A Summary of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus"
A Summary of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
I’m going to try to condense the Tractatus, which hopefully will help those of you with an interest to better understand its contents.
The Tractatus is the culmination of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy or thoughts. It was completed before he was 30 years old. He covers a wide range of philosophical ideas, including, the nature of the world, the properties of language, the nature of logic, the nature of mathematics, and remarks on the philosophy of science, ethics, religion, and mysticism (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, by K. T. Fann, p. 3).
Without a doubt the Tractatus is one of the most difficult works in philosophy to understand. One of the reasons for this is the way the book is written, i.e., the style of the book. It consists of very short concise numbered remarks. Another reason the Tractatus is difficult, is that the subject matter itself is difficult. It is common even amongst philosophers to generally misunderstand the contents therein. Even Bertrand Russell misunderstood the contents of the Tractatus, and he wrote the introduction.
In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us what the book is all about. “The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.
“Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
“It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Preface, p. 3).”
One of the other goals of this thread is not to critique Wittgenstein’s statements, but just to give a general understanding of its contents.
I’m going to try to condense the Tractatus, which hopefully will help those of you with an interest to better understand its contents.
The Tractatus is the culmination of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy or thoughts. It was completed before he was 30 years old. He covers a wide range of philosophical ideas, including, the nature of the world, the properties of language, the nature of logic, the nature of mathematics, and remarks on the philosophy of science, ethics, religion, and mysticism (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, by K. T. Fann, p. 3).
Without a doubt the Tractatus is one of the most difficult works in philosophy to understand. One of the reasons for this is the way the book is written, i.e., the style of the book. It consists of very short concise numbered remarks. Another reason the Tractatus is difficult, is that the subject matter itself is difficult. It is common even amongst philosophers to generally misunderstand the contents therein. Even Bertrand Russell misunderstood the contents of the Tractatus, and he wrote the introduction.
In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein tells us what the book is all about. “The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.
“Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
“It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Preface, p. 3).”
One of the other goals of this thread is not to critique Wittgenstein’s statements, but just to give a general understanding of its contents.
Comments (514)
Or would his scheme not instead thwart those questions, and show that they are meaningless, your feelings be damned?
One of the common misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s later writings is that he rejected the Tractatus. And while it’s true that Wittgenstein did reject some of his earlier premises (e.g., that there was a one-to-one correspondence between names and simple objects in the world – more on what names and simple objects are later), he did not reject the Tractatus in total. This is not to say that he wasn’t a harsh critic of the Tractatus, because he was. It’s only to say that there is a continuity of thought between Wittgenstein’s early and later thinking. That continuity consists in answering the questions of the nature, job, and method of doing philosophy. One can think of Wittgenstein’s early method of doing philosophy, as the traditional method, and in his later works he introduces a new method of analysis (one could look at his early method as an a priori method, and his later method as a posteriori – although this is not written in stone), in both methods he is still thinking about the logic of language, just in different ways.
According to K. T. Fann the basic assumptions behind the Tractatus has to do with the structure of language being revealed by logic, and that the function of language is to describe the world. Wittgenstein deals with two major questions, according to Fann, “(1) What is the nature of logic? And (2) How is language related to the world? (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 5).”
The Tractatus is divided into seven major parts, the seventh part, though, only consists of one statement. The following is a list of these seven parts:
(1) “The world is all that is the case.”
(2) “What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.”
(3) “A logical picture of facts is a thought.”
(4) “A thought is a proposition with a sense.”
(5) “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
(6) In six Wittgenstein gives the general form of a truth-function.
(7) “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”
Each of these numbered divisions are numbered to establish a hierarchy. For instance, remark 1.12 is an elaboration on 1.11, which is an elaboration on 1.1, etc., etc. His remarks are put down as if they were unassailable and definitive, with no argument, or very little argument.
Each of these seven divisions can be further broken down into three main topics, logic, language, and the world.
(This isn't going to come fast and furious guys and gals, but I'll try to post at least one post a day.)
I will continue…
Logic seems fundamental to Wittgenstein’s thinking, however, how logic fits into his thinking in both his early and later thinking is a bit different, but not always. A difference can be seen, for example, in his thinking about propositions. Propositions are a mirror image of the world in the Tractatus. Propositions have a one-to-one correspondence with the world, viz., with facts. One can think of meaning in the Tractatus as a kind of pointing to, i.e., propositions point to facts in the world, names as part of propositions point to objects which are the smallest parts of facts. This logic is much different from the logic that is seen in his later philosophy (Philosophical Investigations). In the Philosophical Investigations he uses the language-game and use (of words, of propositions) within the social context to show the logic behind language. A vague proposition in the Tractatus is no longer vague when fully analyzed. In the PI, a vague proposition is still vague when analyzed, but it has a kind of logical use, a social use, that incorporates its vagueness into its social function.
The logic in the Tractatus contains an exactness that is disposed of in the PI (at least for the most part). It’s this exactness, I believe, that leads Wittgenstein to believe that he has solved all the philosophical problems (in the T.) in one fell swoop. How has he solved all the philosophical problems? Well, if as Wittgenstein supposes one can analyze all propositions via their truth-functions (more on this later), and these line up with facts in the world, then we can determine what’s true and what’s false based on Wittgenstein’s a priori analysis. This is probably why Russell thought that Wittgenstein was creating a logically perfect language.
Wittgenstein saw logic as something sublime in the Tractatus. “For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth—a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences.—For logical investigations explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that (PI, 89).” Wittgenstein’s view of logic drove him in a particular direction, viz., the logical connection between the proposition (thought) and the facts (states-of-affairs in the world). For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus there was an a priori order to the world, and that order would show itself in the connection between the proposition and the world. “The great problem round which everything that I write turns is: Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in (Nb, p.53)?”
In later posts we will see how Wittgenstein uses logic to connect the dots. Connecting the dots was an investigation into the structure of the proposition, and the structure of the world, and again, it’s logic that will reveal that structure.
“This order of investigation [in the Notebooks], however, is roughly the reverse of the order of presentation in the finished text [in the Tractatus]. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein starts with the proposition: ‘The world is all that is the case’ (T. 1.0). ‘The world is the totality of facts, not of things (T. 1.1).’ Though these statements stand at the beginning, they are best regarded as conclusions from what follows. The account of the nature of the world is given first because it anticipates and is required by the theory of language which comes later. The meaning of these metaphysical statements cannot be fully appreciated until his account of the nature of language is understood (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Language, by K. T. Fann, pp. 6, 7).”
If you can talk more about the difference between the younger and latter Wittgenstein, I'd appreciate it. On the religious question, he sounds Zen. A bit too much for me
Regards.
Are you serious? The Tractatus has got to be one of the most boring, simplistic, and straight forward pieces of philosophy, (if it can even be called philosophy), ever written.
Quoting Sam26
Oh yeah, and thanks for reminding me, not only is it the most boring simplistic piece of work, but it's all wrong as well. That's because philosophy is not boring, simplistic, and straight forward as Wittgenstein makes it out to be in the Tractatus. At least he came to recognize this before he wrote his Philosophical investigations.
The Vienna Circle took that as one of the foundational principles of positivism, and yet that is not at all what Wittgenstein meant. The concluding sections are in support of propositions such as 'ethics are transcendental':
Yet, somehow, from this, positivism then says that 'all metaphysics is meaningless' and that therefore the only meaningful statements are those which can be validated with respect to sensible experience. Which is pretty well the exact opposite of Wittgenstein's attitude, in my opinion.
So there will be scant solace here for the religiously incline, I suspect; they will need to give up much in order to follow the conversation.
Can you reference that Banno? I've read quite a bit, but never came across anything like that.
Ya, the Vienna Circle got it wrong, as many did back then when reading Wittgenstein.
Now THERE'S a silence.
I think that the way he solved all the philosophical problems was by showing, or at least hoping to show at a later time, that these problems were not in fact problems, but pseudo-problems, arising from bad and mis-understanding of language. Just like he says somewhere regarding the problem of the left-right hand posed by Kant, that this is not a philosophical problem, but a purely geometrical/mathematical one: it can be "solved" by transforming the coordinates in 4-d space. And so his method is not one of "solution", but of "dissolution", just like Alexander the Great did with the gordian knot. The knot was entangled in an unorthodox way, the only way to untie it or "solve" it, was to employ an equally unorthodox method, pertinent to its nature, cut it through.
Remember I'm talking mainly about the Tractatus, and it's clear if you read what he said about that book, that he believed he solved all the major problems of philosophy. It's in the Tractatus that Wittgenstein puts forward his theory of truth-functions, which I'll be talking more about as we go along.
Language
“My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition. That is to say, in giving the nature of all facts, whose picture the proposition is (Nb, p. 39).” Out of this idea springs Wittgenstein’s picture and truth-function theories of language. These theories will answer the questions, how are propositions related to the world, and how are they related to one another.
Wittgenstein’s premise is that if we can talk about the world, then there must be propositions directly connected to the world. He determined that since these propositions (speaking of elementary propositions, which are a subset of ordinary propositions) are connected to the world, then their truth or falsity is determined by the world, and not other propositions. So, the question arises, how are they connected to the world?
“It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consists of names in immediate combination.
“This raises the question how such combination into propositions comes about (T. 4.221).”
Elementary propositions are further broken down into names, and names are the smallest parts of elementary propositions (T. 4.22). So, what you have are propositions broken down into elementary propositions, and further broken down into names. If an elementary proposition is true, then the state-of-affairs obtains or exists, if the elementary proposition is false, then the elementary proposition is false and the state-of-affairs fails to obtain or exist (T. 4.25). The truth or falsity of elementary propositions is dependent on the world, which is made up of facts or states-of-affairs. If you were able to list all true propositions you would have a complete description of the world.
Wittgenstein was convinced that in order for language to work there had to be this one-to-one correlation between language and the world. He is still operating under the old assumption that meaning is associated with the object it denotes. Hence, the idea that names (the smallest constituent part of elementary propositions) is directly connected with objects (the smallest constituent part of atomic facts). In fact, all true propositions are a mirror image of the world. It’s these ideas that Wittgenstein argues against in the Philosophical Investigations.
It is not surprising that the later Wittgenstein rejected it as a foundation for his philosophy.
Yes, he believed he had solved them at the time, but how, is the question. He says so at 6.53:
The truth-functions have to do with the propositions of natural science, not with philosophy or metaphysics. Philosophy/metaphysics shouldn't, cannot have any propositions at all, language is solely used for the natural sciences. Using language to say something philosophical or metaphysical is an abuse of language, you understand?
Nowhere is there evidence that Wittgenstein thought of the Tractatus as a poem, and he sure didn't wish us to think of it as a kind of poem. And, the idea that the Tractatus is "not strictly logical" belies all the logic in the book.
When you "demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions", you presumably do so using language. That does not seem to be a use of language for natural science, though. Is it therefore an abuse of language to show someone they are abusing language?
What he describes as a ‘language game’, I prefer to call a ‘domain of discourse’, which is a domain of shared meanings within which people can agree or disagree. And one of the underlying problems of modern culture is that it is host to a huge variety of such domains, many of which are incommensurable in Thomas Kuhn’s sense. Calling these 'language games' belittles the concept in my view, as it downplays the sense in which meaning is derived from, and used within, a cultural context with its shared assumptions.
For sure. Which is why W. immediately after writes:
I want to give credit to K. T. Fann (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy), because I’m using his book as a guide through this, along with, of course, the Tractatus.
The question arises, what are names? Wittgenstein does not mean names like chair, cat, or Socrates. His idea is that a name is a primitive sign, i.e., something that cannot be analyzed any further by means of a definition (T. 3.26). A name is something simple, not complex. For Wittgenstein, this idea comes about by logical necessity.
Wittgenstein never gives us an example of a name, or for that matter, an elementary proposition. He did not think it was his job as a logician to give such examples. However, Wittgenstein was not unaware of the problem. “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 62).”
Remember, Wittgenstein holds to the traditional view at this point in his life, that names refer to objects. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’ (T. 3.203).” The configuration of names in an elementary proposition conforms to the configuration of objects in atomic facts. There is a one-to-correspondence to the facts in logical space, which is why propositions are pictures of facts. If we use Wittgenstein’s logic, “A propositional sign is a fact (T. 3.14).” This is why all true propositions (all empirical propositions, propositions of natural science) are equal to particular facts in the world.
“In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.
“Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.
“The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate (T. 3.22, 3.221, 3.23).”
Right, when you get to the end of the book, Wittgenstein admits that it's all wrong, and advises you to throw it all away. He basically says I've given you a demonstration of the wrong approach, now move along and find the right approach. But when you see from the very beginning, that it's all wrong, as Sam26 says, "Wittgenstein holds to the traditional view at this point in his life, that names refer to objects.", it makes a very boring read.
This is incorrect. Wittgenstein is NOT admitting that it's all wrong. He says at the beginning of the Tractatus, "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive (T. p. 4)."
"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them [metaphysical propositions] as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (T. 6.54)."
Wittgenstein's famous last words have caused more problems for those who read the Tractatus than any other passage. Philosophers from Bertrand Russell to present day philosophers have misunderstood the significance of this passage. After all, Wittgenstein seems to have said a great deal about what cannot be said according to Russell. There have been other accusations that Wittgenstein was illuminating nonsense, according to Pitcher in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Ramsey also had some remarks about this passage in the following: "And again we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense (F. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics (London, 1931), p. 263)!"
My understanding of this passage is the following: By examining the propositions in the Tractatus, the reader comes to understand that he/she must transcend the propositions (metaphysical propositions) in order to see the world aright. Once this is done, one can then discard the process because Wittgenstein will have accomplished his purpose - that of showing you the way. Once you see enough of what is nonsensical, hopefully, you will have a clear picture of what can be said and what cannot be said - i.e., what propositions have sense. So, the question now becomes, how do the propositions of the Tractatus show us the truth contained therein? One might answer the question this way - just as music and art show us something important, so do the propositions in the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein defines for us which propositions have sense, and which do not. He demonstrates both in the Tractatus. There is a difference between saying and showing. Once we understand the difference between those propositions which have sense, those that refer to states-of-affairs, then we are able to have a clear view of those propositions that are senseless, viz., those that go beyond the limit of language according to the Tractatus.
So, isn't there a contradiction between 'the truth of these propositions', at the beginning, and 'the propositions are nonsensical', at the end? I interpret that Wittgenstein thought, at the beginning of the work, that he was representing the truth with his propositions, but due to the problems he encountered with the nature of a proposition, he realized that apprehending this as "truth", was a mistake.
Quoting Sam26
I would say that music and art give us something meaningful, without giving us truth. A proposition gives us truth or falsity, by definition, so to allow that the so-called "propositions of the Tractatus" tell us something important or meaningful in the way that art and music does, we would need to characterize them as something other than propositions. Under accepted definition of "proposition", such things get rejected as nonsensical, i.e. of a different category.
Quoting Sam26
The problem though, is at the end he is recognizing his own propositions as nonsensical, according to the quote you presented above. Therefore this difference between saying and showing, and the difference between propositions with sense, and those which are senseless, which he has demonstrated with senseless propositions, is itself senseless. And so, from these principles proposed, there is nothing to indicate that any propositions might have any sense. This is the problem with trying to ground sense, or meaningfulness in truth. It is a backward attempt at classification. In reality, truth must be grounded in meaningfulness, as a type of meaningfulness, and meaningfulness cannot be characterized as a property of truth.
Such is the deficiency of the epistemology which claims that if a statement cannot be judged for truth or falsity (as a proposition), it must be meaningless, or senseless. This epistemology does not proceed from a proper understanding of what a meaningful expression is, because a meaningful expression might give us meaning in the way that art or music does, or some other way, without being a true or false proposition. Now we have to reject that original premise that meaning is grounded in such true/false statements, and accept that meaning is really based in other statements, or expressions like art and music, which all appear to be meaningless, or senseless from the perspective which premises that an expression must be true or false to be meaningful.
@Sam26 Do you think W sees himself as doing a sort of reductio ad absurdum? Putting forth a bunch of “propositions” and elucidating their consequences until the original propositions are shown meaningful by themselves?
He doesn't admit that it's all wrong, he says it is 'senseless', which is a different thing than 'wrong'. Philosophical propositions, as well as "elucidating" propositions referring to the nonsensicality of those, are neither right or wrong, they are just senseless: they don't make sense as language is normally supposed to do. But they do convey meaning. In the Tractatus, there is a difference between meaning and sense, really hard to tell, and besides, it's all lost in translation. Bedeutung und Sinn. Sense and Meaning, or otherwise. I mean, in english, sense and meaning may be taken to be the same, but in the Tractatus, they are most definitely not. See also "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" by Frege. Wittgenstein sort of responds to Frege with the Tractatus, there is a reference to him therein. In order to understand the Tractatus better, we should see it in its historical reference.
You are correct, I think, the Tractatus conveys a meaning but with it being senseless. "sense", in the Tractatus has to do with the facts, descriptive propositions like you say, on "how" the world is, the propositions of natural science. All the propositions in the Tractatus are senseless, huh, in that sense.
But Wittgenstein applies this to the entirety of the world, so it's really incorrect. What sense does it make to say that if we change what the person said, it would be correct?
Quoting Pussycat
When a person makes what are supposed to be truth statements about the world, then later admits that those statements are really "senseless", then I think we can conclude that the person has come to the realization that those truth statements are really not truthful at all, and therefore wrong.
More on what can and cannot be said according to the Tractatus.
You can think of it this way. First, you have the world, and that includes all that we can talk about sensibly. Next you have what’s beyond the limit of the world, and that’s what cannot be spoken of, the mystical.
Language is a mirror image of the world, and the terms sense, senseless, and nonsense are related to saying, i.e., propositions. Within the boundaries of language (saying) we say things with sense. If we attempt to talk about the limit or the boundaries of language, then we are saying things that are senseless. However, if we attempt to go beyond the boundary, then the result is nonsense. The failure to understand these three categories (sense, senseless, and nonsense) results in misunderstandings of the Tractatus. Early interpretations failed to understand the distinction between senseless (sinnlos) and nonsense (unsinnig), and this can be seen in the first translations of the Tractatus. The distinction between senseless and nonsense was lost on many who first read the Tractatus.
An example of senseless propositions are the propositions of logic, they say nothing (T. 6.11). However, they are not nonsensical for they show “…the formal logical properties of language and the world, i.e., they show us the limit of language and the world (T. 6.12, and K. T. Fann, p. 23).
According to Wittgenstein the propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions (propositions of natural science). They are attempts to say what cannot be said (for the most part). Wittgenstein believed that most of the propositions of philosophy are not false but nonsensical. They are attempts to say how reality is. Philosophical propositions are similar to asking if the good is more or less identical with the beautiful (T. 4.003).
Wittgenstein also believed that the reasons for why we misunderstand the differences between these propositions (those that make sense, vs those that are senseless, vs those that are nonsense), is that we misunderstand the logic of our language, viz., the logic displayed in the Tractatus.
“Religion, ethics, art, and the realm of the personal are, like metaphysics, concerned with what cannot be said—that which transcends the world (K. T. Fann, p. 23, 24).”
This phrase seems to have two possible interpretations: attempts to say things about what kinds of things are not able to be said, vs attempts to say things which attempts are doomed to fail because the things one is attempting to say cannot be said. I think here you mean the latter, but it’s interesting that the possible interpretations of this phrase mirror the differences between senseless and nonsense.
In other words, it attempts to go beyond the world of language. Language, in terms of making sense, is language that describes the world. So ya, your latter interpretation.
Seen in retrospect it's a profoundly silly thing, but then I guess most things are.
Yes, but this - the truth-functional propositional calculus as you put it, applies only to matters of fact and the natural sciences, not to everything.
I think the question of intelligibility is interesting, but how words come to mean things, and what they mean or can mean, is a complicated topic not seriously addressed by the Tractatus. The analytic obsession with the conditions on sense-making was a good one, but clearly the answers given in the 20th c. are primitive and silly.
Quoting Sam26
What can be sensed one can talk sensibly about.
."What can be sensed one can talk sensibly about. " is not sensible talk, because one cannot sense 'what can be sensed' but only what is sensed.
But there is a further limitation, that one can only talk sense of that which is named. Thus naming as a process (of ships or persons), becomes a senseless ritual that makes sense. The Titanic couldn't sink until it was named.
Is there anything praiseworthy? Yes, its originality, and based on Wittgenstein's premises it follows logically. It also led to Wittgenstein's critique of the work, and to a better way of looking at how language functions. I also like the idea of propositions picturing facts or states-of-affairs, because I think it is true of many propositions (although not in the way of names connecting to objects). There is much in this work, i.e., many novel ideas, besides his picture and truth-function theories, that could be thought through. What I mean is that there are a lot of side issues that he touches on that might deserve a look at. What I find interesting, is where his thoughts led him in the end. And, ya, we might find some of his ideas silly today, but that's true of many subjects that are over 100 years old.
Not so. If other kinds of claims can be assigned truth values on some other grounds than empiricism, then they can be manipulated through truth-functional logic just the same. The logic doesn’t care what the truth values mean or where they come from.
I think that the idea of knowing when to be silent is good – it's just that here it's too obviously tied to present theoretical prejudices.
Someone else like me? I'd better change then.
If you say questions such as the "difference between contingency and necessity" are meaningless, you have still formed a concept. It's not pure meditation yet, if that is your ultimate goal
I meant what I said from Wittgenstein's perspective at the time of writing the Tractatus, I am not putting forward any ideas of my own. And I think that W's truth-tables and truth-grounds concern the propositions that make sense only, that point as arrows to somewhere in the world, to the facts, those things that we can have a picture of. For everything else, I don't think he would use truth-functional logic.
What prejudices? What do you mean?
Yes, I believe it is so, but only if there is nothing else but true/false, right/wrong. However if there are other things in-between or elsewhere, then it is a different matter, which I believe is what W. was getting at.
So Witt's idea of when to be silent is just whenever this mosaic isn't being carved up into 'yes' and 'no.' But then, this isn't how science, language, etc. work. So it's not quite so clear when to be silent or not.
And what is this logic of language that makes metaphysics meaingless? I havent seen any particular examples. What's a truth that the philosophy of language can prove?
Their solutions were slightly different, in that they had to do with words untraceable to perceptual sources, but even that reappeared in the positivists. Wittgenstein's entire conception of science, what a fact is, etc., are Humean.
