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But surely the statement, "There is a reality that humans can't experience" is either true or false, isn't it? I still don't see the leap from "unansw...

OK, pretend I'm a well-meaning philosophical novice, and explain to me, as simply as you can, why the question is meaningless. It looks to me as if it...

We don't. Can you say why that seems like a quandary to you?

Everything you say in your post is true, including the above. Once again, I'm speculating, but perhaps the conclusion we ought to draw is that physica...

Sure. "Knowing the rules" is a background condition, just like "all things being equal at room temperature and normal gravity etc." is a background co...

I get what you mean, and that particular line is pretty clear, I agree. But what about the human sciences -- psychology, economics, history, textual h...

I do too, and it's captured in Nagel's question about whether "I am J," said by me, is a fact about the world (just to pick one example). We need to p...

Yes. That's why physicalism is untenable. Science is broader than that. Do you read Nagel as arguing against physicalism alone, for the most part? I d...

Thanks, good quotes. Nagel, as I read him, seems to veer between "science" and "physical sciences." So, two questions: 1) Why is an objective descript...

There's a potential theodicy I quite like, but whether you'd buy it depends on how you'd answer this question: If it could be proved to you, right now...

For sure. I'd love to pursue the other ideas. I can imagine people saying, in 2125, "They used to think consciousness might be a physical property! Ho...

I can only reply: not yet. But virtually none of the physical forces we now recognize as objects of scientific knowledge were weighable or measurable ...

Yes, I agree. The kind of inferential reasoning I had in mind is a little different. Let's say you start from premises A, B, C, ...n, and from these p...

Whether a given entity is conscious. An abstract inference . . . is that really what it is? Do you regard it as a fact that you are conscious? Do you ...

There's Penrose's conjecture that consciousness depends on quantum phenomena, which are understood (if at all) primarily in mathematical terms. I lean...

Thanks for asking. Yes, in great part, it has met my expectations. I was hoping to learn a few new things about this problem, and I have. Probably the...

I think panpsychism is less likely to prove true than some version of consciousness as a property only of living things, but still, I don't agree with...

This is surely true. So if the move from individuals to sets works at the formal level, then it's justified, since it captures the concept of entailme...

No worries; I found it difficult to explain, and maybe haven't done it well. That's the key -- whether a definition is needed in order to use a word c...

Thanks for the borderline-life examples. The car example invites the reply: "Can be said to" eat, metabolize, excrete, etc.? Yes, that can be said, in...

Right to all of that. Biology, on my hypothesis, is necessary but not sufficient. My guess is that no single property will turn out to be sufficient. ...

Perhaps I should have divvied up the question and answered more precisely. To the question of whether it's a "being": I can't respond, as the use of "...

Yes, that's how I would argue it, if I shared your view. Interesting. Would it be easy for you to cite an example of each? Curious to know what she ha...

Yes, that was why I was surprised too, but the SEP article that @"javra" pointed us to is revealing. It seems there have been plenty of attempts to fo...

It's complicated. There's no alarm bell that rings when philosophy ceases analyzing a concept and starts revising what the concept ought to cover. So ...

I found Harry difficult to engage with, but for whatever reason he was never outright rude to me. Since I therefore rarely read his posts, I have no o...

Glad you got something from Haack's essay. To start at the end (of your post), I think Haack's pluralism is very much in harmony with your OP's consid...

Thompson concludes, according to the synopsis: "The enactive framework strongly supports a continuity of life and mind, showing that living systems ar...

I've recently read an interesting paper by Susan Haack called Formal Philosophy? A Plea for Pluralism, published in 2005. Haack is one of our most pre...

This, if I understand it, is an important point. Could I paraphrase it this way?: A sentence with a tense operator does not automatically become about...

I don't know. And that's not evasion, just honesty. But I also don't think that the right answer to that question reveals much about the larger proble...

Thanks, I'll read it.

No worries. Sorry I couldn't be more helpful.

I'm not sure what you mean. They work quite differently, as I tried to show. It may not matter at all, for the points you want to cover. But as @"Ludw...

Yes. And I'm in no position to claim that any view on consciousness is necessarily right or wrong. We're dealing with educated guesses, at best. Hmm. ...

Yes to all of that. So the idea that "think" and "believe" are synonymous is a non-starter. The OP would need to be much more specific about which use...

Yes, that too, but the equivocation I referred to shows up a lot. It's just how we use the English language. Sometimes "I think" is uttered to state s...

Came in late on this, so forgive me if the following point has already been made. There's an equivocation going on between two senses of "think": Mary...

Somehow I managed to miss all of these over the last several days. Sorry for the crickets -- I will catch up.

I did indeed point that out, and I think it's important to understand why. I hope I also made it clear that I am not one of "non-difference" group. I ...

-- @"Wayfarer" This begs the question, doesn't it? Yes, if reason is (exclusively) an act of mind, then only minds can reason, but that's what we're i...

This seems a straightforward refutation of the idea that a computer could be alive. The awkward difference, with AI, is that it doesn't just model or ...

Yes, that's the question we don't know how to answer: Would such a structure result in consciousness or subjectivity? Is that what it takes? Is that a...

I meant the types of experiences that @"Wayfarer" listed -- sensory awareness, memory, knowing you exist. But you're right to narrow the target. We cu...

I would like this to be true, but I don't see how it is. One objection I would raise is simply, "If it's axiomatic, why are increasing numbers of not ...

It sure could. If I had to paraphrase "what is it like to . . ." I might go for "what is the experience of . . .", and as you point out, such a formul...

Welcome back. I agree with the quoted statement. But those of us who do hold out for an ontological difference between a device and a living thing sho...

This is particularly helpful, as is the whole idea of thinking of it in terms of an asymmetry. I think that's where my "intuition" wants to go astray;...

Good, and sorry if I added to the confusion. Yes. One of the things I dislike about the "pre-modern -- modern" distinction is that it tends to imply t...

This is where Kantian ethics makes a real contribution to the discussion. As I'm sure you know, Kant believed that only the good will was truly good, ...