What is Change?
Some say that we have a change when a thing has a property at one time that it does not have at another. However, that either doesn’t tell us what change in itself is - it just tells us when we typically recognize there to have been a change - or it is a circular and so tells us nothing. For it appeals to a change in temporal properties. When a thing goes from being present to being past, it has already changed – changed from being present to being past. So if we are trying to get a handle on what change itself is, we can’t appeal to another change as then we are trying to explain change with change, which gets us nowhere.
So what, then, is change in itself? Well, it seems to me that a good place to start is to think about how we detect it (even though it is an egregious mistake to confuse one's detection of something with the thing itself).
I suggest that we first detect change by way of sensation. For after all, it can seem to us that something has changed even when we cannot identify 'what' has changed. Just as, by analogy, we can sometimes hear something, yet not know what is producing the sound, or feel the texture of something yet not know what was producing it in us, or smell something yet not be able to locate the source of the smell. And of course, we can also get the impression a change has occurred when no change has occurred. This too lends weight to sensationalism about how we detect change, for our sensation of change does not itself constitute the change it is a sensation of, and thus it is to be expected that we may sometimes have the sensation in the absence of any change.
Typically anyway, we have the sensation of change and then notice what seems to have caused that sensation in us, and identify that as ‘the change’, in much the same way as we might call something that caused us pain, ‘painful’, or something that caused a loud noise 'noisy' or whatever. So we identify the change with what seemed to us to cause in us the change sensation.
If this is correct, then does this tell us anything about what change itself is?
I think so, thanks to a simple argument of George Berkeley’s. Sensations, argues Berkeley, give us insight into reality by resembling parts of it. That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all.
If that is correct, then the sensation of change must resemble actual change, else it would not be ‘of’ change at all.
Next step: sensations can resemble sensations and nothing else. Sights resemble sights, sounds resemble sounds, smells resemble smells and so on. Thus, as the sensation of change resembles actual change, and a sensation can only resemble another sensation, change itself can now be concluded to be made of a sensation.
Next step: sensations can exist in minds and nowhere else. Their essence is to be sensed (as Berkeley put it “Their esse is percipi”).
But the changes that our sensations of change give us insight into exist outside of our minds. Indeed, there are ‘the’ actual changes, and then there are our sensations of change (as we all recognize, for we recognize that the fact it seemed to us that a change occurred is not decisive evidence that one did occur). So it seems that the actual changes that our sensations give us insight into are unitary, indeed they are part of the unity we call ‘external reality’ or (misleadingly) the ‘objective world’. (By saying they are unitary, I do not mean there is just one change; I mean rather that there are 'the changes' that occur in the unitary external world).
From this it follows that change itself is the sensation of a single mind. That which has caused the sensation in question can then be identified with that which has changed, just as that which has caused an auditory sensation is that which was heard.
So what, then, is change in itself? Well, it seems to me that a good place to start is to think about how we detect it (even though it is an egregious mistake to confuse one's detection of something with the thing itself).
I suggest that we first detect change by way of sensation. For after all, it can seem to us that something has changed even when we cannot identify 'what' has changed. Just as, by analogy, we can sometimes hear something, yet not know what is producing the sound, or feel the texture of something yet not know what was producing it in us, or smell something yet not be able to locate the source of the smell. And of course, we can also get the impression a change has occurred when no change has occurred. This too lends weight to sensationalism about how we detect change, for our sensation of change does not itself constitute the change it is a sensation of, and thus it is to be expected that we may sometimes have the sensation in the absence of any change.
Typically anyway, we have the sensation of change and then notice what seems to have caused that sensation in us, and identify that as ‘the change’, in much the same way as we might call something that caused us pain, ‘painful’, or something that caused a loud noise 'noisy' or whatever. So we identify the change with what seemed to us to cause in us the change sensation.
If this is correct, then does this tell us anything about what change itself is?
I think so, thanks to a simple argument of George Berkeley’s. Sensations, argues Berkeley, give us insight into reality by resembling parts of it. That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all.
If that is correct, then the sensation of change must resemble actual change, else it would not be ‘of’ change at all.
Next step: sensations can resemble sensations and nothing else. Sights resemble sights, sounds resemble sounds, smells resemble smells and so on. Thus, as the sensation of change resembles actual change, and a sensation can only resemble another sensation, change itself can now be concluded to be made of a sensation.
Next step: sensations can exist in minds and nowhere else. Their essence is to be sensed (as Berkeley put it “Their esse is percipi”).
But the changes that our sensations of change give us insight into exist outside of our minds. Indeed, there are ‘the’ actual changes, and then there are our sensations of change (as we all recognize, for we recognize that the fact it seemed to us that a change occurred is not decisive evidence that one did occur). So it seems that the actual changes that our sensations give us insight into are unitary, indeed they are part of the unity we call ‘external reality’ or (misleadingly) the ‘objective world’. (By saying they are unitary, I do not mean there is just one change; I mean rather that there are 'the changes' that occur in the unitary external world).
From this it follows that change itself is the sensation of a single mind. That which has caused the sensation in question can then be identified with that which has changed, just as that which has caused an auditory sensation is that which was heard.
Comments (114)
Change is the effect of a Cause. And we detect Change in the same way know Meaning ; by measuring the Difference in form : Information. By comparing prior Form to latter Form we infer the Cause of the Change. And my name for the cause of all change in the world is EnFormAction, which is analogous to Energy. So, Change is Transformation. That may not answer your question, but it may give you something to think about. :smile:
What is EnFormAction? :
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page29.html
Is everything we need to know about an effect already present in the cause?
Just drop the temporal bias and this will work. It's properties that change.
We talk of unnoticed changes. How could these be, if change relies on sensation?
In theory, that may be the case. But in reality, there may be multiple causes for a single effect. In my information-based personal paradigm, I call the power of causation "EnFormAction". It's the cause of all changes in the world, both physical and mental. That general power to cause change (to enform) is also the source of all meaning (need to know) for our bodies and minds. It's analogous to both Energy and Willpower. Anything else you need to know? :smile:
The EnFormAction Hypothesis :
http://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page23.html
On grandest scale change is the norm. It's easier to argue everything is in some state of flux on some scale. Nothing is truly static. But, change in this context is a difference in measurements attributable to the state of affairs.
Or it's the subtext to greasing yet another slide into a creationist agenda.
That's not a view about what change 'is'. It's a view about how widespread it is. If I ask "what is bread?" and one answers "bread is everywhere", then one has not answered my question.
Quoting Cheshire
There you simply express a prejudice: you believe any analysis is false that implies the existence of a god, yes? Why?
But even if that's incorrect and change is what causes create, that isn't a view about what change 'is', but rather a view about what creates change.
These are some thoughts that as you will see are not very well constructed but might help you look at change from a different point of view, maybe.
Change is some sort of natural law (or the result of) which prevents that the probability of a point in space contains x, where x is anything that can be contained by a point in space, be always 1. That is, there is not a point in space that will always contain x. Change makes sure this never happens. Change is a natural variation in the probability that a point in space contains x (this would mean that the probability is changing - leads to nothing). I ask myself why a point in space cannot always have the same properties (why a point in space cannot contain x forever)? Change results from the incapacity of a point in space containing x forever. That a point in space cannot contain x forever leads to change; that the probability of a point in space containing x cannot be always 1 (because there is something preventing this) leads to change... why a point in space cannot contain x forever?
I actually don't; just skeptical that Bartricks is interested in change and not undermining evolution. If I called it wrong then it saves the disappointment of having unintentionally entered a discussion about creationism.
The big mistake, it seems to me, is that most of those who seek to analyse change, simply describe the conditions under which one has a change, but do not say what change itself is.
What I have done is squarely address the question and have provided an argument leading to the conclusion that change is an external sensation.