I'm curious as to how a humean fact differs from , say a Kantian fact...?
I have no idea of what you mean by 'humean mosaic of atomic facts', but in any case, yes, W's purpose of language I believe it is "to say true or false things under certain conditions". Like if I say "I went to the supermarket and bought myself a beer, then went back home and drank it", this would be a perfect example of how language is used, and one could hold me in check on whether I was saying something true or false, by making a picture of what I was saying and comparing this to the actual, for example if there were cameras everywhere, even in my own appartment, to corroborate my story.
The sentence, "I went to the supermarket and bought myself a beer, then went back home and drank it", has perfect sense no matter what, because it points to facts in the world, but it can be either true or false, false if for example I got myself some milk, or if I went to the theater instead, or if I put the beer in the fridge and not drank it (not gonna happen). But maybe you are saying something else.
The Tractatus, in my eyes, is just saying that language mirrors facts in the world, that it is/was designed to do this, and nothing more. I don't think that W. says what language is supposed to be, he just makes this observation, whether he is right or wrong. And, based on this, he goes on to talk about the abuse of language when people, philosophers mainly, use it wrongfully. But then again, we can discuss.
Then read more! Consider: the reason you don't know what I mean is the same reason you take the Tractatus to be so original: ignorance of the history of philosophy. If you knew what the empiricists had said for example, you'd never think that the tactic of treating philosophers' statements as meaningless rather than wrong, due to them misunderstanding how language works, was original to Wittgenstein.
In general, we tend to think great figures are more original than they are, because we read them in isolation. Once we read more widely, this illusion disappears.
Quoting Pussycat
The point is that Wittgenstein's early view of language is not based on observation of how language actually works, but on how it must work if the presuppositions he has hold. You basically just recapitulated that very thought process to me in your post.
So you imagine the world, like Wittgenstein's picture of the paper divided into pixels, like a mosaic of black-or-white dots, each of which have only two possible values, and the value of each of which is utterly and completely distinct from the values of the others (any combination is possible). Recall that from this, W. concludes in the Tractatus that causality is superstition (Hume speaking).
So, a Kantian fact...?
Hume tried to make metaphysics NOT make sense, instead of working around doubts and reduction. That's like Wittgenstein. I don't see what lock has to do with this. And Berkeley thought the world was a union of our thoughts with God's thoughts, surely meaningless to Wittgenstein. Psychologism is more what Wittgenstein was after, although he wanted to keep certain logical truths objective
Isn't the point to say/show what lies outside, or at the limit, of this picture of atomic facts/language/the world, such as the human subject, ethics, and that which can only be shown but not said?
Locke (along with Hobbes) postulated that philosophers were prone to talking nonsense, due to not understanding the functions of their language, and in particular due to not associating their words with perceptually-rooted ideas.
But if that is a critique, then some alternative should be offered.
Actually, I hadn't considered that PI might be seen as a rejection of Hume's fork by Wittgenstein. That's an interesting point. Is that your claim?
Have I misunderstood? Hume's fork is the distinction between facts on the one hand and relations of ideas on the other. I had taken you to be saying that this is something that Wittgenstein makes use of in the Tractatus - and that seems to me to be right, with elementary propositions in the place of facts and logical space in the place of relations between ideas.
And following this line, the PI is a rejection of Hume's fork, in which what is to count as a fact cannot be made distinct from the relationship of ideas; what counts as simple depends on what one is doing.
I find that intriguing.
1) can something be partially true and partially false? How?
2) can something be both real and unreal?
3) can something be composed of both thought AND matter?
4) can spiritual and material refer to the same thing
I like variety in my garden. I just wish Wittgenstein had had a good conversation with Charles Sanders Peirce
Rather infamously, Wittgenstein had little background in the history of philosophy.
So I'm wondering if you just made this up. Show me that I'm wrong.
1. Have you stoped beating your wife?
2. Pink Floyd - they're unreal.
3. Mortgages.
4...
Now what does thins have to do with the Tractatus?
Wittgenstein says my questions are meaningless, as you have. They make sense to me, maybe for psychological reasons but not because of semantical mistakes. Wittgenstein read Plato but not Aristotle. Everyone back then knew of the scholastic subtleties. Finally, Russell started this "it's language problem" phenomena is response to Hegel
Quoting Gregory
So... you are making this up as you go?
My point was that Wittgenstein saw the world of facts as Hume did: that's the point of his analogy with the paper with black and white dots, or a net cast over the world with each hole being an individual 'unit' (I forget what the proposition numbers are).
I honestly think the Tractatus takes on the Humean assumptions uncritically, so it is not a challenge to them, unless by accident.
The PI is mostly a rejection of the idea that you can derive how language is by seeing how it would have to be given your philosophical prejudices. Instead, you can look at how people talk. The fact that philosophy is a confusion of language seems to just follow from that, since you can just look and see that phil's are confused and don't know what they're talking about. Phil's assume they make sense in virtue of philosophical prejudices too: we have to be making sense, because...
1) we initially use language to describe the world
2) we still use the same language tools
3) so we can only speak of the world
It's a faulty argument. There is such a thing as more mature thoughts about abstracts things. Doesn't the Tractatus itself speak of the mystical? Why can't we speak more of it? Why take all poetry out of philosophy? If you don't understand a philosophers thoughts, how can you dismiss it based on language?
Perhaps, although I doubt that Wittgenstein had more than a passing acquaintance with Hume. @Sam26 would know.
There may be a profound difference between Hume's observed facts and Wittgenstein's elleentry propositions - as I understand them, they need not be mere observations.
Because it seems to me to be quite wrong.
Basing it on all that's been said so far about Wittgenstein's sleight of hand. Follow the conversation
...and not on your own reading of, say, the Tractatus or the PI; or on a reputable secondary or tertiary text. Just on Sam's few introductory notes.
So you cannot actually back up your claims about Wittgenstein.
I don't care to read more of Wittgenstein for now. He said philosophy is word games and claims language proves it. A ridiculous position to hold. Are you a fly or a human?
In previous posts I talked about names being the simplest component of elementary propositions, and that names referred to objects, and objects make up atomic facts. The question came up about how we could make sense of a proposition if there were no corresponding objects, and thus, no corresponding facts. According to the Tractatus a proposition pictures reality, so if we are to understand a proposition that refers to unicorns, it is because the proposition displays a picture, and that picture either matches up with reality or it does not. If it correctly mirrors reality, then it is true, if it does not mirror reality, then it is false. So, to understand the sense of a proposition it is a matter of picturing the proposition, and this occurs quite apart from there being a corresponding facts in reality.
A picture or proposition presents a fact from a position outside of it, or separate from the fact it is displaying. Just as a picture of the White House presents the White House from a position outside it, or quite separate from reality or the state-of-affairs. Any picture either accurately or inaccurately presents a certain state of affairs (T. 2.1). And as we keep repeating, propositions are pictures according to the Tractatus. For example, consider any painting that displays a picture, the picture may or may not actually match up with a corresponding state of affairs (shown in the picture), and yet whether it does has no bearing on whether we understand the picture.
"The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture (T. 2.15)."
The pictorial form is the form a picture shares with a fact. The form of the picture has to do with the arrangement of the elements in the picture. "What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way it does, is its pictorial form. A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spacial picture can depict anything spacial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it (T. 2.17 - 2.172)."
There is a shared logic between the picture and the fact (T. 2.18).
How does a proposition correspond with reality? "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
"That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
"It is laid against reality like a measure (T. 2.151-2.1512)."
Each person, truck, bridge, house in the picture represents those things in the world.
So how do we tell if a proposition is true or false? We must compare it with reality (T. 2.223).
The sense of a picture is the arrangement of the things in the picture, which supposedly correspond to the arrangement of things in the world (T. 2.221).
The way one verifies the correctness of a proposition is by inspecting the proposition to see if it indeed reflects reality (T. 2.223).
According to Wittgenstein a thought is a logical picture (Wittgenstein does not believe that we can think illogically), it uses the form of logic to represent a fact (T. 3 and 3.03).
"In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses (T. 3.1)." So the logical picture is made by logical units, such as, visual marks or auditory marks.
Therefore, a proposition says that 'a' is in a certain relation to 'b', i.e., 'aRb'. For instance, Sam is standing next to Jane.
Before I end this post, I just want to say that I believe that many of our propositions are pictures of reality, but again, this is not the only way propositions state the facts. Many people think Wittgenstein repudiated this idea, but I think he merely was saying that language does more than this. Just as language does more than use the ostensive definition model.
As we've said the other central idea presented in the Tractatus is the truth-function theory. It goes hand-in-hand with the picture theory. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5)." Therefore, if you are given all elementary propositions, then you can construct every possible proposition, which fixes their limits (T. 4.51). My understanding is that this sets the limit of language, or sets a limit to what can be said.
A full appreciation of this thesis requires an understanding of truth-functional logic. It suffices for our purpose to point out merely that a compound proposition, compounded of the propositions P1, P2,....,Pn, is a truth-functional compound of P1, P2,..., Pn if and only if its truth or falsity is uniquely determined by the truth or falsity (the truth-values) of P1,..., Pn. In other words, the truth-value of a compound proposition is completely determined by the truth-values of its components--once the truth-values of is components are given, the truth-value of the compound proposition can be calculated. Wittgenstein claims that all propositions are related to elementary propositions truth-functionally (K.T. Fann, p. 17).
Therefore, what follows is this: "If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false (T. 4.26)."
Quoting Sam26
...and it was the realisation of this incompleteness that led to PI? That sounds not unreasonable. Perhaps that is what is nascent in .
Perhaps.
The Humean nature of the facts has to do with their lack of dependence on each other, not with their observational nature. People in England have seen things that way for a long time – arguably, they still do.
Quoting Gregory
Which he declared himself.
Later, though, he found a way of not talking about Tractatus Club that demonstrates the rule without stating it. A roundabout method that is like a circle, but more active.
To conclude this basic summary of the Tractatus is to conclude that philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. Philosophy is above or below the natural sciences, but not beside them (T. 4.111). This follows from 4.11, "The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science." This conclusion is was arrived at long before the publication of the Tractatus in 1918. It goes back to 1913 in his Notes on Logic given to Russell.
Wittgenstein is saying that philosophy gives us no truths. "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. [It] is not a body of doctrine but an activity (T. 4.112)."
Even in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein is still aiming at the logical clarification of thoughts. Albeit, a different logical method is used. His later method in the PI isn't as rigid as that of the Tractatus, but is more flexible, which is more in conformity with how language works.
"Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries (T. 4.112).
"Philosophy settles controversies about the limits of natural science (T. 4.113).
"It must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards to what cannot be thought (T. 4.114).
"It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said (T. 4.115)."
Understanding what Wittgenstein is doing should clarify what he means in 6.54, i.e., he has shown us what cannot be said, by setting a limit to language, so, you can throw away the ladder that reaches beyond the world of sense into the world of the senseless, and even further into the realm of nonsense.
For Wittgenstein the only facts are the facts in the world, there are no metaphysical facts for language to grasp hold of. If someone tries to say something metaphysical, you would show him using Wittgenstein's picture theory and his truth-function theory that he has not managed to say anything; they've gone beyond the boundaries of the world, beyond the boundaries of language. This is why Wittgenstein says, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (T. 7)."
http://www.truthandpower.com/blog/blog/the-darkness-of-this-time-wittgensteins-pessimism/?fbclid=IwAR2-T0toc2eNNeKrLl6XD21I25kQC8ZvWFQsrdhXCzH-h0uoV2uz54j9IqY
So can we conclude that Wittgenstein's description, or definition of "the world" is unacceptable, and "the world" as we know it is quite different from this?
I don't find his idea of the world a problem, but his ideas of how language connects to the world. Moreover, his idea that there is a limit to language, this idea is not only a part of the Tractatus, but also the PI.
If the entirety of "the world", is what we can represent, or picture with statements or propositions, then how are we to relate to all that we cannot make statements or proposition about? This would be the unknown for example, we can't make statements about the unknown because it is unknown. Do we not normally include unknown reality as part of 'the world"?
Of course what is unknown is part of reality, unless you're referring to that which is outside the world, the metaphysical, this goes beyond the world, or beyond what can be said. However, there is that which is unknown in the world, and this can be pictured too. All the facts in the world, known or unknown, are what we can talk about. Wittgenstein mapped out what can be talked about (at least in theory).
Yes, that is the problem I'm referring to, the opening statements of the book, how he defines "the world". There is actually more to the world than states-of-affairs, there is also activity, change, what the ancients called "becoming". As Aristotle demonstrated change, or becoming, is incompatible with "states of affairs", what Parmenides called "being".
Suppose at one time there is X states-of-affairs, and at a slightly later time there is a different set of states-of-affairs, Y. This implies change. So we must account for what occurs between X and Y, the change, as a real part of the world. We could posit another set of states-of-affairs, Z, and say that Z is what the world consists of in the change between X and Y. However, we now need to account for the change between X and Z, and the change between Z and Y. Suppose we posit the set of states-of-affairs A, to account for the change between X and Z, and B to account for the change between Z and Y. What we have here is an infinite regress, and no way of describing the activity which accounts for the change between static states-of-affairs.
To say that the world is made up of states-of-affairs is to say that the world is made up of static things. This cannot be the entirety of the world, as we commonly use "the world", because our world also consists of changes in the relations which are described as states-of-affairs. These changes in the relation are categorical different from the relations themselves.
Quoting Sam26
I think it is a mistake to assert that change is something which cannot be spoken about, just because we have to use expressions which are other than statements of states-of-affairs, to talk about what change is. Can't we use the concept of "difference" to talk about this part of the world? The difference between the two states-of-affairs X and Y, cannot be expressed as a state-of-affairs, but it is something which can still be spoken about. It's just that we need to use other forms of expression. Wittgenstein seems to have come to this realization by the time he wrote much of the material in PI.
I remember that some years ago, I made the connection between what Wittgenstein was saying in the Tractatus, and previous thinkers before him like Hume, Kant, Plato and others. Hume, with his is-ought problem and the fact/value distinction, Kant with his antinomies, and Plato/Socrates with his problem of definitions, but for sure there are others as well I am not aware of. Everything seemed to me to be the same, or very similar at least. However, I doubt that these thinkers placed the real problem on language and its misunderstanding, well maybe except Plato, and if they did, they did so polemically, as in to show and prove that their 'adversaries' misunderstood language, and that they themselves were able to understand it properly and use it effectively.
But Wittgenstein in the Tractatus doesn't say this, he says that language is completely ineffective in addressing certain problems - all those not in the natural sciences. That there is nothing really wrong with language, but that it is not suitable for doing philosophy as people thought it would, like having a hex key for unscrewing a slotted screw, the bloody thing just won't do. Or trying to swim in a sea of cement, there is nothing wrong with cement or with swimming, but you cannot do this as advertised. This, I think, is the "misunderstanding of language" he meant. Philosophers misunderstood language/they didn't understand the logic of language, because they took language to be something that was not. In fact, they didn't understand a lot of things, logic for one, then they misunderstood language, and thus their "logic of language" was completely off. Wittgenstein is not here to teach philosophers or people how to think logically, because this is something that everybody does, there is no such thing as "illogical thinking". He just wants to show the correct way to philosophize, as well as what logic really is, the limits of language, and of course he most famously insists on quietism.
Now, can you tell me what all this has to do with thinkers before him, who of his predecessors and where in their work, said this same thing?
And you just recapitulated that Wittgenstein was prejudiced. So? Where does this leave us? But regarding prejudice, you don't say something new, cause, truly, one way or the other, every human is prejudiced, or even if they are not, others may make this claim of them. I would agree with you, if you weren't using it to belittle the Tractatus.
In any case, Wittgenstein goes into great lengths to show what language and logic are, it is a work on logic after all, amongst other things. Chapters 4-6 are mainly devoted to this. And so the claim that Wittgenstein just presupposed what logic and language are, would mean that he made everything in the Tractatus, and especially in the aforementioned chapters, to fit with this presupposition, which of course might be true, but we need to examine it closely in order to be sure, or else it is an empty claim.
First article reads "The Naturalistic Epistemology of Hume and Wittgenstein":
Second one, "Skeptical Arguments in Hume and Wittgenstein":
And a third, third time's the charm, like the say, "Hume and Wittgenstein":
And so, it doesn't seem that Wittgenstein is, in essence, "a humean in disguise", but then again, we could be wrong. Nevertheless, it is interesting and somehow odd that W's friend and - most probably - lover, to whom he devoted the Tractatus, David Pinsent, was a descendant of the philosopher David Hume. Did they discuss Hume's philosophy together, is this how Wittgenstein became acquainted with Pinsent's great-great-great grandpa's work? Who knows, it wouldn't make a good bedtime conversation, I don't think!
Quoting Gregory
Metaphysics, for Wittgenstein, is not meaningless, but senseless, it doesn't make sense.
Quoting Gregory
For Wittgenstein, philosophy of language, all philosophy basically, is unable to prove anything, any truth. This is because the medium used to do philosophy, language, is ill-suited for proof-making in the philosophical world. But this doesn't necessarily mean that certain "metaphysical truths" do not exist or that they are meaningless, but just that language is inappropriate to talk about and describe these truths, it is the mystical, as Wittgenstein would put it.
I rather like this, It could set a precedent. It means that one does not have to read the works of philosopher's past in order to philosophise, and not just Hume but also, Plato, Aristotle, Kant and so on.
It can even apply to Wittgenstein's works as well; though as I mentioned before the Tractatus is elegantly written.
And the point is that every philosophical work describes a model, or part of a model, of the world, and it is undoubtedly real for the author, but the question is : Is it real for anybody else?
Just because in Tractatus Wittgenstein claims " that is the case" does not mean that it is the case for anyone else. Internal self-consistency is not sufficient reason for others to accept it, it also requires the work to fit in with their own model of the world.
This, in a constipated fashion, shows the bit of reasoning that seems to be entirely absent from Meta's thinking.
Perhaps Meta was sick on the day they did Limits at his school.
It's odd, because he plainly is an intelligent fellow. How is it that he cannot see that infinite regression has, at least in many cases, been tamed?
And he is not alone. So many threads hereabouts suffer the very same problem.
To be agreeable to everyone you mean? This is never the case, as it seems. After all, a friend to all is a friend to none.
No I am talking about the work to be 'agreeable' to the reader.
Every object is non-existent, it does not exist outside the states in which it can be found. So it doesn't make sense to talk about the objects themselves, but about all the possible formations and combinations between them. So when a single object is given, along with it are given ALL the other objects with which the first meets. Of course, when all objects are given, then all possible states-of-affairs are given, and then the world is fully described. But in order to know that we have the complete description of the world, we must also know that we have been given all objects. In other words, even if we could somehow get to the full description of the world, we would still not know that we had done so, and continue to look for other objects and states-of-affairs, if we did not know that we had them all.
But a good analogy, I think it is with computer programming, if anyone has dealt with it, like I have, I think programmers will understand it better. In object-oriented programming languages, we are dealing with objects and their properties. If we are given some objects, then we can combine them to make a program. But object-oriented programming language tells us nothing about the programs we can make - what they are. The analogy is as follows: the objects of the Tractatus correspond to the objects of the programming language, and the states of affairs correspond to the programs that can be made.
The old philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is, so to speak, object-oriented, while the new philosophy of Wittgenstein ... is program-oriented. What we need to know about the description of the world is not the objects themselves, but in what situations they can appear. In comparison with computers, "knowing" the objects of the programming language means that we know ALL the programs that can be made with these objects.
This is why it is sometimes said that W. breaks with the deep-rooted philosophical tradition, since he shifts it from objects to states-of-affairs or situations. Philosophy becomes fact-oriented, from object-oriented. Fact-oriented philosophy.
Ah to a particular reader you mean? And not to all readers? This would be easier, I guess.
In any communication whether spoken or written there is a communicator and a receiver, a writer and a reader, a speaker and a listener.
Is that so hard to grasp?
If you have something constructive to say then say it.
Quoting Pussycat
A "state of affairs", "fact", or "what is the case", is something which cannot be changed, otherwise you allow the possibility that things could be other than they are, then a fact might not be a fact. Therefore these things are static, unchanging. In Wittgenstein's premise "the world" is nothing other than a restatement of Parmenides' "being". The totality of reality is "what is", and what is cannot be otherwise, or else what is would be what is not, and this would be contradictory.
Quoting Pussycat
Right, that's why it's deficient. It misses a large part of the world in it's definition of "the world", then comes to the conclusion that we cannot say anything about this part of the world, because it's not part of the world according to the definition of the world. But that's an unsound conclusion derived from that false premise which is the faulty definition of "the world".
I do, and I do.
You have a fascinating capacity to not quite understand something. Repeatedly and loudly.
Here's another: Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, no, it isn't. Except to you.
You'd probably have to read the empiricists on language.
How much do you know about the Christian Fathers, for example? Yet if you were to read them, you'd find half of what your civilization thinks there, in those books.
Wittgenstein was famously ignorant of the history of philosophy – but this is part of the reason that he did recapitulate so much of it thoughtlessly, not part of the reason he couldn't.
Do you really believe that a fact is something which can change? Let's take an example. Let's assume that at a particular time, a particular identified person is infected with coronavirus. That is a fact, a state of affairs. How could that fact ever change?
But you take this as implying that change can never occur.
And now you will accuse me of constructing a straw man of you; but there it is, in the quote which I will repeat here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So let me ask you a question. Do you accept that one can find the instantaneous velocity of an accelerating body? Because the argument you presented above seems to say otherwise.
No I don't imply that. I argued that change is incompatible with fact. That's the argument I presented. And before that I said that if the world consist only of facts, then change is not part of the world. But that's not how we understand the world, and use "the world". We include change as part of the world. So this definition of "the world" is faulty.
Quoting Banno
No, of course not, that's completely illogical. There is no such thing as "instantaneous velocity", that would be oxymoronic. No time passes in an instant, so nothing can move or have any velocity at an instant.
Then why does Wittgenstein talk about pictures?
...And there we have it. The mathematical basis of the physical sciences rejected.
Why should anyone take whatever else you say with any degree of seriousness?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/394275
And so Wittgenstein says that talking about certain things, philosophical things, just won't do, due to the nature of talking, the nature of language. What to tell you, I would think that you, apart from everyone else, would embrace it, or relate to it, or at least take it seriously, or otherwise see it critically. But obviously you didn't do any of these things, but you outright ridicule and discard it. I dunno, but I think that there is something wrong here.
