonism did not, and could not, disappear, as there was nothing comparable in the whole Roman Empire to replace it. Instead, it persisted among the intellectual classes and was largely adopted by the upper echelons of the Church itself. Over the centuries that followed, however, Platonism became more and more Christianized and most Christians, especially in the Catholic and later Protestant West, ended up with a poor (if any) grasp of Plato’s teachings.
This is why, personally, I would recommend turning to Platonists and scholars of Plato for a better understanding. Gersons's From Plato to Platonism is a good start. I don't agree with everything he says - just as I don't agree with everything Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus say - but I think he understands the basics of what Plato and Platonism are about and can put readers of Plato on the right track. After that, they can work out the details themselves as they think best within the general Platonic framework.
It can be seen from Plato’s written works that his philosophy acquires an increasingly higher degree of sophistication over time. Plato’s Theory of Forms, for example, starts with the Meno and Phaedo where Forms are described as entities that exist as “themselves in themselves”, i.e., that are separate from the material world and from one another, and moves towards a description of Forms as blended with others and connected with the material world through copies of themselves.
Beauty and Good are not identical in every respect but they are closely interconnected, especially on higher levels of experience, with consciousness and experience becoming increasingly unified. In the Philebus, the Good is described as a mixture of three Forms, Beauty, Proportion, and Truth, and Beauty and Good appear together in other dialogues.
The combination and (partial) identification of Beauty with Good is particularly obvious in the Symposium.
To begin with, the dialogue takes place at the house of the “Good and Beautiful” Agathon. Beauty and Good are combined in Agathon himself, the party host, who is said to be “beautiful” and whose name means “good”. This could not have escaped Plato readers even under Roman rule when all educated citizens, including Christians, spoke Greek. Moreover, Socrates himself calls Agathon “very beautiful and of good nature and breeding” in the Protagoras (315d-e).
So, there can be no doubt that we are in the realm of the Good and Beautiful from the start. Socrates himself is dressed in beautiful clothes for the occasion.
Moreover, the Symposium consists of speeches dedicated to the God Eros. And, as Socrates states, Eros is the son of Aphrodite, the Goddess of Beauty and Love, and he is always “scheming for all that is beautiful and good” (Symp. 203d).
The best, most important, and most beautiful speeches in the Symposium are those of Agathon and Socrates - they are placed at the center of the dialogue and their authors are crowned by Alcibiades who has appointed himself judge over the contest.
Agathon and Socrates mirror each other in many ways. Agathon is young and beautiful, Socrates is older and not very good-looking. Agathon is a playwright who composes speeches for public consumption. Socrates is a philosopher who makes speeches addressed to small private groups. Their close connection is emphasized by the fact that they both are expressly dressed in beautiful attire for the party and they are seated together on the same couch: Agathon the Beautiful and Socrates the Good.
In particular, both value wisdom and expert knowledge above common opinion. Both view love of beauty and goodness as arising from a lack of these. And both agree that, in addition to beauty and goodness, what love lacks is truth – hence they both criticize poets for neglecting truth.
The triad of Beauty, Goodness, and Truth is an important one in Plato. All three appear together in the Phaedrus and now in Diotima’s Love Lesson. This should not be ignored.
Crucially, Agathon brings together beauty and good not only in himself but also in his speech, concluding that love of beauty brings good to both Gods and men:
The connection between beauty and good is made explicit by Agathon when he brings into focus the concept of love of the Beautiful as conducive to Good. He thereby prepares the ground for Socrates’ own speech, in which Socrates takes the theme to the highest level where the philosopher who has set out on the quest for Beauty has found the Good and the Good and the Beautiful combine together with Truth to form one reality.
As already stated, the process implied in the Ladder of Love is one of inner transformation of the soul which involves interiorization, elevation, concentration and unification of consciousness.
The goal of this is nothing less than deification (theosis), i.e. “assimilation to the Divine” or “becoming godlike” (homoiosis Theo) which can only happen as a result of liberation of consciousness from the human condition.
This liberation involves the extrication of consciousness from the confines of human experience revolving on sense-perception and all the mental states based on it such as imagination, opinion, emotion, and thought, and turning our attention to higher realities.
The stages of this process are clearly outlined in the Ladder of Love. The turning of attention from one beautiful body to many beautiful bodies initiates the extrication of consciousness. The consideration of beauty in customs, laws, and knowledge brings about its interiorization and elevation. And the focus on one knowledge results in its concentration and unification.
When the extrication process has been completed, it is followed by a free, spontaneous, and sudden expansion of consciousness beyond anything known or imaginable. The philosopher no longer sees one beautiful body, or any body at all, but an infinite expanse or “sea” of ever-existing beauty (pelagos tou kalou) (Symp. 210d-e).
This is the final state of release or liberation (lysis). It is a state of absolutely free intelligence which is a state of absolute happiness which is nothing but absolute freedom and fullness or completeness and satisfaction.
When intelligence is in this state, it becomes truly creative and productive of things that are beautiful, good, and true. Of course, these beautiful things can be physical babies, who will grow to be like Agathon, beautiful and good. However, Diotima emphasises the beautiful production of poets, artists, craftsmen, architects, town planners, and law-makers who, being “pregnant in the soul” from contact with Beauty and Good, make themselves immortal by giving birth to things that are more beautiful and more deathless than man:
This productive activity of the intelligence which has found its freedom and its true self, is not caused by any lack or need but by unceasing, overflowing and therefore creative, overabundance. Love itself is completely transformed. It is no longer motivated by a desire to acquire and possess things that we do not have, but by a desire to give things that we do have.
The key to understanding the Mystery of Eros, and to understanding Plato and Platonism in general, is the understanding of the fact that Eros here stands for the totality of states and activities of volition.
Eros refers not only to humans, but to all living beings including the Gods. Divine love or desire may seem different from human love or desire. The one stems from an awareness the Divine has of its own abundance. The other stems from an awareness (or perception) of absence of abundance. But human desire is ultimately an expression of divine desire, of the will of intelligence or spirit to be itself, i.e., to be happy and free, including free from desire.
The exchange between Diotima and Socrates is as follows:
Happiness (eudaimonia) is the ultimate end of all human endeavor. And we don’t need to ask why we wish to be happy because we know that to be happy means to be our real self. When we are happy, we are at peace, i.e., in harmony, with ourselves and the world.
Our real self is the intelligent spirit within us (nous) whose supreme happiness consists in contemplating the Divine within itself, i.e., itself as it really is on the highest level of existence. This is the meaning of contemplation (theoria). The divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities (Phaedrus 246e). Contemplation of divine qualities, for example, beauty, elevates and refines consciousness until it acquires a direct vision of Beauty itself. The Gods themselves, who are supremely happy and blessed, derive their happiness from contemplation.