To block my case one would need to challenge one of the premises that got me to that conclusion
So, what's wrong with the argument I made?
I'm going off pure pattern recognition. Change is an interesting topic and fertile ground for some new ideas I imagine. But, when it's creationism being served under a guise I end up sifting through 300+ posts to find a position I wouldn't have invested in refuting. If I'm wrong, then there is no concern. Motives matter in the sense a life is finite.
It also wasn't a fair representation of my statement; per creationist tactics.
Evidence? Specifically the “and nothing else” bit, where did you get that?Quoting Bartricks
This doesn’t mean sights resemble sights and nothing else. Same with smell and sound.
The problem with your proof is the same as the problem here:
Barkley argued that cats resemble X. Assume that’s true.
Cats resemble cats and only cats.
Therefore X are cats.
The validity depends on what X is, let’s assume “X” is “dogs”. Then the conclusion is clearly false, so where was the error? Either premise 1 or 2 is wrong. Let’s trust Barkley for now. So premise 2 is wrong, cats must not resemble cats and only cats given that cats resemble dogs. That or premise 1 is wrong and cats don’t resemble dogs.
So this type of argument doesn't work for any X. What makes you think reality is such an X that it works?
And this doesn't follow either. Why single? Why not a coalition of minds?
If we sense changes and changes are sensations, then are we "sensing sensations"? What does that even mean? And the sensations that we're sensing, what's the source of those? Other sensations?(infinite regress)
I question whether the point has been extended. At this point you could replace the word 'change' with anything from human experience and not lose informative content. The arguments contradictory already anyway. At first we can't compare like things to make a determination about them; Quoting Bartricks
But, we can generalize change to sensation and make any number of statements? What is the motivation for this slight of hand?
If so, it's not a causal relationship, but an inert (no change) relationship? For example, you might have a static geometric or positional relationship, without any change in either factor. :chin:
Quoting Bartricks
This is certainly a very restrictive definition -- it doesn't cover the subject of change.
Am\nyway, why do you care about what "some say"? There are some others who also "say" :smile: Then, you should not get into cyclic definitions. This is the job of bad dictionaries! :grin:
In simple terms, change is "An act or process through which something becomes different" (Oxford LEXICO)
I like this because it's a minimal definition and covers everything. Even the different position an electron can occupy around the nucleus of an atom from one moment to another.
Heraclitus described "change" in a superb way with his "Everything flows" and "You cannot step in the same river twice". What else should one need to understand change?
Change is movement. We can equally say that "change is movement in space" and "movement is change in space". This makes them synonyms, at least to that respect. Both are dynamic, even if we use the word "change" also as something static. Actually, there's no static change. Change is something continuous. A continuous movement. The water in a river that flows. Electrons in atoms that revolve around the nucleus of atoms.
Quoting Bartricks
OK, but I don't think that seeing change via sensation helps us a lot. It's a restrictive way of identifying change. OK, we can "feel" change. Then what?
I see that from here on you are talking about the perception of change. And how we (through our mind) get conscious and interpret change. OK, but isn't it in the same way that we perceive anything in the physical universe? So, the sensation/perception of change doesn’t really gives us --or at least, adds-- any insight on change.
Change takes place everywhere and all the time. We are influenced by it continuously. We can perceive it, think about it,, calculate it, co-act with it, use it, etc., in all sorts of ways.
That is circular as well. For what does 'becomes different' mean if not 'changes'?
The question is not 'when do we have a change?', but 'what 'is' change?'
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Once more, he is simply saying that everything changes, not telling us what change itself is. "What is change?" "Change is everywhere" is not an answer.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
That's circular. For a thing moves when it changes location.
I made a case for change being a sensation. My case was that we have a sensation of change - that is, we are aware of change by means of a sensation. And as a sensation has to resemble that of which it gives us some awareness, we can conclude that change itself resembles our sensation of change. And as a sensation resembles another sensation and nothing else, change itself can now be concluded to be a sensation, albeit one that is not borne by our own minds, but some other mind.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
How does that follow? One can't refute an argument by simply noting that it applies to other things. We are aware of the sensible world via our sensations - and change is a feature of it - and so the sensible world itself must resemble our sensations of it (for they would not be 'of' it otherwise). And thus the sensible world must itself be made of sensations.
I don't see a problem, just an extension of the same argument. Indeed, that argument - the argument that the sensible world is made of the sensations of an external mind - is well known and was made by George Berkeley. I am simply taking that argument and showing how it casts light on other features of reality - such as change.
Anyway, do not be distracted by that example. For this thread is about change, not causation. And as I have pointed out, even if causes create changes - and they do not necessarily do so - that would not tell us what change itself is. If I ask what a car is, and you tell me that factories create them, you have not told me what a car is.
Question begging.
If you think that there is something that resembles a sensation, yet is not one, provide an example. Note, there is no question that sensations do resemble sensations. If you think that there is something else - something that we have no reason to think is itself a sensation - that a sensation can resemble, simply provide an example. (You will find yourself in difficulties, for anything you suggest will have to in some way 'look' or 'feel' or 'smell' or 'taste' or 'sound' like the sensation you are comparing it to, and so will itself be something we are aware of via sensation, and thus it looks like you are doomed to beg the question).
Quoting khaled
You're one of those people who thinks that all valid arguments beg the question. Tedious. Learn to argue properly.
Quoting khaled
What on earth are you on about? First, it is 'Berkeley' not 'Barkley' (it's pronounced Barkley, but spelt 'Berkeley').
Berkeley argued that sensations resemble sensations and nothing else. Now, if that's true, then it follows that a sensation of X, is a sensation of a sensation.
Quoting khaled
I explained why it is a single mind.
And yes, sensations are 'of' sensations, as sensations can only resemble other sensations. Why do you ask 'what does that even mean?'. It means what it means: it means that sensations are of sensations.
What's hard to understand is how a sensation could be 'of' anything else.
As for the 'waht's the source of those' question - er, a mind. You don't seem to be following the argument.
Yes there is. I suspect that, like most people here, you don't know an argument from your elbow. Here is the argument:
1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation.
Your example is quite a stretch, so it is not much of a distraction -- more like a paradox or riddle. :joke:
Note -- see Koan below
Since you want to separate Causation from its Effect (Change), how would you define a "Cause", or an "Effect" without reference to the other? If a cause makes no difference (change) what does it do? :cool:
Causation : the relationship between cause and effect; causality.
Effect : 1. a change which is a result or consequence of an action or other cause.
PS___Koan : If Aristotle's First Cause (principle of causation) had existed forever, without any real world effect, was it really a cause?
You reply by just stipulating that 'effect' and 'change' mean the same. I mean, what's the point?
Again: change and 'effect' are not the same, for one can have cause and effect without any change, as Kant's example demonstrates.
And once more, even if that's false - and it isn't - it wouldn't be an answer to the question 'what is change?'
"What is cheese?" "Cheese is Fromage in French". That's not an answer to the question. What you've done is say "Cheese is Potage in French". That's is false, but even if it is was true, it would not be an answer to the question.
You're one of those people who thinks that all valid arguments beg the question. Tedious. Learn to argue properly.
And besides I did not definitively state that reality is not a sensation. That would indeed be begging the question. I said you haven’t proven it is.
Quoting Bartricks
If I state that A resembles B. Then state that A resembles A and only A, without evidence, that must mean that I think B is A correct? That’s begging the question, when the conclusion is that B is A.
Quoting Bartricks
They could very well not be, which is why I don't find that argument convincing in the first place. And it doesn't seem clear to me that they have to resemble reality to be "of" reality. The binary code of this site doesn't resemble this site. Yet is very much the binary code "of" this site. Why should our sensations resemble reality to be "of" it?