I mean, he gives what you want, isn't it, why you won't just take it?
I dunno why, I guess this was his way.
So here we have the heart of the issue. We use mathematics to deal with things other than logical facts and states of affairs. We use mathematics to deal with things like velocities, probabilities, statistics and predictions. These are real aspects of the world which mathematics deals with, which cannot be pictured as states of affairs. Would you agree that Wittgenstein concludes that mathematics cannot say anything about the world, because it is used to understand the difference between states of affairs, and doesn't tell us anything about any actual state of affairs?
I'm just suggesting that you have an inflated view of his importance, because you're reading too narrowly. He does not 'give us anything,' he is not Jesus Christ. He was just one out of very many philosophers, in a very long tradition, many of whom long before and after him said similar things.
Yes, indeed. I think we have finished. I've cut to the irrationality that lies at the core of your thinking: your rejection of the calculus. And not for the first time.
It puzzles me, since as I said you are intelligent and articulate. But there it is. If it were a mere eccentricity one might be able to pass over it in order to attend to your other comments; but it seems to pervade your writing. But there are some things that must remain a mystery, and hence be passed over in silence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It seems to me that the error Meta makes here parallels the error he makes in rejecting the calculus.
See the discussion here.
Meta is apparently stuck in the first paragraph,
failing to see past the "other way" of dealing with the problem. He's unable to kick away the ladder of in order to see how limits give us a different way of viewing the problem of finding an instantaneous velocity.
In much the same way he can't see how The Tractatus, in setting out what can be said, shows us the limits of our ability ot say things.
You misunderstand. I don't reject calculus, I think it is very useful. But under Wittgenstein's stated principles, in the Tractatus, mathematics cannot say anything about the world. Mathematics doesn't picture anything, like a proposition does, so mathematics doesn't make any sense in that sense. So the expression "2+2=4" doesn't say anything about the world, it's not a fact, it doesn't picture anything. In the Tractatus, mathematics is an "operation". But how is it possible that "operations", from which propositions might be created, are not part of the world? Wittgenstein might give us coherency but he doesn't give us a true picture of "the world". The irony!
I don't think I do.
yet,
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I know you try to finesse this contradiction into some semblance of coherence. We've been there before. Those musings are an indictment of your thinking. Hence,
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, yes, it does tell us about the world; but you can't see that because your notion of meaning is referential, and you can't see a "real" 2 to add to another "real" 2. But meaning is best seen in use, not reference, and hence 2+2=4 tells us about something we can do in the world - adding things together.
SO all that is evident is your mis-phrasing of the very question. Mathematics is embedded in the world, in much the same way as is language. That's what is meant by
(1) “The world is all that is the case.”
Anything to add about truth tables?
Yep, you are right. My defence is that I am speaking in a voice that attempts to parse Wittgenstein into something that Meta might understand. Lies to children, as it were. Notice that above that I tell another lie about meaning as use, which of course has no place in the Tractatus.
Here, interestingly, is much the same point I was making to Meta. I suppose the point might be better phrased as: while 2+2=4 does not say anything about the world, its use tells us a great deal about the world.
I tried to sum up the Tractatus into what I thought was important. Obviously there is a lot that I left out, and his use of truth-tables was one of those things. Wittgenstein is credited with developing truth-tables.
We know that Wittgenstein thought that all propositions were truth-functions of elementary propositions. Therefore, if a proposition X is analyzed into elementary propositions p and q, and they are connected by the truth-functional connective and, then the truth-value of X is determined by p and q. If you took logic, then you should remember truth-tables. For example...
P-------Q---------X
_______________
T-------T---------T
T-------F---------F
F-------T---------F
F-------F---------F
So, if X is true, both p and q have to be true. If not, then it is false. X is dependent upon the truth-values of p and q, i.e., its component parts. So X qualifies as a genuine proposition - X has sense. Wittgenstein demonstrated using truth-tables, that for any proposition, when analyzed into elementary propositions, we can determine whether it has sense or not (T. 4.31).
According to Wittgenstein there are two extreme cases amongst the possible groups of truth-conditions. In one of these cases, the proposition is true for all truth-possibilities of elementary propositions; and thus, we say that the truth-conditions are tautological. In the second case the proposition is false for all truth-possibilities, which then yields a contradiction (T. 4.46).
"Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
"A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.
"Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
"(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)
"(For example, I know nothing about weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.) (T. 4.461)."
"Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, non-sensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as '0' is part of the symbolism of arithmetic (T. 4.4611)."
Wittgenstein goes on to say that tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality, since they do not represent possible situations or states of affairs. Tautologies show all possible situations or states of affairs; and contradictions show us no possible situations or states of affairs (T. 4.462). These are not propositions in the strict sense, but are degenerate propositions; and any proposition that is not subject to truth-value analysis is considered non-sense, or a pseudo-proposition.
"Summarily then, language consists of propositions. All propositions can be analyzed into elementary propositions and are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The elementary propositions are immediate combinations of names, which directly refer to objects; and elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts, which are immediate combinations of objects. Atomic facts combine to form facts of whatever complexity which constitute the world. Thus language is truth-functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world. Here we have the limit of language and what amounts to the same, the limit of the world (K. T. Fann, p. 21)."
Maybe some of you can see why the Logical Positivists latched onto Wittgenstein's theory, and tried to make it support their own view of reality.
Hopefully I didn't leave too much out. Maybe this will give you some understanding of how his picture and truth-function theory works.
How do we know if a child has learned to use a word correctly - is it because they can define the word? No, we observe how they use the word. It seems that this time of teaching brought Wittgenstein's philosophy down to earth, i.e., his observations of the way children learn words probably played a part in his later view of language.
In the late 1920's Wittgenstein attended a lecture in Vienna on the Foundations of Mathematics, and this apparently began to stir his thinking once again. He returned to Cambridge early in 1929 and registered as a student. It seems he wanted to work toward his PhD. However, as it turns out, he was allowed to present the Tractatus as his thesis, and if I remember correctly, he presented it before Russell and Moore.
Soon after he returned to England he wrote a paper for the Aristotelian Society called Some Remarks on Logical Form, and in this paper it is clear that he still subscribed to many of the doctrines of his earlier work. However, there is a short remark in the paper that seems to point in a new direction ("...we can only arrive at a correct analysis by what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a posteriori, and no[t]: by conjecturing about a priori possibilities."). This seems to hint at a new method of inquiry (an a posteriori method of analysis), which is reflected in his later work.
This methodological turn in his mind is what differentiates the early Wittgenstein from the later Wittgenstein. It is not that he repudiates all of what he wrote in the Tractatus, but his method of analyzing propositions shifts; and it is this more practical or pragmatic approach that becomes the hallmark of his philosophical inquiry until his death in 1951.
I wouldn't say that this is new, he distinctly says in the Tractatus that language pictures reality. The reality referred to is empirical reality, the world. That a priori thoughts cannot possibly be sensible, is clearly explained in the 3's and 4's. This is what excludes mathematics from being able to say anything sensible. Mathematics involves internal relations, relations of order, which he distinguishes from proper relations (spatial relations which can be pictured).
"2.225 There are no pictures which are true a priori.
3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
3.001 'A state of affairs is thinkable': what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.
3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world"
Following this he proceeds to discuss what sort of existence an a priori thought might have, and it follows that it must not have any sense. But then he wants to give the a priori some kind of reality as a "logical form", and the logical form would have to comprise some sort of object. But logical forms are presented by philosophers as propositions, and such propositions are nonsensical. In keeping with the picture analogy, Wittgenstein insists that a proposition must show us something, rather than saying something, and this is what gives the proposition some sort of sense, by showing. But the proposition can't show us anything other than its logical form, and this produces the distinction between showing and saying. It's now determined that a proposition cannot say anything. It only makes any sense by showing us its own logical form.
The problem is that he has turned the picture analogy around, so now the picture (proposition) doesn't say anything about the world, it just shows us something, and what it shows us is only its logical form, what turns out to be internal relations. This leaves us with no means for saying anything sensible about the world
I think the main problem with Tractatus is self contradiction. The main thesis of Tractatus is the idea that only logical propositions and empirical propositions are truth apt. In other words, all the rest of statements which includes moral commands, metaphysics, aesthetic etc, are senseless and not truth apt. The thesis itself also falls under the category of senseless statements as it isn't a logical statement nor an empirical one , it is a meta ontological statement, bordering on metaphysics, so we do not know what to conclude. Throw away the ladder or everything ?
The picture theory also doesn't help us at all and Wittgenstein gave us his famous rabbit/duck picture to highlight how weak picture theory is. The reduction of statements into their individual components doesn't help at all as even the elementary propositions which we supposedly cannot further separate are not simple but complex, so the very idea that we can analyze the whole by studying the components still causes problems.
An interesting question which Wittgenstein posed in Investigation is what does a picture of the general prototype of a tree look like. We cannot help but only picture a specific example. The picture theory cannot give us a general meaning ( it should ) and perhaps there isn't a general meaning or a definition which covers all examples. There is only a resemblance between different uses of a word.
Quine famously argued for the existence of abstract objects like sets,numbers etc along with physical objects we find in the universe. It is argued that they both have equivalent ontological commitments.
A theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true ~ Quine
I wonder how Wittgenstein would refute Quine as he was against platonism of all forms. Quine wasn't a full blown platonist as he didn't think hyper real sets existed. His more controversial ideas would be modifying math based on how effectively it describes the world when used in science/empirical endeavors. He emphasized a minimum modification.
Well maybe it's not, but vital to really understanding the Tractatus. After all, it seems like a combination of epistemology and a proposition that has sense.
:razz: I am sorry, I didn't know u were in serious business, or else I wouldn't have imposed! But everyone needs a break, once in a while. Maybe you'll come back, like Wittgenstein did. Take care.
This discussion led back to philosophy of maths, and I'm working my way through the Stanford article.
Do you have an opinion on the changes to W.'s views on mathematics between the Tractatus and PI?
But further, I don't see why we should reject infinite extensions. Or rather, I find it hard to understand his insistence on a division between mathematical intension and extension. It seems to me to have led him to place unnecessary restrictions on mathematics.
Roughly speaking, Wouldn't it have been consistent to treat all mathematics as the construction of rules? That is, all mathematics is intensional? Then the putting of those rules to use would be giving them an extension. That seems ot me the best way to understand 6.211.
Yer suggestions were duly noted, but were subsequently rejected. Reason: insufficient information. Similar is not what I want, I am after same. Everything is the same, if you don't love them. So, Mr. Readmore, do you have anything to offer, other than recopulations of the same that is?
I haven't studied it enough to make an intelligent assessment.
I believe the nature of mathematics remained unintelligible for Wittgenstein. The quest to understand it was probably his greatest philosophical unaccomplishment. However, he provides us with a range of very good perspectives as starting points, not having found the perfect (ideal) one, which he sought.
The problem is that the nature of mathematics remains unintelligible to me as well, as it does to all philosophers. But some wrongly assume Platonic realism, insisting that mathematics consists of intelligible objects, and this is how they wrongly claim to understand infinity.
I'm no mathematician; but of course I have opinions.
Seems to me that mathematics is a built thing. So in that regard I'm with Wittgenstein. But I find his finitism hard to stomach.
I think it's because I do not understand why a mathematical extension must be finite. That is, I don't even understand this terminology, as he is using it, and as it is used in the Stanford article.
Have you considered an exposition on Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics?
I have read some of his Philosophical Remarks, which I believe was written in 1931, it contains the seeds of his later writings on mathematics. I have an interest, but I am not sure I have the will.
(I know I will regret asking).
I know, so do I, that's probably why we're both finitists. Did you read what I wrote? It's only those who assume mathematics consists of some sort of objects (Platonism), like set theory, who create the illusion that infinity is intelligible.
Yeah, i read it. It is just an assertion. So it's of no use.
No use for what?
Read what Wittgenstein says about formal concepts at 4.126 - 4.128. If you can decipher that couple of pages you'll be well on your way. But on your way toward recognizing that Wittgenstein represents mathematics as unintelligible.
Thanks, you finally gave me something, something I could work with I mean. From here:
https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book3.pdf
It seems to me that you have greatly misunderstood the Tractatus, which is why you believe Wittgenstein is, and I quote, "just one out of very many philosophers, in a very long tradition, many of whom long before and after him said similar things". Now how the hell to explain this. Hmm, perhaps Russell's introduction would be of some use. I quote:
In terms of how Russell laid out these 4 problems regarding language, it should be obvious that Locke, in his essay, was solely concerned with the first 3, while the fourth, the purely logical one, completely eluded him. Somewhere you write: "I think the question of intelligibility is interesting, but how words come to mean things, and what they mean or can mean, is a complicated topic not seriously addressed by the Tractatus". This is it right here! You were expecting something different from the Tractatus, or maybe you mistook his symbolical and logical approach to language to be doing something similar like his predecessors, Locke for example in his essay, or the so-called empiricists. I reckon that all your confusion and misunderstanding stems from this simple fact. The middle chapters of the Tractatus, of which I am certain that they are either of no interest to you, or you don't understand them at all, contain Wittgenstein's ideas regarding language, how you can treat it from the point of view of logic alone, using symbolism. And therefore W., in the Tractatus, has to make an exposition of logic as well. But of course, if someone takes logic to be what was traditionally thought to be, then they will understand completely nothing, if they try to make the new concepts and notions to somehow fit the old ones, because they don't, they don't fit, I mean.
But in general, Wittgenstein saw things differently, his POV was quite weird and unique, and so to say that he somehow fits in the philosophical tradition, is plain silly, he is more likely to be a philosophical freak, le freak, c'est chic. You can see for example his take on the philosophy of mathematics, which Banno is now exploring.
Anyway, just something to note regarding Locke's essay. He writes towards the end, in the chapter titled: "Chapter xi: The remedies of those imperfections and misuses":
This echoes with W's last remark: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". The difference is, and a great one, that for W., the one who knows keeps silent, and not as Locke puts it, that there are those who know and should/can use language correctly, and the others that don't and misuse it. And of course, for Wittgenstein there are no remedies. But then again, the methodologies of these two thinkers were totally different, and so were their conclusions.
So perhaps you could re-read the Tractatus in a different light.
1. In the prologue made for the PI, that ended up in his notes known to us as "Culture and Value":
2. In the prologue of the PI:
3. As reported by Von Wright, student, friend and alleged authority on Wittgenstein:
Therefore, if we believe his sayings, we can say that his song came out completely wrong, due to misinterpretation. Nevertheless he tried to write a good book, with not much success as he admits. But that's okay, maybe one day we'll get rich! :)
I'm currently making a video for YouTube that summarizes Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy with an emphasis on On Certainty. I'm going to add my summary of the Tractatus to this thread. The goal is to make it easy enough to understand that almost anyone with some effort can follow Wittgenstein's main points, viz., his view of the logic of language, his picture theory of language, and his truth-function theory of a proposition.
The Tractatus:
My goal is to explain, as simply as I can, the main thrust of his work, and to point out that Wittgenstein’s later thinking, on the logic of language, is a continuation of his early thinking with some important changes. What changes is his method of attacking the problems of language, and what Wittgenstein means by the logic of language changes. His early thinking is an a priori investigation, but in his later thinking is akin to an a posteriori investigation. It can be said with reasonable certainty that the early Wittgenstein did not understand where the logic of language would eventually lead, viz., that the logic of language would in his later thinking take on a social dimension. The early Wittgenstein had not grasped this social dimension, although there are hints of it in his early writing.
We know that Wittgenstein’s early thinking, especially in the Tractatus is influenced by Bertrand Russell and Gotloeb Frege. However, I’m not going to say much more about Russell and Frege’s contribution, other than to point out that they influenced Wittgenstein’s thinking, especially their emphasis on logic and language.
Wittgenstein sets the tone of the Tractatus in the preface. “The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood (Tractatus, Preface p.3).” The problems of philosophy include just about every subject one can imagine, including ethics, mathematics, metaphysics, religion, mysticism, epistemology, and consciousness to name a few. Wittgenstein believes that if we understood the logic of our language, that this will put an end to philosophizing. How will he do this? Well, we express what we think about the world in language, so if he can set a limit to the expression of thoughts, which amounts to a limit to what can be said, then this will give us clarity. Clarity not only of thought but to the expression of thoughts.
Wittgenstein confines what can be said to the world of facts or states-of-affairs, and anything that tries to go beyond the world of facts is simply nonsense. It is nonsense because there are no facts (no states-of-affairs) beyond this world. This is seen in the opening statement of the Tractatus. “The world is all that is the case (T 1).” So, any proposition that tries to go beyond the world of facts is simply nonsense. The metaphysical or the mystical is important for Wittgenstein, but it is outside the world of facts. If it is outside the world of facts, then it is beyond the limit of what can be said in terms of propositions.
So, Wittgenstein sets out to investigate the essence of language, its function, and its structure (PI 92), and it is logic that will reveal this structure. What is the logical structure of language, i.e., the proposition, and how does it connect with the world of facts? Logic has supreme importance in Wittgenstein’s investigation. In PI 89 he says, “For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth—a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences. For logical investigation explores the nature of all things.” With this view of logic in mind, Wittgenstein sets out to demonstrate how it is that a proposition connects to the world of facts, which again, sets a limit to what can be said.
To be continued...
Post 2
So, what is the structure of the proposition? And how does the proposition’s structure connect to the world of facts? Wittgenstein believes that a proposition has two parts, viz., elementary propositions and names. Elementary propositions are directly connected to the world of facts, so that whether a complex proposition (our everyday propositions or statements) is true or false is a function of elementary propositions. An elementary proposition is the simplest kind of proposition, and it’s the elementary proposition that asserts the existence of states-of-affairs (facts) (T 4.21).
What is an elementary proposition? According to Wittgenstein, elementary propositions consist of names (T 4.22). These names are not what we would ordinarily think of as names, like doll, cat, pencil, car, etc., they are primitive signs (T 3.26) without parts. A name is where the propositional analysis ends, it’s the most primitive part of a proposition. Wittgenstein never gives an example of an elementary proposition or a name. He assumes based on pure reasoning (logic) that this is how it must be. He also assumes that language, which is made up of propositions, has a counterpart in the world, viz., fact, atomic fact, and object. The counterpart to a true proposition is a fact, the counterpart to the elementary proposition is the atomic fact, and the counterpart to a name is an object. So, objects like names are simples, i.e., just as a name is the simplest component of an elementary proposition, so too are objects the simplest component of atomic facts. A true proposition is a picture of a fact, i.e., it depicts the facts of the world correctly. A false proposition is also a picture, but it doesn’t correspond with any fact in the world.
The way an elementary proposition corresponds with reality is that it must have a one-to-one relationship between its parts (names) and the atomic fact (made up of objects) it describes. Think of a painting that is supposed to represent your home and the surrounding area. For the painting to represent reality correctly it must present the elements of the picture correctly. In other words, the objects in the painting must be in the correct logical order or correct relationship. The relationship of the things in the picture must correctly represent the relationship of the things in reality, viz., the facts. Think of a true proposition as a mirror image of the world, it correctly pictures a fact, or it corresponds to a fact.
Wittgenstein concludes, based on his logic, that this is how it must be. He accepts the traditional view of meaning “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (T 3.203).” The difference between what is traditionally thought of as a name and object and what Wittgenstein means by name and object is much different. Wittgenstein puts his own spin on these words. He tries to show logically how a name refers to an object. Again, remember we have no examples of what a name or an object are in Wittgenstein’s logic, other than they are simples, i.e., they are the simplest component parts of elementary propositions and atomic facts respectively.
Post 3
So, Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language is his attempt to demonstrate how it is that a proposition has sense. It has sense in that a proposition correctly pictures a fact in the world if true, or if the proposition is false, it incorrectly pictures a possible fact. “What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly-in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality (T 2.18).” So, the logical form of the picture that a proposition represents must match the form of reality. Each name in the elementary proposition matches each object of the atomic fact in reality, it is a one-to-one correspondence.
Along with Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language is his truth-function theory of language. “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T 5).” This means that if a complex proposition is true, then the elementary propositions that make up the complex proposition must also be true. In order to understand Wittgenstein's truth-functional theory, one would have to understand truth-functional logic, which is beyond the scope of this video.
“If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false (T 4.26).” If you had access to all true elementary propositions this would completely describe all the atomic facts of the world. All metaphysical propositions, which go beyond the world of facts, would simply be nonsense, because they do not depict any fact. This would follow given Wittgenstein’s first proposition that “The world is all that is the case (T 1).” However, to assume that Wittgenstein was anti-metaphysical would be a mistake. It was a mistake some philosophers made during the early 20’s. Wittgenstein had nothing but respect for those who tried to go beyond the limits of the world, and hence the limits of what can be said.
This is just a quick overview of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. There is much more that could be added, but my goal is his later philosophy which grew out of his early philosophy. What I want you to remember is Wittgenstein’s idea that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes, because this traditional idea is mostly repudiated in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Moreover, the idea that meaning is connected to some object is the source of many philosophical misunderstandings, and misunderstandings in general.
Quoting Sam26
Although the problems of philosophy include the problems of ethics, Wittgenstein does not regard ethics as a philosophical problem, which is to say he does not put an end to ethics.
He only puts an end to ethics in the sense that there are no ethical propositions that state what is true or false in the world, i.e., no facts to picture. They are unsayable.
One of the foremost Wittgenstein's scholars would disagree with this assessment. Norman Malcolm, in Nothing is Hidden, listed 15 positions in the Tractatus that he believes were rejected in Wittgenstein's later thinking.
"1. That there is a fixed form of the world, an unchanging order of logical possibilities, which is independent of whatever is the case.
2. That the fixed form of the world is constituted of things that are simple in an absolute sense.
3. That the simple objects are the substratum of thoughts and language.
4. That thoughts, composed of "psychical constituents', underlie the sentences of language.
5 That a thought is intrinsically a picture of a particular state of affairs.
6. That a proposition, or a thought, cannot have a vague sense.
7. That whether a proposition has sense cannot depend on whether another proposition is true.
8. That to understand the sense of a proposition it is sufficient to know the meaning of its constituent parts.
9. That the sense of a proposition cannot be explained.
10. That there is a general form of all propositions.
11. That each proposition is a picture of one and only one state of affairs.
12. That when a sentence is combined with a method of projection that the resulting proposition is necessary unambiguous.