Indeed, if we are happy when we possess beautiful and good things, we can easily imagine how much happier we will be when we possess not only beautiful and good things, but the Beautiful and the Good themselves, and with them, Truth itself which is, above all, the truth about our true identity.
But happiness is of little value without the awareness of being happy. Where there is happiness, there is awareness. Awareness and happiness are the highest and most fundamental principles of intelligent life. Awareness and Happiness are the properties or faculties of Supreme Intelligence, along with Will-Power, Knowledge, and Action as indicated in the Timaeus.
Therefore, the imagery of the Sea of Beauty takes us sufficiently close to Ultimate Reality for us to conceptually grasp Plato’s Two Causes.
Though Beauty itself belongs to Ultimate Reality, the philosopher can have awareness of it because it is also within him and because his consciousness has sufficiently expanded to contain Beauty, at least partly, within its field of awareness.
These two elements of experience, (1) the Sea (or Ocean) of Infinite and Eternal Beauty, and (2) Awareness of it, are the objective and subjective aspects of consciousness, respectively, that correspond to the Dyad and the One. Awareness also corresponds to the One through its function of unifying experience.
The philosopher’s expanded consciousness and Ultimate Reality mirror one another. The philosopher arrives at Infinite Beauty and Awareness of it by a process of ascent or return (epistrophe) to the Ultimate Source and Cause of all. In contrast, Ultimate Reality arrives at the stage of the One and the Dyad by a process of descent or procession (proodos) from the Ultimate Source and Cause of all.
The stages of Consciousness prior to Creation are as follows:
1. Pure, Undivided Intelligence or Awareness (syneseis or synaesthesis) a.k.a. “the One”.
2. Self-Aware Intelligence, i.e., Intelligence with Consciousness (parakolouthesis) or Self-Awareness (parakolouthesis heauto) = Intelligence (subjective element) aware of itself (objective element) = “Indefinite Dyad”
3. Creative Intelligence (nous poietikos) = “Creator-God” = Intelligence containing Forms = Knowledge
Otherwise formulated:
(A). The good is defined by beauty (kallos), proportion (symmetria), and truth (aletheia) (Phileb. 65e).
(B). These properties depend on order which is a well-proportioned arrangement of parts in a harmonious whole.
(C). Therefore, the basis of order is unity or oneness.
(D). Therefore, Unity or Oneness is the cause of all good.
(E). But Order and Goodness in the world are not perfect.
(F). Therefore, a cause must exist that is opposed to Oneness and Goodness.
(G). Such a cause must be a principle of Division and Plurality.
(H). This cause is the Indefinite Dyad.
(I). Therefore, there are two causes, the One, and the Indefinite Dyad.
(J). But the Indefinite Dyad exists exclusively in opposition to the One.
(K). Therefore, the Indefinite Dyad is dependent on the One.
( L). Therefore, the One (= the Good) is the Ultimate Cause of all.
When the One, i.e., Supreme Intelligence, sets about to create the Universe, it limits its own powers by imposing Limit on the Unlimited, and thus produces (1) Spirit or Soul which possesses exactly the same powers as the Supreme but in limited degree and (2) Matter which is (almost) completely devoid of intelligence.
Were this not the case, the human soul would not have the powers of awareness, happiness, will, knowledge and action, and would be no better than inanimate objects. Indeed, it would be worse given that even inanimate matter, though devoid of higher intelligence, still possesses some powers as can be seen from the behavior of atomic particles, energy fields, etc. – which, at the very least, indicates the presence of a very limited power of action.
It follows that human love or desire for the beautiful and the good, and ultimately, for happiness, is really an expression of divine will, i.e., of the will of limited, individual intelligence to recover its original happiness and freedom which it once had before descending into particular existence.
This act of volition (boulesis) on the part of the human soul is triggered by the perception of beauty in objects other than itself.
The perception of objective beauty activates the soul’s innate memory of the “infinite Sea of Beauty” that was once part of its self-identity, and, through philosophic practice the soul gradually recovers its full awareness of its true identity. Having recovered its identity, it is once again complete, fully satisfied, self-sufficient, self-contained, full of Beauty, Goodness, and Truth, infinitely and eternally happy, and lacking in absolutely nothing. It has now attained ultimate perfection (and is welcomed into the company of Gods).
I suggest that you consider the passage in The Symposium in the following way. There is a separation described by Diotima between the good and the beautiful. Hence the necessity for good "and" beauty. The good is not necessarily beautiful, and the beautiful is not necessarily good. This is why Socrates could not say why a person would desire the beautiful, but could easily say why a person would desire the good. The good is desired for the sake of something, happiness/. But beauty, if it's desired, is desired for the sake of itself.
This is why Diotima places the good in the human realm, what is desired by people, while beauty is placed in the realm of what is godly. Now, human beings do not necessarily desire what is godly, so the good, what a human being desires, is not necessarily something godly or beautiful. It might still be something ugly. "The good" being what a human being determines as desirable, might not be godly or beautiful.
So when we look at the phrase "beautiful and good", what is described here is a consistency between what is desired by a human being, "the good", and what is godly, "Beauty". At this point, the beautiful (what is godly) is the good (what is desired by a human being. Though the good and the beautiful are not necessarily the same, they may be the same, and when they are, we might call this Truth.
You'll see that Aristotle described this principle in a slightly different way, and his description was adopted into Christianity, especially from Aquinas and later. He distinguished the real good from the apparent good. In Christianity the apparent good is what a human being desires, and the real good is what God determines. The goal of moral philosophy is to shape the apparent good so that it conforms to be the same as the real good.
Quoting Apollodorus
I think this is the point here. Truth is elusive to the intellect, difficult to understand. The good is always present, so it is apprehended first. To move onward from the good to Truth, we must give to beauty what we find in the good, thus uniting Beauty and Good.
Culture, religion, and philosophy in the Roman Empire, especially in the East, were heavily Hellenized. This is why key Platonic concepts like “the inner man” (entos anthropos, Rep. 589a) the true human being that is an image of the Divine, appear in early Christian texts (Romans 7:22, 2 Cor. 4:16, Ephes. 3:16) and later commentators like Augustine.
It is this “inner man”, in contrast to the “outer man” (whose attention is caught up in the material world and in personal interests), that discerns the difference between what an individual person regards as “good” and what may be regarded as “universal truth” or “Divine Truth”.
As in Platonism, human intelligence or reason in Augustine has two parts, one looking upward to higher realities, the other looking downward to worldly existence. The upward-looking part corresponding to the Platonic nous, also called “the eye of the soul” both in Plato and Augustine and other Christian thinkers, is the part that is capable of contemplating the Divine and grasping eternal truths that remain invisible to the untrained sight of unphilosophical man.
Hence, as in Plato, this inner optic organ in Augustine is in need of purification in order to have its faculty of higher vision restored. Like Plato who speaks of Eternal Forms, Augustine speaks of Eternal Ideas, etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Beauty leads to Good and Good (together with Beauty) leads to Truth. All Forms ultimately lead to Truth of which they are expressions or manifestations. This is why I think that the emphasis should be on similarity, rather than difference.
The identity and function of “the Good” is of particular significance, being the link between Beauty and Truth as Ultimate Reality.
In the dialogues, Plato lists the Form (eidos) of the Good together with other Forms that are said to be “essences”. But in the Republic he states that the Idea (idea) of the Good is “above essence” (Rep. 508e).
So, there are two aspects of the Good. One is coordinate with other Forms, the other is superordinate to them.
The Form of the Good itself holds a central place among Forms as a Genus (genos) of which other Forms that bring goodness, e.g., Justice, are species.
This Form of the Good is contained, together with other Forms, within the Creative Intelligence that brings forth the Universe.
In contrast, the Idea of the Good is above Creative Intelligence. It is (1) the source of all Forms, i.e., the Reality of which all Forms are manifestations, and (2) the source of Creative Intelligence itself which contains the Forms.
And, in the same way the Good has two aspects occupying two different ontological positions, so the One has two main aspects:
1. The One in itself (which is identical with the Idea of the Good).
2. The One and the Indefinite Dyad which together generate (a) Creative Intelligence and Forms and (b) Matter.
Creative Intelligence and Forms are (or is) “Intelligence with Form” where Intelligence is the dominant element and Form a barely distinct form of Intelligence, comparable to a perfectly transparent object contained within a perfectly transparent medium, like a clear object made of ice in a body of clear water.
This “transparency” of the Forms makes it possible for the Creative Intelligence to hold within itself a multiplicity of Forms and perceive them at once as One and Many and as distinct from, and identical with, each other and itself.
Matter, on the other hand, is the exact opposite, it is “Form with Intelligence”, where visible Form is the dominant element and Intelligence is barely present, being imperceptible to the naked eye (though it may be observed at atomic level as an internal form of activity).
It is for this reason that the One and the Good are one and the same Reality which is nothing but Pure, Objectless Intelligence that produces all things out of itself in a process of increasing “externalization” and “materialization”.
To take Diotima’s Sea of Beauty Analogy, Beauty Itself is the Sea and beautiful objects are particular waves, and the same holds for the Form of the Good.
Similarly, the Idea of the Good or the One, i.e., Ultimate Reality, is like an Ocean of Infinite Intelligence that contains currents of water (= Forms) within itself that are imperceptible from the outside, and at the same time produces waves on its own surface that are visible externally (= material objects). Thus, the Good, i.e., Reality, is One.
Plato himself held a public lecture in which he concluded that “the Good is One”, as witnessed by Aristotle and related by Aristotle’s pupil Aristoxenus in Elementa Harmonica (Harmonika Stoicheia) II. 30-31.
When Aristotle says:
he can perfectly well refer to Plato. In fact, in light of Plato’s lecture, he most likely does so. The use of the plural does not always imply more than one person. The plural is obviously regarded as less strong and more respectful and therefore serves the purpose of softening the tone of Aristotle’s criticism of some of the views held by Plato who, after all, was his teacher and friend for many years.
In any case, if we consider the philosophical parameters of the time within which Plato operates; his belief in the deification of the human soul, i.e., the elevation of human consciousness to the highest possible level; his belief in the Good as the ultimate source of all knowledge and as the highest object of philosophic inquiry; his commitment to the reduction of explanatory principles to the absolute minimum; and his application of epistemology, psychology, ontology, metaphysics, and mathematics to Ultimate Reality, I think the conclusion that the Good is One and that the Good and the One are identical with one another and with Ultimate Reality, becomes inevitable.
Once we have identified Plato’s Ultimate Reality as absolutely simple and one, the principles below it, though still of some interest, become less important.
This is why I said earlier that the exact position of Forms in relation to one another is ultimately irrelevant and does not present a real problem, not because Forms cannot be classified in a particular ontological or metaphysical order (Plato’s method of dieresis or Collection and Division may be applied to all objects of knowledge) but because the Intelligence that contains them is beyond time and space, which means that no Form is “higher” or “lower” than others, in the same way one idea formed in the mind is not spatially higher or lower than others, though the mind may now focus on one, now on another, endowing one idea with greater importance in relation to others at any given time.
Plato is clearly unconcerned with a complete classification of all things because such a classification is not needed for living a good and happy life. Still, once the First Principle has been more or less understood, a structural hierarchy may be outlined beginning with the Megista Gene (Greatest Genera) and proceeding in descending order with Ethic, Natural, and Mathematical Forms:
1. The One a.k.a. the Idea of the Good
2. Primary Genera – Being On), Self-Identity/Sameness (Tauton), Difference (Thateron), Stability/Rest (Stasis), Motion (Kinesis)
3. Ethical Forms – Beauty, Goodness (Form of Good), Justice
4. Natural Forms – Earth, Sky, Living Beings
5. Mathematical Forms – Number, Quantity, etc.
Incidentally, it may be worth noting that, as observed by Aristotle, Plato does not suggest that there are Forms for artificial or man-made things such as table or bed. These can be explained by means of the combined Forms of Shape, Size, etc., that the human craftsman combines in his mind to form an image of the object to be crafted.
Here, again, we can see the close parallels between human and divine cognition (hence Plato's Mirror Analogy). As humans create artifacts following certain patterns seen in their mind, so Divine Creative Intelligence, too, creates according to certain patterns it forms within itself.
In other words, the Forms are nothing but the cognitive powers by which Intelligence actualizes, manifests, or makes itself known to itself and to “others”. As part of Intelligence, the Forms are one. As powers, they are many and different. Thus Ultimate Reality Itself, the Supreme Intelligence, is the Dynamis Panton, the Power behind all things.
This is why Plato’s central idea is that higher degrees of being are inseparable from higher degrees of unity, eventually resulting in One Ultimate Reality: the closer we get to Truth, the more we realize both its oneness and our own oneness with it.
So, from seeing beauty in one object, the rightly-guided philosopher advances to seeing beauty in all things. From pursuing a single Form, he eventually reaches a mode of experience and being where all Forms are one and individual intelligence is identical with Universal Intelligence. At that point, all things, from Forms to their material instantiations are seen as products of one Infinite Intelligence, like waves rising and subsiding in the vast expanse of the Ocean of Existence which, deep within itself, remains eternally changeless, silent, and One.
I think that this is contrary to what Plato describes in The Republic. He says that when the carpenter makes a bed, as a material thing, he holds in his mind an idea of a bed, a form which he copies when producing the bed. In coming up with his idea of a bed, the one which he will make, he tries as much as possible to replicate the Divine Form, the idea of the perfect bed, or Ideal.
The demiourgos in Timaeus does a similar thing. The things that are made that we encounter directly are brought into being by some agent using a pattern outside of time to create what we encounter in time.
So long as we hold Plato’s central concern before us, the details will tend to fall into place, sooner or later.
Maybe you ought to reread this, starting at 596, Bk 10. "There are many beds and tables...But there are only two forms of such furniture, one of the bed and one of the table." And surely the craftsman does not make the form itself. Then who is this craftsman who makes the form? 597: The craftsman doesn't make "the being of the bed", which is equated with the form of the bed, he makes a replication, a copy, just like the painter makes a copy. Further, the being of a bed, the form, made by God, is one only.
Now, God makes one bed, "the form", and the carpenter makes "a bed", and may make many beds, and the painter imitates a bed, painting a picture of it. Being third from the natural one makes the painter an "imitator", and what is made is an imitation. And the painter does not imitate "the form", which is created by God, the painter imitates one of the many beds created by a carpenter, and the imitation imitates the way the bed appears, not the truth. Being third, it is far removed from the truth.
What I propose is that you carry the analogy further. The carpenter employs "a form", a blueprint, which is 'one' template by which he makes many beds. But the carpenter's template is a replication of the one "Form of bed", which is the perfect template, God's bed. Since there are many carpenters there are many templates, or forms of bed, each carpenter having one's own. Then the material bed produced by the carpenter is twice removed from the truth, and is third, as an imitation.
So when the carpenter makes a bed, it is not an imitation of "the Form of bed", created by God, it is an imitation of the template of the carpenter, one of many such templates, or forms (because there are many carpenters), which is each a representation of the one Form of bed, created by God. So the material bed, made by the carpenter is just an imitation of how the perfect bed, the Form of bed, from God, appears to the carpenter, manifested as the carpenter's template, or form of bed. The carpenter's from or template is one of many, as there are many carpenters, and the bed produced is an imitation of this, which is how the Form of bed appears to that particular carpenter.
This may be one possible way of looking at it. Unfortunately, the matter isn’t quite as straightforward as it seems.
It is entirely possible that Plato here presents a position that includes Forms of artifacts but which he later no longer holds (hence Aristotle's claim), in the same way in earlier dialogues he (or Socrates) seems to suggest that Forms are completely separate from sensibles and from one another, but later presents a more complex view where Forms do combine and are present in particulars through material copies of themselves.
A second possibility is that Plato does posit Artifact Forms but of a different type from the usual one, that does not have all the features normally attributed to Socratic (or Platonic) Forms. After all, a craftsman cannot have the same access to Forms as a philosopher.
Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus tend to dismiss this passage. Personally, I don’t think it should be dismissed, but we should take a second look at it and see if it can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with Plato’s general framework.
A third possibility consistent with this would be that the example of the “bed in itself” or "Form of Bed" could be given for the sake of argument, only.
The passage begins with the following statement:
Then three examples of bed are given, of which the first is referred to as “existing in nature, and we would say, I suppose, that it was made by God”.
“I suppose that God knew it […] and produced in nature a single bed-in-itself”
“I suppose so”.
So, this is a hypothesis (a) intended to back up an argument that is in line with previously stated views, and (b) followed by the phrase “I suppose” repeated several times.
In other words, if and only if, all these suppositions are true, then “we might call God author of the bed’s nature or some such name.”
But what if they are not true?
We also find the question “No one else could have made it?” to which the answer is “I think not” – not “Of course not”.
There are other interesting statements like:
“You must use your own eyes”
“Imagine a mirror that reflects all things”
And, finally, “Suppose a man could produce both the original and the copy”.
This last statement suggests that the carpenter forms an idea of a bed in his mind using properties like size, shape, etc. (eternal and perfect versions of which are present in the Divine Mind), and then produces the palpable bed, the “copy”, after the mental image which is the “original”.
Indeed, there can be no doubt that the craftsman forms an ideal image of bed in his mind prior to producing the physical bed. The only doubt that arises is whether God himself first creates a Form of Bed in his own Mind. Hence the question, “No one else could have made it?” which introduces an element of doubt that this is actually the case.
This doubt is reinforced by another question, “Then you say that the artist’s representation stands at third remove from reality?” (597e) and is followed by the affirmation that a distinction must be made between “things as they are and things as they appear”. In other words, the matter may be not quite as it appears to be.
If, in addition to the image in the craftsman’s mind, we were to admit an eternal Form of Bed in God’s own Mind then the artist’s copy would be at fourth remove. Alternatively, we could say that the craftsman (a) has direct access to the Mind of God and (b) has no mind of his own. More likely, the original is not in God’s Mind, but in the craftsman’s mind.
Another doubt that arises is whether carpenters really look to a Form of Bed as a blueprint or template. A more likely scenario would be that they produce a bed following the specifications indicated by the customer. On the whole, therefore, the passage may not be meant literally.
This takes us back to Plato’s wider argument in the Republic which is to distinguish between productive crafts and imitative crafts. According to Plato, the validity of knowledge increases or decreases according to its dependence on objects of knowledge belonging to a higher or lower order of reality.
Things created by God and the carpenter are true production because they are the product of a higher form of intellection and, accordingly, closer to reality. In contrast, artistic creation which is mere imitation (mimesis) does not amount to true production. The painter who paints a picture of a bed is basing his activity on the visual perception of a physical bed and has no intimate acquaintance with or knowledge of the object he is painting.
Therefore, the artist (painter, poet, etc.) has no real knowledge of the represented object and no practical skill such as making the object. His creation or imitation belongs to the lowest level of knowledge which is the level of shadows or illusion (eikasia) that creates copies of copies. The craftsman’s creation is also a copy, but is a product of right belief (pistis or doxa) which is based on the mental original which is a product of reason (dianoia), which is itself inspired by universal properties ultimately derived from Forms and perceived by means of intuition or insight (noesis).
Drawing inspiration from the Forms perceived by his nous (the part of the human soul that is closest to the Divine Mind or God’s Creative Intelligence), man can form an ideal mental image in his mind, of which he produces a physical copy. If a craftsman has the ability to form an ideal image of an object in his mind that is at least partly consistent with a higher reality, we can image how much closer to reality the accomplished philosopher will be who, thanks to special intellectual training, is able to have a clear vision of Reality. After all, this is why, though craftsmen have a role to play in society, rulers are to be selected from among philosophers, not from among craftsmen.