Quoting Bartricks
Cats and dogs? Barkley? Joke just went over your head.
Quoting Bartricks
False. You argued that. Berkeley argued sensations resemble reality. You don't even understand your own argument....
Quoting Bartricks
No you haven't. You had terrible explanations for why you think your God is a single mind, but no explanation for why this is a single mind. You have to connect this mind with your idea of God, they're not necessarily the same.
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
I didn't phrase the question right. A sensation is a sensation "of" something correct? You say my sensation is "of" another sensation. So what is this other sensation "of"? This leads to infinite regress.
The clarion call of the internet educated.
Quoting khaled
If the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations, then in what possible sense would our sensations be enabling us to perceive the world?
At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world.
Er, Berkeley made that argument. I am simply applying it to change. You clearly haven't read Berkeley. Or me.
Quoting khaled
I could give you any number of arguments in support of there being a single, unified reality that our sensations give us some awareness of, and it would make no difference, would it? If Bartricks makes an argument, it must be shit - yes? So why would I bother? I made one, but I am not going to bother making it again or adding others to it, when my interlocuter is so determined that I am wrong about everything. It's just boring.
Do you not see how this applies to both sides? I'm fine with having a less hostile and more productive conversation, but every time I try to do that you go back to ad homs as soon as you're cornered. If you want to try again sure.
A perfect example is how you choose to ignore valid critiques in favor of long winded responses to minor points. For instance, this goes unaddressed:
Quoting khaled
If A is a sensation of B, and B is a sensation, then what is B a sensation of? If it's another sensation, that would lead to infinite regress. If it stops at one point "P is a sensation of X" and X is not a sensation, then why is A not simply a sensation of X? Why presume all the middlemen? (middleminds?)
Quoting Bartricks
Correct because that's not what I'm asking you to prove. I agree there is a unified reality. I'm asking you to show this mind:
Quoting Bartricks
Is the same one as God.
Or to show that it is a single my by some other means.
And this is another good example of your trolling. Purposeful misinterpretation. When has "single unified reality" ever been questioned in my responses? What made you think I was asking for a proof of its existence?
Quoting Bartricks
In your op:
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Maybe Berkeley argued that sensations resembled sensations and nothing else as well, I haven't read much of his work so I wouldn't know. But since you said it without citation, I assumed it came from you.
Quoting Bartricks
Who said anything about "enabling us to perceive" or whatever. You asked what sensations "of" the real world mean. The key word is "of"
Quoting Bartricks
The answer: In the sense that the perceptions are caused by the external world. That makes them perceptions "of" the real world.
Just like the code of this site is "of" this site, despite bearing no resemblance to this site, because the cade causes the appearance of the site.
Quoting Bartricks
If the field is causing the perception of the mug and desk, then the perception of mug and desk are of the real world. That's a more productive definition.
Otherwise how DO you resolve this? This could indeed be the case. We could be living in a dream world. So requiring the perception to resemble the reality (phenomena to resemble the thing-in-itself) would lead to the conclusion that: Maybe our perceptions are of reality. There is no way to confirm from the perceptions whether or not they are of reality or of a dream world.
And resemblance seems like a terrible standard in other ways too. Mainly that it's vague. If in reality there is a red cat, but I see a blue cat, is my perception "of reality" or not? What about if I see a purple elephant? "resembles" has no clear meaning. The table and mug DO resemble the field in some ways. All 3 have a horizontal flat portion for example.
1. Replacement change: From the little that I know of computer graphics, if you see a red triangle on screen and then it changes color to blue, what's actually happening is the red triangle is being erased (clear screen) and then a blue triangle is being drawn in the empty screen. In short, a new blue triangle is being swapped for the old red triangle.
2. Non-replacement change: You take a red triangle, made of metal bars, and you color it blue. The metal triangle remains same and its hue changes.
Can we actually tell the difference between replacement change and non-replacement change? Does it matter?
I don't think this is what a circular definition is.
"A circular definition is a definition that uses the term(s) being defined as a part of the definition or assumes a prior understanding of the term being defined." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_definition)
There are no common terms between "change" and "becomes different". Besides, they are of a totally different kind: One is a noun and the other is a verbal phrase.
I can now undestand why you are talking about "circles" here and "circles" there. You assume that the definition (meaning) of a word and the word itself are circular. Well, then all the definitions of words are circular!
Based on this finding and on the frequency of your usage of the word "circular", I believe that you have to re-examine / reform your description of your topic.
If one wants to know what change is, it is no good just offering up some synonym for change.
Now, I offered an argument for the view than change itself is a sensation. Do you have anything to say about that case?
If the [math]\Delta \space Law[/math] is true, it itself should change.
If the [math]\Delta \space Law[/math] changes, [math]C \space Law[/math] = Some things don't change.
[math]\Delta \space Law[/math] leads to a contradiction!
I didn't offer any synonym of "change". I described the essence of change. "Movement" just came naturally to me --without the presence of any dictionary-- as something that characterizes and is similar to change. Besides, I also mentioned two of Heraclitus great sayings that also show the nature of change.
I think I have covered the word and essence of "change" well enough for my contribution to your topic to be at least appreciated. Well, I had a good time, anyway! :smile:
Is it changing or is it constant?
That's not what I said, or meant. I merely pointed-out that "cause", "effect", and "change" are inextricably (logically) linked in our experience. If we notice a Change in something, we look for the Cause of that Effect. Change, or Difference, is a clue that something happened. So, curious humans instinctively want to know how or why that happened, and the answer is in the Causation. The Cause is not the Effect ; the Change is not the Cause ; and the Effect is not the Cause, but merely a sign of Causation. Cause & Effect are the "causal relata" of Change.
Change is news; it could be good or bad for us. No-change is not interesting. Change is a Transformation from before to after. "Exchange" is the Cause of that new Form. Change is not a physical thing, it's a rational inference from experience with Before and After. For humans, Difference is the essence of Meaning. No difference, no significance. Meaning is the Difference that makes a Difference to me. Even the "change" in your pocket, is implicitly the result of a Cause or Action that exchanges one form of currency (paper money) into a different form (metal money). "Change" can be a noun ( referring to an Effect) or a verb (referring to the Cause).
The original Big Bang Theory appeared to imply a Change from Nothing to Something. But people instinctively began to ask about the Cause of that existential Conversion. A Multiverse would merely beg the question ; just a never-ending series of Effects. Likewise, Inflation tries to answer the Change question, without mentioning the Ultimate Cause. That's because, a First & Final Cause would be a Creator from scratch.
Does your Acausal definition of "Change", not somehow imply a Cause/Effect relationship? Or, are you talking about transcendent Change? That's a horse of a different color. In the real world, you can't have physical or metaphorical Change (Effect) without a Cause, unless the Cause is Absential, in which case, the Cause is not apparent. :joke:
PS__I apologize for going on & on about such an academic question. But the answer to "what is change" is essential to my worldview.
The Metaphysics of Causation :
Absences: The main argument for transcendence is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Absences are said to be transcendent entities. They are nothings, non-occurrences, and hence are not in the world.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/
Power of Absence :
http://bothandblog4.enformationism.info/page17.html
I disagree, it tells us what change ontologically amounts to. So yes it does tell us what change is. Indeed there can be different properties at different times that no one recognises.
It is not circular because the term change is not included in the definition of change as having different properties at different times.
No it doesn’t. First of all, that definition of change makes no mention of predicates like “being present” and “being past“. Secondly, “being present” and “being past” may not be properties in strict sense.
This sounds like a categorical confusion between “sensations” as an ontological type (the sensation of "red" is neither true or false) with “seeming” which is an epistemological type (what seems to be red can be blue so the red-seeming can be true or false).