13. That what one means by a sentence is specified by an inner process of logical analysis.
14. That the pictorial nature of most of our everyday propositions is hidden.
15. That every sentence with sense expresses a thought which can be compared with reality."
There are at least two points of continuity between W. early and later philosophy, and probably more. The two points I'm emphasizing has to do with the logic of language and that there is a limit to what can be said. I think most scholars would agree with this. Although, what is meant by the logic of language in his early thinking is much different from the logic of language in his later thinking. What seems clear is that logic has an important role in both the early and later W.
That said, you will always find disagreements about the connecting threads of his early and later philosophy. My goal is to make the T. as simple to understand as possible.
The latter Wittgenstein rejects the transcendental logic of the Tractatus. This is not a continuation but a repudiation.
The continuity is on the other side of the "what cannot be said" formulation: what can be shown, what can be seen, what can be experienced. Although he drops the terminology, the ethical/aesthetic.
I agree, which is why I said "what is meant by the logic of language in his early thinking is much different from the logic of language in his later thinking." However, there is still the "logic of use" in his later thinking, i.e., logic still plays a role, but not the same role. I would have thought that was clear from what I wrote.
I'm sure we have disagreements on some of this, but I'm sticking to my guns.
Without too much exaggeration, the only thing they have in common is the word 'logic'. The transcendental logic of the Tractatus is not simply the logic of language, it is the logic of the world. According to the later Wittgenstein, the rules of grammar (logic) are arbitrary (PI 497). There is no necessary or non-contingent connection between logic, language, and the world.
So, the word logic is empty to you? You see no thread in terms of the logic of language that goes from his early thinking to his later thinking? That flies in the face of almost everything I've read.
Quoting Fooloso4
That's strange since W. clearly says in the preface "The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reasons why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood." It's the logic of language and how it connects with the world of facts. The logic of language is demonstrated in his picture and truth-function theory of language.
I'm not sure why you keep using the term "transcendental logic," its simply truth functional logic that he's using. It shows, he believes, how a proposition has sense.
No. What I see is a disjunction. From PI:
Quoting Sam26
For the later Wittgenstein it is the logic of our language as presented in the Tractatus that is misunderstood.
Quoting Sam26
It is the logical structure or scaffolding that underlies both language and the world and thus their connection:
Quoting Sam26
Because Wittgenstein says so:
It is transcendental both in the Kantian sense of the conditions of the possibility of language and world, and in the sense of what transcends or stands outside of the world.
I know very little about schools of interpretation, but I do not see how interpretation can be avoided. If you are satisfied with your interpretation and wish to produce a video that is your business. I assumed, however, that if you were posting here you were looking for some response.
I agree that we will not resolve the issue. I pointed to some problems regarding your claim of continuity. Do with them as you want or will.
Interpretation can't be avoided, and I wouldn't claim that my interpretation is always correct, but at some point one just settles on an interpretation, unless there is a clear mistake. I think I understand the main thrust of the Tractatus. As for continuity, they've been arguing over this for the last 100 years. Even W. when asked what he meant by this or that couldn't always remember his thinking around a particular passage. I don't mind the disagreements, but I don't always have the time to argue through each issue.
Again, I appreciate any response I get.
The other claim that I and others maintain is that the logic of language still has sway in his later thinking. However, the logic of language in his later thinking equates to the rules grammar, but his use of grammar is not the standard use. This confused G.E. Moore, who remarked that W. was using the word grammar in a very non-standard way (Moore made this remark in one of W.'s lectures), and he was correct. Wittgenstein expands grammar to more than just syntax, i.e., he expands grammar to the public use of words or language-games, which is much more than mere syntax. If we think of a simple language-game, like the one W. gives us at the beginning of the PI (between the builder and his assistant), we can, I believe, understand that the use of particular calls (pillar, block, etc) require certain responses beyond syntax. The logic of this language-game expands the use of grammar to how the assistant responds to the calls of the builder, and how the assistant may even use the word pillar or block. So, the rules of grammar in this case are what is meant by the logic of language. Just as the rules of chess make up the logic of the moves.
Not is some general philosophical sense. Only that there is agreement in a language game and form of life. This is agreement in judgment and action. This is shown by describing these forms of life.
It is not coming up with some metaphysical theory like is done in the Tractatus explaining the demarcation of sense and nonsense.
This is not continuous but abruptly different approaches. One is a general metaphysical theory. The other is describing and sticking to examples.
Yeah both are exploring “what is meaningful to say” but if that is the criteria for calling something continuous, then you could say that any philosophy of meaning is continuous with any other theory of meaning.
So, the continuity is there in terms of what can be said about the metaphysical, and it's still part of his thinking. He has an affinity with the mystical for example, but would still, even in his later philosophy, bemoan arguments for the existence of God because, I believe, he still held that there were no facts to latch onto. He still sees the world of facts as quite separate from the metaphysical, which is something that can only be shown, not factually stated.
I am not sure. Let us look at two quotes that may support this view, and two quotes that may not support this view.
Not Support;
1. From PI 241, "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false? It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."
2. From PI Part 2 xii, "If formation of concepts can be explained by fact of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.). But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history-since we can also invent natural history for our purposes. I am not saying: if such-and such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But; if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize-then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him."
Support;
1. OC 505, "It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something."
2. Culture and Value, "Life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring this about; but I don't mean visions and other forms of sense experience which show us the 'existence of this being', but e.g. sufferings of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an object, nor do they give rise to conjectures about him. Experiences, thoughts, -life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is similar to the concept of 'object'.
Wittgenstein's oscillates between two views, human's contribution to concepts, and Nature/Life/World's contribution to concepts. So "The world is all that is the case.", I believe Wittgenstein does not consider the human contribution in the Tractatus, but that there must be an isomorphic relation between the logic of language and the logic of the world to make sense. However, I do not believe he gives up on this idea that our concepts are, at times, accountable to the world we live in.
Passages like this make me think that there is still a strong sense that "The world is all that is the case (PI 1)" in his later philosophy." But there are other passages that seem like he's saying something else, which is why there is so much controversy over interpretation. I think what should be emphasized is his method of doing philosophy in his later works, as opposed to some philosophical theory or truth. However, the tendency is to look for some philosophical theory or truth, which I've done in OC.
There is no doubt that W. repudiated much in the T., but for me there is some continuity. I guess it depends on what you're emphasizing. Anyway much of this is beyond the scope of what I want to say in my video.
A good book that gives a basic understanding of W.'s early and later philosophy, and it's one that I've mentioned before, is K.T. Fann's book called Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.
It may have no bearing on your project, but Wittgenstein's focus on seeing aspects, ways of looking, and ways of seeing run counter to the claim that the world is what is the case. Although he does not develop this, even in the Tractatus he is thinking about these things. This is why the ethical and the aesthetic, in its original sense of what is perceived or seen, are regarded as the same. That they are not in the world does not mean that they are not of the utmost importance. Ethics too is said to be transcendental. (T 6.421)
Logic is what is transcendental from inside the world. Ethics and aesthetics from outside, that is, "my world".
With regard to ethics he says:
With regard to the way of seeing things:
In his later philosophy the proposition is still limited to the world, but the way it functions, the way it has sense, is not through the a priori method of analysis given in the Tractatus (the picture theory and truth function theory). As you know it's more social, but it's still in the world, and I believe that what can be said in his later philosophy is still limited to the world. He still has little patience for factual talk about the metaphysical, even though the metaphysical has importance to him. So, again these are propositional points about the limit of language.
My goal in my video is to try to explain, as simply as possible, his picture theory and truth function theory of the proposition; and to show that he is still holding on to the traditional view of meaning in the T.
In the Tractatus he makes the distinction between "the world" and "my world". That distinction does not carry over to the later writings. What can be said is no longer limited to the facts delimited in the Tractatus. It is no longer a question of what can be said but of the shared language of a form of life.
The limits of language in the Tractatus were drawn in order to show the limits of thought or its expression. In the preface to PI the limits of thought are no longer determined by facts:
Rather than narrow things down his investigations opens up our view of thought and language.
As an e.g. we might think of the logic of chess, i.e., what does the logic of chess look like? First, the rules of chess, viz., knowing how to move a piece based on the rules is part of the logic. Knowing where to place the pieces on the board, and knowing who moves first; knowing which move is best in a particular situation is also part of the logic. So, one could say that the logic of the game, although not spelled out, is intrinsically connected with the rules, the pieces, the board, the clock, the color of the pieces, the shape of the pieces, combined with our actions, etc, etc.
The logic of the PI, although much different from the logic of the T. is seen in the use of language in our everyday lives, and what governs this logic, again, it's a multitude of things that connects to W. concept of forms of life, grammar, and our actions as a people within the language game. This is how I see the logic of language in the later W.
One can play chess according to the rules and not play logically.
What one says within a language game is not thereby logical.
There is a difference between the logic of a language game and an underlying logic of language. Analogously, the rules of chess are not an underlying logic of the game.
Rather than an appeal to an underlying logic Wittgenstein appeals to what we do. More specifically, to the metaphysical demands philosophers put on words.
Wittgenstein is useful insofar as his language games concept. As long as we are using the same language, games, and agree on the definitions of what terms mean what, we will have a much more lucrative dialogue. However, if everyone is using different terms for their starting points, then the language game breaks down, and no constructive debate occurs. However, if Wittgenstein is used to simply shut down philosophical debate, that’s more an agenda. It’s the equivalent of saying “how does philosophy about metaphysics help me in the stock market?” philosophy, perhaps will never satisfy the ultimate pragmatist whereby if it’s not about immediate survival, comfort, entertainment needs it is all useless banter. In that case, it’s just the disposition of the person.
More to the point, it is about using the same terms with different demands on the meaning of the terms. It is not about shutting down constructive debate. It is, rather, about trying to get to an agreed starting point or marking the differences in starting points.
Agreed. I meant people using Wittgenstein to say you can’t talk about anything “meaningful” in regards to metaphysics or ethics etc
It's partly what makes up the logic of the game, i.e., without the rules there wouldn't be a logical move. In fact, there would be no game.
In the game of chess certain moves are prohibited. The rules are specific to the game. One could make that move in a game that is like chess with the exception of allowing that move. The same holds for language games.
When Wittgenstein says parenthetically:
this is not an appeal to logical syntax. It is, instead, about looking at how theological terms are used. What they mean for those who use them. The role they play in the life of those who believe. One might devise or derive rules, but the game is not determined by rules, but rather by what is felt and experienced and believed, by how the words resonate, by how one is moved, by how one is compelled, by how they matter.
I agree that it's not an appeal to logical syntax. When I say the logic of language, it not only includes logical syntax, but Wittgenstein's deeper sense of logic, which includes other kinds of actions, beliefs. etc.
The game is partly determined by the rules. The rules in a sense set the game in motion, but the logic of the game has a much wider sense, in that it includes other kinds of actions. These other actions are closely related to our "forms of life."
I don't think I agree with "...the game is not determined by the rules." I agree that there are other factors involved, but there would be no game of chess without the rules that dictate how, for e.g., a bishop moves. It wouldn't be the game of chess as we know it. It would be a different game. The same is true for the language-game given at the beginning of the PI. The rules dictate how one should respond to the calls of the builder. It matters not how I feel, what I believe, or how the words resonate, it only matters that I respond in the correct way to the calls.
It is clear that the game of chess is played by fixed rules. But what about PI 83:
If we ask the person who claimed they are following definite rules will he be able to say what the rules are? If we ask the people who were playing, what would they say?
Maybe I'm not being clear. I'm not saying that every game is defined by a set of rules, this is obviously not the case. My point at the start of this conversation is that logic still plays a role in W's later philosophy, although it's not the formal system that is used in the T. Even in the quote from the PI there is still a kind of logic built into the actions, it's harder to define, granted, but it's still there. You seem to want to point out the exceptions as though I'm speaking dogmatically about rules and logic, but I'm not. Rules in some cases can and do dictate some of the logic involved in games, but the logic does extend further than just the rules. When I speak of logic, I'm not referring to formal logic, but the logic that is seen in our actions. For example, there is a kind of logic that dictates, in a sense, that when I leave my house I don't try to walk through walls, but use the door. The logic of the T. is a priori, whereas the logic of W.s later philosophy is more of an a posteriori logic seen in our general experiences, especially as it relates to language.
Why do you think there is a logic built into this kind of free play?
Quoting Sam26
That is the problem. I don't see the logic in the example given. You say it is there but harder to define, but on what basis or evidence can it be shown to be there?
Are you claiming that there is a logic to the actions of other animals?
Quoting Sam26
If you or some other animal were to try doing this it would not be because you or they are acting illogically but that there is something neurologically wrong.
That certainly is true, there could be something neurologically wrong. However, my point, and maybe I'm pushing logic a bit to far here, is that apart from some neurological problem, there seems to be a kind of logic built into the world around us and how we interact with that world. I maybe looking at logic as something transcendental, this maybe a mistake, not sure. I have to think more about it.
Rather than a logic I would say an intelligible regularity. Even in the Tractatus he says:
(T 6.41)
Quoting Fooloso4
What do logics basically consist in, if not intelligible regularities?
It might be more productive to see what he excludes. From On Certainty:
287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And
no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.
The kind of expectation that things in the future will be as things have been in the past does seem to be instinctive in animals as well as humans. The implicit logic there would be "regularities remain invariant", but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.
So, I don't think there is really any "law of induction", or at least it would be some kind of conditional deductive formulation such as, "if there are laws that govern observed invariances, and if those laws are changeless, then we could expect observed regularities to remain regular".
Logic, viz., propositional logic, is an act of inference using propositions. Not all of our actions are of this type, which I'm sure you know, and not all regularities are of this type. My thinking was that there is a kind of logic, not propositional logic (formal logic), behind reality, this was the thinking of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Logic in the T. is the starting point, and this W. inherited from Russell and Frege.
My original point, is that logic still plays a significant role in W's later thinking, is, I believe, an important continuation for W. In W's. later thinking logic is "...everything descriptive of a language-game... (OC 56)." My contention, and the contention of others, is that logic still plays a central role in W's later thinking, and it's the chief method of investigation, not only in the T., but also in the PI and beyond (especially in OC). So, in the PI and beyond, logic is seen in the various uses of the proposition in our forms of life. Logic, then, is still about the proposition, but it's internal to the various uses we give to the proposition. Logic, is intrinsic to how we use propositions in various settings, and it's what gives propositions their sense.
This is where we disagree. I think there is a distinction between a propositional logic and a logic "good enough for "a primitive means of communication". When a baby cries I do not think this means of communication is propositional.
I would argue that the logic of our most primitive forms of life lies foremost in the activity, what is done, rather than what is said. Someone could, for example, learn to fish in the same way non-linguistic animals do, by imitation. There were builders before there was a builder's language.
It's both, the logic is seen in both forms of communication, i.e., in very primitive forms of life or communication and more sophisticated forms of communication (e.g. propositions). You can't separate what is said (propositions) from what is done, which is why language-games are connected with our forms of life (activities). For communication or language-games to have sense they must be connected with other activities, this includes primitive communication.
What he being said when the baby cries? It it communicating but is it trying to communicate and what is it saying? My dog will knock over her metal water bowl when it is empty. It is loud enough to be heard even if you are not in the room. It has become an effective means of communication but is it a proposition? I agree with those who question the usefulness of the term.
In many cases they can't, but spatial thinking does not always require anything being said.
— On Certainty
The deed was not a word.
You're leaving out an important part of what I said, viz., "...the logic is seen in both forms of communication..." the primitive forms that you site, and the propositional forms that I'm emphasizing. One doesn't have to communicate via propositions, that's a given, but even in these primitive forms of communication the logic is seen in the activities associated with them. OC 402 does nothing to diminish my point. Obviously the deed is first. We wouldn't get to language without the deed being first.
Seems propositional to me.
So can the baby wants to eat the dog.
As for your comment that rudimentary communication can be put into a proposition, it's true of course, but the point is that it's not a proposition until it's used as a proposition.
It seems to me that if something can be put into a proposition, then by that very fact, it has a propositional form - and this regardless of whether it has been expressed in a proposition by someone.
So, the obvious question to is, what place does logic have in PI?
I have, perhaps uncritically, suppose that PI led in many ways to the interest in intuitionistic and paraconsistent logic of hte last fifty years.
How can it have propositional form without being a proposition, without being used as a proposition? Are you saying that animals are communicating via propositions? I think we've argued about this before.
Yeah.
Seems to me that if something is the case, then it is in a form that can be put into a proposition - whether it has been or not. IF you prefer, the world is proposition-ready...
We agree that it can be put into a proposition. Where we disagree is that it has propositional form before being used as a proposition. Propositional form is nothing more than a particular kind of statement, and it doesn't exist prior to becoming a statement (to repeat myself) Because something has the potential to become X, it doesn't follow that it is X before its potential is realized.
Not quite. At issue is realism against antirealism. Things can be true and yet unsaid; there are unstated facts.
Facts and states of affairs are propositional. Hence the world is propositional It can be put into propositions, despite not having all been put into propositions. In this sense the cyr of the baby and the dog tipping its bowl are propositional. Perhaps as "The baby wants its mother" or "The dog wants its water".
But leave this if you like, since it is pulling at the consequences of the Tractatus account, rather than part of what Wittgenstein was saying. My apologies for interrupting.
Ya, we're very far apart on this. If truth is a property of certain kinds of statements, viz., propositions, then truth is not something unsaid. I can see how you arrived at this though, at least I think I do. It seems to come from your idea of potential propositions. If you believe proposition have form prior to their use, then I can see where you get the idea that truths can be unsaid. Facts, on the other hand, have an ontology that is separate from statements/propositions.
Oh, well.
I agree and I wasn't thinking about propositional logic but logic in the broader sense of semantic relations or structure.
Quoting Banno
I'd agree with this, with the qualification that actualities as experienced by humans (and arguably certain other animals) are proposition ready.
We can talk about anything that exists, including the metaphysical, as long as we have access to it, so I disagree with W. on this.
Of course it is part of his later philosophy. The question is, where does it fit as part of his later philosophy? You say:
Quoting Sam26
What does it mean for logic to underlie language? This sounds like what he is rejecting when he says:
(PI 92)
Logic does not underlie language. It is not a structure that is already there. The logic of language is built. It develops according to its practice. The idea of a surveyable representation
an 'übersichtlichen Darstellung' is, as he says, of fundamental importance. He is looking at the lay of the land of language, not something underlying it.
His concern with grammar is simply to untangle the philosophical knots.
[/quote]
What can be put into the form of a proposition is not a proposition.
The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: the baby is crying
The latter is about the former but is not the same as the former. There is an immediacy and urgency in the baby's crying that is hard to ignore, it demands our attention. The proposition may be false, the baby crying is not.
That explanation does not make the difference at all clear.
The proposition does not get hungry or need its diaper changed.
The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: "The baby is crying"
?
You seem to be pointing out that the fact is concrete whereas the proposition is abstract. The baby crying is a concrete fact. The term 'fact'; is ambiguous; it can mean either 'true proposition' or 'actuality'.
Hmm. Neither does the fact. You're thinking of the baby.
The fact is what is the case. What is the case is the baby is crying. You are conflating the fact and a statement of fact.
Where did I do that?
All I've done is point out that your:
Quoting Fooloso4
does not set out a distinction. If anything, it says that facts and propositions are the same.
Here:
Quoting Banno
A fact is not true or false. There are no false facts, only false claims and beliefs about what is a fact.
You are thinking of 'fact' as equivalent to 'actuality'. In a different sense, the encyclopedia is a compendium of facts, or true propositions and descriptions. Facts, considered as true propositions are necessarily true. If a propositons or description is false it is not a fact. Facts considered as actualties are not true or false, they simply obtain.
Quoting Banno
What I said was correct. Facts do not cry. Babies cry.
This is silly.
I agree.
What is the case, the state of affairs, the fact is that the baby (the thing) is crying.
Now the next question is how one gets from a fact to a proposition - so to the elephant in the corner, proposition 6.
This seems about right:
Quoting Reddit
Science as removing the false propositions from logical space...?
I agree with everything, except, I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence. Are you saying true propositions are necessarily true?
Not quite, I'm saying that if a proposition is to be counted as a fact then it is necessarily true. That still sounds a little ambiguous, because it might be understood to be saying that only propositions which are necessarily true are to be counted as facts, but that's not what I meant. So, I should have said that if a proposition is to be correctly counted as a fact, it must be true.
But propositions are not facts, they either mirror a fact, or they mirror or picture a possible fact. It sounds like you're conflating true propositions with facts. Do you agree that propositions and facts are two separate things? Propositions, as I see it, are claims about facts.
So, I don't see it as a case of "either/ or" but "both/ and" since the word 'fact' is commonly used in both of these senses, and thus I don't believe I have conflated anything.
Right:
Quoting Banno
The problem is atomic propositions are an a priori assumption. He never identifies an elementary proposition. Without elementary propositions we cannot get started.
I pointed that out a long time ago and was chastised for not just allowing Wittgenstein to get away with it.
Following the Tractatus, there is a distinction between facts, which are a combination of objects (2.01), and statements of facts which are propositions.
Quoting Janus
It is a compendium of statements of facts, that is, propositions. It does not contain the objects that make up facts.
What value does any of this obviousness have? The important part is figuring out the true propositions.
Just saying that there are states of affairs and we can make propositions that are true or false (about these states of affairs) just seems not adding anything.
How can we distinguish between and true and false proposition?
That’s precisely my question and doesn’t seem Wittgensteins enterprise here. He doesn’t really go into a thorough investigation on how to determine true propositions other than the circular understanding that it’s atomic facts, deduction of these atomic propositions and some remarks about observation and empirical investigation.
You have provided the answer: observation and empirical investigation.
So it's neat that you interpreted him this way (that he means by pictures of reality- empirical observation or whatnot), but let's say this is the correct interpretation, what does this add? He thus proclaimed something as thus. Other than the fact that he uttered a statement that he believed to be true, what exactly does this progress in the conversation, other than defining pretty self-explanatory things (that there is the world, and we create propositions about the world).
It doesn't tell us what true propositions are or anything like that, so I don't quite see the significance here of his project.