So, the focus here is on the similarity between human and divine creation and, therefore, on the reality and correctitude of human activity when based on a divine and perfect model. It is action in harmony with a higher, and true, ideal that enables the philosopher who has established contact with the Light that illumines all things (to Phos pasi) i.e., the Light of Consciousness itself, to always act in the correct manner in all circumstances.
Of course there is another possibility. This possibility is that what you call "Plato's general framework", is not consistent with what Plato has written at all. Therefore what you espouse as "Plato's general framework" is the product of a misunderstanding of Plato. I propose that it is not by mere coincidence, nor by some mistaken strokes of Plato's writing hand, that some of the most important passages in Plato's dialogues are not consistent with what you call "Plato's general framework".
Well, I think I have made myself clear on what I believe Plato’s framework to be.
But here is another example in connection with the Forms:
(A). Sensibles are “in flow and motion” and always changing (Theaet. 152e).
(B). Therefore, knowledge of them is not possible.
(C). But knowledge is possible.
(D). Therefore, there must be non-sensible objects of knowledge that are changeless.
(E). These non-sensible, changeless objects of knowledge are the Forms.
Plato is clearly committed to Forms as principles of explanation for knowledge or aspects of knowledge.
He is also committed to certain Forms like the Good (or the One), Beauty, Justice, etc.
But there is no evidence that he is committed to Forms for everything under the sun.
In the Parmenides (130b-d), he has Socrates say that he is undecided about a Form of Man and that he does not believe in Forms for things like mud, hair, or dirt, which he holds to be “such as they appear to us”. The contrast between appearance and reality is a recurrent theme in the dialogues.
Plato does not explicitly say what his exact personal view on Forms of artifacts is. We have to rely on the material available in the dialogues and on the testimony of members of his Academy.
Aristotle says that Plato does not believe in Forms of artifacts. Therefore, it is legitimate to see if an interpretation can be found that reconciles what we know about Plato from Aristotle and others that were close to the Academy on one hand, and Plato’s own statements on the other hand.
The fact of the matter is that the speakers here are Socrates and Glaucon, not Plato. The fact that Socrates expresses or appears to express a certain view regarding Forms does not mean that Plato himself holds exactly the same view in all respects.
At any rate, what matters is the wider argument that is being made in the Republic against poetry, of which the reference to “Form of Bed” is a part.
Socrates’ real complaint is against poets. This is why he begins by saying that he is delighted that all dramatic representation has been banned from the Ideal City.
Glaucon asks him to explain. Socrates introduces the painter as an illustrative example. The painter paints an image of an object or person that can be so realistic as to “deceive children and foolish people into believing that it is real” (598c).
But the greatest deception is that people are led to believe that the painter is an expert on all the things he is representing, when in fact he is just an imitator of things he knows little or nothing about.
Socrates describes the painter as standing three removes from the original maker in order to make an analogy with the poet. Having presented the painter as a paradigm of imitator, Socrates next moves to poets.
He does mention a “Form of Bed” but one that is hypothetically made by God and the whole passage is coached in ambiguous terms that raise doubts about this “Form of Bed”.
What is telling is that he makes no attempt to define this “Form of Bed” and offers no argument to show that there must be such a Form. His real concern is the analogy between painter and poet. Not the “Form of Bed” (that may or may not exist), but the painter himself as a Paradigm (or Form) of Imitator.
A Platonic Form is a Paradigm (Paradeigma) and the Paradigm at issue here is the Paradigm of Imitator and Deceiver which is contrasted with those who possess true knowledge, and which Socrates will use to make his point about the poet as a questionable educator of the masses as part of the wider discussion of education.
Socrates classifies craftsmen into three types: one who actually uses an object, one who makes the object, and one who merely imitates the object. Those who actually use an object have the best knowledge of it, i.e., of its practical use, which defines the object’s practical value. Those who make the object have no knowledge of its practical use. And those who imitate the object have even less knowledge of the object as they merely observe it from a distance. Moreover, the imitators do not imitate the things, e.g., a bed, as they are, but as they appear to be.
Similarly, the poets produce imitations or copies of what appear to be instances of human or divine excellence. This leads people to believe that the poets are experts in excellence who can teach them how to live their lives.
But these imitations are not always consistent with the reality of what is truly good. If the masses blindly follow the poets and the role models praised in their poems, they will be deceived in the same way they might be deceived into thinking that other imitative artists, such as painters, are experts on crafts and on objects used by craftsmen.
Of course, poetry is not always deceptive. Socrates himself, like most other Greeks (whose main education consisted in learning the Odyssey and the Iliad by heart), sometimes cites Homer in support of his views. The lesson he and Plato are trying to convey is not that poetry in itself is harmful, but that it can be harmful when it gives a false impression of what is right and what is wrong in terms of human behavior, for example, by uncritically presenting a particular action as the correct ideal.
Philosophers must not follow the masses. They must use their own judgement that has been honed through specific methods of inquiry, and separate what is good in poetry – and in all forms of transmitted knowledge – from what is bad. The whole dialogue has an ethical theme which is the Good and the Just and how they can be integrated into human society by means of education, philosophic inquiry, etc.
In any case, the way I see it, Socrates here seems to use the “Form of Bed” simply as a hypothesis (which is why he repeats phrases like “we assume” or “suppose”) for the sake of the analogy between painter and poet, and need not be taken as a commitment to Forms of artifacts on Socrates’ (or Plato’s) part.
As I said, I don’t see carpenters looking to a “Form of Bed” made by God as a template. They normally have a catalogue of templates most of which are copied from other carpenters.
At the most, humans might look at “beds” (or nests) made by apes and other animals from tree branches, leaves, and grass, and construct something similar adapted to human use, that can be later perfected according to Forms like Proportion, Size, Shape, etc., instantiations of which can be observed in nature.
So, if anything, there might be a Form of Nest, that animals copy and humans imitate after the example of animals. And if neither humans nor animals need a Form of Bed to construct a bed, then no such Form need be assumed. We may, however, assume one when we want to make some particular argument or analogy that requires such a hypothetical assumption, as Socrates does in the Republic.
I pretty much agree with all this.
Quoting Apollodorus
Where I disagree with you is in how you present this aspect of Platonism, as being "committed to certain Forms". This would be the way that Forms are related to each other, perhaps as a hierarchy of Forms. Plato presents the good, not as a Form, but as the material thing desired by a man. So there is no equivalence between the One, which is the Form that supports mathematics (for Plato), and the good.
Therefore your proposed hierarchy which places the One as the highest Form, as derived from Neo-Platonism, is not necessarily what Plato intended. I think Beauty, for example, and even Justice, as closer to "the good", being what is desired, are higher Forms than One, .
The fact that Plato did not explicitly produce a hierarchy of Forms, is one reason why there is a division amongst "Platonists", as Aristotle described, and why "Neo-Platonists" are called by that name, not "Platonists".