And the cause of a sensation is a sensation? And if it’s not a sensation how do you get the idea that “sensations” are caused?
How do they resemble since reality is what is beyond sensation? On what ground one can support the idea of such resemblance, since he/she can not even verify such resemblance?
What is not still, changes. Thus, change is movement/motion. There is no overall Stillness, else naught would go on; therefore, something is ever changing.
I think that premise 1 here needs to be justified. If you can explain how change can be sensed by one sensation, rather than needing a number of sensations to be perceived, then we might have a solution to your question of what is change. But if we find that there cannot be "a sensation" of change, and that it requires a number of sensations to perceive change, then your entire approach must be rejected.
We can get the impression a change has occurred, without being able to identify what, if anything, has changed. Thus there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change. For this would not be possible if, rather than having a sensation of change, we had instead to infer change from some kind of comparison between cases.
None of that follows. I provided an answer to the question I posed in the OP. Whether is works or not is the matter under discussion.
What on earth does that mean? What work is the word 'ontologically' doing?
I explained why it is circular. If you say 'change is when an object has a property at one time that it doesn't have at anotehr' then you have appealed to another change - a change in temporal properties - in your analysis of change. So it is circular. It is really no different to saying "bread is a substance made of bread" when the question is "what is bread?"
Quoting neomac
What? If an object goes from being present to being past, it has changed, has it not? Changed from being present, to being past. So it is no analysis of change to say "an object has changed when it has a property at one time that it does not have at another", for that's no more or less than to say that an object has changed in one respect when it has changed in another - true, but not an analysis of change.
Quoting neomac
Yes they are, and that would be irrelevant anyway, for you'd still be appealing to a change in your analysis of change.
A substantial answer to the question "what is change" must not make any mention of change or a synonym for change, otherwise it will be circular.
That's not necessarily a fault, incidentally - if we find we cannot analyze change without making mention of change or one of its cognates, then we have discovered that change is change and not another thing.
The point, though, is that my sensational analysis does not make mention of change and thus is substantial.
Quoting neomac
You keep putting in extra words. What's a 'categorical' confusion as opposed to just a confusion?
Anyway, what you're doing is throwing mud at a wall and hoping some of it sticks. I have not said that sensations can be true or false, so why on earth do you think I am confused about the nature of sensations?
There are different sorts of sensation, and some of them are 'of' reality and thus are capable of being accurate or inaccurate. That's not true of all of them. A sensation of pain cannot be accurate or inaccurate. However, the impression that one is in pain can be. And similarly, my visual impression that there is a mug on my desk can be accurate or inaccurate.
The impression of change is like this - that is, it is capable of being accurate or inaccurate. It is accurate if there has been actual change, and not if not.
The point, though, is that the accuracy condition of a sensation is going to be another sensation. And thus, if change is something we have a sensation of, then change itself is a sensation.
Quoting khaled
I have not claimed that all sensations are 'of' things (indeed, the word 'of' is ambiguous anyway). Sensations - some of them - tell us about reality by resembling it. That is not a full account of how perception works - but it is, I think, an essential element of any plausible account of how it works and it is the only element that I need. For if that is correct, then change is a sensation.
That does not imply an infinite regress, for sensations do not 'essentially' tell us anything. It is our reason that tells us that our sensations (some of them - I am not going to keep putting in this qualification hereafter) are resembling an actual world. And as sensations can only resemble other sensations, then the reality they are resembling is itself a world of sensations. Those sensations - the one constitutive of reality - are not resembling anything.
Take a conscious act of imagination: when you imagine something (and are aware you're imagining it), the sensations constitutive of your imagining are not 'representing' anything to be the case. That is, one does not take them to be resembling something. They are not necessarily accurate (I say not necessarily, for one may be trying to imagine something real - in that case they could be judged for accuracy - but this is not a case in which one is trying to imagine something real, one is just engaging in pure imaginative activity). They just are what they are: sensations constitutive of an act of imagination.
If someone else's sensations were somehow tracking my imaginative activity, then that person's sensations could tell them about my imaginary world by means of resemblance. Their sensations would be 'of' my imaginative activity - and so be 'of' a subset of my sensations - but there would be no regress, for my sensations are not themselves 'telling me' about anything. Their sensations are 'of' mine, whereas mine are of nothing (by which I mean that mine are not 'of' other sensations - they are not doing representing work).
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
How did you come to this conclusion? How do you know this:
Quoting Bartricks
is not the case? Because it seems to me that defining sensations to be "of reality" iff they resemble something leads to us not knowing if our sensations are "of reality" or of some dream world. Just like how you can't be sure from the contents of a painting whether or not it represents a real landscape or something the author imagined.
Quoting Bartricks
I took it as part of the definition. I wouldn't use the word "sensation" without it being of something. "Sensation of heat", "Sensation of cold" etc. I have never seen "sensation" used in vacuum without it being a sensation OF something, have you? I can't think of a sentence that uses "sensation" without it being a sensation of something.
I wouldn't call imagination a sensation for instance. The confusion may be due to us not using "sensation" in the same way.
The definition of change that I gave was: "An act or process through which something becomes different" (Oxford LEXICO)
There's no "movement" in it. Read well what other people write.
You are obsessed with "circles"! You see "circles" everywhere! Everything for you is a "circle".
OK, that's it for me.
This really does not address the issue. Your claim that you can sense change through a single sensation without the requirement of comparing a number of sensations, is not justified by your assertion "that there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change".
Try looking at it this way. When we sense something, we can describe the feeling, as "a sensation", by distinguishing it from other sensations within the same category of type of sensation. So for example, in the category of taste, sweet can be distinguished from sour, in the category of hearing, loud from quiet, hard from soft in tactile sensation, red from green in vision, etc.. All these descriptions require a comparison
Now, what category of sensation would you put "change" into, such that we can consider it to be a type of sensation which can be apprehended and described without comparison to another sensation?
> What on earth does that mean? What work is the word 'ontologically' doing?
The question “what is change?” may mean that one want to know under what ontological categories/terms change can be understood: e.g. men are substances, colours are properties, wars are events, number are abstract entities etc.
The notion of “change” you are clumsily referring to is a known as “Cambridge or russellian change”, within the analytic philosophical tradition. According to Russell there is no intrinsic state of change, but simply possessing different properties at different times. Since you are clumsily reporting it as if the term “change” was included in the definition to make it look circular, you think that the definition of russellian change is circular, which is not.
What? If an object goes from being present to being past, it has changed, has it not? Changed from being present, to being past.
It seems you are unfamiliar with the philosophical debate about the subject you are talking about. Russellian change can not be understood as a transition from being present to being past. Being present and being pas are predicates which may or may nor indicate properties in a strict ontological sense. Some believe that being present and being past can be reduced to predicates which do not refer to present nor past. In any case russellian change can be understood without reference to such predicates.
> Secondly, “being present” and “being past” may not be properties in strict sense. — neomacYes they are
Again, you seem unfamiliar with the ontological terminology. Properties in ontology are technical terms, and may presuppose a more or less strict usage. E.g. existence is not a property according to some, while it is a first order property to some others, or a second order property for some others. So one can claim that also predicates like “being present” and “being past”, as “being possible” and “being necessary” are not properties as much as existence is not a property. This needs to be argued of course. My point is simplu that yours is just a debatable assumption in ontology.
> You keep putting in extra words. What's a 'categorical' confusion as opposed to just a confusion?
"Categorical confusion" specifies the scope of your confusing as much as terminological confusion specifies that you are confusing terms and mnemonic confusion specifies that you are confusing memories. In this case you are confusing ontological with epistemological categories. “Sensation” as an ontological category is neither true nor false: red is a sensation, and as such it is neither true nor false. While if we take “red” in terms of what information it delivers of the world it may refer to, therefore - as a perceptual belief - then it can be true or false.