He's basically saying, "Anything beyond atomic facts and their combinations is nonsense". But without explaining what makes something true, this is just a preferential or prejudicial statement about what statements/propositions are meaningful. Something he saw clearly as an error in his later work.
Here's another statement, but in this case it is I who will utter them (a person that is not Wittgenstein, who is apparently given great significance to his words):
"What is really meaningful is what we can intuit". Why is that true or false? I don't know, but it is on par with the utterance "What is really meaningful is what is observed". Ok, so where does that get us? Nowhere. I can build systems on any utterance I thus have.
These were direct quotes from the text.
Quoting schopenhauer1
True propositions are those that accurately picture reality, propositions that state the facts.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The totality of facts is the world. (1.1) The world is not nonsense.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The proposition, "it is raining", is true if it raining and false if it is not raining. The proposition has a sense, that is, we know what is the case if it is true or false.
What about the proposition, "God exists"? Does this agree or disagree reality. Can we know whether it is true or false?
It should be noted that Wittgenstein is neither affirming or denying metaphysical beliefs, he is attempting to draw the limits of what can be said. And what can be said is what has a sense, what can be determined to be true or false.
You added what the text didn't say. You quoted something, then you said other stuff not in the text that you gleaned from the text.
The text said:
I didn't see anything about empirical observation. I am sure of it, he did discuss that elsewhere and that is what he means here, thus completing his self-referential circle of himself to himself but just saying, there are authors who explain themselves and ones where you explain them. This is the latter apparently.
Quoting Fooloso4
That is either saying nothing or saying something so obvious as to be not worth saying, "Ok, and anything of significance?". Each person describing reality thinks they are accurately picturing reality. He is giving his preference for observation of events in the world as this "accurate picture". And so what of this preference?
Here's example of things that do have some explanatory worth (or at least have that potential) perhaps:
Chomsky's theory of language aqcuisition device. It explains how language derives from a small set of inputs. Now, it could be completely wrong by future empirical evidence to the contrary. But it is trying to explain something.
Tomasello's theory of language from social learning: It explains how language derives from children having the capacity for common ground and showing a shared reference that is not directly about wanting the item. It may be refuted or revised with further experiments and observations but it is trying to explain something.
Wittgenstein's theory of atomic facts and propositions: It doesn't explain how language is derived. Ok. It doesn't explain how words get their meaning. Ok. It doesn't explain why observation and empirical evidence is more important than intuition, feeling, immediate sensation, abstractions of imagination, etc. It just asserts something (observed objects are what reality is). But he doesn't explain this. He just asserts this. He just says, observed objects are reality. He doesn't explain why this is the case. He just starts with it. And then, once we have this assertion, what of it? What is it proving? Not much except about common sense ideas like, "If you observe that an apple is on the table, there must be a fact that the apple is on the table". Not blowing me away here.
Quoting Fooloso4
How is this proven? This is just a preference for discussing things observed. It explains nothing. It advances nothing. It is just preference-writ-large and then self-referential ideas circling this same preference over and over.
How can we compare a proposition to reality without empirical observation?
Quoting schopenhauer1
This needs to be read against what he says about metaphysical propositions. The former have a sense the latter do not.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Right, and how do we determine which is an accurate picture of reality? There are facts about the world, but no facts about God.
Quoting schopenhauer1
He does not claim it is more important.
My interpretation: Shut up in order to allow things that can be seen and experienced to manifest themselves.
That's for HIM as the PHILOSOPHER (not Fooloso4) to explain.
Quoting Fooloso4
No, I get. God, free will, the green idea that sleeps by the dreamy number 3, etc. is "non-sense" because they are not observed (and is a misuse of atomic facts and category errors and all that). But this is the very idea that needs to be EXPLAINED. He is just asserting it.
Quoting Fooloso4
It is Accurate Picture of Reality that needs to be explained. What IS this idea of an "accurate picture of reality"? He doesn't explain what makes true propositions true, so he's not helpful there. He is just a reality ELITIST. And like elitists who have no reason to be elitist except for their behavior towards the undesirables, he simply asserts his preferences as the world-writ-large. He is simply stating (but not really stating like the cool hipster he was because he was "showing" it by not stating anything :roll: ) that "observation is more important than speculation". But this is just, like, his opinion man.. He liked concrete things about the world (at that time in his life), and thought this was just the bees knees.
Plato fanatics like the idea of Forms. Some people like speculating on the Hard Problem, which cannot be observed itself, but is the very foundation of the observation, so not amenable to simply pointing at. What fruitful investigation comes from this, I don't know. But what is "fruitful" here? Does it explain something? At a certain level of explanatory power, it might be. But to cut off speculation and non-observable ideas from the start as "not reality", is a huge assertion that itself IS THE THING TO BE EXPLAINED. But it isn't. It's assertion all the way down.
Not sure I have what you mean here. Atomic propositions are not each learned a priori. I hope youa re not saying that.
But one might say that the category, "atomic propositions", is understood a priori.
I think this might be what is really at issue for you, at least in part, although it does not explain your apparent animosity. You like speculative philosophy.
My animosity mainly comes from the very project of the Tractatus itself which is ultimately speculative, but poorly done speculation, as it doesn't even explain itself. Schopenhauer is very speculative (all of existence is striving, and this striving is an indication of a philosophical principle, etc.). But he explained himself. He explained it, put it in context with previous and contemporary philosophers. In fact, he over-explained it. He put all the ideas, and all the reasoning out there to be criticized. Tractatus doesn't do this. It is a long opinion piece with common sense ideas about facts being true propositions.
His a priori assumption is that there are elementary propositions. That in the final analysis we have a configuration of simple names of simple objects.
It is an a priori assumption because nowhere are these names or objects identified. Nowhere are elementary propositions given. It is just assumed that the world and language must be built from this starting point.
Anyway, this just reflects the sloppiness of language, and I'm not claiming it is of any great importance.
Where the logical atomism of the Tractatus differs from that of Russell is that Russell took individuals to be basic, while in the tractatus it is facts. The "final analysis", in the Tractatus is not the names of objects. "Only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning." Names only have significance within propositions, not vice versa.
And this is one of the the crucial differences between the Tractatus and the PI. The Tractatus sought to build a description of the world from atomic propositions, while the Investigations recognised that what counts as simple, atomic or axiomatic depends on what one is doing.
I agree. What I said is:
Quoting Fooloso4
Then the salient stuff is that this is a large part of what is different about PI. The Tractatus is of interest in consideration of how it feeds into the Investigations.
Quoting 6.54
Any insights on what 'surmounting these propositions' means (discounting the logical positivist interpretation)?
4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.
The tractatus is showing us how things are, not saying how things are.
That's an important point often overlooked. W. is doing both in the T., viz., showing using metaphysical propositions (which is why we throw the ladder away at the end of the book), and also telling us that the limit of what can be said amounts to the whole of natural science. The showing part is all the metaphysical language used in the T. Once you take the journey with him, then you can toss all the metaphysical propositions away in terms of what can be said. He treats the metaphysical propositions as normal at first, but once you understand him (T 6.54) you can discard them.
An example being.....
but:
What is it that a proposition shows but cannot be said?
There are two reasons why Wittgenstein attempts to draw the limits of language.
From the preface:
On the one side is what language shows and on the other what it does not show. This other side is not called nonsense because it is of no importance but because propositions about what lies on this side lacks sense (Sinn). There is nothing in the world that they show.
But:
What is higher of the greatest importance. It is nonsense (Sinn) for the very reason that it is higher than what is in the world.
Wittgenstein make a distinction between 'the world', that is, the factual world, and 'my world'.
Far from rejecting what cannot be said, he points to limits of what can be said in order to able to "see the world aright". (6.54) That is, to see what no proposition can show.
Push all you wish, this is one of the common themes between Tractatus, Investigations and Certainty. And the source of my angst with your otherwise excellent posts - the tendency to tell us stuff that really can only be shown. That fuzz on the edge of language. Here be dragons is better than inventing new continents. Or is it?
You can see how this lends itself to the positivist’s ‘boo/hurrah’ theory of ethics - that there are no intelligible criteria for ethical judgements and that they’re simply matters of feeling. I’m sure that was not what he meant but it’s easy to read it that way. (Elsewhere I’m sure we’ve discussed the Stuart Greenstreet article on the folly of logical positivism.)
More broadly, language has many functions beyond the descriptive. There’s poetic language, there’s symbolic and metaphoric language, there’s literature and drama; and the perplexities of existence are due to much more than just ‘confusions of speech’. Apophatic silence has a place but it’s not, pardon the irony, the last word.
I notice in the Greenstreet article there’s another pregnant phrase “The great problem round which everything I write turns is: Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in?” (Notebooks p.53)’ That is a question of great interest to me, so I’d love to know where he explores it.
(It's the difference between praising National Socialism and working in a hospital ward.)
Quoting Wayfarer
Yeah, it is. Because we don't know. But then there is what we do.
All this by way of getting myself arsed enough to make lunch.
What follows is the beginning of my work on OC, it's a revision of a paper I wrote some years back. I'll post at least some of it here.
edited on 5/15/23
__________________
Post 1
Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
In what follows, I will try to set out an epistemological theory that enunciates a particular set of propositions, which are derived from Wittgenstein’s final notes called On Certainty (OC published in 1969). These bedrock propositions (often called hinge propositions) were identified mainly by Wittgenstein in the final years of his life (1949-1951). I am not claiming anything original in my thesis except to point out that these statements or bedrock beliefs (as I refer to them) have an important epistemological role that will advance the subject of epistemology in ways that few philosophers, if any, before the writing of OC, have considered.
Bedrock beliefs form the substructure of our epistemic language. In other words, they provide the bedrock to create sophisticated epistemological language constructs or language-games. For example, our understanding of knowledge and how we use phrases like “I know that such and such is the case” and “I doubt that such and such is the case” in certain social linguistic contexts and not in others; and how not understanding the proper use of words like know and doubt can cause conceptual or linguistic confusion. The underpinnings of these beliefs are crucial to understanding what it means to know and where justification ends with our epistemology. Answering such questions helps clarify the limits of reasoning (the infinite regress problem), and it also solves the problem of circularity.
As pointed out, many of the ideas presented here, are derived from OC, which begins as a response to Moore’s papers, A Defense of Common Sense (1925), and Proof of an External World (1939) in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty. Propositions such as the following: “Here is one hand” and “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body.” These propositions supposedly provide Moore a proof of the external world, and as such, they seem to form a buttress against the radical skeptic. Moore says, “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples. But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one; and that it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever. …(G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World, 1939).”
It is undoubtedly the case that OC goes beyond Moore’s propositions, so it is not just about Moore; it is about knowing, doubting, making mistakes, reality, empirical statements, certainty, acting out beliefs, rule-following, etc., so it covers a range of topics in relations to what we know, and how it fits into our language. So, it is essential to note that not everything in OC should be seen as a response to Moore.
It is not only Moore’s claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes but his use of the word know. Wittgenstein also spends much of his time critiquing the radical skeptics, specifically, their use of the word doubt. Wittgenstein emphasizes an essential relationship between the word know and the use of the word doubt as part of the language games of everyday epistemology.
Even though Wittgenstein levels his attack against Moore’s argument, he is not entirely unsympathetic. However, he argues that Moore’s propositions do not accomplish what Moore thinks they do, namely, to provide proof of the external world, which in turn is supposed to undermine the doubts of the radical skeptic.
OC begins with the following statement:
“If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest (OC 1).”
Wittgenstein grants that if Moore knows what he claims to know, then Moore’s conclusion follows. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues throughout his notes that Moore does not know what he thinks he knows. However, we are all inclined to agree with Moore; at least our intuition seems to lean in Moore’s direction. After all, if we do not know this is a hand, then what do we know? This inclination to use the word know, as Moore uses it, causes Wittgenstein to question Moore’s argument. Is Moore justified in believing his claims are true? It certainly seems so, but Wittgenstein has other ideas.
“From it seeming to me—or to everyone –to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.
“What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC 2).”
We begin with Wittgenstein’s juxtaposition of the word know against the word doubt, that is, if knowing does not make sense in Moore’s context, then does doubting make sense as a rebuttal against Moorean propositions.
If there never arose a doubt in connection with a knowledge claim, would it be a knowledge claim? What would be the purpose of a justification if a doubt never arose, or if the question “How do you know?” never raised its head?
“We just do not see how very specialized the use of “I know” is.
“—For “I know” seems [my emphasis] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.
“For it is not as though the proposition “It is so” could be inferred from someone else’s utterance: “I know it is so”. …[F]rom his utterance “I know…” it does not follow that he does know it
“That he does know takes some shewing (OC 11-14).”
It is certainly the case that one’s knowledge does not follow from the mere assertion that one knows. As if the truth of a statement follows from merely uttering “It is so.” It is this tendency to emphasize one’s conviction with the phrase “I know…” as if it guarantees that our statement is a piece of knowledge. However, as Wittgenstein points out, “That [we] do know takes some [showing] (OC 14).”
Wittgenstein puts Moore’s statements into the category of an expression of conviction because it seems obvious to Moore that we know these propositions (I will often go back and forth between saying these propositions are propositions, as opposed to what I believe they are, viz. basic beliefs), even though Moore offers a kind of proof. It is often the case that we claim to know that something is the case, but later find out that we were wrong. Hence, Wittgenstein’s pointing out the phrase “I thought I knew (OC 12).” Understanding this points to how a doubt can enter our claims of knowledge, but the doubt must be justifiable. It cannot be used in the same way that Moore is using the word know, that is, as an expression that can stand alone without demonstrating how it is that one knows. In other words, “I know that something is the case,” should be justifiable, just as doubting should be justifiable, it is just how the language-games of knowing and doubting work, at least as a function of how Moore is presenting his argument, and also as a function of the criticisms of Moore’s argument, that is, the radical skeptics criticism.
I mean to get back to a close analysis of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's book.
What I think it of the utmost import to note is that On Certainty is a work in progress. I think therefore that any exegesis which supposes itself to present a definitive conclusion is jumping the gun, since it is not clear, indeed it is doubtful, that Wittgenstein himself had reached such a conclusion.
Hence your cautious approach is appropriate.
Let me know what you think because her views are very similar to my own.
His spade is not turned when he hits a proposition that is bedrock but when he has exhausted propositions used to justify his acting in this way when complying with a rule. He can go no further.
From On Certainty:
And:
Most succinctly:
Rather than bedrock we should consider the river and its banks:
continuing with...
Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 2)
Moore’s proof is supposed to show that the conclusion follows necessarily, and if it does, then the skeptic’s doubts are rebutted. The proof would look something like the following:
1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that there exists an external world.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.
Wittgenstein challenges the first premise, namely, that Moore knows that he has two hands. How does Moore know that he has two hands, that is, what is his justification? And do we justify these very basic beliefs? This is at the core of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Do I know that I have hands because I check to see if they are there every morning? Do I make a study of my hands, and thereby conclude that I do indeed have hands? I know chemistry, physics, history, epistemology, and other subjects, and there are ways to confirm my knowledge. However, in our everyday lives do we need to confirm that we have hands? Do we normally doubt these kinds of statements?
Consider the following:
“I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human”. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on (OC 4).”
Even the sense of these kinds of propositions (I do not think they are propositions. I refer to them as very basic foundational beliefs.) is unclear according to Wittgenstein. This is not to say that we cannot imagine a situation in which they have a clear sense, or that there are contexts in which it is reasonable to doubt such statements. It just means that these statements have a unique place in our language of knowing and doubting. The uniqueness of Moorean statements seems to be what Wittgenstein is pointing at in the following quote.
“Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand—my own hand, that is (OC 9)?”
The idea here is clear, we do not as a matter of course, make “…sure [we] know that here is a hand—[our] hand…,” and this applies to many, if not all, of the Moorean statements; and although there are exceptions, which Wittgenstein concedes (OC 23), these exceptions are irrelevant in Moore’s context. The point is to answer the skeptic in relation to what can sensibly be doubted.
“Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.—For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC 6).”
The disputes with Moore’s propositions are not only problematic, but they are also very subtle disputes, which means that they are difficult to flesh out. One of the problems is that we sometimes fail to see the connection between the use of the word know, and the use of the word doubt, and the logic behind that use. The connection between knowing and doubting, that is, the logical connection, is a crucial point. It is the kind of logical link that is also seen between rule-following and making a mistake - one is logically dependent on the other, that is, they are necessarily logically intertwined.
Although I quote Wittgenstein quite a bit, I'm trying to give an account of where I believe his thoughts lead. There is no way to know where Wittgenstein would have gone with OC, and no way to know which passages would have been left in or out in some final version of OC. All we can do is work out where they might take us, and try to fit his mostly original thinking into our epistemology ideas.
_____________________________
Continuing with...
Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 3)
One of the problems with Moore enumerating what he knows, is that it seems to amount to more of a conviction of what he believes, than a statement of what he knows. How does this happen? It happens because the beliefs Moore is claiming to know are not normally part of the language-game of knowing, that is, what he is retailing as part of what we know does not normally fit the role of what we justify. Moore’s use fits the role of someone expressing one’s conviction, and this seems to be the mental state that Wittgenstein is pointing out in OC 6. We often see the use of the word know as an expression of someone’s conviction, but this is not an epistemological use of the word. It expresses more of a subjective certainty, a feeling of being correct, an intuition, or a mere belief. Moore did not intend that his use of know be an expression of a conviction, but that is what his use amounts to. The evidence that this is so is seen in the relationship between the expression of what we claim to know, and the question, “How do you know?” - which is the expression of a doubt or a challenge to justify your claim.
“When Moore says he knows such and such, he is enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar role in the system of our empirical propositions.
“Even if the most trustworthy of men assure me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore’s assurance that he knows…does not interest us. The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments.
“We don’t, for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation (OC 136-138).”
The main thrust of Wittgenstein's argument is that these Moorean propositions (my claim is that they are not propositions, but expressions of belief shown mostly in our actions) have a "peculiar role," as Wittgenstein says, in our language-games.
This peculiar standing that Moore's beliefs have, is that they function as foundational or bedrock supports (not all foundational supports are bedrock), which is similar to how the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces give life to the game of chess. Moore’s beliefs have a similar role in the language-games of epistemology (although their function is probably much broader). In Moore’s context such beliefs are in no need of justification, that is, there is no need to justify Moore’s claim that he has hands, no more than a rule of chess needs a justification that stipulates bishops move diagonally. It just is the case, as part of the contingent background of reality, that Moore has hands, or that bishops move diagonally. It is not a matter of knowing, namely, justifying a claim, but a matter of contingent bedrock beliefs that support many of our language-games of knowing, justifying, and making truth claims, which is the whole of epistemology. Hence, their peculiar role.
Any thoughts on where I might need clarification, whether you agree or not, are appreciated.
OK, a distinction is being made here, a “conviction” vs “a statement of knowledge”? Declaring “I have two hands” falls under the category of “conviction” But Wittgenstein finds this odd to say this in front of a bunch of philosophers rather than saying it after, say, a car crash. Should it even be called a “conviction” when our concepts have been removed from its common use? What about whether this is an example of a “statement of knowledge”? Again, what circumstances would this become knowledge? I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion?
Yes, Wittgenstein is pointing out that Moore's propositions seem to be more like statements of conviction, rather than epistemological assertions.
Quoting Richard B
Declaring "I have two hands," may or may not fall under the category of conviction, i.e., there are contexts where it might be appropriate. Yes, he does find it odd to say it in front of philosophers, especially as an epistemological statement as Moore does.
Quoting Richard B
Well, there is a use of "I know..." that is not an epistemological use, and you hear it all the time. It's used to emphasize one's subjective certainty (their strong conviction) about their belief. It's often confused with objective certainty, which can often be used as a replacement for the epistemological use of "I know..."
Quoting Richard B
One's conviction, viz., one's subjective certainty can become knowledge when one has the appropriate justification for one's belief or claim. Moore's use of "I know I have hands," would never become a piece of knowledge. It's not a matter of knowing, which means I have the proper grounds. Moore of course beliefs he has a proof, but Wittgenstein is challenging this use of know. Justifying these kinds of Moorean beliefs would be akin to justifying the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces. They are just there as part of the background allowing chess to be played. In the same way, our background, the reality we find ourselves in, is the background that allows for epistemological language-games, and other kinds of language-games. In fact, language arises out of this background, i.e., our conceptual framework is dependent, in many ways, on this background.
Quoting Richard B
No, and this Wittgenstein's point, i.e., it's not a matter of epistemology, generally speaking.
If you can’t, what distinction can one be making between “ a conviction” and “a statement of knowledge”
A statement of knowledge is a statement that's justified in some way, and there are various kinds of knowledge statement based on different language-games. We justify our knowledge using logic (inductive and deductive arguments). I'm assuming you know many e.g.'s of these. We justify knowledge claims based on sensory experiences. For example, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" - because I tasted it. There is knowledge based on testimonial evidence, and this is wide spread, given in books by experts, lectures, testimony in courts of law, etc. So, there are many e.g.s.
The Earth has one moon is a statement of knowledge. The Earth is the third planet from the Sun, on and on. I'm not going to list them, but they're all over the place. Why would you ask this?
A conviction on the other hand is just one's strong belief, which is expressed as a strong subjective feeling, that's not justified or it's based on very little evidence. You here this from many religious people. For e.g., "I know X is true." How do you know? - "I just know it," it's a matter of faith. It's just a expression of one's religious conviction. It's not an epistemological statement.
Quoting Sam26
So is this not Quoting Sam26?
No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. Again, it's just part of the inherited background. The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong, since when do we need to justify that we have hands, unless it's in a very special context, like waking up from an operation. What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context?
But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here.
In my example, I am not speaking in front of skeptical philosophers who are doubting the external world. I am a job applicant who is being ask if I have two hands because the job requires two hands to operate the machinery. I can answer yes or no. If one of my hands was amputated due to an injury the answer is"no". In this circumstance, this can be counted as a statement of knowledge.
Quoting Sam26.
Not in general, it depends on the circumstance.
Quoting Sam26
Agree here that the use of "doubt" is questionable in Moore's context. But why could we not say that Moore is justified in saying "I know I have two hands." by just showing the audience such objects.
In PI 325, Wittgenstein says the following, 'The certainty that I shall be able to go after I have had this experience-seen the formula, for instance,-is simply based on induction.' What does this mean?- 'The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction.' Does that mean that I argue to myself: 'Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?' Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground? Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty. Is our confidence justified? - What people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live."
