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I think I get the point. Our imaginations are giving us different pictures of what might result from non-standard speech, that's all. To me, they look...

Neuronal events are nothing like thoughts, so the question is, how can they be the same thing? And if they are co-dependent in some way, does one caus...

Yet, in ordinary language, if someone asks you, "Do you believe the TV is on?" you'll answer yes. You might also point out that it's a rather strange ...

Or, as I suggested to @"Metaphysician Undercover", if you continue to say such things you may well be institutionalized. Sure. The evolutionary thesis...

In the case of the signs, I was imagining dying in a crash because of not following the speed rules. In the case of language, someone who didn't follo...

That would be my answer too. And how, exactly, does an assertion add something to a belief? (Neither of us means, I assume, that an assertion has to b...

You're not missing the point; our conscious experience certainly seems to rely on something like causation. But the OP question focuses on whether it'...

I don't quite see this. By "obliged," do you mean "forced"? Not many sets of rules come with their own enforcement. Or, if it's merely a matter of "Ei...

I suppose some might find it a kind of comfort -- the idea that we can't help doing what our biology (or unconscious, if you prefer) insists on. But t...

I'm reminded of this, from Schopenhauer (I don't know if he was aware of evolutionary theory): This expands the "sense of purpose, of intent" into the...

Depends on what we agree a belief to be. I've changed my tune on that, and now allow that a belief can be non-linguistic. But I think it's still helpf...

One reply would be: "Oh, so you don't believe there's a TV in your living room?" But I think your point is rather that belief doesn't enter into it at...

All good questions. I agree that the instinctual practice precedes any actual mice. And the story you're telling seems plausible: At a certain point, ...

The one @"Dawnstorm" offered would be a good example: And see my somewhat chagrined response below! This is persuasive. You've done what I asked, whic...

I agree, that's central to a lot of what's been discussed on the thread. But this already presumes a tentative answer to the question. I'm trying to i...

Thanks for all this. I will give it thought.

I really want to respond to your interesting post, but I have to be out a lot of the day. I'll check in later . . .

OK, this seems important. I hadn't seen the distinction you want to make between subsistence and what you're calling existential dependency. So the id...

Yes, a bit clearer. One thing first, though: Is the reason that "some things are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.)...

But you said: So if a language-less animal has a belief -- moreover, a belief without propositional content -- isn't it by definition a non-linguistic...

Pretty good for a sleep-deprived philosopher! :smile: This is unproblematic until we consider what I've been calling the experience of being conscious...

I agree, it's open to several interpretations. Consider the first dictum. Is it definitional? That is, should we read it as "'The world' is 'all that ...

Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many wa...

If I may . . . This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositio...

Yes. As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to se...

Yes, I also think I can have a self-aware experience, without running into the "eye seeing itself" problem. What I experience, in such a case, is not ...

The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful defin...

As above: But what is a correlation? In what mental process does it happen? If animals can do it, then a correlation doesn't use words. What correlate...

But you're just re-asserting all this. I'm asking why you believe it's true, and what such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat ...

OK, I see what you're saying. Yes, a physicalist would probably agree there are things that humans can't know, but fortunately you don't have to be a ...

Maybe. Even in ordinary conversation, it can get vague really quickly. I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de B...

This gets at the gnarly, self-reflexive quality of the con* problem. Can my experiencing of, say, warmth also itself be an object of experience? Rathe...

Right, that's the question. OK, but I still wish I understood what the "stuff" was.

Nicely summarized. I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well. Nabokov said, "'Reality' i...

OK. Popper agrees that all W3 objects, such as propositions, are human-made. The reason he puts them in a separate "world" (and of course that is meta...

Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can b...

Well, yes, it would be. But I'm trying to puzzle out whether that's a category mistake. You may well be onto something, but help me understand: What i...

I meant all of the "therefores" to be mistakes, trying to show that they don't follow from the initial statements. For this one, the idea is that we c...

I wasn't really trying to imagine an alien encounter. I agree that would certainly pose all sorts of conceptual problems. It's more a logical or intui...

Fair enough. We'd have to start by agreeing on what can be an object of experience. As you know, many philosophers believe that con* can never be an o...

I agree. I chose the expression "shadow of propositional content" to try to express something closer to what's going on. But if we agree that this doe...

They certainly do. I think I see some of them, but always happy to learn more. Appreciate all the thought you've given this.

Well, two thoughts: First, to establish my point, I don't need a reason to think it could be said by a non-human, I only have to note that there is no...

:lol: Yeah, I guess I walked into that one. But the fact that we don't know of it could hardly demonstrate that it's impossible. I think this is true,...

No, I don't think so. I agree that the feeling of warmth is an example of a conscious experience. We also agree, I suppose, that being conscious as su...

I know what you mean, but I don't think @"an-salad" is defining it that way. They're making a distinction between "our reality" and "reality = our rea...

Good description, thanks, very clearly explained. I'd like Bitbol better if he just told it straight, though, and stopped trying to scare his readers ...

Yes, that's what I'm suggesting. But I would change the terminology in a small but crucial way: Both in ordinary language and from a phenomenological ...

Quite right. And yet, if a child asks for an explanation of what heat is, you're going to tell the story about the molecular motion. We can finesse th...

Aaaaaa! :wink: OK, no more questions, just pointing out that your motto, while no doubt useful, isn't likely to convince someone who hasn't already ad...