> There are different sorts of sensation, and some of them are 'of' reality and thus are capable of being accurate or inaccurate. That's not true of all of them. A sensation of pain cannot be accurate or inaccurate. However, the impression that one is in pain can be. And similarly, my visual impression that there is a mug on my desk can be accurate or inaccurate.
You believe that there are 2 types of sensations: sensations “of” reality and sensations which are not “of” anything. FYI, this does not correspond to the empiricist view where sensations do not refer. In philosophy “reference” recalls the debate over “intentionality”, and sensations are usually understood as devoid of intentionality . I’m claiming that such a distinction is a confusion. One and the same type of sensation can be understood in ontological terms or epistemological terms. In ontological terms, sensations do not “refer to“ , they are not “of” something. However if you understand them in epistemological terms, they can deliver information of something else, like a red sensation can accurately or inaccurately deliver information about the skin color of an apple. Also the sensation of “pain” can deliver information about our body and this information can be inaccurate (e.g. phantom limb pain). Aristotle, Hume, and Kant have different ideas about how sensations can deliver information about the world. None of them believes that sensations as such deliver such information. The intuitive reasons why one may want to not assume that there are sensations that refer to something as such are the following: 1. the same sensation can deliver information about 2 different objects: the external world and us (e.g. sensation of heat on our skin delivers information on the source of heat and our body part), and two completely different sensations can deliver information about one and the same object (e.g. we recognize the circular shape of an object by tactile and visual sensations ) 2. An accurate assessment about a sensation doesn’t depend on the accurate assessment about the sensation is referring to (e.g. I can see something red without understanding what is red).
The additional trouble with the notion of “sensation of change” is that sensations are actual: at time t1 you have a sensation of heat, and at time t2 you have a sensation of cold, now when would the sensation of change supposedly happen? If you say at t1, then t2 didn’t occur yet, so there was no change. While if you say at t2, then t1 doesn’t exist anymore so how can you detect the change?
> The point, though, is that the accuracy condition of a sensation is going to be another sensation. And thus, if change is something we have a sensation of, then change itself is a sensation.
As someone said: “it is an egregious mistake to confuse one's detection of something with the thing itself” so having an impression that something has changed may be understood as detection mechanism for establishing what is true, but truth conditions do not need to be understood as sensations (e.g. statements about the existence of aliens in the outer space can be true or false independently if we can ever prove it or not by direct or indirect observation, and related sensations). And “having an impression that something has changed” doesn’t necessarily amounts to “having a sensation of change” but it may simply express a weakly belief that change was detected even in the absence of any specific “sensation of change”.
The answer lies in irreversable and reversable processes. A reversable process is used in the definition to quantify the irreversable processes (or another reversible process). A pendulum is a cyclic reversible process (in the ideal case) and time is defined as the number of times (how appropriate!) the process has shown the same face. This definition of time is not applicable in defining the reversible process itself. You could
compare a reversable process with another reversible process, but what's the use? A sinusoidal, reversible process can be a function of time but that time is again based on another reversible periodic process.
There are few truly reversible processes. The reversable process time refers to is that of an ideal clock and a realization is difficult, if not impossible. Of course there are 60 billion watches with a strap to sell, and an atomic clock is kept in isolation to compare all other clocks to, but an ideal clock is impossible to construct and will always stay an idea. A real clock will always show failure of a constant period, no matter how closely approximated.
It's this ideal clock that serves as the background of theoretical processes, when theoretically described and which are measured by a theoretical observer. Like the distances this theoretical observer measures refer to an ideal unit of distance which can only be approximated in the real world, like a standarized meter kept at constant temperature or a defined as the distance that light travels in a standarized amount of time (which shows the connection between space and time), which only shows that the meter is not an exact realization of the ideal, since the clock that measures the time needed can never be ideal or reversible.
So for change we need different situations which are part of an irreversible process. The parts of a reversible process that repeat themselves are used to compare two situations that are separated in time. Reversible processes induces the notion of time. They exhibit the reversible cyclic behavior relative to which the evolution of irreversible processes (or other reversible processes) is measured.
Irreversible processes are the key to change. They induce the notion of reversible processes, which induce the notion of time to measure the rate with which parts of irreversible processes become different or indicate if processes are reversible. Now you might ask if parts becoming different doesn't beg the question. I think it's clear though. If you define becoming as distances between particles varying, there is no circularity.
If you reverse time, which is the same as reversing all momenta of all particles, the clock will just reverse it cyclic motion, and no difference with the forward clock will be seen, as the clock is based on a reversible cyclic motion. The numbers the clock is attached to though, will be decreasing instead of increasing (it always amazes me why the counting before a rocket's ignition is backwards, though time zero, as well as ground zero, are regarded special; as if it all starts with the ignition of the rocket). This is the solution to the question why time is not reversible. If you reverse time the numbers decrease, counting back to time zero. This implies though that there is a beginning at infinity, which is an impossibility. On top of that the boundary conditions would have to be finely tuned with infinite precision, but since infinity has no boundary, this can't be realized. Locally we can reverse time, but globally this is impossible.
If space, time, and charge are reversed, then according to the TPC theorem in physics, processes look the same, a strong indication that a mirror universe must be there.Around t=0 there obviously was no clock present. But we can look at that state as a clock going forward and backward around time zero.
To experience change we must have a memory of past parts of processes. You compare the perceived situation with a memorized one and change will appear naturally. Of course you can have a change of heart and think that no fundamental change has appeared, which can diverge you to different conceptions of change. Is there a change in general? A change that is valid for everyone? No, there isn't. One man's change is the other's static.
It is also not a belief, for I might not believe anything has changed.
So, there is a sensation of change. There is also a sensation of stability. That is, it can seem that nothing has changed (even when things have).
1. We can sense change, so there is a sensation of change.
2. Appears to be several English phrases arranged.
3. Change can be sensed; it doesn't follow that change is the mere sensing of an event.
Take an explosion. I can sense an explosion. Does it follow that only the "sense" of the explosion is what has transpired? Probably, not. I'd imagine there's plenty of empirical evidence corroborating the sensed event occured.
If I ask what yellow is, providing me with a list of things that are yellow is not an answer to my question.
You have mentioned time. But though no particular temporal property essentially involves change, the instant one appeals to a 'change' in temporal properties to explicate what change itself is, one has gone in a circle.
So it seems that time is time and change is change, and we can't reduce one to the other.
My point is the conclusion is a non-sequitur in a modified sense. Premise 2 appears to be deliberate nonsense. So, anything could technically follow without a violation of logic, but in this context the objection should maintain. If premise 2 can't be stated clearly without misc. notation then I'm afraid the matter will remain illusive to any remedy. Thanks for the reply, as always.
A sensation cannot 'tell' us anything - sensations do not have little mouths or little notepads on which they might write things. Insofar as our sensations give us some awareness of something other than themselves, they do so by resemblance: that is, our reason tells us that there is a world out there that our sensations (some of them) are resembling.
Now, there is nothing like a sensation except another sensation. Thus, if we have a sensation of change, then change itself must be a sensation. That just follows.
But sensations detect change (something in the environment must activate them beyond a threshold). Change is implicit in the function of the sensation. If you block the ability of the sensation to change (if you keep the the sensory machinery in a dynamic equilibrium) it will be unable to report changes in the environment - the sensory machinery still changes (due to random motion), but if the rate of change does not reach threshold, the sensory machinery will not report what we consider to be a change in the environment. In this sense, sensations are change, but change is not a sensation (or not only a sensation). I guess the sensation of change comes from putting together the respective environmental changes each of our senses is able to capture, an action carried by our minds. Change is ubiquitous and not only a sensation, in my opinion.