Is not this the case with Moore when he shows the skeptical philosopher his hands thus demonstrating the absurdity of doubting such a thing?
Yes, it does seem that way, but here it's important to note the relationship between knowing and doubting (very important), which Wittgenstein points out. So, when trying to separate those beliefs (they are arational beliefs) which are bedrock, and not part of any epistemological justification, it's crucial to ask oneself, "Does it make sense to generally doubt this belief?
In the case of Moore's propositions there are very few contexts that we doubt, for e.g., that we have hands. It's something we have, it's part of the inherited background of being human (at least for most), and we sure don't doubt that we are human, unless you're a skeptical idealist. Again, similar to the inherited background of chess, viz., the rules, pieces, and the board. How can we doubt the inherited background our lives?
If we take my e.g., "The orange juice is sweet," we do come to know this in various ways, by tasting it is the most common (sensory experience), but asking someone is another way of knowing (justification through testimony). Does it make sense to doubt that the orange juice is sweet? Yes, we may be asking ourselves or others if it's ripe, or if it's sweet enough and not sour. So, this proposition is not the same as Moore's propositions, viz. called variously, hinge, bedrock, foundational, or basic propositions (I don't believe they are propositions in the normal sense, which is why they have a special name attached to them. It has to do with how they function in our epistemological language-games, viz, as the very building blocks of our epistemological language.).
Moore is demonstrating his knowledge of his hands, and it's this knowledge, demonstrated by proof, that is supposed to rebut the skeptic. Wittgenstein, of course, argues against this. Wittgenstein points out that much of our certainty (I call this certainty subjective certainty, as opposed to objective certainty, the latter is knowledge) is arrived at in the course of our lives, as we act within this reality. I don't in many cases arrive at some of these beliefs through some logical process, which is the point. It's through our interaction with the world that this subjective certainty comes out. Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen.
I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands. If other people would start challenging me on this, I would think they have gone mad, or psychologically manipulating me for some reason. Additionally, if one would say, “Well I could imagine that you have been drug and your hands have been amputated, yet you feel certain that you have hands.” My response could be, So what, just because you could imagine such a thing does not make it possible, it could be that I am immune to such drugs and hallucinations. Lastly, why are we calling something “knowledge” as something that excludes possible doubt. This seems too unnecessary of a high bar for a concept that is use in everyday life. It seems Wittgenstein could not cure himself of this philosophical view of “knowledge.”
Of course, but I'm not saying that the statement, "I believe I have hands," is any better. The beliefs Wittgenstein is referring to in many cases, are the beliefs that are shown in our actions. When I sit in a chair, open a door, pick up a pencil, etc., all of these actions reflect beliefs. This is why some philosophers refer to them as animal beliefs, and why I sometimes refer to these bedrock beliefs as pre-linguistic. Not all bedrock beliefs are pre-linguistic, but many are.
"Ludwig Wittgenstein's final notes, On Certainty, are a series of reflections on the nature of knowledge and certainty. In these notes, Wittgenstein argues that there are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions, which Wittgenstein calls "hinge propositions," are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world.
"Wittgenstein argues that hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action. For example, we cannot doubt that we have bodies, that the world is external to our minds, or that the past is real. These propositions are so basic to our understanding of the world that they cannot be doubted without undermining the very possibility of knowledge itself.
"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language. His work has been praised for its insights into the nature of knowledge and the limits of skepticism. However, it has also been criticized for being too vague and unconvincing. Nevertheless, On Certainty remains an important work of philosophy that continues to be studied and debated today.
"Here are some of the key points of Wittgenstein's argument in On Certainty:
"There are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions are called "hinge propositions."
"Hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action.
"Hinge propositions are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world. Without them, we would be unable to make sense of anything.
"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language."
The Tractatus:
In light of some of the remarks made in the thread “Wittgenstein’s creative sublimation of Kant,” I will explain some parts of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus again. This will be done without regard to what has been said in the earlier parts of this current thread. In other words, I will be starting over from this point forward.
Wittgenstein covers a wide range of topics in the Tractatus, including, but certainly not limited to the nature of the world, the nature of language, logic, mathematics, and even mysticism. Wittgenstein did not think that many philosophers would understand his thinking in the Tractatus. However, today it is not as daunting as it was when it was first written because we have access to much more information about Wittgenstein and the backdrop of the times. The Tractatus is a difficult work to master, and there are many disagreements about what Wittgenstein meant by this or that remark.
We know what the Tractatus is about, namely, that many of the problems of philosophy are related to a misunderstanding of the logic of language. He states this in the preface. What Wittgenstein means by the logic of language is spelled out in his account of the nature of language and how language connects with the world. He believed that logic was key to this understanding. So, the three major subjects of the Tractatus are logic, language, and the world. For Wittgenstein philosophy was about logic and metaphysics (Nb. p. 93). Wittgenstein never changed his mind, even in his later philosophy, that logic revealed something important about language. Although in his later philosophy vis-à-vis the Philosophical Investigations logic is more expansive, that is, it is not restricted to an a priori investigation. His later philosophy gives logic a much wider role, which is revealed in the cultural uses of language.
There seems to be no doubt that Wittgenstein believed the world had an a priori structure, and it is logic that would reveal this structure. Specifically, logic would reveal how language connects to the world. “My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world (Nb. p. 79).”
Ethical claims are meaningless but ethics is not. Ethics lies outside the limits of logical constructs and analysis. It is experiential , existential. From within the world, logic. From without, ethics and aesthetics. The two transcendentals of the Tractatus.
The Tractatus is divided into seven major propositions, and these propositions are divided and further subdivided. The seven propositions are the following:
1. “The world is all that is the case (T. 1).”
2. “What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
3. “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3).”
4. “A thought is a proposition with a sense (T. 4).”
5. “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5).”
6. “The general form of a truth-function is [p, ?, N(?)]. This is the general form of a proposition (T. 6).”
7. “What cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (T. 7).”
I’m not going to give a detailed account of all of these propositions. I’m only going to give some of the highlights of the book. You don’t need to understand all of the details, nor do you need to understand the logic to understand the main ideas of the Tractatus.
The Tractatus begins with “The world is all that is the case.” For Wittgenstein, this is all reality or all that exists. “The world is the totality of facts, not of things (T. 1.1).” Facts for Wittgenstein are states of affairs which are not things (not a list of things like table, chairs, mountains, etc), but the arrangement of things (things are Wittgensteinian objects) and their relationship to each other.
“The world is determined by the facts, and their being all the facts (T. 1.11).” It’s all the facts in combination that make up the world, and thus define the world as Wittgenstein envisions it. Moreover, it’s “…the totality of facts [that] determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case (T. 1.12).”
“The facts in logical space are the world (T. 1.13).” I’ll say more about this later.
“The world divides into facts (T. 1.2).” My interpretation of this is that when talking about what’s factual we are talking about a small part of the totality of facts. For example, the Earth has one moon is a fact, but it’s only one part of the larger whole. The larger whole being the totality of facts that make up the world.
Facts are separate from propositions, that is, a true proposition is a picture of a particular state of affairs. We'll talk more about this when we get to proposition 2 and 3.
edit: 3/11/24
By 'things' he means simple or elementary objects not configurations of things such as tables and chairs.
(2.02)
(2.021)
Tables and chairs are composite. This is not nit picking. It is essential for understanding both the ontology of the Tractatus and the logical structure of language.
.
Facts themselves are made up of things like tables and chairs. However, facts are then broken down into atomic facts, which are broken into objects. Objects being the smallest component part of an atomic fact. The atomic fact is what's broken into objects. He hasn't started down this line of thought yet.
He does explicitly state that things are objects in 2.01, so I stand corrected.
2.01:
A combination of elementary objects would be a state of affairs. A table is a combination of elementary objects. A fact of the world.
Quoting Sam26
I think that this is where he is at. This is what he begins with. Elementary configurations of elementary objects. But what he says would also be the case with compound objects or things. The world is not a collection of separate things.
Continuing with the summary...
Post 3
"A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)." The things/objects are possible constituents of states of affairs (2.011). It's not a perfect example, but think of the points on a line, the points aren't much of anything by themselves, i.e., until they're combined to form a line or a circle. It's somewhat similar to Wittgenstein's objects (although we have no examples of objects), i.e., objects by themselves don't do much of anything, other than to provide the substance that makes up the possible world of facts. It's a kind of metaphysical reality that Wittgenstein believes is dictated by logic.
Objects contain within them all of the possible ways in which they can combine.
If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) (2.0123)
As you point out, we have no examples of objects. This raises the question of in what way we can know these objects.
It would seem that we know these objects in so far as they are the source of the possibilities of the world. From themselves they generate the world through the ways in which they combine.
There is a bottom up order to the universe.
It's not a conviction, it's simply something I see or feel. If I have two hands, and I can see or feel, I can see or feel that I have two hands. What could it mean to doubt it?
This seems to invoke things in themselves. Do you read it as suggesting that we can know any "internal properties" of objects, or is all we can know of objects "external properties"?
Well, to begin we would have to identify the objects.Wittgenstein does not do this. We do not even know what these objects are let alone knowing internal or external properties except that internal to them they must have the ability to combine with other objects.
The nature of "object' is contentious; it might be bets to acknowledge this and move on
(For my part I'll go along with Anscombe that objects are particulars and un analysable.)
I get that the "objects" Wittgenstein refers to are not ordinary objects but logical simples or something like that. But they seem to be as inscrutable, and hence as propositionally useless, as Kant's 'things in themselves'
I agree that they are inscrutable and propositionally useless, but Wittgenstein's argument is about the possibility of propositions.
Just as elementary facts consist of objects, elementary proposition consists of names. (4.22)
(5.55)
Simple names function as the names of simple objects, but this does not mean they name things in the way tables and chairs do. They are not the names of 'this' or 'that'. They are about the form not the content of propositions.
Again, this seems conceptually similar to the ding an sich since the term does not refer in the ordinary sense as with naming table and chairs but is about the form "in itself' as opposed to 'for us'.
The point here is to see Wittgenstein's connection between knowing and doubting, i.e., the logical connection between the two concepts. I don't think anyone has ever pointed this out in the way Wittgenstein has in OC. When someone claims to know, one of our natural responses is "How do you know?" This question introduces the doubt into our epistemology. We want to know how it is that you know, what's your justification; and when someone points to their inner feelings (their convictions), this is not the language-game of epistemology, although some argue otherwise. I think they're mistaken.
(Sometimes we forget that we often use the concept know as an expression of a conviction. It's not an epistemological use of the word know as JTB, it's just an expression of how strong our conviction is about the belief. These convictions are often expressed with great emphasis but have very little or no justification. They're mere beliefs or opinions.)
Wittgenstein sees statements like "I know I have hands." more akin to an expression of a conviction because he views these kinds of propositions as bedrock, i.e., they form the backdrop of reality that allows us to create epistemological language-games. One of the ways to identify these kinds of bedrock propositions is to ask if it makes sense to doubt them (in a particular context), which is an identifying mark of being bedrock or hinge. A difficulty arises because there are instances where these propositions can and are justified within a particular context and Wittgenstein points this out, but he believes that in Moore's context they are hinge propositions, not generally susceptible to doubt. They give life to our language-games of knowledge and doubt, just as the pieces, board, and rules of chess give life to the game of chess. Doubting hinges would be akin to doubting that a bishop moves diagonally.
It's important to understand that Wittgenstein is trying to answer the question of why it’s possible to make statements about the world. He answers this by doing an a priori investigation, which is very distinct from his later philosophy. Wittgenstein believes that it’s through purely logical analysis that we can come to understand how propositions connect to the world of facts. He assumes this from the beginning. It’s an a priori investigation that will provide the solution to philosophical problems. He also believed that even vague propositions (Nb p. 70), once logically understood, are not vague, but have a clear logical structure. Once you have a clear understanding of the logical structure of propositions, then you essentially have a clear understanding of all the propositions of philosophy. This is partly the reason why Wittgenstein believed after completing the Tractatus that he had solved the problems of philosophy. It’s his logical analysis of the proposition, and specifically how it connects to the world, that draws him to this conclusion.
“What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).” We use language, specifically propositions, to make statements of facts about the world. States of affairs are not the same as propositions, they are quite distinct. The world is made up of facts (states of affairs), viz, the totality of all the facts (T 1.11). You might not agree with Wittgenstein’s notion of facts being composed of objects (objects being the simplest component of an atomic fact), but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions, I believe, is a good one; and many philosophers, including myself, use it. States of affairs make up reality, but not as Wittgenstein envisioned it in the Tractatus, but I digress.
Much can be said about Frege’s influence on the Tractatus. In fact, some of Wittgenstein’s ideas reflect Frege’s ideas. For example, Wittgenstein and Frege are trying to break down propositions into their simplest form. Frege’s work marked the beginning of what became known as logical atomism. Frege also introduced the distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) in linguistic expressions. There are other important ideas that Wittgenstein got from Frege, but it’s beyond the scope of these remarks.
Ignores relational facts, as best I can tell. A fact can obtain between objects, but not be either. A distance is a fact, but is not an object. It's not anything except a brain delineating a straight line through space between two objects. But that distance obtains.
In the previous post we talked a little about the 2nd of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein spends about six pages on this topic.
We know based on 2.01 that a fact is made up of a combination of objects. Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. They cannot be further analyzed into simpler parts. Think of them as irreducible (T. 2.021). (They are sometimes referred to as “atomic objects.”) Objects have an independent existence (if you’re thinking of what we mean by ordinary objects, then you’re far from what Wittgenstein meant by objects in the Tractatus), free from the existence of other objects.
Wittgenstein uses the idea of objects as a necessary ingredient to his a priori analysis. He doesn’t just create objects out of thin air, i.e., at the time Frege and Russell were thinking along similar lines. This is most likely why Wittgenstein created both the name and the object. Names being the smallest component of an elementary proposition, and objects being the smallest component of an atomic fact. Names in propositions represent objects. This is a source of confusion for many who read the Tractatus for the first time. Also, objects have no material properties because propositions represent properties, “…and it’s only by the configuration of objects that they [material properties] are produced (T. 2.0231).”
Frege developed a system of logical notation to express logical relations in mathematics, and he played a significant role in the development of formal logic. Wittgenstein extended Frege’s ideas of logical notation to show the logic behind the proposition and its connection to a fact, so the Tractatus reflects Frege’s influence.
Russell’s influence is significant in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (up to about 1929). Russell’s work on logical atomism, particularly in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) is particularly impactful for Wittgenstein. Russell believed that thought and language could be reduced to atomic propositions that correspond with the basic elements of reality. So, the ideas of the Tractatus were extensions of both Frege’s and Russell’s ideas, but there are also important differences.
“It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something--a form--in common with it (T. 2.022). Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. So, if a proposition presents a picture of a possible fact, then it has a particular logical form, and that form either matches reality or it doesn’t. Its form is the arrangement of things in the picture. So, both the proposition and facts have forms, but whether a proposition is true depends on whether its form, the arrangement of names in the proposition, matches the arrangement of objects composing the atomic fact. Even space, time, and color are forms of objects (T. 2.0251). In other words, objects that have a particular arrangement, make up space, time, and color. Every fact of the world is composed of a certain arrangement of objects (again, objects make up the substance), including space, time, and color.
Wittgenstein’s reasoning was that if I assert that “Plato was a philosopher,” I know what I mean. But who is Plato and what is a philosopher? If we try to answer the questions, the questions may be open to more questions. Therefore, the process of analysis might go on and on without resolution. Wittgenstein believed that the process of analysis must come to an end (Nb p. 46), but what is that end? The end for Wittgenstein, as stated in the Tractatus and the Notebooks, are elementary propositions made up of names, “…which will correspond to... simple objects (Nb p. 61).” The point is that even though Wittgenstein was unable to give examples of names and objects (names being simple signs, and simple objects being the basic substance of the world), he believed that logic dictated that this is how it must be. Wittgenstein believed that the idea of a simple is already contained in the idea of a complex and the idea of an analysis (Nb. p. 60). For us to say things about the world, our statements must come in direct contact with the world. This is accomplished via names. “A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” And, although Wittgenstein was unable to carry out the analysis completely, he was sure that this is how it must be. Of course, we remember that Wittgenstein inherited many of these ideas from Frege and Russell, which provided the impetus for his logic.
This is a good write up, and I think you're on to something. I think that Witt's concept of object is heavily influenced by Russell, and Russell was heavily influenced by Mach.
Russell's position during the early 1900s was neutral monism which stems from the work of Ernst Mach. The neutral monism of Mach postulated reality as being composed of elements; these elements were: colors, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, etc.
“As to the sum of my physical findings, these I can analyse into what are at present unanalysable elements: colors, sounds, pressures, temperatures, smells, spaces, times, and so on. These elements depend both of external and internal circumstances; when the latter are involved, and only then, we may call these elements sensations…” (KE, 7).
These elements built up into ‘complexes’ or ‘bodies’ and those complexes which are “relatively more fixed and permanent...engrave [themselves] in memory, and express [themselves] in language” (AS).
I think that this is what Wittgenstein is going for.
"Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects" (2.0251).
Objects, give complexes their form, and their material properties. It would be senseless to say they themselves have the property, it is only in the instantiation within the complex that these properties are manifested. This is why Wittgenstein says: “The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties.
A fact, that “my car is black” is first presented in the proposition which pictures it, but that my car is black is dependent upon a certain arrangement of elements which give it the form of being both a car, and black.
In the Notebooks he says:
He asks:
And in response:
But:
(NB 17.6.15)
Whether things in the world are infinitely divisible is left open. His investigation is logical. To the question raised above as to whether we must arrive at simple components or ad infinitum analysis, his answer is a third possibility.
(11.5.15)
Wittgenstein's concern is propositional analysis, not physical analysis.
(17.6.15)
We do not have to dissect a frog to make sense of the proposition: "The frog jumps". In this proposition the frog is a simple object. If, however, the proposition was about the nervous system of a frog, the name 'frog' would not serve as a simple name.
(18.6.15)
When he says that no further division is possible, this is because we have arrived at the simple propositional names, not at some imagined indivisible entities. Wittgenstein's simples are not Democrates' atoms. Further division is superfluous because it would not make better sense of the proposition.
While I believe that a lot of what you said is true, I don't believe that its exhaustive of Witt's view in the Tractatus. In a sense, an object is both logical and physical.
You're right, Wittgenstein's endeavor is a logical one, not a scientific one, but Witt holds:
1. Logic tells us there must be logically simple objects
2. To these objects corresponds a definite atomic fact.
3. To each atomic fact corresponds a definite state of affairs
"Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts" (Tract, 4.2211)
"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality" (2.06).
I think Witts thoughts are more like this:
Consider the fact: "The ball is red". This fact can itself be analyzed into atomic facts, these facts would be about 1. the ball and 2. the color red. An atomic fact is a definite arrangement of objects.
"The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact" (2.0272).
"In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way" (2.031).
What does this mean? Well, what is a ball?
Just a quick google says: " a solid or hollow spherical or egg-shaped object"
okay, well what is "solid", "hollow" "spherical"?
Trying to define these words simply results in synonyms. This is because in some sense, these concepts are simple. We learn them not by definition, but ostensively. "Red" is the same, not something that can be taken to pieces by a definition so to speak. You either know what it is or you don't. These are objects. So, "The ball" is an arrangement of objects both logically and spatiotemporally. Logically its sphericalness that has either firmness or hollowedness. To this corresponds a definite complex in space - a ball - which depending on whether it is solid or hollow exists a certain resistance to pressures in a sphere form which obviously corresponds to a definite arrangement of atoms.
I think this way you get both the logical aspect of Witt's thought with the indefinable aspect of logically simple objects as well as their tie to reality.
Truthfully, though, I am still wrestling with this so I could be wrong.
If the ball is an arrangement of objects then it is composite. Objects cannot be composite. (2.021)
It is composite. The ball is not a wittgensteinian object. It is made up of Wittgensteinian objects.
That's what I said.
Quoting 013zen
are objects.
Sorry, you lost me. The passage you quoted:
Quoting 013zen
Might seem to support that there are, independent of us, simple objects that combine to make the physical world. I have sometimes read it that way, but I think that is wrong. One problem is that if such objects are non-material, then how do non-material objects combine to make material objects?
(1.13)
Logical space is the space of what is possible. The facts in logical space are not the facts in physical space. The facts in physical space is a subset of the facts in logical space.
(2.0121)
I'm sorry, I don't entirely follow. To my understanding, the Tractatus essentially sets up an isomorphism between thought, language, and possible/actual reality.
Thoughts>Concepts>Simple concepts
Propositions>Expressions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts>objects
"We make for ourselves pictures of facts. The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and on-existence of atomic facts" (2.1-2.1).
"The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space" (2.202 ).
"The logical picture of the facts is the thought" (3).
"The picture is a model of reality" (2.12).
"Every part of a proposition which characterizes its sense I call an expression (a symbol). (The proposition itself is an expression.) Expressions are everything essential for the sense of the
proposition that propositions can have in common with one another. An expression characterizes a form and a content" (3.31).
To an object corresponds a name, to which corresponds a simple concept which is indefinable or analyzable. These build up to form complex concepts, "classical objects" which are characterized by a "form and content" and are what different propositions have in common. For example, when I used the example "The ball is red" earlier, "ball" is simply the general form and content of particular objects which can have wildly different properties. It's only in the coupling of concepts in thoughts and propositions that objects are vested with properties "The ball IS red", and these map to possible states of affairs.
I could be wrong about this however. But, I don't see the issue that you're referring to.
What is at issue is the relationship between Wittgenstein's indivisible propositional 'objects' and the objects we find in the world. The question of whether there are indivisible objects that make up the world. In the Notebooks he says:
(NB 17.6.15)
You said:
Quoting 013zen
But Tractarian objects are not physical:
(2.0231)
(2.027)
Quoting 013zen
A couple a points on the content of a proposition:
(3.13)
(6.111)
We cannot infer the content of the world from the form of a proposition.
(3.221)
We cannot say what the objects of the world are. From the Notebooks:
(21.6.15)
Quoting 013zen
It is isomorphic. That is, language and the world have the same underlying logical form. It is this form that makes it possible to say anything true or false about the world. But this says nothing about the content.