Quoting Apollodorus
I agree with this. The complaint which Socrates has, is against this description of reality which is twice removed from the truth, but presented as a direct representation of the truth. This is presented as "narrative" in common translations, and can be understood along the lines of a representation of a representation. Or in the cave allegory, the cave dwellers see a reflection of reality, and the narrative would be a representation of this reflection. The cave dwellers would think of it as a direct representation of reality, not grasping that what they see as "reality" is already just a reflection.
There is a very similar situation with the artists. The artist, or poet, might present us with a representation of reality, but it's really a representation of the artist's opinion, which is itself a representation. The double representation is a common theme for Plato.
We can see the importance of this in Aristotle's interpretation of "the good". Ethicists will present us with what is "good". But any particular ethicist is just presenting us with a representation of one's own opinion of "good", which is itself a representation of the "real good". So what is presented to us by ethicists is something twice removed from the real good.
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes, I agree completely with this, and I think it is the principal message presented to us from Plato, which keeps him relevant today and into the future. In our world of mass communication and mass media, it is very important to keep in mind the multitude of layers of representation. A report in the media is a report on someone's interpretation, it is not a direct representation of reality. If we want to understand reality, we need to go beyond the layers.
Quoting Apollodorus
I think you are missing the point. When we take words like "just", "good", "beauty", "knowledge" and look for their meaning, we see that different people have different ideas. That is what Plato does in many dialogues, looks to the meaning of a word by analyzing the opinions of people who assume to know it. It's called platonic dialectics. The issue is that with any such word, if there is supposed to be an objective meaning, what the word actually refers to, there must be an independent Form of that thing. The independent Form is supported by the divine mind, how God would define "just", "good", etc..
So when we practise platonic dialectics, in the attempt to go beyond, the opinions of individual people, we must assume that there is a true Form, the divine Form, as the third layer. Otherwise nothing justifies the assumption of the third layer, or "Truth". We have what is reported to us in the media, and this represents the many different opinions, but we have nothing further assumed, to validate a judgement, only one's own opinion, the person judging. But one's own opinion is just another part, one of the many, in the second layer, and does not support the assumption of the third layer. That is why we need to assume a "Form", made by God, in order to validate this whole idea of "narrative", or layers of representation, which Plato presents us with.
So, whether or not the individual poet, artist, or craftsperson, looks to the divine Form, to produce one's own template, is irrelevant. In fact, the vast majority would not, having no education in philosophy one would not even know about such a thing. The person would learn one's own trade through education from others, such that one's opinion would replicate another's opinion, and this propagates what you call "the masses". There is no need to assume a divine Form here. However, the philosopher, who wants to judge the opinions of others, for truth, must assume a divine Form, or else one's own judgement is just another opinion, amongst the opinions of others. There is nothing to validate Truth.
Well, we’ll just have to disagree then.
The way I see it, the word “good” can have many different meanings on many different levels. It can refer to a material thing, an ethical value, a Platonic Form, or Ultimate Reality, depending on the context, on how we wish to use it, the purpose for which we use it, etc., etc.
To return to my earlier statement, Aristotle says that Platonists deny that there are Forms of house or ring. In discussing Plato’s Phaedo, he says:
In Peri Ideon (On Ideas/Forms), he says:
As a member of the Academy, Aristotle was in a position to know what the general view, including Plato’s own, was, and he clearly agrees with Plato that there are Forms of natural objects but not of artifacts:
Alcinous also says that most Platonists rejected Forms of artifacts (Didaskalikos 1.9).
So, there is a tradition going back to the Old Academy according to which Plato and other Platonists reject Forms of artifacts. This is why Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus pay little attention to the Republic 10 passage.
As I said earlier, the passage should not be ignored. First, because it is quite interesting in that it shows how Plato connects human psychology with ontology and metaphysics, which I for one believe to be a key feature of his system. And second, because in my view, a closer reading puts to rest the idea that it commits Plato to Forms of artifacts.
Craftsmen do indeed look to “forms” in the sense of “paradigms” or “templates”, but not necessarily to Forms as eternal Ideas. They can look to paradigms in nature or in the work of other craftsmen. If anything, what craftsmen need for their knowledge is not an Artifact Form such as Form of Bed, Table, or House, but a Mathematical Form like Geometrical Shape or Size that involves exact measurements.
Animals are a different story. For example, some bird species build intricate nests without being shown how to do it. In Platonic terms, it may be argued that they do this as a result of some form of subconscious access to a higher intelligence that contains templates or “forms” related to such activity. Humans have largely lost this instinctive knowledge and need to learn such skills by observing other animals (or humans).
Ultimately, however, the individual selves or intelligences are manifestations of the Universal Intelligence which creates them (v. Timaeus) and therefore dependent on it. It is in this sense that we look to a higher reality in order to acquire certain forms of knowledge. Even when we look to natural objects or animals for inspiration, it is really the Universal Intelligence that we draw inspiration from.
We are normally unaware, and even dismissive, of the individual intelligence’s connection with a larger, collective or universal intelligence until extraordinary circumstances, such as precognitive dreams, force us to acknowledge at least the possibility of such a connection. This realization of the possible (or probable) existence of a higher reality is the first step on the path to knowledge and the beginning of Platonic, i.e., genuine philosophy as understood in Ancient Greece.
Much has been made of Socrates’ admission that he “knows nothing”. In reality, his exact words as related by Plato were:
Those who see nothing here but an admission of ignorance do nothing but demonstrate their own ignorance and lack of understanding. They are like the imitators in Socrates’ Analogy of the Painter. In reality, the key words are not the denial of knowledge but the affirmation of awareness: “I am aware” (synoida emauto). What matters is awareness. Awareness that there are limits to our knowledge implies awareness of the existence of some things that we have no knowledge of.
This is the beginning of philosophy in the Platonic sense. The awareness that there are realities “out there”, i.e., outside our everyday experience and knowledge, that we don’t know and don’t understand and that it is our task, as intelligent beings endowed with awareness and understanding, to inquire into these realities. Some, like Socrates, feel compelled to do so by an “inner voice”, “instinct”, or “guiding spirit” (daimonion) that in itself indicates that there is more to reality than meets the eye.
At the other end of the spectrum, others refuse outright to even contemplate the existence of anything outside the range of their five sense-perceptions.
Socrates himself tells us why this is the case. The soul has two aspects (or forms of intelligence): a higher, thinking one that is receptive to higher truths and always strives toward wisdom (phronesis) and a base, unthinking one that is attracted to what is far from wisdom (Rep. 602c-605b).
Different parts of the soul are attracted to different aspects of reality. This is why, in Socrates' analogy, the thoughtless in whom base intelligence is dominant are taken in by the illusory product of the imitative crafts, whilst the thoughtful in whom higher intelligence is the dominant aspect see the productive crafts as producing what is real. This applies to painting, poetry, science, and philosophic discourse itself.
This explains why Plato is interpreted in many different ways by different readers. Some, like the Straussians, who come from a background of political science, see Plato’s dialogues as having a purely political message with no metaphysical content. Similarly, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and Atheists all have their own interpretation according to the inclination in their soul that happens to be dominant at the time.
Some follow the imitators, i.e., the translators and interpreters of the unthinking kind who have little knowledge of Greek and even less of Plato, and who choose to render phronesis as “prudence”.
My own view is that Platonists understand Plato best. This is because their understanding is based not only on Platonic tradition itself, but also on the realization that Plato is a highly intelligent writer whose entire project starts with intelligence and ends in intelligence.
As Plato puts it, it would be extremely strange not to assign intelligence (nous) to Being:
Similarly, we are told that the Universe is created and ruled by Intelligence:
The Platonic philosopher’s task is to become aware of the oneness and universality of Intelligence. It is the universality of Intelligence which is One that validates Truth.
Like awareness (syneidesis) which is derived from syn (“with”, “together”) and oida (“know”), understanding (synesis), from syn and hiemi (“bring”), implies a bringing together of cognitive elements resulting in understanding.
Without this bringing together or unification, no understanding is possible. This is why Plato stresses the importance of the cognitive processes whereby intelligence classifies cognitive elements according to the principles of sameness and difference. It is this bringing together or unification of elements of experience into assorted categories and of categories into a unified whole, that makes understanding possible.
Awareness, therefore, is a principle of unification or unity that makes intelligence and life possible, and is itself one. This is why Plato and Platonists refer to Ultimate Reality as “Intelligence” and “the One”.
In Plato, philosophy begins with epistemology and ends with metaphysics, both of which are part of one cognitive continuum as clearly indicated in the Analogy of the Line. The underlying reality of it is intelligence itself, which is why Plato tells us how intelligence works, how individual intelligence mirrors a higher Intelligence of which it is a part, and how philosophy can be used as a practical method of elevating human cognition from the most basic to the highest possible.
Aristotle makes a separation between "Platonists", and "Plato". I even saw at one point where he referred to. "some Platonists". Your quotes are quite questionable. Perhaps you could find the place in Phaedo which Aristotle refers to? My footnote says 100d, but I didn't find it.
Perhaps Aristotle is referring to the fact that Plato posited Forms for qualities, like Beauty and Just, not for particular things like a house or a ring. That of course was the big issue for Aristotle, particular things have substance, yet Platonists claimed Forms (as universals) were the the cause of substance. So there is a gap to bridge here.
Aristotle says that Plato posits Forms for qualities, but not for artifacts.
He says that Plato at Phaedo (100d) affirms that a beautiful thing exists in virtue of its dependence on the Form of Beauty.
Aristotle’s point is that (man-made) objects like house or ring of which Plato and the Platonists hold that there are no Forms are nevertheless generated. And if objects like house and ring are generated without Forms, then other things might also be so generated.
Therefore, he concludes:
In other words, Aristotle is using Plato’s rejection of Forms of artifacts to attack Plato’s Theory of Forms.
However, Aristotle does not apply to his own comments the same logic that he applies to those he attacks. For, if no Forms are necessary for humans to build houses and make rings, it does not follow that this must apply to naturally occurring things, or to all things.
Moreover, according to Plato, natural objects (and the whole Universe) are not generated by Forms but by the Universal Intelligence (Creator-God) using Matter shaped according to Forms. Aristotle knows this, but he must reject it because in his own system there is no Creator-God.
Therefore, Aristotle's argument may succeed according to his own system, but fails according to Plato’s.
In any case, Aristotle’s statements in the Metaphysics and elsewhere show that Plato holds that there are no Forms of artifacts. As we have just seen, Aristotle sometimes puts a subtle spin on his treatment of Plato’s views to bolster his own. Therefore, we should acquaint ourselves with Plato’s views before we read Aristotle’s comments on them.
However, as I said before, Aristotle does not lie. He could not lie even if he wanted to because his audience knows what Plato's views are. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may safely assume that he is a reliable witness in this regard.
This is why, as already explained, Socrates’ “Form of Bed” is a purely hypothetical Form that he uses exclusively for the sake of the Painter and Poet Analogy and should not be taken to mean that he (and even less Plato) is committed to Forms of artifacts. Had Plato believed in Forms of artifacts, he would have made this clear. But nowhere does he do so.
As regards the Platonic tradition, the Academy at Athens was closed down in 529 AD (though other Platonic schools continued to function even afterward). Platonists like Alcinous, Plotinus, and Proclus wrote and taught at a time when the Platonic tradition was still alive and well and existed within the wider Greek-speaking, Hellenic tradition.
In contrast, Christians like Aquinas who lived about a millennium later in the West, were cut off from the Platonic tradition. Their knowledge of Greek philosophy was largely limited to Latin translations of Aristotle and the works of Aristotelians like Averroes and Maimonides, who were anti-Platonists.
So, if we are reading Plato through a multi-layered filter of Aristotelianism, Thomism, and anti-Platonism, we may find that there isn’t much of the real Plato left.
Platonists (Platonikoi) in antiquity did not start their study of Plato by reading Aristotle and even less (as is currently the case) by reading translations of the Republic interpreted by non-Platonists and non-Greeks. They normally began with dialogues like the Phaedo and ended with the Timaeus and the Parmenides, in the original Greek, which afforded a much better preparation for a proper understanding of Plato’s true teachings. This is why I believe that we stand a much better chance of correctly understanding Plato if we follow the Platonists, at least in general outline.
Concepts like “the One” and “Oneness” (or “Unity”) are absolutely central to Platonism for a very good reason. They go back to Plato and his Academy (and even before).
The quest for the One (on different levels) is a recurrent theme in the dialogues. Plato himself writes:
The very same principle is applied by Plato to philosophy as a whole as much as to individual philosophical problems. To begin with, candidates for philosophical life are to be selected on their aptitude for dialectic which is the ability to take a comprehensive or unified view (synopsis):
For Plato, synoptikos = dialektikos = philosophos
(synoptic-visioned man = dialectician = philosopher)
Moreover, Plato is a man of action who does what he preaches. He says that everyone in practicing their respective craft must survey and organize all the elements of that craft with a single eye to one unifying principle.
And this is precisely what Plato is doing in the context of his own craft which is, practicing, teaching, and writing about philosophy. He takes different strands of culture, religion, and philosophy that he regards as the best, the most beautiful, and the truest, and masterfully weaves them into an integrated, sublime whole.
And he can only do so because he is endowed with synoptic vision.
So, Plato may be regarded as the paradigm of the synoptikos, of the man who has a holistic, unified and unifying vision, which is the true philosophical vision.
Indeed, all the terms that a careful reader of Plato finds at the core of Platonic philosophy, such as “awareness” (syneidesis), “understanding” (synesis), “comprehensive view” (synopsis), etc. are based on the concept of bringing together, unifying, making one, and seeing, knowing, and understanding everything as one.
In short, Plato understands that which all philosophers, consciously or subconsciously, strive to understand.
Each thing exists by being one. And there is a universal principle of unity that makes this oneness possible, both at individual and at universal level. In the case of man, it is the soul. In the case of the Universe, it is the Cosmic Soul. And because soul is intelligence, this Principle of Unity is Intelligence.
If we acknowledge our true identity as intelligence (nous), and bring all elements of cognition together, which is the only way we can have a comprehensive view or synopsis, we obtain one cognition and one cognizer, i.e., intelligence consisting of a subjective and an objective element.
If we next complete the unification process by bringing together cognition and cognizer to make them one, so that subject and object are cognitively identical, we obtain the One. And since the Ultimate is One (Hen), oneness (henosis) is the ultimate goal.
This is the inescapable conclusion if we follow the inner logic of the dialogues and, in particular, Plato’s Divided Line representing the cognitive continuum stretching from the multiplicity of sense-perceptions to the vision of a single Reality symbolized by the Sun, i.e., the all-illumining Light of Consciousness which is the Source of all Knowledge and all Life.
This is the fundamental core around which the Platonic framework is built.
I don't think we can make this conclusion about Platonic Forms, because Forms account not only for the existence of qualities, but also of types. So the Form of Animal is the reason why anything which is an animal is an animal. We could say the same thing for Ring, and House. But I agree that there are many simple little things which Socrates would say we can't assume a Form of this, and a Form of that, until there is a different Form for every distinct individual.
This is a deficiency in Platonic metaphysics which I think Aristotle greatly improved on. Aristotle assumed that every particular thing has a Form proper to, and unique to, itself. And this becomes the principle which his law of identity is based in. He says that the fundamental question of Being, or metaphysics, is not 'why is there something rather than nothing?', but 'why is each thing the exact thing that it is, rather than something else?'.
Quoting Apollodorus
But Aristotle's argument in his Metaphysics is that it is impossible that a thing is not the thing that it is. If it were not the thing that it is, then it would be something other than it is, and this is impossible, (forming the law of identity). Further, since things are generated (come into being), then in order for a thing to come into being as the thing which it is, the form of the thing must be prior to the material thing itself, as the cause of it being the thing which it is. If the form of a thing is not prior to the material existence of that thing, then the thing could come into being as anything, therefore not necessarily the thing which it is, violating the law of identity, by allowing that a thing could be anything.
So Aristotle's argument is that it is necessary to assume that each and every thing has a unique Form which is prior in existence to the material thing, as the cause of the thing which it is. So Plato is seen as not going far enough, by not allowing that every existing thing has a form unique to itself.
Quoting Apollodorus
There is a 'Creator-God' responsible for material existence in Aristotle, it's the Divine Mind, described I believe in Bk 12 Metaphysics. In his Metaphysics, I believe it's around Bk 6, he describes how the form of an artificial thing comes from the soul of the craftsperson, and is given to the matter in the act of creation. The matter accounts for the "accidentals", and why the thing created is not exactly the same as the form coming from the soul of the artist. He implies that natural things are created in the very same way, but from the Divine Mind.
The problem which Aristotle sees with Platonic metaphysics is that Forms are only universals, yet material things are particulars. But Plato wanted Forms to somehow be the cause of material things, by causing material things to be the type of thing that each is. However, Plato does not close the gap between universal and particular, to show how one universal Form can cause the existence of many particulars, when each particular is distinct and unique. Aristotle moves to close the gap with the concept of "matter", allowing that matter accounts for the accidentals, and the uniqueness of each individual.
Quoting Apollodorus
So this is why Aristotle portrayed Plato's Forms as conceptually deficient.
Quoting Apollodorus
I believe that this is factually incorrect. The early Christian metaphysicians, St Augustine for example were well versed in Neo-Platonism. So Christian theology was based in Neo-Platonism. The fall of the Alexandria library made the work of Aristotle less and less available to the early Christians, though they had access to Neo-Platonist teaching. The Muslims maintained access to Aristotle through other sources, and Averroes and other Muslims worked to introduce the more scientifically inclined Aristotelian metaphysics into the more mystical Neo-Platonist metaphysics which the Christians held. You can see in Aquinas' writings that he was working to establish consistency between the Neo-Platonist principles already held by the Church, and the newly introduced Aristotelian principles. This brought scholasticism to an end, and also came the end of the middle ages
Quoting Apollodorus
Metaphysically, this "quest for the One" is lagging far behind Aristotle, who found "the One", as the particular, the individual, and defined it with the law of identity. The introduction of Aristotle into Christian schools marked a revolution in thinking for the Christians.
When we are talking about a literary figure in the dialogues, it is safe to assume that they serve as a conduit for Plato’s views. But when we are dealing with real characters like Socrates, then we must take into consideration the possibility (or likelihood) that their statements represent their own views.
In any case, if the assumption is that Plato posits Forms of artifacts, then there should be some corroboration for it from internal or external evidence. Personally, I can see no such evidence.
On the contrary, as shown by his conclusion, Aristotle at Meta. 1080a and elsewhere means to say that Plato limits Forms to natural things, only.
(See H. F. Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism, 243-4; G. Fine, On Ideas, 83; L. Robin, La théorie platonicienne des idées, 177; W. D. Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas, 171, and others.)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don’t see any such “gap” in Plato at all. Plato, of course, does believe in matter consisting of the primary elements.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think Aristotle’s conception of this “Divine Mind” is pretty nebulous. Its relation to the physical universe is not at all clear. In contrast, Plato clearly says that the Creative Intelligence or Creator-God (Demiurge) creates the Universe along with the Cosmic Soul and other subordinate entities.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn’t factually incorrect at all. My exact words were:
That early Christians like Augustine were well-versed in Platonism is beyond dispute. They lived at a time when the living Platonic tradition was still extant. I myself have said so multiple times as you can see for yourself if you read my posts!
Aquinas is a totally different story. There was no Platonic tradition in the West at the time.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don’t think Plato is "lagging" behind anyone. It is obvious that Plato’s metaphysics leads to the Universal One which comprises all the individual or particular ones. There is only one Ultimate Reality and Plato’s teachings show the way to it.
Obviously, anti-Platonists see things differently. This is why we’ll have to agree to disagree.