I disagree. I think you can sense something new correctly the first time. Even if it's novel. Otherwise, there's no basis for constructing this reference for resemblance.
Quoting Bartricks
It is a bit clearer when isolated from the annotations.
Change by itself does not exist. It's a relational property. Irreversible processes constitute change because a process constitutes change. Cyclic, reversable changes constitute a means to assign time to the irreversible changes, which by themselves are timeless changes. A process doesn't involve time. That's what we assign to it later.
You can have a sensation of this change if you become aware of the process. The process is projected into your brain and leaves memory trails. The new projection is felt to be different from that before. You have a sensation of change.
So calling change a sensation is circular. In the very concept of sensation, change (an irreversible process without time) is involved. Sensations are based on change. You can have a sensation of change. The sensation involves change but by itself it is not a change.
I appreciate that you’re focusing on time as it has been treated within empirical accounts. I just wanted to mention that phenomenological philosophical models
of time are quite different from this.
Even animals experience time. My dog can get very impatient if I let her wait to long. What do philosophers consider as time? Experienced time? Modern science has literally objectivized time. Time is nowadays nailed to the zillionth second, and the big bang approximated to 10exp-36 seconds. Time is the clock. A funny cyclic process we appear give high value. We have such a process on our wrist, it can be seen on thousands of places, and you can fight, save, find, or loose it. What is time as a phenomenon? As used in life?
Somewhere outside Tokyo
Invented time
Someone in a factory
Invented time
If people wanted proof to carry on
They'd like to buy one
Fifth million watches
With a strap to sell
If they should ever sell out
That would be the end of time
It began as objectivized with Aristotle and his equating of time with the motion of objects. Modern science hasn’t abandoned that view, merely complicated it.
Quoting Cartuna
Phenomenologists realized that in order to get past time as motion and magnitude it was necessary to dig beneath the concept of the object as res extensa.
Sò the experience of time? As apposed to t as a magnitude on a clock or moving objects? What lies beneath objects changing, where they the phenomenologists dig?
Yes, it would have to begin with experience, because the phenomenologists believe a subject-independent world
is an incoherent notion.
What does it imply to make a time measurement, to state that it takes certain amount of time for some process to unfold? A time calculation counts identical instances of a meaning whose sense is kept fixed during the counting . To count is to count continuously changing instances OF something that holds itself as self-identical through a duration or extension.
Phenomenologists analyze how we construct objects as idealizations from constantly changing sense data.
These sense data can’t be said to have duration or extension, even instantaneous. This primordial time does not measure or count instances of anything.
So, once more, if you try and explain what change is by saying that it is when something has a property at one time that it does not have at another, then you've gone in a circle, as one would be invoking change to explain change.
Now, I presented an argument that appears to demonstrate that change is a sensation. When someone does that, one has to challenge the argument, not simply assert an alternative (and in your case, circular) analysis.
For an analogy: if I say "Tom murdered Susan and here is my evidence that he did so....." you are not engaging with my argument if you say "The murderer of Susan murdered Susan, not Tom".
:lol:
A familiar example of "change": An (unripe) green banana becomes a (ripe) yellow banana.
Unripe/green banana has changed to a ripe/yellow banana.
Ripe/yellow (banana) is different from an unripe yellow (banana).
In other words, Difference[math]\leftrightarrow[/math] Change.
If I now say that change has occurred, I must demonstrate that there's a difference but a/any difference is change and ergo, my argument is:
1. Change [premise (difference)]
Ergo,
2. Change
Begging the question.
If you are subscribing to a static view of time, then you are providing no analysis of change at all. That is, if a thing does not 'go from' having a property at one time to not having one at another, then you're not talking about change at all. The circular account at least has the merit of being true - even though it tells us nothing about what change itself is - but if you think time does not pass, then your view does not even have that merit.
But anyway, you persist in just ignoring the case I made for change being a sensation. Until or unless you can refute my case for change being a sensation, we do not need to worry about whether a temporal analysis will be circular or not.
Now, it is hopeless to analyse change itself in terms of such a change, for it is a change and thus one will have said no more than change is when change happens (which is true, but uninformative).
I have presented a case - an apparent proof, if you will - that change is a sensation. You need to refute that case by challenging a premise.
That doesn't engage with my point. A sensation cannot literally 'tell us' something, for then it'd have to be a little person, yes?
Sensations are either just sensations and tell us nothing at all, or they resemble something and we can be told, by our reason, that they are doing so and thus in this way can learn about a world that is not itself made of our sensations.
If the latter is true - and it is, of course, for the sensible world just is the place that our sensations resemble - then change is a sensation if, that is, there is a sensation of change.
Supposing your model of information is true; what does it add to note change is subject to it. I could say for example; then ____is a sensation if, that is, there is a sensation of ____ . Why choose to fill the blanks with "change" as opposed to any other subject?
Here my feedback:
- No I do not subscribe to a static view of time, this is why I explicitly wrote “I myself do not believe that the russellian definition of change is satisfactory, but not because it's circular which indeed is not”.
- I questioned that you understood the static definition of time, because the static definition of time doesn’t need to refer to temporal properties nor can be rendered with “going” or “becoming” terms and it offers us an analysis of change in ontological terms. But if your point is that a russellian definition of change is a static one so it misses the dynamic nature of change, fine with me however I didn’t read arguments in favour of this latter contention, while you spent lots of comments focusing only on the putative circularity of the russellian definition of change .
- Indeed I gave you several arguments against the idea that change can be a sensation which you simply ignored [1]. And I’ll add one more: if sensations “refer to” X, then they can not be identified with what they are referring to as much as a perception of a red apple doesn’t identify with the apple. So a sensation of change is not change nor what change is. Unless of course you interpret the grammar of “sensation of change” by analogy with “sensation of red” instead of by analogy with “perception of a red apple”. If so there would certainly be a case of identification however not a case of reference!
[1]
> There are different sorts of sensation, and some of them are 'of' reality and thus are capable of being accurate or inaccurate. That's not true of all of them. A sensation of pain cannot be accurate or inaccurate. However, the impression that one is in pain can be. And similarly, my visual impression that there is a mug on my desk can be accurate or inaccurate.
You believe that there are 2 types of sensations: sensations “of” reality and sensations which are not “of” anything. FYI, this does not correspond to the empiricist view where sensations do not refer. In philosophy “reference” recalls the debate over “intentionality”, and sensations are usually understood as devoid of intentionality . I’m claiming that such a distinction is a confusion. One and the same type of sensation can be understood in ontological terms or epistemological terms. In ontological terms, sensations do not “refer to“ , they are not “of” something. However if you understand them in epistemological terms, they can deliver information of something else, like a red sensation can accurately or inaccurately deliver information about the skin color of an apple. Also the sensation of “pain” can deliver information about our body and this information can be inaccurate (e.g. phantom limb pain). Aristotle, Hume, and Kant have different ideas about how sensations can deliver information about the world. None of them believes that sensations as such deliver such information. The intuitive reasons why one may want to not assume that there are sensations that refer to something as such are the following: 1. the same sensation can deliver information about 2 different objects: the external world and us (e.g. sensation of heat on our skin delivers information on the source of heat and our body part), and two completely different sensations can deliver information about one and the same object (e.g. we recognize the circular shape of an object by tactile and visual sensations ) 2. An accurate assessment about a sensation doesn’t depend on the accurate assessment about the sensation is referring to (e.g. I can see something red without understanding what is red).
The additional trouble with the notion of “sensation of change” is that sensations are actual: at time t1 you have a sensation of heat, and at time t2 you have a sensation of cold, now when would the sensation of change supposedly happen? If you say at t1, then t2 didn’t occur yet, so there was no change. While if you say at t2, then t1 doesn’t exist anymore so how can you detect the change?
> The point, though, is that the accuracy condition of a sensation is going to be another sensation. And thus, if change is something we have a sensation of, then change itself is a sensation.
As someone said: “it is an egregious mistake to confuse one's detection of something with the thing itself” so having an impression that something has changed may be understood as detection mechanism for establishing what is true, but truth conditions do not need to be understood as sensations (e.g. statements about the existence of aliens in the outer space can be true or false independently if we can ever prove it or not by direct or indirect observation, and related sensations). And “having an impression that something has changed” doesn’t necessarily amounts to “having a sensation of change” but it may simply express a weakly belief that change was detected even in the absence of any specific “sensation of change”.
Do you have any objection to the argument?
Ironically it is you who is committing a fallacy - for you are clearly thinking that as it is a mistake to confuse a vehicle of awareness with an object of awareness, then objects of awareness and vehicles of awareness cannot be made of the same material. That's patently false.
Now, to sensations. No sensation by itself 'refers' to anything. Agents refer to things, sensations do not. Sensations are just a kind of mental state. (Philosophers sometimes talk of mental states that have 'representative contents' - but this is really nonsense as that states themselves do not 'represent' anything to be the case, for 'representing' is an exclusively agential activity).
But by reason we know or are told that some of our sensations 'resemble' a world. And it is in this way that we - we possessed of reason - come to the conclusion that there is a sensible world. The sensible world 'just is' the place our sensations give us some awareness of by resemblance.
Now, as a sensation can only resemble another sensation, then a sensation of change can only resemble another sensation. And as the word 'of' there means no more or less than that the sensation is resembling some aspect of the sensible world, we can conclude that change itself is a sensation.
So, once more, I am not committing the fallacy that you are trying to attribute to me. I am abundantly well aware of the fallacy, as a careful reading of the OP would tell you. And I have not committed it. Our sensation of change is not constitutive of change itself. It is 'of' change, by which I mean precisely that it is a means of awareness, not an object of awareness.
What you are doing is reasoning that as it is a fallacy to go from vehicle to object, then no object can be made of the same material as the vehicle - which is fallacious.
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
My initial objection and a few others, yes.
1x1 = 1 isn't really an argument in any normal sense. So, 1x Change = Change doesn't bring anything new or make a statement; which seems to be partially conceded in your reply.
Secondly, people deduce change long after it has occured. Say for example the fossil record. Are you extending "sensationalism" to change that isn't sensed directly?
I don't see how that relates to my argument. My conclusion is that change itself is a sensation. That's a substantial conclusion. And it is certainly new. Who else has made such a case?
Quoting Cheshire
I am talking about what change itself is. You are talking about when people infer it. I am talking about the 'it' they are inferring.
Right, but it was never a sensation in the case of having been inferred. If change occurs apart from being a sensation, then your conclusion is underqualified.
It is sufficient that there is a sensation of change to establish that change itself is a sensation. I have not claimed that the only way we can be aware of sensation is via a sensation.
Take yellow. We are aware of yellow by sensation. Yet we can infer that an object is yellow despite never having seen it.
Likewise, we can infer that there has been change without having any sensation of change. But we can also sense change directly, and that's sufficient for my argument to go through.
> Change itself is the object, but because sensations can only resemble other sensations, change itself can nevertheless be concluded to be a sensation.
In what respect do they resemble and in what respect do they differ? And if your conclusion is that change is a sensation then why would I need a sensation of a change (actually a sensation of a sensation, a second order sensation) to detect it?! Or are you saying that change is a sensation that is not sensed? Which doesn’t make sense (pun intended!)
> objects of awareness and vehicles of awareness cannot be made of the same material. That's patently false.
Why? What is the argument? Can you show your point with an example other the sensation of change?
> But by reason we know or are told that some of our sensations 'resemble' a world.
We know or we are told?! Why some and not all? Also the idea of an external world is a sensation? How can a sensation resemble a magnetic field or a quantum leap in the real world?
We don't infer the "sensation" of it being yellow though; I don't see something brown and infer the fruit was previously yellow by some retro sensation experience. Even saying change 'can be' a sensation seems to confuse a thing with the sight of it. Do we then suppose all sensations are changes? That might improve the case.
I'd think so. That's one of my operating assumptions about this physical and human landscape we call reality; ingredients make a cake. And I think that with the correct digital measurement tools, it is possible to know everything about a cause, before "it" even becomes one.
Those seem like confused questions.
We are aware of a world via some of our sensations. It's why we call it 'the sensible world'.
Now, I have argued that we have a sensation of change.
And I have argued that sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world by resembling it. If you think that's not how sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world, please say how you understand matters to work on that front. My account is perfectly straightforward. Do Rembrandt's self-portraits give us any insight into what Rembrandt himself looked like? Yes, insofar as the sensible image they create in us resembles the sensible image looking at Rembrandt himself would create in us. Do you not agree?
Now, consider your questions in that context. I say that a portrait of Rembrandt - or to be tediously accurate, the image it creates in us - gives us some insight into Rembrandt's appearance by resembling the image that looking at actual Rembrandt would have created in us. So, in this case it is an image of an image of an image. Would you raise the same questions? Would you ask me "in what respects does the image accurately resemble the image that looking at Rembrandt himself would have created in us?" No, for that would be beside the point. Similarly, would you ask "why would I need a portrait of Rembrandt if the image it creates resembles the image looking at him would create in me?" - no, for it makes no sense. Sensations don't answer a 'need' in us. It's just confused.
And as for asking "Or are you saying that change is a sensation that is not sensed?" no, I am not saying that. Where have I said that? All sensations are sensed. I explicitly stated that it is their essence to be sensed. So as change is a sensation, then it is sensed. We are aware of change via a sensation that is not itself constitutive of change, though resembles it. Change itself is a sensation, and it too is sensed, but not by us, but some other mind.
I don't know what you're on about now.
It is sufficient for my argument to go through that we have a sensation of change. I do not need it to be the case that we can only know of change through having a sensation of it. We often infer that change has occurred without having any sensation of it (which underscores that change itself is not made of any sensation of ours).
Now, do you agree that we have a sensation of change? If no, why not? Can we not get the impression a change has occurred when no change has occurred? That is, can we not suffer illusions of change? Of course we can - we often do - and yet that illusion would have to be made of false impressions, else in what sense is it an illusion?
And if there is a sensation of change - and there does appear to be - do you agree that sensations can only resemble sensations and nothing else?
No, you owe the argument - what, you think that you can 'only' sense something that isn't a sensation? On what basis do you think that means of awareness have to be made of distinct material from that of which they give us an awareness?
But I can provide one, even though I do not owe one. It is by introspection that I am aware of my own mental states. Yet introspection is by mental states. And so, when we introspect, we are aware of mental states by means of mental states.
By your logic, of course, introspection is impossible. Which is absurd.
> And I have argued that sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world by resembling it.
I doubt that. First of all notice that we can refer to the world independently from sensory resemblance: the term “one” denotes a number but is there any resemblance between them? The term “democracy” stands for a political regime but is there any resemblance between them?
Besides reference is an asymmetric predicate (a name refers to an object not the other way around) while resemblance is symmetric (a picture of an object resembles the object and the other way around). So how do we settle their relationship? First we establish if there is a resemblance on top of that we ground a reference claim oriented in one sense or the other: in other words if an agent is referring to something based on sensory resemblance first the sensory resemblance must be identified by comparison of entities that can be independently experienced, then the agent can take one of the entities as referring to the other by resembling it!
Yet what you are trying to argument is the opposite: you’re trying to infer the sensory-resemblance between sensations of change and real changes from the putative ability of sensations of change (assumed you are right, and I doubt that too!) to refer to the world, prior to having made any sensory comparisons.
Besides sensations do not require “sensory” resemblance to be able to inform us about the world: e.g. a red sensation can be triggered by an electro-magnetic wave coming from a given source, now how does the red sensation “sensory”-resemble the electro-magnetic wave or the source? There is no such “sensory” resemblance since electro-magnetic waves and their source are not sensations!
> I say that a portrait of Rembrandt - or to be tediously accurate, the image it creates in us - gives us some insight into Rembrandt's appearance by resembling the image that looking at actual Rembrandt would have created in us. So, in this case it is an image of an image of an image. Would you raise the same questions?
Of course not, because the resemblance is always between visual sensory patterns. Besides to each of them you can in principle have independent access: the image of Rembrandt as directly perceived, the image of Rembrandt as perceived in his portrait and the image of Rembrandt one can remember. Just because you have independent access to all of them you can compare them and notice the resemblance. Based on that you can take these images “stored” in memory or in paintings to refer to the visual object. All of them belong to the domain of visual phenomena, and can be experienced independently from one another.
But how can this example help you prove that changes in the real world are sensations?
I don’t see how for several reasons:
1. The two domains are categorically heterogenous: A. Physical particles are not even accessible to our senses, then how can changes affecting them (like quantum leaps) be sensations? Consider the symptoms a person gets even weeks after the cells of her body got infected by a coronavirus: if the changes in her cells during the infection were “sensations” happening in her body how come she became aware of the infection only days or weeks later, namely when experiencing the first symptoms of the viral disease?
B. And, as I previously clarified, the sensory-resemblance is unsustainable even for explaining what of the world is accessible to us through sensations.
2. As I argued before, the possibility for an image to refer to a certain object by resembling it, is grounded in the possibility of detecting the resemblance by direct comparison of 2 sensory patterns that one can experience independently, however it is no possible to experience the world independently from our sensations to make sensory-comparisons between the world and our sensations.
3. If we need a resemblance argument to prove that change is a sensation, do we need a resemblance-argument to prove that red is a sensation? If not, what is the reason?
> Change itself is a sensation, and it too is sensed, but not by us, but some other mind.
What is the mind that is sensing a quantum leap?
Pls give and argue on examples if possibile to not get lost in abstract arguments
The example of the portrait was to show you how resemblance works. The portrait would not, for instance, give us any insight into what Rembrandt sounded[/i] like, because a visual sensation does not resemble a sound.
You then go on to point out things I am clearly aware of and that have no bearing whatever on my argument. For instance, it is no premise of my argument that resemblance is the only way in which we can come to understand something. A book about Rembrandt does not, for instance, resemble Rembrandt, yet I can learn about Rembrandt from it. My argument requires merely that when it comes to sensations, they give us an awareness of what they are sensations 'of' by means of resemblance.
Imagine that the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations. Well, in what possible sense would we be perceiving the world by means of them? We would conclude not that we are perceiving the world by means of our sensations, but rather that we are subject to a systematic hallucination of a world that is no actually there.
So, when it comes to sensations, if they are to be 'of' a real external world and not a hallucination of one, then the world they are 'of' would have to resemble them. And as sensations can only resemble sensations, the external world would therefore be made of sensations too.
Among the sensations we have are sensations of change, and so the same applies: change is a sensation.
So far as I can tell, you have made no real objection to my case.
But if you agree that we are aware of change by sensation, then this - once it is acknowledged as well that sensations can only resemble sensations - establishes that change is a sensation.
You seem to think that if that applies to other things too, that somehow refutes the analysis. How? That's like arguing that water is not made of molecules, because any case that seeks to show water is made of molecules will apply to all manner of other things too.
Indeed if you understood, you would see how catastrophic your argumentation still looks to me. And it’s catastrophic for 2 main reasons:
1. It’s grounded on very bad premises.
2. Even if the premises were acceptable (and they aren't), the entire argumentation would still be completely useless to prove your point.
OK let me try once again:
1. Concerning your premises, a very bad one is that we become aware of the world through sensation by sensory-resemblance. Why? Because it is unsustainable not only for entities inaccessible through direct experience (like physical particles) but also for entities accessible by direct experience: e.g. a red apple is a physical entity that reflects some electromagnetic waves which hit our sensory organs and may result in a sensation of red. Now how does the red sensation resembles the electromagnetic wave or the apple that reflected that electromagnetic wave? Since electromagnetic waves and apples are not visual entities per se, but physical entities existing independently from the experience we have of them and can not share ontologically intrinsic sensory properties, it’s impossible to detect such sensory resemblance. So if entities that we can access through direct experience and entities that we can not access through direct experience are not sensations, how can changes affecting them be sensations? And here, I’m assuming that you are not committed to a pure empiricist (say, humian or berkleyian) ontological framework. If you are, then just tell me in advance and we can spare ourselves from arguing further. Besides this is also why your example of the painting look completely misleading in explaining how sensations refer to the world, unless they are suggesting that everything in the real world (not only change) can be reduced to sensation.
The other very bad assumption is that change can be sensed (which for me it’s impossible, even when change concerns sensations, go figure!) but I’ll leave it for next time.
2. Even if your assumptions were sound (and they aren’t to me), your argumentation is useless to prove your point, namely that change is a sensation due to a sensory resemblance to the sensation of change. Here are the 2 steps to get that:
A. Reference by resemblance is logically warranted by resemblance not the other way around. If you want to talk about X referring to Y by resembling it, then I challenge you to clarify the relationship between the “referring” and “resemblance” between X and Y because “referring” and “resemblance” are logically distinct predicates: indeed there can be X referring to Y (but not the other way around) without X resembling Y ; and there can be X resembling Y without X referring to Y (nor the other way around). So how do we explain the co-occurrence of both predicates when X is referring to Y by resembling it? Your example of the portrait shows that claims of reference by resemblance is proven by prior resemblance detection, not the other way around: it’s because a portrait painting resembles Rembrandt in the first place that then we can take that portrait to refer to Rembrandt by resemblance not the other way around. So, by analogy, only the prior detection of resemblance between sensation of change and real change that can allow us to take the sensation of change is referring to real change by resemblance not the other way around!
B. The detection of sensory resemblance is possible only by comparing entities directly and independently experienced: it’s because the Rembrandt perception, the painting perception, and the mnemonic images can be directly and independently accessed that one can do the comparison among their visual properties and detect similarities. In other words to detect visual resemblance between X and Y, then X and Y need to be directly and independently experienced as visual entities. By analogy, you can detect the sensory resemblance between the sensation of change and change only if each of them would be independently and directly accessible as sensory phenomena. Hence if change was not evidently a sensation independently from any comparisons, it would be impossible to detect any resemblance between change and the sensation of change. Indeed as much as you do not need a sensation of a sensation of change to know that the sensation of change is a sensation, then you do not need to have a sensation of change to know that change is a sensation. This is true for all sensations: sensations are categorized as such by evidence and without any need of comparisons or ensuing resemblance detection or second-order sensations, were this the case this would lead to an infinite vicious regress! There is no need to argue that change is a sensation based on resemblance, or worse, based on reference by resemblance (as you fancy to do), were this really the case.
If you do not address my points as they are, after reading them carefully, it’s useless to continue the exchange. Of course, if you feel so badly the urge to remind me once more that “So far as I can tell, you have made no real objection to my case” (when I made plenty and didin't even finish yet), be my guest but pls skip at least the part were you pretend to counter my objections.
I think we passed by here before already. "Change is a sensation" isn't an informative conclusion. At best an imprecise way of speaking.
No, it is a substantial conclusion. It is not an imprecise way of speaking. Some things are not made of sensations - minds, for instance. And some things are. And change, I have shown, is one of them.
Fantastic. What absurd implication is all this intended to support?