Wittgenstein wasn’t blind to the fact that he was unable to give examples of objects. He says for example, “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 68).” For whatever reason Wittgenstein suppresses his doubts and proceeds with his analysis.
I’ll try to define objects as I see them, i.e., based on, I believe, a reasonable interpretation. Let me say first that you don’t need to have a perfect understanding of names or objects to have a clear understanding of the general ideas of the Tractatus, this seems obvious. You can be wrong about this or that interpretation (within reason) and still have a clear picture of most of his ideas.
First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language.
Second, being subsistent in the case of objects, means their reality is not contingent on any observation or linguistic description. This implies that their existence is objective, which is the case with atomic and complex facts.
Third, objects are unchanging or unalterable.
Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality).
Fifth, the implications of all this are closely related to the limits of language. Objects represent all that can be meaningfully said about reality. Why? Because combinations of objects represent every possible state of affairs. They are the building blocks of reality.
I have recently come to the opposite conclusion as can be seen in my post above and subsequent exchange with @013zen.
Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects. The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'.
(Notebooks 17.6.15)
I don't disagree with these statements.
Quoting Fooloso4
I might argue over the wording of this, i.e., the analysis of language brings us to names, the smallest component of an elementary proposition. Names correspond to objects, which make up atomic facts. A proposition is a picture, according to Witt, its "...end-points [names]... actually touch the object (T. 2.1521), like a measure laid against reality (T. 2.1512). Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality.
Quoting Fooloso4
I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." I would say that Plato, as part of a proposition about the person, is either part of an atomic fact (simple fact) or a more complex fact. There are no simple propositional objects. There are simple propositional names, but not objects. Objects are connected specifically to atomic facts. Names point to objects, which again make up facts or reality.
You quote 2.0231, but let's look at the entire quote:
"The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions first formed by the configuration of the objects" (2.0231).
Wittgenstein says that "material properties" are determined by "the configuration of objects". This neither implies that:
1. objects are not physical
nor that
2. the configuration of objects makes something physical.
Rather, it is the precise material properties that a particular has that are determined by the arrangement of objects. But, notice that Witt is talking about 1. propositions and 2. objects; each of these corresponds to a different aspect of the isomorphism. One, at the level of language and two at the level of reality.
Quoting 013zen
Witt is saying that a material property, such as a particular ball being red is expressed at the level of the proposition "The ball is red". To this proposition corresponds a definite arrangement of objects in the physical world which determines that the ball is red. If the arrangement of objects were different, the ball could very well be a different color, more or less firm, or perhaps not a ball at all.
Quoting Fooloso4
Correct. This is why I said originally that your post was correct, but I didn't believe it was exhaustive of Witt's view. Witt arrives at the necessity of objects through a logical analysis. He is a philosopher not a scientist. Recall Witt says:
"...there must be objects and atomic facts" (4.2211).
This is because:
"Objects form the substance of the world" (2.021).
and
"If the world had no substance...It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true
or false) (2.0211-2.0212) .
---Edit---
I accidentally submitted the post before I was finished. I'll leave it at that for further discussion, but the end may not be so clear due to me having originally intended to say more lol
I agree with Sam..."Plato" is not a simple object. Plato is a complex entity which we can define by appealing to many different aspects of his existence. Things such as his mortality, his being a man, his being a philosopher, his being bipedal, etc. A simple object can only be named, not analyzed further. Wittgenstein might say it has no "parts" to which we can take it to pieces, so to speak. Yet, Plato can be taken to many pieces, as illustrated.
But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality.
Quoting Sam26
How do you interpret the passage I quoted?
On the same day he says:
and:
and:
Quoting Sam26
I misspoke. I agree that proposition consist of names not objects, but Plato is both the object meant and the name of that object. When we talk about Plato isn't the meaning of who we are talking about clear? What further analysis is necessary? Does the meaning become clearer when we talk about Plato's eyes and hair or some other components of him?
Those are objects "in the original sense" i.e. these are complex entities which we normally refer to as objects. These are not objects in the Tractarian sense. This notebook entry was written while Witt was thinking through his ideas which would become the Tractatus. That he even goes through the trouble of pointing out that he is using the word objects here "in the original sense" shows he's already thinking about a stipulative usage of the word that's different than the every day sense.
Norman Malcolm asked Wittgenstein for an example of a simple object, and he records Witt's response in his memoir.
"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70).
Wittgenstein arrived at the conclusion that there must be simple objects through logical analysis. What those objects turn out to be is a question for science.
"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word philosophy must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.)" (4.111).
Every proposition (true or false) presents a picture of a possible state of affairs. If the picture matches the facts (state of affairs) of reality, then it's true, if not it's false. Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem.
"When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense (Nb. p. 63)."
I'd have to do a careful reading of the preceding pages but keep in mind that the Tractatus is the final arbiter of how to interpret propositions and facts. The Notebooks are not the complete story, the Tractatus is. That's not to say that it's not important, it's just that he's working through these ideas in the Notebooks. Besides I'm not sure I see your point.
I'm trying to give an accurate presentation for people to read. I don't want to get sidetracked with every little disagreement with you. I only say this so I can focus on my goal. If you want to present a different interpretation that's fine, but don't be surprised if I don't respond. I'm not always going to be correct with every nuanced word, but I think I can give an accurate overall interpretation.
When he says that is that it is only by the configuration of objects that material are produced, he does not distinguish between the production of material properties in general and the precise material properties of particulars. It is only by the configuration of object that material properties are formed. Objects do not have material properties.
Quoting 013zen
Right, and the proposition requires no further division for it to make sense.
Quoting 013zen
Take the proposition: Plato is a man. In our analysis of this proposition do we arrive at the tautological proposition: this man is a man? Is man a part of the man? Does an analysis go from the more general to the more specific or the more specific to the more general? Which is more simple? Is man a part of Plato or is Plato a part of man?
Quoting 013zen
That supports what I have been saying. His concern is with propositions and meaning. Whether this thing, Plato, is a simple or complex thing is not his concern. We know who Plato is and further analysis is not necessary.
For him objects are merely formal. Whether or not there are such things in the world was not his concern.
This is interesting. I actually share this view, although I will admit that I am far more knowledgeable about the Tractatus. But, from what I have read in the LE and PI I also feel that the two works are essentially saying the same thing - or rather, presenting the same problem from a different perspective. So, naturally, nothing really changes, except perhaps how we are talking about the problem.
The problem arises when we move from the logical form and structure of the world to its content. When we move from a form to content. When we treat Tractarian objects as if they are entities existing in the world.
Quoting Sam26
The point is that the analysis of a proposition is to determine its sense. If this means to arrive at the relationship between the names of simple objects then we never complete an analyse of propositions.
Two things:
1. I don't believe that this is how analysis works for Wittgenstein. Analysis yields atomic propositions, which are objects. "Man is a man" is just another proposition, not an atomic proposition.
Witt says of analysis that:
"Every statement about complexes can be analysed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complexes" (2.0201).
2. In the sentence "Plato is a man", Plato is a definite description, not an object.
But, I actually think you pointed out something that corrected my previous way of thinking, so thank you.
The relationship goes more like:
Thoughts>Concepts
Propositions>names
Facts (States of affairs)>Atomic facts (objects)
I believe that
"Socrates is a man" analyzes into:
?x[Fx]
But, let me read a bit more and I'll comment more later. Thanks for the direction!
This begs the question of what stands as a completely analysed proposition. What functions as a name?
Quoting Fooloso4
What determines a simple thing is that which yields definite sense. I think that holding on to the picture of elementary objects as the building block of the world (@Sam26 )misleads us. Wittgenstein's investigation is in "logical space" (1.13) not physical space.
Quoting 013zen
Now we can be lost together!
I will continue with a few more remarks. All of this is still under the second main proposition of the Tractatus.
“What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. For example, “The Earth has one moon,” Is a state of affairs. The proposition represents a picture of a fact. A fact is something real, not imagined. The two parts of complex facts are atomic facts and the objects that make up atomic facts. These things (things in the normal sense) are real for Wittgenstein. “Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real.
Philosophers going back to Augustine have believed that names, in the normal use of the word, refer to objects (objects in this sense are things like chairs, pencils, cars, etc.). Wittgenstein develops this idea into his theory of names and objects. Of course, his idea of names and objects is much different from what philosophers traditionally meant, at least up to Frege, Russell, and maybe a few others.
“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true (T. 2.0111). In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false) (T. 2.0212).” Pictures, of course, are sketched by propositions, and names are the smallest component of propositions. The names within a proposition refer to objects in the world. All propositions for Wittgenstein are logical pictures. A picture presents a form, i.e., the arrangement of the elements of the picture, and the “…elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (T. 2.131).”
So, the form of a proposition, which is the arrangement of the elements of a picture (made up of names), must match the form of a fact, which is made up of the arrangement of the objects. “There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all (T. 2.161). What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it does, is its pictorial form (T. 2.17). A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc (T. 2.171).”
All propositions have a sense, and that sense is represented by its pictorial form. Whether that sense is representative of reality depends on whether its logical form matches the logical form of reality. The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. This must be for us to understand the sense of false propositions or pictures that do not match reality.
“A picture represents its subject [the subject being the possibility of the existence of a fact] from a position outside it (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly (T. 2.173). A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form [a picture presents or shows its form] (T. 2.174).”
This is why we do philosophy, after all. :)
Quoting Fooloso4
So, we know that facts/propositions are analyzed into atomic facts/elementary propositions. Regarding their structure Witt says:
[b]"It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination" (4.221).
"The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact" (2.032).[/b]
So, we learn that elementary propositions have a structure which is names in immediate combinations.
But, how do we know when we have reached the end of our analysis and gotten to the objects?
Well, Witt says:
[b]"Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.
The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of
the object.
The object is simple" (2.014 - 2.02 )[/b]
I believe what he is saying is simply this: In order to determine if a sign is signifying a simple object or a complex object, you simply have to ask "Can this name appear in an atomic fact?" You know that you have the proper form for an object if its possible for it to occur in one. This is what is meant by it being simple.
What do I mean by this? Well, Witt. says
[b]"The names are the simple symbols, I indicate them by single letters (x, y, z). The elementary proposition I write as function of the names, in the form:
'fx', '?(x, y)', etc.
Or
I indicate it by the letters p, q, r" (4.24).[/b]
So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here.
Your original question:
Quoting Fooloso4
should analyze into:
fx or more clearly F(x)
with F being "man" and x being "Plato".
This has the structure of objects in "immediate combination". In fact, we can now clearly see what Witt says that:
"The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact" (2.032).
Because:
"[He] conceives [of] the proposition like Frege and Russell as a function of the expressions contained in it" (3.318 ).
He believes that proper analysis results in you culling the excess and superfluous aspects of a proposition, resulting in two things:
1. Only those things which are logically necessary for the meaning of the proposition (These are the objects)
2. The form that the proposition is instantiating.
"A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental are the features which are due to a particular way of producing the propositional sign. Essential are those which alone enable the proposition to express its sense" (3.34).
So, what do we learn by analyzing "Plato is a man" into "F(x)"? Well, what does "F(x)" mean?
Witt says:
"For 'fa' says the same as (?x) . fx . x = a" (5.47).
"(?x) . fx . x = a"
Says: There exists at least one x that satisfies the function f(x), and "a" is that "x".
Or whatever is meant by the concept "man" at least one thing falls under it, and "Plato" is that thing.
Witt says as much in 5.471-5.4711.
"The general form of proposition is the essence of proposition. To give the essence of proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world."
So, the relation contained in the original expression is just that of a Function and input. So these are the names that correspond to our objects, perhaps. Witt does say:
[b]"One could therefore say the real name is that which all symbols, which signify an object, have in common. It would then follow, step by step, that no sort of composition was essential for a
name" (3.3411).[/b]
"The Earth has six moons" is a state of affairs. It tells us what is the case, but only if it is true.
(2.06)
Quoting Sam26
If what is real is what is the case then substance is not real:
(2.024)
The substance of the world is not a state of affairs. The substance of the world is not a fact. Substance is what stands under and makes possible what is real.
(2.0231)
This is an a priori claim about the form of the world, its logical structure.
Quoting Sam26
It is because they have the same logical form that the picture makes sense. If the proposition did not have logical form, the form of both a proposition and of reality, it would not make sense. They are not independent of each other.
I believe that you're right, that this is what Witt was struggling with in the notebooks, at times. You point that out, rightly - it's a main component of the Tract. But, I think he tries to show that he has come down on one side of the issue, namely that there are physical elements that correspond to logical simples. His analysis tells him that there must be logical simples, otherwise propositions having sense would rely on another proposition was true. Why does he say this?
Well, consider:
"The young man is starting college tomorrow."
I know what that means regardless of any content. I don't need to know who the young man is, what college he's going to, what todays date is, or anything one might otherwise suspect I'd need to know in order to make sense of the expression. I don't need to know if anything else is true in order to understand its sense. So, there must be logically simple entities which can be applied to any number of particulars. Any young man, any college, any date, etc.
But, Witt does try and give any idea regarding what these forms might mirror in the real world when he says:
[b]"Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.
It is form and content. Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects" (2.024 -2.0251).[/b]
Wittgenstein suspects that particular arrangements or forms in things like space, time, and colour that persist over and over again must exist, for how else could a flower 200,000 years ago be red, and so can the coke can sitting on my desk today? Like the necessity for some general logical form which allows many particulars to fall under it by only containing a logical form allowing relevant aspects of the particular in question, so too must there be a general physical form which allows particulars to insatiate a quality.
Just a couple of points of clarification before I continue.
When a proposition is true it mirrors a positive fact. False statements are possible states of affairs not actual states of affairs, in other words, they don’t obtain, but they still have sense because they picture a possible fact. Again, there is nothing in a false statement that connects with reality, i.e., it’s a picture that isn’t representative of a positive fact. The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. “Logical form is mirrored in propositions. Propositions show the form of reality (T. 4.121).” In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally (Nb p. 7). A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (T. 4.01).”
Just a bit of nit-picking for consistency's sake.
The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads:
"An illustration to explain the concept of truth. A black spot on white paper; the form of the spot can be described by saying of each point of the plane whether it is white or black. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not black), a negative fact".
So, here we can kind of see what Witt has in mind.
A black spot is like a positive fact that obtains. There IS a cat over there.
A white spot is the absence of any fact (since the paper itself is white). There is NO thing over there.
But, importantly, we already know to what a negative fact corresponds in order to be able to say it is false. We understand the sense of "The spot is white".
I think Witt touches on this when he says:
"Why should one not be able to express the negative proposition by means of a negative fact? (Like: if "a" does not stand in a certain relation to "b", it could express that aRb is not the case.) But here also the negative proposition is indirectly constructed with the positive. The positive proposition must presuppose the existence of the negative proposition and conversely" (5.5151).
A negative fact can still furnish a proposition with a sense because the negative contains the positive as prototype. To know what it means to say:
"The spot is black" we must know what it means for it to be white, and visa versa.
I would probably clarify it this way: The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a positive fact. Some of the confusion has been that when I've been talking about states of affairs or facts I've been talking about positive facts/states of affairs.
Quoting 013zen
Quoting Sam26
There can be no false facts.
I gather, Sam, you have been misunderstood by 013zen?
It's easy to be misunderstood because of Wittgenstein's use of these concepts. Hell, even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he meant by certain statements. Years after he wrote the Tractatus he was asked about what he meant by this or that statement and he couldn't say. So, I'm not going to claim that my interpretations are always correct. We're all going to be off to one degree or another, and we're certainly not all going to agree.
What do you mean by "false fact"? When I say:
Quoting 013zen
I mean to say, a fact can either be the case, or not the case.
I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211.
The rejection of this view strikes me as one of the main departures from the Tractatus found in the PI.
No, it can't. If it is a fact, then it is the case.
"[Any fact] can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same" (1.21.)
https://archive.org/details/g.-e.-m.-anscombe-an-introduction-to-wittgenstein-s-tractatus/page/n9/mode/2up
I recommend reading a few pages from about p. 28.
And the pages before that, if you are under the illusion that elementary propositions are somehow observed. If you disagree, I have a poker handy.
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.
An item is only a fact if it is true.
It's not a misquote. The quote is:
"Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same" (1.21).
Any one here is in reference to the previous two points:
[b]1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.[/b]
Any one is referencing facts.
I believe that you are, my friend.
Please tell me to what the expression "Any one" in 1.21 is referencing? Any what?
Quoting Sam26
Yep.
In more modern parlance, of all the possible worlds, only one is the actual world.
What it does not say is "any fact can be true or not true". Facts are all of them true. Some possible facts are not true.
That is what they have said. :roll:
Have you read Anscombe's book? She had this stuff at first hand, of course, so is I think authoritative; the only problem is that she is not that much more comprehensible than the original...
We are writing over each other.
An excellent few pages. Well done. Still think you should put it into WIki...
I am saying:
1. Fact can either be the case or not be the case.
In the event that it is the case, a certain set of atomic facts obtain. In the event of a fact not being the case, a certain set of atomic facts does not obtain.
In the event that they obtain, Witt calls it a positive fact. In the event that they do not obtain, Witt calls it a negative fact.
"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.)" (2.06).
I haven't read the replies here in detail, focusing on your posts instead. My interest is in the change between Tract and PI. In Tract, objects and atomic propositions are taken as essential, I suspect as the result of a transcendental argument: without these, language could not work; language works; therefore there must be objects and atomic propositions.
But this is rejected in PI, replaced by meaning as use, and simples as whatever is needed for the language game.
No. If you had said "possible facts can either be the case or not be the case", I would agree. All facts are the case.
Then followed with
This is too fast for sufficient care.
(I had written that before your last post... yes, I'm going for a walk.)
As Wittgenstein said:
(CV 65)
Quoting 013zen
Perhaps. I thought we understood this in the same way but your next post indicates that we don't.
Quoting 013zen
To simplify this a bit I would analyse this as: a (young man) stands in relation (R) to b (college)
Quoting 013zen
Yes, the variables can stand for anything, real or imagined. The logical structure and relation stays the same. His analysis is logical. It says nothing about the content or beings in the world.
(3.1431)
That is, the sense of a proposition does not require that objects be simple.
(2.021)
What does this mean? As he goes on to say:
It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it. (2.022)
Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form. (2.023)
There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. (2.026)
Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. (2.027)
Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable. (2.0271)
What subsists, unalterable objects, are not the changeable spatial objects such as tables and chairs we encounter in the world. They are not objects to be found in the world if we are able to analyse compound object completely. They are what all object in the world have. They are formal properties. Internal relations. The possibility of combining. They are purely logical or formal.
Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name.
I doubt it. Look for yourself. That there are such things is implied by the structure of language Wittgenstein develops. What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology.
And this is what was later rejected in the PI. Anscombe does not mince words and is not protective of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus.
But what elementary propositions are not, is simple observation statements.
Of course this is muddled, hence the PI.
Yes, I'd also think this analyzes into aRb, in which case, if I'm understanding correctly, "a" and "b" would be our objects with R just being a possible relation that can hold between them. Not itself an object.
I believe that we might have a similar understanding which is simply being obfuscated due to loose language.
As Frege once pointed out (I can't recall exactly where at this moment)...due to the nature of everyday language, we often times have to rely on the good nature of our interlocutors when trying to get our points across. Especially when approaching technical issues.
I'll look for the quote tomorrow. I believe I have an idea which paper it's from.
In the passage where Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein he does not say that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology. He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. This in support of Anscombe's point, contra Popper, that:
Whatever they may be is not irrelevant and not an issue for psychology. In fact, she goes on to say:
One need only take a quick look at other secondary sources to see that scholars still do not have an agreed upon account.
(To quote try highlighting and control C. to copy and control V to paste,)
We know that the idea of propositions being pictures, as presented in his picture theory of propositions, is central to his thinking in the Tractatus. So, propositions represent reality through their pictorial form. The elements of a picture include several things, including the following: Names, of course, are part of what is included in the elements of a picture, names correspond to the objects, i.e., the arrangement of names corresponds to the arrangement of objects that make up atomic facts and hence complex facts.
Second, is the logical structure of the picture (all propositions whether true or false have a logical structure). The logical structure of the picture (the proposition) also includes the logical connectives, such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, etc., and they determine the truth-possibilities of propositions (T. 4.31).
Another way to talk about the elements of a proposition is to refer to the representational content of the picture. So, the elements of a picture can be talked about in different ways. A propositional picture is a particular picture, say of A as opposed to B, because of how the pictorial elements of A (the form of the picture) relate to the situation pictured. They are identical (T. 2.15).
We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).”
This ends my comments on the second of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus.
See also the last whole paragraph on p.27. "The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.
I'll leave you to your musings.
Did I say or imply otherwise? Why bring this up?
Quoting Banno
Right, but the epistemological problem and the problem of what elementary objects are are two different issues. Anscombe remarks:
(28)
Saying he pretended suggests he knew better.
He does say a few important things about what they are:
In order to avoid the impression of interrupting and interfering I decided to delete the rest of my post and start a new topic of Tractarian objects,
Because you seemed to me not to be differentiating between atomic objects and elementary propositions.
Where do you think I failed to differentiate them?
First off, what you referred to was not about simple objects:
Quoting Fooloso4
Second, come on Banno! This is basic stuff. We have been through this before, if not in this thread then in others.
The elementary proposition consists of names. (4.22) A name means an object. (3.203)
I picked that this passage:
because it is part of her argument that shows, contrary to your claim that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology, that an account of them is important for understanding the Tractatus. An account of elementary propositions must necessarily include an account of names and the objects the are names of. As she says prior to this on page 28:
It makes no sense to say that an account of elementary propositions is important but to address what an object is is irrelevant.
Quoting Fooloso4
That was what I was talking about.
I've no clear idea of what you are talking about, if not objects. Here is where you joined my part of the conversation:
Quoting Fooloso4
That sentence appears to me to be about objects.
You are all over the place.
What an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, is unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented. I'm arguing along with Copi and Anscombe that names refer to particulars, along the lines of individual variables in modern logic. Further I think that the way in which simples are viewed is one of the main changes between the Tractatus and the PI.
But the vital thing here, which permeates all of Wittgenstein's work, is that the world is not made of objects but of facts.
That's the view that I, and I think @Sam26, are setting out. And again, while your tone suggests that you adamantly disagree with me, I really do not know what it is you are suggesting, and hence how you agree or disagree with what I have said.
So unless you are able to explain what it is you are saying in a way that is comprehensible, I do not see how this conversation might proceed.
Quoting Banno
To which I asked again:
Quoting Fooloso4
The simple answer is no, she does not. To claim that language demands it is not to identify one.
With me so far?
In your response to this you said:
Quoting Banno
What do we find at the top for page 28? Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein:
‘I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.’
It is the constituents of a thought that he says is irrelevant. That is what is a matter of psychology. The constituents of a thought is not an object. That the constituents of a thought are irrelevant and a matter of psychology does not mean that the question of what an object is is either irrelevant or a matter of psychology.
Quoting Banno
Does she say this? Where?
On the top of page 29 she says:
That objects form the substance of the world is not unimportant. It is fundamental.
Quoting Banno
And the facts are made up of objects. The question of what objects are is deeply problematic. I can understand why you and Sam want to skip over it. As I said above, I will be addressing it in a separate thread.
My apologies. I stand corrected. My attention was drawn elsewhere and I forgot to return to this.
You said:
Quoting Sam26
While it is true that they make up the substance of the world, I think the building block analogy is misleading. You did point out that they are not material, but building blocks and the building are made of the same kind of stuff. The substance of the world and the world, however, are not.
Quoting Sam26
This unalterable form is not an arrangement. Objects have within them the possibilities of forming arrangements, but the form of objects is logical form. Unfortunately, he uses the term 'form' in different ways. There is the unalterable form (singular) and the forms (plural) of objects in configuration.
In another post you say:
Quoting Sam26
They do not form the substance by combining. They are the substance. And I think this is the crux of the matter. What does he mean by substance? As I mentioned above, I will be starting a thread on this, but if you want to discuss it here I'm game.
Do you have something in mind for this specifically, or would it be alright if I tried typing up a thread? I say this because I was working through this a bit and think I have something to perhaps start off the discussion. Otherwise, I'd be happy to wait until you started your thread and comment there :)
I also don't want to sidetrack this project, if I am being unhelpful.
I have no objection to you starting it.
Okay, I started something: here
What the objects are is "a matter of empirical investigation to find out", not an issue to be addressed in The Tractatus. It is irrelevant to the work at hand. As I said, what an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented.
Immediately, Anscombe adds:
Now it remains unclear to me what you are claiming, but I don't much care.
If you or suppose Wittgenstein to be arguing that the world is made of objects, that objects are the fundamental building blocks in the Tractatus, you have badly misunderstood what is being argued.
Well then, I will leave it there.
Nicely put :)
I agree with this, too.
I've made a couple of misstatements that I have to also correct, as @Fooloso4 pointed out.
I have no problems with the way the thread is going.
Sorry Banno, but I think we disagree on the nature of objects. It's pretty clear what Wittgenstein had in mind, at least partially clear.
I am glad you took my remarks in the spirit in which they were intended. Of course, down the road I might see the need to revise my views. It would not be the first time! I think that anyone who thinks he has got it all right has got it wrong
I think I brought this a while ago, but we are finally getting to the crux of Wittgenstein's (assumptions on/glossing over) metaphysics. He asserts objects, makes little value in explaining them and then plows forward. I don't believe that's how it should work. There should at least be supplementary material if it doesn't fit into his case (Tractatus' argument). That is to say, "objects" in everyday speech can be taken for granted; "objects" in programming have a specific definitional use (and it's a logical entity of sorts, not a physical thing in the world, but has analogies thereof in programming-jargon). However, I dare pose that in the philosophical world of argumentation and grand-treatises, such important terms should not be glossed over and made so ambiguous so readily. Whether they are psychological, "real" or whatnot should be a matter of importance, as it contributes to clarity as to how the grand view the author is positing is constructed (is it facts or objects- the implications are enormously different!).
See this discussion.
Trying to be clear about objects, so a step back.
We know this, viz., that objects, which make up the substance of the world, can be arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). This is basic to what an object is. You move from object ? to atomic facts ? to complex facts. Logic dictates this for Wittgenstein. Objects contain the possibility of arranging into any potential fact (“If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the beginning (T. 2.0121).”). Whether the fact obtains depends on the arrangement of the objects in an atomic fact. Objects by themselves are mere potentiality, like any building block, but also unlike any building block we are familiar with.
My understanding of Wittgensteinian objects leads me to believe that they are the fundamental components of objective reality, i.e., they’re real things that combine. They combine to form states of affairs (T. 2.01). If states of affairs are objectively real, it would seem to follow that objects are real, at least in some sense. Otherwise, what would be combined to form states of affairs? They also seem real because they can occupy logical space. Obviously, Wittgenstein’s objects don’t exist, but Wittgenstein’s theory of objects is a theory that postulates them as real.
You must be careful about what you say about objects because you can’t ascribe external properties to objects, only internal properties (T. 2.01231). One such internal property is that they are simples, but it’s not the only internal property. Other internal properties include the ability to combine with other objects to form atomic facts, and that they make up the substance of the world of facts.
Keep in mind that to have a basic understanding of Wittgenstein’s picture theory you need not have a perfect understanding of objects or names. After all, we’re not trying to write a doctoral thesis.
Your step back is a step forward. We are in agreement.
Quoting Sam26
As you go on to say, objects contain the possibility of arranging into facts, but as stated it might be taken to mean that something arranges them. Objects arrange themselves. Facts are the result of such arrangements.
Quoting Sam26
What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them?
I'm thinking along the lines of what Wittgenstein said, viz., "...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)." In other words, it's only as they combine with others that we get atomic facts, otherwise we just have Witt's substance. Or it's only when they combine with other objects that they're actualized into atomic facts or complex facts. That's my take.
This is going much further into the Tractatus than I intended, but it's interesting.
I take him to be saying that combining with others is what it is to be an object, and that there is no object that cannot combine with any other object.
The purpose of the post above "Taking a step back..." was to clarify my earlier statements, in which I used a couple of terms in a different sense than Witt. This caused you to think I meant one thing when I meant another. My error. I think we're pretty close to interpreting objects in the same way.
Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact?
No, I wouldn't go that far. My intention was not to go this far into the meanings of these Wittgensteinian concepts and their place in the world. It's beyond the scope of this thread.
According to K.T. Fann Wittgenstein is trying to answer two questions “How are propositions related to the world?” and “How are propositions related to one another (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 8)?” These questions are related to Wittgenstein’s goal, viz., “My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition (Nb. p. 39).”
It's already been stated in earlier posts that Wittgenstein assumes a priori that if we can talk about the world, then some propositions must be connected with the world. These propositions are called elementary propositions, and what determines their truth or falsity is the world, not other propositions. Complex propositions, made up of elementary propositions, are truth-functions of elementary propositions (e.g., T. 5). Elementary propositions are combined using truth-functional connectives such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, and implication (T. 5.101).
We know that elementary propositions consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221). “It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names (T. 4.22)” We also know that Wittgensteinian names are not the kind of names we’re used to, viz., dog, cat, Plato, pencil, etc. Names are simples that cannot be dissected “…by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” “Names are simple symbols: I [Wittgenstein] indicate them by single letters (‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’) (T. 4.24).”
Wittgenstein was a traditionalist in his early philosophy because his view was that the meaning of a name was the object it denotes. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (T. 3.203).” So, elementary propositions, composed of names, if true, are arranged in a way that pictures or mirrors the objects in the corresponding atomic facts, which make up states of affairs. Objects are important in that they provide meaningful referents for our language. Objects are the building blocks of states of affairs, and thus the world (reality). Objects also play an important role in showing the limits of language and what can be meaningfully said. There is nothing for names in elementary propositions to latch onto besides objects in atomic facts, which make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021). In other words, you can't go beyond the substance of the world using language. The mystical, for Wittgenstein, which does go beyond the world, can only be shown not said.
Some of this has already been said, but hopefully wording it a bit differently will help to clarify misunderstandings.
I think some clarification regarding the term 'object' might be helpful. At first I was puzzled because he used 'object' to refer both the simple and compound objects. 'Object' is what he calls a "formal" or "pseudo-concept". (4.126 - 4.1272)
Formal or pseudo-concepts are expressed in conceptual notion by a "variable name" such as 'x' Particular objects such as tables and chairs and books, however, are concepts proper. The distinction between formal and proper concepts is not made along the lines of simple or complex, but between what has been identified or specified and what has not. Analogously the formal concept 'number' can refer to any or every number, but 'six' or 'eleven' is not a formal concept. The former is expressed by the variable name 'x' and the the latter by the sign '6' or '11'.
In a proposition the variable 'x' is not a "name" in the ordinary sense of the term. The simplest sentences are not made up of variable names. But Wittgenstein's investigation is logical or conceptual not empirical. In a complete empirical investigation objects would not have variable names. The simple objects would be identified and distinguished in the simplest propositions as particulars with particular rather than variable names.
Strangely, he refers to objects as pseudo-concepts, and at the same time, they form the building blocks of atomic facts. Maybe it's a pseudo-concept because no concept can capture their essence. I'm not sure.
I must point out that you don't have to understand all of this to understand Wittgenstein's basic ideas in the Tractatus.
He is saying something about conceptual notation, but it is important to understand why formal concepts are represented as variables and proper concepts are not.
Quoting Sam26
I agree that it lacks empirical content, but it does have logical significance. Objects make up the substance of the world and play an essential role in the logical structure of the world.
Quoting Sam26
Note what else he regards as pseuo-concepts:
‘complex’, ‘fact’, ‘function’, ‘number’, etc.(4.1272)
In a proposition a proper concept tells us what is the case. "The book is on the table", but "The object is on the object" is nonsense.
Quoting Sam26
I don't think anyone understands all of it. I regard it more as an activity of thinking through interpretation rather than an examination of a set of doctrines (4.112). Despite what he says in the preface, I don't think the truth of the thoughts communicated are unassailable or definitive. Or that he has found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. Nor do I think that the problems he addresses are the extent of the problems of philosophy.
The way I understand it, when Witt is talking about the distinction between formal or pseudo-concepts, and proper concepts he is trying to get the reader to understand the logical form of each one, but he's running into problems due to language.
Its as Fooloso pointed out, I think, when he uses variable names such as "x", in proper analysis, the variable would be replaced by a proper concept which could logically fall under the pseudo concept. Because of this, we can see that pseudo concepts like "number" or "fact" cannot be talked about in the traditional sense. We can't say what a "number" is - we can give examples of proper concepts that fall under it...like 5 or 3, but we can't define their structure in any meaningful way. We either know what they mean, or we don't, but we bring this knowledge to the table, so to speak.
Post 14
There is a clear, at least at a certain level of analysis, ontology in the Tractatus. Reality for Wittgenstein is composed of facts, not things [not Wittgensteinian objects] (T. 1.1). In other words, reality is not composed of individual objects, i.e., in isolation, but objects in combination, which form atomic facts and facts proper. As has been said many times throughout this thread objects are simple and unanalyzable, and they only exist as the smallest constituent parts of states of affairs (facts). “[O]jects fit into one another like the links of a chain (T. 2.03).” Objects are necessarily prior to the facts in the same way atoms are prior to material objects. This does not mean that atoms are like Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., atoms are not simple or unanalyzable in the same sense that objects are.
If the world had no substance, and by extension no objects, then whether a proposition was true or false would depend on other propositions (T. 2.0211, 2.0212). (However, it seems to me that it would be hard to imagine propositions without a world of some kind, and thus facts of some kind.)
In 2.0212 Wittgenstein first introduces the idea of a picture and its connection with truth and falsity, then, in 2.1 he says “We picture facts to ourselves.” We have now moved from the world of facts to thoughts. When we picture facts to ourselves we are modeling reality (T. 2.12). “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3). “In a proposition a thought finds an expression… (T. 3.1).” We move from thoughts, specifically pictures of possible states of affairs, to expressing these thoughts/pictures using propositions. “[A] proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world (T. 3.12).” What a proposition projects is not included in the proposition, but its possibility is, and so a proposition does not contain its sense but the possibility of expressing it (T. 3.13).
Wittgenstein specifies what the aim of the Tractatus is, viz., “…to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (T. Preface, p. 3).”
Wittgenstein attempts to demonstrate what can be said and said clearly by first defining the world (reality), which is all that is the case (the facts) (T. 1 and 1.1). This sets the limit to what can be said. If you attempt to go beyond the world of facts into the metaphysical, then you are failing to give meaning to your propositions because metaphysical propositions do not contain any factual information. Of course, this did not mean that Wittgenstein had a disdain for the metaphysical as the logical positivists supposed, it only meant that we could not assert anything factual about the metaphysical. The logic of language falls apart when trying to assert something metaphysical. There are no facts for the proposition to picture when trying to say something metaphysical. There is no way to decide if a particular metaphysical proposition is true given Wittgenstein’s logical analysis of the proposition and its connection to the world via names and objects.
To appreciate Wittgenstein, one must realize that certain terms in the Tractatus have a Wittgensteinian twist, especially terms like saying and proposition among others (object, name, form, showing, etc). What can be said, the propositions of natural science (T. 4.1, 4.11, 4.111), can be said clearly. For Wittgenstein, the propositions of natural science are all the facts (states of affairs) of the world, and any proposition that tries to go beyond this limit is nonsense. Wittgenstein wants us to be silent about the propositions of metaphysics. For Wittgenstein, the propositions of metaphysics can only be shown not said. These propositions include, but are not limited to, religion (praying for e.g.), poetry, music, and art, so there are many ways to express the inexpressible.
Silence for Wittgenstein doesn’t mean complete silence. For example, praying is a way of showing the metaphysical, yet praying can be very verbal. Wittgenstein is telling us to be silent when it comes to statements that seem to convey facts but are metaphysical statements instead of Wittgensteinian propositions. Only Wittgensteinian propositions (or propositions of the Tractatus) convey facts or states of affairs in reality.
How does Wittgenstein show what is shown in the Tractatus? After all, he says in the Preface that the truth of the propositions outlined in the Tractatus is unassailable and definitive (Preface p. 4). It seems almost contradictory, and some have interpreted Wittgenstein as contradicting himself. In the Introduction to the Tractatus Russell says that Wittgenstein seems to say a lot about what cannot be said. Wittgenstein shows us how to climb the ladder, by showing us what can and cannot be said. So, we take many of the metaphysical propositions seriously up to a point, they show us how to climb the ladder, and once we reach the top and realize what can and cannot be said we can throw those metaphysical propositions away. After all, they have done their job by showing us the way. The propositions of the Tractatus are important because they show without saying. In other words, the metaphysical propositions of the Tractatus are similar to the propositions of poetry, neither convey facts according to Wittgenstein’s view of a proposition. And to the extent that Wittgenstein’s propositions convey facts that are unassailable and definitive.
I would say that, perhaps, he wants us to be silent about certain kinds of metaphysics. Like Hume before him which said to "cast into the fire" all metaphysics devoid of quantification or qualification, this reduces the sphere substantially. Hume didn't, for example, consider folks like Newton wrong in their metaphysics that investigated space, time, and force. I don't know if Witt would disparage this manner of metaphysics, but most would inevitably be thrown to the wayside.
Quoting Sam26
Have you read Witt's "Lecture on Ethics"? It's very short, only like 7 pages. I think it would help you flesh this out a bit. Witt's views regarding ethics were, I think, more robust than simply somehow through, say praying, we are able to show what we cannot express clearly. But, this is certainly, I think, part of it. The question is, what does it show?
Quoting Sam26
Consider why he said this, especially in light of what else he says in the preface:
[b]"Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply
because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task. May others
come and do it better".[/b]
He says:
"...the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive"
He says that to him the thoughts seem unassailable and definitive, not that they simply ARE such.
Just as each of us has certain beliefs which seem definitive to us, but we'd admit might not be, I think Witt is being humble here and simply saying, "This is the best I could do, and I can't make sense of it any other way".
That's just my take, though.
It seems clear to me that metaphysics is beyond the world of facts, and that metaphysics for Wittgenstein is beyond what can be said. This is the distinction between saying and showing.
This doesn't make sense though. First off, this statement itself is a metaphysical statement of the world.. one regarding metaphysics relationship with facts. Also, not all "facts" have to be empirically verifiable. It would be more speculative, but possibly true "facts" about the states of affairs of reality.
Given Wittgenstein's logic about what can be said within the limits of the world of facts, anything that goes beyond the world of facts (beyond the propositions of natural science) is metaphysical and outside the limit of what can be said. His statement doesn't violate his logic, i.e., it's not a metaphysical statement. Of course, Wittgenstein does make metaphysical statements in the Tractatus, but they're meant to show us the way, i.e., they're not meant to be factual in Wittgenstein's sense. They show the way up the ladder, and once the ladder is traversed it can be discarded. What we're left with after the ladder is discarded is all the propositions that connect with the world of facts.
Is the world of facts only propositions of natural science? Why would it be so?
Quoting Sam26
Um, it's not a fact (empirically valid), it is a statement about empiricism en toto, so it is metaphysical.
Quoting Sam26
This is as useful as if I said, "Don't believe what I am saying, believe me". It's just cherry-picking and making exceptions for his own claims.
If you have a better understanding of Wittgenstein's Tractatus explain it in a thread. I'm just giving my interpretation of what he said.
So I cannot comment on your thread on an topic in the main part of the forum?
"Moving forward" implies you don't want a discussion. Is it because you find my commentary distasteful or you just don't like the point of a forums.. which is discussion? Or is it that, you think that threads in forums are simply for one's own commentary, and no one else's? All of these seem odd to me.
Ah, an elitist. School me, bro... Use Tractatus to prove Tractatus and show me.
In your estimation, unless you agree with most of the Tractatus' premises, you cannot have a discussion.
What a dick way to go about this forum.
This is my problem with this kind of CIRCLE JERKING thread.. Just KNOWING the premise of the Tractatus doesn't impute that it is RIGHT.
No because everything I say is liable to be said, "Thus interpreted wrong.. so I am not going to communicate with you". I commented on your summary of Wittgenstein's statement about "facts" and metaphysics and gave my commentary on your summary. I did NOT question your summary, I went with it, and made my own evaluation of it.
But you will always make a move (a bad faith one) where you say, if you look a bit harder at Wittgenstein, you see he has ALL the answers. It's like people proving the Bible by using the Bible...
For people like me who think a lot about what Wittgenstein said I find it challenging to understand his early thinking as compared to his later thinking. It's interesting to trace his thinking throughout his life.
As far as engaging with you on this or that idea, I don't engage that much with people anymore. I do here and there, but not consistently. So don't take it personally.
Since language is used to communicate our ideas it's very important to incorporate linguistic analysis into our thinking as philosophers. It's the starting point of any good philosophical investigation. It's his later philosophy that's most important, along with J.L. Austin's thinking.
Gotcha, I realized that after, but you also inspired me to write a whole other thread that I think is important in regards to Witt, and I'm sure you've seen by now...
As I said in that thread:
May I ask why the need to simply summarize without commentary? Is it like a SparkNotes by PhilosophyForum thing?
Aye. I recall.
I'm not sure why you would make such a statement. You've witnessed me in several of the threads on Wittgenstein. When have I been unwilling to generally engage? I may not engage with everyone, but I've engaged with people in my threads, including you. So, I don't know what to say.
It was directed to schop. Not you. I edited the post to make that clearer afterwards.
Here is the thread.. Feel free to comment..
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15218/wittgenstein-and-how-it-elicits-asshole-tendencies
Also mine for lack of clarity. You were being attentive and responded to garbled words.
Witt says:
"The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences)" (4.11)
But, language can convey possible states of affairs that are not true. Witt does not limit what can be said to the domain of science, but rather science is a smaller domain within the larger domain of possible natural language.
For example, philosophy doesn't simply seclude itself to true facts like science does. Which is why Witt says:
[b]"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
(The word 'philosophy' must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.)" (4.111)[/b]
Philosophy does not discover which propositions are true, or engage in simply reiterating scientific propositions.... it only clarifies what can be said.
[b]"The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions", but to make propositions clear.
Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred" (4.112).[/b]
It is only whereof we cannot speak clearly thereof we must remain silent, and philosophy's aim is to clarify and make clear what is said, not to put forward true statements like science. Metaphysical speculation, if tethered to reality in some fashion, could be one manner of clarification, I think.
Which statements support this interpretation?
Without having to dig out the quotes that explain that a proposition is a possible state of affairs, I hope this helps:
"The totality of propositions is the language" (4.001)
Quoting 013zen
Quoting 013zen
He says all propositions are language and all true propositions are science, therefore language is a larger domain and science is a smaller within that domain.
They all are language, of course.
But your reading of "domains" is not in the text.
Quoting 013zen
Quoting Paine
What would a better word be?
I am challenging your description of what the writing is about. If it is not worthy, just ignore it.
Every objection is worthy, my friend :smile:
So, from 4.001 we know that the entirety of language is simply every possible proposition.
This makes sense, given that to a proposition corresponds a possible state of affairs.
From 4.11, we know that the language of natural science is all true propositions.
So, we know that all the propositions of natural science are a subset of all possible propositions.
Okay, so where does this leave metaphysics? Well, since we know from 4.111 that philosophy is not one of the sciences, we know that it isn't confined to only true propositions, but can and does use possibly true propositions. Thought experiments are a good example, as are intuition pumps.
This distinction between philosophy and science draws clear limits on what metaphysics can accomplish, however, it does not outrightly reject its possibility. Philosophy cannot, for example, tell us whether any of our metaphysical speculation is accurate - it does not produce true propositions, like science which Witt points out in 4.112
Rather, it elucidates, or clarifies things by offering mental pictures that we can imagine.
I appreciate your willingness to continue the conversation. I apologize for my intemperate comment.
If I can pull together a response, I will put it in your thread since this comment is a continuation of what is said there.
I also disagree with "The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction".
Language less creatures can be certain that touching fire hurts, and rightfully so. Being burned by fire causes one to draw the correlation between the behavior and the pain(correctly attribute/recognize causality). It only takes once.
Some who've been burned learn to talk about it, others prior to being burned.
One knows that touching fire hurts by virtue of touching fire and drawing correlations/associations and/or connections between what they did and the subsequent pain. In a language less case, the experience grounds the certainty. There is no justification possible, if that requires language use.
A language less creatures' certainty is shown, not argued for. That certainty is based upon previous experience, and it depends - in no way, shape, or form - upon "the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty"