Ukraine Crisis
The situation in Ukraine is becoming more dire by the minute. NATO is implying Russia is planning to invade Ukraine, whereas Russia denies this. Russia claims it will not allow Ukraine to enter NATO, as this would effectively put a hostile military alliance - NATO - right at the borders of Russia.
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
Comments (18084)
The UN Charter, which starts with:
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.
Seems pretty collectivist to me…
Key word:
Quoting the UN
Not "bound to" or "for sure going to happen".
Or, in other words:
It's a nice charter the UN has there, very pretty, I honestly wish I had a charter just as pretty.
But how does the UN actually work (what it actually is) in it's own words:
Quoting UN about page
Key word is "gather", making the UN more of a "gathering" than a collective action organisation, at least how they put it.
But, for the topic at hand, the UN is the worst possible example ... for, whatever you want to call it, Russia has a Veto, so it's pretty unlikely the UN will come to Ukraine's aid of "collective security" of the UN "collective", if you insist on calling it that anyways.
And, keep in mind I am not an anti-Ukrainain advocate. I don't like Zelensky, that's for sure, but I've made my position very clear that what I have issue with is NATO supplying arms to Ukraine in a drip feed manner that results in maximum loss of life, trauma, economic destruction for Ukrainians. Now, it harms some Russian soldiers too, and this is purported as a justification for the policy, but I disagree with that justification.
I'd be a lot happier if Ukraine did actually have real allies, was actually part of this "collective security" Zelensky is talking about, that there was a giant Cuban missile crisis standoff between the US and Russia before the war and some solution worked out that avoided war, using actual NATO power as leverage.
Problem is US and company simply didn't care about Ukraine at the time, and wouldn't have A. the balls and B. the "national self interest" to carry out such a policy before the war to the benefit of Ukrainians.
It was in the "national self interest" to keep teasing Ukraine about eventual NATO membership for the West's own purposes knowing full well it would never happen and the policy was not "charity", as some may call it, to Ukraine.
Sending arms after the war starts and hiding behind the "but, but, but the nukes" as an excuse to not let our "friend" Ukraine into our little club, despite flying their flag on our lawns, avatars and prestigious buildings as if we cared, is cowardice and not "standing up to Russia". Our policy may indeed harm Russia (though this is not "guaranteed"), but whether Russia is in fact harmed or not in the long run, the costs to Ukrainians (and poor people's around the world due to the knock-on consequences) suffered for our policy is absolutely enormous.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1594068262996045825[/tweet]
Quoting Boris Chernyshov
Another posted by Julia Davis (Nov 19, 2022)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1594146245337288705[/tweet]
Quoting Dmitry Steshin
So, this stuff is broadcast throughout Russia. They're aware of the destruction, and call for an expansion. Government official still calling them Nazis. ... If this is what passes as The Word in Russia, then no wonder peace seems elusive. "Existential threat." Land grab. Submission.
Holy hatred? :grin:
Yet, officials keep repeating the Nazi thing, seemingly also oblivious to carrying some amount of hypocrisy. As mentioned before, have some parallels to the Sudetenland crisis (? 1938). The consequences come through as serious enough (to me).
What else might be a ruse? The (supposed) existential threat to Russia? ...?
Nonsense.
If his country is attacked, it is totally logical for him to try to get as much assistance. That's the urge for a no-fly-zone earlier in the war. And because of the nuclear deterrent, that possibility was totally out of the question. Now later a gaffe that he has backtracked seems have you and Isaac all over for many pages describing the wickedness of the Ukrainians.
It would be typical of Russian propaganda to say Zelensky has "in mind to go all the way to nuclear war". As if he was the instigator of this war.
The illiterate....
Yes it was.
But notice how eagerly it was employed even on this thread by some very active participants.
What a fascinating collection of self-immunised arguments we're getting. First we have @ssu's absurd "when my theory is disproven by the past 'times have changed', when it's supported 'twas ever thus'"
Now we have your classic example...
When did Russia news stop being a propaganda tool of the regime?
Apparently, the moment it starts saying something you think is true.
Where's your graph of how frequently Russian media talked about Russia's 'right' to Ukrainian territory?
When Russian media says stuff that doesn't support your theory - "It's all lies, Russian media is such a propaganda tool - they're not going to tell us Putin's true intentions are they?"
When Russian media says stuff that does support your theory - "See, the Russian media are saying it, so it simply must be true representation of Putin's intentions"
Quoting ssu
Over 8 months ago I posted several reports by Western media (made before the war) investigating the Nazi's in Ukraine.
Are these Western journalists working for Putin? Just part of the ruse you're talking about?
If it's not a ruse ... well what is the ruse?
Why didn't yourselves or anyone who thinks the Nazi's aren't a problem explain why these reports aren't alarming, 8 months ago or anytime since?
At the time, the opposing view was that yes these Nazi's were a problem, there just wasn't enough of them to justify an invasion. I asked at the time, and several times since, what "enough Nazi's" would be; as to say there's not enough Nazi's with not enough power to justify invasion, implies some theory and analysis of where the line of too-many-Nazi's is and that the facts point to Ukraine being on the not-enough side of that line.
A simple question one would presumably need to answer to support Ukraine is fighting a just war, rather than using an unjust war (started in 2014 against separatist who have a right to self determination same as Ukraine) to build a fascist regime where all their political opposition is banned.
But, maybe you just forgot to respond to my comment and these reports I posted 8 months, and just require a friendly reminder to do so now:
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
Quoting BBC
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
Ah, ok, making false accusations in the context of a delusional "urge" to put the world on a path to nuclear war in order to get more assistance, is just a:
Quoting ssu
Nothing to see here. All completely:
Quoting ssu
Seems to me that Russia is far more isolated than Ukraine at the moment. Its one and only ally is Belarus, and it is not helping much.
Thanks for the laugh. You’re the voice of Moscow here. Of course you are anti-Ukrainian.
Read first, reply second. It always works best that way round.
Quoting boethius
A veto does not require allies.
Essentially your position, along with the other Zelenkyites, is that support for Ukraine means support for Ukrainian propaganda, and especially whatever Zelensky says. If he contradicts himself (which he does often) then it is incumbent upon us to understand why Zelensky would want us believing something one day and the opposite the next day. If he gets caught lying (such as making accusations without justification; such as these missiles, existence of Nazi's sporting the black sun in his entourage, or the basic historical facts leading up to the war) then we must understand that of course he was motivated to lie to us! It was to his advantage for us to believe whatever he says and he's fighting a war!
However, does just parroting whatever Zelensky or Ukrainian intelligence service say, benefit Ukraine?
Let's take an example. One "pro-Russia" view I was accused of early on, was my conclusion that Javelins and other man-portable-weapons would not be enough to win any major offensive or counter-offensive, that armour is needed for this kind of warfare. At the time, NATO had a no-armour policy, and the pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian position was that of course Javelins are enough.
Now, many moons pass and it goes without saying that Ukraine needs armour to accomplish anything on the battlefield.
Well, what did the obvious lie (NATO certainly knew as well as I you need armour for this kind of fighting on this kind of terrain) accomplish?
Thousands of Ukrainians dead that maybe would be still alive if armour was supplied sooner.
And, despite it being now completely obvious to everyone that Ukraine needs armour to compete on the battlefield, NATO still maintains the policy of no NATO produced tanks ... well, why is that? NATO just want Ukrainians to die when superior NATO tanks could save them?
The excuse is that NATO tanks are different and it would require training ... ok, well, train them then. Considering this war could go on for years, the time it would take to train Ukrainians on NATO tanks doesn't seem all that relevant. Had things got started in February, seems to me that it would be quite easy to field several companies of Leopard 2 or M1 Abrams tanks. Sure it takes time, but it doesn't take more than 8 months to to train a tank crew, especially if they already have military and tank experience.
Of course, it doesn't feel good that NATO is holding back weapons and training, getting Ukrainians killed that could have had better protection, all while claiming to be fully supporting Ukraine's fight. But that's the obvious truth.
Worse, the substitute for NATO built tanks is Soviet built tanks, which NATO has been scrounging left and right to throw into Ukraine. Some of these tanks are incredibly outdated and basically a coffin on wheels. Of course, better than nothing, but not only is it simply hypocritical for NATO to hold back the good stuff, but what happens when Ukraine just runs out of tanks entirely?
The day Ukraine simply doesn't have tanks and Ukrainian lines start to crumble because of that, wouldn't be the optimum time for NATO to sigh and finally provide the NATO built tanks and training.
Pointing the policy is not genuine on NATO's part, is not anti-Ukrainian, it's just reality.
Now, the apologetics for this reality is that NATO doesn't want to provoke Russia too much, so can't "go crazy" and just supply anything that would be useful to fight a war and accomplish the stated objectives (we're not even going to talk about F-16s ... much less F-35s) ... but why would these weapons systems be too provocative? Obviously because it might allow Ukraine to obviously win ... so, what's the policy? Clearly not let Ukraine actually win.
What's the consequence of propping up Ukraine enough to fight but not with? A very large amount of suffering in the pursuit of objectives that cannot be accomplished.
This is a pretty ridiculous canard, even by your standards. Nobody here repeats Ukrainian intelligence service material or whatever Zelensky says.
Quoting boethius
I would think that the reasons for this are that tanks cost a lost of money, are in short supply, and you don't want the enemy to get hold of them.
Quoting boethius
So you think NATO countries should support Ukraine with fighter jets and tanks? I mean, that's an option worth considering.
I have zero problem reading the entire thread and verifying your claim. Also, keep in mind that apologising for Zelensky is also apart of it ... which we just went through an example of:
Quoting ssu
If Zelensky lied or had delusional requests (like a no-fly zone) then we're asked to just understand that he's fighting a war and doing whatever, zero expectations to make sense. If he's caught in a lie ... that's just a "gaffe".
Quoting Olivier5
How does this make any sense whatsoever? Again, exactly the apologetics for NATO policy I just described to avoid the inconvenient truth.
First, tanks are not in short supply.
Quoting List of currently active United States military land vehicles
And that's just the US tanks ... doesn't seem like tanks are in short supply.
Second, even if the tanks were in the short supply, one of the foundational justifications for arming Ukraine is so that Ukraine fights the Russians so we don't have to. So, if this was really the policy, you'd want to send tanks to do that fighting.
Quoting Olivier5
The question here is, if the support to Ukraine really is genuine, why hasn't that happened since day one of the war?
Western political leaders keep saying their objective is to support Ukraine with "whatever they need" to defeat the Russians.
If we both agree fighter jets and tanks would be useful in that effort, and training is only a temporary problem and totally irrelevant as the war could still be on years or decades from now, why hasn't NATO already started those programs to train, supply, workout the logistics for tanks and planes months ago?
Is my pointing this out anti-Ukrainian?
Or, it is just the reality that the West is using Ukraine for its own purposes, not Ukraine's purposes, and those purposes don't include actually defeating the Russians (otherwise their actions would be consistent with such a goal).
If that's the truth, objectives cannot be attained through military force (as NATO is holding back the support required to do that), then the alternative to indefinite war or a war that you lose, is compromise and make peace with the Russians.
What I have issue with is people who accept NATO isn't really supporting Ukraine enough to win (obviously we agree here jets and tanks are nice to have) ... but also support indefinite fighting or uncompromising diplomatic positions.
You can support an uncompromising diplomatic position, but that only makes sense (for Ukrainians) if you believe Ukraine can win, and therefore believe NATO is going to support that. But holding back weapons systems for no reason (if the goal is to actually defeat the Russians) is incompatible with the premise.
First, in our exchange, you wasted all occasions to quote where Zelensky used the word "precondition" in support of your argument.
Second, what may be relevant to your argument, may be irrelevant to mine, as in this case, so your statement may contribute to explain why you misunderstood my claim, that's all.
Quoting boethius
I'm not diluting anything, I formulated a very consequential reasoning from general principles (pragmatic rationality as applied to geopolitics) to conclusions (what was rational to expect from Zelensky and the West). Besides what you accuse me of ("tautology" which you neither defined nor quoted anything from what I said to prove it is, and can be charitably understood as "obvious truth"), can be retorted to you in the same dumb fashion. Finally, if my actual claim (not the one you attribute to me) was really obviously true to you, then either you must (rational requirement, logic conclusion [1]) converge with my conclusions, or keep as well your conclusion in contradiction with mine and end up with a logically inconsistent position.
See how catastrophic your position is, dude?
Quoting boethius
I'm not here to convince anybody. I had fun in clarifying my points against you. Instead of addressing them to my satisfaction, you decided to divert attention from them by blabbering about some trivial literal misunderstanding of yours which shouldn't have been a big deal for you to acknowledge and move on, given all my timely and repeated clarifications. If you now look so dumb to yourself, it's all your fault. I have no pity for you.
Quoting boethius
Oh no no no, that's the sort of claim I made [2]. You keep claiming that this kind of proposal is "ornamental" and meaningless [3]
Besides given the historical circumstances US/NATO/West security interest and Ukrainian security interest may converge profitably for both. And this is another thing you missed from those quotations. Nowhere in those quotations there is a support for the claim that those agreements are ornamental or "zero meaningful security guarantees". Those quotations express the opposite of it, there is strong convergent interest.
Quoting boethius
WHO ON EARTH IS SAYING THAT SUCH PROPOSALS ARE OUT OF CHARITY? QUOTE HIM!
Until then, I'll consider your reiterated claims as a strawman argument based on a caricatural understanding of other people's claims (mine included).
Quoting boethius
"Security guarantees" are meant to hedge against uncertainty, so by taking into account the pessimistic scenario for security, not the optimistic one. Isn't that obvious to you?
Quoting boethius
What?! You'd go so far, to claim that I would argue against the consistency of such proposals I myself quoted to successfully support my claims against yours?! Are you crazy?!
Quoting boethius
Your argument is essentially based on an association of ideas between terms extrapolated from a sentence whose meaning you find hard to digest. I can concede that association of ideas is good enough for rhetoric not for understanding things logically which you failed to do. Taking into account logic is a precondition for the kind of discussions you can rationally engage in, dude!
Quoting boethius
"Precondition" wasn't referred to deterrence means nor nuclear weapons (this is your misunderstanding), but to considering the available deterrence means as a rational ground for pursuing any kind of security agreement by geopolitical agents. In other words, I was referring to a rational requirement. Indeed, pragmatic rationality is about effectively adapting means and goals, since the goal that geopolitical agents can often prioritize in given historical circumstances is security, then OBVIOUSLY deterrence means will be taken into account, and among deterrence means there might be nuclear weapons (like for the US and the Soviet Union) or alternatives (like in Ukraine). So countries which do not possess nuclear deterrence (like for Ukraine) will rationally look for AFFORDABLE means of deterrence alternative to nuclear weapons, like military cooperation with non-hostile and powerful countries (e.g. NATO membership, security guarantees from the West) that can stand against Russian expansionist and/or nuclear threat. To what extent is such form of military cooperation AFFORDABLE by Ukraine? To the extent the West/NATO/US has security concerns against Russia convergent with those ones of Ukraine, as it happened so far, also thanks to the boasting&aggressive defiant attitude of Russia against the West/NATO/US!
This argument is perfectly consequential and in contradiction to the claim that the military cooperation between Ukraine and the West is "zero meaningful" from a geopolitical point of view. This war is proving exactly the opposite of such spectacularly dumb claim of yours.
Finally, SINCE YOU KEEP DODGING MY QUESTIONS, HERE THEY ARE AGAIN:
UNTIL YOU ANSWER THEM APPROPRIATELY, I’LL KEEP CONSIDERING YOUR CLAIMS FOR WHAT THEY LOOK, A MONUMENTAL STRAW MAN ARGUMENT BECAUSE GROUNDED ON THE CARICATURAL ASSUMPTION THAT SECURITY GUARANTEES IS WRONGLY ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAINTY INSTEAD OF BEING RIGHTLY ASSOCIATED WITH HEDGING AGAINST UNCERTAINTY.
[1]
[2]
Quoting neomac
[3]
Quoting boethius
Why would this be relevant to my argument? The word precondition was already being discussed, the point of discussion was if Zelensky's precondition to negotiate were reasonable or not.
If you want a citation of Zelensky literally using the word precondition, here you go:
Quoting Reuters
Quoting The Times of Isreal
How does citing Zelensky using the word precondition or journalist reporting on his preconditions relevant to the argument here?
What is relevant here is that the word precondition was already being discussed, that was the whole focus of my point you were clearly trying to rebut.
Quoting neomac
Again, look where you've moved the goal posts.
You start off with bait-and-switch the meaning of precondition, which you were obviously using for the reason that it tied into the debate that was ongoing, not some maverick "off-book" and "I don' give a shit about your dictionary and I make my own rules, here's a new meaning for this word that server no pragmatic purpose to just randomly invent now with no explanation."
Next, what do you explain here? Exactly what I describe, that in order to remove the original meaning from your statement to not admit saying something false and foolish, you are saying nothing at all. US and Soviet Union considered "available deterrence means" in making agreements ... and so did everyone else, including Ukraine, in joining various non-proliferation treaties.
All you're saying is "agents" reason about things. Obviously they do. Moreso giant institutions that run entire countries.
But that's simply obviously not the point you were making. In using the word "pre-condition" and emphasising that Ukraine is in a different nuclear status, you were clearly rebutting my position and supporting Zelensky's intransigence.
If you were just chiming into say that people reason about things, just in a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of speaking with "geopolitical agents" and all, then you would have made that clear: you would have said "of course, having nuclear deterrence isn't a precondition for anything, and I'd never mention the idea, but Ukraine may reason themselves to a peace deal or then reason themselves to continue fighting, both conclusion could be potentially reasonable hypothetically given everything that should be considered in making these kinds of decisions." In other words, if you were stating the obvious you would have said you were stating the obvious and then maybe explain something not obvious that follows from that.
Quoting neomac
What the hell are you talking about?
My point is that any promise to Ukraine by the West is meaningless in itself. The promise would be fulfilled if, later, it suits these powers to fulfil the promise. If, later, it doesn't suit these powers to fulfil the promise then it won't be fulfilled. There's alignment for now (for some arms, but "tut, tut, tut get your dirty hands of the shiny shit"), I'm just pointing out that if that alignment ever went away (such as happened with the Kurds) then no piece of paper is going to matter.
An obvious reality you seem finally to agree with.
Quoting neomac
Quoting Zelensky, quoted by CNN
Now, if you're saying Zelensky knows that security guarantees are only ornamental fluff to promises that will only be kept if it suits the promising party to keep the promise (aka. a nominal but meaningless promise), then I'd be happy to hear that Zelensky isn't delusional on this point of international relations.
Quoting neomac
Russia doesn't only cite nuclear weapons as a threat from NATO, but forward deployed missile bases.
Tangible weapons systems in the real world owned and operated by NATO that require NATO membership to be deployed in your country.
Now, there was a de facto understanding after the ascension of the Baltic's into NATO that certain systems wouldn't be forward deployed in order to reduce tensions and the possibility of accidents.
NATO then forward deployed exactly those missile systems saying "something, something, Iran" even though that made no sense. Whether this was breaking a promise or not, clearly NATO's policy is to forward deploy threatening weapons systems.
The deployment of actual weapons systems is what matters.
If the Baltics were nominally in NATO but hosted no NATO infrastructure, then, yes, this isn't really a threat as no NATO attacks could be launched given this lack of NATO infrastructure to do so. It's a reasonable compromise to maintain a reasonable defensive posture: we won't forward deploy to the Baltics as we have no intention to attack you, but we will come to their aid if they are attacked.
Of course, once you do forward deploy military systems you are by definition threatening the people in range of those systems and the logic of a defensive posture goes away.
The apologetics logic about this is that Russia shouldn't view these forward deployed systems as a threat, even if there's no other reason for it, because in NATO's heart of hearts they're not "out to get Russia", that's paranoid delusion talk.
But, if the first reaction of the West to this war in Ukraine is that it's an opportunity to weaken Russia, a geopolitical rival ... then obviously NATO was indeed threatening Russia all along.
Now, being threatened by real weapons systems in the real world does not then justify any action, but it does make this story of "unprovoked attack" absurd propaganda. If you threaten me and I punch you in the face, I could definitely still be in the wrong and be convicted of assault, but it wasn't unprovoked.
But to focus on the central issue we've been discussing:
Quoting neomac
I have said adding the word "guarantee" to a promise is ornamental. The texts of international agreements still matter for what they actually do: coordinate actions of willing participants.
If there's a peace deal and Russia wants to follow it, then what the peace deal says matters a great deal as they'll need to read it to implement it, and likewise other parties will see their actions and compare it to the deal to evaluate if the Russians are indeed intending to stick to peace (rather than attack again or then just not follow some parts of the deal as they don't feel like it, perhaps motivating others to not follow their parts of the deal that they only want to follow if Russia is doing their part).
This coordination of willing participants to a deal is not ornamental.
More importantly, real weapons systems in the real world is not ornamental.
The military relevance of Ukraine joining NATO would be forward deployment of NATO weapons systems to Ukraine, which would then be there fore decades and under conditions that today we cannot predict.
An analogy is that if I point a gun at you but assure you I don't intend to fire it. Well, even if that were true, maybe the situation changes and you want to fire it later, or then someone jumps out of a giant novelty cake in surprise and it startles you into firing it.
The NATO apologetics on this issue is that NATO weapons systems aren't a threat to anyone: obviously they are.
Quoting neomac
But to focus on another error in analysis. Everyone says that the footsie between NATO and Ukraine, even if we do see NATO policy is to forward deploy under stupid pretext (like "Iran" needs to be defended from the Baltics ... no closer NATO country or US / NATO base to Iran is convenient for that purpose), didn't matter because Ukraine wasn't going to join NATO anytime soon.
How would the Russians actually know what's imminent or not?
And, take a step back and think about this form of apologetics, as it is premised on the idea that it would be justified to attack Ukraine if NATO promises to Ukrainian weren't meaningless ornaments.
However, I have not described promises in international relations as meaningless ornaments, only embellishing or trying to "lock in" the promise is, and can only be, ornamental. Promises are meaningful as people may actually intend to carry out the promise, and if that is the case then the exchange of promises coordinates further cooperative action ... just in no way guarantees things stay that way nor if one's belief in other people's declared intentions turns out to be a good idea in hindsight.
But what's asked in this apology is that we must view Russia's concerns about NATO weapons systems in Ukraine as unfounded and foolish, because we must obviously know that NATO's promises to Ukraine are meaningless.
But, if NATO, UKraine, Russia, and everyone else knows the promises from NATO to Ukraine are totally meaningless (of friendship and partnership and joining NATO presumably in a useful way before and not after being invaded and significantly harmed) ... what was the purpose of those promises in the first place other than simply to provoke Russia? Promises aren't going to happen, everyone knows that, so why make the promises?
Now, what we should demand of Russia in interpreting such information is one topic, but clearly if the only explanation available is an intent to provoke a war, we can certainly all agree that the NATO-Ukraine footsie game was of criminal intent on NATO's part: would not and could not protect Ukraine, only meant to provoke a war at the expense of Ukraine.
Zelensky probably will use everything at his disposal to secure his goals. Since it's a matter of self-preservation, it can't be condemned. We'll all do what we have to do to survive, and for many, that extends to the political entities we're parts of.
Of course it can. If I feel that you're threatening my life, I'm not thereby justified in dropping a nuclear bomb on your house. The collateral damage would be out of proportion to the harm mitigated.
It's absurd to suggest that self-defense somehow morally justifies any response no matter what.
Uh huh.
Good. Glad we got that one sorted. Perhaps put a little thought into your posts next time before reeling off meaningless knee-jerk platitudes.
I think you're just procrastinating instead of studying how to trade on the currency market.
Time for your meds, I think. Is one of the nurses nearby? Do you need us to call someone?
@Isaac has pointed out the basic problem with your statement.
However, I think even more revealing is the underlining self-contradiction in this sort of apologetics for Zelensky.
For, shouldn't Europeans also do what it takes to survive? Which may require throwing Ukraine under the bus in a deal for Russian gas?
Now, imagine this was the self-interested and self-preserving action, for the sake of argument, would you maintain your position that it cannot be condemned? even the most viscous stab in the back (we can even go wild and imagine Ukrainians literally falling off of our aircraft as we high-tail our embassy staff and special forces the fuck out of there). It's self preservation after all.
Yet ... how would this square with the West's own Churchillian ideals of defending freedoms and things? Just doing and saying whatever we need to manipulate the Ukrainians and secure our goals? Sending arms to fight the Russians when it advances our goals, cutting a deal and abandoning the Ukrainians when the circumstances change.
Do we accept the (good, Western) Afghanis and (good, Western) Iraqis, and Kurds ... and Georgians, are only allies of convenience as they are foreign enough (some of them brown!) whereas Ukraine, because they have hot woman to a noble Western sensibility?, gets special treatment and we'll even pursue their goals at the cost of our own?
I think you're following Isaac in doing your best not to understand that when you act to preserve your life in the face of a lethal threat, your actions can't be condemned, even if your actions result in the death of your attacker.
I suppose some would chose to die instead. I don't understand it, but I acknowledge it.
This is not the issue. Zelensky isn't literally on the battle field kungfooing or whatever.
Forget about Ukrainians for a moment, forget even about the collateral damage that can obviously be unjustifiable, focus for a moment on a simple question: Is it in our interest to accept Zelensky lying to us?
Even if I thought it was reasonable for Zelensky (from his point of view) to manipulate me for his own benefit ... is it in my benefit to be manipulated?
If you had spy satellites, you probably wouldn't feel manipulated.
What?
So... you're saying Zelensky is just stupid enough to lie to people who would know he's lying? So it's not a lie?
... Also, I don't have spy satellites, many other parties that jumped in to support Zelensky assuming he had some basis for what he was saying, also didn't have spy satellites.
You're saying manipulating everyone else who doesn't have spy satellites ... we just don't care about them (like the Kurds ... and Afghanis ... and Iraqis ... and Georgians etc.)?
But, even if we ignore everyone else, what if the US administration, who saw what happened with their satellites as you say they would, and saw it was a lie, but felt too invested in Zelensky to contradict him, so go along with the story. That's not manipulation?
Even more alarming, what if the US administration, being the only other party with any information on what happened, decided it was a great lie that Zelensky is telling, suits US "goals", and they push the lie too. This wouldn't be manipulation on Zelensky's part because he has co-conspirators?
Robber: "I didn't steal anything, you caught me red handed! Jeesh!! It's not robbing if the people you're trying to rob can stop you! Everyone knows that!!!!"
Did you read my answer to that question, re. the tanks? Maybe we can stop asking queestions that have been answered already.
For the airforce support I believe an additional issue would be related to avoid escalating the war.
Quoting boethius
Just because folks have opinions and share them here, does not make those a form of "parroting" of anyone. @ssu and @SophistiCat have been critical of Zelensky after the Polish missile incident, and that is evidently at a variance with Ukrainian propaganda. You guys don't like it when we disagree with you, fair enough, but we are not parroting the enemies of the folks you are parroting.
But seems like not to some. :wink:
I don't think your country has any satellites, do they?
I remember someone eagerly quoting articles from 2014, when the right-sector had fought on the streets of Kyiv yet had not lost in the elections (which seems to be a minor detail). And of course that fringe party isn't in government. And then of course the favorite unit of Ukraine, which seemed to represent the Ukrainian armed forces well over half a million strong.
And needles to say, no mention of the true right-wing extremism in Russia. Who cares about that!
Of course, what you lack to understand is that Putin justified the war with the denazification of Ukraine argument, which accused of the present administration to be neonazis. This administration has no ties to neonazis. Trump has more to do with neonazis and nobody accused that populist administration to be neonazis (or perhaps some did, actually).
There's the old saying in Finland: the dog that barks is the one that the sticks hits.
It's a good saying. :smile:
I am struck by how quickly our good friend @boethius here is prompt to lose the plot, or change the goal post. First he says Ukraine is part of no collective, then that the UN -- which includes Ukraine -- does not define itself as a collective, and when proved wrong on it, he then segues into the UN not currently operating as a collective... Well, it does and it does not, depending.
If you want to discuss about "preconditions" attributed to Zelensky ("discussing Zelensky and his preconditions for dozens of pages”) or “Zelensky's precondition to negotiate” based on actual and pertinent evidence, you must (rational requirement) provide such evidences, starting with Zelensky's declared "precondition" statements, if there are any. Isn't that obviously obvious to you? Or should I say “tautological”?
Quoting boethius
So no evidence of Zelensky's declared preconditions in relation to "security guarantees" or "NATO membership", just evidence about preconditions for diplomatic meeting with Russia. That’s why it’s irrelevant to quote him, and you need to conjecture things in the most caricatural way to make a point. Unfortunately it didn’t go well for you.
Quoting boethius
So you are using the word “precondition" the way it suits your argument not necessarily in relation with Zelensky's actual "precondition" declarations and in spite of talking in terms of "Zelensky's preconditions". Then I too used the word "precondition" the way it suits my argument not necessarily in relation with the actual "precondition" statements in your previous discussion on “Zelensky's precondition to negotiate”. Period.
Your historical example of NPT between US and Soviet Union didn’t clarify to me what we could infer from it wrt the Ukrainian case. Hence my objection.
For example, you didn’t consider their hegemonic role to induce compliance also in non-nuclear countries within their sphere of influence, nor the obvious motivation for non nuclear-powers to join such treaties in exchange for a nuclear-power states commitment to curb their military nuclear capacity. As far as the Ukrainian case is concerned, any long-term agreement between Russia and Ukraine must take into account that, given the historical circumstances, Ukrainian security concerns require some form of Western military support (e.g. NATO membership, security guarantees or equivalent) because Ukraine doesn’t have nuclear bombs to protect itself against Russia.
Now let’s loop for the thousand time over your intellectual failures…
Quoting boethius
Not at all, for the reasons I just explained. Maybe you were misled by the way I formulated my objection due to its syntax and the discussion you previously had with other interlocutors. That was unfortunate, but a misunderstanding nonetheless.
Quoting boethius
That’s again a misunderstanding of my claim. Not what I actually claimed, indeed you can not quote me. You desperately need to rephrase in a caricatural way my point to reach the conclusion that suits you. And that’s intellectually miserable. I’m responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.
Quoting boethius
Then you must (logical requirement) converge to my conclusions!
Quoting boethius
That’s again your silly misunderstanding, and your arguments to support it are just a preposterous way to brainwash yourself into believing you are right. But I have no pity for your intellectual misery, as I said.
Quoting boethius
But I don't agree with you, you are a liar if you claim otherwise. In particular, I don't agree with those claims in bold. There are material and reputational costs to take into account while implementing such promises, and implied security concerns that such promises can trigger. It's the promise of having Ukraine joining NATO that has been claimed to be an existential threat for Russia and to provoke its reaction.
From the fact that a paper doesn't compel the West to act in a given way, you infer that it's meaningless. But it's an unjustified claim: even words have no meaning outside their actual usage, but it would be a sophism to infer that, for that reason, words are meaningless! The same goes with "NATO membership" or "security guarantees", it’s the geopolitical and historical conditions that surround such agreements that give meaning and motivate the perpetuation of related informal and formal practices (treaties, alliances, pacts, etc.). And all rational geopolitical actors are aware of this. That's how they deal with geopolitical threats or opportunities.
That's why your argument in support of your claim that such practices are "ornamental" is a straw man argument.
Quoting boethius
And where on earth did you get the idea that "need security guarantees" means or suggests that the West/NATO/US support is certain or certain because it's signed on a paper ?! Are you crazy, dude?
Quoting boethius
I NEVER MADE SUCH A CLAIM, YOU LIAR, quote where I did! I just claimed that "security guarantees" (or equivalent) are neither "ornamental" nor "meaningless" and that it’s rational for Zelensky to pursue them based on the current geopolitical and historical circumstances.
That is supported by the quotations I previously reported.
Quoting boethius
In other words, the blablabla was so far out of focus, and therefore ornamental.
Quoting boethius
ROFL. So finally you are agreeing with me [1], then you must (logical requirement) no longer claim it's “ornamental” or “zero meaning” (on pain of inconsistency).
Besides, your smartass claim was due to an issue with the word “guarantee”, really?! Poor you! And what would be the legal expression you would use instead?! "Security ornaments"?! "Ornamental guarantees"?! “Ornamental ornaments”?! The legal expression "security guarantees" is perfectly intelligible because concerns the task of hedging against geopolitical risks coming from Russia and it implies greater costs than e.g. "security assurances". Besides no rational geopolitical actor can possibly misunderstand the meaning of "security guaranties" the way you suggest. Conclusion: yours is just an embarrassingly overblown straw man argument. Q.E.D.
Quoting boethius
Blablabla, just to change subject while still implicitly proving that such agreements are not ornamental at all! Catastrophic!
Congrats for your epic fail, dude!
[1]
Quoting neomac
Quoting neomac
You mean:
Quoting Olivier5
That you believe this is sufficient explanatory power?
Quoting Olivier5
Escalating the war to what? A war Ukraine can win? And if there going to win anyways, just barely, why not have them win sooner and save plenty of lives?
Your position is that Ukraine can and will win ... but just barely after a maximum amount of preventable Ukrainian suffering, because if they won an inch faster that would be an escalation?
Quoting Olivier5
Anyways, just so people are aware:
Quoting ssu
Is from @ssu and not my description. If you cite someone citing someone else, you should put in the effort to format things so that's clear ... at least retain the default behaviour which is still to copy the person's name and a dash, so it's clear it's a citation (just can't tell when it started without additional effort put into make your post clear).
However, as I mention previously, I will go over the entire discussion when I have time to verify if indeed pro-Zelensky proponents aren't changing their positions to just reflect or defend what Zelensky or Ukrainian intelligence is saying at the moment.
Proving what? A "collective" (as defined by the dictionary) has collective interests and collective actions and policies.
The UN is mainly a diplomatic tool for different actual collectives (called nation states) to meet and try negotiate opposing (rather than collective) interests. Of course, from time to time and on some issues all interests align, or sufficiently so, and there's collective action on that point. But to say the UN brings the US, Russia, Ukraine, China, Iran etc. into one "collective" one unitary political body, is absurd.
For example, contract the "United Nations" with the "United States of America". True, they both have the word "United" in their name, and, true, they both bring together different states into interaction and some shared resources and some collective actions, they even both have some sort of leader. However, the United States of America in an actual collective providing actual collective security to it's member states, and the United Nations is very much a different thing.
Collective is not a good word to describe the United Nations and even if it was is a terrible example of a "collective" in the sense of "collective security" that Ukraine is apart of ... because Russia too is apart of the United Nations.
It's almost unbelievable that that detail is lost on you guys. Bringing up the UN as a potential "collective" in which to invoke "collective security" (the topic of discussion) is just completely absurd as not only is Russia a member of the same "collective" but Russia is a far more powerful member with a veto on whatever the UN even tries to do on topics of security.
And then you accuse others of losing the plot?
I don't have time for the rest of your post just now, but I'd like to point out the reading comprehension that, perhaps, you could spend some time in the meanwhile to reflect on.
What do I say, that you literally cite just above your reaction?
Quoting boethius
Key words: "If you're saying".
It's called "if" followed by a "then".
It was honestly unclear to me what your position has evolved into with all the goal post moving around.
So, if your position is A, then B.
You can clarify that your position is "not-A", which you have done.
As for your position, you literally cite as evidence for your position ... evidence that supports my position, such as international law is a voluntary thing (so obviously guarantees also voluntary, which is the opposite of guarantees).
All you're discovering is that "guarantees" is euphemism for "trust us bro" (as I've been explaining) and, sure, it can be reasonable for Zelensky to get whatever promises and statements of trust he can in a deal, but "guarantees" are purely ornamental. If the US goes back on its word in the future (such as make certain "assurances" it doesn't give a shit about now), Ukraine will have no recourse. If Ukrainians complain "but I thought it was guaranteed" ... what's the answer going to be from the neocon appreciation brigade on reddit defending the US's position? "All is fair in love and war," or maybe "life's not fair, take care of your own security" etc.
In addition, you are discovering the nominal world can be very different to the real world of actual substance.
For example, I sell you a lemon, I guarantee you it's sour. You want to be sure so ask for that guarantee in writing, as you want it actually guaranteed and for some crazy reasons if the lemon turns out not to be sour you'll suffer incredibly high damages.
So, I go and write a contract and I call it the "Boethius lemon super promise hyper guarantee" and in this contract I write clauses that explain I am not liable for anything.
You read it and explain I'm not guaranteeing anything with this contract, and I respond "but it's got guarantee right in the title of the contract, you're crazy."
What do we learn, that simply calling something a guarantee doesn't make it a guarantee. If there's zero consequence for me delivering a non-sour lemon or even no lemon at all, it maybe a nominal guarantee as it's a contract with guarantee in the contract but in the real world of actual substance it is not a guarantee as there's nothing to keep me to my word.
Guarantee in the context of agreements refers to some actual consequence for not delivering.
In this case of US guaranteeing something to Ukraine, no such consequence would be there, so no guarantee is there in actual substance of the real things in the world.
Now, maybe US keeps it's word anyways, but maybe not.
Again, think about things for a few seconds. If you ask me for that lemon, and I say I'll get it to you but maybe not, and you say "man, I really need to be sure, can you guarantee it" and I say "zero problems guaranteeing it, I guarantee you I'll get you that lemon, but of course maybe not, things could shake out that way" and then you say "that's not a guarantee then!!!" and then I say "but I literally just said I guarantee it to you!! ... just, with the added information that maybe not, because nothing is actually guaranteed."
This is the kind of confusion you get yourself into if you mixup nominal ornamental things with real things in the world. There is a difference between calling something a "guarantee" and that thing being a guarantee in some substantive way.
More appropriate term that describes reality would be that what diplomats call "security guarantees" are actually in the real world of substance "security reasons". They maybe reasons to accept the deal, they may even actually happen, but they are not guarantees in some substantive contractual sense of guarantee.
I go to some length to explain that agreements coordinate actions between willing participants, and also solve catch 22 situation where one party is willing only if another party is too.
In the case of Russia evaluating NATO-Ukraine footsie, it maybe well aware that US promises such as:
Quoting Reuters
Are meaningless insofar as promises go. Maybe US has zero intention of ever letting Ukraine join NATO.
However, that Russia knows what promises from a more powerful state to a less powerless state are worth, it cannot know what the US actually intends or will do if the circumstances change.
You have simply strawmanned my position with conflating the ornamental nature of guarantee with the idea no one ever does what they promise.
Promises can be kept between nations, but because the promising party believed at the time of the agreement and continues to believe that it was a reasonable promise to make and in their interests to keep it. Adding "guarantee" or other flowery language is of minor consideration.
For example:
There's been this bizarre historical revisionism that Ukraine should have held out for "guarantees" rather than settle for "assurances" in the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances".
Since these "assurances" turned out to mean nothing, the thinking is that people knew that at the time.
But what's the substantive actual meaning of "assurances" ... is it really "means nothing"? Obviously not, at the time assurances was meaningful.
It's only since these assurances turned out to be meaningless that "assurances" have become a euphemism for "nice things people say sometimes" in international political analysis.
If the assurances turned out to be meaningful in 2014 when Ukraine first started complaining about the "commitments" not being kept, then people would not go around today saying these assurances were meaningless, they would point to US and other signatory actions as clear evidence of the meaning of the assurances.
If a new agreement is struck and called "The guarantees agreement" and then the day comes where whatever is guaranteed should be fulfilled ... and it's not, then "guarantee" would be the new euphemism for what people say because it sounded nice at the time.
The last clause states: "6. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will consult in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments."
Which, notice the actual promise is only to "consult" ... but as far as I know these parties didn't do even that. Well what exactly is the meaning of "commitments" if all you're actually promising to do is "consult" about questions concerning them?
Any new agreement will be in the exact ontological and epistemological and legal status as the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances".
The mistake was not "ah, damn, if only we held out for the word 'guarantee', then Russia could not have invaded."
The mistake was not navigating political reality since in a competent and non-delusional way and believing NATO's promises were meaningful from Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, rather than consider the possibility that NATO may not be able to offer meaningful protection ... at least not from the destruction that has been brought to Ukraine so far.
Just restating it doesn't make it true. If I dropped a nuclear bomb on your neighborhood because I was justifiably concerned you were going to kill me, people would definitely condemn my actions. The collateral damage my actions resulted in would be out out of proportion to the harm I was trying to avoid.
Just ignoring the counterargument doesn't render it met.
It’s not my position. You’re very easily confused. I just tried to provide you with an answer to your question, based on what I heard and what seems reasonable to me. You are welcome to address my explainations, but they are not « my position ».
Note that the suffering is mutual. Over the past few months, the evidence is that the Russians suffered the most. I wonder why you keep forgeting their sufferings… not allowed in the putinista narrative I guess. Russians ought to be depicted as victors, always.
True. Shooting me in the head would be legal though.
Still a liar, my position didn't evolve. It's your understanding of it that did. Still in the wrong direction! Besides, the fact that you use a if-then statement to make your reasoning sound more plausible is still dishonest in suggesting that I'm agreeing with the way you framed the antecedent of the statement which also keeps echoing the claim "An obvious reality you seem finally to agree with". By putting your words in my mouth, you keep suggesting a conceptual framing that you have no reason at all to use to formulate my claims (actual or hypothetical), because I expressly and repeatedly objected against it.
Quoting boethius
But your conjectures do not prove anything from a geopolitical point of view. What gives meaning to such agreements is the actual geopolitical and historical circumstances, and their trends.
Quoting boethius
This claim is as obvious as "nothing certain in life". Nothing substantively relevant for geopolitical analysis and explanation.
Quoting boethius
Wrong, there can be consequences. These are implied material and reputational costs at least. At worst hegemonic influence.
Quoting boethius
There is a contractual sense of "security guarantees" as long as there is a legal codification. The point is that contract between states is not the same as contract between persons since there is no authority that can enforce contract the way a central state can do with individuals. That's all. In any case, that doesn't imply AT ALL that the meaning of such agreements are ornamental or meaningless.
Quoting boethius
I didn't claim that either. Indeed you can not quote me, you have to invent a putative conflation between ideas that I never stated nor implied. You are a pathological liar.
You went from "pre-condition" to "rational requirement" to "considering the nuclear deterrence they both had" ... that I remind you "Ukraine doesn't have!" but apparently that had no relation to your original use of the word "pre-condition".
That you were just pointing out US and Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons was a precondition for "something" ... just not the kind of deals we were actually talking about that Ukraine also agreed to.
Quoting neomac
You start by contradicting my position, that guarantees aren't ornamental ... and then just repeat my position back to me.
We engage with promises that aren't guaranteed in any sense of the word all the time: All the way to the altar. It's in fact the usual state of affairs that people can break their promises to us. Of course, there can be plenty of reasons to trust someone even if there is no real consequence to them for breaking their word to you.
There is very particular (and unusual) set of contractual promises in which guarantee is not ornamental. A company sells you something and guarantees the delivery date, quality, etc. and doesn't deliver, there is actual legal recourse to recover the damages. Of course, not guaranteed in the sense of certainty, but in this legal recourse sense.
Now, if the word "guarantee" is ornamental and basically a euphemism for "trust me bro" then we are indeed in agreement that you'd need to be evaluating other things to decide if the United States, or any other state, is actually going to keep their word.
You've basically transitioned into this euphemistic use of the word guarantee: not certain, not legal, no legal recourse ... but what's the status of such a promise with the word guarantee attached?
It's: trust me bro.
Now, maybe Biden, Sunak, Macron and the rest of them, really are Zelensky's bro's and they got his back for personal bro code reasons that are personal to them, even if it's against the interest of their respective nations. Maybe Zelensky can feel that bro spirit and knows the promises will be fulfilled when the time comes. Or, maybe Zelensky evaluates "historical trends" and determines that whatever is promised will be delivered for a bunch of reasons. Or maybe Zelensky has some leverage that would increase the cost of any party not respecting the deal, for instance we've already discussed the cost to Russia for another war would be primarily ... the cost of another war, Zelensky or a new Ukrainian presidents leverage being the fighting of another war. Zelensky could maybe have some leverage on the US, UK et. al. such as invading Poland or something, that would increase the cost of unkept promises.
I explain at some length that there can be other reasons outside of what wording is used in an agreement to believe that people, even an entire nation, will keep their word: nearly all of it is called circumstances and leverage.
However, if you want to be more certain than what amounts to futurology of historical trends, if you want a real and substantive "guarantee" from the parties, to be really sure they're keeping their word on their honour: is not on offer in international relations.
As has been pointed out time and time again, what matters in the question of who will win this war and how is the capacity to absorb suffering, not the raw numbers.
If the Russian military losses indicate a likely win for Ukraine you shouldn't have the slightest trouble finding a military or strategic expert stating as much.
As it is you have to resort to citing your co-Zelenskyites on here because virtually every single expert on the matter has concluded that Ukraine are either quite unlikely or very unlikely to win back the territory they are aiming to regain.
The matter at hand is, and always has been, should Ukraine cut their losses and negotiate. Most of the sane world are saying 'yes' at this point. In a few weeks, the media-train will catch up, and upon recieving your new instructions, you'll pretend like that was your position all along.
Right. So your comment was meaningless.
If Zelensky's actions were proportionate to the harm being mitigated, then they were justified.
If Zelensky's actions were not proportionate to the harm being mitigated, then they were not justified.
So what matters is whether Zelensky's actions were proportionate to the harm being mitigated...
...which is exactly what we were discussing before your mindless interjection.
I think you're kind of over doing it tho. Back to USD's and GBP's.
You are really saying after hundreds of pages of arguing the situation in Ukraine, that your position is not Ukraine is fighting a just war, can will, will win and therefore should keep fighting to victory?
Or something very, very close to that ... so close, that this is an accurate and reasonable summary of your position?
Quoting Olivier5
First, the suffering is not mutual. Ukrainian economy is in free fall, entire cities severely damaged or abandoned, industry in disarray and now the Russians are turning off the lights. Should somebody stop them? Maybe ... but I don't see anyone going and doing that.
In simple military terms, Russians have withdrawn from one week point (West of the Dnieper) and one strategically unimportant area (around Kharkiv).
Zero questions this is not desirable for the Russians and no questions it is embarrassing, especially Kherson. I am 100% aware that annexing territory and then withdrawing from it looks dumb. But that's intense warfare. UK, France, US, Germany, Japan, Russia all had embarrassing setbacks in WWII.
However, embarrassment is not suffering.
Ukraine paid a high cost for their offensives as well as continuing to pressure Russian force. We do not know the cost exactly, obviously every estimate will be accused of bias.
What we can know is that it would be common military wisdom that if the Ukrainians are attacking and in addition the Russians are able to withdraw without being routed, that Ukrainian losses, aka. suffering, will be higher than the Russians.
In other words, if Russia is suffering more losses than Ukraine while defending, that would be unexpected.
Second, to expand on what @Isaac just explained to you, the amount of territory the Russians are occupying is pretty significant.
As I described months ago, what actually matters at this stage in the war is losses multiplied by the distance covered.
We don't know what the losses are, but what amount of losses would be worth it to you?
For example, assuming that it took 100 000 dead Ukrainians to get this far, and just "eyeballing it" at this rate it's going to take another 200 000 to 300 000 Ukrainian KIA to reconquer the rest of the territory, would you pay that price?
Good summary of your neverending misunderstanding, troll. May view didn't evolve. Here is my statement: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. The word "pre-condition" here expresses a rational requirement for geopolitical agents. And it applies differently in the case the US negotiating with Soviet Union and in the case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia.
Quoting boethius
"Security guarantees" are not "ornamental" or "zero meaning" from a geopolitical point of view. But you think I'm repeating your position because you misunderstand mine. There is nothing in your reasoning that compels me to find the word "ornament" as appropriate replacement for "security guarantees". Even contracts enforced by central state are not guarantee in the sense of certainty. Legal justice more often than we hope can fail us for all kinds of reasons. Are they ornamental for that reason or State is not the guarantor of legal justice? No.
What is fallacious in your reasoning is that we are compelled to consider with "zero meaning" the "security guarantee" just because the word "guarantee" suggests to you certainty. This reasoning is utterly dumb and has no ground in geopolitical rationality. Indeed you are incapable of providing any parties (Russian or Ukrainian or Western) that understand the word "guarantee" the way you suggest.
So you built a fictitious "straw man" to argue against. That's how intellectually desperate you are.
Quoting boethius
I didn't transition at all. Depending on the way the security guarantees (or NATO membership) is legally codified there might be occasions also for legal recourse, obviously.
Quoting boethius
I did it repeatedly before you did.
You are literally describing how the word "guarantee" doesn't literally mean "guarantee" ... as why would it be a guarantee in any sense of certainty.
In other words, according to your own explanation, guarantee in this context is ornamental and a euphemism for "trust us bro".
Can we count on these "guarantees": of course not! Don't be silly! is your new position.
Again, you may have "bro trends" or bro leverage or other broformation particular to the broverse in which you base your decision to trust your bros. But is the bro code 100% reliable, "guaranteed" in any meaningful sense. Alas, t'is not.
The only reason they left Kherson was the suffering they went through there.
Quoting boethius
What is it with your obsession with little me? This war is not about me. I pay no price for it, or very little.
You’ve been saying that for 8 month.
Guarantee in a sense of certainty doesn't exist anywhere with the reliability of a physical law or mathematical truth. "Guarantee" just expresses a formal commitment to act in a certain way. In geopolitics the nature of the "security guarantee" commitment under discussion is to be distinguished from "security assurance" because the nature of military cooperation should be much more substantial in the former case (comparable to NATO membership). That is the only sense that is relevant for geopolitical reasoning.
Quoting boethius
Not new, liar. It's simply what is left of your preposterous position to hang on because for all the rest you have capitulated already. You need badly to attribute it "zero meaning" because it probably helps you question the rationality of Zelensky's demands. But you are failing in doing so. Badly.
Quoting boethius
Since you can't quote literally any parties to support your claim, you invent your own fictional evidences. You look so dumb, bro.
This process has been happening for 8 months.
For example, media believed man-portable systems were enough to "beat the Russians", gushed unending praise ... eventually caught up with the reality that wasn't the case.
In the summer Ukraine, the war was all but declared over aft the Russians withdrew from the North, and Ukraine was declared "winning" even if they were steadily losing ground, and eventually the media caught up with that reality.
Right now, while Ukraine has been making advances, media has been gushing praise on Zelensky's uncompromising diplomatic positions, but is slowly catching up to the reality that we have not witnessed decisive battles, collapse of Russian forces and / or the economy and / or the political system, and the media is slowly catching up this reality.
Always weeks and weeks after it is obvious.
Quoting Olivier5
You're the one debating here. Why would I join a discussion to discuss with people that are absent?
But, if you don't have the courage of your convictions to lay out a reasonable price to pay for reconquering all of Ukraine, seems indeed you no longer have any position at all in this discussion. I'll note that down.
You clearly just have no reading comprehension.
The claim that "security guarantees" are as meaningful as "trust us bro" is the claim that, just like between bros promising a sick and whack party, as you've already noted yourself, there's only "historical trends" in which to evaluate if the party will indeed be sick and whack. For instance, if your bros have thrown sick and whack parties previously, then stands to reason that this new party they speak of will be of a similar mintage. However, adding embellishment to the basic promise that the "party will be good" neither guarantees the party will in fact be good nor even guarantees it will happen at all. If your bros absolutely, positively, guarantee you, 100% fresh, the party is both happening and will be incredible ... we are no closer to being any more certain than we are based on the "historical trends" of these party throwers.
Compare this to a company guaranteeing your computer will turn on. If it doesn't, you have legal recourse for damages and can sue this company. Could Ukraine sue the US for not keeping a promise? No.
It doesn't matter how you dress up the promise, Ukraine will have no legal resource and have no reason other than, you put your finger on it, "historical trends" in which to decide the likelihood promises will be kept in an agreement.
Calling the promises "security guarantees" does indeed sound fancy and something you can trust from ol' country, but it's a euphemism. It is a noun in the nominal world referring to an agreement, but that agreement can completely lack any guarantee.
Just like, nominally, the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" is very assuring indeed ... but if you actually read it, the actual real substance doesn't seem too assuring at all and didn't actually happen when the time came to "assure" Ukraine about the promises made.
If it was actually assuring, representing some sort of real assuring substance of some kind, there would be no need for talk of any new security guarantees now, mighty fine nations have already committed to making sure Ukraine's borders are respected, so let them do that as they said they would.
Of course they'll have to consult first, but that's just the first step of a much bigger plan they are clearly committed to.
So, considering the Security Assurances were ornamental addition to what amounted to "trust us bro", why would just renaming what is in essence the same thing to "security guarantees" be a single gram of coke lighter than "trust us bro".
What is confusing in this subject matter of international treatise, is that they are written in highly legal language and very formal, but they are of the same nature as informal and unenforceable agreements, similar to just most promises in normal life: promises of love, promises of taking out the trash, promises of being on time, and other informal promises as you may find between bros that have no standing in a court of law.
Of course, your bros may actually love you and be on time to your sick and whack party, even helping to clean up and take out the trash in the morning, but there's no legal recourse if they don't.
Normal people are like OMG the assurances weren't assurances in the Budapest Memorandum, but only because normal people are accustomed to any legal paper being a formal agreement that has legal standing (work contracts, insurance policies, sale terms, and so on) and, almost never, are the informal promises of daily life cast in a formal language.
But, to understand what is really going on in these international relations, just stop and imagine if you made some legal looking paper for promises that you know don't need to be kept. It's fun and ceremonial, maybe has some useful information to note such as keep track of some important information (like who's taking out the compost and when), but it is not really a contract like your work contract is a contract.
So, maybe people do what they say, but evaluating that would have little to do with your little legal ceremony.
I’m not in the business of putting price tags in human blood over territories, if that’s what you are asking.
Then by what metric do you determine your support for, say, continued drip-feed arms to Ukraine?
On what grounds do you agree with Zelensky's uncompromising position on negotiations?
"I agree with Zelensky because..."
...ends how?
Of course, if there is an adequate legal codification behind the "security guarantees". Yet that doesn't imply that there will be justice to Ukrainian satisfaction. But this happens also within legal systems where individuals are suing e.g. big companies which have the material resources and political ties to grant them impunity. That doesn't make such legal system an ornament either.
Besides the "security guarantees" may involve European parties too, not only the US.
The main problem with your view is that talking about certainty independently from geopolitical and historical considerations is pointless. Nothing that geopolitical actors can work with. The reason why you are blabbering about it is because you likely want to argue that Ukrainian demands for security guarantees are irrational. Indeed how can a State rationally rely on something that is ornamental, with zero meaning and equates to a cheap/hypocritical flatus vocis like "trust us bro" that any random boethius can endlessly troll anybody about?
That's precisely how dumb your dialectic strategy is.
Quoting boethius
First, the violation of the Budapest Memorandum is taken into account [1] to condemn Russian violation of international laws (which justifies sanctions and military support to Ukraine). Second, as I have already explained "security guarantees" are precisely contrasted with "security assurances", because the nature of the commitment would be much more costly for those who are engaging in it, legally speaking as well: The Budapest Memorandum was negotiated at political level, but it is not entirely clear whether the instrument is devoid entirely of legal provisions. It refers to assurances, but unlike guarantees, it does not impose a legal obligation of military assistance on its parties. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) Third, the historical circumstances for the Budapest Memorandum were different from the ones we are living now and the purpose of the Memorandum as well is different from the one addressed by the security guarantees: "Scholars assumed at the time that Ukraine's decision to sign the Budapest Memorandum was proof of Ukraine's development as a democracy and its desire to step away from the post-Soviet world and make first steps toward a European future. For 20 years, until the 2014 Russian military occupation of regions of Ukraine,[50] the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament was an exemplary case of nuclear non-proliferation. " (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum)
Anyways West/NATO/US and Ukraine understanding of what is at stake geopolitically speaking will determine what form of military cooperation [2] must be implemented at the expense of Russia as long as Russia is perceived as a non-negligible threat to the West. So is it rational for Zelensky to pursue security guarantees or equivalent, and for us to believe that some form of security guarantees will be implemented? Given the current circumstances, it's more rational than believing the opposite based on fictional scenarios, or on the preposterous idea that such agreements are ornamental.
I would take you more seriously if you could convincingly argue that the West/NATO/US has actually lost interest/resources or will likely lose interest/resources to support Ukraine against Russia. Alas, it's not the case.
[1]
We the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) are appalled by and condemn the large-scale military aggression by the Russian Federation against the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, directed partly from Belarusian soil. This unprovoked and completely unjustified attack on the democratic state of Ukraine was preceded by fabricated claims and unfounded allegations. It constitutes a serious violation of international law and a grave breach of the United Nations Charter and all commitments Russia entered in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and its commitments in the Budapest Memorandum. We as the G7 are bringing forward severe and coordinated economic and financial sanctions. We call on all partners and members of the international community to condemn this attack in the strongest possible terms, to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine, and raise their voice against this blatant violation of the fundamental principles of international peace and security.
https://uk.ambafrance.org/G7-condemns-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine
[2]
[i]Security guarantees come from two main sources: 1) collective security organizations (NATO is the most greatest example) and 2) bilateral defence treaties (for example, Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America etc.).
Security guarantees are usually defined in the text of a treaty as a duty “to come to one`s defense when it faces external aggression”. In comparison, security assurances are commonly contained in other international legal acts and are expressed in terms of a promise “to provide cooperation and aid (or “assistance”) in case of aggression”. That means that security guarantees impose much stronger obligation, than assurances do, because they are inferred from the source of international law – an international treaty (subject to Art. 38 of IC Charter).
This guarantee means the guarantor’s direct participation in protection of recipient’s national security. Therefore it is usually accompanied by the deployment of guarantor’s armed forces (or assurer) on the recipient’s territory, by creation of joint military headquarters and joint armed squads/units etc.[/i]
https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law
I compare it with the alternative, which is Russia getting its way in Ukraine, which would result in attrocious consequences for both Ukrainians and Russians.
... Therefore Ukrainian lives are a price you're willing to pay (or support Zelensky paying) as a blood price to retake the territory that Russia currently has?
Am I missing something?
Decency?
The decency of supporting a policy (or supporting other people with those policies) that results in thousands of people dying but ... shhh ... we do not say so?
We focus only on the glory.
That's what I was missing? The "decorum" of the elites?
We can say so, of course. We must. An enormous sacrifice is being paid by Ukraine for the common good, which must be recognised.
Ok, there you go, price is worth it so far.
Assuming it's 100 000 lives to get this far, would you sacrifice (or support Zelensky sacrificing) 300 000 more lives to complete their mission for the common good?
In this context, common good being the reconquering of the territory in question.
That's what we're discussing.
However, you're only argument here is "Ukraine business!", and it would be Ukraine business and mere academic interest for us, if we weren't sending them weapons.
First, if we're sending them weapons knowing it is not enough to win anyways would that be a price worth paying (or telling Zelensky to pay)? Having Ukrainian sacrifice so much and still lose?
And if you're talking about France as an example maybe honest to mention ... France capitulated in WWII, precisely to avoid damages once it seemed the war could not be won.
So, if your position is "courage les gas, mais si vous abondonne ... c'est la vie!!" That would be more coherent as following the French example.
But I get it, you won't actually take a position, just defer to the Ukrainians, deny any criticism of the freedom of that choice they are apparently fighting for, and evaluating our arms shipments is off limits, how confident we should be it can and will result in an good outcome for the "common good", or then if it's not enough, certainly tanks are in short supply ... can't spare them at the moment, sorry Ukraine, but we thank you for your sacrifice.
Is there a better way to paraphrase your position?
George Bush: 'God told me to end the tyranny in Iraq' (Ewen MacAskill · The Guardian · Oct 7, 2005)
... well, except for the (attempted) land grab.
Quoting Oct 13, 2022
Passing the buck on, Putin's Russia has been and is in a (dehumanizing) systematic process of creating a Ukraine of more hate, which, in time, I'm sure they would/will use to justify more (given the chance), perhaps with the help of some questionable friends.
Nonsense, you've been given plenty of alternatives, the two options you're considering are not mutually exclusive.
It could be, for example, that Russia gets its way and very little changes, as is the case in Crimea.
It could be the case that Russia gets it's way at first, but solid pressure from exactly the kinds of groups who liberalised Ukraine bring about a better Russia. Saving millions from oppression.
You've rejected every option for making a better life for the people of the region that isn't war... The one option that just so happens to be pushed by one of the largest lobbying organisations the world has ever seen.
Are you asking us to believe that's just a coincidence? That their lobbying power was all for naught because you just happened to agree with them anyway?
Just like on Covid, where you just happened to agree with the next largest lobbying power the world has ever known. Another coincidence?
These behemothic lobbying groups sure are wasting billions of dollars pushing narratives that people just happen to believe anyway. They're going to be furious when they find out.
You're talking about everyone here?
And that's your preferred form of government, what actually matters, and you're just a loyal patriot willing to believe?
But otherwise, I fail to see your point.
Things changed between the Poles and Ukrainians ... for now ... so presumably they could also change back? Or things change between the Poles and Ukrainians so presumably will change with the Russians too ... they'll remake the USSR after all?
From before the war
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato
From March
https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-says-russian-military-action-will-stop-moment-if-ukraine-meets-2022-03-07/
Late March
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/16/zelenskyy-says-russia-ukraine-peace-talks-more-realistic
Developments in April
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ukraine-presented-unacceptable-draft-peace-deal-2022-04-07/
Up to October
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/21/much-softer-is-russia-eyeing-a-way-out-of-the-ukraine-war
An article from Professor Kupchan about the situation as it stands currently
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/opinion/russia-ukraine-negotiation.html
Notice how Putin's demands have, if anything, got more substantial as the war progresses. The idea of Ukraine gaining a 'better negotiating position' through war doesn't seem to be playing out. Demands before the war were limited to NATO down-scaling, then independence for Donbas, then much bigger swathes of Ukrainian territory.
The more committed Putin becomes, the less he seems to feel able to walk away with. A catastrophic miscalculation on the part of the allies, at best. A callous disregard for human life at worst.
Oh, you lost the plot again! You can evaluate or criticise everything you want. Even Putin, if you ever wanted to…. Ha ha ha. It’s no skin off my nose. You keep on trying to make it personal, trying to hurt. But the war is not fought here on TPF and there is no point in using violence against other posters. Go fight in Dombass if you want to kill other human beings. Here, you will not succeed. You can yell at me at the top of your lungs, I don’t care and I won’t mind. I’m not the one calling the shots.
So you think NATO countries should hand over tanks to Ukraine? They’ve taken thousands of them from Russians already. Ukraine now boasts the largest panzer army in Europe. What they really need is an airforce.
A lot has changed in Crimea.
Quoting Isaac
The odds for that are minuscule. The Nazis did not reform from within.
Quoting Isaac
No, I have proposed plenty of options for that. It is you who never proposes anything but submission.
Not really, no.
Quoting Olivier5
So Russians are Nazis now? Your anti-russian racism is getting ever more disgusting.
Quoting Olivier5
I must have missed them. Cite me an example of a proposal for improvements to the lives of people in Dombas that isn't more war.
Nazis are not a race. They are just folks like you, who despaired too much.
Russians are, and you just likened them all to Nazis. But, hey, they're Russian, so doesn't matter I suppose. Even raise the spectre of any Ukrainians being Nazis however, and all hell breaks loose...
Those 'solutions' you mentioned...? Still working on them? With the entire Russian race condemned as irredeemable Nazis, it's hard to see where you go from there.
Where did I do that?
Quoting Olivier5
I said Russians could reform. You said it was unlikely because the Nazis didn't.
So if Russians are not like the Nazis then why would the Nazis' failure to reform have any impact whatsoever on the Russian's likelihood of reforming?
Still waiting on all those non-war solutions you've apparently put forward, by the way.
Russians cannot reform their being Russian -- so this is not about race -- but they can reform their polity, their government -- so it is about politics. This much is obvious, even to you.
The current Russian government has a lot to see with the Nazis: nationalistic, violent, sadistically cruel, sexist and racist, dominating, destructive, and relying on big-man worship to replace rational administration and make do for the lack of individual agency. These sorts of regimes do not reform from within. Why should they? How could they? They just rotten slowly, and then crumble at some point, like the USSR did after 75 years in existence.
The only way to transform Russia would be a revolution.
So if you are serious about Russians changing for the better, that's what you should call for: a revolution, like the Ukrainians did at Maidan. And Putin losing the Ukraine war could trigger a revolution in Russia, so logically speaking, if you care about Russians, you should hope for Ukraine to win this war.
Quoting Isaac
Option 1. Russian unconditional surrender would be a great outcome, avoiding a lot of unnecessary suffering. This would probably be the best option for everyone involved, except perhaps for Mr Putin.
Option 2. Dombass and Crimea could be administered by the UN or something similar until such a time when all their original population can freely come back to their birthplace, so that a fair referendum can be organized. This option would take forever -- like half a century or so, see for instance what happened in Cyprus -- but it would also avoid a lot of unnecessary suffering.
Option 3. A revolution in Russia, and/or the decapitation of the Russian regime by Kiev forces or by Kremlin insiders, could lead to a political transition in Moscow and ultimately to a peace deal based on some classic qui-pro-quo: e.g. land given back, war crime prosecuted, but no war reparations.
Yep. That'll be why I said...
Quoting Isaac
Fucksake. Read first, reply second. If you want to argue with a 'putinista' figment of your imagination do it on a blog. If you want to argue with me read what I fucking write first.
Then why did you object when I called for a revolution in Russia?
And why don't you hope for a Ukrainian victory, which would likely trigger a revolution in Russia?
Logic, anyone?
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/22/kherson-city-sympathies-russia-complicate-reintegration-into-ukraine/
Where?
Quoting Olivier5
Because the chances of a victory are very, very small, thousands of people will die in the meantime, and Russia can have a revolution without a Ukrainian victory just as well.
You've not cited a single expert saying that Ukrainian victory is likely, let alone more likely than an overthrow of Putin's regime without it.
Quoting Olivier5
It's nothing to do with logic, it's to do with disagreement.
Still waiting on those solutions you apparently mentioned...
"Russians" aren't a race. You can be a citizen of a nation and that does not mean you are a race of that nation, that just means being part of a national system, a state in which you are a "member". I'm not the "race" of Swedes, I'm a Swedish resident and citizen, a member of this state.
And if the state programs you to hate, loot, rape, murder, and conduct war crimes on a systematic scale, that can be compared to how the Nazis programmed people to hate and murder people on a systematic scale. Criticizing the people who follow a state doctrine that clearly conducts war crimes and systematically murder, rape, and torture civilians in a nation that the state invaded is not criticizing "the race of Russians" by comparing these citizens and the state to the Nazis.
Is this that hard to understand? Or are you deliberately using these obvious rhetorical tactics to once again produce low-quality arguments and bloat this thread with useless noise?
I don't really care about your personal meanings for words.
Discrimination on the grounds of nationality or citizenship is racism according to the law. If you don't agree you can take it up with them.
Quoting Christoffer
Yep. IF that was the case then you would be right.
Quoting Christoffer
True. The discussion was about the chances of Russians overthrowing Putin. It was not limited to the subset of Russians who follow state doctrine.
Quoting Christoffer
No, it's not hard to understand, you're just factually wrong. Race does cover nationality, it is not the case that all Russians are indoctrinated and it is not the case that all Russians follow state doctrine, therefore the fact that the Nazis did not reform has no bearing on whether Russians will. Germans did reform their system. Russians can reform their system. Nazis in both cases are far less likely to do so, but since we're not discussing Nazis in either case, the comparison is irrelevant.
Beside which, the options were being compared to a continued war. No one has given a single military analysis which rates the chances of Ukraine winning as anything more than slim.
What I'm saying is that compared to those chances, Russia divesting itself of Putin's regime is no less likely. Ousting them from Donbas and Crimea first has yet to be demonstrated as necessary.
There are two possible outcomes for the people of the region being considered here.
1. Ukraine successfully oust Russia from Donbas and Crimea and continue their moves toward greater freedoms.
2. Ukraine cede Donbas and Crimea to Russia and the people there help (together with the millions of dissatisfied Russians) push Russia toward greater freedoms.
Either way gains greater freedoms for the people of the region. Option 2 has way fewer lives lost, is more likely to succeed, and results in releasing a greater number of people from oppression.
Option 1 is unlikely according to leading military analysts, but it earns the world's largest lobbying industry several billion dollars whilst it is failing. It is therefore heavily promoted in social media.
What? "Race" is about genetic lineage, it has nothing to do with what nation you are in or which citizenship you have. Look it up in a dictionary if you're so uneducated on the matter that you think that this definition is a "personal meaning" and factual.
The fact is that it's YOU who change the meaning to fit your own narrative, not me, so don't even try to dismiss this just because it doesn't fit your argument.
Quoting Isaac
No, I'm not factually wrong. You are cherry-picking the Equality Act without even caring to understand what comparison is in place in the first place. It's a dishonest way of arguing with your interlocutor. If citizens, brainwashed by a state, are being criticized with a comparison to how Nazis were brainwashed, then that is a valid comparison. You are trying to play the racism card in order to defend a rational and valid criticism of how many Russians are indoctrinated into the Russian state worldview. You are also straw-manning through this race card by corrupting the argument to be about "all Russians". If, say, 80% of Russians were indoctrinated into the Russian/Putin worldview, then 80% are indoctrinated, and that 80% of Russians can be criticized for it, just like we criticized the citizens of Germany looking the other way during the holocaust. If 30% of these 80% are also active in war crimes and actual acts of violence, then they can be criticized in comparison to the Nazi soldiers and SS officers doing the same.
The rest you wrote is just noise that doesn't have to do with what I objected against. The problem is that if you corrupt the definitions and corrupt others' arguments with strawmen before you continue to argue a conclusion, you are building your argument upon a ground that isn't honestly and factually established.
The way you play the racism card in this is dishonest and makes discussion impossible with you. Understand other people's points before you continue. No one is criticizing the "Russian race", that's your fucking strawman.
I've literally cited the legal definition of race. I've zero interest in your personal version.
Hardly surprising that that you are living in an alternative reality. As Ukrainians already have regained territory. They didn't have to rely on an insurgency to fight the Russians, which some experts thought they would have to rely.
But as a leftist tankist I assume you have a totally different view on 'experts on the matter' are.
Putin lost this war on the first day. Ukraine didn't collapse as the Afghan government did.
I've literally described in what way the comparison is being made and you ignore it. Comparing Russian citizens following a state doctrine to another group of citizens following another state doctrine is not racism or is about race whatsoever. You invent a race card to play instead of actually fucking reading what people write.
I've zero interest in your low-quality bullshit. You have infested this thread with so many bloated strawmen and invented twists and turns to fit your own argument and narrative that it's impossible to discuss anything in here without you taking a crap on everything. You don't care to read or understand others' writings, you only care to push your own ideas and attack others based on whatever false narrative you conjured up about others' texts.
This thread should be renamed to "Putin/Russia apologists group think" since that's what this whole thread is about.
My Dear Russian Friends, It’s Time For Your Maidan
(source: https://www.lemonde.fr/le-monde-in-english/article/2022/03/28/jonathan-littell-my-dear-russian-friends-now-is-the-time-for-your-own-maidan_6119497_5026681.html)
I hope you like it. You good friends here did not.
Quoting Isaac
I'm not as pessimistic as you are. I trust that Ukraine will win this war, and that it will result in regime change in Russia.
I call them putinistas.
Well. I'm all ears. Just quote from the expert opinion you're using to counter those I've cited who put Ukraine's chances of success very low. Then we can have a discussion.
You just muttering about alternative realities without a shred of expert evidence is not a discussion, it's just your ill-informed opinion.
Quoting ssu
How ironic. you know tankies were the ones willing to use tanks to achieve their political objectives. Not the ones opposed to doing so.
Quoting ssu
No, just the normal view. I cited General Mark Miley, I cited Swift analysts, I cited Christopher Chivvis, Nicholas Wheeler, Princeton University... Is there some good reason why these are the 'wrong' experts other than that they disagree with you?
At least we aren't pushing for World War III, because Russia is so bad.
From barely two pages back...
Quoting Olivier5
Or simply...
Quoting Olivier5
But of course, anyone not toeing the media-sanctioned line must be demonised with aplomb.
Still waiting for a shred of evidence to support your position. Anything? The slightest mention will do, just anything we can actually discuss other than your uninformed ad hoc reckons.
LOL! :rofl:
An absolutely ludicrous idea!
Even you wrote his name wrong (MIlley), and obviously that when the general says the obvious, that there is no quick victory for Ukraine (something that Ukrainian military leaders themselves have said), you interpret in your fantasies "every single expert on the matter has concluded that Ukraine are either quite unlikely or very unlikely to win back the territory they are aiming to regain." How telling.
For others here, let's just quote what actually this Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has said, which obviously is very important. To have this thread to be about the reality about the war in Ukraine. From US defense.gov website:
And what Milley continues about the Ukrainians:
AND FURTHERMORE, Milley continues:
See reference here.
Which one?
Where in any of that does it say that Ukraine are likely to win back Crimea?
Nowhere.
The assessment of every single expert I've read (and cited) is that it is very unlikely that Ukraine will win back the territory they have lost. That's the issue.
It's not a question of whether they'll fight, or whose decision it is, or how many battles they've won. It's a question of whether they should include ceding territory on their negotiations.
Not a single expert thus far has suggested they didn't ought to, as you are.
Wrong again, Isaac.
It's even in bold, so you could notice it. (But again, too much to assume you would read what people say or write)
That doesn't even mention likelihood. Christ!
The point is that Ukraine are unlikely to win back their lost territory militarily.
"world renowned" Swift analysts put that "not high" probability at 4%.
Your evidence that it's likely?
Nowhere to be seen.
Why the ellipsis?
"The probability of a Ukrainian military victory - defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they claim as Crimea - the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily,"
And?
Any evidence at all that victory is likely? Anything whatsoever? One, even passing mention that contradicts the analysis by the Swift center?
Link to the source ?
I've already cited the source. I'm not playing this "let's wait a few pages and then pretend there's no citations" game. It's dull and transparent. Find a new game.
That's the game I'm playing: link the source you quote (if available online). And I couldn't find such a link from your previous posts.
The fact that I stated is that Milley doesn't see a quick victory for Ukraine (just as the Ukrainians don't either see it) makes you fantasize that Milley (or your Miley) is concluding "that Ukraine are either quite unlikely or very unlikely to win back the territory they are aiming to regain." That's simply is utterly false.
Please look at what he actually said (from the site given):
More of the timetable is actually discussed during the briefing.
And of course, the Ukrainians have put forward their terms, hence they are open for peace talks.
Where does he say that the Ukrainians are likely to win back their lost territory?
Where is the conclusion of swift analysts contradicted?
Where is any expert evidence at all that regaining the disputed territory is sufficiently likely?
Where is any expert opinion that Ukraine needn't cede territory as part of any deal?
The question is whether continued war is worth the cost. That question is answered by
1. What difference will it make to the lives of the population in that region being under Russian rule or Ukrainian rule?
2. What cost, in human lives and well-being, will it cost to regain the region.
Answering (1) requires an analysis of Ukraine's governance of the region.
Answering (2) requires an analysis of how long it will take, if ever, for Ukraine to regain the territory (assuming the costs of war increase with time).
Milley's comments speak to the latter, suggesting a long and costly war. So the benefits at 1 have to be even higher now. That's the conclusion these analyses yield.
To support your position in the light of them you need to show either that the benefits of 1 are even higher than previously thought, or that Milley et al. are wrong. You've done neither.
The costs of regaining the territory are too high relative to the gains.
What in "as long as it takes - for the territory to be intact" do you not understand?
Anytime soon doesn't mean never, especially when you just said the US will back them up as long as it takes. And notice just what Milley says:
And this is quite in line what the Ukrainians are actually thinking about: Crimea is an issue for next summer. Or something on that timeline.
It's interesting that those neonazis don't get the focus of those seeing neonazis in Ukraine as Putin sees. But Putin's far-right views are in line with the imperialist idea of Russia being the third and final Rome... and everything good coming from Holy Russia and everything bad coming from the decadent immoral West.
From Putin's annexation speech (30th September):
[sup]— Tom Nichols · The Atlantic · Nov 21, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Yaakov Kedmi
Quoting Tom Nichols
Oh wait, is that "mainstream"? A "partyline"...? :grin:
"Destruction of our nation is the sole reason for their existence."
Had some such comments — and this ain't the only one — come out of some small country, then some would just have gone ahead and called them paranoid already.
Repeat: No one is marching on Moscow, or have threatened with that. Yet! :wink:
Quoting Nov 17, 2022
[tweet]https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1593247334430699523[/tweet]
Huh ? Talking about the Nazi thing.
Nothing.
Third time. Where in that speech does it contradict the view that Ukraine are unlikely to regain their lost territory? I get that the US aim to support their attempt. That's obvious, it earns the hawks millions.
The question is whether it's worth it. It's no different question, it's the same one I've been asking for 300 pages and getting nothing but a fascinating range of ways of dodging the question.
Is the chance of Ukraine regaining their lost territories worth the cost? It's a simple question. How many lives is that region's choice of governance worth?
Videos Suggest Captive Russian Soldiers Were Killed at Close Range
[sup]— Malachy Browne, Stephen Hiltner, Chevaz Clarke-Williams, Taylor Turner · The New York Times · Nov 20, 2022[/sup]
[sup]• via Business Insider: UN reviewing video of captured Russian soldiers who appear to have been killed at close range, NYT reports[/sup]
[sup]• via Yahoo: UN reviewing video of captured Russian soldiers who appear to have been killed at close range, NYT reports[/sup]
Ukraine to investigate alleged prisoner shooting video
[sup]— Julia Mueller · The Hill · Nov 20, 2022[/sup]
Will see what comes of it.
Analysis: Surge in Russia's defence and security spending means cuts for schools and hospitals in 2023 [sup](via MSN, St Louis Post)[/sup]
[sup]— Darya Korsunskaya · Reuters · Nov 22, 2022[/sup]
Russia-Ukraine War By The Numbers
[sup]— The Onion · Apr 1, 2022[/sup]
Nobody is pushing for WW3 here. We just don,t understand why you guys would chose this hill to die on. What is the point of defending mass murderers on a philosophy forum?
When you in your ignorance (or living in your alternative reality) think there is no difference between Ukraine and Russia...
And don't understand why Ukrainians would fight an aggressor in the first place, because the only thing would be that more people would die....
Then it's obvious nobody can make you understand the reality here. That Ukrainians will fight an imperialist aggressor, which in the end will likely lose just like it lost in the Russo-Japanese war or in Afghanistan.
Yep. Ought they?
It's a simple question. Ought the Ukrainians fight this imperial aggressor to regain their lost territory? Not "will they?", "ought they?"
Why? What's wrong with all the other routes to freedom?
Are there what?
Seriously? You're asking if there's any other route to freedom other than war?
Did the South Africans have a war to get rid of Apartheid?
Which war overthrew the Ceau?escu regime?
I must have missed America's second civil war which brought about full emancipation for Blacks in the 60s
Or England's which gave women the vote
Or the full on invasion currently being executed by a bunch of school girls in Iran.
What a fucking stupid question.
Since 1990. From Wiki
1990: People's Movement I was a revolution to restore democracy in Nepal and end the panchayat system in Nepal.
1990–present: United Liberation Front of Asom launch major violent activities against Indian rule in Assam. To date, the resulting clashes with the Indian army have left more than 10,000 dead.[183]
1990: 1990 Mass Uprising in Bangladesh Strikes and Protests topple the Bangladeshi military government and democracy is restored for the first time in nine years.
1990: The Poll tax riots were a series of riots in British towns and cities during protests against the Community Charge introduced by the government of Margaret Thatcher.
1990–1992: Anticommunist forces led a National Democratic Revolution that overthrew President Ramiz Alia and ended with an election victory by the Democratic Party of Albania, the biggest anticommunist party in Albania.
1990–1995: The First Tuareg Rebellion in Niger and Mali.
1991: The Kurdish uprising against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Iraqi Kurdistan.
1991: The Shiite Uprising in Karbala, Iraq.
1991: The failed 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt takes place, leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union
1991: The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front take control of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, after dictator Haile Mariam Mengistu flees the country, bringing an end to the Ethiopian Civil War
1991: Somali National Movement rebels establish the Somaliland administration in northwestern Somalia, and declare the region independent from the rest of the country.
1992: 1992 Los Angeles riots
1992: Black May (1992) Thailand popular protest in Bangkok against the government of General Suchinda Kraprayoon and the military crackdown that followed. Up to 200,000 people demonstrated in central Bangkok at the height of the protests.
1992: Afghan uprising against the Taliban by United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, or the Northern Alliance.
1994: The 1990s Uprising in Bahrain, Shiite-led rebellion for the restoration of democracy in Bahrain.
1994: The Zapatista Rebellion: an uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas demanding equal rights for indigenous peoples and in opposition to growing neoliberalism in North America.
1997: The 1997 rebellion in Albania sparked by Ponzi scheme failures.
1998: The Indonesian Revolution of 1998 resulted the resignation of President Suharto after three decades of the New Order period.
1999: The Iran student protests, July 1999 were, at the time, the most violent protests to occur against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
1999–2000: The Cochabamba Water War in Bolivia.
2000s
Police clash with protestors during the December 2001 riots in Argentina.
2000–2005: The Second Intifada, a continuation of the First Intifada, between Palestinians and Israel.
2000: The bloodless Bulldozer Revolution, first of the four colour revolutions (in 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005), overthrows Slobodan Miloševi?'s régime in Yugoslavia.
2001: The 2001 Macedonia conflict.
following the 2001 war in Afghanistan which overthrew Taliban rule.
2001: The 2001 EDSA Revolution peacefully ousts Philippine President Joseph Estrada after the collapse of his impeachment trial.
2001: Supporters of former Philippine President Joseph Estrada violently and unsuccessfully stage a rally, so-called the EDSA Tres, in an attempt of returning him to power.
2001: Cacerolazo in Argentina. Following mass riots and a period of civil unrest, popular protests oust the government and two additional interim presidents within months. December 2001 riots in Argentina
2003–2005: Bolivian gas conflict.
2003: The Rose Revolution, second of the colour revolutions, displaces the president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and calls new elections.
2003–2011: The Iraqi insurgency refers to the armed resistance by diverse groups within Iraq to the U.S. occupation of Iraq and to the establishment of a liberal democracy therein.
2004–2004: The Shi'ite Uprising against the US-led occupation of Iraq.
2004–2005: The Orange Revolution in Ukraine. After pro-Russian prime minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner of the presidential elections, people took to the streets in protest against mass fraud and vote falsification. Eventually, the country's Supreme Court ordered a recount, in which pro-Western opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko was declared the winner. This was the third colour revolution.
2005: A failed attempt at popular colour-style revolution in Azerbaijan, led by the groups Yox! and Azadlig.
2004–present: The Naxalite insurgency in India, led by the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
2005: The Cedar Revolution, triggered by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, asks for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.
2005: The Tulip Revolution (a.k.a. Pink/Yellow Revolution) overthrows the President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, and set new elections. This is the fourth colour revolution.
2005: Paraguayan People's Army insurgency.
2005: 15 April Intifada – Arab uprising in the Iranian province of Khuzestan.
2005: Ecuador experiences a nationwide and countrywide revolution, consisting of rallies and demonstrations, rioting and protests in March–April 2005 from indigenous tribes that started with a protest that mushroomed into a widespread uprising and popular movement that led to the overthrow of the government.
2006: 2006 democracy movement in Nepal was a revolution against Undemocratic rule of King Gyanendra.
2006: The 2006 Oaxaca protests demanding the removal of Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, the governor of Oaxaca state in Mexico.
2006–present: The Mexican Drug War.
2007: The Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan emerged to restore a judge but eventually moved to rebel against the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf.
2007–2009: The Second Tuareg Rebellion in Niger.
2007: The Burmese anti-government protests, including the Saffron Revolution of Burmese Buddhist monks.
2008: 2008 Armenian presidential election protests.
2008: 2008 Kashmir Unrest.
2008: A Shiite uprising in Basra.
2008: Attacks in Lanao del Norte in the Philippines by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front led by Kumander Bravo and Umbrfa Kato.
2008: Anti-austerity protests in Ireland
2008: 2008 Tibetan unrest.
2009: 2009 Iranian presidential election protests, leading to development of Iranian Green Movement
2009: 2009 Bangladesh Rifles revolt took place in Dhaka, Bangladesh killing 57 army officers.
2009–2011: A civil uprising popularly known as the Kitchenware Revolution brought down the Icelandic government after the collapse of the country's financial system in October 2008.
2009: The 2009 Malagasy political crisis in the Madagascar.
2010s
Tahrir Square protest during the Arab Spring in Egypt.
A line of riot police in the city of Kyiv during the 2014 Ukrainian revolution.
YPJ fighters during the Rojava Revolution.
The sentencing of nine Catalan independence leaders in a 2019 trial triggered protests in Catalonia.
2019–20 Hong Kong protests
2010 Thai political protests.
2010–2011: 2010–2011 Ivorian crisis.
2010–2012: Tajikistan insurgency.
2010: Kyrgyz Revolution of 2010.
2010: Kashmir Unrest 2010.
2010–2012: Anti-austerity movement in Greece
2010–2012: Arab Spring:
The Tunisian Revolution (2010–2011) forces President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to resign and flee the country, and sets free elections.
The 2011 Egyptian revolution brings down the regime of President Hosni Mubarak.
2011 Post-civil war violence in Libya.
Bahraini uprising of 2011.
2011 Yemeni Revolution, the revolt that led to the eventual resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh as President of Yemen.
2011–present: Sinai insurgency.
2011: Cherán uprising.
2011: Wukan protests in China.
2011–present: Sudanese conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Iraqi insurgency (2011–2013).
2011–12 Maldives political crisis: Public protests and police mutiny lead to resignation of President Mohamed Nasheed.
2011–2012: Occupy movement.
2012–present: Rojava Revolution in Syrian Kurdistan.
2012–2015: Northern Mali conflict.
2012–2012: 2012 Tuareg rebellion.
2012–present: Central African Republic conflict–François Bozizé, president of the Central African Republic, is overthrown by the rebel coalition Seleka, led by Michel Djotodia.
2012–2013: M23 rebellion.
2012–2015 unrest in Romania.
2013: 2013 Protests in Brazil
2013 Eritrean Army mutiny.
2013: Gezi Park protests in Turkey.
2013–present: Turkey–ISIL conflict.
2013 South Sudanese political crisis.
2013–14 Tunisian protests against the Ennahda-led government.
RENAMO insurgency (2013–2019).
2013–2014: Euromaidan.
2014 Ukrainian Revolution.
2013–14 Thai political crisis.
2013–14 Cambodian protests.
2014–present: 2014 Protests in Venezuela.
Iraqi Civil War (2014–2017).
2014: Abkhazian Revolution.
2014: The Umbrella Revolution of Hong Kong
2014 Burkinabé uprising.
2014: Ferguson unrest in Missouri
2015–present: Yemeni Civil War (2015–present).
Burundian unrest (2015–18).
2015–present: Kurdish–Turkish conflict (2015–present).
2015–present: ISIL insurgency in Tunisia.
2015: 2015 Baltimore protests
2016–present: 2016 Niger Delta conflict.
2016 Ethiopian protests.
2016 Mong Kok civil unrest, also known as "Fishball Revolution" in Mong Kok, Hong Kong
2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, a failed military coup.
2016–17 South Korean protests, or Candlelight Revolution, in South Korea.
2016–17 Kashmir unrest.
2016–17: United States election protests – protests challenging the outcome of the 2016 United States presidential election.
2017 Ivory Coast mutiny.
2017: 2017 Military Police of Espírito Santo strike in Espírito Santo, Brazil.[184][185][186]
2017–18 Spanish constitutional crisis.
2017–2018 Romanian protests.
2017–2018 Iranian protests.
2018–present: 2018–19 Arab protests:
2018 Jordanian protests.
2018–2019: Sudanese Revolution, which resulted in the ouster of the President.
2019–2020 Algerian protests, also called Revolution of Smiles or Hirak Movement.
2019–present: 2019 Iraqi protests, also nicknamed the October Revolution, and 2019 Iraqi Intifada.
2019–present: 2019–20 Lebanese protests, also referred to as the Lebanese revolt.
2018 Armenian Velvet Revolution, which resulted in the ouster of the Prime Minister.
2018–2019 Gaza border protests, also referred to by organizers as the "Great March of Return".
2018–2020: 2018–20 Nicaraguan protests.
2018–2019: 2018–2019 Haitian protests.
2018–2019 Ingushetia protests
2018–present: Yellow vests protests.
2019–2020: 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests
2019 Papua protests.
2019 Indonesian protests and riots.
2019 Puerto Rico Anti-Corruption / Chat scandal Protest.
2019–present: Dutch farmers' protests.
2019 Ecuadorian protests.
2019–2020 Catalan protests.
2019–2022 Chilean protests, also called "Estallido social".
2019–2020 Iranian protests.
2019–2020: Citizenship Amendment Act protests, in India.
2020s
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Protests over responses to the COVID-19 pandemic – a series of protests around the world against various governments' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly lockdowns.
Strikes during the COVID-19 pandemic – strikes against wages or low hazard pay, insufficient workplace hazard controls such as a lack of personal protective equipment or social distancing, high rents or evictions, and the pandemic's general economic impact.
2020–2022 United States racial unrest – a series of protests against racial inequality and police brutality in the United States, sometimes in favor of abolishing or defunding the police.
George Floyd protests.
Breonna Taylor protests.
Kenosha unrest.
2020–2022 Minneapolis–Saint Paul racial unrest.
2020–2021 Bulgarian protests – protests against Boyko Borisov's government.
2020–2021 Belarusian protests – protests against Alexander Lukashenko's government.
2020–2022 Thai protests – pro-democracy protests for reform to the Thai monarchy and against the 2017 Thai Constitution and Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha's government.
2020 Malian protests, also called "Malian Spring".
2020 Inner Mongolia protests
2020–2021 women's strike protests in Poland – protests against a Constitutional Tribunal ruling restricting abortion.
End SARS protests – protests to abolish the Special Anti-Robbery Squad in Nigeria.
2020 Kyrgyz protests, also called the Kyrgyz Revolution of 2020.
Indonesia omnibus law protests – protests against the Omnibus Law on Job Creation.
2020 Peruvian protests – protests against the removal of Martín Vizcarra.
2020 Guatemalan protests
2020–2021 Indian farmers' protest – protests against the 2020 Indian agriculture acts.
2020 United States election protests – protests challenging the legitimacy of the results in the 2020 United States presidential election.
2021 storming of the United States Capitol
Attempts to overturn the 2020 United States presidential election
2021 Bo?aziçi University protests
2021 Tunisian protests
2021 Russian protests
2021–2022 Myanmar protests, also called the Spring Revolution.
2021 Greek protests
2021 Bangladesh anti-Modi protests
2021 Northern Ireland riots
2021 Colombian protests
2021 Senegalese protests
2021 Eswatini anti-monarchy protests
2021 South African unrest
2021 Brazilian protests
2021 Cuban protests, also called the Cuba Libre movement.
2021–2022 Iranian protests
Panjshir conflict, started on August 2021
2021–2022 Afghan protests
2021 Solomon Islands unrest
2021–2022 Serbian environmental protests
2022 Kazakh unrest, also called Bloody January, known originally in Kazakhstan as Zhanaozen22.
2022 Freedom Convoy
2022 Sri Lankan protests
2022 Corsica unrest
2022 Argentinian protests
2022 Azadi march
2022 Karakalpak protests
2022 Ecuadorian protests
2022 Peruvian protests
2022 Iranian food protests
2022 Iranian protests
2022 Brazilian election protests
2022 Azadi March-II
What a fucking stupid answer... The situation in Ukraine is totally different from women vote in the UK or apartheid in SA, and routes available there might not be available here.
And all the other countries listed above? Ukraine different to all those too? You're suggesting that the situation in Crimea and Donbas is different to virtually every other country in the world which has, at one time or another, brought about freedoms through means other than war.
Each case is unique. History is not done in a laboratory with interchangeable mice, history is not replicable, and hence the course of history cannot be predicted. Nobody can tell with certainty, faced with situation X, that "based on what history tells us, the right move now is Y", because there never was in history a case that was exactly similar to X.
Beside, it's not like there is no historical precedent for war as a means to freedom. If the UK can wage a just war against the Nazis, then Ukraine can wage a just war against Putin's forces.
Yep.
I'm not the one arguing that there are no other choices.
There are two ways the region can move toward freedom.
Fighting a war to ensure control by a more freedom oriented government.
Ceding that war and fighting a series of protests and political campaigns to make the occupying government more freedom oriented.
I'm asking why you rule out the second option. And, more importantly, I'm asking for the expert evidence on which you base that judgment.
I don't rule it out. The two options are not mutually exclusive and can be pursued concurrently.
Why rule out the first option?
Thousands dead (possibly hundreds of thousands). Tiny chance of success. No real improvement on the second option.
Option 1 - Ukraine retake the region militarily and their government continues its moves toward greater freedom
Option 2 - the region is ceded to Russia and we support protest movements and political campaigns to oust Putin's regime so the people of the region can move toward greater freedom
Has Crimea's time under the Russians resulted in hundreds of thousands dead, infrastructure destroyed and decades of debt? No.
Has it risked nuclear war? No.
Has is caused global famines, health disruptions, economic crises and fuels shortages? No.
Has Putin 'getting away with' invading Crimea resulted in a mass campaign of European invasions? No.
So it's very hard to see how Ukraine invading Crimea is going to bring about a net gain in well-being.
Risk assessment and probability. Is the "defeat of Russia" worth gambling a nuclear war? One issue is if a nuclear power can be so defeated when the stakes are this high. The gamble is extremely dangerous with very, very bad odds.
Quoting Olivier5
This is one of the issues here that we are incapable of communicating properly it seems. I think one can confuse explanations of behavior with defending the behavior.
If I say that no nuclear power would accept humiliation at such a scale, I am not defending Putin's actions, I am describing a situation.
Yes, he is a mass murderer. But so are most of the leaders in NATO too - given very recent history, so that's not a special argument of some kind.
There is no evidence of that. Arguably, a thousand year Russian reich over Ukraine would kill many many times more people (over thge years) than a quick war of liberation.
Geopolitics are not a sub-field of mathematics. You cannot base geopolitical decisions on mathematical equations. There are too many unknowns.
There's ample evidence. We have the numbers killed in the current war and the numbers dead under Russian occupation of Crimea. These are known facts. The numbers don't stack up.
Quoting Olivier5
Probably, yes. Can you cite a single country in the modern world which has suffered a thousand years of oppression without revolution? Most ex-Soviet countries didn't last more than a few decades before throwing off their oppressors, and we already have the figures from 8 years of Russian occupation of Crimea.
And do you have any expert evidence at all that this will be a 'quick war' of liberation. I'm not interested in your armchair reckoning.
You've provided no evidence at all that continued Russian occupation of Crimea will result in more deaths than continued war, you've given no evidence that the war will be 'quick' and you've given no evidence that Russia's 'Reich' will last a thousand years. We can all just make stuff up off the top of our heads.
Quoting Olivier5
Then on what do we base decisions where there are fewer unknowns? So far you've offered nothing but your idiosyncratic, uniformed guesswork.
No, you are just saying something you have absolutely no clue about and no evidence for. Uninformed opinions have zero value; and when taken as facts, they even have negative value (are detrimental). So please stop putting out your uninformed opinion as if they were facts. Try to think before you post, and challenge yourself a bit.
Quoting Manuel
Rest assured that no one is gambling a nuclear war. Biden has told Putin that nukes should not be considered, and Putin has said that nukes are not being considered.
Well then, don't ask questions that require armchair reckoning...
Quoting Isaac
We take decisions based on gut feeling, most of times.
I'm not. There's a whole army of qualified experts out there publishing their findings from whom you can obtain informed opinion.
The numbers of dead in the war thus far are not 'armchair reckoning', they are statistics gathered by various expert agencies.
The number killed in Crimea under Russian occupation are not 'armchair reckoning', they are figures gathered by several Human Rights groups with many years of experience doing just that.
The chances of Ukraine succeeding in re-taking Crimea are not 'armchair reckoning'. They are figures arrived at by experts with, collectively, hundreds' of man hours in the field doing exactly those kinds of calculations.
The experience of counties under oppressive regimes is not 'armchair reckoning'. Hundreds of historians have carefully reviewed the evidence and reached informed conclusions about how such cultures respond.
If you can't be bothered to back up your opinions with research then stick to topics where the facts don't matter
So considering that...
Quoting Olivier5
You'll have no trouble backing up that opinion with evidence then.
So why do you ask me? Ask your qualified experts, if you trust them rather than me.
Quoting Isaac
You have no idea what you are talking about, displaying all the hubris of the typical armchair cretin, taking himself for God. How many Russians have died in this war so far, pray tell? How many Ukrainians? No armchair reckoning allowed...
Quoting Isaac
Oh yeah? Can you list the names of these historians? I'm curious about "how counties under oppressive regimes respond". Like, I am really curious about how the countries under the oppressive regime of the USSR responded. I wonder if Tchekoslovakia or Hungary or Poland ever tried to free themselves from Soviet oppression, and whether they succeeded... That would be interesting to study, no? :-)
No problem at all.
Go on then.
While you're at it, we'll have the evidence for...
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Olivier5
I'm not asking you for data, I'm asking you why you hold the position you do.
Quoting Olivier5
4.
Quoting Olivier5
100,000,000.
Presumably, if we have "no idea" then you'll have no grounds on which to contest those numbers.
I don't see how Ukraine could justify continuing a war which will likely kill another 45 million people as have already been killed when Russia have sustained only one stubbed toe of a soldier who tripped over a tree stump.
Especially when you consider that under Ukraine, 8,000,000,000 people were unlawfully killed in Crimea...or was it 4? Shame we just can't know these things isn't it.
Which position, again?
Your support for continued war. That Ukraine ought (not 'will', 'ought') to regain their lost territory by military means.
More importantly, that others who disagree are so mistaken that the only rational explanation for their position is that they are pro-Russia, or Putin supporters, or even actually work for the FSB.
It's the latter I'm most interested in. The grounds on which you find alternative views so untenable.
Well then don't give it to me. Give it to all the other people reading the thread. After all...
Quoting Olivier5
...so we'd best rectify that.
This applies to yourself too. As for evidence, there is a lot of it, which has been posted here by many members, including most importantly, NATO's decision to not implement a No-Fly Zone.
I am aware that my "side" is effectively saying that Ukraine is going to have to give up more land. That's not a palatable view, but I happen to think it is the least harmful one. So maybe it can be considered a challenge to myself, whatever that means.
Quoting Olivier5
There aren't any assurances in politics, despite the rhetoric.
Why do you think it's not a palatable view?
That quite probably Ukraine will lose, not only Crimea (which has been more or less taken for granted by the rest of the world), but also these new "liberated cities". I do not know where the borders will be finally established, but I think this is something that Ukraine will be forced to concede.
I hope I am wrong though.
You wrote:
Quoting Manuel
My question is: why do you think that "Ukraine is going to have to give up more land" is not a palatable view? Don't you think that "Ukraine is going to have to sacrifice more lives to have a chance of regaining lands" is not a palatable view either? Yet Ukrainians seem to find sacrificing or risking their people's life for an uncertain but desirable outcome (namely fighting to free their lands) more palatable than conceding lands. So what is making conceding lands instead of sacrificing people to free lands so unpalatable?
Superpowers are perfectly capable of losing a war without using nukes. It has hapened before. Or did the USSR use nuclear weapons against Afghanistan? Did the US use nukes against Vietnam?
Quoting Manuel
That would be what you are saying, and I congratulate you for your clarity and frankness. But I am not sure that this message is representative of anybody else on "your side", or that there is such a thing as "your side". Others have been more ambiguous.
Well, it's both at the moment. People are being killed and land has been stolen (though some of it has been taken back for the moment). The issue you are pointing to, namely sacrificing "people for an uncertain... outcome", is less problematic from a narrative perspective, because they are fighting against an aggressor for dignity's sake.
As I see it, by arguing that Russia will end up with a portion (if not all of it) of the seized territory, it is pointless to let civilians die with no realistic hope of retaining such lands. I don't see this as a good reason for dying or being killed.
Not to mention the specter of escalation, which would involve everybody else.
Yeah yeah, these cases have been mentioned in this thread several times already, I'm surprised you haven't seen them. Afghanistan and Vietnam are quite different given the context and the importance of the countries involved.
And speaking of "defeat" in the case of Vietnam is rather misleading.
In my opinion, it is absurd to fear a Russian defeat in Ukraine, as you seem to do, on the ground that they will go nuclear if they lose. That idea implies that all non-nuclear nations must always agree to the will of nuclear nations.
Why are your only two options total military defeat or submission to their will? Has the concept of negotiations passed you by entirely?
What happened to...
Quoting Olivier5
Suddenly history become all important again now it backs up your position. The case not so "unique" anymore, now it suits you to see it as the same.
I mean, at least wait a full page before completely reversing your argument to suit your pro-US narrative.
https://slantchev.wordpress.com/2022/11/17/it-does-not-matter-what-happens-putin-must-be-given-a-slice-of-ukraine-walt-in-fp/
What does dignity have to do with land to you? Consider the case of, Kurds and Palestinians, they are fighting against much greater regional foreign powers for having a land internationally acknowledged to them and sovereign (which never happened) for generations. Do they have any chance to win for something they "never" had? How many lives is their fight worth?
Quoting Manuel
The ~9 year Soviet-Afghan war caused between 6.5%–11.5% of Afghanistan's 1979 population of 13.5 million is estimated to have perished in the conflict. The war caused grave destruction in Afghanistan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Afghan_War) what were the chances for the Afghans to win a war against the second strongest army in the world of a state with nuclear weapons? What was that chance at the beginning of the war, in the middle of the war, and by the end of the war? Finally the Soviet Union withdraw and the Soviets' failure in the war is thought to be a contributing factor to the fall of the Soviet Union (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Afghan_War)
As regards the study of history and its place in geopolitical analysis, the way I see it in my non-determinist, anti-historicist Popperian way, historical precedents are useful to show the range of possibilities, the range of potential outcome in a given situation, but they do not constrain that range. History does not repeat itself, it is unpredictable.
IOW, history can tell you that X is a possibility, and has in the past happened after Y, so if you do Y now, there is a possibility of X happening. What history cannot tell you is things like: "X will certainly happen as a result to Y". Historian have no crystal ball.
So, in our case, it is a fact that superpowers have lost wars without using nukes before. Therefore such a thing is historically possible. So if Russia loses to Ukraine, there is certainly a possibility that it will not use nukes. It is also a fact that no superpower faced with an embarassing defeat against a smaller nation, has ever resorted to nukes before. So one can possibly say that "there is no historical precedent for Russia nuking Ukraine." But one cannot say for certain, based on a historical analysis, that Russia will not use nukes in Ukraine. And there is zero historical precedent to say that Russia will certainly use nukes in Ukraine.
But perhaps these nuances are a bit too sophisticated for you.
So? Who did you think needed telling that?
What, in @Manuel's post gave you the impression he thought Russia either must use nukes or must not?
It was referred to as...
Quoting Manuel
...and your counterargument was that it was...
Quoting Olivier5
Your evidence from history contradicts neither and supports neither.
We are getting side-tracked from the origin of the comment:
The point of my original comment was that Olivier was suggesting that I am presenting a view that has "no evidence" in its favor: that a nuclear armed country like Russia would accept humiliation at these scales given all that has taken place since this war began.
Hence, I should "challenge" myself. Because for some unexplained reason, if you don't support the continuation of this war by "supporting Ukraine", then one isn't challenging oneself.
So this is how it is: if you fall in line with Western Propaganda (US, EU, British, Australian), you are being brave, support democracy and are against dictatorship.
If you disagree and think this war should end now, then one is a Putin Supporter and a sympathizer for dictators.
That out of the way, let's go to your examples:
By now the Palestinian cause is widely recognized, up until the mid-early 2000's, if you supported Palestine, you were a terrorist sympathizer. Do they have a chance to get a two-state solution? Israel is uninterested and is instead stealing everything of value in the West Bank. What options do they have? They could try and change Israeli society from the inside through the Arab parties - unlikely to happen but it's an option.
Or they could keep forcing for a two-state solution, which is what is recognized by international law. Regardless of how they act, they will be killed, as can be seen almost every day in Israeli news. It makes sense for them to get a state, if only to be able to live a semi normal life.
The Kurds have been betrayed by everybody at one point or another. They do have a quite advanced society, which merits autonomy. Will they get it? Who knows. These topics deserve whole threads not brief comments.
Quoting neomac
Afghanistan has been fiendishly difficult to conquer for hundreds of years, we also see how they managed to get rid of a much larger US army, never mind the Soviet one.
But on to the important issue, what was there in Afghanistan than the Soviet Union cared enough about such that they would resort to nuclear war? Did "the West" sanction the Soviet Union for going into Afghanistan? Did the West say that victory for them means that the Soviet Union cannot win this war?
Was the global economy in a fritz because of Soviet war in Afghanistan?
No - these are quite different times. The stakes are much higher in all respects.
You of course, eternally confused as you are.
Then why did you post it in reply to @Manuel?
My re-involvement here was occasioned by a silly remark made by Christoff about people wanting the war to stop being labeled "Putinistas" or something like that.
Olivier replied to that, then it took off. I needn't have - you are more than doing enough presenting a coherent position that seeks to de-escalate, none of this macho-bullshit.
I have trouble understanding the war aims of the people who are argue "for Ukraine." We will see, maybe by January, how this pans out....
Thanks. I often wonder if anyone is even reading what I write.
Quoting Manuel
Yes. It's what keeps me here, my interest in what motivates such a position and, more importantly, the methods employed to maintain it against contrary arguments. Endlessly fascinating, but more than a little disturbing too.
This...
Quoting Olivier5
...is in reply to https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/758255.
If all your historical examples show is that it's possible for a superpower to lose a war without using nukes, then they are utterly redundant. Nothing in what @Manuel argued suggested an illusion that it was impossible for a superpower to lose a war without using nukes. The argument was about the likelihood.
If there’s no historical precedent for it, how likely can it be?
As high as the causal factors suggest. Events don't happen because history books dictate they should. Events happen as a consequence of their immediate causes. Expert analysts consider the current set of immediate circumstances to present a small but significant risk of nuclear escalation.
The fact that your analysis is limited to two historical examples is the reason why you are not counted among that body of experts.
LOL. How could you possibly know that I’m not one of ‘them experts’, for one, and that the reason is precisely that my analysis is limited to two historical examples, for two? This kind of cheap shot is precisely why I will never take you seriously though.
Quoting Isaac
My analysis is that a very small risk of nuclear escalation exists, additional to what this risk has historically been before February. This risk has evidently already been factored in by NATO members, as evidenced by the lack of allied support for a brand new Ukrainian airforce for instance. That decision was already some form of yielding to the superpower nuclear status of Russia. I think it was enough. In fact I wonder if we shouldn’t revisit the issue of some no-fly-zone, given the current abuse of civilian targets by Russia.
A reasonable and fair settlement, or starting point perhaps, could be ...
• Ukraine not to join NATO
• Ukraine to allow UN/similar inspectors to check for atrocities
• Ukraine and Russia to come to agreement like or based on the Kharkiv Pact
• Ukraine otherwise intact, free, sovereign — and not bombed
• Russian military personnel in Ukraine to go home
• any Ukrainians taken to Russia to be recorded and (allowed) to return home, first and foremost children and political prisoners
• some sort of guarantees to be signed ? for all to see
• ?
This more or less meets stated demands. If someone wishes something else, then it can be stated, justified, negotiated, whatever. Maybe no-NATO isn't enough? Could add, say, no UK/US/Romanian/French military installations in Ukraine...?
To be investigated (doesn't seem like someone you'd want to surrender to):
Some Russian commanders encouraged sexual violence, says lawyer advising Kyiv
[sup]— Joanna Plucinska, Anthony Deutsch, Stefaniia Bern · Reuters · Nov 23, 2022[/sup]
[sup]• via Business Insider, MSN, The Jerusalem Post[/sup]
(? there are other concerns of relevance here)
Some sort of rebuilding/reparations discussions would be appropriate:
Russian attacks force shutdown of all Ukrainian nuclear power plants
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Nov 23, 2022[/sup]
Putin spreads 'terror and murder' across Ukraine with new missile blitz leaving cities without power and claiming lives in Kyiv after newborn was killed in overnight maternity ward strike
[sup]— Rachael Bunyan · Daily Mail · Nov 23, 2022[/sup]
Russia launches new wave of missile strikes across Ukraine
[sup]— The Kyiv Independent · Nov 23, 2022[/sup]
Admittedly, this may not look all that good for Putin's Russia. Regardless, I'd say take it to the diplomats. Besides, if they were ever serious about their parts of the stated demands, then they can't dismiss such a proposal with a handwave. Without getting talks going, all bets are off. Get things on the table.
That component is where the support of sanctions goes beyond deals made about territory and people. With the ongoing campaign to destroy residential infrastructure, Russia does not seem to be concerned about racking up costs in that regard to achieve their goals. Whatever deal might be made between the combatants, the Russians seem to think they can avoid some kind of Treaty of Versailles.
... could be put on the table in talks. :up: (If they don't feel too embarrassed?)
The reports in the post are from one day. Kind of obscene.
European Parliament declares Russia a state sponsor of terrorism
[sup]— Siebold, Trevelyan, Hunder, Meijer, Strauss, Baum, Macfie · Reuters · Nov 23, 2022[/sup]
[sup]• via MSN[/sup]
I think one of the bigger problems is Ukraine wanting security guarantees. It's not getting them from the West, no mutual defense pacts and no joining NATO. That last option was already explicitly taken off the table by several NATO members.
Possibly Ukrainian security can be created through a demilitarised zone but I'm not sure how much sense that makes with Crimea containing an important naval base. Nevertheless perhaps a DMZ for grounds forces along the Eastern Ukraine-Russia border would be enough. You can't invade with boats after all.
The second problem is how much land the Ukrainians are willing to part with. Negotiating now means giving up land and if the Ukrainians can continue to make gains, then the timing is not good for them. And that's also dependent on "ally fatigue", which I thought weird was openly communicated. Why not say "hey, Russia, we'll probably blink before you so just keep it up and you'll get the upper hand". That only makes sense if Russia has communicated a palatable (to NATO/USA) solution to the conflict.
They naturally ought to fight, and that fight has been proven very successful. An invader that thinks your sovereign state is artificial, that ought to be part of Russia (because of history) and you ought to be Russian and you don't deserve to have your own country, as we have seen from what kind of actions implemented on the occupied territory, is the worst kind of occupier.
But you don't care a damn about the Ukrainians, aren't interested at all and simply have no idea just why they should defend themselves.
When you don't get this kind of truths into your head, as noted, there's no point of continuing this topic with you.
Very simply: a free Ukraine and a free Russia.
@EP_President
The @Europarl_EN [European parliament] is under a sophisticated cyberattack. A pro-Kremlin group has claimed responsibility.
Our IT experts are pushing back against it & protecting our systems.
This, after we proclaimed Russia as a State-sponsor of terrorism.
My response: #SlavaUkraini
4:45 PM · Nov 23, 2022
I think that polarization is inevitable as well as the risk of being perceived by other interlocutors as serving somebody else's political agenda (implicitly or explicitly). The reason is that we are part of a competitive game (at all levels) that is bigger than us and the endgame will impact all of us. So whatever nuance and impartiality one may want to put in their own views, it is likely going to get lost in the process of collective choice making. In other words, we can reason and analyse geopolitical conflicts of such magnitude for the intellectual fun of it (or for moral concerns?) in a forum but in the end we can't likely hope to be more than polarised political "meme" vectors in the geopolitical arena.
Quoting Manuel
The reason why I cited those examples (along with the Afghan case) is because you claimed: As I see it, by arguing that Russia will end up with a portion (if not all of it) of the seized territory, it is pointless to let civilians die with no realistic hope of retaining such lands. The story of those people fighting for their "claimed" land for generations shows that their motivation and endurance is not weakened by to the kind of reasoning that makes you think their fight is pointless. And Ukrainians may show analogous motivation and endurance wrt the Russians, no matter how much land Russia has currently annexed nor to what extent it has military means to preserve it.
Quoting Manuel
You are moving from what is at stake for Afghans (which is relevant to guide our expectations about their behavior and prospects of success), to what is at stake for all other players. So I’d say we concur on a couple of points: first, if we want to better assess the relevance of a conflict for us we should move from the stakes of one player to the stakes of all other players directly and indirectly impacted by such conflict (including us). Second, the Ukrainian conflict risks to become a more open & direct confrontation between Russia and the West than the Afghan proxy war because Russia has annexed Ukrainian territories [1].
Therefore I wouldn’t talk just about what Ukrainians want and can achieve at the expense of Russia, but also about what the West wants and can achieve at the expense of Russia.
[1] FYI, concerning Western sanctions against the USSR for the soviet aggression in Afghanistan, you can read here: http://www.americanstudies.history.knu.ua/en/archive/11-2/2021-11-kovalkov/
This is why I like discussing with you. You never fail to disappoint. Just when I think your defence mechanisms can't get any more ridiculous, you come out with "I might be an expert". Priceless.
Hey, we might all be experts. Bagsy being the spy.
Quoting Olivier5
My analysis is that a significant risk of nuclear escalation exists, additional to what this risk has historically been before February. This risk has not fully been factored in by NATO members, as evidenced by the continued supply of weapons for instance. That decision was already some form of yielding to the superpower nuclear status of Russia. I think it wasn't enough. We shouldn’t revisit the issue of some no-fly-zone, given the current risk of severe escalation by Russia.
So that's our uniformed, pointless analyses done. How dull.
Anything of interest to add? Like why you prefer your analysis over that of the experts reaching a different conclusion? You know, the sorts of matters laymen can discuss on a discussion forum.
If you spent less time trying to make everyone else's views out to be "absurd" or, "biased", or uniquely "ideological", and spent a little more time defending why you've chosen your beliefs we might have a more fruitful discussion.
OK. So why?
Now we've got past the pointless repetitions of the mere fact that they're probably going to fight and into the matter of interest - on what moral grounds ought they fight?
Do they have a moral right to some piece of geography? If so, did Russia have a similar moral right to Chechnya?
Do they have a moral duty to fight aggressors? If so, then why do we not? Why is NATO not there too?
Do they have a moral right to respond as they see fit? If so, does that autonomy extend to Pro-Russian elements in Crimea and Donbas?
I can clearly see a moral allowance for fighting back. If someone comes to take what's your by force, it seems fair use equal force to retain it. But I can't see how you're getting from a moral allowance to a moral duty - that they actually ought to fight back, not merely that they could.
And when doe they have any moral compulsion to take into account collateral damage? If their actions risk nuclear escalation, or if their action risk further starvation, or health risks in less well-off countries, are they absolved of all responsibility? How so?
If you do not clarify what you consider "moral ground" vs "non-moral ground" and "moral right" vs "non-moral right", "moral duty" vs "non-moral duty" and there is no convergence in the usage of such notions, you and your interlocutor will inadvertently talk past each other. Examples may be very helpful in clarifying things: e.g. "If someone comes to take what's your by force, it seems fair use equal force to retain it". Here is mine "if someone comes to take what's legitimately yours by force, it seems fair to use all force it's necessary to retain it if not more to deter or disable the robber, or even other potential robbers from trying to do it again".
I'm interested here in why people believe the things they do, so there's no need for me to clarify anything in the respect you suggest. I'd be as interested in any answer regardless of the definitions used. In fact the more diverse the definition, the better.
As far as I'm concerned something like "moral ground" just defines a set of conditions. The debate is about what sorts of conditions belong in that set. If I pre-define the set, then the conditions which belong in it become a matter of mere accordance with that (my) definition. A fairly boring exercise in consistency - we might as well be doing maths. The interesting discussion is in the disagreements about the definition (about what belongs in that set) and the reasons for believing in those criteria.
You're asking me to clearly define 'chair' and then ask people if, according to my criteria, the thing they're sitting on is, in fact, a chair.
I've no interest in that. I want to know what people think the thing they're sitting on is. I want to know if they think it's a chair.
Speak for yourself. All you can do is parrot little me, incapable as you are to contribute original ideas.
But what if your mission here was different from just contradicting whatever Olivier says, in a manic, mechanical manner? What if you developed your own ideas and personality, and let the chips fall where they may? It won't be the end of the world if once in a while you happen to agree with me, or with someone else here.
Quoting Isaac
Most experts I've read from (French dudes you wouldn't know of) seem to agree that Ukraine has a good chance of recovering territories, that the Russian army is disorganized and liable to collapse, that Putin's territorial ambitions need to be pushed back against, that the risk of nuclear escalation is exaggerated by Kremlin-affiliated cretins, and that it won't succeed in intimidating Ukraine or NATO. Now do tell what the 'experts' that you are reading about are saying. I'm sure you can find some anglo boys out there, barely weaned from their mother's milk and with fresh oxbridge degrees in their pocket, whom I would not have heard of.
So, do I take it you've no intention of giving any explanation as to why you've chosen to believe those experts (nor even telling us who they are it seems). How dull.
We're not conducting a poll. We're not compiling a database of 'things Olivier thinks'.
We're having a discussion. So to take part you need to be able to support your position, explain why you prefer some explanations over others. Otherwise there's nothing to discuss.
Quoting Olivier5
You're embarrassing yourself. Anyone following the thread can see that I've already done that in spades.
If you want to have a fair intellectual debate on matter of morality you have to be ready to explicit your own set of conditions and your own reasons for believing them to others as well. Otherwise your interlocutor has no compelling reason to find your interest in their views or questioning their views intellectually challenging (even more so if you do not care about consistency). This becomes evident when you frame a problem within your idiosyncratic set of assumptions which others do not necessarily share and then you complain that they keep dodging your questions based on such assumptions (like "How many lives is that region's choice of governance worth?") precisely for that reason.
And if you are interested in the disagreement then why you write comments such as the following?
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
I don't read your posts much, so I wouldn't know. Last time I did see one of your "experts", he looked 20 years old and fatuous, like a young you, which is perhaps why you chose him?
My go-to experts on military mattersd in Ukraine are Michel Goya, ex-colonel and military historian and commentator, Xavier Tytelman from the website Air&Cosmos, ex-military pilot and aviation specialist, and the good guys in ISW. I also consult this Youtube channel, signaled here by another poster and generally informative.
Quoting Isaac
There is never anything to discuss with you, and we are certainly not having what I would call a discussion. We would need some mutual trust to have a discussion. At best, I use you as a pretext for posting.
https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/18/russia-risks-becoming-ungovernable-and-descending-into-chaos
So why them?
Which one said that, for example,...
Quoting Olivier5
...and why did you choose to believe them over, say, Swift Center analysts, or Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s deputy secretary general from 2012 to 2016, who said that Western leaders had concluded that Russian plans to use nuclear weapons in a major crisis were sincere, raising the risk from any accident or misstep that the Kremlin mistook for war, or Dmitry Gorenburg, an analyst of Russian military policy who said "The escalation dynamics of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia could easily spiral into a nuclear exchange", or Samuel Charap, Russian foreign policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, who said "Between volunteers from NATO countries, all this NATO weaponry, reinforcement of Poland and Romania...they might connect dots that we didn’t intend to be connected and decide they need to pre-empt", or Christopher Chivvis, Senior Fellow and Director American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment who said "Scores of war games carried out by the United States and its allies in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine make it clear that Putin would probably use a nuclear weapon if he concludes that his regime is threatened. In most games, Russia still responds with a second nuclear attack, but in the games that go “well,” the United States and Russia manage to de-escalate after that, although only in circumstances where both sides have clear political off-ramps and lines of communication between Moscow and Washington have remained open. In all the other games, the world is basically destroyed"?
What is it about the message of the people you choose to believe which makes it so attractive to you?
Because I don't know who these guys are, never heard of them, and have not assessed their credibility and biases critically and effectively as I tend to do before I trust folks. What I am not prepared to do is trust average 'experts' out there whom I haven't assessed first. Unlike you, I have no intellectual inferiority complex.
So, should a times come when I need to study those guys, I will study them and their biases, and I might end up using them if I can trust them enough. In the meantime, I don't see a point.
Interesting. So, your study of the credibility and biases of the sources you do use - how was that carried out, and what were the results?
Take...
Quoting Olivier5
...for example. What checks did you carry out as to their credibility and bias? What was it about the results which satisfied you?
Quoting Olivier5
Odd. What might prompt such a time? You read a quote from someone with apparent credentials (I supplied their qualification details) saying that the position you support might well lead to nuclear war, and you think "well, maybe something will crop up where I need to check these guys out, but threat of nuclear war isn't it" - well, what the fuck is?
You don't?
Quoting Isaac
I don't know even their organisations. Never heard of "Swift", for instance.
Quoting Isaac I could come across one of these guys saying something I find interesting or dubious enough that it warrants additional review.
Quoting Isaac
I checked his sources as much as possible , anbd found out that he relies on microdata from Ukrainian and Russian foot soldiers on the front, Russian milbloggers, and satelite imagery analysis - also uses a lot of excellent newspaper sources such as Medusa. I looked at the amount of data vs interpretation in his videos, at the consistency of his message over time (contradictions are a bit tell tale sign) and consistency with other trusted sources e.g. ISW (the main benchmark of everyone right now), also at the amount of bad news (for Ukraine) he is channeling and the distance he takes with official Ukrainian positions, the latter as a check for wishful thinking tendencies. He past those tests, though I find his quality to be decreasing over time: he provides less and less data, and more and more interpretation, perhaps because less and less open source info is available.
All this to show that this source assessment is not something done once and for all, but a "living document".
You don't know who NATO are? Never heard of RAND Corporation? Never come across Carnegie Endowment?
What about the US intelligence service? Heard of them. Their director Avril Haines warned that Putin was likely to use nuclear weapons if he felt an existential threat to Russia and that "We do think that [Putin’s perception of an existential threat] could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine, and that Nato in effect is either intervening or about to intervene in that context, which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine"
Or perhaps the most senior intelligence official in the US isn't qualified enough for you. Perhaps she ought to have consulted some bloke off YouTube or a retired pilot.
That would be ideal. Hard seeing it actually happening. Not impossible, obviously, but I don't see what possible things must happen for such a situation to materialize.
Quoting neomac
Very much so. I mean the caveats and nuances one may argue for, in the end, are "just" that, caveats and nuances, the "endgame" being the same (from your "opponents" perspective).
This generalizes to a larger phenomenon (I think), which is, one simply creates "shortcuts" for other points of view, in philosophy, politics and everything else. Otherwise, it would take forever to do any political discussion - or any other discussion.
Quoting neomac
That's correct. And obviously, they should react in whatever way they think makes sense for them (in so far as each person has a particular perspective on this war).
That doesn't alleviate or address my issue, which is, they may continue to do this, but I have reasons to believe that Russia will take the territory it wishes. So the deaths do end up being in vain, having achieved no specific goal, as in, dissuading Russia from doing what its doing, or creating more awareness for this war (which has enough eyes on it as it is) and so on.
In that respect, I think deaths with no goals in mind, are pointless and sad.
The issue w/Palestine has been different. It took many, many, many thousands of brutal deaths for Palestinians to even be acknowledged as human beings in the eyes of the US public - which is the one that matters. Israel could carry out no occupation without US aid.
Even if Palestinians gave up today, Israel will treat them exactly the same as if they struggled from time to time. That's a situation which is intolerable, given it's been going on for over 50 years.
Quoting neomac
Sure. Which is why I said that this situation in Ukraine now bears little (save superficial) resemblance to Afghanistan.
Yes, they will need to consider what would be a fair deal to them, as well as to Russia. It won't be trivial, but it must be done.
You switched back to what the Ukrainians want. But we wanted to consider all other players too. Russia is not the only other player. There is also the West front supporting Ukraine, and the Rest front supporting Russia or trying to remain neutral. And the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. Besides Russia is capable to blackmail the West (and the rest of the world) with wheat and gas supply (among others), threaten it with nuclear weapons, fund pro-Russian lobbies in the West, conduct cyber-warfare against Western facilities/institutions and project military assets in Africa, Middle East and Mediterranean sea through the Black Sea (basically encircling Europe), while increasing Putin's authoritarian regime and spiking Russian budget for military expenditure [2] with the money earned during Putin's 20 years of happy business with the West, instead of investing this money to improve and widen system of rights, education and welfare for his people.
So I do not see how exactly letting Russia get what it wants expressly out of fear of Russia under the eyes all other authoritarian challengers of the West is to the best interest of the West (if you care for the West, of course).
Do you have any ideas about this issue? Maybe we can try see things from a different perspective: maybe it's not simply that the West is helping the Ukrainians but also that the Ukrainians are helping the West.
[1]
https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/vladimir-putin-meets-with-members-of-the-valdai-club/
http://clcr.over-blog.com/article-putin-s-munich-speech-93308395.html
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/14/china/xi-putin-meeting-sco-summit-analysis-intl-hnk/index.htmlhttps://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/towards-asian-geopolitical-alliance
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/07/28/the-axis-of-russia-iran-and-china-birth-of-a-new-world-order/
[2]
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1203160/military-expenditure-russia/
Jeez dude, you are going in that direction?
I don't even know how to reply to this, because it looks to me so, so far removed from actual possibility. There's been talk - for some time now - of the whole "decline of the American Empire" and so on, because of how China is growing and is now (or is about to be) a bigger economy and so forth.
First of all, this overlooks a crucial problem for China: drastic declining population numbers. This is going to severely impact economic output.
But the main point to me anyway, is to ask, how many military bases does the US have around the world? Around 750.
How many does Russia have? 20. What about China? 1. That makes a grand total of 21 military bases vs 750.
I think such numbers are useful in projecting actual power and the capacity to get countries to do what you want. Right now, Russia is barely managing Ukraine, how can they expand more? And after this war, the Russian population is surely going down, along with birthrates.
China has Taiwan. That they can't take. They're extending to the "South China Sea" and well as the Silk Road, it brings forth some influence sure. Nowhere near the US.
Iran is not worth talking about, until we mention a much more problematic country in all respects: Saudi Arabia. And Israel too.
So we are as far apart as possible on this issue.
Yep, that's exactly right.
Also, it's weird to seriously consider that Xi will rule over everybody. Like, what?
But the rest of the world knows quite well just how friendly the West can be...
Never indeed, for the latter. RAND is a military think tank with good analysts but strongly connected to the US military-industrial complex, which implies a significant bias towards their interests and thus a tendency to take any threat to US military dominance very very seriously, if not to exaggerate them. As for NATO, it is not a think tank or anything like that, and ex NATO officials may disagree with one another on this issue. I’d be surprised if they didn’t.
Of course they are, which is why the West helps them. I mean, I subscribe to your analysis. Ukraine is about the ushering in of a post-UN world, without any notion of collective rules and security, a world dreamed and made by dictators, for dictators.
Taiwan, for a start.
Like the Chinese don't know how to automate?
As an Englishman, do you have a moral right to some piece of geography, like where you live?
Quoting Isaac
It's not about duty. It's simply a very rational response. When you can defend and protect yourself from a hostile attack, do so. Russians aren't control of Kyiv as they wanted. They failed to capture it and put a puppet regime in place... and get that Novorossiya, that they have dreamed about.
It's the simple fact that the attack is about imperialism in it's most aggressive, most ugliest form: when your country is "artificial" and actually said to be part of your neighbor, now somehow governed by "neonazis", everybody should understand how bleak the future is under such control. We have already seen the Russification efforts in schools in the occupied territories and the forces evictions/relocations of Ukrainian people and children to Russia. We've seen the mass killings. And the attacks on hospitals and civilians. And you can just follow what actually Russians and above all, what Putin is saying. But you don't, so you think there would be nothing different in Ukraine if it's part of Russia or an independent country.
Why would you as a tankist care because it's not the evil US doing the bad things.
We might suppose things kind of freeze for a while with, say, Putin's Russia having taken over Crimea + Donbas + Zaporizhia, now parts of Russia according to them. Russian law, with whatever changes the autocrat circle sees fit, will be enforced. Give it another 8 years, with lots of new Russian soldiers, bomb factories, re-culturation, Putin's Chef (a nasty piece of work) having acquired additional power, industrial-strength propaganda and oppression, whatever along their current trajectory, and you have a recipe for disaster. (Kadyrov is another nasty piece of work in a top position, that ought to take up knitting rather than politics.) From memory (admittedly unreliable), Moldova is neutral by law (their constitution), which Putin's Russia has taken advantage of with Transnistria, a remnant of Soviet takeovers, happily inherited by Moscow. Such goes some longer-term conjectures — speculation yet plausible — that no one (else) wants, that would increase victim counts into an uncertain future.
On the other hand, if talks could reveal thinking, plans, concerns, objectives, issues, etc, then everyone would have something to consider, something stated to mull over, something to talk about. (Maybe Putin would just say "Ukraine is ours"? At least that'd be something.) A next-generation Kharkiv Pact remains worthwhile pursuing.
As an aside, my impression is that the EU needs to step up. There's far too much babbling thumb-twiddling impotence sitting-on-hands. Putin isn't all that likely to pay much attention to, say, ?aputová or Cassis on their own, just wee blotches on his map. Putting it off to our children (or their children) is too close to being complicit.
Talks, where talkers would bring something like the suggestion to be talked about. :up:
This seems to have had an effect on the discussion about using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Likely the costs of any "Escalation to de-escalation" would be far too big.
The countries that have acknowledged the annexation of Crimea don't include China btw. (They are The countries are: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela)
China has simply abstained from both recognizing and discouraging the recognition in the votes in the UN.
He doesn't rule over Taiwan. I don't know what you meant by that comment.
For some things yeah, you can do that, for others its much harder. I mean you have to consider military personal, construction workers, tax payers. Automation can only do so much. Maybe some radical new AI discovery will render people obsolete in most things, but we are far from reaching that point.
In any case, whatever happens in Ukraine in terms of winning or losing, has no consequence for us in terms of who will lead us. It's not a serious issue for people who don't share a border with Russia.
What is "far removed from actual possibility”? I’m talking about things that happened and are happening. Besides the West is not just the US.
Quoting Manuel
Demographic dynamics are one aspect of the problem sure. But a part from the fact that it would be more useful to compare demographic trends of Russia and China wrt the Western countries, considering that now the Rest is ~7B vs the West ~1B (that the difference could grow in the future, see Africa and India), and that authoritarian regimes are trying to extend their sphere of influence particularly in the Rest of the world (according to which - somebody could say - the West "it's been mostly shit" [cit.]), the demographic trends won’t be in favour of the West for the foreseeable future.
Quoting Manuel
Now is the case, but how about the future? Considering the growing military buildup of authoritarian regimes (that at this point doesn’t concern anymore only land and maritime control but also space control), the American temptation to reduce their military commitment around the world (due to the costs of maintaining such bases, the pressure of isolationist trends to the point of even having a anti-NATO presidential administration partnering with Putin, and deep unresolved domestic politics issues), and other Western countries weaknesses in military capabilities and mindset (many Westerners are scared to think of a military confrontation with Russia), your observation doesn’t sound all that reassuring at all. Besides military security is not the only issue. There is also economic and political security. Russian attempts to destabilise Western politics through lobby, cyber-warfare and undercover alliance (like with Hungary and Serbia) are already severely insidious and can likely continue in the future. As well as the Russian capacity of threatening economic security by destabilising the market of commodities like for wheat and gas (among others) can likely continue in the future.
Most importantly, it’s precisely because the West didn’t consider Russia or China a security threat that Russia and China could grow richer in 30 years of Western-led globalisation and support their hegemonic ambitions at the expense of the West. It’s after 22 years of economic partnership with the West and Western complacency with Putin’s expansionism in Ukraine since 2014, that Putin could likely feel encouraged to push further his hegemonic agenda.
Quoting Benkei
Is this an objection to my post? If so, that's a strawman argument since you are suggesting that I believe "the West is a power for good for the rest of the world" which thing I never stated nor believe. On the other side, if you are simply suggesting that I believe "the West is a power for good" because I'm living in the West where is the objection? You yourself claimed: "Which it mostly only is when you actually live there".
In any case, I never stated such a slogan "the West is a power for good" nor I would express myself in such terms.
No, but he wants to.
What are you including in the west?
Quoting neomac
They are constantly overspending on the military, no matter who gets in power.
Anything beyond 5 years is way too much speculation in my view. We don't know what will happen.
Sure. But he can't.
Yes, we need humans for some things. China's progress toward great power status won't be hindered by having a slightly smaller population.
Quoting Manuel
The war has weakened Russia's international standing and has positioned Russia as a client of China.
Oct 21, 2022
Quoting Oct 29, 2022
Nov 8, 2022
Nov 11, 2022
Not really the kind of machinery you want rolling into town.
Analysis: Have China and India shifted stance on Russia war?
[sup]— Foster Klug · AP News · Nov 17, 2022[/sup]
G20’s criticism of Russia shows the rise of a new Asian power. And it isn’t China
[sup]— Rhea Mogul · CNN · Nov 17, 2022[/sup]
Angry families say Russian conscripts thrown to front line unprepared
[sup]— Robyn Dixon, Natalia Abbakumova · The Washington Post · Nov 20, 2022[/sup]
Meanwhile in Russia: a rare moment of sanity on Russian state TV, when one panelist was finally fed up with Vladimir Solovyov's threats to wipe Kyiv or Kharkiv off the face of the earth.
[sup]— Julia Davis · Russian Media Monitor · Nov 20, 2022[/sup]
[tweet]https://twitter.com/juliadavisnews/status/1594529208650317824[/tweet]
The wife of a Russian soldier says she gave her TV away because the war in Ukraine was making her 'aggressive'
[sup]— Sophia Ankel · Business Insider · Nov 21, 2022[/sup]
Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov had clearly given up on the idea of defeating Ukraine militarily. In his desperation to scare the West into stopping its support, he resorts to nuclear threats—but even fellow propagandists are sick of it & say he lost all sense of reality.
[sup]— Julia Davis · Russian Media Monitor · Nov 22, 2022[/sup]
[tweet]https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1594915216026112000[/tweet]
Families of drafted Russian soldiers accuse Putin of snubbing them
[sup]— Andrew Roth · The Guardian · Nov 23, 2022[/sup]
Putin's only alliance could crumble after special summit shows Russian despot isolated
[sup]— Alessandra Scotto di Santolo · Express · Nov 24, 2022[/sup]
So the West should lose then?
I'm curious about what you find to be so boring about the risk of nuclear escalation resulting from the very actions you're currently supporting? Unless you're already biased against such views (which would be prejudicial) we have some apparent experts (they do have some credentials without you needing to do any research at all) sating that your preferred course of action might lead to nuclear war and your response is "call me if anything interesting turns up".
You seriously expect anyone to believe that isn't massively biased?
Continuing your education...
Chatham House? Heard of them? Dr Patricia Lewis Acting Deputy Director echoed Avril Haine's concern
Also wondering what your experts say about The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance, Jens Stoltenberg. Is he one of the...
Quoting Olivier5
...when he says "The risk of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine is low, but the consequences will be huge, so we take it very seriously,"
Oh and as to your absolute bollocks about...
"Quoting Olivier5
...here what about 30 seconds of internet research found out about your sources...
Michel Goya works for BFM-TV a channel which has faced numerous accusations of bias, been caught lying (coverage of the yellow-vest protests), co-writing their material with the subject of their inquiries (police unions), and openly giving preferential support to politicians it favours.
Xavier Tytelman is a private contractor whose business benefit directly from conflict
and the ISW... seriously
Edit - I almost forgot - there's 'some bloke off YouTube'. Let's check out his credentials shall we? Confirm his biases and political influences...
Yep. Seems to check out. Must have taken you ages to research that.
If that's what you think passing a bias check is about then god help anyone relying on you for such services.
No. I can't see how I do. If you think I do , then give us an account of it.
Quoting ssu
Then why ought we support them? It's rational for me to earn money, does that mean you ought to support me in doing so?
Here's the US attitude to 'international law' - From https://towardfreedom.org/story/archives/americas/the-u-s-makes-a-mockery-of-treaties-and-international-law/
the United States refuses to sign or to ratify foundational international laws and treaties that the vast majority of countries in the world have signed, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), ICESCR (the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), CRC (the Convention on the Rights of the Child), ICRMW (the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families), UNCLOS (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), PAROS (the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space), the Ottawa Treaty (the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention), and the majority of labor conventions of the ILO (International Labor Organization). In fact, the United States harbors sweatshops, legalizes child labor (for example, in migrant farm labor), and engages in slave labor (in prisons and immigration detention centers). Even the U.S. State Department’s own 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report acknowledges severe problems in the U.S. of trafficking and forced labor in agriculture, food service, manufacture, domestic service, sex work, and hospitality, with U.S. government officials and military involved in the trafficking of persons domestically and abroad. Ironically, the United States tries to hold other countries accountable to laws that it itself refuses to ratify. For example, the United States tries to assert UNCLOS in the South China Sea while refusing—for decades—to ratify it and ignoring its rules, precedents, and conclusions in its own territorial waters.
There are also a slew of international treaties the United States has signed, but simply violates anyway: examples include the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, UN treaties prohibiting torture, rendition, and kidnapping, and of course, war of aggression, considered “the supreme international crime”—a crime that the United States engages in routinely at least once a decade, not to mention routine drone attacks, which are in violation of international law. Most recently, the AUKUS agreement signed between the United States and Australia violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by exploiting a blind spot of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
There are also a multitude of treaties that the United States has signed but then arbitrarily withdrawn from anyway. These include the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, the Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, the Geneva Conventions, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and many others.
There are also approximately 368 treaties signed between the Indigenous nations and the U.S. government; every single one of them has been violated or ignored.
There are also unilateral fictions that the United States has created, such as “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs): this is gunboat diplomacy, a military show of force, masquerading as an easement claim. FONOPs are a concept with no basis in international law—“innocent passage” is the accepted law under UNCLOS—and it is the United States and its allies who are violating international laws when they exercise these FONOPs. Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) are likewise notions that have no recognition in international law—the accepted concept is “sovereign airspace”—but the United States routinely claims that China is violating Taiwan’s ADIZ or airspace—which covers three provinces of mainland China. These are some examples of the absurd fictions that the United States invents to assert that enemy states like China are violating the RBIO. This is weaponized fiction.
The United States also takes great pains to undermine international structures and institutions; for example, not liking the decisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it has disabled the WTO’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism; it has undermined—and threatened—the ICC (by passing the American Servicemembers Protection Act [ASPA], also known as the Hague Invasion Act), and more recently, sanctioned the ICC prosecutor and her family members; it thumbs its nose at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its decisions, and generally is opposed to any international institution that restricts its unbridled, unilateral exercise of power. Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton, in blunt candor, asserted that there is “no such thing as the United Nations,” but this unhinged ideology is quietly manifested in the day-to-day actions of the United States throughout successive U.S. administrations.
Does he know that?
First Wikipedia copy/paste looks a bit raised to a genetic fallacy.
Second looks fine, except you'll rarely find something like this with exclusively positive reception.
Temper mon capitaine, I wouldn't just wholly dismiss them that easily with a casual handwave.
It's not like InfoWars or something.
A bunch of pretentious idiots, as far as I can see.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, NATO takes this risk seriously, I already mentioned that and you disagreed. Now you agree then?
Quoting Isaac
Ok so you prefer RAND Corporation and NATO top brass. Be my guest... :-) Your experts do not need to be the same as mine. In fact, I would be worried if that was the case, given how poorly informed you are.
Funny your keen anti-bias radar missed...
Quoting Olivier5
'Genetic fallacy' here? or is it just when your opposition say it?
Even if they would be the same, Isaac would interpret them totally differently. As he has done.
I would include North America, EU, UK, Norway most certainly.
Quoting Manuel
“Overspending” in what sense? Not wrt their GDP. As by comparison with other countries, in an age of great power competition we may reasonably expect that the American military spending can grow more likely than decrease to at least preserve their overwhelming military superiority. Yet that’s not enough to think that the American commitment to the security of the West won’t change. Besides if there is a military clash between the US and Russia is more likely going to happen in Europe than in the US (as the Ukrainian war is reminding us of). So I’d find more reasonable to hit an expansionist Russia as hard as possible when it’s in a weaker position, than wait for Russia to recover and give it another try in the future just for the fun of it.
Quoting Manuel
Yet that’s what I take strategic thinking in geopolitics to be all about. Even the demographic crisis that China is expected to face - as you were talking about and you didn’t calculate by yourself, I guess - doesn’t concern the next 5 years, right? If you feel dispensed from engaging in such kind of speculation like anticipating potentially hostile competitors’ moves far before they could actually happen, States will do it at your place anyways and likely much better than you could ever possibly afford because they have means and that’s necessary for their own survival.
I wouldn't be surprised. Russia did nothing to help it's ally Armenia when it was attacked. But naturally for Russia alliances don't mean the same thing as for the West. Just like the Warsaw Pact, they are a tool to control the internal situation of the other member countries. And when Russia doesn't have the similar control of CSTO members as it had of it's Warsaw Pact members, then it can only withdraw that help when the country needs it.
And this is noticed in the Central Asian realm as there is the possibility that the consequence of this war can be a lot more than just a humiliating defeat against the Ukrainians.
So what? First of all American violations, withdrawals, refusal to ratify or to sign, undermining of international law that your piece of propaganda has comfortably summarised, however concerning from a geopolitical point of view or eventually legitimate in terms of principles, are often alleged by authoritarian States which themselves have being accused of analogous behaviour, or for American domestic political competition (see the concerns about Trump’s administration attitude toward international law for example). Secondly, and most importantly, International Law is a dimension of geopolitics, so the attitude of ALL geopolitical players toward it will realistically serve geopolitical goals as bluntly clarified by John Bolton in his extended quote [1]. So more important of the attitude of the US toward international law is all other players (allies and enemies) attitude toward the US. Third, I’m siding with the US not because I think the US is good nor because I think the US is good for the West, but because I think Russia or China would be worse than the US for the West if they managed to extend their hegemonic influence at the expense of the American hegemony in the West. So until there is a better alternative for the Westerners in the foreseeable future, I would find more reasonable to partner with the US than to partner with Russia or China.
Do you enjoy our disagreement, Pollyanna?
[1]
There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world and that is the United States when it suits our interest and we can get others to go along
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/19374/
What?! Is that a logic inference, dude?
The problem is that what the Russians are doing is simply Shock and Awe, which is a US military doctrine and involves targeting civilian infrastructure.
Of course, when the West does it then it's because that infrastructure is required by the opposing military and for society to "function" and also we "don't count bodies".
Quoting Shock and Awe, wikipedia
Is a brief description.
Anything the US also does, such as Shock and Awe as well as torture, the Western media isn't all that concerned about. Nothing wrong with a little "enhanced interrogation". Obviously if you have a thing, you'd want an enhanced version of the same thing.
People in the West have been very convinced that Russia shouldn't do these things since the beginning of the war, but is there any feasible way to actually stop a nuclear power?
In the words of Zelensky:
Apparently your arms dealer isn't your friend after all, as otherwise he wouldn't say this sort of things but just thank his friends the arms dealers.
What violence?
But anyways, again, excellent demonstration of the incapability of understanding a position other than pro-Zelensky or pro-Putin.
I'm not going to go fight for Russia, nor Ukraine, and I'm not going to support my country going to fight for Ukraine and I recognise the obvious reality that the West isn't going to go do any actual fighting, actual "defending Ukraine". Ukraine is not our ally, not our friend, but a tool for Western policy.
I do not view much difference between Ukraine and Russia. Neither represent "freedom".
What can the West do?
The West could try to broker a peace, which will take compromise and if the West wants a good outcome for Ukraine it would use the leverage it has.
Since the West has dug itself into a propaganda whole of Russia ending up even with Crimea would be a "win" for Putin, compared to this delusional position any peace agreement is essentially by definition a win for Putin. But that's purely a consequence of Zelensky and the West's delusional approach to basic features of reality.
The alternative is more war.
After 8 months it's now clear what more war means. Russian soldiers are harmed, but the harm to Ukrainian society is orders of magnitudes worse.
Compared to the offer Zelensky rejected early in the war (independent Dombas still part of Ukraine, recognising Crimea as part of Russia, neutral Ukraine), the price Ukraine has since paid to accomplish nothing remotely close to a better situation than this deal ... it's obviously a regrettable to any common sense person that doesn't actually want Ukrainians to suffer.
Quoting Olivier5
Ah, so we've gone from modern Western tanks would obviously be useful for Ukraine ... to Ukraine is totally fine just capturing Russian tanks. Not that your figure is remotely credible, but even if it was true what happens when all those tanks are destroyed; would it not by definition be useful militarily to be conducting the training and setting up the logistics of Western tanks "just in case"?
Likewise for the anti-air. Why didn't the West send in sophisticated anti-air systems "just in case" the Russians attack critical infrastructure? There was 8 months to prepare to deal with the US own playbook of Shock and Awe.
Why didn't we?
I am the only poster to actually describe how an actual Western military intervention (in particular before the war) could have worked, why very likely it would have worked (send in troops, offer economic benefits like Nord Stream 2 going ahead: probability of war very low, mutual beneficial outcome for Russian and Europe ... but no new gas market for the US so of course we can't have a common sense peace).
You are arguing against this sort of actual support for Ukraine.
Why? Because any peace before or during the war would be "not-bad" for Russia. That it would be orders of magnitude better for Ukraine is not even part of your thinking.
You and the other Zelenskyites are not pro-Ukraine. You are simply war horny Russophobes and so reject any peace plan or even military plan that does not result in continuing this mode of warfare with Russia.
Now that you see the cost of your position, it creates cognitive dissonance neatly resolved by "it's the Ukrainian decision" and the West and citizens of the West can wash their hands of it.
So?
Quoting neomac
And?
None of this nonsensical verbiage alleviates your error. You said that...
Quoting neomac
How is it a problem that Russia are violating international law, when America clearly violates international law all the time?
Because we are stingy and reactive rather than proactive.
Behold Ukraine's friends / liabilities: stingy and reactive.
Quoting neomac
So are you saying that you support the West or no? Based on this comment, I think you sound like a West is good (or least bad) type of person.
What I would add, is that I don't think we have good reasons to believe Russia will come out of this war in good shape. It has a population problem, it's economy is far from being optimally used, without even considering the effects of the sanctions long-term.
In short, I see such conflicts as rather dated and mostly dangerous. Something not worth gambling on.
Quoting neomac
Correct. I threw it as an arbitrary number, I think 5 years is reasonable time frame to think about what could happen. Anything longer that that is bound to be distorted or drastically changed given unforeseen events, which if enough of these happen, can alter a countries history.
You could say something like, every 4 years (being the average election cycle in most countries). But if you want to go beyond that, which you have the right to do, the further in the future you go, the more distorted your projections can be. It's just a tendency in human history, it seems to me. International Relations involve many actors and events, it's not physics.
What error are you blabbering about? Why nonsensical? Why "clearly"?
First, if you are talking about international law, it should be a resolution within international law to establish what constitutes its violation.
Second, when I talked about international law violation by Russia I'm talking about this:
[i]UN responses to Russian invasion
See also: Reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine § Intergovernmental and international organizations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2623, and United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1
On 26 February 2022, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have called for Russia to immediately cease its attack on Ukraine. China, India, and the United Arab Emirates abstained from the vote; the 11 remaining members of the Security Council voted in favor of the resolution.[39][40] Days later, a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian invasion was passed with an overwhelming 141–5 vote majority, with 35 nations abstaining.[41]
Among other statements, the General Assembly resolution called upon Russia to abide by the UN Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations.[41] The Declaration on Friendly Relations says that assisting a rebel group in another nation would threaten the target country's "territorial integrity," and that states have a duty to refrain from engaging in such actions.[42] [/i]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legality_of_the_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
Third, I didn't claim that the US didn't commit international law violations, I simply claimed that Russia did.
Four, the international law violations I'm interested in must be related to the THE PROBLEM I SEE : "Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US". So OBVIOUSLY I'm interested in the violations committed by Russia against West/NATO/US.
How do you like our disagreement, Pollyanna?
Until you provide a reliable accounting model estimating how much military budget the US must spend wrt its security goals and geopolitical ambitions better than the impression the comparison between Russia/China military expenditure vs the US military expenditure has on you, your judgement doesn't sound that persuasive to me.
Quoting Manuel
I'm not here to reason through slogans. But, as I said, we can't likely hope to be more than polarised political "meme" vectors in the geopolitical arena..
Quoting Manuel
"Not in good shape" sounds good, "not likely be a security threat to the West for another couple of decades at least" sounds better.
They are still better than nothing. How many allies does Russia have, again?
https://rg.ru/documents/2022/09/30/prezident-ukaz691-site-dok.html
How do you know they are better than nothing? How do you know without the West first making the entirely false promises and expectation that Ukraine would one day join NATO in a useful period of time (say anytime before Russia invaded) and also encouraging total war rather than a negotiated settlement early on, Ukrainians would not be far better off?
Quoting Olivier5
Ukraine does not have allies. Ukraine has arms suppliers.
There's a big difference. Allies would be in Ukraine right now fighting on behalf of their ally.
Ok. Sounds good.
Hm.
Comes to mind what a great ally Russia was to Armenia, when it was attacked by the Azeris. Didn't even provide arms, but least after Armenia lost the war held peace talks.
But then for Russia alliances are a way to control and dominate smaller states (hence the Russo-Chinese axis has it's problems).
... and humanitarian aid (medicine, food, whatever), organized refugee aid, training and intelligence aid, UN support (68/262, ES-11/4). Putin's team has whined about NATO, this alliance is seemingly off the table.
Possibly, not always. Many of the issues are the US's failure to ratify laws others have taken on.
Quoting neomac
So?
Quoting neomac
So?
Back to the same transparent strategy you used last time when @boethius pointed out your obvious error. Reduce the scope of your claim to something so utterly mundane that no one could disagree.
So what you're now saying is just that Russia broke international law. Yes. Well done.
Quoting neomac
We don't have one. I agree Russia broke international law.
Because I suspect the invasion has nothing to see with NATO blah blah. It would have happened regardless of anything related to NATO IMO. The real threat for the Putin regime is Ukraine ´s progressive liberalisation and ultimate EU accession, and the induced socio-economic development. The example of an open society next door is bound to give some untoward ideas of freedom and justice to folks living in the goulag nations of Belarus and Russia.
One of the ironies of the collective nature of NATO's decisions is that they protect Russia from individual nations joining the fight by themselves. Any boots on the ground from any member states would be treated as an attack by all. Cue WW3.
Russian confidence in NATO acting with restraint is shown by reports like:
“Russia had this ground force posture facing us for decades that is now effectively just gone.”
I'm curious then as to why...
Quoting https://www.migrationdataportal.org/ukraine/migration-overview
Perhaps you could explain the origin of Putin's concern when, as of 2020, more than half of those leaving Ukraine chose to go to Russia?
Also, the second largest population of students studying abroad chose to study in Russia.
I'm curious as to why the...
Quoting Olivier5
...attracted the largest proportion of those leaving the...
Quoting Olivier5
...utopia that is Ukraine.
Perhaps some bloke off of YouTube has an explanation you can share with us
Maybe the data from Migration Data Portal is wrong? I suppose you've never heard of it and it's not passed your rigorous credibility and bias checking. Is there perhaps a retired secretary whose sister once knew a guy in immigration you can ask?
He didn't point any "obvious error". You can't even clarify what the error is, as he couldn't. But I understand that as his sidekick you should try to come to rescue and troll once more over the same shit. "Same transparent strategy". Besides if you agree and what I say is mundane, where is the error? What's more catastrophic in your support to boethious' position is that he (not me) essentially believes that international law is ornamental and zero meaning, but if it's that the case then the putative examples of international law violations and injustice by the US are violations of something ornamental and meaningless! So what's the point of crying justice over something ornamental and meaningless? None, right?
I made plenty of claims, so it's not my fault if you both pick always the claim you finally end up agreeing with. Choose better next time.
Quoting Isaac
Now? That's the same fact I claimed in the piece you yourself quoted: the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law
Where is the error dude? Can you spell it out?
Besides I didn't just claim a fact, I brought it in support of my claim about Russian expansionist attitude "in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US". Isn't that obviously true? it's all mundane and tautological, yes?
All I said about international law is consistent with what I already told you a while ago:
Quoting neomac
So now do you agree with that too? it's all mundane and tautological, yes?
Or maybe this piece of emigration data means something different from what you think it means. Likely, it reflects historical ties.
[sup]— TASS · Nov 25, 2022[/sup]
Russia's justice ministry adds Meta to 'extremist' list - Kommersant
[sup]— Reuters · Nov 25, 2022[/sup]
:grin:
Russia rains missiles on liberated Ukrainian city of Kherson
[sup]— The Hindu · Nov 25, 2022[/sup]
What a joke.
Maybe Monty Python took residence at Zhitnaya Street 14.
Probably, from past experience, when pushed you'll end up claiming it only says that Russia exists, or that people sometimes think before they act. You seem to want to write at enormous length explaining boring and obvious truisms that everybody already knows.
I expect I'll agree with your next post too if it is, as I predict, a 500 word masterpiece concluding that, yes, there is a war in Ukraine.
Quoting Olivier5
Yep. Exactly. "Maybe".
So the question you keep dodging. Why believe that explanation and not the other? Why do you prefer the 'Russia bad, Ukraine good' narrative? Why do you interpret all evidence in that light?
Is it just a coincidence that it also happens to be the sales pitch of one of the most powerful industries in the world?
Probably, from past experience (and this quotation confirms it), when pushed or catastrophically fail to understand and rebut on rational grounds, you'll end up caricaturing your opponent's view to make a point. How pathetic. Ops, I just stated another example of boring and obvious truisms that everybody already knows ! LOL
There's nothing to rebut. I completely agreed. Russia broke international law.
BTW, if you agree with all I wrote, then why did you write the following claim?
Quoting Isaac
Why "nonsensical"? why "error"? All that sounds contradictory with your claim that you agree with me, right? do you agree on that truism too?
Because Russia is currently governed by a ruthless, aggressive dictatorship that attacked Ukraine and other countries such as Georgia. Ukraine is the victim here, and it aspires to be a liberal democracy. I find it natural to sympathize with the victim.
That's a restatement of what the narrative is, not an explanation of why you choose to believe it.
Also, Ukraine is not a victim. That's a category error. Ukraine is a country, it's not the sort of thing that can have victimhood.
People are victims, not countries. And as we've seen, the people of Ukraine are not one homogeneous mass all of a conveiniently singular opinion which virtue-signalling westerners can adopt in faux solidarity.
I chose to believe it because it was reported to me by reporters I trust.
"Ukraine" in this context should be taken as meaning "the Ukrainian people".
Actually, what Russia would need would be it's own Monty Python.
Monty Python, and it's success shows a crucial great aspect of the English, if not the British: the ability to laugh at and ridicule themselves. Naturally an autocratic regime wouldn't tolerate any of it and would see Monty Python as a symptom of the decadence and impotence that the UK fell into after losing the Empire.
Just as an example, think what the reaction would have been during the times of the British Empire, early 20th Century or late 19th Century of the following Monty Python skit, the Queen Victoria Handicap:
Nobody would dare to mock Queen Victoria in such way those times. Empires cannot laugh at themselves. Now it is very funny.
And actually this would come easily from the Russians as they have had totalitarian systems that they have joked about. A traumatic history is one of the best ways people find a fountain from jokes and comedy (just think about Jewish humour).
Yet when in the 21st Century a country has laws where uttering the obvious, that the country is in war when it is in a war, can get you jail time, for me it tells that the situation isn't on solid foundations at all. Such urge to limit simple talk is a sign of weakness and fear. And something that is unsustainable without a North Korean type dictatorship.
For the UK the humbling happened during the Suez Crisis and the Churchillian wing in the British leadership understood the the time of Empire acting by it's own was over...and wouldn't be coming back. Yet Monty Python is something that the British have they can be proud of. It shows that the British have no appetite for reconquering their Empire. A politician calling for the unification of the British Isles under the Union Jack, hence occupation and annexation of Ireland, would simply be called what he is: a lunatic. With the British (and they still are the British) we can know that they are quite independently thinking (Brexit and stuff), but they aren't a threat to the sovereignty of Ireland. And furthermore, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are still part of the UK. Something that Russia should understand to do as how to keep it's minorities happy and chugging along.
For Russia to become a normal country and shed it's bellicose aggressive behaviour a humiliating defeat could do it. The Soviet Union came so splendidly and peacefully apart that people like Vladimir Putin understood it as a mistake, something you can and have to fix.
The Putinist empire builders have to become the butt of jokes. Otherwise Russia will pose a threat to it's neighbors. And actually to itself.
Yeah, we've just got through demonstrating that to be bullshit. You can't provide a consistent criteria you use to judge who to trust. You dismissed RAND because of their connection to the military industrial complex yet 30 seconds on the internet tells us that ISW have exactly the same connections.
The difference..? RAND were saying something you didn't want to believe and ISW were saying something you did want to believe.
It's abundantly clear you choose who to trust because they agree with your preferred narrative. The narrative came first.
Quoting Olivier5
Right. So...
Quoting Isaac
ISW is of course staffed with US military types and they have their pro-US bias but they don't behave as a lobby. RAND on the other hand does, it channels more evidently (to me) the military-industrial complex's collective messages and interests than ISW.
This said, I haven't read ISW's assessment of the nuclear risk. I would think they care more about the safety of the nuclear plant at Zaporizzia (or whatever it's spelt) than about the tactical use of nukes.
In any case, the point of bias analysis is less to discard sources, than to interpret them correctly. To triangulate, IOW. It is generally unwise to discard a source entirely, unless it lies almost systematically. So I don't discount RAND, I just try to interpret its pronouncements at the light of its interests.
Quoting Olivier5
OK. So these sources who argue...
Quoting Olivier5
...what efforts did you take to 'triangulate' their pronouncements with those of experts offering contrary views. Talk me through how this process works.
What was exactly that I reduced before reducing it? Can you spell it out? Can you quote me?
Indeed I said a lot more than "Russia broke international law". Here, I'll repeat it again:
[i]the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. Besides Russia is capable to blackmail the West (and the rest of the world) with wheat and gas supply (among others), threaten it with nuclear weapons, fund pro-Russian lobbies in the West, conduct cyber-warfare against Western facilities/institutions and project military assets in Africa, Middle East and Mediterranean sea through the Black Sea (basically encircling Europe), while increasing Putin's authoritarian regime and spiking Russian budget for military expenditure [2] with the money earned during Putin's 20 years of happy business with the West, instead of investing this money to improve and widen system of rights, education and welfare for his people.
So I do not see how exactly letting Russia get what it wants expressly out of fear of Russia under the eyes all other authoritarian challengers of the West is to the best interest of the West (if you care for the West, of course).
Do you have any ideas about this issue? Maybe we can try see things from a different perspective: maybe it's not simply that the West is helping the Ukrainians but also that the Ukrainians are helping the West.[/i]
Why did you select just that fact from all I said, believing it was an "error" and then LATER you agreed with it. What is the error? Can you spell it out? Can you talk me through it?
I suppose the same way as you do it, just better.
Yes.
Quoting neomac
So the problem I saw here was that violating international law is not in defiance of "the West/NATO/US" because "the West/NATO/US" have little respect for international law either.
Quoting neomac
Same problem here. The West/NATO/US act as authoritarian regimes. In terms of their actual impact on the globe there's not sufficient difference in their approaches to justify the claim that Russia's intent was "a new World Order". It's the same world order.
Also, I found your evidence that this is, indeed, Russia's intent to be sketchy at best. A lot of supposition, very little empirical ground.
Quoting neomac
This doesn't seem to have a point related to the argument. You've stated a fact (Russia has this capability) but you've not made any argument about what is consequent to that fact. No one has expressed disagreement on those grounds, nor any argument assuming the opposite. So the statement just hangs purposelessly. Yes, Russia has that capability. So what?
Quoting neomac
This conclusion doesn't follow because you've weighed only one side of the argument.
The argument being made is that Russia getting its way would be bad, but Russia not getting its way would be bad too (nuclear escalation). Therefore some negotiated compromise between the two positions is the best course of action.
You've only concurred that, yes, Russia getting its way would be bad. This adds nothing to the discussion because we were all already agreed on that matter, it's right there in the argument.
To dispute the argument, you have to show that one is worse than the other. Not merely that one is bad.
Quoting neomac
I don't. I find such thinking disgusting. I care about humanity. Not just westerners.
This is simply irrational.
Neither side will overcome and defeat totally the other side. Hence there will be a negotiated peace or armstice (like between the Koreas). That's the totally logical.
The illogical or delusional reasoning is that "Russia not getting its way would be bad too (nuclear escalation)". Well, many even nuclear armed powers haven't gotten their way in wars. Their defeats have been smaller or larger, but having nukes hasn't change it. Last example was that the US had to withdraw from Afghanistan.
People disagreeing with you doesn't make them illogical and delusional. I've shown quite clearly that normal intelligent and informed people think that right here right now in 2022 Russia are likely enough to use nuclear weapons that concessions might be a wise precautionary move.
As has been discussed at some length, your examples from history show only that it is possible for a nuclear power to lose a war without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. It does not prove that they always will in all circumstances.
Experts are of the view that they might use nuclear weapons this time, in this place, in these specific circumstances. It is recklessness beyond criminal to ignore their concerns for the sake of some localised nationalism.
NATO wasn't/isn't this dire existential threat to Russia that's been proselytized and swallowed by whoever around the globe.
But, sure, NATO troop concentrations close to Russian borders could be seen as threatening moreso than local/native/domestic troops, and NATO training local troops could be seen as threatening in a way.
It's kind of the other way around, NATO would get in the way of free Russian military actions, and it's that "threat" that's been swapped out (partly successfully it seems) by the propagandists.
That being said, there's the matter of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, previously under the Kharkiv Pact, until ditched by Russia in March 2014.
If their perception is that Russia is doomed without that stuff intact (or perhaps doomed without a secured expansion thereof), then that could explain their invasion, waging war.
Until no-NATO is set in stone, Ukrainian NATO membership remains looming however, unless all of Ukraine was to be assimilated by Russia — this sort of "threat" can be raised perpetually by the propagandists.
What we've seen in Russian broadcasts can occasaionally best be described as paranoid fear-feeding.
The main threat NATO poses to Putin's Russia is to them getting away with free military actions, not the dire existential threat proselytized by their propagandists.
Meanwhile, they're raining destruction on Ukraine, refusing to let the EU act as an interlocutor, shamming and attempting to re-culturate, creating more haters.
The irony here is that Putin's Russia instead has proven a real, present threat to Ukraine.
Putin Admits Annexation of Crimea Put in Motion Weeks Before Referendum
[sup]— Vladimir Soldatkin · Haaretz · Mar 9, 2015[/sup]
Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot
[sup]— BBC · Mar 9, 2015[/sup]
From 'Not Us' To 'Why Hide It?': How Russia Denied Its Crimea Invasion, Then Admitted It
[sup]— Carl Schreck · RFE/RL · Feb 26, 2019[/sup]
Putin Admits He’s Worried NATO Could Help Ukraine Get Crimea Back
[sup]— Allison Quinn · The Daily Beast · Feb 1, 2022[/sup]
Putin doesn’t fear NATO or Ukraine — he fears democracy
[sup]— David Tafuri · The Hill · Feb 10, 2022[/sup]
Quoting What Putin Fears Most · Robert Person, Michael McFaul · Journal of Democracy · Apr 2022
Putin sees no threat from NATO expansion, warns against military build-up
[sup]— Guy Faulconbridge · Reuters · May 16, 2022[/sup]
Regime Preservation is Putin’s Primary Concern
[sup]— Mary Glantz · USIP · Sep 22, 2022[/sup]
Russia’s Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine
[sup]— Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch · Foreign Policy · Sep 28, 2022[/sup]
How to respond to Putin’s land grab and nuclear gambit
[sup]— Steven Pifer · Brookings · Oct 4, 2022[/sup]
Why exactly should a country accept that another country or group of countries limits its possible actions? If we accept countries are peers, this is principally problematic and militarily an issue because it means you're constrained in defence. If it's about aggression, we should be encircling most European countries and the USA.
A lot of what's written about this, does not take into account how Russians see NATO. Which is why people keep reiterating NATO is defensive and countries join because they feel threatened. That doesn't preclude the Russians feeling threatened, which in turn causes them to threaten their neighbours. So we have a nice vicious cycle and the West demands it to be broken by Russia acquising to the expansions, while it could also just stop expanding. A cynical interpretation is that NATO must expand or become irrelevant as tensions would subside and a geo-political equilibrium would arise with buffer states between the West and a regional player that doesn't want to be "Western".
I personally think limiting a nuclear power's conventional choices also increases the likelihood of nuclear escalation but I'm told not to worry since proxy wars never escalated before. Except of course everybody was fucking scared about a nuclear holocaust during the Cold War, entirely aware of the distinct possibility. The hand waving about the risk I see during this war should be grounds to worry about an escalation more instead of the opposite, simply because it's not taken seriously.
I figure the arguments over the larger strategy of Russia and other states do not have to be decided conclusively to observe that Russia has enough confidence to use those troops immediately in the path of NATO to fight in Ukraine instead. That speaks to an acknowledgement of efforts to avoid escalation as much as possible by NATO. The other side of that conversation is the support being given to Ukraine.
The restraint in arming Ukraine has been characterized by boethius as a callous burning of an asset. That view does not take into account the language of limited escalation being used by both Russia and NATO when it comes to Article 5.
Quoting Paine
Both these statements are not really true.
First Article 5 is not "we start WWIII" but is technically only a commitment to meet and respond in some way.
More importantly, NATO's article 5 does not cover troops in other countries anyways. For example, attacks on US troops in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria or anywhere not in the US or some analogue they'll consider an attack (like an aircraft carrier), has nothing to do with NATO's Article 5 as these are not attacks on the US and article 5 is never invoked about any military interventions or wars of occupation.
Countries within NATO could send in troops to Ukraine if they wanted to and them being attacked in Ukraine would have nothing to do with article 5.
Countries don't send troops into Ukraine to help out because they don't care about Ukraine, and they don't actually believe that Russia will keep on expanding if not "stopped in Ukraine" and so have no actual security interest to ally with Ukraine.
Ukraine is simply a tool of both realpolitik by the US, essentially as a gas play (wise or not), as well as an outlet for Russian resentment (in East-Europe) and virtue signalling in West-Europe.
The war is the best possible distraction to all those starving children in Afghanistan. We're the good guys again, hurray!!
In the case of both East and West Europe the policy of maintaining a total war rhetoric without an actual justified total war scenario, is insanely dangerous, and not just because of the nukes.
Who is actually likely to attack other Eastern European countries once the war is done with Russia ... is Ukraine. They may not have an army big enough to go and defeat Russia, but they will be a formidable force to any of their neighbours, have zero economy and the likely outcome of the war for Ukraine is a "ultra nationalist" government dedicated to warfare. If they can't beat the Russians their attention will turn elsewhere. Anyone who thinks this war has made Eastern-Europe one happy family all of a sudden has never been to Eastern-Europe.
Obviously, for Western Europe, the smart thing to do would have been to just trade putting online Nord Stream 2 to avoid a disastrous war ... a pipeline that (sans war that started immediately after the project was cancelled) benefits Western Europe and very obviously would maintain the peace. The idea of "sovereign" states allowing the pipeline to be built but then advancing a policy against their own countries interest to not open the pipeline, is just dumb and even more dumb that they then claim to be supporting the "sovereignty" of Ukraine by supplying arms. Of course, maybe the pipelines not a good idea, but the time to decide that is years, preferably many years, before it's completed. It's just common sense diplomacy that you don't let your neighbour build a 10 billion Euro infrastructure project to your own benefit and then just not let it start. No credibly sovereign state would actually do that.
Now, what the US and Europe and other countries will do is a pretty open question, but what's not very difficult to guess is they aren't sending any troops to go help their non-ally.
And, if people think you can have allies that you don't go defend when they are attacked, that's just not what ally means. Ukraine is a tool, willing or not for more or less actual Ukrainians, of Western, mainly US, policy.
They will be the new Iraqi's, Afghanis, Kurds, whoever we were supporting in Libya, that, like them, in a relatively short amount of time we will have forgotten about and will be just a dirty word in any of, what @Olivier5 calls, "decent" conversation.
Indeed, as far as I can tell that process has already started as no one in the West wants to hear Ukraine is being completely destroyed and millions are suffering intensely ... as that would have a followup question of if we're actually going to do anything substantive to help and maybe even some sole searching of why we encouraged and financed Ukraine into this situation.
Once-upon-a-time leaders of countries were viewed as responsible for actual outcomes of their policies.
That "the enemy" did bad things to you ... sort of goes without saying that that is their function, what makes them enemies.
But people who lose wars, or get their country destroyed in the process of some disastrous stalemate, who throw their hands up in the air and say "our enemies did this": no shit Sherlock. Either avoid making them your enemy or have some plan to deal with the consequences.
Why, perchance, the finger pointing has begun with Zelensky trying to throw the mayor of Kiev under the bus and blame him for not preparing for the obvious next step in the war ... what NATO retired officers were literally mocking Russia for months not doing on day one and being "weak" and then deducing Russia ran out of missiles after a month ... as clearly if they had the missile capabilities we thought they had they would take out Ukrainian infrastructure, but they weren't doing that, the incompetents!
From the Russian point of view, the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine would mean NATO did not wait to be directly attacked before fighting Russians. It is the most established part of Article 5 as a collective defensive agreement as it relates to the threat of Russian expansion. It is difficult to consider the other dynamics you refer to when this most obvious one is not considered.
Not all "possible actions", but in said context
Quoting jorndoe
There aren't that many protective clubs around. Putin would divert with reasons against any. The trajectories of Putin's Russia and Ukraine diverged. (But, hey, maybe Russia should become Ukrainian. :smile:) NATO ain't that dire existential threat it's made out to be by some. The fear-mongering by intuitive emotive appeal is another tool.
Quoting Benkei
Most Russians / Russians in general? Hard to tell while Putin's team sets the agenda, largely controls broadcasts. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, whoever, apparently don't have particular reservations about NATO. Georgia left the CSTO (subject to the signature Russian interloping). The other day Putin had a get-together with select wives and mothers of lost soldiers. He made sure to emphasize not to believe what others say.
How to stop rolling the dice on the destruction of human civilization ? pessimistic
[sup]— Kelsey Piper · Vox · Sep 22, 2022[/sup]
Russia will lose as well as whoever else if they go nuclear. If that's on Putin's table anyway, then what's to stop them? It's become a perpetual threat begging for international standards/transparency toward stability. North Korea ain't helping. Another murderous autocrat. At least China is trying.
Quoting Alexander Lukashenko
Ukraine Situation Report
[sup]— UNOCHA · ongoing[/sup]
October–November 2022 nationwide missile strikes on Ukraine
[sup]— Wikipedia · ongoing[/sup]
Kind of obscene. (For that matter, are homosexuals next?)
And that objection is supposed to prove an “obvious error” I committed?! Are you crazy?! Aside from the fact that it fails to land anywhere near the target, I don’t even see how it can take off. Indeed, as it is formulated, your objection is a non sequitur, logically speaking. To be logically valid, it should look something like:
To be sound both premises must be true. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that P2 is true, what about P1? Is it obviously true?! To me it’s the opposite of it. If it’s an empirical claim, where is the evidence to support it? If it’s a semantic entailment, can you exactly spell out what that is?
Anyways your objection totally misses the target. Let me repeat once again the point: my main claim wasn’t about international law violations but about Russian defiant attitude against West/NATO/US support for Ukraine. So I listed facts that support that claim, like the fact that Russia didn’t halt its invasion even after a UN resolution against it as widely voted by West/NATO/US, with ensuing sanctions and continued military support to Ukraine by the West. If that’s not an act of defiance by Russia against West/NATO/US, then I don’t understand your usage of the word “defiance”: if X is warned, condemned and sanctioned by Y for a certain choice, and X knowingly pursues its choice despite of that, that’s for me enough to call X’s behavior defiant toward Y. EVEN MORE SO, if X were to question Y’s authority with “tu quoque” arguments (as you suggest with “but also the US has little respect for international law”)!!!
Quoting Isaac
At this point, I don’t know really nor I’m sure I care about how you assess empirical evidence for whatever claim about “Russia’s intent” in this war made by avg dudes on a philosophy forum, not to mention that I take the facts I listed in my argument as common knowledge as the obvious mundane truism that Russia violated international laws. But you can always show me a comment of yours about Russia’s intent (or the US, NATO, West, Ukraine intent for that matter) that is more than “sketchy at best” and with great “empirical ground” and I might reconsider.
Quoting Isaac
Security concerns are about means and intentions of potential hostile subjects: Russia has proven capability of damaging the West and proven intent to do so. If you do not understand the purpose of my argument about security concerns for the West (because I care for the West and reject Russian expansionism), that’s intellectually self-discrediting. These are pretty basic concepts and “as I said, you need to meet a minimum threshold of comprehension to take in part in discussions at this level”.
Quoting Isaac
To begin with, who is “we”? You commented a post of mine which was part of an exchange I had with another interlocutor. In that exchange he didn’t claim anywhere Russia getting its way would be bad for the reasons I discussed (as far as I read and remember of his previous posts he simply acknowledged that Russian aggression must be morally condemned, then he questioned the Western support of Ukraine for the risk of nuclear escalation). That’s why I discussed them. Actually, at some point, he expressed his disagreement with me. For that reason, I find your claim “we were all already agreed on that matter” twice false.
Secondly, I don’t buy the caricatural way you frame the problem, nor I care much about you pressing anybody to delimit the scope of the discussion the way you see fit. As far as I’m concerned, I don’t assume that my understanding of this war is nearly enough as good as the Western administrations’ one, starting with the US. And I have no strong reasons to question rationality, means and intentions of all directly or indirectly involved parties about avoiding any spiraling of this war into a nuclear world war, even in the case that tactical nuclear weapons would be used by Russia. From the news reporting the American establishment representatives’ doubts about the Ukrainian intentions to seize back Crimea (like Gen. M. Milley), one can guess some pressure by the Americans on the Ukrainians to get back at the negotiation table. Even in this case, that alone wouldn’t be enough evidence to support the idea that the Americans are acting primarily out of concern for a nuclear escalation. Also because in an hypothetical scenario where Russia is in such desperate conditions to use tactical nuclear weapons at some point, I wouldn’t exclude that the Western following military response, however not in kind, may decisively worsen the Russian situation on the battlefield.
Anyways, currently, there seems to be still room for continuing an attrition warfare without involving nuclear weapons. And if that’s expected to be in line with Western and Ukrainian objectives at the expense of an expansionist Russia, I’d welcome it too.
These would not be "NATO" just whatever country they are from.
For example, say Estonia announced they weren't going to just talk shit and launder money anymore, but actually put their beliefs in practice. "We're going to Ukraine!" they announce.
And then they go. And, if this isn't NATO doing anything, then that would be announced and clear, that Estonia is making a bilateral alliance with Ukraine and declare an official state of war with Russia (as they have the sovereign right to do!) and they are going in! This would not create an article 5 situation. NATO would make clear that Estonia is on its own now in declaring .
Now, let's also assume that Estonia troops don't matter in the slightest on the battlefield. Nothing would change in the current situation, except maybe Russia invading Estonia. That's what happens when you declare war on another country, and article 5 does not cover that.
The reason this is not even considered by these countries is for the reason I explain. No one actually believes the propaganda that Russia is can or plans or even wants to conquer all of Easter Europe, it's just propaganda. If people actually believed that their own countries are in danger, "going in" would be a serious consideration.
Again, more bullshit soup.
What's the purpose of "defiance" in your strawman here?
Obviously if West/NATO/US has little respect for international law, then breaking international law is a homage to their realpolitik "move fast and break things" maverick attitude, and not some sort of act of defiance.
You seem to be holding on this word defiance like mould to stale bread because if Russia is "defying" the West ... then it follows in the topsy-turvy mental gymnastics of the propagandist the West must do something about that "defiance", regardless of the consequence on Ukrainians or even if our anti-defiance policies even work.
So no, Russia didn't violate international law in "defiance" of the West/NATO/US.
If the "WMD's" in Iraq that no one could find were justification to invade Iraq, then certainly the biolabs the US admitted in public were in Ukraine are more than enough justification to invade Ukraine. Russia is just paying homage to the West/NATO/US understanding of international law, if anything it's a sign of deep respect.
- China is against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
- There's a serious risk of this escalating the war and not cowing the West push for cessation of fighting, but to do the opposite.
- Ukraine is next to Russia, hence radiation can easily travel to Russia by winds.
- Destroying Ukrainian forces with tactical nuclear weapons is difficult: troops on the modern battleground are very dispersed.
- Ukraine is unlikely to surrender or to give in just by using tactical nuclear weapons.
- Forces operating in nuclear fallout areas will need training and equipment Russia doesn't have now: basically you will create a small no-go zone for your troops also.
- After the initial quick-capture strategy went bust (on day one) and created the logistical fiasco, Russia has actually been very risk-averse. The withdrawal from Kherson (and Kyiv) shows this. Suddenly such an escalation would go against the way that Russia has fought the war after the initial push.
- Russia has no interest to initiate World War 3. If the "Escalate to De-escalate" doesn't work, then there is nothing to gain from this kind of escalation. It has suffered severe losses in Ukraine already and the last thing would be to escalate the war to a totally new level.
Furthermore, I was even before this war started very worried about the Russian doctrine to "Escalate to De-escalate", meaning that Russia would use at a time of it's convenience and by using the nuclear weapon to create an environment where there is a overwhelming public desire to stop the fighting at all costs immediately.
Yet this isn't 2014 and Russia has no strategic surprise. It had in 2014 the surprise then as just taking off the flag from their combat fatigues and Putin insisting that the VDV paratroops were not Russian soldiers confused the West and especially it's media totally. The "Escalate to de-escalate" strategy would need the West to be already confused about the war, the Western politicians not having had any thought of a nuclear escalation. Then knee-jerk response "STOP EVERYTHING!"
Now as the nuclear sabre-rattling is many months old, Western generals and Western leaders have had ample time to think about their response which makes it likely that NATO can hold it's line together even if Russia did escalate this way. The shuttle diplomacy behind the scenes of intelligence directors sending the message to Russia has made this pretty clear to the Russian leadership. Don't forget that NATO has it's own nuclear deterrence.
And the basic simple fact is that Russia can lose this war. In fact, because there is no opposition and Putin is firmly in control of the country (at least now), he could be just fine even after a disastrous humiliating defeat. Just like Saddam Hussein after the Iran-Iraq war and Desert Storm. Hence the idea that Putin cannot be humiliated is just pandering the dictator.
Encourage Putin to do what exactly?
Sure, it sounds good to say we're "standing up to a bully", but what cost to Ukrainians do you think is worth it for the Western policy of not doing anything that risks Ukraine "winning"?
And why is the West's policy to not go into Ukraine, no no-fly-zone, as well as severely limit weapons systems to Ukraine?
Resulting in this situation where Russia has no particular need to use nuclear weapons.
The disadvantages of nuclear weapons far outweigh the benefits ... but only because the West isn't really stopping Putin.
Quoting ssu
The US/NATO are 100% clear that China is the real "competitor" and so on and they are enemies. China may have zero problem with Russia nuking NATO troops in Ukraine and then taking advantage of the uncertainty and fear to invade Taiwan.
Point is, what China would want in what scenarios we can only speculate. Certainly China's current stance is that nuclear weapons would be a bad thing ... but also there's simply no reason to use nuclear weapons at the moment.
Hence, why we don't see NATO troops in Ukraine as that may not only be reason enough for Russia to nuke them, but also their friends may see it is indeed reasonable course of action. As we've already discussed, Ukraine, with or without NATO troops, getting nuked would not be a reason to nuke Russia in turn.
Furthermore, actually losing in Ukraine may change the calculus to the Kremlin being what China thinks no longer a primary concern.
Hence, perhaps why we don't see Russia actually losing in Ukraine.
Quoting ssu
Obviously using nuclear weapons could escalate to more nuclear weapons and this is a reason not to escalate.
... again, maybe why we see the US placing limits to weapons and assistance, and everything organised around the principle of not threatening Russian defeat in any realistic sense.
Quoting ssu
Radiation isn't all that big a concern when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons.
Quoting ssu
The utility of nuclear weapons would be in the scenario where Ukraine is actually advancing a sizeable concentration of force. Dispersed forces are a defensive measure and not an offensive measure.
There's also other uses of nuclear weapons such as destroying bunkers, bridges, logistics hubs, air bases, EMP and so on.
Of course, if Russian troops aren't actually at risk of any real defeat there would be no reason to use nuclear weapons against any such target. For example, right now Ukrainian airforce isn't doing much ... so why blowup air bases with nuclear weapons?
But, again, for the sake of argument, let's imagine the West actually supporting Ukraine in anyway it wants, and actually trained and equipped the Ukrainian airforce since the start of the war and now F-16's, B-2's, F-22's and F-35's, plethora of advances drones, and so on are an actual problem for Russia, then maybe nuking those airbases would be the only effective military option, and even China may see that as a reasonable response.
Again, why the Western media, politicians and officials simply accept the framework of "support Ukraine ... but, shhhhh, not too much".
Quoting ssu
Again, nuclear fallout of tactical nuclear bombs isn't all that big an issue, and you can just avoid these areas entirely or then, if it was a problem, only employe nukes far behind enemy lines to take out key infrastructure, such as the air base example above.
Quoting ssu
Agreed ... but the reason why is that their parallel operation to capture the land bridge to Crimea was an amazing military success and they are in a defensive posture to protect these gains. Capturing the rest of the Donbas would be a political victory, but doesn't secure the land bridge any better in and of itself (only if it was captured at a cost benefit maintaining or improving relative strength terms, which explains the super slow advances that minimise casualties and simply withdrawing from positions that are difficult to defend).
Quoting ssu
Definitely. However, the question is what escalation the West would do that would be responded to with Nuclear weapons by Russia ... that the West would then not respond with nuclear weapons.
It's NATO that would be escalating to a point of Russia using nuclear weapons and then ... nothing, which NATO wants to avoid, and is avoiding by limiting assistance to Ukraine, excluding things like a no-fly zone, certainly not sending troops, and so on.
Nuclear "sabre rattling" has already deterred significant amount of actions that NATO (already "appeased" the nuclear bully in your parlance) would certainly have done if all this rhetoric was drummed up against a non-nuclear power.
And, you may say, "what's wrong with that! of course we don't want to harm Russia so much that they may actually use nukes!!" ok, yeah I agree, but then we're not really "standing with Ukraine" but we have a policy of appeasement. Our actions are more symbolic than practical.
This is the central absurdity of the West's position. It argues right up to its policy line with extreme rhetoric, standing up to Putin, Churchillian "never surrender" type stuff, Putin's a war criminal and the Russians are literally terrorists, and the entire world order is at risk, and basically the greatest moral imperatives you can think of etc. But when it comes to the question of "well, why not do more then, send modern tanks and fighter jets or then go in with our own planes and troops" the exact opposite direction of appeasement is argued that "of course the nukes". Well ... which one is it? Are we "doing what it takes" and fighting on the fields and beaches and and in the air and seas and so on, or are we actually tiptoeing around any actual risk to the Kremlins core goals and making clear we are appeasing with respect to those core goals so no need for any desperate measures?
Now, when it comes question to just adjust a tiny bit this balance between fighting pure evil and appeasement, then what's trotted out by Western retired general is "don't worry about the nukes!" ... but that's disingenuous as if you really weren't worried about the nukes then it wouldn't be slight policy adjustments under consideration (such as ... well, still not sending Western tanks, but at least scrounging up old Soviet tanks)-; if you were really not worried about the Nukes you'd be right back to no-fly zones, and send in the cruise missiles, and troops and strike Russia on their own territory and so on.
However, what this different arguments on different sides of the policy to sort of "squeeze it" to where NATO wants it to be means, is that there is no actual justification in any coherent moral or political philosophy. Different incompatible justifications are used to support conflicting elements of the policy framework. Putin is Hitler so we need to send some arms ... but also Putin isn't Hitler so we aren't going to actually go defeat Putin as we defeated Hitler. The analogy is only as relevant as we say it is!
Why? Because the actual policy is just to separate Europe from Russian resources, in a cynical realpolitik move that has no moral justification.
Why strawman?
Quoting boethius
You are contrasting "maverick attitude" with "some sort of act of defiance", as if if they were incompatible, while Russia can be described as both. You are just playing with words (without defining them) and I don't care about your miserable rhetoric games. What I care about is the substantial security threats that an expansionist Russia constitute for the West.
BTW there is no international law resolution that NATO expansion has violated. While there is an international law resolution against Russian invasion of Ukraine. So what homage are you talking about?
Quoting boethius
Here I re-edited your caricatural bullshit to something that can express justified Western security concerns. BTW the West is already doing something about Russian defiant attitude, no matter what the Western propagandist and the pro-Russia propagandist like you is saying.
In other words, you just have "tautologies" that in the end you must agree with, dude. So suck it up and move on.
Simple: to continue to undo "the greatest tragedy of the 2oth Century". Russia to claim dominance over it's "near abroad".
And the West has given him this: After annexing Crimea and starting in limited insurgency in the Donbas, what did Putin do? He took take the next step to make a large scale attack on Ukraine. Did then the West and NATO respond as it has now? No, not back in 2014. There's your example from history.
You really think he would be satisfied with Novorossiya and a puppet regime in Kyiv? No. Then there's Moldova. It's so clear and obvious when you read actually what Putin has said. And done.
Quoting boethius
Tell that to people. (I have to remember to quote you later.) And btw radiation on the site where a tactical nuke has been used, it is a problem.
Quoting boethius
Again you have no idea what you are talking about. In the age of drones and instant fire-missions that can rain down in few minutes, artillery poses a threat at any time to any concentration of force. That's why you don't see columns of Ukrainian tanks... or nowdays of Russian armour moving along in long columns also. The unit size is smaller than before (Soviet doctrine was to operate with fronts and armies). This is obvious from the fact that the Russian forces, already before the war started, were deployed as Battalion-combat-teams. You don't operate with larger formation, brigades, divisions as in WW2 or as during the Cold War.
Quoting boethius
I think it's obvious from what has been leaked even to the public. A conventional attack on Russian forces in Ukraine and Naval ships operating in the Black Sea. Hence notice the level of escalation: Russian sites in Russia aren't attacked. Then again Russia has an option to escalate: does it enlarge the battlefield to outside Ukraine and the Black Sea.
Let's remember that for example in the Korean war the Soviet Air Force fought the USAF on a limited airspace next to the Chinese border. That indeed the two Superpowers were engaged in fighting was simply kept a secret by both sides not wishing to escalate matters.
But then again, this is the "sabre rattling" to Russia's "sabre rattling" in the first place. What actually NATO would do or not is another thing. Medvedev could be right and NATO wouldn't do anything, but be outraged.
Where do I do this?
I do the opposite. The US's maverick attitude in invading Iraq with sufficient justification or a credible plan, somehow succeeding in making things worse than under Saddam, is an act of defiance against international law and morality. If Russia is doing the same, that's just called "learning" and being a fan, unless defying defiance is a thing, which I assume is what you'll be arguing next.
Quoting neomac
The word play in this little dialogue is your use of the word "defiance" to somehow imply justification of something, in this case, Western policies.
Russia and allies "defied" Hitler in WWII ... did that make Hitler's war justified?
"Defiance" doesn't justify anything. Ukraine was defying Russia by financing and arming Nazi's ... so according to you the entire Russian war effort is justified due to the defiance of Ukraine.
Quoting neomac
Again, what threat? Make your case. Russia is about to invade all of Western Europe? ... with it's incompetent army that can't do anything right?
What is this threat to the West you keep talking about?
Quoting neomac
The key question of the recent dialogue is "at what cost to Ukraine?" and is this cost reasonable to ask a proxy to pay.
You and all the other Zelenskyites simply keep dodging the question.
For example, Russia can just destroy the Ukrainian power grid. Is this a reasonable cost to Ukraine for the West to be seen "doing something about Russian defiant attitude".
And what's the end result? There is no guarantee that the current policies actually turn out bad for Russia.
In the current trajectory, Russia will have a far stronger army, ramped up arms industry, and has already reoriented its entire economy away from the West so if the West isn't willing to do more, Russia now has basically a free hand vis-a-vis it's neighbour's.
What has the war established so far?
It's mostly established NATO cannot defeat Russia through proxy means and is unwilling to intervene directly and sanctions are an empty threat that have already been expended, and the Russian military is willing to suffer large costs to achieve military objectives and can and will destroy your essential infrastructure if you "defy" them.
We keep on being told Ukrainian victory is just a battle away, but that hasn't happened.
Notice the difference with rhetoric and actions on the Russian side too. Russians have basically made the argument that they already are fighting NATO... when they are fighting Ukrainians armed with Western weapons and support.
And notice one limitation here: NATO does also have to upkeep it's own forces. Only the Baltic states have basically given all-out support plus the kitchen sink. Javelins are a good example: a huge portion of all Javelins have been sent to Ukraine means that the US to produce the systems to replace these will take two years I remember.
We have to remember that the armed forces of West European countries are small compared to Ukraine (and Russia). Ukraines army is now estimated to be 500 000 to 750 000. That is a huge army to arm, when by European standards the mobilized Finnish army is huge (less than 300 000).
This is what shouldn't be forgotten: The Ukraine war is a conventional war and because it wasn't a short two week war, it's draining the hell out of everybody. Yes, Russia has had to rely on antiquated tanks and ancient Cold War weapon systems because it doesn't have anything else. Well, don't think the West this would be different. The weapons manufacturing in the West is designed for small wars, small limited operations and procurement of small batches of expensive weapon systems. Not to feed a WW1/WW2 style weapons manufacturing juggernaut needed to provide sufficient materiel to the mouth of Moloch.
Oh yes, the Ukrainians as the "proxies" of the evil West. How typical, the victim is the proxy.
Simply keep the same level as now. Keep the course now set. Let's see after next year. As long as Ukrainians are willing to fight, it's their decision. It is them who are actually paying the cost, not us. If they aren't willing to fight, then military aid is useless.
... Like Belarus and Kazakstan and Georgia?
Places Russia already dominates?
What is the next step of this "rebuild the Soviet Union" plan?
Quoting ssu
What Putin did next was negotiate Mink I, which Ukraine didn't respect and the Western "guarantors" didn't use any leverage to pressure Ukraine to respect it, and later Ukraine said was just playing for time to build up their forces to have a big war, and then ... negotiate Mink II, which had the exact same result.
However, the more important question remains what we can do about it.
This whole "Russia will keep expanding in an unexplained way without any evidence or rational" is simply to justify the Western policy of having Ukraine pay an enormous price for harming the Russians. A price that will never be compensated, may not achieve even close to the military outcomes, and in which the West could intervene at any moment to provide real help, but doesn't.
Quoting ssu
Radiation of tactical nuclear weapons simply isn't much. If there's a scenario in which a tactical nuclear weapon would be under consideration for military purposes, the radiation would not be a major concern. Of course, if there's zero military reason to use a nuclear weapon then the radiation, among a long list of things, is an additional reason not to use them.
Where radiation from nuclear weapons is a real problem, is in a full strategic nuclear exchange. Strategic weapons create far more radiation, far more fallout, and there would be hundreds if not thousands of them exploding around the world. Additionally, you may have nukes hitting nuclear power plants (that contain far more radiation than a nuclear blast) or then just society collapsing and melt-downs and nuclear fires at various defunct nuclear power plants.
Quoting ssu
Let's say Ukrainians form a bridge head over an important river and need to pour in significant resources to consolidate that bridge head ... drop a nuke on said bridge head and not only all those forces are gone, but it become clear that there is basically no way to ford the river in peace.
The idea Nuclear weapons have no military use is just insanely naive.
If there was no political reasons to not-use nuclear weapons, and it was just one of many capabilities, military commanders would find tactical uses for them.
Now, if you're saying nuclear weapons would not "guarantee" victory, again, totally false. Russia could drop a nuclear weapon on every Ukrainian city and every command centre and the war would be over in a day.
Again, there's lot's of reasons not to do that, but the idea nuclear weapons are some sort of nothing burger in a theatre of war seems just bizarre.
Quoting ssu
It seems, if what you say is true, Russia can suffer some acceptable losses for the privilege of nuking Ukraine.
There would be a "cost of doing business" is what you are saying?
Of course, we are in agreement that there are plenty of good reasons for Russia to not use nuclear weapons (the main one being they are sitting on the land bridge to Crimea and Ukraine can't seem to do anything about that anyways).
However, that the cost to Russia of using nuclear weapons doesn't seem to be much, maybe explains why the West is careful to not create a situation where it would start to arguably a good idea to start using nukes: i.e. a situation in which Russia is actually losing in conventional warfare.
Quoting ssu
We totally agree.
Again, maybe just explains why the US and NATO aren't actually escalating to "help Ukraine win" which is why Ukraine has so far not won and suffering immensely for the honour of representing Western interests, in some vague way.
Quoting ssu
Of course the West wouldn't strike Russia, why would they?
However, West seems already at maximum outrage. I don't see what more outrage would accomplish.
Our proxies will keep being proxies so therefore we should continue to use them as proxies? It's their country that gets fucked, not ours?
And to accomplish what?
First, "Ukrainians" make decisions now without any critical press or critical political parties and in a vast stew of propaganda. We don't really know what Ukrainians think and whether polls are accurate considering any dissent is viewed as "Russian collaboration" and may get you imprisoned and/or killed.
Additionally, the West keeps saying it will support Ukraine indefinitely and with "whatever it needs" and so on, so even if the decision to fight was genuinely democratic, it maybe based on the Wests assertions about support.
And, more fundamentally, they are still our weapons and we are still responsible for the outcome regardless of what the Ukrainians want to do. It maybe simply not morally acceptable to have Ukraine fight a lost battle even if they want to.
There are also many benefits to peace.
Convenient, that Ukraine and others could come together in a common cause, huh? :D Democracies against autocrats, defenders against invaders, ...?
Hard to tell what would happen if, say, the UK was to deploy 6000 troops + equipment, Poland 6000, France 6000, Romania 3000, Spain 5000, the US 10000, Australia 2000, Luxembourg 10, Norway 800, in Ukraine. (just whatever came to mind while typing, and assuming this stuff would go through whatever procedures the respective governments have, however unlikely, but invitation accepted) Would Putin play the victim card (again)? Take Kim Jong-un's offer? Tell Lukashenko "Send what you got!"? Ukraine could become quite the battleground. Not sure how realistic something like this is, but one might hope not all that likely...? What might happen?
Quoting Limiting the war: What might Western intervention look like in Ukraine? · Seth Cropsey · The Hill · Nov 27, 2022
Cropsey's comment ? there doesn't need NATO so close by. NASAMS (and others) can help. :up:
Lavrov says Ukrainians will be liberated from neo-Nazi rulers
[sup]— TASS · Nov 26, 2022[/sup]
Getting old, the Nazi thing (and Lavrov perhaps). Been shown the door. Repeating doesn't make it so.
Here:
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
Then neither Russia nor you learnt well. First of all the act of “defiance” which I’m interested in must be assessed wrt the subjects supporting some international law resolution against the violator. So my question to you is: what is the UN resolution that the US was acting against during its invasion of Iraq, exactly?
Secondly, the US’s invasion turned out to be a reputational failure for the US and set a dangerous precedent exploitable by anti-Western authoritarian regimes. Still the US is the hegemonic power which the Westerns rely on, so Western countries are not compelled to treat Russia with the same submissiveness they treat American abuses on geopolitical grounds. Russia is no peer of the US on the geopolitical arena. Period.
Third, as I said elsewhere, I’m siding with the US not because I think the US is good nor because I think the US is good for the West, but because I think Russia or China would be worse than the US for the West if they managed to extend their hegemonic influence at the expense of the American hegemony in the West. So until there is a better alternative for the Westerners in the foreseeable future, I would find more reasonable to partner with the US than to partner with Russia or China.
Quoting boethius
The word “defiance” is perfectly intelligible with or without reference to any legal or moral justification as a form of intentional disobedience. Since I’m reasoning on geopolitical grounds, I will assess Russian geopolitical posture as the challenger of the West accordingly.
Concerning your likely confused questions, rational geopolitical agents must (logical requirement) effectively link geopolitical means to geopolitical goals. That’s how practical rationality must be applied to geopolitics. This is true for ALL geopolitical players: Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, China, ISIS, the US, Ukraine, Switzerland, the Vatican, Roman Empire, etc.
Quoting boethius
Looping for the thousand time on the same point: [I]the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. Besides Russia is capable to blackmail the West (and the rest of the world) with wheat and gas supply (among others), threaten it with nuclear weapons, fund pro-Russian lobbies in the West, conduct cyber-warfare against Western facilities/institutions and project military assets in Africa, Middle East and Mediterranean sea through the Black Sea (basically encircling Europe), while increasing Putin's authoritarian regime and spiking Russian budget for military expenditure [2] with the money earned during Putin's 20 years of happy business with the West, instead of investing this money to improve and widen system of rights, education and welfare for his people.[/i]
Quoting boethius
Wrong, with its incompetent army Russia did lots of damage. So far not enough to win its strategic war against the West, though.
Quoting boethius
Your question is based on assumptions we do not share. It’s like asking to an atheist: is being gay a sin against God or not? Likely the atheist answer won’t be based on what is claimed in the Bible, but on his disbelief of any such thing as “sins against God”, right?
The same between us, so here is my answer: at whatever cost Ukraine and the West as geopolitical agents are willing to pay. It’s reasonable in geopolitical terms if it’s effective for any of them. Hopefully for both of them.
Besides given the rate I'm repeating my answers to your objections, it's less that I'm dodging your questions and more that you are playing dumb.
Quoting boethius
We are reasoning under uncertainty. Yawn.
Quoting boethius
What?!
Quoting boethius
So far? NATO alliance was revived (and will likely expand). Russian original goals failed. Russia has been humiliated on the battlefield. And other countries are distancing themselves from Russia (even countries within within Russian sphere of influence, like Kazakhstan).
Quoting boethius
The same blablabla. We have already been through this, here is my answer once again:
The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West.
Again, if you declare martial law and disband the second largest political party, that does not qualify as democratic.
But even putting aside that, is the cause common?
Zelensky and his followers certainly want to "defeat" the Russians, that's certainly their cause, so if the cause was common what would follow from that is Ukraine would already have the weapons systems, training, even allied troops to accomplish this "common cause".
We don't see that, so perhaps because the causes are different.
US and co. is certainly happy to see the Ukrainians suffer a lot to make the Russians suffer somewhat, but unless the goal is to "win" I don't think that's what Zelensky et. al. have in mind.
Quoting jorndoe
Yes, seems incredibly unlikely.
If you agree on that point and just want to discuss hypotheticals, you haven't listed enough troops to make a significant difference.
Quoting jorndoe
I posted 6 videos of Western journalists investigating Nazi's in Ukraine and all concluding that there definitely seems to be Nazi's in Ukraine.
But let's get back to that later and focus here on your argument form:
Ukraine keeps blaming Russians for the war ... has that gotten "old" in your definition?
Quoting neomac
Your full sentence was referring to Russia, whereas my statement was referring to the US invading Iraq was not "defiance". Maybe follow the context.
You then setup some sort of maverick-defiance strawman stated above, which obviously has nothing to do with anything. As the following statements you cite demonstrate, pretty much doing anything can be construed as "defiance" of someone who disagrees.
Why are we talking about defiance? Because your argument about the West needing to deal with Russia's "defiance" (originally of international law) justifying Western policy, couldn't standup to @Isaac's criticism so you've again do what you always do and focus on some trivialities and moving the goalposts: in this case moving the goal posts from Russia is defying international law and that broadly supports your position, to Russia is defying the "West".
Quoting neomac
Notice how this, your actual position of supporting US hegemonic power, has nothing to do with justifications of US actions you throw against the wall to see what sticks and we've been cleaning up for hundreds of comments.
Putting that aside, let's deal with this argument. First thing to notice, is that if Russia is a Hegemonic power in its neighbourhood then Ukraine should be compelled to treat Russia with submissiveness.
The only justification here is who has the hegemonic power in the region should call the shots in Ukraine. If Russia comes out on top in the war then it was the Hegemonic power all along, Ukraine should have submitted and that would be that.
Your argument basically boils down to might is right, so who has the might is the key question which the war is going to uncover.
Quoting neomac
Just wow. The question of whether the cost to Ukraine of our policies of encouraging, financing, arming more war is worthwhile cost so far to accomplish ... "liberation" of the Donbas? Crimea? well whatever it's accomplished compared to the offer at the start of the war, and what further cost do Zelenskyites think would be reasonable to pay to accomplish the objectives of the "common cause" ...
... is akin to asking if being gay is a sin against God to an atheist.
Quoting neomac
Your whole premise is:
Quoting neomac
... So what's there to fear?
And notice how just after lauds the "common cause", it's made as plane as day there is no common cause as Ukrainian defeat is completely acceptable as long as enough damage has been done to Russia along the way.
Is the cost to Ukraine of such a policy morally acceptable?
Quoting neomac
Truly remarkable.
Meaning?
Quoting boethius
Same steamy pile of shit as usual:
First, you keep repeating that I made a strawman argument. Do you know what strawman argument means? Explained that to me. And show me how that applies to my counterarguments.
Second, I already explained what I mean by “defiance”, it’s you who didn’t.
Third, your and Isaac’s duo-promotion is pathetic, but expected. Intellectually misery at its finest. Besides I don’t care about the scores you assign to me, I care about arguments.
Forth, every time you call my claims trivialities, that means you agree with me. And since I keep disagreeing with you by virtue of those alleged trivialities, then it means that you disagree with yourself. Do you see the problem, dude?
Besides my arguments are always the same ones. Just looping through them for a while now. And if I find your approach conceptually flawed, I don’t feel rationally compelled to stick to it.
Fifth, quote where I made such a claim “Russia is defying international law”, you serial liar.
Quoting boethius
What do you mean by “justification”? I clarified for the thousand time my point when talking about practical rationality. While you keep playing with words.
Quoting boethius
No, there is no reason to constrain the field to region in the sense you suggest here. When great powers struggle for hegemony they can do so over all domains within their reach on earth, sea, space, virtual space. Small powers pick their side according to their means and convenience. Besides I don’t reason through caricatural slogans like “might is right”. I’m not sure it makes even sense.
Quoting boethius
When you are asking ME your questions you look as dumb, yes. I don’t share your conceptual assumptions. And for exactly the same reason, your rhetoric attempt of emotional/moral blackmailing me looks even dumber to me. And if you are doing it for your fans and sidekicks, I don’t give a shit about it.
Quoting boethius
Russia can still do lots of damage and especially at the expense of the American allies. Indeed if there is going to be a more direct clash between the 2 powers, this is going more likely to happen in Europe than on the American soil.
Quoting boethius
I answered yes and argued for it a while ago. It was among my first posts to the thread.
Meaning pointing out US's invasion of Iraq was not an act of "defiance" does not create some situation where the "contrasting" the concepts of maverick and defiance has anything to do with anything.
You receive criticism ... can't deal with it, then move the goal posts. Obviously, you're no longer remotely arguing that Russia's breaking or not breaking international law is a justification for Western policies.
Quoting neomac
I point out that your argument about "defiance" is unsound and invalid, at no point does party A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified and what any of those or then third parties should do about it, and you then formulate my position as somehow contrasting maverick with defiance ... but they are compatible. Sure, you can also have the maverick defier, but that was not my statement which was just pointing out the US invasion of Iraq was not "an act of defiance" and then pointed out how your whole topsy-turvy defiance logic makes no sense.
Which you've entirely abandoned, formulating your position as very clearly support for US hegemony.
Quoting neomac
No, when we say you've moved the goal posts to something trivial, the triviality maybe true, but that doesn't support your position.
You have a bunch of elements in an argument that doesn't support your position: we point that out and then you move the goal posts to focusing on just one element, such as "defiance", or then just generalising your argument into a tautology which you quite clearly didn't say, but very clearly said something specific but unfortunately unsupported.
Quoting neomac
Do you just not remember what you've already written and what we've been discussing?
Quoting neomac
Clearly your position at the time can be summarised as Russia defying international law, the West/NATO/US therefore needing to apply that law somehow, and to make things more abundantly clear "violation of international law" is another way to say "defiance of international law".
Quoting neomac
So you're saying something that is of "practical rationality" to do would not be justified to do it? Why would it being both practical and rational to do ... not therefore be a justification to do it?
How is "practical rationality" anything other than a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of saying "justification".
If I ask why you did something and you answered with the practical and rational reasons for doing it, how is that not you justifying your actions with those reasons?
Quoting neomac
Again, so if Russia wins the "struggle" over Ukraine then it's actions were justified all along and Ukraine just picked the wrong side since 2014?
You're only substantive criticism of Russia seems to be they haven't won yet ... but the US hasn't won this struggle yet either. "Might is right" is not a slogan, it's just exactly what you are describing: if the US can dominate Russia in this confrontation then it should do so, which of course exact same thing applies to Russia dominating Ukraine.
Quoting neomac
You say this question of cost is both dumb and emotional/moral blackmail ... while stating you already answered this question literally a few sentences later:
Quoting neomac
Nothing is preventing anyone here arguing the cost is worth it. No one in the West hesitates to argue the cost to defeat Hitler was worth it. Sometimes great causes have great costs.
Of course, in the case of WWII the people arguing the cost was worth it actually sent their own soldiers to fight and share that cost. Saying the cost to Ukraine is worth it for our policies, such as not needing to "win" just damage Russia a lot, is quite clearly a cynical exploitation of Ukraine for our own ends.
However, nothing stops anyone from arguing the cynical exploitation and manipulation of Ukraine for our own ends is justifiable, that we will save more lives in the long run in the Baltics and Poland.
However, my question is not some "conceptual framework" that makes sense to reject. If you advocate some goal, such as in this case harming the Russians, "what would be a reasonable cost to attain that goal?" is just common sense. Obviously you wouldn't sacrifice every single American to harm one Russian soldiers knee ... so between that and achieve your objective at the cost of a cup of coffee there obviously some zone of acceptable cost (to the US, to NATO, to Ukraine) which you're comfortable with.
It's simply a common sense question to participants who reject a negotiated peace and any essentially any compromise whatsoever, what cost to Ukraine they think would be worthwhile in refusing to compromise. Would 300 000 lives be worth it to conquer Crimea? Is clearly a reasonable question. Of course, people can argue that 300 000 lives wouldn't be worth it, but it can be conquered with some amount of lives that is worth it. However, to be an honest participant in this debate one should be able to answer such simple questions.
That the questions simply point to a total incoherence, ignorance and Russophobia underpinning your position doesn't somehow make these simple questions as part of some "conceptual framework" that can be rejected.
Quoting neomac
Like who? The Baltic states? Poland? Germany?
And in what conditions and scenario does Russia just start invading East-ward?
Also, if Russia can do what you say here, doesn't that just make them the Hegemon?
But I wasn’t talking about the American invasion of Iraq, I was talking about Russian invasion of Ukraine. To repeat it once more:
[I]I listed facts that support that claim, like the fact that Russia didn’t halt its invasion even after a UN resolution against it as widely voted by West/NATO/US, with ensuing sanctions and continued military support to Ukraine by the West. If that’s not an act of defiance by Russia against West/NATO/US, then I don’t understand your usage of the word “defiance”: if X is warned, condemned and sanctioned by Y for a certain choice, and X knowingly pursues its choice despite of that, that’s for me enough to call X’s behavior defiant toward Y. EVEN MORE SO, if X were to question Y’s authority with “tu quoque” arguments (as you suggest with “but also the US has little respect for international law”)!!![/i]
Your criticism doesn’t address my claim and plays with words (“maverick”, “justification”) in interpreting my original claims which weren’t using such terms. Your conceptually confused or caricatural way of rendering my claims is good to mislead or brainwash you, not me. Anyways yes the Western reaction against Russia is justified on geopolitical and legal grounds.
[quote=“boethius;758974”]I point out that your argument about "defiance" is unsound and invalid, at no point does party A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified and what any of those or then third parties should do about it, and you then formulate my position as somehow contrasting maverick with defiance ... but they are compatible. Sure, you can also have the maverick defier, but that was not my statement which was just pointing out the US invasion of Iraq was not "an act of defiance” and then pointed out how your whole topsy-turvy defiance logic makes no sense.
Which you've entirely abandoned, formulating your position as very clearly support for US hegemony.[/quote]
First, in your blablabla is not clear to me what argument you claim as being invalid and unsound (the piece you quote is not my argument, but arguably Isaac's), so first show the argument of mine you are objecting to, then show why it is invalid, then show why it is unsound. Second, I didn't express myself the way you report "A defying party B tell us anything about who is justified". Third, you said I committed a strawman before making the distinction between maverick and defiant attitude [1], and what follows doesn’t prove that my objection to Isaac’s argument from the post you cite was a strawman wrt Isaac’s argument, it just offers another argument which is supposed to somehow save Isaac’s argument. However Isaac’s argument as it is formulated remains fallacious or inconclusive as I claimed. Four, your distinction between maverick and defiant is a diversion from what I was talking about, and it's irrelevant wrt what I originally claimed (it doesn't matter only who transgresses international law, but also against whom the transgression has been committed, especially if it looks like an insubordination from a minor power to a greater power), so why on earth would I let you drag me into a dispute grounded on a misunderstanding? Five, I didn’t abandon anything, it’s you who is progressively discovering how poor your understanding of my claim was and still is.
Anyways feel free to brainwash yourself into believing otherwise. Along with your sidekick. As I said, it's pathetic but expected. Fun fact is that even in two you can't manage to build a decent objection.
Quoting boethius
You and your sidekick focused on the word “defiance” from a comment of mine addressed to another interlocutor and for reasons apparently evident to you both, and yet when I questioned you both you are incapable of making a point without rephrasing in a caricatural or confused way my claims. Besides you are no credible referee nor credible reporter of our past exchanges. So I don’t see the point of such preposterous summaries other then offering cues to your sidekick to parrot.
BTW my claimes are "trivialities" or "tautologies" or "both"? Quote 2 trivialities/tautologies I claimed, and quote the claims expressing my position which the trivialities/tautologies I claimed later were moving from.
Quoting boethius
NO, IT CAN’T be summarised in the way you rephrased it. I wrote in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US not in defiance of international law. I get that the expression “Russia defying international law” is useful for your and your sidekick’s preposterous counterargument. But that’s NOT what I said. So it was you who tried to generalise my argument into a dumb claim about international law violations and arbitrarily conflating it into international law defiance. And that's why you committed a fallacious strawman argument against me! But once you realised how dumb your counterargument is, you started accusing me of shifting subjects to “tautologies” (do you know what “tautology” means? Explain that to me!) which you must agree with. How pathetic is that.
[quote=“boethius;758974”]So you're saying something that is of "practical rationality" to do would not be justified to do it? Why would it being both practical and rational to do ... not therefore be a justification to do it?
How is "practical rationality" anything other than a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of saying "justification".
If I ask why you did something and you answered with the practical and rational reasons for doing it, how is that not you justifying your actions with those reasons?[/quote]
I clarified what I mean by “practical rationality” as applied to geopolitics: rational geopolitical agents must (logical requirement) effectively link geopolitical means to geopolitical goals.. While we could use the word “justification” to refer to practical rationality, one could use it also to refer to “moral justification” and “legal justification”. For that reason, there is a risk of conflation between three different cases of justification, and that’s why I didn’t use it. Since you didn’t clarify the way you use the notion of “justification” I’m not sure we share the same usage, nor I’m sure that you are not conflating different meanings (indeed, I suspect you conflate different meanings). In any case I do not feel compelled to use your wording to express my ideas.
Quoting boethius
See how you reframe all my claims with terms I didn’t use, to make claims I didn’t make, while ignoring my other contextual claims or subsequent clarifications, and despite the fact that I complained about such approach several times?
My claim is more like this: if the US has valid reasons to perceive Russia as a security threat and has effective means to repel such threat, then it’s rational for the US to act accordingly. As it is doing.
The claim “might is right" is conceptually confused or misleading, it doesn't sound anything but a slogan to me. I could never use it to express my beliefs.
Quoting boethius
I argued against such putative “simple questions” a while ago. They are not simple, they are simplistic. In other words, I find them conceptually flawed.
Quoting boethius
All the alleged reasons that pushed Russia against the West (NATO expansion, Russophobia, protection of Russian minorities, existential threat, securing strategic military assets like in Crimea) may still be exploitable in the future once Russia recovers enough to pursue its geopolitical ambitions and if circumstances are more favourable (e.g. a US more isolationist toward Europe, China more supportive toward Russia) that could be a problem for unprepared westerners. But it’s not on me to figure out future plausible geopolitical scenarios and security threats from an authoritarian, expansionist and anti-Western Russia, I’m not a geopolitical analyst. I just read them.
Quoting boethius
Right. Indeed, also on that occasion I criticised the conceptual framework of my interlocutor who was wondering the same questions and supports your views. I'll let you guess who he was.
[1]
Quoting neomac
Would have to be hypothetical; the numbers could be higher too.
The question was more what might happen: other troops on the ground.
Quoting boethius
Sure, Nazis, and they're a problem, wherever, anywhere (even in Russia).
And that's not what Lavrov and the (other) propagandists say.
They postulate a Nazi junta ruling Ukraine — nonsense, old — part of their campaign.
Quoting as mentioned
These days, gauging their crap is almost down to gauging their motives?
[sup]— Chris Livesay, Tucker Reals · CBS News · Nov 26, 2022[/sup]
Russia has more bodies to throw into the fire than Ukraine.
And that's apparently what they're doing, yet omit explicating.
Reports seem consistent, have been for a bit now...
Untrained Russian ‘minced meat’ soldiers so terrified they deserted and hid in woods
[sup]— Gemma Jones · Daily Star · Nov 6, 2022[/sup]
‘We were completely exposed’: Russian conscripts say hundreds killed in attack
[sup]— Pjotr Sauer · The Guardian · Nov 7, 2022[/sup]
Russia's mobilized soldiers speak out: 'We were thrown on to the frontline with no support'
[sup]— Emmanuel Grynszpan · Le Monde · Nov 10, 2022[/sup]
Quoting SOTA · Oct 16, 2022
Putin Doesn’t Care: Russia Rushes Untrained, Unequipped Troops to Ukraine
[sup]— Stavros Atlamazoglou · 19FortyFive · Oct 17, 2022[/sup]
Untrained Russian draftees sent to fight for Makiivka sustain heavy losses, survivors record video message
[sup]— The Insider · Nov 23, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Ukraine war: Putin tells Russian soldiers' mothers he shares their pain · Jaroslav Lukiv · BBC · Nov 26, 2022
Don't know Russian law, or if that matters, yet doesn't this seem kind of criminal?
Quoting boethius
That is where nuclear weapons work: deterrence. If this would be a non-nuclear armed country attacking Ukraine, it is likely that a no-fly zone would have been enforced.
And it works both ways: Russia doesn't dare to attack the countries supplying arms to Ukraine or training Ukrainian troops.
Quoting boethius
Wrong.
Trade relations with the West are important to China, you know.
Quoting boethius
Two of the need a lot of work. Even if Russia did help the regime survive in Kazakhstan, they didn't turn the favour for Putin. Haven't gone along with the annexations and have given refuge to those fleeing the mobilization.
Quoting boethius
Not the Soviet Union, just Russia. With Putin you have the closest to a Russian Czar, actually. Only that he doesn't have a son waiting in the sidelines to become the next President.
As some have:
Quoting boethius
Minsk I (not Mink I) came only after Ukraine had fought the insurgents to a standstill (and the Russian army did have to save their asses a few times).
Quoting boethius
Which both sides didn't respect.
Quoting boethius
After Russia first declared the puppet regimes independent (in a choreographed meeting which an intelligence chief fumbled and got mixed with the next chapter, annexation) and then annexed not only them, but also more areas of Ukraine (parts of it which Russian forces don't even occupy), the Minsk procedures have been long dead and buried. Conveniently you are forgetting all the annexations that Russia has done.
Quoting boethius
Why wouldn't you use a smart bomb, enough conventional missiles or artillery to destroy the bridge? Absolutely no threat of NATO getting involved. Good if the media even would pick it up, but it wouldn't cause any outrage. This is where the stupidity lies in using nuclear weapons. If you really think that it's "naive" not to use nuclear weapons, then just why aren't people using them?
Or you have now become and adherent for tactical nuclear weapons?
Quoting boethius
There are escalatory ladders. But basically yes, there is a "cost of doing business" with nuclear weapons. Russia cannot dismiss the West's response of a conventional attack as a bluff. Of course, it could be a bluff, but I don't think they want to find out.
Quoting boethius
As I said, there are two reasons why Ukraine isn't getting everything it wants:
1) Yes, there can be those who think of it as escalation and worry that for example longer range artillery rockets would be used to attack targets inside Russia proper (which actually Ukraine has done by it's own weapon systems).
2) The arm cache of the West isn't actually so big and new weapons cost much. The world economy is going to a recession and spending on military in Ukraine is costly and doesn't create jobs much if any, actually. The West's arms procurement is made for peace time, not for a long conventional war.
The simple fact is that the Russian Army was totally incapable of handling hundreds of thousands of mobilized troops at once. Annually in peace time Russia takes in a quarter of million of conscripts, 100 000+ in two batches. They are then basically trained in the units...that now are deployed in Ukraine. So where do you have the spare people to train suddenly 300 000? Nowhere. It basically will take them years to create an organization to train such huge masses. This is the simple reason why it's such a mess.
Even my country, Finland, would have severe problems after it mobilized the 280 000 war time force. Yes, the country has potentially 700 000 reservists. But once the 280 000 are deployed, there is nobody to train the next batch of conscripts than reservists themselves: all the professional officers are acting as commanders in the fielded army. As the army is fully oriented to being a reservist army and focus on that mission, it could be overcome, but then take Russia, an army that has tried to do away with conscription and didn't have an organization to mobilize hundreds of thousands. This is the simple unavoidable end result.
That those are then shot by the their own troops I would be skeptical, too crazy. Stalin's army with straf battalions? What is obvious that without anything else and without the ability to train the troops, they are used in this way. Perhaps the idea is to go through the winter and have then the next batch of conscripts ready and trained for the spring. After all, now as these parts of Ukraine are part of Russia, you can use the conscripts there.
But that won't change the endemic corruption among the armed forces and the utter lack to train such large forces. Just an example of the theft:
It has been looked at just how likely it is. By experts in their field (as cited previously) and by, for example, @boethius above.
They reach different conclusions to you.
This is the problem with centrists like you. To dodge the moral evaluation of your position you need to argue that alternatives are actually impossible ("I'm as cut up about it as you, but we've just got to avoid taxing the rich, it's economics, I'm afraid"). Your attempts to do so are sounding more and more messianic.
You've still not answered the very basic moral question. Why ought Ukraine have control over Crimea/Donbas? There's no god-given right to any piece of land, there's no racial-biological link to Ukraine, there's no harm-reduction principle... There's no grounds at all been offered as to why they ought have that land. Without such grounds there's no reason we ought take even a 0.000001% risk of nuclear war to help them get it back.
So now Russia aren't a threat to the West, and Putin is a master strategist who doesn't make massive blunders? I wish you guys would get your story straight.
Nukes have their military use, which is to wipe out all mankind and give the earth a well-deserved break from us critters.
Why ought Russia have the right to take it from a sovereign state, whose territories it has accepted on several occasions? Why ought violence, aggression and straightforward imperialism justified?
But for you it doesn't matter if Putin is control of Ukraine or the Ukrainians are in control of Ukraine, hence this conversation has utterly no meaning. You just reinforce the stereotype of a typical tankie, for whom US and the West is evil and nothing else matters.
It didn't ought. I don't think the question of who governs what territory is a moral one, any more than what hat I ought wear today is a moral question.
Quoting ssu
I didn't. No one is justifying it.
Quoting ssu
The question was meaningful enough. Your continual dodging of it is telling. Why ought Ukraine have control over that territory? It doesn't matter if I disagree, you should still be able to provide me with an answer.
The choice has been between Russia or the United States to control Ukraine.
Before the United States aimed for regime change in Ukraine, Ukraine was as independent as it can hope to be given its sensitive geopolitical position.
It's the United States who sought to change that in 2013.
The United States has profited immensely from the cut gas ties between Europe and Russia. It is likely the United States orchestrated the sabotage of Nord Stream.
Interestingly, Hunter Biden notoriously participated on the board of Burisma, Ukraine's largest private oil and gas producer.
There seems to be a red line in this story, and that is the United States' interest in European gas and its gas dependency.
If nothing else, it fits the signature of Putin's Russia. Other than that, I'd take it with a grain of salt.
, you forgot the most important option: Kyiv.
If Moscow [sup](Nov 2, 2022)[/sup], then (definitely) not Kyiv; industrial-strength re-culturation, Kremlin autocracy, possible threat to Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia instead, going by the modus operandi of Putin's Russia.
If Washington (London Warsaw Paris Bucharest Helsinki Prague UN ...), then (hopefully) Kyiv; :eyes: watching, hopefully democracy, self-governance; no, not a Nazi junta [sup](Nov 21, 2022)[/sup].
... (? more?)
1991: Independence
2014: UN 68/262
2022: UN ES-11/4
Quoting Putin · Oct 27, 2022
That's what Ukraine was in the process of doing, when the invasion, destruction, dehumanization, etc, hijacked the agenda.
Agreed. But it's interesting to keep an eye on, since not only Russia is reluctant to return the occupied Kuril Islands to Japan but it also started militarizing them: https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-are-russia-and-japan-gridlocked-on-the-question-of-the-kuril-islands-58074
The war in Ukraine perhaps represents the most significant offensive use of nuclear weapons since WW2. Not in their hot use, but in the terroristic threat of their use, in support of an unprovoked war of aggression. This is the world we now live in. Russia may have blundered themselves into a position where their terrorist threats of nuclear war is the only reason they should get to keep Crimea and the Donbass. How to put that genie back in the bottle? There are no easy answers, but submitting to the threat would set a deadly precedent.
Moreover, no state can afford to let the seizure of their territory go uncontested. Unless one side is defeated decisively, the war might continue indefinitely.
Not their only move either
• The (melting) Arctic? Aug 25, 2022 and some more recent moves
• Africa? Nov 16, 2022 (perhaps a bit on the clandestine side)
NATO allies wake up to Russian supremacy in the Arctic [sup](via Yahoo)[/sup]
[sup]— Jacob Grønholt-Pedersen, Gwladys Fouche · Reuters · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
Putin touts Russia's 'Arctic power' with launch of nuclear icebreakers [sup](via CTV News, The Telegraph)[/sup]
[sup]— Reuters · Nov 22, 2022[/sup]
Russian military back to harassing the Canadian Arctic
[sup]— Tristin Hopper · National Post · Nov 25, 2022[/sup]
What about Ukraine being under the control of Ukrainians? Is that totally out of question?
A neutral Ukraine can only happen if both Russia and the US agree to reinstating Ukraine as a neutral buffer as it was before 2013.
The United States will never agree to that, since the whole point of this crisis was to expand the US sphere of influence into Ukraine. A neutral Ukraine would be a defeat for the US and a nullification of billions of dollars spent over the course of at least a decade.
Further, after 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine the US will not trust Russia to respect Ukrainian neutrality. LIkewise, after 2013 Russia can no longer trust the US to respect Ukrainian neutrality.
Doesn't make any sense. Since 'Ukrainian' is not a natural kind, it's not a subspecies, or a genetic type, Ukrainians will always be controlled by Ukraine since the definition of 'Ukrainian' is 'person under the rule of the government of Ukraine'.
There's no difference between a citizen of Donetsk having to accept power sharing with a citizen of Lvov, than that same citizen having to accept power sharing with a citizen of Rostov, or New York, or Paris. They're all miles away. No magic connects Lvov and Donetsk more than New York and Donetsk that somehow magically renders the former a morally 'correct' unit of government, but the latter not.
I wasn't thinking of a neutral Ukraine, but of a country going the way its citizens want to go. EU accession would be on the table. Maybe even NATO membership, though that may be a step too far, IDK.
Whatever the solution is going to be, it's going to have to appease both big players in this game: the USA and Russia.
I don't know how else a future-proof solution could ever be reached. Even if one side manages to defeat the other and simply impose a new status quo, it's going to be a flashpoint for decades in the future.
Your argument doesn’t make any sense: first, the premise “Since ‘Ukrainian' is not a natural kind, it's not a subspecies, or a genetic type” doesn't seem to play any other role than putatively supporting your definition of ’Ukrainian’ as 'person under the rule of the government of Ukraine’. Even if the premise is true, that doesn’t logically prove the definition. Indeed that premise is compatible with other arguably more plausible definitions like “Ukrainian is a person with Ukrainian passport”, incompatible with the definition you provided: indeed not all persons under the rule of the government of Ukraine are Ukrainians, likely the non-Ukrainian foreign professional, tourists or residents located in Ukraine.
Second, the claim “Ukrainians will always be controlled by Ukraine” doesn’t logically follow from your definition of “Ukrainian” unless “Ukraine” in your conclusion is understood NOT as a territorial entity but as the government of Ukraine. Yet, if @Olivier5’s claim has to do with control of territorial entity (Ukraine) by a group of people (the Ukrainians), as it seems to me, then your argument is irrelevant, because your argument deals with the control of a government (the government of Ukraine) over a group of people (the Ukrainians).
Third, nowhere is clarified what “morally 'correct' unit of government” is supposed to mean, nor why “mileage” would make no difference in identifying “morally 'correct' unit of government”, nor why these claims would be relevant for Olivier’s question to another interlocutor.
I may, but only 'deadly' in the sense that further expansion may lead to more war. Since the ;deadly' we'd be avoiding by concession is also war, I can't see much in it either way. at least war later can be mitigated, war now is killing people right away.
Quoting hypericin
Why not?
Nope. Indeed it doesn't.
Quoting neomac
It is, yes.
Quoting neomac
That's right..
Other irrelevant facts about my post are that it contained 114 words and doesn't once use the letter 'j'... if you're starting a collection.
Quoting neomac
The argument is that control over the people of Ukraine is in the hands of the Ukrainian government.
The idea of a group of people literally controlling a 'territory' is absurd (what are they going to to do control it's geography?). What is controlled is people not land, and the way people control people is primarily via a government making laws. So the only matter in consideration is what government controls which people, and by what means.
The argument is that there's no 'natural unit' of people who all have some single homogeneous set of needs so the grouping used has no bearing on the life of any given member.
Each individual ukrainian might be better off sharing their control over their government with other Ukrainians, or New Yorkers, or Parisians. There's nothing about the border of Ukraine which makes the people within it better off sharing control with each other than with people outside that border.
Quoting neomac
Your comment here makes no sense at all. Nowhere is the word 'clarified' clarified., nor what you mean by 'supposed to mean'. In fact your whole post is just garbage. What do you mean by "make any sense" in the first sentence. You've not provided any measure of what 'making sense' would constitute, nor a method for how we'd judge it. And "play any other role" is ambiguous. What is a 'role' here, how do we determine whether something is or is not 'playing a role', your argument is just nonsensical unless you can define these terms and how we'd measure them. Then there's "arguably more plausible". How are we going to judge if something is, in fact, arguable? Or plausible? Without these things defined first we can't possibly make any sense at all of what you've written. "Likely". How likley? You've got to be specific here otherwise we can't judge. Is 80% enough? Baysian or frequentist likelihood? How will we measure it?
It seems you've got a ton of work to do before anyone can make any sense whatsoever of your post. Alternatively, we could act like reasonably intelligent adults and accept that although some terms have fuzzy definitions we need not clarify every single one in advance of making any point.
But then it seems absent of asking for definitions, you've nothing to say.
[sup]— Ilya Yablokov · The New York Times · Apr 25, 2022[/sup]
‘Weaponisation of everything’: Putin’s hybrid warfare exposed by hidden attacks on Europe
[sup]— Tara Fair · Express · Nov 28, 2022[/sup]
? Material for a Bond movie? (hmm Putin could use a scar or something)
According to Zakharova, it's like Russia against the world:
Russia denounces Pope Francis’ latest words as proof of his «Russophobia».
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Nov 28, 2022[/sup]
Ironically perhaps, their efforts might turn that into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As a matter of financial gain? (Russia and the UK blame each other)
Anyway, does this seem dis/agreeable to anyone?
• most want the invaders to leave, and to bring about a situation where the displaced can head on home, reunite with family/friends, ...
• most want to show that such land grab attempts won't go unnoticed/uncontested/unchallenged, and that such re-culturation attempts are disgusting/criminal, the less feasible the better
• most want to bring this stuff out to people as well, for all to see, show other ways
• few (but maybe some) want more haters, destruction, world war, autocrats, autocrats with nuclear weapons, oppression, ...
• (... and other things, please correct)
Whatever is un/wanted taken together (which complicates things) would then reflect in actions taken, yes?
Why yes, people do control geography to a degree, by building infrastructure or destroying them. Think of how a dam affects the landscape. BTW, humans share that property with many other species, like beavers. Something people can do but beavers can't do, though, is name places, which represents a form of symbolic control over them. Hence Kyiv rather than Kiev.
You seem to be against the idea of a modern nation state. Fine with me but what's the alternative?
EU membership should be fine. There's no good reason to oppose it. "I'll nuke you if you join the wrong trading group" sounds rather absurd.
If the UK did it, they clearly didn't do so on their own initiative. They wouldn't take a dump on their own initiative. Likely the US orchestrated it, and the UK carried it out.
The case for Russia doing it themselves seems unlikely.
Quoting Olivier5
Maybe? I'm not sure what the Russian stance is on EU membership. Their gripe seems mostly with NATO membership.
Quoting Olivier5
The EU is not just a trading group. Countries give up a lot of autonomy to Brussels.
Russia's efforts to weaken the EU takes many forms. One of the most visible is the vigorous support given to ultra-conservatives in individual states. This report points to how the realpolitik of such influence merges with the 'cultural' war aspect. Empowering divisive elements of any commonwealth is the purpose of the activities.
The Russian influence in Ukraine and Belarus, by contrast, is more directly connected to establishing puppet regimes.
The subject was people acting as a mass (an electorate, or a nation) these make changes via instructing people. The government does not simply will a dam into being. They instruct people to make one.
Quoting Olivier5
I have no objection to the modern nation state. I think it's an excellent, pragmatic way to organise governance. I object to the ludicrous notion that it has some moral value. It has none. If moving a border saves lives, move the border. Hell, if moving a border makes the trains run better, move the border. It's a nothing, a trivial bit of bureaucracy. It's absolute insanity to reify it to something worth dying in the thousands for.
Not really. It's all about having economic rules not too disparate so as to have a fair enough free trade areas.
So you'd have no objection to France taking over the UK? That would make trains run better alright....
From the EU's own website:
Source: https://op.europa.eu/webpub/com/eu-what-it-is/en/
A governance can be more or less authoritarian. Polity can be more of a cooperative involvement of relatively autonomous people, or a system of coercion executed by less autonomous people. To struggle for that autonomy is not the same as establishing borders. It often involves that dynamic, especially when the coercive authority has no regard for the people they invade.
To view all armed resistance as a fetish ignores the natural revulsion to coercion and degradation. A model of a pragmatic 'modern state' without this being recognized is not very useful.
Quoting Andrey Turchak (May 2022)
Quoting Alex Kokcharov (Sep 10, 2022)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/alexkokcharov/status/1568698529677283328[/tweet]
Kherson removes pro-Russia signs, puts up pro-Ukrainian ones [sup](via US News)[/sup]
[sup]— Reuters · Nov 22, 2022[/sup]
Oleksandr Tkachenko: 'The civilized world must take active measures to prevent the Russian propaganda machine from winning'
[sup]— Oleksandr Tkachenko · Le Monde · Nov 24, 2022[/sup]
AP PHOTOS: Propaganda billboards embodied Russian occupation
[sup]— Bernat Armangue · The Independent · Dec 2, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Isaac
Not quite "the modern nation state". Maybe some day?
, not a defense/military club, though. With NATO around, that would be a bit odd (or redundant to some extent) I guess.
The facts I listed are relevant to establish whether your argument is fallacious. Your stats aren’t.
Quoting Isaac
The expression “controlling a territory” was more clear before you tried to clarify it. Indeed what your clarification misses is that the idea of “controlling a territory” suggests a geographic perimeter for people’s or government’s controlling activity. Not surprisingly you talk about “government of Ukraine” to refer to a government meant to rule over the territorial entity called “Ukraine” and not “Botswana”.
Besides “primarily” doesn’t mean exclusively nor necessarily. But, most importantly, a government controlling a territory doesn’t need to be one that represents people’s will in a democratic way, which is a more relevant point to @Olivier5’s argument as far as I understood it.
See clarification is very important for rational people debating over complex topics. Unfortunately you spectacularly suck at it.
Quoting Isaac
No bearing?! If one is Australian, then she doesn’t need a permit to enter and live there, while non-Australians do, so the grouping based on citizenship has a bearing on people’s life.
Quoting Isaac
Not sure what you can infer from such a random hypothetical.
Quoting Isaac
It sounds like claiming: “There is nothing about the walls of a flat which makes the family members within it better off sharing control with each other than with people outside those walls” which, if it has a meaning, is likely a preposterous one.
Quoting Isaac
I agree about your claim marked in bold. But here you are clearly abusing it, and playing dumb is making things look even worse. Indeed you spontaneously proposed a definition of “Ukrainian” and a clarification of “controlling a territory”, namely two very ordinary notions that so far the interlocutors you are dealing with managed to use intelligibly and correctly without your proposals (luckily so, since they are ineffective). Yet you don’t feel the need to define nor clarify the locution “morally 'correct' unit of government” which sounds pretty esoteric (google reports zero results for “morally 'correct' unit of government”), indeed nobody has used it so far, except you, and despite sounding very important to you since you keep framing your thoughts on this war in moral terms?! And then you dare lecturing me if I protest about it?! Are you crazy?!
Quoting Isaac
It hurts, I know. Sorry, but not sorry.
Like "mitigation" is working out for "war now"?
Concession would mean strategic victory for an aggressor who used nuclear weapons to achieve their aim. Nuclear weapons already have excellent utility as a deterrent; if they are proven useful by Russia as a weapon of aggression, everyone will take note. Nuclear powers will all see new opportunities to settle regional scores, and non-nuclear powers will be further incentivized to join the club. At some point an aggressive nuclear power will have to be confronted. Does the west do it now, following the first such use of nuclear weapons, when the enemy is already reeling, or later, in the context of a new, terrifying global nuclear arms race? Hell, we (the USA) may be that aggressive nuclear power. Either way, your ".000001%" chance is a pure fiction.
The west is already walking the tightrope, unwilling to fall one way into possible Armageddon, or the other into handing an aggressively nuclear Russia victory. It's a poor position, and it is not clear what the alternative is.
Quoting Isaac
Domestically, it is a show of extreme weakness by the leadership. It makes people feel humiliated and insecure, as they may be next. Opposition parties will seize on this. An administration which passively cedes its land will be replaced by one which does not, one way or another.
Regionally, if the aggressor is not contested and punished, they or others will seize more, threatening the existence of the state itself. In fact exactly this happened, Russia was hardly chastised in 2014, and look where we are now.
[sup]— TASS · Oct 4, 2022[/sup]
Putin calls for integrating the four annexed Ukrainian regions into the Russian judicial system
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Nov 29, 2022[/sup]
Land grab. Veiled in rhetoric, masked by misdirection.
[sup]— Aditi Shah, Aftab Ahmed. Gleb Stolyarov · Reuters · Nov 29, 2022[/sup]
The sanctions are apparently having some effect.
[sup]— Sabina Fati · DW · Nov 29, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Christoph Heusgen
Quoting Christoph Heusgen
I guess the Black Sea and Moldova might get more eyes-on.
Kherson residents evacuate while those who stay struggle to survive
[sup]— Matthew Chance · CNN · Nov 29, 2022 · 2m:57s[/sup]
Bring in the NASAMS and such. :up:
None whatsoever. And if I did (was the sort of person who cared what flag flew over my parliament) I would be a monster to expect thousands of people to die bringing my personal preferences as to flag colour about.
It'd be about more than flag color. There's also the language. French is hard to learn.
Quoting Isaac
You are already a monster in my book due to your despicable posting manners and content here. Whatever you expect is not going to worsen that much.
It's not ignoring it. It's drawing out the assumptions. The border as national perimeter is irrelevant. You're pointing to the fact that some forms of governance are worse than other and so people might legitimately have (and fight for) preferences. But these judgements (better or worse) are either moral judgements (universal, humanitarian ones), or aesthetic judgements (personal preference). I don't see how they can be any third type.
If the former (humanitarian) then it is possible for the Ukrainians to be wrong, since these values are universal. they may wrongly prefer one government over another, incorrectly assessing the humanitarian gains. Thus the argument that it's morally "up to the Ukrainians" is flawed.
If it's personal preference, then it is indeed "up to the Ukrainians" what they sacrifice for what ends. But under that understanding, it has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone else. We've no moral obligation to help them achieve their preferred style of governance.
So we're back to the question that this whole diversion about national borders was proffered to avoid. Russia's governance of Crimea. What evidence is being presented to show that Russia's eight year occupation of Crimea was a significantly worse governance than Ukraine's would have been?
You were arguing about Russia being able to use the mere threat of nuclear weapons to achieve it's ends, no? About a nation, simply by virtue of being a huge nuclear superpower, getting it's way and the dangerous ramifications of this...?
Ringing any bells yet? Anything getting through the soup of propaganda you're clearly drowning in.
Like the fact that the US - a nuclear superpower - the only one to have ever actually used nuclear weapons, has been waging a near constant war across half the world since 1945. Did Iraq avoid getting it's own back on America because it was too far away? Is Afghanistan merely waiting for the SatNav to show them the way? Somalis, Libya, Syria, Kosovo, Serbia, Venezuala, Cuba,... You're seriously suggesting that all the countries America have fucked over haven't even thought about America's massive nuclear arsenal when considering whether they 'let them get away with it'?
It's already happened. It's been happening every single years since the second world war. a nuclear power has been using it's nuclear threat to invade other countries and impose their preferred governments there.
Think for a while about it.
Is the US annexing parts of Ukraine?
Does the US think Ukraine is an artificial state and should belong to American culture and English be spoken and taught in schools?
Does the US want to demolish Ukraine?
Is the US forcing people to transfer to the US?
And Ukraine would want to join the EU. Wouldn't the EU then "control" Ukraine far more than the US?
The idea of the US being in control in similar fashion than Putin is simply absurd. Ukraine is really fighting for it's existence to be a sovereign state.
The EU demands an even greater sacrifice of autonomy, because it also gets legislative power inside EU countries. It's purpose is/was to become a "United States of Europe", essentially, of course still completely dependent on the United States for protection.
So lets not harbor illusions about countries in NATO or the EU being sovereign. They are lapdogs of the United States (or Brussels, which is again a lapdog of the United States), just like Belarus is Russia's lapdog.
That one may prefer the US over Russia is fine. I never said their overlordship would be the same, but that the choice Ukraine has now is overlordship either by the US or Russia.
Yeah, that's exactly what I am suggesting. These are all countries that faced an adversary with overwhelming conventional force, nuclear was the last of their worries. How exactly are you suggesting they would otherwise have not 'let them get away with it'? Whereas the invasion of Ukraine would be impossible without nuclear weapons, since it would otherwise almost certainly trigger engagement with NATO.
But then what's your argument? It seemed to be that if we allowed a country to use the threat of nuclear weapons to get it's way then all hell would break loose because other countries would follow suit, but that argument seem to hold exactly the same for conventional forces. "If we allow a country to use the threat of massive conventional defence to get its way then all hell would break loose because other countries would follow suit". Why would allowing the threat of nuclear weapons to work cause any more disruption than allowing the threat of massive conventional weapons to work.
America can, and did, flatten a country like Iraq without even touching it's stock of nuclear warheads. It can get any non-nuclear nation to do it's bidding on the strength of conventional forces alone. So why's that not a problem, but Russia doing exactly the same with nuclear weapons would be?
What if, hypothetically, Russia didn't have any nuclear weapons, but had an amazing military, the biggest and best the world has ever seen. They invade Ukraine with it. Would your position then be "that's fine, we can let them get away with that because it's only conventional forces"?
Quoting hypericin
Where are you getting this information from?
It's essentially the mission statement of the EU. The fact that the entire EU trips over Hungary and Orban says enough.
You can utilize what kind of discourse of vassalization whatever about the EU or being in NATO, but it totally falls to be similar with the case of an autocratic dictatorship where speaking of a war as a war can get one long prison sentences... and a country which has either gone to war or created frozen conflicts with three of it's neighbors.
Just to give an example, the vast majority of the people in this country wanted to join NATO and the Parliament heard their calls and voted to join NATO (with far larger majority than EU) as everybody understood that neutrality was meaningless for Russia's ambitions. Countries have joined voluntary both NATO and EU. And the reason seems to be confusing for some here.
The case where the US has imposed it's force, the result has been utter failure (Afghanistan) and extremely bad and tense relations (Iraq). Somehow you don't get friends by bombing the people first.
But don't let such facts hinder your logic of the West being "vassals of the US" and the straightforward comparison then to the empire building with war, violence and annexations as Putin's Russia is doing.
I never said they were similar. I said one shouldn't harbor illusions about Ukraine being a sovereign, independent state if it enters the EU or NATO, like none of the member states of those institutions are.
If you want to make the case that American overlordship is preferable that's fine.
It doesn't really matter, since if the new status quo doesn't in some way satisfy the Russians, it's going to lead to war again sooner or later.
[sup]— Héloise Urvoy · Euronews · Nov 30, 2022[/sup]
International democracies are weakening as authoritarianisms deepen their shortcomings.
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Nov 30, 2022[/sup]
Global State of Democracy Report 2022: Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
[sup]— The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)[/sup]
I'll take the tedious task of ruling with an iron fist.
Just need some compensation, like a new PC, a new furnace.
And enough of this crap already:
Russia says it will focus on building nuclear arms infrastructure in 2023
[sup]— Reuters · Nov 30, 2022[/sup]
[sup]? Source: Democracy Tracker[/sup]
Quoting Tzeentch
If we're talking Stalinesque borders + control from Moscow, then it's looking grim.
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting Tzeentch
? this is propaganda'ish'esque, hyperbolic spin (on one page alone, like on a mission)
But that's fine, just have to take the verbiage for what it is.
Quoting Nov 19, 2022
I guess wants are of some relevance.
Quoting ssu
:up:
You got me, I'm a Kremlin propagandist. :rofl:
No, but in all seriousness, people in this thread need to understand the actual situation instead of this fantasy in which the United States is some spreader of peace and love, and the foolish notion that countries in the EU and NATO are sovereign.
They are not. When the US says jump, they jump. They have no choice. There's not a country in Europe that has a military capable of defending itself, and people should have no illusions about what that means for the power relation between the US and its "allies" (vassals).
Illusions sometimes need to be dispelled using harsh words.
Can you quote anybody here talking about the US as "some spreader of peace and love"?
Quoting Tzeentch
Maybe it's your notion of "sovereignty" which is foolish. Indeed its normative usage in international relations is more nuanced than you might think, for example it shouldn't be confused with the notion of "independence" nor "autarchy" nor with "territorial control": Sovereignty may be recognized even when the sovereign body possesses no territory or its territory is under partial or total occupation by another power. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty#External
Not what I meant. Look at the quotes'n'comments again.
Zelensky’s wife given standing ovation by MPs while urging UK to be ‘leader’
[sup]— Liam Coleman · Metro News · Nov 29, 2022[/sup]
EU seeks tribunal to probe possible Russian war crimes in Ukraine
[sup]— Bart Meijer, Andrew Heavens · Reuters · Nov 30, 2022[/sup]
It's more doubtful what they can effectively do, though.
What could they do?
(Limit Putin's vacation spots some?)
It's a fairly simple language and has many root words in common with English, because the last invasion of the French was never repelled. Far from being hard, it is one of the easiest languages for an English-speaker to learn, and far easier than the reverse, because spelling and pronunciation and even grammar are so very inconsistent in English.
And of course the Welsh, The Scottish, The Northern Irish are expected to learn English and be grateful.
And this attitude (that everything not English is difficult and a huge imposition) does much to explain the appalling government that the UK suffers.
All of which is by the fucking by, to the point that the borders have to be drawn before you even know who to ask about who they want to be ruled and exploited by. This is a necessary and unavoidable democratic deficit: the UK apparently has an unassailable right to independence from the EU based on an internal referendum, but Scotland has no such unassailable right because [made up waffle]. So we now apply "made up waffle" to Donbas, Crimea, Ukraine, or whatever other region we like, citing the split up of Czechoslovakia , or the break up of Yugoslavia to taste. Shit happens, and then, with luck, we get a semblance of democratic control, or at least the illusion of it.
Then obviously you have an incorrect idea of what is to be a sovereign state. There's an interconnected web of international laws, agreements and international cooperation that limits the sovereignty of the individual state. That simply is the reality in the modern World. And as clearly seen with Brexit, EU has it's advantages just why so many countries have chosen to stick together.
That countries have voluntarily chosen to join these institutions makes it different. It makes all the difference in the World compared to a military invasion an sham referendums.
When Bush invaded Iraq, many NATO countries starting with France and Germany didn't participate.
When Obama wanted to attack Syria, his NATO allies said no.
A continuum of US presidents have been disappointed in their allies. Hence NATO members do have a choice just when to jump.
Yet unlike CENTO or SEATO, which don't exist anymore, NATO continues. It exists because it member states want it to exist. For starters, NATO has kept the countries from having wars between them. Hence it's a genuine security system for Europe. Otherwise it would have gone the way as those former organizations I mentioned. The US could easily make bipartisan defense treaties with European countries, just like it now does in Asia.
But it's telling about the whole effort. A war that came as a surprise to many in the administration. A mobilization that has mobilized more young men to leave Russia than were put into the army to be stop-gap cannon fodder. A war that sometimes resembles WW1 fought with drones.
Quoting jorndoe
Just keep supporting Ukraine as they did in spring. Keep on track, stay focused.
The purpose of the Ukrainian resistance is precisely to tell the Russians to mind their own busines. I trust it will work. Once they're finished losing this war, the Russians will be become war-adverse for at least a generation. Once bitten twice shy.
The only superiority Russia has over Ukraine is now nuclear. In terms of conventional warfare, Russia is losing its non-war against Ukraine, which is precisely why they try to score against Ukrainian civilians right now, and why they and their supporters wank on nukes so much: it's a form of porn, designed to give back a sense of power to the impotent.
So Ukraine needs not fear a future conventional war -- which they could well win. the only question, going forward, is: What Ukrainian behavior could possibly lead Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine? I.e. which behavior should Ukraine avoid in order to avoid getting nuked by Russia?
For this reason, I predict Ukraine will join the EU but not NATO. Russia cannot possibly use nukes just to stop a nation from freely joining a trade group like the EU, but moves towards NATO membership could possibly trigger a nuclear response.
Indeed, an estimated 41% of common, everyday English words are borrowed from old French, and often without much alteration in the word's writing. Table --> table; vase --> vase; fleur --> flower, etc. The other main source for English vocabulary is old German dialects, accounting for 38% of words in common use if memory serves, so these two sources are roughly on a par, with French words predominating only slightly.
As I always say, this is one big reason why English is such a powerful language: it comes not from one language that evolved overtime, but from two languages that merged in the 12th century after William's conquest.
It exactly doesn't make it different. Countries that join NATO or the EU voluntarily give up a great deal of sovereignty, and they give up even more by neglecting their defense, thus making themselves completely dependent on the USA.
Quoting ssu
Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria all featured a great deal of NATO participation. Those conflicts weren't remotely related to the NATO mission statement, nor did many of these countries have any type of stake in those conflicts. That should tell you enough about the considerable sway the Americans have.
NATO countries that do not participate in America's wars, even if those wars aren't related to their own defensive situation, get no say in what happens within NATO. However, by participating in America's wars NATO countries can buy their influence.
I don't agree with that assessment. Russian doctrine is clear, attacks on the motherland will illicit a nuclear response. This wouldn't qualify. The risk of Ukraine joining NATO was what caused the current war but funny how for 400 pages you and others argued against that being the reason for the war and now all of a sudden it would be grounds for a nuclear attack?
How's that been working out?
That's not what I am saying.
Why would it when according to you those moves weren't a reason for the war to begin with? Why would it all of a sudden illicit a reaction even worse than conventional war if it wasn't the reason for war in the first place?
It wasn't the reason for this war because Ukraine had zero chance of joining NATO before Feb 2022. IF they had been in a process of joining, then one might surmise otherwise. But as it happened, Putin invaded for another reason.
What i am saying is this: after this war, Ukraine will probably seek to join both the EU and NATO. I further predict that their EU accession bid will be acceptable to both the EU and Russia. However, I am afraid the current Russian regime will not tolerate Ukraine joining NATO, and in any case will oppose it aggressively. Much more than a EU accession bid.
Among the leverage left to them, their conventional forces are already well diminished and will be more so at the end of the war. (assuming a Ukrainian victory, evidently) Therefore, their only leverage will be the mass of nuclear weapons they have. They might not detonate any, but they will threaten it, and that may be enough to deter or derail a NATO bid.
Such a threat is not readily available in the case of the EU, which is a trade group, not a military alliance. Putin cannot credibly threaten to nuke Ukraine if it joins the EU. But in case of NATO he can.
Zero chance?
The US and NATO have been holding joint military exercises almost every year with the Ukrainian military. They were a NATO/US ally in all but name.
- 2015, Fearless Guardian
- 2017, Rapid Trident
- 2018, Sea Breeze
- 2018, Clear Sky
- 2019, Rapid Trident
- 2020, Rapid Trident
- 2021, Rapid Trident
Name me one other country that the US military has joint military exercises with every year, that is not a US ally.
Yes, and that will continue. Maybe I am wrong and Ukraine will manage to officially join NATO. I'm just saying that it will be harder than joining the EU. If they fail to join NATO, they can always remain "a US ally in all but name".
Quoting Olivier5
...but...
Quoting Olivier5
Russia sure are touchy about names.
In my view the Russians successfully used their nukes to provide them an umbrella to conduct their invasion relatively uncontested. The current arrangement where NATO supplies arms and intelligence but no planes and no direct involvement is the result of a tacit "negotiation". Russian nukes, which they emphasized with thinly veiled threats, were perhaps their most important bargaining chip in this "negotiation", and bought them somewhat favorable terms.
This "ally in all but name" sure didn't seem to buy Ukraine much security in the end, whereas with NATO membership Russia would lose the privilege of levelling the country when they please.
Has anyone explained how, with Russia's ridiculously overpowered nuclear arsenal, Ukraine in NATO posed even the slightest threat to Russia? In the real world their mere threat has deterred NATO even defending their "ally in all but name", in their own damn country.
What's in a name? did Juliet ask. Note my use of the scare quotes, which in this case implies ironic distance. As @hypericin picked up: "This "ally in all but name" sure didn't seem to buy Ukraine much security". Such an ally can be dropped in a New York minute, if supporting it becomes inconvenient, and it certainly does not oblige the US to spill American blood to defend it.
If you're making shit up anyway you may as well throw as much as you can against the wall and hope some of it sticks with some of the people.
Quoting Vladimir Solovyov
:D
[sup]— Stephen McGrath, Lorne Cook, Ellen Knickmeyer · AP News · Nov 29, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Stoltenberg
Quoting Medvedev
Zelenskiy Invites Musk to Visit Ukraine in Response to His Talk of Peace Deal
[sup]— Daniel Flatley · Bloomberg · Nov 30, 2022[/sup]
Putin + team requires/demands (Nov 11, 2022) ?
[sup]• legal guarantees that Ukraine will never join NATO, signed ? and set in stone in Ukraine's constitution
• that Ukraine (the world?) recognize independence of Donetsk + Luhansk
• that Ukraine (the world?) recognize Crimea as part of Russia
• (Ukrainian surrender, demilitarization, deNazification has been mentioned a few times)
• (Moscow is not to be attacked :grin:)[/sup]
The former could likely be worked out without that much difficulty if Russia was to give a similar guarantee to leave Ukraine alone, what NATO membership would help with in the first place. The two latter more or less constitute a non-licet land grab (besides, Donetsk + Luhansk wouldn't be independent but more or less under Moscow control, a signature move of theirs).
Kyiv requires/demands (Nov 23, 2022) ?
[sup]• apart from neutrality / some sort of UN oversight perhaps, Ukraine otherwise intact, free, sovereign, self-governing
• Russian military personnel in Ukraine to go home, and no Russian insurgency or other interference
• Ukrainians taken to Russia to be recorded and (allowed) to return home, first and foremost children and prisoners
• guarantees to be signed ? for all to see
• (compensation for destruction or similar has come up)[/sup]
Other items that have come up ?
[sup]• investigation into war crimes, prosecution of war criminals
• (has Kherson + Zaporizhia been added to Donetsk + Luhansk?)[/sup]
Some requirements/demands are incompatible. Others could be pursued now. As far as I can tell, all of the items would have to be brought to the table, whether they'll be rejected, considered, approved or not. Otherwise it's not really genuine.
Putin + team want Crimea, at least. A secured Donbas would sort of help with connecting Russia and Crimea (Kerch is a bit skimpy). All of Ukraine would be :up:, and would connect Russia and Transnistria. Farms, resources, ..., go beyond geo/military gain. Stated/official reasons, rhetoric, various efforts, propaganda, etc, are means to that end.
Kyiv wants the invaders to leave and not come back. That includes the interference/insurgence in Donbas. (And quit the destruction.)
? consistent with observations, not overly complex/speculative, plausible
Ukraine calls for «destruction» of Russia to prevent it from pursuing its colonial aims
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Dec 1, 2022[/sup]
Not really helping. (Regardless of how in/accurate it is.) It'll just give reason to fear, and fuel the zealots. The fact remains that Putin's Russia invaded, is waging war, destroying, etc.
Quoting Putin
Except for the "Nazis" and those that don't want to be subjects... :D (the evil uncle that nieces and nephews stay away from comes to mind)
Putin Ally Blames Crisis on Rise of Black U.S. Music Stars He Calls ‘Descendants of African American Slaves’
[sup]— Allison Quinn · The Daily Beast · Dec 1, 2022[/sup]
Translation: some posters, including you, have tried very hard over 400+ pages to peddle the lie that Putin is only defending Russia against NATO, or that NATO provoked Russia into a war with Ukraine. The rest of us wonder if you are just criminally stupid, or worse, complicit.
Now you may delete my post because it's "poor quality". :-)
Yet what worries me more than nuclear escalation is the vulnerabilities of the Western front which will likely remain (if not deepen) after the war ends: uncertain American future commitment within the Western front (due to domestic unresolved political tensions and impending competition with China more than with Russia), Europe without military and economic security (e.g. Germany is losing at once energy input from Russia and output to China) and its political polarisation between East and West Europe. Add to that the possibility of having an unstable Russian Federation at risk of collapse.
Quoting Benkei
Russia's response to Ukraine joining NATO has been to invade Ukraine and annex parts of land. I would not be so certain that Russia wouldn't use nuclear weapons to defend the parts of land it now occupies. So it does seem at least plausible that Russia is willing to resort to nuclear weapons in this conflict.
In a new interview John Mearsheimer actually argues that the chance of nuclear war is non-trivial, and that the bar for Russia to use nuclear weapons is lower than we think because, A. the Ukrainians cannot retaliate, and B. the US/NATO would likely not risk general nuclear war over Ukraine.
Mearsheimer even theorizes that nuclear weapons use by the Russians would end the war. I'll leave it up to you whether you agree with that assessment.
And the West's response to that invasion was to help defend Ukraine. :up:
Now that Kherson and Zaporizhya have been formally annexed along with Luhansk and Donetsk, retaining Crimea has made the Sea of Azov into a Russian Lake. For Russia truly to own Crimea requires keeping enough of Kherson to secure the water supply from the Dnipro River. Perhaps having that much conceded to Russia through negotiations would make it worth for them to agree to an end to hostilities.
It is difficult to imagine that deal happening since it would amount to rewarding the invaders for their efforts so far. The destruction of civilian infrastructure to render the place uninhabitable is a demand for unconditional surrender.
Given how far away the sides are from something like mutual recognition, what else could be a starting place for more than a ceasefire based upon limited agendas?
, it's just that those formal annexations have become but a ritual, a performance to appease certain sensibilities. :/ Fake, a sham, an imposition. Just about everyone already knows, but that might not work on some mindsets, and hence the humbug sticks around.
When it comes to talks, which I'd think generally is seen as a positive thing, it seems that various parties say they're ready, serious, good to go, just say the word — except, only if what they bring to the table is already accepted. And so, no talks. Wouldn't be talks anyway, would be declarations.
As an aside, per se I'm not quite convinced that Crimea is as secured (Russian) as some. I guess it depends on Ukrainian support and such. Also, rumors on the street will have it that bomb shelters are being prepared in Moscow, despite no indication they'd have to be used. I suppose, if they want to waste resources (instead of using them for their "Ukraine project")...?
‡ Except Danilov perhaps, depending? Some have argued for political change, like doing away with the oppression, autocracy, shamming, rigging, but that's not the same.
Seriously: joining voluntarily and being attacked is the same thing?
Doesn't then being a member of the United Nations mean a lack of sovereignty?
At least for me joining a club voluntarily or some goon forcing by violence to join a club are two different things. And so are the terms just what I give up in joining those clubs, obviously. Besides, Russia is annexing parts of Ukraine, so that is totally different than just joining the CSTO, for example.
But back to an issue you asked some time ago in this thread:
Quoting Tzeentch
When I listed to some interviews that Mr Ritter made just now, going through all the Russian propaganda talking points (of how hard it will be for the Russians to denazify Russia), this question came into my mind.
I think Ritter is a case example of just how Russian propaganda works.
First of all, Ritter was a Marine officer and was a member of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) overseeing the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq from 1991 to 1998. He has written books including a small booklet where he exposed that there were no WMD program during that time and the UN mission transformed to be used as propaganda. Naturally in the post 9-11 era dominated by the Bush administration he was a persona non grata. But as an truthful whistleblower (as there indeed was no WMD program in Iraq), he naturally had credibility.
So suddenly he appears now as an expert on the Ukraine war? An expert that tows to the point the Russian line: Ritter declared in February that Russia will not invade Ukraine. After the invasion Ritter said Ukraine will fall in a week. Ritter got suspended from Twitter after claiming that the National Police of Ukraine is responsible for the Bucha massacre. Ritter often appears on Russian government channels (Channel 1) and various Facebook pages, his comments being shared by Russian embassies in multiple countries. So why does an earlier self-proclaimed Republican and a former Marine Corps officer tow the line of Russian propaganda?
The most likely answer is that for a repeated sex offender (involving minors) that has done jail-time, you have trouble to get otherwise work. That credibility of being one of those who exposed the WMD lie about Iraq is enough for Russia to pay. And if your focus group is conspiracy theorists, they will likely believe that you were "set up" and sent to prison by the intelligence services...or something.
[I]L'obéissance à la loi qu’on s’est prescrite est liberté[/i].
(Obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is freedom.)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau - Of the Social Contract
The United Nations is completely different from NATO or the EU. Nations do not give up any sovereignty to the UN. It's basically a public forum for states.
Quoting ssu
The suggestion was given that there was any way that Ukraine would come out of this conflict neutral, sovereign, independent, free, etc.
To that I said, it is practically impossible, since it must accept overlordship from either Washington or Moscow. Whether it accepts overlordship voluntarily or by force doesn't matter to the final state of affairs.
An independent, neutral Ukraine is a fantasy now, except for the unlikely case in which the US and Russia agree on reinstating Ukraine as a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia. This would be the ideal outcome to the conflict, but alas a fantasy.
It may not matter to you but still matter to them.
Really?
First of all, it's not basically a "public forum for states".
and if the member doesn't comply,
And furthermore, "public forums for states" don't have articles in the Charter as the following:
So just remember @Tzeentch, that it was the United Nations that went to war with North Korea when the country invaded South Korea. The closest it came to a similar situation was when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Then neither the Soviet Union or China vetoed the military action in the UN as the invasion was unanimously condemned by all major world powers.
So if you think members of EU or NATO aren't sovereign states, then isn't also the sovereignty of the members of the UN also limited with the charter saying what they can do or not?
:roll:
Quoting ssu
I didn't mean to suggest Crimea is now militarily secure for Russia. On the contrary, it is more vulnerable than Donetsk. I was trying to frame the idea of talks based upon each side giving up something significant enough to satisfy the other. I agree with ssu that negotiation of that kind usually only happens when both sides reach the end of their tether. That does not seem to be the case at the moment.
I see what you mean by the annexations being theater, but they do shape any negotiation regarding borders because Russia now holds them directly instead of maintaining the mask of 'independent' republics. Losing them militarily will weaken Putin more than before the annexations.
The authors caution that the report was based to a large extent on classified and sensitive data, which precludes discussion of methodology. "For this reason, this report should not be considered a work of academic scholarship and it does not use citations."
Got it.
In the spirit of adding stuff, the latest Kremlin speak regarding the annexations and talks:
[sup]— Geert De Clercq, William Maclean · Reuters · Dec 3, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Macron
:up: Address the point they brought up (plus public awareness)
If you are going to go for the trope NATO members of being vassals to the US and EU members to being vassals (umm...to somebody), then you really should look at the organizations themselves. The UN can use force (and has used force), as it's founders understood quite well just how the previous organization had utterly failed.
NATO is an European security solution. One should just look at it's first articles:
It's basically also to prevent the Western states to have conflicts among themselves. I'm sure that without NATO there would likely have been several conventional wars between Greece and Turkey. And perhaps territorial disputes between Hungary and Romania, for example. To have the armed forces operate together is quite a way enforce that they won't start to eye each other as potential enemies.
And countries definitely do cede sovereignty to the European Union by becoming a member state.
[sup]— Tom Balmforth · Reuters · Dec 3, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Nuland
Quoting Zakharova
But...then that's an admission...? :o Bad rhetorical tactic, ma'am.
[sup](two wrongs don't make a right, whataboutism, diversion)[/sup]
Notice how neatly this replays a particular narrative (while ignoring a few things of relevance) — with evil NATO, Nazis, etc, rousing anger — dancing (and yelling) to the tune of a particular dish of propaganda:
The USA Caused the War in Ukraine, and Only the USA Can End It
[sup]— Bryan Davies · CODEPINK · Nov 24, 2022[/sup]
Some have (and perhaps will) lap such colorific bias up without further ado. It's not that it's all plain wrong, more that it ignores too much, skips past a few things of relevance, expresses too much preconception, ending up with a story of wholesale blame-switchery. Had that "PINK TANK ~ BLOG" been posted a good while back, then it could perhaps have been said to provide a perspective surely worthwhile of consideration, but not any longer. At least they got one thing more or less right, in principle (if only Putin + team had taken that to heart):
Anyone can sympathize. And then get their feet back on the ground.
By AFP
13 hours ago
There is currently no diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine, a co-founder of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Russian rights organization Memorial said Sunday.
"I am absolutely convinced that there is not a diplomatic solution with Putin's regime, so long as it is still there," said Irina Scherbakova.
"The solution that there will now be is a military one," said Scherbakova, who was presented with an award for her human rights work at a ceremony in Hamburg, Germany.
There would ultimately be some form of diplomatic resolution to the conflict, she said.
"But these decisions, this diplomacy will only happen when Ukraine believes it has won this war and can set its terms," she said.
Hasty calls for peace were "childish," she said, adding that things would not return to the way they were before the outbreak of the conflict.
"This war has turned so many things upside down, it will never be like that again," she said.
In Hamburg, Scherbakova was presented with the Marion Doenhoff Prize for her years of work on human rights in her home country by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
Scherbakova's efforts showed the way of a "better future for Russia," Scholz said, even if the prospect "still seems unlikely."
The war would not end with "a victory for Greater Russian expansionism," said Scholz, who has faced repeated criticism for not doing more to support the Ukrainian war effort.
Russia would, however, "still be there" after the end of the conflict, Scholz stressed.
Scherbakova's organization, Memorial, will be presented with the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on Saturday December 10.
Memorial was awarded the prize along with fellow campaigners the Centre for Civil Liberties in Ukraine and the Belarussian activist, Ales Bialiatski.
One of the foremost Russian civil liberties organizations, Memorial has worked for decades to shed light on terrors from the era of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, while also compiling information on ongoing political oppression in Russia.
The group, founded in 1989, was forcibly shut down by Russian courts at the end of 2021 and Scherbakova left Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine. She is now based in Germany.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/04/no-diplomatic-solution-to-ukraine-war-nobel-winner-a79584
Quoting Tzeentch
And Ukrainians have seen how prosperous and stable this has made other countries. Earlier Ukraine enjoyed a higher GDP per capita than for example Poland had. Now it's totally different.
The simple fact is that in a globalized World it is better to seek that cooperation with your neighbors and thus shed some of that sovereignty in decision making than go it all by alone. To somehow hang on to an economically weak and authoritarian neighbor that obviously has desire to annex you is the most ruinous decisions you could do. Apart if you aren't a dictator yourself, like Belarus has.
And peaceful, too.
Giving up one's virginity voluntarily or at gunpoint results in exactly the same situation: a lack of virginity.[/quote]
But it's good that you yourselves seem to have realized this is not an option either.
You mean, living on Mars is not an option? I must share planet Earth with other human beings? What? Eight billion of them? Oh shoooooot!...
(you ought to realize that nobody is perfectly independent or sovereign. We all have to make compromises)
Also, they're taking the Hobbits to Isengard.
This has made the demographic pyramid in Russia to oscillate (as those generations that were substantially smaller after WW2 had less children) and then after the Soviet Union collapsed births fell also.
Of course, the demographics of Ukraine is even worse, but now as such a huge portion of the people are refugees, the statistics are quite out of the ordinary.
Source: Macron Says New Security Architecture Should Give Guarantees For Russia
Putin Cronies Resort to Begging on Live TV Over War Failures
[sup]— Julia Davis · The Daily Beast · Dec 4, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Simonyan
Quoting Solovyov
Quoting Skabeyeva
Quoting Simonyan
Good grief. Promoting paranoia to the masses? It's Ukraine that's on fire. Muscovite street cleaners aren't in the line of fire.
Larger Wheat Harvest in Ukraine Than Expected
[sup]— NASA · Dec 4, 2022[/sup]
Looting, after a fashion?
Rebuilding Ukraine After Russian Invasion Will Cost $500-600 Billion, Says World Bank VP
[sup]— RFE/RL · Dec 4, 2022[/sup]
Costly.
Quoting Dec 3, 2022
Macron’s idea of ‘security guarantees’ to Russia faces backlash
[sup]— Alexandra Brzozowski · EURACTIV · Dec 5, 2022[/sup]
French president Macron criticized for suggesting ’security guarantees’ for Russia
[sup]— Reuters via Al Arabiya · Dec 5, 2022[/sup]
Anyway, opening some talks would be :up:
But what are the odds for him to succeed? His losing popularity in France, in EU, in the US, and in Russia (after expressing his support for investigating Putin's war crimes)
This comes only a few days after Ursula's supposed "slip of the tongue", which I believe was intentional - a signal that the EU will not support the war in Ukraine if it means deceiving the public about the course of the war.
https://money.yahoo.com/leaked-kremlin-poll-shows-55-184223785.html
Macron is only stating the obvious: that Russia ain't going to disappear from the map, and Ukraine and her allies will have to live with it.
I am not sure what success looks like, when someone states the obvious. Maybe success in this case is measured by the amount of anger, suspicion and lamentations about his statement?
I disagree. Macron is not stating the obvious. He's talking about discussing "security guarantees" for Russia. And as far as I know these are the security guarantees Putin wanted: no more NATO enlargement; no missile deployments near its borders; and a scaling back of NATO's military infrastructure in Europe to 1997 levels. Opening to Russia's anti-NATO security concerns before even having Russia opening to Ukrainian and Western security concerns, along with Macron's position toward Putin since the beginning of this war seem more in line with a political agenda and likely an understanding of NATO's role that neither the US nor other more involved NATO partners are sympathetic with. So not only Macron is far from stating the obvious but he holds no leading position to weigh in.
Good point.
The truth is that if would want a true solution, not a frozen conflict of some state (like what exists between the two Koreas), Russia simply would have to shed it's bellicose imperial aspirations just like France and the UK have done. The UK isn't eyeing to annex Ireland back to it's Kingdom. Hence Ireland doesn't have to be afraid of that. With Russia neighbors it's different.
True change is possible basically with a huge humiliating defeat, which would throw out the existing leadership. One possibility is that Russia would fall into even smaller parts. The parts in Russia where Muslims are the majority would likely be the first one's to go: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia.
But if we want that an autocratic Russia will prevail and continue, then appeasement is the correct way, of course.
I doubt Macron is trying to appease Putin. I don't quite see what the point of that would be, and he can't do that all alone anyway. I mean, the guarantees he is talking about would be given by NATO, not by France, so there's no sense in trying to go alone on this.
If you pay attention to what he actually said, the point he is making is that allies ought to discuss this, and come to some common position about what they can compromise on, what they are ready to offer in exchange for peace.
Yes. Since Macron also says Ukraine must take the lead on what terms they would accept, this matter of 'security guarantees' provided directly by the West is an alternative to acceding to Russia's demand that Ukraine write "never joining NATO" into their constitution.
For Russia to accept such an approach would undermine the pretext for the invasion whereby Ukraine is merely the foreskin of NATO.
I agree. Yet he keeps talking about discussing anti-NATO security guarantees for Putin, “the rapist” - to recall your analogy - while still raping. Why? Even French commentators on TF1 look baffled at his words [1]
My guess is that Macron is fancying some security system alternative to NATO for Europe. So he’s trying to use Russian security concerns as a pivot to make Europeans step in that direction, hopefully with the support of other prominent allies.
The immediate vocal reaction of other NATO partners against his words (while none in their support as far as I know) along with a very weak French military support for the Ukrainian resistance so far, tell me that after 9 months of rehashing the same refrain [2], Macron is nowhere close to build any consensus around his ideas or leadership.
[1]
[2]
That's speculative, and far fetched.
In NATO, the only nation ever pushing back against the US is France. Other nations may agree with the French but they will not dare to say it. So Macron follows upon a time honored tradition: that of the guy talking about the elephant in the room, which all other partners are busy ignoring.
I purposefully say 'European', because the American leaders have eagerly steered Eastern Europe towards this war for 15 years without pause. The Europeans went along with it, mostly guided by ignorance and blind obedience to Uncle Sam.
If this conflict wasn't outright caused on purpose (can't have the Europeans and the Russians cozying up too much - Heartland theory and all that. Also, awful convenient, all those gas exports the Americans are currently enjoying), at the very least it was a risk the Americans were willing to take, and Ukraine a sacrifice they were willing to make.
Speculative to some extent. After all "Unfortunately, the French president tends to come up with abstract ideas [in the public space], but never develops them to a level of specific programs or road maps. This allows officials, including those at the French Foreign Ministry, to interpret these ideas at their own discretion. Therefore, it is still too early to say if this particular initiative Macron has proposed will develop into something more significant. The current situation as it is, considering some comprehensive European security system is at least premature," he pointed out.
https://tass.com/politics/1546113
Why far fetched if " the only nation ever pushing back against the US is France"?
France intends to create a new "security framework" during the presidency. "We need to build it between us, Europeans, share it with our allies in NATO, and propose it for negotiation to Russia," Macron said.
https://www.dw.com/en/macron-proposes-security-pact-to-make-europe-a-power-of-the-future/a-60482625
The expansion of European defence capacities strengthens NATO, but France's goal remains strategic autonomy for Europe. Finally yet importantly, France claims leadership within this new European security architecture.
https://www.freiheit.org/european-union/frances-new-security-strategy
Here is my counterfactual: had the European leaders understood the need to take into account Western security concerns earlier, in say, 2014, this entire war could have been avoided.
Are you talking to me?
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/beijing-s-long-arm-china-s-secret-police-stations-in-europe-a-d6732094-ca32-4c0a-8e6f-58b395b946aa
Calling "speculation" statements of mine which start with "My guess is" or "Here is my counterfactual" doesn't sound as an objection. They are speculations. If you want to claim they are implausible where is the argument?
The Freiheit article points to an important dynamic between France and Germany regarding common defense beyond the structure of NATO. The last paragraph:
Such an observation is made in the context of Germany being very vulnerable now because of their past dealings with the Putin regime. It seems like Macron wants to become the sort of pivot Merkel used to be but with less dependency on non-European resources.
[sup]— Essi Lehto, Terje Solsvik, Nick Macfie · Reuters · Dec 2, 2022[/sup]
Finland’s prime minister acknowledges that «Europe is not strong enough».
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Dec 2, 2022[/sup]
Well, there you have it.
The EU is riddled with babbling bureaucracy thumb-twiddling impotence sitting-on-hands — not going to cut it. For that matter, there's a fair amount of EU dislike within the EU already. The EU isn't about defense anyway.
A Russian autocrat isn't going to pay much attention to that, but surely might try to fuel it. And facing an individual European country won't faze them much either. Despots may just grab what they want, and roll over what they don't.
A cohesive European defense, on the other hand, preferably including the UK and Ukraine :wink:, might do it. The resources exist, at least.
Until then, NATO it is. And NATO, apparently, scares Putin.
I see that gap. And maybe it will get bigger. I am not trying to shake pom-poms for him.
On the other hand, he is basing his view on not returning to the previous status quo. He wants to talk about that instead of postponing the topic until after some presently inconceivable terminus. That approach may become useful someday.
It seems to me that your speculations about Macron dreaming to become Napoleon IV are not empirically testable and serve no purpose that I can see. You might as well speculate that Biden secretly wants to enslave Western Europe, or that Merkel fantacized to become a second Hitler...
Exactly. A diversity of views within NATO is not a weakness, as long as allies respect and listen to each other while moving forward. NATO must defend democracy, not undermine it.
This being said, I personally appreciate US leadership within NATO, in this particular instance. But it has a lot to do with Biden. Had the pres been Trump, NATO would have been nowhere in sight. The advent of Trump (and Bush before him) is one if the reasons why Europeans don't trust Americans over the long term: the US is on a decline, and as it turns out, their elections are relatively easy to manipulate.
There simply isn't the will.
With the US committed to Europe, it won't change.
The only thing that would get Europeans and Europe to truly emphasis on defense would be the total departure of the US from Europe. Only then the Germans and others would wake up from their slumber. Or possibly Finlandization would be an option.
It's just simple geography: the Russians are behind Poland. Not in the eastern parts of Germany having the possibility to run through Europe to the Atlantic in few weeks as during the Cold War.
Russia on the other hand hopes that it can engage European countries individually. Then it would be strong and hence the opposition to European integration.
Agreed. It's not unrealistic, with republicans like Trump, it could well happen.
Instead, he went against the "unprovoked aggression" narrative - which is utter nonsense - and suggested that maybe 15 years of the Russians saying they perceived NATO expansion as a threat wasn't a "clever ruse" to revive the Russian empire.
I dislike the little wannabe dictator, but at least he's got this right. He probably realizes that his head will be on the chopping block too if he simply let the Americans sacrifice Ukraine and Europe like a pawn, without any form of protest.
Don't let knee-jerk antifrog racism blur your thinking. Macron is easy to dislike, but he is not a wannabe dictator.
Then, that’s not an objection to what I said, but an objection to a caricature of what I said. Indeed you can not quote the claim you attribute to me. So let me double down on the facts that support my speculation.
Macron’s dreams were stated by himself and promoted by his own initiative already in 2017 [1]
En matière de défense, l’Europe doit se doter d’une force commune d’intervention, d’un budget de défense commun et d’une doctrine commune pour agir. Il convient d’encourager la mise en place au plus vite du Fonds européen de défense, de la coopération structurée permanente et de les compléter par une initiative européenne d’intervention qui permette de mieux intégrer nos forces armées à toutes les étapes.
That his proposal is seen as an attempt to emancipate Europe from NATO [2] is in line with his declared project for European security, his declarations during NATO summits [3] and became manifest to the large public since when he declared NATO brain-dead [4] . That Macron’s initiatives and aspiring leadership is not as appealing as Macron might wish is not only evident by the reaction of the other NATO partners but also acknowledged by French commentators as well as politicians like Arnaud Danjean (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnaud_Danjean) [5]
Notice, I’m not suggesting some evil intentions on Macron such as pursuing some kind of French imperialism (even though I get why he might be caricatured as a “petit Napoléon” or “petit de Gaulle” and can't discount his pursuit of national strategic interests in Europe and outside), or unreasonable concerns about European strategic autonomy (on the contrary I myself expressed that concern earlier [6]). My point is simply that as the war unfolds Macron’s pushy attitude as a European leader and promoter of European security autonomy is wearing out in support.
[1] https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique
[2]
L’atlantisme est-il un anachronisme ? Le nécessaire débat sur l’avenir de la politique étrangère de la France
https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-et-strategique-2017-4-page-16.htm
L’Alliance atlantique selon Emmanuel Macron
https://www.cairn.info/revue-defense-nationale-2021-2-page-95.htm
Une idée incertaine de l’Europe. Comprendre les ambiguïtés stratégiques d’Emmanuel Macron
https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-champs-de-mars-2020-1-page-149.htm
[3]
https://otan.delegfrance.org/Conference-de-presse-du-President-Emmanuel-Macron-a-l-issue-du-sommet-de-l-OTAN
https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/285669-emmanuel-macron-30062022-otan
[4]
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-nato-braindead-idUSKBN1Y21JE
[5]
[i]« Etre un peu plus humble dans notre approche »
Dans cette nouvelle redistribution des cartes, la France se positionne en leader, ce qui n’a rien d’étonnant selon Arnaud Danjean. « Depuis le départ du Royaume-Uni de l’UE, la France objectivement est la principale puissance militaire d’Europe, qui a en plus une gamme complète y compris avec la dissuasion nucléaire, ce qui est tout à fait singulier en Europe. Donc la France est naturellement dans un siège de conducteur pour l’Europe de la défense. » Mais ce spécialiste des questions de défense et sécurité met en garde la France. « Ça nous oblige nous Français, à un grand travail de conviction vis-à-vis de nos partenaires. Et parfois, je trouve que ce travail est fait avec un peu trop d’arrogance. Car on se satisfait d’être dans la position de leader et on a envie d’imposer cela à tout le monde, on pense que c’est une évidence pour tout le monde. Je pense que l’on doit être un peu plus humble dans notre approche. » Un message clairement destiné au président français Emmanuel Macron.[/i]
https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/europe-de-la-defense-la-france-fait-preuve-d-un-peu-trop-d-arrogance-estime-arnaud
[6]
Quoting neomac
:rofl:
Quoting Olivier5
He threatened the people of France for exercising their human right to bodily autonomy. "Dictator" is being kind. Absolute scum of the Earth, better? The fiery pit is too good for that man.
Sure. But his moves do not seem effective in building consensus. To work in that direction I would expect Macron to pursue bilateral accords with other European countries (including eastern European countries), to assure enough convergence with European leaders behind doors before coming out with challenging ideas and see those give him a cold shoulder, and to put France more at the forefront of the European military support for Ukraine (e.g. as relevant if not more relevant than French military involvement in Syria in a war against terrorism). It's unlikely he will meet his strategic goals for Europe if he doesn't address Eastern Europeans' security concerns in a persuasive way (especially if predictable national interests lurk behind his behavior).
This is some intense shit right here
Here it is: Macron Says He Wants To Piss Off France's Unvaccinated
Could've been a quote from Germany in the '30s.
If you want a discussion, discuss. Stop with this passive aggressive nonsense.
Also, where do you get the idea I live in Eindhoven? It's actually a bit creepy that you're trying to guess (or trying to find actual information) about where I live. Sounds like something a hacker kid in their mother's basement would do. :chin:
Really?! Macron's quote is extrapolated from an interview where the interlocutor reports that 85% of patients in reanimation were non-vaccinated and that their cases were saturating intensive care units to the point that many operations were deprogrammed. Can you pls quote politicians from Germany in the '30s enraged with non-vaccinated people because of the saturation of intensive care units by willingly non-vaccinated people?
In any case, what certainly couldn't be from Germany in the '30s was the free public polemic reactions of political opposition, media and civil society against Macron's controversial wording choice [1]
Right?
[1]
"Cretin" is being kind.
It's just a different modus operandi, which integrates provocation as a means to challenge the status quo. Macron accepts that he needs to ruffle a few feathers in order to get his message across, that nobody listens to Mr Nice Guy. So he regularly says things he 'shouldn't say', and all the commentators then ask "How come he dares to say this?" But I personally think he is right to speak (somewhat) freely and not to be too obsessed about optics. Of course he is still a politician, and still cares about optics, but he is not slave to them.
A true leader is not someone who tells you what you want to hear, but what you need to hear. E.g. on the anti-vacc, he told them what they needed to be told: that their behavior is ultimately antisocial.
In this modus operandi of Macron, it's not his problem if others are annoyed at him; it's their problem. They are only annoyed because somehow, somewhere, he is right; they know it and he knows it. So the annoyance generated is just a proof that the message has been heard.
I note that Mario Draghi said things along similar lines when he was Italian Prime Minister, about the need to make peace with Russia, ultimately. But he said them nicely and softly, and hence no one paid any attention.
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/05/europe/russians-fighting-for-ukraine-intl-cmd/index.html
I deeply disagree with that too. Even if “somehow, somewhere, he is right”, as Gérard Araud (ex-diplomatic adviser to Emmanuel Macron) twitted: En politique étrangère, on ne dit jamais publiquement tout ce qu’on pense. Avoir raison ne suffit pas. Il faut aussi le dire au bon moment sinon on risque d’atteindre le résultat opposé au recherché. Je dis ça à tout hasard… Soupir (https://twitter.com/GerardAraud/status/1599692520794968064). Publicly framing the peace issue in line with Putin’s anti-NATO narrative was a questionable rhetoric move because this time he’s not “emmerding” the bad citizens for the sake of the good citizens, but “emmerding” his allies for the sake of the enemy, an enemy who is eagerly looking for exploitable devisions among Westerners.
Besides if Macron doesn’t manage to build a consensus among European partners around his idea of a European Security system which is other than just more NATO, then he’s going to fail his declared objective. So it’s his problem too.
Quoting Olivier5
Anybody can talk peace with Russia, even Zelensky. The problem is on what grounds. In any case, Mario Draghi never talked about security guarantees for Russia as far as I know. Yet he did talk about security guarantees for Ukraine: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-golovoyu-radi-78129
And support for enlarging NATO: https://www.euronews.com/2022/05/19/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-italy-finland
2022 was year the horror of war returned to Europe (minor warning: graphic)
[sup]— Jill Lawless · AP News · Dec 8, 2022[/sup]
Surely you jest.
No.
[sup]— Michael Morell, Andrew Weiss, Paulina Smolinski · CBS News · Dec 7, 2022[/sup]
Well, the (sociopathic) opportunism über alles is something Putin shares with der Führer.
Russia's Putin Vows More Strikes On Ukraine Energy Infrastructure
[sup]— Via NDTV · Dec 8, 2022[/sup]
I guess the Ukrainians aren't really allowed to try throwing the invaders out? Such goes Putin's rhetorical move. Not the best excuse. Destruction continues.
Slovakia compares negotiating peace with Russia to the dialogues with Hitler that led to WWII
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Dec 8, 2022[/sup]
, Macron is "Absolute scum", belonging in "The fiery pit"? :D I guess, by your take, humans best go extinct, or at least be markedly decimated. Not quite a realistic outlook. Or maybe just another hyperbole.
By Covid? Get with the times, buddy. That hysteria ended last year already.
Of course, that didn't stop closet tyrants like Macron from blatantly threatening people for exercising a human right.
I'll stop derailing the thread now.
By "The fiery pit" (and whatever else you have in store for people).
He's emmerding his allies by reminding them that they will need to make peace with their enemy, that however giddy they are about emmerding the Russians, ultimately they will need to make peace with Russia, so they might as well start a conversation about how this might happen.
I agree with you that his provocative communication technique is often counterproductive, at least initially. It generates controversies and yes, annoyance. But as I said, that's the way he communicates, and it is often effective in a strange, disruptive way. Note the similarities with Trump's style, who basically got (almost) elected by saying all the wrong things.
Quoting neomac
Yes, that's true and I also agree with your comment about arrogance being counter productive, but I agree with @ssu that such a project has zero chance of working anyway, as long as NATO functions reasonably well. It can only work as an alternative to NATO, and such an alternative will only be considered if Europe has very very good reasons to mistrust the US. Eg if Trump comes back to the White House and aligns his foreign policy with Putin's, or something similar.
The focus is not making peace with Russia but under what conditions. Macron is expressly making a point about anti-NATO security guarantees for Russia.
Besides his analogy with the eventual concession of Alsace-Lorraine region by France to Germany (in that interview) is muddling his point about international law and respect of territorial integrity in the case of Crimea.
Always in that interview Macron was also referring to another critical issue: the recent unfair/protectionist American policies (maybe deniable by the US but not implausible) which may compromise the European re-industrialization program.
So he made himself vulnerable to criticisms from every side: Ukrainians, Americans, Eastern Europeans. And he weakened both his arguments at once by triggering a predictable polemic over the question of security guarantees for Russia which in turn shadowed the merits of the other argument against the American anti-EU policies.
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Olivier5
I don’t know what evidences you have that his communication style is effective in international affairs, but that interview on very critical subjects is hardly evidence of that.
Quoting Olivier5
If there is zero chance of working, what’s the point of invoking an "obvious" discussion about anti-NATO security guarantees for Russia? What's the point of remarking the "effective in a strange, disruptive way" of his communication style? Macron’s proposals would just look as wishful thinking. Besides working on an alternative to NATO when we have “very very good reasons to mistrust the US” might be already too late. I guess many European politicians can understand and share Macron’s concerns but he’s committing such alienating missteps in an already unfavorable European political and economic environment that his leadership is unfortunately easy to question.
I don't know what leadership you are talking about. The relationship between France and Germany -- the traditional political engine of the EU -- is currently tense. Until Macron and Scholtz (or their successors) reforge a strong franco-german bound, the EU will be strategically leaderless.
Nobody in Europe considers Macron as a natural European leader. Why should they? Was he elected the president of Europe? Has there ever been a national political figure who was universally accepted as a natural leader of Europe?
IOW, you may be assessing Macron against unreasonable expectations. Pushing your argument one step further, Macron's leadership of planet Earth is also easy to question.... but that may be because he was never meant to be the leader of planet Earth.
I'm referring to what is more extensively discussed here:
https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/emmanuel-macron-mario-draghi-olaf-scholz-qui-prendra-le-leadership-de-la-zone-euro-apres-angela-merkel-1421587
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2022/07/02/la-france-et-l-ue-presidence-reussie-mais-leadership-fragile_6133075_3232.html
https://mouvement-europeen.eu/avec-macron-la-france-peut-elle-prendre-le-leadership-de-leurope/
https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/emmanuel-macron-president/politique-etrangere-un-leadership-europeen-retrouve-une-strategie-mondiale-infructueuse-1394289
Quoting Olivier5
I'm assessing Macron's recent call for "discussions about security guarantees for Russia" as a misstep toward attaining his ambitious goals for Europe.
Irrespective of what the Parisian journalists you quote may opine, there's no way any single nation will lead Europe. Even Merkel with the weight of the German economy behind her and her amazing personal qualities and exceptional length in service, was never an unchallenged leader of the EU.
I do.
Quoting Olivier5
Indeed none of the articles I quoted (nor even Macron himself) is likely adopting some hyperbolic notion of "leadership" given the European political context. As suggested in the first article I referenced, the comparison that understandably comes to mind is approximately with Angela Merkel as a role-model, Draghi as a strong competitor. Considering France's strong economy plus greater military capacity and geopolitical projection (e.g. Africa, Middle East, Asia) than Germany or Italy, Macron's pro-active attitude and ambitious plans for the EU, he clearly had good cards in his hands to be more influential than he's turning out to be. My impression is that's not just fault of bad luck.
That's fair, I think.
PS: You mentioned France's projection to Africa, Syria, or the Indo-Pacific as assets but in a EU environment, this might not work to France's advantage, because other member states have no interests in those places and in fact are often rather suspicious towards what they see as French neo colonial ambitions. These French military operation oversees are not necessarily seen as positive by other EU nations, more as distractive of the EU predilection for soft-power projection. Europeans like to hide in their NATO-sponsored fortress and send other people in Africa or Asia some money, and diplomats.
Agreed. Beyond the question of Macron's agenda, France and Poland have much to repair in their relations. At the very least, recognizing and compensating for the heavy lifting on the refugee front by the Eastern nations would itself be addressing a security concern.
[sup]— Toronto Sun · Dec 9, 2022[/sup]
The editorial doesn't really make a whole lot of points, just the usual (which is not a dismissal of them).
Allowing the invaders to get away with it is too close to being complicit.
They'll learn from success, others (autocrats, despots, tyrants, dictators, whatever) will take note, and thus we may end up putting it off to our children (or their children).
It's not new and not that hard to understand; we ought to learn from history.
[sup](Plato Tacitus Burke Mill Niemöller Wiesel)[/sup]
But, in this case, it's for the Ukrainians to decide, their homes (whatever is left of them), their self-governance, are on the line.
[sup]— Justin Yau, Ben Farmer · The Telegraph · Dec 9, 2022[/sup]
More or less Prigozhin's and Kadyrov's free playground ...
Grotesque.
I'd suggest footage be broadcast all over Russia, well all over really, without propagandist editing that is.
Photographers Kostyantyn Liberov and Vlada Liberova published a photo of the "graveyard" of shells that Russia fired at Kharkiv this year.
[sup]— Reserve Petty Officer · Dec 4, 2022[/sup]
[tweet]https://twitter.com/StarshinaZapasa/status/1599390231262040065[/tweet]
This is not correct.
MAD theory does not apply to Ukraine as Ukraine does not have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the planet, or any nuclear weapons.
And this whole idea that nuclear weapons would not be useful militarily ... but of course could destroy the entire planet, is just dumb.
Take this argument for example:
Quoting ssu
Why would nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent to a no-fly zone if nuclear weapons are not effective?
Why would implementing a no-fly zone be the obvious and easy response to the use of nuclear weapons?
Nuclear weapons are right now deterring a no-fly zone ... but if nuclear weapons would actually be used then the deterrence would evaporate and of course there would be a no-fly zone?
The argument seems to be nuclear weapons are not useful militarily, but serve as a deterrence (because they're not useful?), and of course so powerful that they can destroy the planet, but cannot be made less powerful to be useful outside the context of destroying the planet?
Makes no sense.
Obviously, there are many political reasons not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but the idea they would not be useful is just absurd. Now, they may not be some magical weapon that produces instant victory.
But to take the bridge example, the situation could be that conventional missiles failed to destroy the bridge, or there's effective missile defence defending the bridge (that a nuclear hypersonic missile could penetrate), or simply too many conventional missiles would be needed and it would be nice to conserve them, and the bridge is essential for an offensive operation, and a tactical nuclear weapon can destroy the bridge, completely and totally with zero chance of repair.
It is very, very easy to see a scenario where a small nuclear weapon would be useful in military planning. Would destroying said bridge, or bunker, or bridge head, or air field, or fortified arms depot, etc. win the war in itself? No, but there are reasons these are targets of military strikes even when the target can easily be repaired (like an air field), as it would be convenient to get rid of them; so, if nuclear weapons can do that (which they can), then they are clearly useful.
And the fact is US has no reason to nuke Russia for Nuking Ukraine and any conventional retaliation would be lower than out-right victory in Ukraine. Move-fast-and-break-things, "cost of doing business", is just a page out of our corporate play book.
Hence, drip-feed theory is alive and well, of supplying Ukraine only with enough weapons to lose, and so keep the political reasons to not use nuclear weapons a sufficient deterrent, and since Ukraine is once again losing, we now hear talk of supplying cluster munitions, and people trying to restart the discussion about jets.
This is just a word salad and has nothing to do with your original argument.
Your original argument tied "defiant" to justification of Western policies ... you've just moved the goal posts to Russia is doing things the West doesn't like. Yeah, no shit.
Now, does not liking what someone is doing justify any particular course of action?
No.
People do things I don't like all the time, I wouldn't call it "defying me" but you're free to say that, but, what matters here, is that whatever you call it, that does not in itself justify arming their competitors, or any particular course of action.
Russia and the West are at odds over Ukraine, no one disputes that. If Russian "defiance" against the West justifies Western policies, then the Ukrainian "defiance" of Russia justifies Russian policies.
And you've already laid your cards on the table, in that you simply want the West to win this confrontation, so you support Western policies regardless of justification or trying to reconcile with what they West itself does and rights it claims (pre-emptive war, shock and awe, etc.), and regardless of whether they are a benefit to Ukraine.
You state clearly several times the only objective that needs to be achieved is harming the Russian military (not Ukrainian victory, not any benefits at all for Ukraine, even the total destruction of Ukraine is acceptable if Russia is also harmed).
So, argue this position, rather than throw out pseudo-intellectual bullshit that is quite clearly just trying to prop up the propaganda (in this case the US's claim of holding up the "rules based international system" as reason to arm Ukraine, is clearly where you sourced your "defiance" justifies Western policies, but you can support that because it's a bullshit argument, so you move the goal posts to simply someone is defying something in this situation, which is clear: Ukraine is defying Russia, therefore, according to your argument, Russia is completely justified in destroying entirely Ukraine to put a stop to that defiance).
You may think of yourself as an astute intellectual, but you are not.
Astute intellectuals make a clear and meaningful point.
Propagandists throw shit against the wall, see what sticks, throw more shit at whatever spot they think has landed, which is what you do.
What is the point of your posts?
You're just microblogging and news aggregating.
Again, there are places you can do that without betraying your fanatical devotion to propaganda by simply reposting material without scrutiny, criticism, nor even any link to the discussion.
Quoting jorndoe
The videos I posted show Western journalists investigating Nazi institutions and Nazi groups receiving arms from Ukrainian military (that came in turn from NATO members ... including members who needed to pass laws to make clear that was illegal to arm Nazi groups, but Ukraine does it anyways). These are not fringe organisations.
Western journalists who point out this arming of Nazi's and the clear Nazi sympathies, links and lying by the Ukrainian ministry of defence in arming the Nazi's even if NATO was claiming they shouldn't and weren't.
But, I am happy you agree that Nazi's are indeed a problem and should be liquidated, and whether the Russian war is justified or not, if they've killed some Nazi's along the way, in Azov Battalion and Right Sector and Ukrainian Intelligence and in the ranks and elsewhere, then that's at least happy happenstance we can all celebrate.
The new NATO Wunderwaffe is the German Flakpanzer Gepard, latest entry into the weapons drip-feed to keep Ukraine just well enough to keep fighting.
The Gepard can fire bullets at drones and cruise missiles, and supposed to deal with the attacks on the electricity system, but that idea is just dumb as an electricity grid is simply too vast with too many targets to protect with a system like Gepard.
Zelensky is now basically just complaining that Russia uses too much artillery and they can't deal with it. News has certainly arrived from the front that the weather makes war fighting no longe or very fun (a warrior "lifestyle" as a Nazi in one of the videos I posted phrased it).
Drone attacks on Russia air bases do not seem significant or sustained in anyway to matter militarily; just a dose of propaganda.
The devastation of Ukraine is severe.
Yes, air campaigns don't win wars (except when they do), but sides to military conflicts still lose.
The dynamic NATO has created is sending out Ukraine's best troops with "just enough" weapons to lose, starting with the Javelin and Stinger type systems, then when they can't win (and a lot of them die), provide the next military system to not-lose, rinse and repeat.
However, it's not clear to me how long this strategy can go on for. Continuously attritting your best troops in battles they can't win, then compensating the loss with more sophisticated equipment to make the next tier as effective (but not more effective), has clear limitations in man power.
I see zero indication NATO is coming to help their "friend".
Again you don't understand.
They are perfect for deterrence, but not so great in actual warfare because of the obvious drawbacks and the obvious escalation. Why would Russia use them, if that could get NATO involved. How are things better for the war for Russia if they really will fight also NATO?
THAT doesn't make any sense.
Just in comparison: The Third Reich had a huge amount of chemical weapons (basically WMD's too) in it's arsenal and it never used them. And then when it was all over and the fighting was inside Germany, there simply wasn't effective measures to use them on some level that could change anything.
... how would something that doesn't work deter an opponent?
And again, Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons so MAD does not apply.
Prof. John Mearsheimer recently gave a lecture in Hungary, During the Q&A session (timestamp: 1:13:40) the question about MAD comes up.
Mearsheimer concludes that it is not obvious that the MAD principle applies for various reasons. The most important one being that, as pointed out, Ukraine does not possess nuclear weapons, and it is unclear whether the Americans would be prepared to enter a nuclear conflict with Russia over Ukraine. Most likely not.
When a nuclear strike would be launched against American soldiers in Ukraine (if the US would involve itself further to the points of "boots on the ground") it's a more dangerous situation, since the Americans would likely retaliate in some way, thus there'd be a serious risk of nuclear escalation.
There is no post goal shift. The UN resolution expresses the majoritarian will of its voters (the West/US among them) as much as a democratic election expresses the majoritarian will of the voters: if one political candidate would violently rebel against the results of such democratic elections despite their legality or without legally appealing against them, this political candidate would be defiant of what has been ruled as expression of people’s majoritarian will. So concerning the Russian “special military operation”, there is a UN resolution which has a normative legal force and such resolution widely expresses the will of the West/US. And yes the international law resolution against the Russian “special military operation” LEGALLY JUSTIFIES the western policies of the West against Russia.
At the same time due to the fact that Russia is pursuing its war AGAINST that resolution supported by the West/US AND THEREFORE the will of the West/US, Russia is playing the role of the defiant minor power against the West/US major power. Add to that all other facts I mentioned about Russian hostility in acts and deeds toward the Western-led World order.
So, if that’s not enough for you to apply the notion of "defiant" to Russia then I do not understand what else could possibly count as “defiant” to you in the case of great power conflicts.
Quoting boethius
Again “justifies” in what sense? From the international law point of view, no. Russia wasn’t legally justified since there was no UN resolution in support of Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine. While the West/NATO were legally justified in applying sanctions to Russia and military supporting Ukraine.
However one can argue that, despite of what international law ruled, Russia was/is engaged in a geopolitical competitive game where players’ moves are made at the expense of adversaries so it was/is strategically justified in invading Ukraine because it felt/feels threatened by the Ukrainian defiance and/or NATO enlargement. Even in this case, if one wants to assess the rationality of this strategy one shouldn’t consider only objectives and perceived threats of a single party, but also means and ways of using them to effectively succeed against competitors which in their turn have objectives, perceived threats and available means to pursue their goals. In that sense, I’m not sure whether the “military special operation” was unquestionably the best strategy for Russia to preserve/expand its allegedly threatened hegemony, because NATO was already losing relevance at least to main EU members, economic ties with EU were pretty solid, Germany and France were against Ukraine joining NATO (predictably to appease Russian security concerns), the alliance between Russia, China and other Asian countries was building up, the Russian military projection and relevance in Middle East and Africa was growing, and the annexation of Crimea was already a de facto smooth achievement ensuring control over the Black sea, the US was troubled by more pressing issues (the domestic politics crisis and the strategic challenge represented by China). So Russia didn’t seem strategically impelled to take such a risky move as intelligence failures, military poor performance on the battlefield, and hostile reaction/resilience of the West/US made clear. Precisely because Russia didn't seem strategically impelled to make such a risky move many geopolitical analysts didn't believe Russia would probably start a war until Russia actually started it.
While the West/US were more impelled to react against an aggressively expansionist Russia. This was definitely a non-negligible wake-up call for the Europeans, and for the US as long as the US wants the European countries within its sphere of influence.
Quoting boethius
You keep talking about “justification” without clarifying what you mean by it. To me the term “justification” is pretty general and it expresses the idea that some relevant shareable rational requirement is satisfied. In any case its application varies depending on what set of rational standards one wants to take into consideration: strategic, moral, legal, military, economic, diplomatic you name it. That’s why generically talking about “justification” is ambiguous and potentially misleading.
Quoting boethius
If I clearly stated several times what you attribute to me, you can easily quote myself, but I don’t see any such quotation. Besides your understanding of my claims is under question, your serial misinterpretation of my claims is intellectually creepy, so using the word “clearly” is no assurance of your understanding at all.
To clarify my views here once more: both Ukraine and the West/US converge enough in fighting Russia until Russia ceases to be a threat to both, whence their allegiance. The West/US have strategic, legal and moral reasons to support such convergence. Notice also that Ukraine expressed its interest in entering Western/US sphere of influence by joining NATO and/or EU so the convergence may not be occasional but systemic.
However the competitive game these players are engaging in is full of uncertainties and occasions for non-negligible divergence which players must deal with. Nobody can offer a recipe for victory or a full account of what’s best in the long term. One may think that “justification” must be based on such recipes or accounts, but I find this approach conceptually flawed. As an avg dude, I would rely more on geopolitical speculation and historical analogies for guidance.
Quoting boethius
If you want to play the ad hominem game, then I can as easily accuse you of rehashing pro-Russian propaganda. In any case, I don’t care what side you pick. What counts to me is the quality of your arguments and counterarguments. Rephrasing and caricaturing my claims after dismissing the logic of my arguments (e.g. when I’m pointing at facts and motives by which Russia is intentionally defying the West/US, its stability and its hegemony), associating extrapolated ideas the way it suits you (e.g. “defying” & “international law”), introducing ambiguous terms I didn’t use without clarifying them (like “justification”), or muddling the meaning of those terms which are already clear enough (like “defiant”), and then brainwash yourself over your straw mans against me despite my reiterated clarifications are all rhetoric tricks of the most intellectually dishonest propaganda.
What the NATO countries have said is that if Russia hits Ukraine with nukes, the previous efforts to stay out of the conflict will come to an end. The source of firing platforms and air bases would likely become targets of conventional weapons. If Russian escalates to using nukes on western targets in response, that is when MAD would kick in. Maybe that is what Putin was thinking about in his recent musing over the dynamics of striking first in order to suppress the retaliation.
The use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia on NATO troops is also not off the table. Mearsheimer makes the argument that during the Cold War NATO planned for limited nuclear weapons use in case of a Russian invasion of Europe, so clearly they believed MAD would not go into effect immediately.
It's about the Ukraine crisis, not just your own take, though that's cool too, despite the occasional curious tunnel vision.
Some reports might suggest getting the diplomats scrambling immediately, others suggest some un/predictability factor of the Kremlin, other reports still may suggest whatever other things. Without data, there isn't anything to chat (or reason) about.
You keep ignoring that Putin, Pavlov, Solovyov, Patrushev, Medvedev, Chernyshov, with Peskov, Matviyenko, and others in tow, speak of liberating Ukraine from a Nazi regime (previous posts, all over actually) — a ruse, an excuse — fail. For that matter, it's pretty clear that Kremlin has no particular concern for the Ukrainians (also prior posts).
Anyway, I suppose we could designate it all propaganda, though government officials and public TV characters are influential enough, more so with the oppression in place and enforced.
Quoting boethius
I'm glad too. Have you seen (indications of) Nazism here...? Fascism racism ... for that matter? Anyone belonging in Tzeentch's fiery pit?
We could also keep one line of the chit-chat purely on the military tactics, which would exclude speculation about ulterior motives and such.
Medvedev of the Russian Security Council:
Quoting Dmitry Medvedev · Dec 11, 2022
The red line has been drawn. Only crossing it will show the answer. Mearsheimer's point about reluctance to escalate because of MAD applies to Russia too.
I agree, though. We simply don't know. When experts say that the chance for nuclear weapons use is non-trivial, that's saying something.
Sure, if you see no reason explain what your point is, then yes, hopefully the moderators will remove this sort of content. If you are not supporting a point, nor offering any analysis of what you're sources say and and why you think they are trustworthy, then it's just propaganda.
Quoting jorndoe
What other "take" have I suggested be removed from the discussion? The problem with your propaganda is that it's not a take, just spamming links. There's generally nothing to respond to, just a few unverified anecdotes that don't even relate to any topic of discussion.
Quoting jorndoe
If you actually followed the discussion, instead of just spamming, you would have read a long exchange on this exact topic that obviously Russia produces propaganda as well. Of course, as @ssu has pointed out numerous times, the best propaganda is based on truth. So that the Kremlin says something, and that we know they will also produce propaganda same as you, doesn't make it untrue (the problem I have with your propaganda is that it generally has nothing to do with what's being discussed, lending zero additional weight to any position, but clearly designed to just impress the gullible).
I also make clear that people are free to argue there are not enough Nazi's to justify invasion.
If you were actually engaged in the discussion and not just toiling away at spamming propaganda, you would have actually argued why there is not enough Nazi's with enough power in Ukraine to justify invasion, which starts with setting a bar of what "too many" Nazi's would be, that would justify invasion, and then demonstrating Ukraine is under this threshold. That there are Nazi's elsewhere does not serve such a purpose, as the distribution of Nazi's is obviously not uniform.
Clearly the actual number of Nazi's and how much power they have is essential to the West's, generally speaking, argument that appeasing the Nazi's was a mistake (i.e. they should have gone to war sooner). For example, Hitler, in himself, was no reason to attack Germany. If Hitler was literally the only Nazi in Germany at the time, and it was only himself and his book and no one listened to him and he had no power or influence, there would have been zero reason to attack Germany to fight Naziism. The appeasement argument rests on there being more Nazis than just Hitler, and at some point too many Nazis and war is preferable to appeasement.
One could also argue that, yes, there's too many Nazi's in Ukraine and there has been for a while, and the West should not have appeased these Nazi's by sending them weapons, but, nevertheless, the Kremlin is simply cynically exploiting the otherwise completely justified invasion to kill said Nazi's in order to accomplish unjustified objectives such as steal resources.
Whether something is used as propaganda is independent of whether it is true. Not everything Zelensky says is false, for example. Likewise, even a true justification for war may also be propaganda, if the war does not actually serve that purpose. For example, maybe it was justified to attack Saddam and the Taliban simply because they are bad and there was the means available to do something about it (a key element that maybe lacking vis-a-vis Russia, or China, or North Korea or any number of authoritarian / totalitarian governments that maybe as bad or worse than Saddam / Taliban); however, if the war is then prosecuted in a way that does not actually help Iraqis or Afghanis, but simply transfers wealth the arms industry, creates some forward operating bases to threaten Iran and so on, then the justification is not actually for the actions, but similar actions that did not actually happen and was not the actual goal.
Which is a synthesis of my criticism of the West's intervention in Ukraine. If Iraq and Afghanistan and Libya were now vibrant democracies, benefits of the Wests reconstruction and tutelage of these places far exceeding the cost of the war to bring it about, then by all means go help Ukraine become a happier place. However, the West simply has no track record of actually fulfilling our promises, but rather abandoning our allies.
Maybe it was entirely justified, in itself, to remove the Taliban from power and support democratic forces in Afghanistan. The problem with this scenario is that we under-supported, enabled and engaged in corruption at all levels of governance, and then abandoned our so-called allies in Afghanistan the moment they no longer served entirely different purposes to "democracy" and "welfare", which was control of resources and transferring funds to the arms industry.
We will abandon Ukraine the moment they are inconvenient to the actual objectives as well.
Even if the current intervention was somehow justified (which I highly doubt), it does not matter as we will abandon Ukraine to the cold and dark, and our claims to bringing the light will be something that we just keep telling ourselves. Indeed, I would argue we already have.
To Europe's great credit, there has not; neither Hitler not Jesus managed it. It has always found other ways to reach an approximate consensus - war, usually.
Why do you see this as a good thing?
Seems unlikely at this point.
Why do you ask?
Because I thought you were concerned about the environment. Centralized government is likely the only road to effective action.
A global government would be necessary to thwart the effects of economic competition.
Because it worked in the case of child labor in the US. Individual states couldn't outlaw child labor without crippling themselves economically. The answer was for everyone to do it at the same time according federal law.
This is essentially the second biggest obstacle to doing something about climate change: lack of central authority to make everyone act in concert.
Which would be impossible if it were outlawed by a global government.
Long, drawn-out fart noise.
Which would be impossible if it were outlawed by a global government. See how nice?
How is not having stuff nice?
Long, drawn out fart noise.
Quoting frank
Yes, Frank. Repetitive, rude, and yet in the end, meaningless.
People cannot work together without a boss wielding power is your position, and it is indefensible, because most people most of the time just do get on with things cooperatively. Languages actually thrive better without a boss. Science itself rejects the boss in favour of open and equal discourse. In the case of environmental degradation and global warming it is absolutely the bosses of industry and government who are refusing to act while people all around are calling for action and trying to do their bit, and this in the face of a massive propaganda campaign trying to minimise climate change and ridicule and delegitimise any protest or demand for change.
Was I supposed to get that from the Tim Jones song?
Again, "normative legal force" is just pseudo-intellectual bullshit. Are you adding "normative" to "legal force" because you are aware there is no actual legal force involved in the situation? Or do you just have no idea what you're talking about?
In terms of the situation, legal justification for military action under the UN system requires a security council vote, which Russia obviously vetos.
As for the votes you're talking about in the general assembly of the UN, they have no legal force in military matters, and they didn't even represent a majority of people on the planet, so are not the "people's will" which seems important for your argument.
Now, if you say number of people doesn't count because countries joining the UN agree to the 1 vote per country rule ... sure, but they also agree to the security council and veto system on any military issues.
An international law based justification for intervention in Ukraine would require Russia to sign off on it, which they obviously haven't. You may say that's not fair, not "normative" according to your moral standards, but that's not how the law works. If you make a legal system where a minority has asymmetric power and favouritism, perhaps it's not fair but it's still legal.
For example, the US senate represents a minority of voters due to the states with lower populations having the same amount of seats. So, the US senate does not represent a "people's will", and US senators act in "defiance" of the people's will and are "normatively" unjustified according to your own argument, but the way the US senate works is still legal despite this defiance.
Quoting neomac
Although "rational requirement" means nothing in this context, just pseudo-intellectual bullshit that the pseudo-intellectual, usually of the "economics" variety, adds to statements to make themselves feel better about their lack of knowledge of the topics they come to conclusions about, I do agree with your key word "shareable".
Indeed, justification can be anything you mention, but the essential element is we are justifying it to others with some relation to the concept of "justice" that's universal in some way. Of course, what sorts of theories and arguments can be used to justify an action is wide open, the common element is that justification is towards others; arguments we want other to agree with.
"Regardless of justification" in the context I use it, refers to the US/NATO, or you own, justifications to others about the policies. You've made it quite clear you are on the "side of the West" and simply want the West to win. That is not a justification to me, or to other third parties that need not pick a side (India, Africa etc.), and certainly not less Russia.
Now, you may accept that what you want you cannot justify to others (although it maybe still useful to your purposes to fool them into believing the actions are justified) and have a separate internal justification for your actions. In this case, within your own head, there becomes two uses of the word justification; one use is essentially how you try to trick others, say a public position on the matter, and another use is why you are actually doing what you're doing, say a private position. So, in this duelism it can make sense to talk of your justifications for trying to convince others of your justifications which are not your real justifications, but it serves your real justification if others believe your justifications for other reasons.
For example, being the "Hegemone" maybe your "private position" and you may justify that by saying having more power is a "rational requirement" of all "rational agents", but since this applies to everyone else, you cannot simply justify your actions seeking more power simply because you want more power, as you recognise other actors want the same power: i.e. that you want more power is not a justification for others to give you more power. So, you think to yourself "how can I justify these actions" and then create arguments, for example protecting a "rules based order", that you may recognise are insufficient justifications but the gullible may believe them, or then one's opponents are perhaps at least flummoxed a bit in needing to deal with them.
Quoting neomac
This is insanely clear:
Quoting neomac
Point 2 applies what you obviously actually believe: "And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit".
As I pointed out at the time, if US hegemonic status is a justification, which you clearly state it is, then if Russia wins the war then it's just asserting its hegemonic power over Ukraine, and likewise justified. If the US can't stop Russia then clearly it isn't a global hegemone, as it was unable to determine the outcome of this even that happened on the globe. US may, nevertheles, have a larger sphere of hegemoning than Russia, but it is not global.
In particular, your point 3 is extremely clear "the end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian."
Your "end game" involves zero consideration of Ukrainian welfare nor any notion that it would be justified, in terms of your international law arguments that are in any case wrong, to seek such an outcome. The goal is quite clearly to simply harm Russia as a power competitor.
Which, whether the war is even doing that, would be an interesting question which I'm happy to debate. It could be the war is harming Russia, but it could also be Russia will come out of this war with a far more efficient and powerful army, more autonomous economy and new international banking system and so little reason to ever stop "defying the West" (had Putin implemented the sanctions himself this would have certainly caused serious domestic problems, but since the West did it for him, it's easy to say the West doesn't want to do business with Russia ... sort of what sanctions mean), rapidly replace any equipment, and all its neighbour's far less (rather than more) willing to "defy" Russia, seeing as they clearly can and will do what it takes to destroy your entire economy and the West clearly doesn't have a solution to the needing gas problem.
So, if you want to stop advancing propaganda, we could discuss what you actually believe, which is that the US / West can and should use this war to harm Russia in pure power competition terms. Ukrainian welfare doesn't matter, nor any other justification, just harming Russia.
The problem with your position is that historically wars, even extremely harmful wars in the short term (such as the American civil war, or WWI or WWII), generally result in any non-losing-party having far more powerful military at the end of the war.
Indeed, even losing parties can radically increase their real military power, such as Germany after WWI still had all sorts of "war experience" benefits even if physical war fighting capacity was essentially dismantled, despite this and the high casualties it is applying the experience and lessons of WWI that Germany could then rapidly rebuild their military power and fight WWII.
However, in the case of the war at hand, there is little probability that Russia will lose. At best, it "won't win".
Furthermore, in your hegemon's got to hegemon, you don't consider at all China.
Viewed as a proxy war between Russia and the US, perhaps US is winning something at some expense (at the expense of the destruction of Ukraine), but viewed as a proxy war between China and the West, China is winning a great deal at no expense; indeed, if the first view is correct, the West is weakening due to this war as well as Russia, an otherwise regional competitor.
So, if this war with Russia is satisfying some "rational requirement" of a global hegemon, there should be some argument as to why this helps against China, a more economically powerful adversary.
For, if China is a larger threat to US hegenomic power, which was the basis of all this talk of "pivoting" to East-Asia for over 2 decades, then optimum hegemomic strategy would be to "divide and conquer" the would be Russia-China alliance, and certainly not expend immense material and political capital in trying to harm the weaker of the two in such a team.
Again, that the use would result in NATO making a conventional attack on Russian forces in Ukraine is believable enough to make the use a very, very bad decision.
And would the Ukrainians suddenly surrender? I'm not so sure.
How convenient that Mearsheimer is talking in Hungary.:smirk:
The only country in NATO that is invested in Ukraine is the United States, and even they aren't invested to such a degree that they're willing to risk a protracted land war or even a nuclear conflict.
But @boethius, the West isn't intervening in Ukraine as in Iraq. And in Libya there are quite many countries all around meddling in it's internal problems (also Turkey, Russia, Egypt, Qatar,...). Ukraine is basically getting arms and intel from the West, but it's doing the fighting all alone. So
No, actually where the West can fuck up big time isn't now (of course, if they just abandon Ukraine to face of Russia all alone would be that fuck up), it's later. The West can fumble after this war in the promised rebuilding of Ukraine. Done lousily that can simply increase corruption, which the Ukrainian people hate. And simply if it disregards it's own requirements, values and laws in case of Ukraine. The rebuilding of Afghanistan is a prime example how these things go bad.
And Medvedev has made that point.
So you think then Russians or Putin will just ignore warnings as fake? What if you then after using tactical nukes the Ukrainians won't budge, China gets angry and suddenly the rest of your Black Seas fleet gets attacked and sunk?
Putin has lost his strategic surprise that he had in 2014. A response to Russia using nukes is something that the Western leaders and NATO have had to think now.
The Americans ignored Russian warnings as fake for 15 years.
It's entirely possible they will ignore warnings if A: the stakes are high enough and B: they expect the Americans are bluffing.
Quoting ssu
Who knows?
It's unlikely the Chinese will alter their stance towards Russia much, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. Their shared rivalry with the United States is likely what will determine their relations for the coming decades, and by provoking conflict in Eastern Europe the Americans pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese even further.
Also, it is not "my" Black Sea fleet. Don't start again with trying to frame me as partisan.
Quoting ssu
I highly doubt that Western leaders are willing to enter a protracted land war in Eastern Europe and/or nuclear conflict just to save face for the Americans after they overplayed their hand in Ukraine.
That is not the case:
Bilateral Aid as percentage of GDP from nations
The above combined with shared forms of support and totals allotted
Ukrainian refugees in the EU.
If Russia uses nukes in Ukraine, the whole Russian army in Ukraine and in the Black Sea will be annihilated by NATO strikes, thus ending the war quickly and neatly. This has been communicated to Mr Putin already.
First, this is no longer making the point that nuclear weapons are somehow not useful militarily, so I think we agree there, that there are useful.
We also seem to agree that NATO would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, why would it?
As for conventional retaliation, this is really a problematic thing. You don't just casually destroy Russian forces. The options are fairly limited.
For example, let's say you launch a conventional attack on Russian military bases in Russia ... how would Russia be sure this is a conventional attack and not a nuclear first strike? So, it's not so easy.
Sending in boots on the ground into Ukraine ... does any Western nation actually want this? No one disputes Ukrainian forces have suffered high casualties, far higher than is the usual tolerance for Western armies. When does "teaching Russia a lesson" turn into just getting stuck in a quagmire with Russia with no options to actually defeat Russia, just continuing exchange of offensives without any clear outcome?
Also, if the Russia declares Ukraine free-to-nuke, and then nukes NATO forces in Ukraine ... does it really fear a nuclear retaliation? This is not even clear, so not only is it not clear that any NATO country even has the appetite for a full scale conventional confrontation with Russia in Ukraine, it's not clear whether they have any reasonable followup to being nuked in Ukraine, which, in this scenario, Russia just demonstrated it is willing to do, so it a fairly common sense followup to say they will not distinguish Ukrainian and other forces that are in Ukraine.
Certainly, there are plenty of reasons not to use nuclear weapons we would agree on (domestic politics, China and India's reaction); however, that Russia is reasonably deterred by conventional military means, or reasonably deterred by nuclear means, or believes nuclear weapons are not useful, are fairly weak arguments.
Sending funding (basically bankrolling the entire Ukrainian military payroll), sending weapons, providing intelligence, covert meddling, are all in themselves interventions.
You are going back to the idea that we are not morally responsible for the outcome because Ukrainians want to fight and die, and if it's a total disaster for them that is the obvious outcome that we clearly see coming ... then that's fine. We can rediscuss this idea we aren't somehow "intervening" in Ukrainian agency, it's somehow all Ukraine and we aren't a party to the conflict, if you want.
However, my argument was simply that the West has no track record of intervening militarily in countries and producing vibrant democracies as advertised. There is no reason to believe that's ever seriously intended in the interventions so far that have catastrophically failed on this humanitarian metric, and so there is no reason to believe that is the intention now with regard to Ukraine, and there is even less reason to believe that will somehow magically happen.
Quoting ssu
No, the West can definitely fuckup now by actively obstructing peaceful resolutions, encouraging hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries and millions of traumatised and disrupted lives and the complete destruction of Ukraine which Zelensky does not hesitate to tell us is being done for "your values" (i.e. the West, not necessarily good for Ukraine) and to protect Eastern Europe (not necessarily good for Ukraine).
That we won't help rebuild Ukraine in any sense remotely commensurate with the damages our weapons have helped cause ... goes without saying. Obviously we won't do that.
That's great power politics.
Other NATO/EU nations have no such interests. Whether they win or lose in Ukraine, it doesn't matter. Only to the United States it matters, and the Ukrainians of course.
Quoting Olivier5
If NATO could end this war "quickly and neatly" they would have already done so.
Likewise, if Putin could use nukes in Ukraine, he would have already done so.
I agree. Putin is not a fool. He knows he can't do that. Talks of nuke use are rhetorical.
So far, yes.
If Russia were to start losing the war, I believe they no longer would be.
By only framing it as a matter of a U.S. agenda, you fail to see or hear how much other nations want Russia to lose. They have all said as much and have put their money and resources where their mouth is. Many of the refugees will have no home to return to if Russia keeps all the annexations made so far. The rest will have no place to return to if the country is made uninhabitable. If Russia partitions Ukraine as you propose being all they want, the benefits of aggressive invasion will be established, especially if it leads to the withdrawal of sanctions and the return of business as usual.
While you and Mearsheimer fuss with the pieces at your game of Risk, others have a lot to lose should Russia succeed.
Sending "political signals" to Moscow and other countries about the consequences of aggression is so hypocritical even the most deluded European leaders couldn't sincerely believe that. I don't know if you've noticed, but the United States and European countries have been meddling non-stop in other nations' affairs, invading wherever they pleased, leaving behind chaos and smoking ruins wherever they went.
Perhaps such rhetoric is aimed at propaganda-fed domestic populations.
If all of this is about sending messages, how many dead do you suppose it is worth to get that message across?
Lastly, what message do you suppose is being sent? "It is only ok when we do it"?
You know what message that is? "Might makes right" - and it seems Russia took it to heart.
Alas, rounds of hypocrisy abound. Machiavelli lives.
I was not, however, addressing the purity of their hearts but your claim that only the U.S. (and some peasants living in the wrong place) have something to lose if Ukraine goes tits up.
Other nations have more than a rhetorical interest in the outcome. The security crisis in Europe is real. The economic crisis is real. The refugee crisis is real. It is all very well to analyze what all parties did to get us to this place. But to depict Russia as merely defending itself is to turn a blind eye to what they have been doing and what they are capable of.
Being only capable of thinking in terms of absolute hierarchies leave only orders of rank to be perceived. Everything else fades into the mist.
You'd think then that the Europeans would have been a bit more reprehensive about letting the Americans stir up shit in their backyard, because they helped create all of those crises.
Or perhaps that now they would be interested in ending the conflict instead of "teaching the Russians a lesson", which is a recipe for protracted, possibly nuclear war.
It seems to me the European stake in this conflict is mostly the ego of its deluded leaders.
Quoting Paine
I don't view Russia merely as defending itself, but pointing out the obvious role the Americans and the Europeans had in causing this conflict seems enough to give off that impression to some.
That's why she sought to stop Ukraine from entering NATO.
You seemed to be on the verge of recognizing those aforementioned crises are real ones and then you say: "European stake in this conflict is mostly the ego of its deluded leaders." It sounds like you are saying that the leaders could solve those problems if Russia wins or not. You will have to explain what the former scenario would look like. The latter has already been established as the basis for policy decisions.
Please link the document you are quoting Merkel from. Whatever were the concerns about Russia's intentions before 2014, 300 days of preemptive war has given us a chance to learn more about them.
China has said that they are against the use of nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine.
Quoting Tzeentch
But then you aren't highly in doubt that the Russian leader and military will want to escalate the war and face a possible conventional NATO attack when they have experienced severe losses in Ukraine?
During the Cold War, which seems to be continuing now, US and Soviet forces did clash. When they did, both sides didn't opt to escalate to the next level and go to a declared war. First and foremost, this is rhetoric on both sides now. Russia hasn't used nuclear weapons and hence NATO's response is also hypothetical. But when the issue has already come up, I think that the situation is different than where the West was in 2014. The West has given an unified response and I don't think
Quoting boethius
Why would they be sending ground troops? If the response to a hypothetical use of nukes would be a conventional attack, that likely would be done by cruise missiles and aircraft. Then Russia would have to think if it wants to escalate further and strike NATO countries. And really, if it now has problems to fight a war with Ukraine, is the solution to start a war with countries it even before it's attack in February didn't match? De-escalation through escalation is simply a shock-and-awe strategy which can work when the other side is totally unprepared for it.
Quoting boethius
Russia has gotten already the benefit from it's nuclear weapons: NATO hasn't openly interfered in the war. There aren't any "no-fly-zones" being patrolled over Ukraine.
Hence to start actually using them is in my view really pushing the limit. Russian armed forces aren't on the verge of imminent collapse in Ukraine. Hence it would be really strange just why to continue to be so reckless.
Quoting boethius
Which happened all the time everywhere during the Cold war with the Soviet Union and the West.
And that's why the era was called a Cold War.
So absolutely nothing new here.
Quoting boethius
Lol.
Let's first notice just what Russia had in mind if their planned 10-day operation would have been successful and they would have gotten Kyiv:
See Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022
That above is the reality what "De-nazification" would have meant. We already have seen this in the occupied territories with Russification taking place. The evident Stalinist approach makes this a truly existential struggle for Ukraine and Ukrainians, hence it is ludicrous to talk about that Ukrainians are being killed for "our values". The fight is about their existence their sovereignty and own culture and hence it's whimsical to argue that Zelensky and the Ukrainian defence is the problem here. It's all totally evident when you just think what it means when Russians declared earlier Ukraine to be an "artificial" state.
Isn't everybody, including the Russians, against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine?
That doesn't mean that it won't happen.
Quoting ssu
My expectation is that they will escalate if they start to lose, and they won't shy away from using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, possibly even on NATO troops should they choose to intervene.
Quoting Paine
Anyone with a shred of sense can see that the Americans purposefully pissed off the Russians in Ukraine, in Europe's backyard, as it always does - stirring up shit far away from their island so other people can bear the cost of war and conflict.
I've always argued that the European leaders should not have played America's lapdogs, and not let Europe become a pawn in America's game, as it is now.
Things were looking great between Europe and Russia. Even after 2008 and 2014 (both crises caused directly by the Americans), things were mendable. Perhaps things were looking a little too great for the Americans' taste - heartland theory and all that, divide et impera.
Had the European leaders cared about their countries, they would have given a clear 'no, and never' to Ukrainian membership to NATO and EU. Merkel did this in 2008 for Ukrainian NATO membership.
The part I quoted was taken from an interview she gave in June of this year.
I didn't agree on much with Merkel, but at least she was level-headed. It seems nowadays European leaders are desperate to prove something. That Europe is strong perhaps, to keep the dream of a United States of Europe alive. But being completely dependent on America and lacking any military strength (or intellectual, for that matter) they were always destined to become Washington stooges in the process.
To "teach Russia a lesson" - what a joke, but I don't know whether to laugh or cry.
Such rhetoric belongs in the children's playground - not in the real world where "teaching lessons" means thousands of people will die and countries get destroyed.
It's better than some posters' rhetoric about nuclear weapons, which belongs to death.
Russia needs to be humbled alright, and the Ukrainians are busy doing so.
Clearly the situation is different than in 2014, there is a full scale war.
However, it is not first and foremost rhetoric. The nukes are very real and have a real impact on decision making. Putin recently harmonising Russian nuclear policy with United States policy to allow first strike against a non-nuclear opponent, is not rhetoric.
The original issue we were discussing was if nuclear weapons would be effective or not, which I think we agree they would be effective against a number of military targets, but Ukraine could continue fighting anyways.
Quoting ssu
Ground troops are the other conventional response, but if you agree that's unlikely then no need to debate it further.
The problem with a conventional air attack on Russian forces in Ukraine is that it may simply not be as effective as the nukes. If we're talking long range cruise missiles, those maybe in limited supply to do damage remotely similar to the damage Russia just did with nukes in this scenario. So there's a real risk of "cost of doing business", as I've mentioned.
Significantly upping the damage would require planes, but it's entirely possible that Russia can shoot down a significant amount of NATO aircraft. It would also not even be possible to establish air superiority without attacking SAM's and air bases in undisputed Russian territory.
I would definitely agree that NATO could do significant damage with its air power, no questions about that. The problem is the tolerance for losses. Western audience will be expecting literally zero losses, stealth is magical, Russians are incompetent and so on.
Stealth has been around now for decades and the Russians have put significant effort into defeating it. I think the odds of zero losses is pretty low, so the question becomes how many NATO losses would be tolerable in such an operation. On top of this analysis of the operation itself there's the risk of nuclear escalation, such as tactical nuclear missiles launched at NATO air bases.
The other problem is that even if such operations are successful with acceptable losses, no escalation, everything seems "fine" ... it doesn't end the war, Russia would still be there, and essentially in a permanent hot-war with NATO firing at any aircraft that comes near and so on, maybe withdrawing from and re-invading Ukraine regularly, using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine at will, potentially for decades.
The logic that Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon, NATO spanks Russia, profit, I just don't see how that actually works. Even if successful, one needs a plan for what happens next.
Quoting ssu
We agree here. There's lot's of reasons not to use nuclear weapons; I'm just disputing the idea NATO has an obvious and easy retaliation that would make it clearly "bad" for Russia in military terms, and also the idea nuclear weapons would not be effective. We agree, however, on all the political reasons not to use nuclear weapons.
And, although I'm not sure NATO can so easily implement a no-fly zone over South Ukraine, for sure one retaliation would be more and more sophisticated weapons to Ukraine.
As I've outlined before, the scenario in which Russia would consider nuclear weapons seriously is if they were actually losing. However, if NATO is essentially letting Russia win by the weapons drip feed, only introducing the next weapons system when the previous one proves insufficient, and everything is very predictable and controlled, then Russia has no need of nuclear weapons and their use only introduces plenty of unknowns and risks that have no need to be tested.
One would need a situation where there is serious risks of not-using-nuclear weapons, such as actually being routed at large scale on the battle field.
All this analysis, in my view, NATO has done, which explains their policy to let Russia slowly win but inflicting (tolerable) damage and limiting the scope of victory. When NATO considers trying to escalate to actually defeat Russia in the field with the weapons (NATO tanks, NATO planes, cluster munitions, thermobaric weapons, "whatever Ukraine needs") and the training that would require ... then that does start to look like a situation Russia would consider nuclear weapons, which NATO doesn't have any obvious and easy response to, hence the decision is not to supply these systems.
Quoting ssu
You are citing from:
Quoting Rusi.org
Which is difficult to take you seriously when you don't mention their top funders 2020-2021:
Quoting Rusi funders
And just "maybe" their analysis is biased towards being essentially pure propaganda for their funders.
But, if nevertheless you are certain this analysis is just pure-truth, then I'll respond to it.
However, make very clearly you believe the analysis you posted is really true, the authors have access to the the (Russian?) data required to make their conclusions.
As for opportunities to end the war, the biggest opportunity of ending the war was before the war, implementing the Minsk agreements in good faith and actually end the civil war, and also licensing Nord Stream 2 (or then not allowing it to be built in the first place; which you may say isn't sufficient justification to start a war, but that's just the reality of geopolitics and Russia starting about it, show their "serious", is an expectation ... and Germany allowed the pipeline to be built because buying the gas is to their own benefit).
The next biggest opportunity was when Ukraine had successfully arrested the Russian offensive, this is the common sense and obvious time in which to negotiate a peace deal with a larger invading force, the time of maximum leverage. Again, if the West encouraged, even de facto ordered, Ukraine not to negotiate a peace deal at that time, that is a major fuckup (if the goal is Ukrainian welfare) that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and injury, and millions of traumatised and disrupted lives since.
It is pretty conventional and classic war theory that the thing you want to avoid doing in a fight with a superior force is a protracted war of attrition (why would a smaller force have an advantage in doing that?) and the more such a war goes on, the more the invading force would need to get in a peace deal for it to be "worth it" for the home audience. So the choices (after initial resistance and demonstrating will and capacity to fight and the cost of further fighting) becomes a much worse deal and suffering significant damage or then fighting to some sort of victory (which may not even be possible).
Of course, Western neo-cons would be upset that Ukraine makes any compromise and Russia gets anything, like recognition of Crimea and independent Donbas, and so on, and they'd be doing their little tantrums about it. However, is the destruction of the war so far really worth not-compromising over the Donbas?
Now, the counter argument would be "Russia will just take more later!" but the whole point of the fighting is to demonstrate the cost of such an operation.
The scenario where concessions just encourage more land grabbing, is if land is given up without a fight ... if it's at no cost, why not take more? However, if a heavy cost is inflicted, like hundreds of tanks destroyed, one's army and people demonstrates the will to fight a war, the whole point of doing that to show land grabbing is at a significant cost that is not worth it. But it's simply the reality that a superior force is going to need something to end the war, to sell it to the home audience. You may say "that's not fair" but that's just reality. Alternative is entering a long drawn out war of attrition.
So, are you really arguing that concessions (such as Nord Stream 2, which isn't even a concession but a mutually beneficial "comparative advantage" trade project) before the war or then in the first stages of the war (no NATO, which you keep saying was never a possibility anyways, independent Donbas still part of Ukraine, and recognising Crimea), would not have been worth it for Ukraine to avoid the current situation?
In “normative legal force” the expression “normative” refers to the fact that laws are norms and “legal” is a specification of “normative” since there are also non-legal norms. Now “normative force” and “law” or “legal system”, or “legal force” are part of very common jargon in the juridical domain. Google it if you have no idea what I am talking about.
Besides you are the one to believe that international law is “ornamental” or with “zero meaning”. I already made my point against this. And I stick to it (even recently Macron was talking about “security guarantees” for Russia).
Quoting boethius
That could be a conclusive objection if one took “LEGALLY JUSTIFIES the western policies of the West against Russia” as meaning that each Western foreign policy (like economic sanctions and military support of Western countries) against Russia should be approved by a UN resolution to be legally justified. But that’s not necessary at all, nor I claimed otherwise anywhere. Indeed, international law resolutions that for whatever reason are not enough to coordinate an effective action against infractions still leave the UN members the initiative to take such resolution as a legal justification for national law foreign policies. So the UN resolution wasn’t just a demoscopic survey with no legal consequences, indeed it legally justified Western national policies against Russia.
Besides your legal quibble is irrelevant wrt he original point of contention: I referred to the UN resolution against the Russian invasion of Ukraine to clarify my original claim about Russian defiant attitude toward the West.
Quoting boethius
About time you made an effort to clarify your own terminology. My impression is that your notion of “justification” is pretty general as mine, if not even more vague than mine, with possibly some non-negligible differences like the relation to the notion of “justice” and the “universal” clause. In any case, I can’t clearly see how the notion of “justification” you just laid out is enough to support your accusation (i.e. “regardless of justification”) against my claims and what has this to do with my being “on the side of the West”. Can you show better how your accusation follows from your notion of “justification”?
Quoting boethius
As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!).
My notion of “justification” is easy to understand: the UN resolution against Russian invasion, Russian threatening and defying attitudes toward the West, historical and current Russian genocidal oppression of Ukrainians justifies Western policies against Russia among others justify Western attitude toward Russia based respectively on legal, security and moral criteria shared among Western countries. Where is the trick exactly in claiming this?
Maybe you could argue according to your notion of “justification” (which I’m not committed to) that those reasons are not enough to justify my or Western position because India, Africa and Russia, you disagree with that. But why should I or Westerners care about this? I or Westerners may not see universal agreement necessarily as an attainable or desirable goal under the current circumstances. And if I or Westerners disagree with Russia/India/Africa’s or your position, they & you aren’t justified either, because they & you can not justify your position to me or Westerners, right?
Besides in the case of power competition, unreconcilable disagreements are likely the root cause of the outbreak of conflicts between involved parties so I don’t see how “justification” for involved parties’ policies could reasonably require previous agreement of all involved parties.
Quoting boethius
We can agree on this as long as you don’t confuse your notion of “justification” with mine. In a competitive game between countries for global hegemony each country can act at the expense of their adversaries the way they see fit. But that’s not enough for practical rationality applied to geopolitical agents. Indeed countries’ policies toward potential or actual enemies must also take into account available means and related usage to effectively succeed. In other words, taking into account not only relevant security goals but also available means to ensure those goals are preconditions for the kind of rational attitude the countries can exhibit. A chess player’s moves are justified by the chess game rules not only if they are aiming at checkmating the rival, but also if they are adequately assessed as effective to that end. The reciprocal situation holds for the adversary of course.
Quoting boethius
The fact that I didn’t mention "Ukrainian welfare” in that statement is not enough to conclude that there is zero consideration of the Ukrainian welfare on the NATO/US’s part. Indeed there is no logical incompatibility between that “end game” and consideration for Ukrainian welfare. In other words, it may be in the interest of the Western power struggle against Russia to take into account the Ukrainian welfare, for the simple reason that power is grounded not only on brute military force and systematic deceit, but also on consensus, reliable partnership/alliance, and related reputational profile. That’s why discrediting the West also through dishonest arguments is so important for the pro-Russian propaganda like yours.
Quoting boethius
I would be more interested in the empirical evidence supporting your conjectures.
Quoting boethius
I believe all I claimed so far. So we are already discussing what I actually believe. You simply repeatedly failed to understand it. Or you are simply playing dumb.
I don’t know what you mean by “in pure power competition terms”, I’m more inclined to say that there is no “pure” power competition. Power competition is messy, without predefined and universally accepted way to account for strategies, and practically everything can serve it (including unintended consequences or unpredictable circumstances).
I didn’t claim anywhere that “Ukrainian welfare doesn't matter, nor any other justification”. Quote where I did made such claims, instead of putting words in my mouth like the most intellectually dishonest propaganda.
Quoting boethius
I would be more interested in Russian history’s lessons: https://www.rferl.org/a/adam-michnik-russia-ukraine-change-putin-brezhnev-afghan-war/31808312.html
Quoting boethius
Since you didn’t specify what counts as “win” or “lose” to you, all I can say is that if we are talking great power competition then it’s relative power which must be assessed, and most importantly its trend in the long term, which is the most difficult part to account for when we are still in the middle of these events. In any case, I don’t care about your conclusions, I care about your arguments.
Quoting boethius
It’s not true that I didn’t consider at all China. Certainly I didn’t say much about my understanding of the American strategy toward China nor I have the intention to start a discussion on another contentious subject now, so I limit myself to say that I don’t believe that “China is winning a great deal at no expense” nor that “the optimum hegemonic strategy would be to ‘divide and conquer’ the would be Russia-China alliance”. All I can concede is that there are implied non-negligible costs and risks for the West at least in the short period, arguably significantly more for the Europeans than for the US.
I know what the words mean, obviously you don't. You could have said "normative and legal force" (and then explain your non-legal theory and your hegemonic normative theory) but a normative statement is not the same as a legal statement. The Nazi genocide was "legal" as well as US slavery and segregation, but we have normative issue with such legal states of affairs.
Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case and just prepending "normative" to "legal force" means you don't understand the subject matter.
To make matters worse, "normative" is not at all the same as a "norm" and laws are also not necessarily norms. It's illegal to jay-walk, but can be entirely the norm, likewise it can be illegal to take bribes but, likewise, just as much a norm as jay-walking.
Furthermore, powerful states invading or interfering smaller states that "defy them", in your jargon, without any UN security resolution, is the actual "norm" on this subject matter. You spent some time justifying why the US can invade countries to maintain their hegemony for the simple fact that they are the hegemon.
Now, if you actually do google "normative legal force" you get a whole list of entries that explain the difference between normative and legal statements.
Quoting Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy
Is literally the first result for doing as you suggest, which is a paper explaining how there is no prima facie normative connection to law.
Not only, as you account for yourself in your next paragraph, no actual UN legal basis for the West's intervention (no security council resolution), but your reference to "normative legal force" just leads directly to an explanation that even if there was a UN security resolution that would not be sufficient to establish to a duty to implement it (it maybe legal but wrong, due to, for example, resulting in a worse outcome for the citizens concerned, such as we saw in Libya).
Quoting neomac
If you're moving the goal posts back to this argument, then certainly you'd agree that Russia's actions in Ukraine are entirely justified by Ukraine's defiant attitude toward Russia, and that Russia is only "wrong" in your framework if they fail to teach Ukraine a lesson.
Quoting neomac
What a ludicrous straw man.
First, justifying one's actions to others is independent of whether the actions are justified or if others agree. The actions can be justified but you fail to convince anyone. Likewise, the actions could unjust but everyone agrees with you.
Indeed, one maybe engaged in a process of justification one knows to be false (lying to investigators, or throwing out UN resolutions as having "legal force"), but hope other parties agree. Of course, in this scenario, presumably one has some internal justification for presenting a false justification.
Even more bizarre is the idea the entire world would need to agree as a condition for justification, which doesn't even make any internal sense. For, if the proposition isn't justified until everyone agrees ... why would one be justified to try to convince people of it's truth, which is by definition is false until everyone agrees.
Obviously in any remotely common sense ethical framework, the truth of a justification is independent of others agreeing it's true.
Since your arguments don't make any sense and are mutually incompatible, also take note of your trying to flip the burden of proof of what "justification" means, as it's very clear your actual position is that you're a fan of US hegemony, which, by definition, non-US partisans should not be a fan of by the same logic of lust power. Of course, if people under hegemonic control, such as Europe, can be convinced the hegemony is good for them, that's a better situation, even if one knows that's the self delusion copium of de facto captives and advancing their own interests, rather than the hegemon's, would, by definition, be in their interest to do.
You've made this position clear, showed your hand so to speak, so maybe argue this position and that the US actions in Ukraine will strengthen, rather than overstretch, their hegemonic position, vis-a-vis their largest hegemonic competitor: China.
The rest of your comments are basically just word salad, but I'll respond to the meaningful part:
Quoting neomac
The fact you don't mention Ukrainian welfare is obviously because that is not a priority. Describing how the US / NATO endgame need not be Ukrainian "victory" but just sufficient harm to Russia could nevertheless be compatible with maximising Ukrainian welfare is just a farce.
In what plausible version of the world, would Ukraine losing the war, with the death and casualties so far and likely at least as much but likely many multiples on the way to losing, and then losing, would be compatible with Ukrainian welfare?
Sure, "logically" we can imagine a universe in which somehow every single Ukrainian gets a billion dollars (without any inflation problem from that) and every dead Ukrainian comes back to life, and all bad memories of the war are replaced by happy cat videos, nothing "logically incompatible" between that and:
Quoting neomac
You literally state NATO/US involvement need not be to "stop Russia".
And you accuse me of quibbling? You literally need basically magic to imagine a scenario in which "not stopping Russia" is in the welfare of Ukrainians. Sure, "logically" we can imagine by some unexpected turn of events that magic is real, reincarnation a breeze, memory replacement facile, and so on, Russia isn't "stopped" and this is actually great for Ukraine.
Indeed, "logically" there is nothing that prevents Russia winning but this somehow results in Zelensky becoming emperor of the entire planet, immortal, and a just and wise ruler who solves all our problems.
Do you even consider a few seconds what you are writing?
You do not mention Ukrainian welfare in your "endgame" because you do not care about Ukrainian welfare. You care only about harming Russia due to some irrational fear (especially when combined with the belief that the Russian military is incompetent ... of which the corollary is they are nothing to fear); i.e. your entire position rests upon Russuphobia and, as you say, not mentioning Ukrainian welfare.
I mean, I thought "practical rationality" was your pseudo-intellectual slogan, and you dare move the goal posts to "logical compatibility"?
And what have they been doing? Winning and having huge victories?
Quoting Tzeentch
Anyone with a shred of sense can see the hollowness of the "everything is America's fault" argument. Never mind that Russia isn't just intervening in it's neighbors, but annexing parts of them. That too, Russia wanting create Novorossiya again, must be the fault of the Americans.
So when attacking your neighbors, just say how everything is the fault of the US and there's an eager audience in the West wanting to listen to you.
Russia hasn't made this change recently. They have said this far earlier than now, actually.
Quoting boethius
Conventional response means non-nuclear in this case. NATO and the US use the arm of the forces that is most powerful, which is the air forces and cruise missiles. I don't know why you are insisting the case for ground forces, which make an obvious target. Air attack is the way to keep the response limited. You can stop the attacks instantly. It's Russia's choice then to escalate.
The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is.
Quoting boethius
NATO letting Russia to win? Bit of hubris there from you.
Quoting boethius
LOL!
Oh you are so funny again. Yes... the evil Commission of the European Union!!!
The next argument will be that I'm referring to experts with military intelligence background or military leaders themselves. Or perhaps all the interviews of Ukrainian people that have been tortured? All of them are just propaganda!
As I've said before, considering the amount of troops they deployed at the start of the war it is likely that taking the Donbas and establishing a landbridge to Crimea were the Russians' primary military objectives. I don't view them as losing - definitely not to a degree that would make them consider nuclear weapons, especially since they can escalate conventionally.
Quoting ssu
I'm not making that argument.
This is just the knee-jerk deflection for anyone who doesn't like to think about the obvious role the US and the EU have played in provoking this conflict.
If after 400 pages of thread you still haven't moved beyond a World War I-esque propaganda depiction of the Russians as the imperialist bad guys then I don't know what to tell you. Geopolitics might not be for you.
Quoting ssu
As Mearsheimer points out, there is zero evidence for that.
However there are bags of evidence, 15 years worth of evidence if not more, that Russia viewed Ukraine in NATO as a security threat.
They've mentioned their previous policy before of using nuclear weapons if attacked with nuclear weapons or to defend against a threat to the existence of the Russian state, but news seems
Quoting Daily Star
Normally I wouldn't cite the Daily Star, but it seems just citing Putin's speech. If you want to quibble that they haven't technically changed the policy just yet, feel free. Clearly the policy of what policies are under consideration have changed in that case.
Quoting ssu
I'm not insisting on ground forces, other people talk about ground forces in Uktaine, including main stream media. I am just listing and considering the possible responses and noting they are all problematic. We both agree ground forces would be highly problematic.
Yes, air attacks are the likely option, but as I point out using only cruise missiles is of limited damage, and there are large risks in sending NATO planes into Ukraine. Maybe they would be highly effective, teach the Russians a lesson, and then maybe Russia won't escalate further. But both elements there are problematic. NATO cannot know its air combat effectiveness against Russias integrated air defence system, and any essentially any losses are going to be embarrassing.
It's also simply doesn't seem possible to implement air superiority without striking AA systems in undisputed Russian territory, which NATO is unlikely to do in this scenario. So even if you pushed Russian air craft out of Ukraine they would still fly around on the Russian side firing missiles at your planes.
Quoting ssu
We agree we're talking hypotheticals, just obviously not rhetoric. Rhetoric is what you use to try to convince your interlocutors or simply justify your actions. Threats (that are not empty) are not rhetoric.
Quoting ssu
NATO could have been training Ukrainian pilots on F-35 and modern NATO main battle tanks and supplying every sort of missile, from day one of the invasion, or even years prior. If your goal was to see Ukraine win, this is what you would do, yet they don't even supply F-16's or older NATO tanks. Sure, would take time, but the war may still be on during that time frame in which case you want this option.
Why doesn't NATO do this?
Because they don't want to "escalate" beyond a certain point. What's that point? A point unacceptable to the Russians. What would be unacceptable? Actually losing.
If you didn't care about Russias own metrics of evaluation and what's acceptable to them, you'd simply provide all the equipment and training that maximises the Ukrainian force to allow them to win.
The two concepts of holding back weapons systems and Ukraine winning being your main priority, are incompatible. It's like if I say I "really, really, really want you to win this cross country ski race", but I give you second hand skis that are a major handicap, while holding on to plenty of shiny modern skis in my garage. Obviously, my first priority isn't seeing you win the race, but there's some other priorities that lead me to hold back the support I could provide, but choose not to. Sure, maybe I would wish for a world where I give you shitty skis and you manage to win the race somehow anyways, but that's not how priorities and decision making work.
Quoting ssu
Can't help but notice you ignore the "s" to "funders" and don't bother to even put United States Department of State and BAE Systems plc as the next entries on the list.
The whole reason think tanks exist is because you can simply buy the analysis you want whereas academia is more difficult to control.
The whole reason academia is more difficult to control is because biased analysis and censorship (of intellectual debate) proves harmful to society and so a few (however limited) mechanism were developed to limit such harms, such as tenured professorship as well as a general context of needing to at least encounter different points of view.
You really think the funders on that list are going to finance producing analysis that criticises their polices?
Nevertheless, noted, that you can only come up with a strawman that my issue was "only with the European commission" and I believe they are evil caricatures of some sort.
What you cite has literally no sources.
Quoting Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
How do we know what the Russian theory of victory was or is? Did the Kremlin publish it somewhere? Why then do they directly contradict the theory of victory they themselves published, it in public statements saying they were prepared for this outcome and the Northern offensive was a fixing operation to capture the South etc. Do the authors just telepathically read the Kremlin and Russian army top commanders minds and "know what they really think"?
Quoting Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
What the hell is "assumption appears to have been" doing in purported serious analysis. Is everything that follows just deductions from what "appears" to the authors?
Complete trash.
Quoting Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
What does "targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society" even mean?
Do the authors have the FSB list?
How do they know the categories:
Quoting Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
The entire paper is just an unsourced narrative based on (in the authors own words) "appearances" that Ukrainian partisans would certainly wish to be true.
And who are the authors?
Quoting Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
Literally includes Ukrainian intelligence.
And ...
Quoting Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
You're really stating here, in this forum, today, placing your posting reputation on, sear by the scared runes, that this RUSI paper represents unbiased and well sourced analysis and simply trustworthy expertise?
... and not a total farce of the most transparently stupid propaganda?
As clearly stated even in this thread, Russia has desired Ukrainian territories right when Ukraine got it's independence. If this was about NATO, Putin wouldn't be annexing territories, talking about how artificial the whole construct of Ukraine is and how Ukraine belongs to Russia. The frozen conflict in Moldova shows that this isn't about NATO, as Moldova has never tried to join NATO.
Not only is it a figleaf of a reason, just like to say Iraq's Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait because the country wasn't towing the OPEC production quotas or presumably drilling oil from the Iraqi side.
Nope, this view is based on an alternative reality where causes and effects have changed places: that NATO is the hostile aggressor, not that countries next to Russia have frantically tried to protect themselves from a hostile militant nation that by force tries to conquer it's lost Empire. And now this aggression can be seen by all in just what Russia does and says.
This illogical view tries to disguise itself as "realpolitik", that somehow an economically failed dictatorship should have the right to dominate and annex countries that have long since broken from the former Soviet Empire it enjoyed. And that these countries, that many thankfully have joined NATO for protection now, are only "pawns" of the US, not having either the capability or the intellect to chose their own foreign and security policies. The Balts, the Poles and even now the Swedes and Finns admit just what an untrustworthy and dangerous neighbour Putin's Russia is. But they, just like Ukraine and Ukrainians, don't matter in the story where only the Americans are the actors. Such is the arrogant hubris.
No, the idea that this war is America's and NATO's fault is the knee jerk view of people who just blindly want to be "critical" of the West's actions and for whom a more nuanced version of reality is uncomfortable.
Well, it's a war.
You can of course be critical what military intelligence of the West says, but then just look at what actually has happened in the occupied territories: forced movement of people, jailings and torture, the Russification policies... All that gives the credibility to what they are saying. If Russian actions and manner in which the war is fought would be different, then I would be also critical about such plans. But it seems that they have indeed implemented such actions. That "denazification" can be quite well seen.
Quoting boethius
Likely it would be of limited damage, at least in the long run.
Look. I think it should be evident that in the case of Russians using nukes the vowed retaliation by US/NATO would likely to be to save face. If they have given the message that in case of using nukes, they will make a conventional response, then it would really look very bad if they would not do anything. Yet NATO or the US have no desire or ambition to take the war inside into Russia and have a victory parade in the Red Square.
Yet coming back from hypotheticals, the likely future of this war is that Russia will try to stabilize the fronts for the winter and build up strength for a spring offensive. The Russians have formed the 3rd Army Corps to handle the inflow of the mobilized troops. These are now either sent in company strength formations to plug gaps in the line or sent near Rostov to create new formations. Will we see an Ukrainian offensive perhaps against Melitopol earlier in the winter? Next months will tell.
In short, this doesn't look like the situation is so desperate that Putin would gamble with nukes. Hence it's quite unlikely. Putin already gambled with attempting to seize the government with a 10-day campaign in which Ukraine ought to have fallen just like US-backed Afghanistan. Likely he isn't in the mood for desperate gambles, yet. But who knows.
You won't find a credible source portraying Russia as a "hostile militant aggressor" before 2014.
That's where your entire argument falls apart - before 2014 Russia was seen as a mostly normal state, and Putin was widely regarded as a reasonable leader with whom the West could do business. Cold War rivalries were put aside, things were looking good and you can find plenty of sources lauding the Russians during this period. That's why there was even talk of Russia joining NATO and the EU.
Your attempt at creating a larger context of Russian aggression has no leg to stand on, since this narrative only started after the conflict in Ukraine went hot.
Quoting boethius.
I made my google search before asking you to do the same. Now I see that the problem is not the exposure to an unfamiliar jargon but, worse, your conceptual confusion. Of course there is a difference between normative statement and legal statement. That’s why I wrote: “legal” is a specification of “normative” since there are also non-legal norms. The point is that talking about normative force or legal force doesn’t presuppose any specific theory about what motivates or should motivate agents to follow norms or laws. My usage of the expression “normative legal force” in that context was descriptive and not theory-laden: there are different kinds of norms, among those norms there are legal norms or laws, and laws that agents are motived to follow can be said to have some “force”. And the reference to the UN resolution is a consistent illustration of that conceptual framework. As simple as that.
Quoting boethius
First, your quotation (and the entire chapter for that matter) doesn’t conflict with my conceptual framework which I clarified above. Indeed it arguably presupposes it. The quotation simply refers to the fact that there are different theoretical accounts (instrumental vs deontological) of the “moral force” of the “normativity” (which itself has different senses!) of the law. And talking about “moral force” is already a theoretical position: “while it is true that many people are motivated to act in accordance with legal norms, it is not obvious that they ought to be; there remains the question of whether there are, in fact, prudential or moral reasons to accept the law. My focus is on the moral force of law – the ancient philosophical issue of whether there is a prima facie obligation to obey the law. ” (Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy) which is a step if not several steps further the basic conceptual framework I laid out.
Second, the quotation you reported is talking about the “normativity of law” so what on earth is “there is no prima facie normative connection to law” supposed to mean? The question if “there is a prima facie obligation to obey the law” is a theoretical issue that divides deontologist from instrumentalist accounts ultimately concerning the “normativity of law”!
In other words, you just offered a good couple of intellectual failures.
Quoting boethius
First, you didn’t prove anywhere that I should understand “normative” and “legal force” the way you understand it. So judging my position according to your understanding which I find conceptually confused, begs the question.
Second, the argument that precedes your claim in bold, is intelligible also within my conceptual framework, not to mention that my conceptual framework can obviously account also for the idea of normative issues due to the clash between laws and other norms (e.g. moral norms like in the case of the Nazi anti-semitic laws or the slavery laws). So that argument doesn’t illustrate anything that would support your claim in bold.
Yet another couple of your intellectual failures.
Quoting boethius
To me, “no security council resolution” doesn’t equate to “no actual UN legal basis” for West’s intervention. Actually I argued against this equation “in the next paragraph”. So again you are attributing to me something I don’t believe nor claimed anywhere. Yet another fallacious move.
[quote=“boethius;763783”]If you're moving the goal posts back to this argument, then certainly you’d agree that Russia's actions in Ukraine are entirely justified by Ukraine's defiant attitude toward Russia, and that Russia is only "wrong" in your framework if they fail to teach Ukraine a lesson[/quote].
First, I didn’t move any goal post. I argued against your objection, then I reminded you that in previous posts you were questioning my claim that Russia was “defiant” toward the West. So it’s you who is shifting the polemic target, after failing the previous one.
Second, “entirely justified” is not an expression I used for a reason: I already questioned the idea that Russia was strategically justified to start a war against Ukraine. So not only you are suggesting beliefs or claims I never expressed but I also explicitly questioned them. Yet another fallacious move.
[quote=“boethius;763783”]As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!). — neomac
What a ludicrous straw man[/quote].
What on earth did you just write?! Are you crazy?! A “strawman argument” is an argument: A straw man (sometimes written as strawman) is a form of argument and an informal fallacy of having the impression of refuting an argument, whereas the real subject of the argument was not addressed or refuted, but instead replaced with a false one. One who engages in this fallacy is said to be "attacking a straw man”. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man)
I didn’t formulate any argument, there is no conclusion from premises in there: I just confessed that I don’t understand your notion of “justification” and I can not assess it, and added a question concerning your obscure expression “you cannot justify to others”. Yet another catastrophic intellectual failure of yours.
[quote=“boethius;763783”]First, justifying one's actions to others is independent of whether the actions are justified or if others agree. The actions can be justified but you fail to convince anyone. Likewise, the actions could unjust but everyone agrees with you.
Indeed, one maybe engaged in a process of justification one knows to be false (lying to investigators, or throwing out UN resolutions as having "legal force"), but hope other parties agree. Of course, in this scenario, presumably one has some internal justification for presenting a false justification.
Even more bizarre is the idea the entire world would need to agree as a condition for justification, which doesn't even make any internal sense. For, if the proposition isn't justified until everyone agrees ... why would one be justified to try to convince people of it's truth, which is by definition is false until everyone agrees.
Obviously in any remotely common sense ethical framework, the truth of a justification is independent of others agreeing it's true.
Since your arguments don't make any sense and are mutually incompatible, also take note of your trying to flip the burden of proof of what "justification" means, as it's very clear your actual position is that you're a fan of US hegemony, which, by definition, non-US partisans should not be a fan of by the same logic of lust power. Of course, if people under hegemonic control, such as Europe, can be convinced the hegemony is good for them, that's a better situation, even if one knows that's the self delusion copium of de facto captives and advancing their own interests, rather than the hegemon's, would, by definition, be in their interest to do.[/quote]
Dude, I explained what I mean by “justification”, so I already unburdened myself of this task. And it’s a while that I keep asking you what you mean by “justification”. You just recently tried to clarify it, but I still do not understand it. I told you that and asked questions:
Unfortunately I still don’t see any positive answers to my questions in your delirious rant. So can you answer them or not? Give it a try at least.
Here an additional question: since you believe the following “Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case” how can we possibly justify (in your terms) our position to others if they do not share our values or we can’t assure that little or no corruption exists?
[quote=“boethius;763783”]Describing how the US / NATO endgame need not be Ukrainian “victory” but just sufficient harm to Russia could nevertheless be compatible with maximising Ukrainian welfare is just a farce.
In what plausible version of the world, would Ukraine losing the war, with the death and casualties so far and likely at least as much but likely many multiples on the way to losing, and then losing, would be compatible with Ukrainian welfare?[/quote]
You are making objections to my position based on a poor understanding of my claims and on unclarified notions of “victory” and “losing” for Ukraine. But to me it’s non-trivial matter to understand what counts as “victory” or “losing” in terms of welfare for Ukrainians. All I said about this is: both Ukraine and the West/US converge enough in fighting Russia until Russia ceases to be a threat to both, whence their allegiance. The West/US have strategic, legal and moral reasons to support such convergence. Notice also that Ukraine expressed its interest in entering Western/US sphere of influence by joining NATO and/or EU so the convergence may not be occasional but systemic. However the competitive game these players are engaging in is full of uncertainties and occasions for non-negligible divergence which players must deal with. Nobody can offer a recipe for victory or a full account of what’s best in the long term.
So I don’t have some idealised notion of “victory” for Ukraine/West nor I have some idealised notion of “compatibility” between Western and Ukrainians’ interests. I just see enough convergence in interests and effective means to pursue common goals.
Besides, the Japan case in WW2 proves that even in the most daring post-war conditions things can turn out to improve in terms of rights and welfare in the long term under the right surrounding conditions. So I’m relatively confident that the Western sphere of influence can offer such surrounding conditions to Ukraine at the end of this war, more likely than remaining outside of it or falling under the Russian sphere of influence. Apparently Ukrainians believe the same. And if that’s a farce to you, I don’t care.
[quote=“boethius;763783”]You literally state NATO/US involvement need not be to "stop Russia".
And you accuse me of quibbling? You literally need basically magic to imagine a scenario in which "not stopping Russia" is in the welfare of Ukrainians. Sure, "logically" we can imagine by some unexpected turn of events that magic is real, reincarnation a breeze, memory replacement facile, and so on, Russia isn't "stopped" and this is actually great for Ukraine.
Indeed, "logically" there is nothing that prevents Russia winning but this somehow results in Zelensky becoming emperor of the entire planet, immortal, and a just and wise ruler who solves all our problems.
Do you even consider a few seconds what you are writing?[/quote]
Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! Yet if the endgame was stopping Russia, the quickest effective way would be for the West to force Ukraine to surrender to all Russian demands, or not even start a “proxy war” against Russia in the first place, right?! But that’s neither the Western endgame nor the Ukrainians’. So YES concern for the Ukrainian welfare is LITERALLY and REASONABLY compatible with not stopping Russia if that means Ukrainian surrender.
As always, I’m responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.
Said that, let’s deal with your myopic conspiracist mindset which is likely driving such preposterous understanding and accusations of my position: even if immoral dispositions like cynicism, power lust, greed (of the lobbyists e.g. the weapon industry, the oil shale industry, financial institutions, etc.) are the dominant motivational factors of Western policies and narratives against Russia (which I do not believe, but I won’t a priori exclude for the sake of the argument) would this be necessarily incompatible with advancing Ukrainian welfare? I doubt that for 2 reasons: 1. Also Western policies and narratives appeasing Russia (as well as anti-Western policies and narratives from Russia and the Rest for that matter!) may be driven by exactly the same immoral motives, so if such policies and narratives would still be compatible with advancing Ukrainian welfare (even in just relative terms), the immoral motivational factors behind them are not the issue 2. Alternatively, even if such motives will likely be pursued by each opposing faction at the expense of Ukrainian welfare, it still remains the possibility that the clash of opposing factions may wear out the most wicked effects of those motivations on the Ukrainian welfare at some point e.g. by leading to a negotiation between opposing factions that may benefit the Ukrainian welfare, regardless of the persisting immoral motivational factors behind such a negotiation.
[quote=“boethius;763783”]You do not mention Ukrainian welfare in your "endgame" because you do not care about Ukrainian welfare. You care only about harming Russia due to some irrational fear (especially when combined with the belief that the Russian military is incompetent ... of which the corollary is they are nothing to fear); i.e. your entire position rests upon Russuphobia and, as you say, not mentioning Ukrainian welfare.[/quote]
Your attacks ad hominem would be more credible if your fallacious arguments ad rem weren’t so overwhelming. BTW, since you seem to care and know about the Ukrainian welfare more than I do, I still have to ask: how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly?
[quote=“boethius;763783”]I thought "practical rationality" was your pseudo-intellectual slogan, and you dare move the goal posts to "logical compatibility"?[/quote]
Both are rational requirements that you extrapolated from their argumentative context just to randomly reiterate one of your “big lies”. There is no moving goal posts on my part. There never was.
Kudos for your epic failure practically on all your points!
Medvedev agrees with your view of Georgia incursion.
You're just so delusional.
Obviously this statement is not compatible with a concern for Ukrainian welfare. The goal is to just harm Russia, not actually stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine (which, unless you invoke basically magic, is not compatible with Ukrainian welfare).
So just say you are willing to sacrifice Ukraine and Ukrainian welfare to harm the Russians, and argue that point. Sometimes great achievements require great sacrifices (of other people).
It's just crass and cowardly to show your cards, what you truly believe, which is harming Russia is your priority and not Ukrainian welfare, which is not "mentioned" as you say, then say "no, no, no, there's nothing logically impossible about "not stopping Russia" and Ukrainian welfare!!
That's just dumb, obviously if Russia isn't stopped, Ukraine loses the war at great sacrifice, this isn't "good" for Ukrainian welfare.
If it's an acceptable end game for you, then it's acceptable for you to sacrifice Ukraine for your objectives.
So maybe stop your torrent of psuedo intellectual bullshit that doesn't even have anything to do with your actual position in this matter: which is:
Quoting neomac
I'll respond to this as well, as it's such a dumb strawman.
Obviously, my recommendation (my position in this argument) of a negotiated resolution to the conflict, which would require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians (and also against the Russians) would be the first step in trying to find an acceptable compromise to the warring parties, would, if followed, result in an end to the war and saving Ukrainian lives who would otherwise perish in the trenches, explosions, from the cold in their apartments, disease, and all manner of evils which accompany a war if it was to continue (which it has).
What I can say, is that if my recommendation was followed at the start of the war (when Ukraine had likely the most leverage it would ever have) literally hundreds of thousands of people now dead would still be alive (not only in Ukraine but due to increases in food and energy prices worldwide that translates directly into more suffering and deaths).
Of course, it could be argued that whatever compromise would be required is not worth saving those lives, or that the Russian demands of an independent Donbas (at the time) and recognition of Crimea would be a worse state of affairs than the lives lost since.
It could be argued that what's important is:
Quoting neomac
And so concern of Ukrainian lives is misplaced given what can be achieved if we encourage them to fight on, even perhaps without actually "stopping the Russians" and even if we know that to be the likely outcome.
But saying a peace settlement would not result in less Ukrainian dead, is just dumb. Obviously it would.
The benefits to a peace and compromise are less death, and the benefits to more war are achieving the fruits of war (mostly territory and national pride) at the cost of a lot of death.
Now, this is of course a debate between non-decision makers, so at no point do I have the power to directly translate my recommendations into "saving Ukrainian lives" by negotiating what I think is a reasonable resolution to the war; so proposing that as a burden of proof of some kind is just stupid. No where do I claim I've saved Ukrainian lives, and that's basically the text-book definition of a strawman to present my position as claiming that or somehow requiring to demonstrate that.
Had there been a peaceful resolution at any point in the conflict, perhaps then I could say my analysis contributed to that in some small way, but there is no peace and no lives have been spared.
Now, normally I don't pay much mind to government or military officials' statements. You have to read between the lines to get a morsel of useful info. But Zaluzhny is no politico, and he is known for speaking candidly on those infrequent occasions when he speaks in public. And indeed, this interview is not what you might expect: "Rah-rah-rah! Crimea in six months!" Not at all.
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan · Reuters · Dec 7, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Putin
, I guess I could repeat, though the thread is rife with repeats already. It so happens that some of the bolder Kremlin'ers say that Washington set up a coup and installed a Nazi junta in Kyiv, other of those folk say Russia need to liberate Ukraine from a Nazi regime. Sure, it's propaganda (good point :up: :wink:), because it's false, yet there you have their justification, what government officials and TV broadcast. (Already posted whatever sources, quotes, speeches, commentaries, propaganda, situation reports on the ground, comparisons, whatever.) The implication is that their supposed justification was a ruse, an excuse, plus there are additional reasons for this implication, outside of their propaganda — as (also) mentioned, you may inspect their actions. Hence the point, a ruse, an excuse. On the other hand, if you wish to justify what the Kremlin'ers claim, then you'll have to show the supposed Ukrainian Nazi regime (from memory, you ignored/declined that prior), that it's not propaganda after all. While rounding up what characterizes Nazi rule, I noticed some indicators that...nevermind, you'll just designate it all propaganda (again). :D
Zelenskiy shuts court, says Ukraine can fight graft, Russia at same time
[sup]— Dan Peleschuk · Reuters · Dec 13, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Zelenskyy
Ukraine's parliament enacts reform laws recommended by EU - Speaker
[sup]— The Jerusalem Post · Dec 14, 2022[/sup]
Such likes ? at least, look positive.
While reading ...
Exclusive: The global supply trail that leads to Russia’s killer drones (via MSN)
[sup]— Stephen Grey, Maurice Tamman, Maria Zholobova · Reuters · Dec 15, 2022[/sup]
I was vaguely reminded of ...
Quoting Nov 14, 2022
Florida, Hong Kong, in addition to US/EU funds going to Rosatom, ..., the plot thickens.
Ukrainian man reunited with his rabbit after Russia destroyed his house
[sup]— Josh Milton · Metro News · Dec 14, 2022[/sup]
Gave me a chuckle
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan, Guy Faulconbridge · Reuters · Dec 13, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Peskov
The sham annexations may have to break, one way or other.
If that causes collisions in Moscow, then so be it; if they don't break, then so be it as well.
I guess it's illegal to criticize in Russia; they can break, however. [sup](2014, 2022)[/sup]
Sorry, but that is the most ludicrous statement, which shows your ignorance. The threat of Russia acting as it has now was obvious... at least to a minority. Of course the mainstream hope was that Russia would transform. Remember all the reboots in US Russian relations!
Ok, to give just SOME examples of many, let's have now one favorite of the pro-Putinists, John Mearsheimer from 1993.
Do note what Mearsheimer is talking about: Russia attempting to reconquer Ukraine.
And there are a multitude of other writers, for example Stephen Kaufman from 2004:
What the real problem is Russia and the choices it's leaders have made. NATO expansion is a consequence of Russia's ambitions: that countries like Finland and Sweden shed their neutrality and join NATO, when they surely would preferred good relations with Russia, shows this clearly. It is simply absurd after all the annexations to insist that Russia is acting defensively and NATO would be here the culprit and aggressor in this war.
Stephen Kotkin explains this very clearly in the following short commentary:
They are simply aware of the geopolitical issues that exist, and assume conflict will break out at one point or another. That's the realist view.
If discussions about geopolitical issues that a country is involved in brands them as a "hostile militant aggressor" then I suppose the United States more than fits that bill, but that seems to be a hard pill for you to swallow.
And since you're keen on quoting Mearsheimer, I assume you take his analysis of the current state of affairs very seriously then? Or do you only quote him when you believe it suits your argument?
Quoting ssu
Nonsense. After the Cold War ended the subsequent NATO tranches have been a result of American ambitions, seeking to take advantage of Russia's weakness. Mearsheimer makes that point aswell, but I forgot his opinion only matters when it suits your views.
Quoting ssu
That after 400+ pages of discussion you're still clinging to this strawman is the real absurdity.
The basic fact is that Russia thanks to it's own policies constituted that threat. Naturally countries tried to do have good relations and hope for the best, but the unpredictability of Russia was totally obvious to many.
And that's why Eastern European countries wanted to join NATO.
Now NATO in the 1990's early 2000's was looking for other roles, but those applying for membership had Russia in mind. And the threats that for example the Baltic states tried to get other Europeans to think about just came only true after 2008, 2014 and 2022.
Quoting Tzeentch
The US can be defined in such away in the Middle East and Central America or the Caribbean. Unlike some, I don't have that as "a hard pill to swallow". I've been critical of the US policy in the Middle East for a very long time. It's usually the leftists that have this problem that when they are critical about the US, they cannot be critical about the countries that oppose the US. That's their own illogical behaviour.
Quoting Tzeentch
Just because people are so keen to quote him as an expert. Well, he has his views and they sell very well to one segment of the audience. What should be obvious (which seems not to be for some) is that you can agree with some issues and disagree with other issues what an individual expert says. The counterarguments to Mearsheimer's present views are simply compelling. Besides, the view that one has to accept all views of some academic person and you have to put them on a pedestal and support them is very naive.
Quoting Tzeentch
How did the US force Russia to annex Ukraine, to see Crimea as a historical and essential part of Russia? How did the US make Putin to see Ukraine as an artificial state?
How did US ambitions make Sweden to through away it's neutral stance after few hundred years? How did US ambitious makes us apply for NATO with more support than when we joined the EU?
You cannot answer that, because the idea is just absurd. It's nonsense.
By ignoring the Russians for fifteen years when they proclaimed Ukraine in NATO was a dire security concern and a red line?
Now, you're right that most countries tried to have good relations, and in that they succeeded for the most part up until 2013.
That's when 'the most important country' - the United States of America, doubled down on intentionally provoking conflict with the Russians, likely because they thought the Russians were weak and would allow it, just like they had allowed all the other NATO expansion prior.
Quoting ssu
I think the term "hostile militant aggressor" objectively fits US foreign policy a lot better than it does the Russian.
You seem to be at a point where you're able to accept that the world isn't black and white, and that at the level of great power politics there are no good guys or bad guys.
Perhaps then it's also time for you to take a more balanced stance towards this conflict.
Quoting ssu
The issue is not that you disagree. The issue is that you dismiss Mearsheimer's views entirely when they don't fit your ideas, and treat people who agree with his ideas as Kremlin propagandists.
So yes, I find it very weird how you can quote Mearsheimer in one context as an expert and dismiss his ideas as nonsense in the next. And how odd too that these instances seem to coincide with whehter they support your personal fancies or not.
Quoting ssu
There have been several NATO tranches before 2014, if you'll remember. All of which directly violated agreements made at the end of the Cold War that NATO would not expand eastward.
But I guess we'll just pretend those are the result of Russia's "hostile militant aggression", and when after decades of NATO expansionism and warnings from the Russians the Russians finally lash out, you go "SEE! I told you they were a hostile militant aggressor!"
You fell hook, line and sinker for the western narrative.
[quote=“boethius;764144”]That's just dumb, obviously if Russia isn't stopped, Ukraine loses the war at great sacrifice, this isn't "good" for Ukrainian welfare[/quote].
By comparing these 2 quotations, anybody can immediately notice your conceptual confusion, typical of a militant mind addicted to reasoning through slogans. In the first one you do not talk just about “stop Russia” but about “stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine”. Yet in the second quotation, the “from” clause has vanished (it’s common for slogans to use ellipsis: e.g. “Yes we can!”, “Just do it!”, “Stop Russia!”). So you are implicitly conflating “stop Russia” and “stop Russia from achieving it’s objectives in Ukraine” and then mistakenly projecting it on to me, hence your disingenuous misunderstanding. Why the conflation? The point is that for pro-Russian propaganda like yours “stop Russia” ultimately equates to “stop Russia from killing more Ukrainians by surrendering to all Russian demands” (because otherwise Russia won’t stop the killing! Possibly it will escalate to a nuclear war that will destroy humanity! etc.), and possibly let the West/NATO/US take the part/main/whole responsibility for what happened (because the Westerners have provoked Holy Russia), including all atrocities Russian committed to their alleged “brothers”. And the conclusion that this narrative is surreptitiously pushing is that if the West doesn’t want to stop Russia the way it is suggested by the pro-Russia propaganda that means that Western decision makers do not care for Ukrainian welfare, they are using Ukrainians as "cannon fodder” (in Putin’s words) to piss off Russia, so their policies against Russia will get discredited to the eyes of Western people and the Ukrainians’ people that really care for the Ukrainian welfare or their morality, and in turn likely lose their support.
So while your intellectually miserable rhetoric trick is insanely clear (which is classic pro-Russian propaganda), and explains your convenient misunderstanding and chopping my quotations, the substantial point is still the same as I fully stated it. The endgame of the West is not “to stop Russia” whatever that means, but something more specific which is not even to “stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine”, but what I specified in the part that you conveniently chopped out from that quotation of mine: “But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West”
That’s the security concern that the West is rationally expected to prioritise as any geopolitical entity (including Ukraine and Russia). Yet as long as the West wants to extend its sphere of influence in Ukraine and Ukraine wants to join the Western sphere of influence, there is convergence of interests and since both see Russia as a security threat they are cooperating to fight such threat. To the extent there is cooperation, convergence of interest and perception of threats, Western strategy against Russia is compatible with Ukrainian welfare perspectives as they understand them.
[quote=“boethius;764144”]So just say you are willing to sacrifice Ukraine and Ukrainian welfare to harm the Russians, and argue that point. Sometimes great achievements require great sacrifices (of other people).[/quote]
What did you just write?! Since when do I even have the power “to sacrifice Ukraine”?! Is that a psychological quiz to guess my astrological sign?! BTW how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly? How many lives you and those you care about were you willing to sacrifice to save the world from whatever deserves your online outrage exactly?
[quote=“boethius;764144”]It's just crass and cowardly to show your cards, what you truly believe, which is harming Russia is your priority and not Ukrainian welfare[/quote]
What I truly believe is that Western strategic priority is neither harming Russia nor Ukrainian welfare (yet another misattribution), it’s Western security currently threatened by Russia and other authoritarian regimes.
BTW also Ukrainian strategic priority is neither harming Russia nor Western welfare but Ukrainian security currently threatened by Russia and supported by the West.
BTW also Russia strategic priority is neither harming the Ukrainian nor the Western welfare but it’s Russia security currently threatened by Ukraine and the West.
So pertinent debate about geopolitical strategy would be about reliability of threat perception and responses of these 3 geopolitical subjects, and trying to make it personal with such fallacious emotional blackmailing objections to discredit me (instead of questioning ad rem my arguments) is just an intellectually miserable move of the worst propaganda.
Quoting boethius
Again that’s not a strawman but an attack “ad hominem” (as an intellectually fair retortion against your attack ad hominem against me), more specifically a “tu quoque” argument (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tu_quoque). Unfortunately it’s not logically fallacious, because I’m not questioning your honesty to prove your arguments or claim over the war to be false, I’m simply questioning your honesty. At worst you can prove my accusation of dishonesty to be false. Unfortunately you proved to be overly intellectually dishonest. So good luck with that.
Quoting boethius
First, this argument doesn’t prove concern for Ukrainians’ welfare at all. You are simply suggesting a moral dilemma involving Ukrainian lives as a burden for Western/Ukrainian decision makers and their supporters, which is perfectly in line with the kind of argument pushed by pro-Russian propaganda too, including Russian decision makers, namely those who ordered committing atrocities against Ukrainians. And committing atrocities against Ukrainians doesn’t sound much like being concerned about “brother” Ukrainians, right? So your accusations exposing my alleged lack of concern for Ukrainian welfare (based on arguments I find fallacious) can be as easily and fairly retorted to you and your emotional blackmailing strategy.
Second, what do you mean by “require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians”? Peace negotiations can be dealt with as quid-pro-quo without recognising any legitimate grievances, like a prisoner exchange, so why would this be required as a first step for a peace negotiation? What form should we adopt such recognition exactly? Is it something that needs to be officially recorded anywhere? With what potential/likely legal and propaganda cost/benefit and strategic implications? What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”? Finally what kind of legitimate grievances against the Russians (notice how the negotiation requirements are framed around pro- and cons- for Russia, because they are the ones really need convincing not the West or the Ukrainians) is Russia required to recognize as a first step?
Third, the rest of your quotation is just a text-book example of dishonest framing your opponents’ views over one single trivial point (peace settlement would result in less Ukrainian dead). Indeed you are just conjecturing arguments (“It could be argued”) and claims (“saying a peace settlement would not result in less Ukrainian dead”) and opponents’ reasons (“mostly territory and national pride” “at the cost of a lot of death”) which nobody in this thread actually expressed (certainly I didn’t), constantly framed in terms of discounting “Ukrainian lives” (“concern of Ukrainian lives is misplaced”, “not worth saving those lives”, “worse state of affairs than the lives lost since”), to hint how the moral dilemma must obviously be solved to you. In other words, an insanely clear prove of your brainwashing strategy.
Quoting boethius
First, talking in terms of “my recommendations” is already symptomatic of your militant mindset. Unfortunately you do not look anything other than an avg anonymous dude of a philosophy forum giving “recommendations” to other avg anonymous dudes for a negotiation between Ukraine and Russia even though nobody in the thread is a decision maker (by your own assumption) nor is evidently directly involved in that war, and yet so passionately looking forward to intellectually wanking himself over the idea of a peaceful resolution where perhaps maybe who knows inshallah then he could say "his" analysis (practically copy and paste of pro-Russian propaganda) contributed to that resolution in some small microscopic infinitesimal practically unnoticeable by anybody yet so so so decisive way ?! How pathetic is that?! And I am the delusional one here?! Tell me more about "your" analysis’ contributions to end the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, dude! How is it going with the war in Yemen, dude?!
Second, that question wasn’t a strawman, and it didn’t mean to suggest claims of yours you didn’t make (as you repeatedly did and keep doing with me). It was an accusation of hypocrisy: your outrage and accusation of lack of concern of Ukraine welfare, your disingenuous psychological quiz, your anonymous, cheap, simplistic and unoriginal recommendations about peaceful negotiation for your self-conceited moralism prove neither my lack of concern nor your concern for Ukrainians’ welfare at all. And since exposing your interlocutors’ alleged hypocrisy seems to matter to you, no matter how pointlessly, here I’m fairly exposing your hypocrisy.
Third, elsewhere you too seemed to understand that the problem is not just peace deal to save lives which Westerners and Ukrainians want but also other critical needs including a “third party to keep Russia to its promise” and to “actually act” which also Westerners and Ukrainians want [1]. It’s wanting to satisfy all such critical needs and yet perceiving that the circumstances are such that one can not have all of them satisfied at the same time that triggers the moral dilemma. Indeed if other needs weren’t perceived at least as critical as the lives already sacrificed and at risk of being sacrificed, starting with those who must directly suffer such sacrifices of the war (i.e. the Ukrainians), there would be no moral dilemma. But since you also believe the disagreement between your views and your opponent’s views may not be related to moral corruption (as you keep so desperately trying to depict pro-Ukrainian/West supporters) but to different values [2], then until you don’t offer any rationally compelling criteria to assess how your views can be justified to your opponent with different values you’ll remain entrenched in your irrational informational bubble and arbitrary accusations of moral corruption (e.g. no concern for Ukrainian welfare, Russophobia, hypocrisy, cowardice, etc.). Such is the abyss of your intellectual misery.
It’s Xmas time and yet I have no pity for you. Go figure.
[1]
Quoting boethius
[2]
Quoting boethius
https://tass.com/world/1549509
Your words are absolutely clear:
Quoting neomac
No where in this is Ukrainian welfare or Ukraine "winning" requirement in your endgame, whatever definition of that they are using today, under consideration. Ukraine can both lose, and in the process suffer extreme harms, and your end game can still be accomplished if enough damage is inflicted on Russia.
The instrument to "inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power" is Ukrainian lives. In the world of "practical rationality" there is no military achievement in this context possible without sacrificing Ukrainian lives. So, if you want to maximise your military objective, which is harming the Russians in your "endgame", then that requires maximising the sacrifice of Ukraine. Even when in a clearly losing position and even when suffering far higher kill-ratios than the Russians and civilian and economic damage etc. fighting on another day will still inflict another day of damage to the Russians.
Predictably, you now try to move the goal posts to NATO and Ukraine, but again the harms to Ukraine in such a process can still be essentially total. Ukraine could be totally destroyed, totally sacrificed, in such a project and if the goal to inflict enough damage on Russia is achieved then perhaps Russia is indeed no longer a threat to Ukraine. However, if in the process "Ukraine", however you want to define it, is totally sacrificed and destroyed, clearly Ukrainian welfare has not been protected.
You just throw up bullshit and then move the goal posts around in typical pseudo-intellectual fashion.
However, you've made your position and priorities clear, which is an entirely coherent geopolitical position to take: you want the US to "win" in this conflict, Russia to be damaged enough to no longer be "a threat" and Ukraine can serve this objective. If your top priority is inflicting damage on Russia, then Ukrainian welfare is subordinate to that.
You can not serve 2 masters: you will love the one and hate the other. Clearly, you serve US interests in this conversation.
Which leads to plenty of interesting debate.
For example, I have serious doubts about your geopolitical theory considering China is the much larger hegemonic competitor to the US.
Is the US attritting Russian forces and weapons stockpiles and political capital using the Ukrainians ... or is China attritting the US weapons stockpiles and political capital using the Russians?
Are energy flows from Russia that once fuelled the NATO war machine in Europe diverging to fuel the Chinese war machine a good thing for the US?
Does the US need its allies in Europe in good economic order more than China needs its ally Russia in good economic order, is Russia even hurting economically more than Europe? Now and over the medium and long term.
Can your objective of inflicting "enough damage" on the Russians even be achieved, considering the war is 99.9% taking place in Ukraine and Russia has already increased it's population due to the annexes and refugee flows out of Ukraine:
Quoting wikipedia citing the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
And military stockpiles after a war (that you win) usually rapidly match and exceed the stockpiles that existed prior to the war (although perhaps not in this case, given the size of the Soviet stockpiles, but certainly Russia has the resources and production capacity to keep arms manufacturing going at a good pace both during and after the war).
As far as I can tell, regardless of how and when this war ends, post-sanctions-and-war Russia will be far more dangerous to its neighbour's and the West than the previous Russia-we-trade-with, and at the same time Europe will be significantly worse off economically.
The war is certainly good for US gas producers and arms producers, but equating these interests with US interest as such or "the West's" interest as such is a big mistake.
Scott Ritter's take on this interview is essentially as follows:
First, this is not some spontaneous off-the-cuff remarks by some low level commander.
He may very well be someone who speaks candidly, but this interview was certainly planned by the US administration (because it's to a US news outlet; if it was to Ukrainian journalists, then maybe in that case he's gone off script or just shit-happens kind of thing). In addition, Zelensky was there.
So, already the fact this interview happens and is Zaluzhny is the primary representative of Ukraine delivering critical information is pretty significant.
Why not Zelensky? Because he's talked himself into a corner of refusing all compromise, insisting Ukraine is winning, and going to win every single inch of territory back, including Crimea and anything less is unacceptable.
Unfortunately, in war you may simply not be able to achieve what you want, and this is Zaluzhny's central message, that 300 tanks, 600-700 infantry fighting vehicles and 500 howitzers would be required to take Melitopol, a key objective to pressure Crimea.
Not only does he state this, but he states Russian mobilisation has been a success and without this fairly massive infusion of equipment (if I'm not mistaken, [s]larger than every single NATO country's vehicle fleet, with the exception the US[/s]; actually Turkey has 3000 main battle tanks, followed by Greece with 1200, and Poland with some 800, and then a Romania, Bulgaria, France and Spain have over 300, along with the US 8000, so numbers isn't a problem but these are mostly tanks that NATO does not want to provide), that Russia will win the war.
To emphasise his point, he reference Field Marshal Mannerheim's concession speech explaining Finland admitting defeat and signing the armistice with the Soviet Union.
Finland has been used as a model for fighting the Russians (in reality Soviets), but if that's the model, Finland loses the war. Of course, losing the war while retaining independence was potentially the best outcome for Finland, so it was definitely a "win" in that sense, but since it was simply impossible for Finland to "defeat" the Soviet Union, the only options are eventual defeat or then a diplomatic compromise (acceptable to the Soviet Union; what other people think doesn't matter if you're dealing with Soviet Union).
Now, the white house did not respond with "yeah, yeah, yeah, all that's on its way".
So, if defeat is inevitable, and it's impossible for Zelensky to negotiate, then Zelensky will need to be replaced. This is pretty standard politicking, as insofar as you believe more fighting in desirable, someone like Zelensky is good for moral by essentially maximising the cheerleading, then when further fighting is no longer desirable someone more "candid" can be selected to replace him and negotiate a resolution.
That Zelensky was still involved in the interview indicates to me that he'll likely be resigning, instead of being thrown under the bus. This will be the definite signal to Ukrainians, as well as the whole world, that Ukraine will negotiate a peaceful settlement.
Is essentially Scott Ritter's analysis.
Of course, nothing is totally certain in war, but I would guess the US administration is setting up the option for an end to the war along these lines with this interview and switching media focus to Zaluzhny. People in the West now know who Zaluzhny is and that he's a trustworthy straight talker.
The other piece of evidence I would add that would support this analysis, is that the US response to all the Russians shutting down the Ukrainian grid every 2 weeks and degrading it, is to send Patriot Missile systems.
These cannot possibly defend Ukrainian air space against this kind of an attack. Essentially nothing can defend against offensive missiles except your own offensive missiles.
Air defence only works against vastly inferior opponent that is unable to attrit your AA systems. The basic math is: offensive missiles are cheaper than defensives missiles, and the attacker can employ decoys which has no counter part in defence. Not only can you make smaller and cheaper decoys but you can also just produce cheaper missiles with minimal guidance and no payload (or replace with fuel) and then fly around and there's zero way to differentiate.
Not that anti-air is useless. It does make sense in defending point targets like military bases and air craft carrier with multiple levels of defence, but, even there, the point is you're also attacking and your AA is buying time while you carry out your own air attacks on the opponents assets. So definitely, if you attacked a US carrier group, your missiles maybe destroyed and yourself shortly after.
However, there is simply no way to employ Patriot or any other AA systems in a war of attrition against an electricity grid spread out over a vast area without being able to actually destroy the origins of these attacks (i.e. invade and conquer Russia). Indeed, even in it's intended use case of defending fixed points, if you weren't fighting back, and even if Patriot is 100% effective you would quickly run out of missiles and everything else and your entire carrier group would be sunk (what makes the carrier group dangerous is that it will probably fight back).
Council adopts decision not to accept Russian documents issued in Ukraine and Georgia
[sup]— European Council · Dec 8, 2022[/sup]
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A.A. Khan KC, announces conclusion of the investigation phase in the Situation in Georgia
[sup]— Karim Ahmad Khan · International Criminal Court · Dec 16, 2022[/sup]
[sup]• Russo-Georgian War (Wikipedia)
• Responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War (Wikipedia)[/sup]
A couple of scattered, peripherally related news items ...
Russia sends St. Petersburg riot police to Mariupol to stop new protests
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News 360 · Dec 16, 2022[/sup]
Someone, quick, the coast is clear, incite some bigtime protests in St Petersburg. :up: :grin:
Israeli-tied Moldovan TV channels halt Russia-Ukraine war reporting
[sup]— Reuters via The Jerusalem Post · Dec 17, 2022[/sup]
Ilan Shor, "the young one", is done with corruption/subversion in Moldova I guess.
Russia won't be more dangerous after the war, it will be defanged and humbled. Don't you look forward to that?
It could be, but that's far from certain.
Conventional war theory is that an army that is merely not-defeated (doesn't even need to win), is stronger after a war than before even if damage suffered during the war is severe. As I've mentioned, even militaries that lose and essentially forced to disarm, such as Germany after WWI, still have all the experience benefits enabling starting entirely new world war a few decades later in this case, but typical examples are the US army after the US civil war and Soviet army after WWII (some 12 million personnel despite some 9 million dead and 22 million wounded during the war; essentially 2 orders of magnitude greater than current Russian losses in Ukraine).
The reasons for this is that fighting an actual war is not only "real-world experience" necessary to get good at anything, but places significant meritocracy pressure on the chain of command, as well as orienting a large part of the economy to war materials and fighting.
It is very simplistic thinking to believe that short term harms inflicted on the Russian army translate to any medium or long term harms.
As for economic sanctions, I have trouble seeing any problems for Russia insofar as China is willing to supply them. People should keep in mind that nearly all our "Western technology" is fabricated and/or assembled in East-Asia, significant portion in China itself, and there's zero way to significantly obstruct Russian supply chains without China's active assistance.
Considering we've been calling China our rival, geo-political threat, needing a pivot or two, etc. for decades, I have difficulty imagining why China would suddenly assist us in what is, arguably, a Chinese proxy war to attrit NATO.
And this is not controversial opinion in geo-political analysis circles, the top "cold warriors" nearly all came out of retirement to warn the US and NATO that their actions in Ukraine are potentially counter-productive in terms of the balance-of-power, such as Kissinger.
Does cutting Russia off from the Western economic system (while still needing to buy their resources directly or through intermediaries) harm Russia? Or does it reduce our leverage in dealing with Russia? Leading to all sorts of trouble down the line.
Is Russia transitioning to (a large degree) a war economy where we've purposefully removed all potential pathways to "Westernise", even going so far as to ban Russian orchestras and sports teams etc., increase or decrease Russia as a threat to our interests?
Indeed, Kissinger just reiterated his position that peace is a preferable geopolitical choice.
I disagree with a lot Kissinger's decisions, but there is no denying his expertise on geopolitical issues as well as his priority being "US interests".
Quoting Reuters
Notably, Kissinger also suggests international organised referendums as a means to solve the annexation issue (which I was the first to suggest, on this very forum, as far as I know).
Likewise, achieving the goal of breaking up Russia, potentially resulting in chaotic internal nuclear wars between factions, is not a reasonable goal to have, as I've also pointed out.
How do you envision this "defanging" and "humbling" taking place?
First, it’s not “my” endgame. Making it personal would be misleading even if there was no intellectual dishonesty involved, because it may confuse my understanding of certain geopolitical dynamics with my taking position toward them. These are 2 distinct things. My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another.
Second, of course we can not rationally expect that the ultimate endgame for a geopolitical subject X concerns the security of a separate geopolitical subject Y. The ultimate endgame for X concerns the security of X. No matter who is X and Y. So if it’s the welfare of Ukraine that needs to be ultimately secured, that’s the task of Ukraine as geopolitical agent, not of other geopolitical agents like West/NATO/US. And the other way around. Yet the conditions may be such that not only there is enough motivation for cooperation between separate geopolitical agents in the pursuit of their respective security interests, but it’s even possible that their respective security interests may eventually merge: e.g. as of now not only fighting Russia is in the interest of both Ukraine and the West (e.g. EU/NATO), but maybe in the future Ukraine will be part of the West (e.g. EU/NATO). All this is perfectly compatible with the West “feeling concerned” about Ukrainians’ welfare or taking Ukraine “winning" as instrumental to its ultimate endgame, more likely so, if the long term goal is to have Ukraine integrated within Western sphere of influence (e.g. NATO/EU). The point is the West can not be reasonably expected to be as concerned about Ukrainians’ welfare as Ukraine.
Third, I’m arguing that Western support to Ukraine is strategically and morally defensible in theory, how strategic and moral reasons are playing on the ground is however hard to assess for short term goals and much harder for longer term goals (like for the next decades).
Quoting boethius
Again you are conveniently framing the issue as it suits your narrative. Ukrainian lives (namely casualties) are not “The instrument to ‘inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power’” but the collateral damage of Ukrainian decisions to fight back Russian aggression, direct damage inflicted by Russian decisions on Ukrainians, and indirect collateral damage of Western decisions to support Ukrainians in fighting back Russian aggression. As collateral damage is Ukrainian lives, this poses a moral dilemma of course.
Quoting boethius
I didn’t focus on military goals. I talked about Russian power of threatening Western security. So the sacrifice of Ukrainians can be contained (in the present and in the future) by disrupting whatever relevant factor (not only the military one) that fuels the Russian war machine. If you reason through hypotheticals I can counter with hypotheticals. After all the geopolitical game admits best and worst scenarios and all in between, so the debate should focus more over their likelihood. The fact that you obsess over conjecturing worst scenarios and build fallacious and conspirational arguments around them more than providing evidence in their support or internal inconsistencies in your opponents views about them is proof of your rationally self-defeating militant mindset.
Quoting boethius
“Moving goal posts” is your brainwashing mantra likely reinforced by your arbitrary assumption that it’s on you to set what counts as “goal post”. If one wants to understand the reasons of Western involvement in Ukraine one has to understand things from Western perspective. If one wants to understand the reasons of Ukrainians fighting Russians one has to understand things from Ukrainian perspective. By this way one can see why they can cooperate as they actually do and how this cooperation is not occasional but with shared long term goals of integration, which your conjectures totally fails to consider. As much as they fail to consider that Ukrainians have agency, concern for their lives and welfare (expectedly way more than you and Putin possibly do), can understand strategic and moral stakes for them and the Westerners, and that the cooperation implies costs/risks/limits. One can’t reasonably expect Ukraine to willingly (or coercively?) sacrifice its people just to advance Western goals as pro-Russian propaganda you are lining with suggests, or just for “territory and national pride” (as you framed Ukrainians’ position) which is more likely true for powers like Russia trying to restore their sphere of influence outside their borders through wars and atrocities than for their victims which are trying to survive such wars and atrocities.
In any case your conjectures are not proof of what is actually nor likely happening nor what is rationally expected to happen. Letting your conjecture always drift toward the worst scenario (like in a slippery slow) is how you desperately try to mess with your opponents’ psychology as you do with escalation to MAD (which will destroy the world, maybe except the evil US right?) and induce some irrational fear, or phobia, and again fear mongering is also classic textbook strategy of the worst propaganda.
Quoting boethius
Let’s examin the density of your intellectual squalor as illustrated by this arbitrary accusation.
First, I expressed my preferences and the reasons of my siding with the Western support to Ukraine in previous posts, so there was no need for you to invent such pathetic slogans about my preferences (BTW why love one and hate the other? I could be averse to both powers yet hate Russian hegemony way more than the American one).
Second, I’m arguing that Western support of Ukraine is both strategically and morally defensible (actually more than the opposite view for avg Westerners) so your attack ad hominem is irrelevant wrt such arguments. Besides it’s likely fallacious given that you didn’t offer rationally compelling arguments ad rem, so you are shifting goal posts to discrediting me personally with biased accusations.
Third, such biased attack ad hominem can be as easily and fairly retorted against you. You can not serve 2 masters: you will love the one and hate the other. Clearly, you serve Russian interests in this conversation. The difference is that Ukrainians fighting Russia would hold views more likely in line with my views than yours. That’s why when you and Putin blame the West for Ukrainian lives doesn’t mean that you and Putin care for them more than the Westerners, actually it can likely be the opposite. In your twisted logic and hypocrisy, you might despise the Ukrainians for sacrificing their lives for the US, and secretly enjoy the atrocities they are suffering as a just punishment for not siding with the master you love and siding with master you hate.
Quoting boethius
Your claims lead to plenty of more interesting debate to me. For example:
To recapitulate your intellectual failures so far: emotional blackmailing, slippery slopes, strawmans, ad hominem, misattribution, misinterpretation and conflations, bagging the question, framing, arbitrary accusations (like “strawman”, “tautology”, “shifting goal posts”, “love the master US”, “Russophobia”), and so ardently looping over your fallacious reasoning post after post like any brainwashed useful idiot of pro-Russian propaganda. So intellectually intimidating right? You are a textbook example of logic illiteracy, namely how one should NOT argue to be rationally compelling. What a loser.
You don't have much imagination, do you?
Indeed. Taking Melitopol would do the trick. That's why he is referring to the 84 km to Melitopol. So it's a long war.
Quoting boethius
Really? How are you sure of that. Oh, I forgot, Ukrainians are only the pawns of Americans...
Quoting boethius
Or because Zelensky is the elected political leader of the country and this is an interview with the head of the Ukrainian army, general Zaluzhny.
Quoting boethius
Yeah.
And Japan didn't "win" Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, because it didn't "defeat" Russia.
Or Germany didn't "win" Russia in WW1, because it didn't "defeat" Russia.
So Ukrainians might be looking at similar "losing" this war as the two mentioned above. So he is hopeful as things aren't as bleak as they were for us Finns in the Winter War.
He's trolling, which means that he doesn't measure his success by the number of correct, logical points he makes, but by the amount of time you waste here talking to him.
You're really now trying to say you're just engaging in objective analysis without a horse in the race?
Moving the goal posts all the way from:
Quoting neomac
All the way to "My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another."
We debated your support for "the West" in this war in Ukraine for many pages.
You present your actual arguments in clear terms "Putin unilateral aggression must fail".
It's "your endgame" because you're the one proposing it:
Quoting neomac
"Putin must fail" and you propose an US/NATO endgame that "doesn’t need to be to stop Russia".
You then literally just say the exact thing I just says, just you're issue is my "framing".
Quoting neomac
Collateral damage to Ukrainian lives would make sense if NATO was fighting with Russia in Ukrainian territory, then Ukrainian lives lost would be unfortunate collateral damage.
That's not the case, NATO isn't fighting.
Ukrainian lives (especially the soldiers) are the instrument of US / NATO policy in this fight, and the collateral damage would be civilians and structures that the Ukrainian military kills, wounds or damages as an unintended consequence of warfare.
Soldiers dying is not collateral damage.
However, even if you want to call it that, you recognise the main issue which is all this death and destruction in Ukraine "As collateral damage is Ukrainian lives, this poses a moral dilemma of course."
Why is there a moral dilemma? Because achieving the policy objective you set (and US / NATO doesn't have much problem admitting to) of inflicting enduring damage on the Russian military is not the same objective as Ukrainian welfare, which I have zero problem saying can involve some fighting (the first weeks of fighting is certainly preferable to total capitulation and humiliation, but it's after demonstrating your honour on the international stage, is the optimum time to sue for peace and accept a compromise as a smaller nation) but (regardless of when peace is sought) fighting for the welfare of Ukrainians is a much more constrained criteria than fighting to harm the Russians. Saying "they both want to fight the Russians so they both want the same thing" is simply totally wrong: "fighting the Russian insofar as it's in the interest of Ukrainians" is a very different objective than "fighting the Russians insofar as it damages the Russians".
This is why "the US / NATO fighting to the last Ukrainian" has been a focal point of debate since the beginning of the war, because, obviously, if the goal is simply to maximise damage to Russia then what follows from that would be "fighting to the last Ukrainian". It's a way of saying the objectives of Ukraine and US / NATO are not the same, which US / NATO don't really have a problem saying.
For example, saying Putin and Russia must "pay a cost" for breaking the international "rules based order" is exact same idea, maybe with slight "narrative framing" differences. It is not saying "we must ensure Ukrainian welfare is the top priority, which may require compromise with Russia", but it clearly means the priority is damaging Russia so the war is costly, which means pouring arms into Ukraine as they are doing the fighting, which means Ukrainians are the instrument of this policy, not the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are all who benefit from the "international rules based order" and if the entirety of Ukraine is sacrificed for this policy then "mission accomplished".
Quoting neomac
Even more ridiculous that after stating "My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another" you state a few paragraphs later "I expressed my preferences and the reasons of my siding with the Western support to Ukraine".
Can you not read and understand your own statements? You are "siding with the West" and you propose an "endgame" that is sufficient for the West (The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power) ... so i.e. an endgame you support.
Quoting neomac
Sure, but as you yourself admit there's a "moral dilemma" in the Western support of Ukraine for the purposes of harming the Russians, as it is not the same thing as supporting Ukrainian welfare.
So, if Ukrainian welfare is sacrificed for a goal that is not Ukrainian welfare, the moral responsibility for our policies cannot just be then shifted to the Ukrainian leadership and "Ukrainian people" (insofar as we equate them with Ukrainian leadership), we are still responsible for our own policies and what we are trying to achieve. Just because you want to kill someone doesn't mean I am justified in giving you the weapon to do it. Even if you were justified in your desire to kill (say self defence) and I was justified in helping you do that, even then it does not justify any form of lethal support. As @Isaac pointed out, self defence vis-a-vis your neighbour doesn't justify nuking the whole city. As the provider of lethal support, I'd still be responsible for the outcome and how my actions contributed to the outcome.
Whenever the cost to Ukraine of the Western policy is pointed out, essentially all the supporters of the policy here and elsewhere just throw their hands up and say "Ukrainians want to fight!" and seem to believe that completely unburdens them of the consequences of the policy.
But as you say yourself, there's a "moral dilemma". If you want to support this policy and argue in good faith, then solve the moral dilemma, rather than move the goal posts around for your own arguments so much that the "game" your playing is now entirely made of goal posts. We're literally walking on goal posts.
Quoting neomac
I've accused you of moving the goalposts of you arguments around rather than just arguing what you actually believe (that the endgame is to "inflict enduring damage on Russia", which causes "collateral damage" in pursuit of that goal, that causes a moral dilemma).
I have argued the justifications you present are insufficient, such as a UN general assembly vote being some sort of "normative / legal justification", or, even if it was (which it isn't), then totally incompatible with supporting the US despite the US ignoring UN generally assembly votes all the time. More importantly for the actual debate we're having, the "normative / legal" argument isn't your actual justification but rather supporting the West, and US hegemony in particular, generally speaking.
There are four central issues to what you actually believe.
1. First being the justification of US hegemony in the geopolitical struggle with Russia, but more importantly China. Now, like yourself, I prefer to live in the West than in China or Russia, however, this is equatable with seeking hegemonic control / influence / containment of China and its neighbours. My approach would be a "lead by example" policy and not picking fights that get hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and injured and destroying half or more of the Ukrainian economy, in seeking to harm Russia, which benefits China so seems to me entirely counter productive on the geopolitical hegemonic "chess game" in any case.
2. Bringing to the second point which is this policy really does advance US hegemony and Western leadership of the whole world.
3. And lastly, that the sacrifice of Ukraine to advance this policy is morally justified. At least the US was fighting in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and there's at least honour to that and suffering the consequences of the policy. It is impossible to ignore the fact that when parties are armed to do the fighting for us, that this creates an intense moral hazard, moreover when any criticism of the leadership and war is banned in the country, we wholeheartedly condone and promote propaganda for "morale" purposes and winning the "information war" with Russia (i.e. we cannot even say there's some sort of informed consent) and (make matter morally worse) we produce a lot of the propaganda ourselves (encouraging belief that the side we need to fight can "win" when our military and civilian leadership may be fully aware that is very unlikely) leading to decisions on false pretences, and, also important, if pouring money and arms into the country is de facto bribing the leadership of that country who benefit immensely in both legal and illegal ways from all this money and arms pouring in.
4. That anytime the goal posts change to "Ukrainian sovereignty!" then why aren't Western armies in Ukraine defending this alleged priority?
These are not "accusations" but just what your position actually entails. If harming Russia is the objective, and Ukrainians are doing the fighting, and the West is arming and bankrolling and "advising", then it simply goes with that position that it's entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that this setup will result in Ukrainians fighting beyond their own self interest (which I have zero problem recognising involves some fighting).
In other words, we may have already (I would definitely argue this), and if not, may very well in the future, sacrifice Ukrainian welfare to pursue the West's priority in this situation, which is, to boil it down, "not letting Putin get away with it!".
Quoting neomac
"Justification" has a social function definition of justifying to others. If a judge asks for your "justification" for some actions, the request is to justify to the judge not yourself. When a justification is only to oneself, we say "self justification" to clarify that no one else is intended to be convinced by the argument.
For example, if you were caught taking something and this led to a trial, "I wanted it" is not a good justification in this context; this self-justification goes without saying and not the issue at trial (no harm in mentioning it, obviously you took the thing because you wanted it) so if you started your explanation with "well I wanted it" unlikely anyone would disagree, but a adequate justification in this context would be some right to the thing (there was a deal for example, that the counter party is now denying) or then some particular circumstance (some emergency, for example, or then you actually thought it was lost and took it to "return it" to the owner etc.).
That's just what the word justification means.
Of course, one can propose nothing is justified, there is no justice, all moral language is for the purposes of rationalising and manipulation. But, even in this position, the word "justification" still refers to the attempt to convince others your actions are just (only everyone, perhaps even yourself, is always deceived about it, there is no "actual" justification for anything, life has no purpose other than pursuing your inclinations and desires, which are accidental to your genes and upbringing and themselves not justified either, just nothing else to do).
Anyways, essentially no one, certainly not myself, argues that a position is justified only after a everyone agrees, which creates immediately the problem of why anyone would believe it's true if it's not true until everyone believes it's true. The "truth" (or then meaninglessness of the issue) of a justification is independent of anyone's belief about it. Your actions maybe justified and a judge and everyone else disagrees. Indeed, your actions maybe justified and you yourself are convinced it was actually wrong later.
The point of getting into the meaning of justification, is that what people propose as their justification maybe a lie. So, it is entirely reasonable to speculate as the real motivations behind what people do. Now, the actual (secret in this case) justification maybe true and following from that the lies about it are also justified, or then maybe both are not-justified. Or, the more confusing situation but entirely possible, is one uses a true justification to advance a hidden objective that is similar to but not actually the same or even compatible with the true justification.
For example, I maybe entirely justified in helping a traveller in distress, but if my true intentions are to simply gain this travellers trust for the purposes of stealing from them, then my actions up to that point only appear entirely justified but it is in actuality part of a deception. So, a true justification can also be a lie, that it only even possibly revealed in the future.
Quoting neomac
We may not be able to, but we try nevertheless. For example, the Byzantine Empire would argue theology with the various caliphates they were in contact with. Neither side expected to convince / convert the other, but they would still make the attempt. Lot's of reasons for this: vis-a-vis the other party in the debate it can be simply a sign of respect to argue one's position, as it recognises the other party's arguments at least have the merit of being responded to, and it can also be for the purposes of just maintaining a polite dialogue with people you may need to deal with to avoid wars or do business etc. or then it could be for internal reasons of just impressing your own court with "proofs" that the heathens are wrong (or for all these purposes) or then just an obvious task of one's own theologians to prove the faith etc.
However, what's a norm, what's normative, and what's legal are not the same thing. Certainly the goal of society is to harmonise all three, and for some things that happens to be the case, but you cannot deduce one from another. Simply because something is a norm does not mean it it normative nor legal. From my position in corporate management, people break the law literally all the time with no consequences.
Quoting neomac
This was discussed at length near the very beginning of this discussion, but, in short, if you want to negotiate a dispute with a party the first step is to recognise legitimate grievances of the other party (i.e. grievances that you yourself agree are reasonable and can do something about). Generally, everyone has some legitimate grievances in any situation, and the more complex the situation the more legitimate grievances everyone has, if you want to negotiate a settlement then the first step is to layout all the grievances of all the parties on the table and see if everyone can at least agree those are all legitimate points of view. The other essential starting element is the leverage each party has. Based on these two things, perhaps it is possible to come up with an arrangement acceptable to all the parties that is preferable to further conflict.
If you ignore someone's grievances then they are unlikely to accept anything you propose. Now, "legitimate" is prepended to "grievances" as maybe someone grievances are simply unreasonable (at least to you) and you can do nothing to solve them. "Legitimate grievance" is something you yourself agrees the counter party has a point about and an agreement would need to resolve, compensate or address in some way.
The position that Russia is 100% wrong about everything and has no legitimate points or grievances, is simply the position of refusing to negotiate and the choice of more warfare, which maybe justified, but the West and Zelensky like to present demands obviously Russia would never accept and just deny any problems on their own side. Like the very real Nazi's with significant influence, whether there is enough to justify invasion or not, it's clearly a legitimate grievance that the West should also have a problem with. Also expansion of NATO is also a legitimate grievance, considering NATO is quite clearly an anti-Russia organisation. Engaging in the self-justification of NATO expansion, just insisting that of course it's anti-Russian because Russia is the threat and countries want protection from Russia and getting into NATO and expanding NATO closer to Russia is not a threat to Russia because NATO's intentions are pure, people can do ... but, if you don't intend to negotiate. Obviously, my "anti-you" alliance will be perceived as a threat from your point of view. That Westerners can say we place these missiles closer to Russia but that's not like "a threat" to Russia is dumb if the goal is to negotiate with Russia.
A negotiated peace would be by definition a compromise. An uncompromising peace is what's called a surrender. So, listing uncompromising demands that Russia then obviously rejects, is a convoluted, bad faith way of saying there is no desire for negotiation, the surrender of Russia is preferable, for the purposes of propaganda. The problem is if you can't actually force Russia to surrender then this sort of language prolongs the war.
The problem the West has created by encouraging Zelensky to be uncompromising and make delusional statements while also insisting all negotiation must be with Zelensky, without the other powers involved at the table, is that basically any compromise on anything is now a Russian in Zelensky's framework.
Quoting neomac
In order to engage in a quid pro quo, you need to recognise those are in fact legitimate grievances (such as return of prisoners) to then arrive at an agreement about it. Your own side negotiating needs to do this process at least internally (hear what others have to say, what they want, etc.). Whether something is recognised explicitly in public is a form of compensation, and is not a requirement as you say. However, anyone doing any actual diplomacy with Russia (with an intention of resolving the conflict) would need themselves to evaluate legitimate grievances that are reasonable to address in a settlement, and likewise anyone simply analysing the situation and trying to what sort of resolution the war is possible must do the same (to have any chance of proposing some practical insights).
Quoting neomac
As I explain above, the important recognition is internal to the negotiating parties (if they genuinely seek a resolution; if not you just say whatever you want). How these legitimate grievances are then recognised in an agreement can be through explicit recognition and compensation (but this is pretty rare in a settlement, as one of the benefits of a settlement is not recognising any wrong doing), so usually it's simply recognised in compensation and horse-trading, and between nations there can be entirely secret arrangements.
Quoting neomac
The main on is of course NATO expansion. When Russia mentions moving missiles and forward operating bases and so on closer to Russia is a threat to Russia, that's obviously true. One of the quid pro quo agreements with Russia in the expansion of NATO was that missile bases wouldn't advance. The actual military threats are hardware and personnel, not the actual NATO treaty, so bringing countries into NATO is one thing, and actually advancing NATO hardware, systems and soldiers is another.
In terms of real military analysis, the central military justification for Russia war is that NATO installed a missile base in the Baltics. That NATO says it was to protect against Iran and is only missile defence is entirely meaningless if you want to negotiate an end to a conflict with Russia.
There is actually a stable form of NATO enlargement in making NATO bigger but not only moving little to no hardware closer to Russia but the Easter-European states themselves becoming more stable vis-a-vis Russia and also each other and both lowering their defence expenditures because they are in NATO as well as depending on NATO command structures to function so unable really to do any independent military actions anyways. For, previous to NATO expansion you can have disputes between East-European countries entirely unrelated to Russia or NATO but that then draft Russia and/or NATO into the conflict and the it growing into a regional conflict and getting out of control. Prior to NATO directly threatening Russia with advancing missile bases and proposing Georgia and Ukraine join NATO (and notice the combination of abandoning the quid pro quo of not advancing advanced hardware will also wanting to expand right to Russia's border, is something any general would say warrants a war, and there'd be only political reasons not to go to war; this is a sad reality of NATO's actions over the last decades, that this war is totally provoked and any NATO member would evaluate things militarily exactly the same as Russia has).
So, obviously if NATO wants peace with Russia it will likely have to recognise it has to take a less threatening posture with Russia. Advancing missile bases is particular stupid if the goal is peace. Obviously, neutral Ukraine are removing the missile base would be one way of recognising this grievance. If you want Ukraine in NATO, then to convince the Russians you'd need to propose a lot more compensation for that, but that seems essentially an impossible deal, but maybe there's some sort of "NATO light" version or something.
There are definitely the Nazi's in Ukraine. As a Westerner I don't think that should be acceptable to the West, let alone the Russians. And if you look into the issue with reporting pre-invasion, these are definitely Nazi institutions with enormous power and influence in Ukraine. It should be, first of all, Western policy to not support and arm Nazi's. That Western media lauds these "ultra nationalists" as "the best fighters" that Ukraine simply needs, is even more outrageous.
The rights of Russian speaking minorities that, fact of the matter is, Ukraine started oppressing in total contradiction to the West's "values and policies" about minority rights, is also simply an entirely justified grievance, which is text-book prejudice due to ethnicity and language that the West claims to be against.
There have been war crimes also by the Ukrainians, but generally in a peaceful resolution to a war, all the warcrimes are ignored. As with any settlement, one of the main benefits is not admitting any wrongdoing.
We had trials against the Third Reich ... because we won. There was no trials of Western war crimes even if they were of comparable or worse nature than some convicted Nazi's.
Benefits of winning is also likewise not needing to admit any wrong doing.
Quoting neomac
Yes, the negotiation from our Western perspective is mainly around the pros-and-cons for Russia, since it's them that we are negotiating with.
The first step in negotiating a settlement is coming up with a compromise of the key issues that you think is acceptable to the other party, the "deal breakers". There can be a long list of minor stuff, in this case economic arrangements of how to rebuild Ukraine or then dropping sanctions and so on, but there's no point in addressing secondary issues if there's no possible compromise on the deal breakers.
The deal breakers in this war for the Russians are concerning NATO and Crimea. There maybe someway to negotiate the other big issues, such as Russian speaking rights in Donbas and so, in a way that de-annexes these territories (such as the proposed referendums to be part of Ukraine, autonomous in Ukraine or independent) or then simply recognises the annexation (such as another referendum to join Russia that the international community recognises).
There is, for certain, no compromise Ukrainians and Westerners would be happy about, but the alternative is more war, more death, and potentially Ukraine losing anyways, which people will just blame Ukraine for not "fighting hard enough" but people should be far more unhappy about compared to a compromise now or at any point previous in the war.
Which is why the issue of the cost to Ukraine of more fighting is simply ignored in Western media, and even in this forum: so that if Ukraine comes out a big loser in all this, well that's what they wanted, what are you gonna do, all we did was give some of the weapons that they wanted, as any friend would do.
Quoting neomac
That you perceive my pointing out the cost of your "endgame" for NATO, who you support, as emotional blackmail, is just demonstrating your cognitive dissonance about your own position.
Harming Russia by arming the Ukrainian army, comes at to Ukrainian welfare, and if harming Russia is the goal the cost to Ukraine could be far in excess of what would be in Ukrainian-self-interest (with or without us deceiving them about it, we would still be responsible for the outcome).
If you want to support harming the Russians, and not just a little bit but until they are no longer a threat to the West, then this requires a commensurate cost to the Ukrainians, a "moral dilemma" in your own words. Pointing out the cost is just reality, not "blackmail", and your perception that the reality is blackmail, is delusional.
Quoting neomac
What slippery slope, what straw man? You can't be more clear what your position actually is, and then you double down on it to be even more clear:
Quoting neomac
It's not outrageous, it's exactly what US / NATO are trying to do, and they are pretty clear about it.
Lot's of geopolitical "moves" require the sacrifice of some country or people's wellbeing for the "greater good". Talk to the Vietnamese, talk the Kurds, talk to our liberal "friends" in Iraq and Afghanistan, talk to the Libyans and Syrians (again, our "friends" there, not to mention just average person there trying to get by).
And, indeed, it is typical of any war that it is waged on land and among civilians that do not benefit from the outcome, either way, especially if their dead. Sacrificing here or there, this person or that, for the polities benefit and not their own, is an entirely normal process in any war.
The reason it's controversial in this war is because we're not even fighting it, Ukraine may lose anyways and even if they have some sort of "win" it may easily be at an unreasonably high cost. If it was all just to virtue signal without any coherent workable plan to actually "beat" Russia, then this Western attitude (of which the policy of the leadership entirely depends) has caused immense suffering for nothing.
You support the policy, the cost to Ukraine is immense, face the reality and explain how it's worth it so far, how the same or multiple times more cost would be likewise worth it, or even the entire destruction of Ukraine would be worth it if Russia is harmed enough.
For months the cost to Ukraine was simply denied, casualties super low, easily winning, Russian army incompetent and will collapse any day etc. so everyone in the West could just ignore the "moral dilemma" of what this policy is costing Ukraine.
Now that the "bill is coming due" people in the West want to just ignore it and if they see it a little bit: Ukraine! Ukraine! Ukraine! Ukraine chose this path!!
The truth of the situation is simply that nuclear blackmail works. The situation would need to be nearly inconceivably more extreme than what is happening in Ukraine for it not to be reasonable to submit to nuclear blackmail.
And, because nuclear blackmail works, US / NATO policy is not to "escalate" beyond a certain point: that point being Russia actually losing the war.
Ukrainian lives (especially the soldiers) are lost in the defense of a sovereign Ukraine from an existential threat, which wants (or wanted when attacked) to annex parts of Ukraine and put a puppet regime in place for the rest of the country. Now it seems to want to destroy Ukraine and it's economy.
That simply isn't "an instrument of US / NATO policy".
Just remember that the first thing when Russia attacked was for the US to ask if the Ukrainian leadership needed help in evacuating from Ukraine. That's how much they believed in this "instrument of US / NATO policy" you try to depict.
The Americans have purposefully steered towards this conflict since at least 2008.
Now they have their conflict, and they spin a yarn about Ukrainian sovereignty.
Yes, if the priority is to harm Russia, and not "defend Ukrainian sovereignty" then Ukraine is an instrument of this policy.
You can argue that the real objective is just a concern for Ukrainian well being and Sovereignty if you want.
Quoting ssu
It's entirely possible that the policy came into existence after seeing the Ukrainians fighting back successfully enough to halt the invasion.
Although I completely agree with Quoting Tzeentch
There's been 4 US administrations since 2008, and I'd be willing to accept the idea the US more-or-less stumbled into this conflict without really a military plan if Russia did a full scale invasion (they may have been satisfied with Russia conquering Ukraine, having a big headache to deal with trying to manage it, and slapping tons of sanctions on Russia).
Which is how proponents of this policy usually frame it: know one could believe Ukraine would be so good and Russia so bad, and suddenly there was this opportunity to bleed the Russians! Is usually how it's presented.
The policy of arming Ukraine "whatever it take, but not really" may not have been pre-planned, which would explain why US keeps having this "let's negotiate ... but haha, no, but actually yes! peace would be good, but talk to Zelensky!" and completely inconsistent in the logic of weapons supplies, rather than some clear and coherent position on these issues.
Also, I wouldn't disagree that fighting back initially is a good idea, preferable to complete capitulation, even if the cost is not trivial (thousands dead). However, it's after doing that when a smaller party has maximum leverage: the leverage is basically "you might ultimately be able to win, but the cost will make it not-worth it and there are significant risks". For example, in the first weeks of the war, the Kremlin would not know how the sanctions would play out, if their lines would hold (or then be able to withdraw from losing positions without being totally encircled), if Ukraine / US had some insane surprise, what the domestic political reaction would be to the war and sanctions and so on, if mobilisation would work / be accepted by Russians, if the whole thing could just spiral into a nuclear conflict the Kremlin doesn't actually want either and so on. There's not only the cost even if you win, but all these other risks and if the cost of 2 weeks of war to Russia isn't that much, then it doesn't have to get much in a compromise to show it was "worth it". Likely, due to all these risks, when the Russians offered to be out of Ukraine the next day, if Donbas was independent and Crimea recognised as Russian and Neutral Ukraine, it was entirely genuine and clearly the minimum the Russians would accept.
The longer the war drags on, the more all these risks at the start either go away or then get clarified (or then just now familiar and no longer feared as much, even if the risk is actually the same).
However, if the priority is Ukrainian sovereignty then what follows from that is an honest discussion with Ukraine of what would be a reasonable compromise to end the war on the best conditions possible, given the limitations of Western support and also the cost in itself of more war (some plausible cost-benefit analysis for Ukrainians, not the West). Additionally, if the priority was Ukrainian sovereignty and welfare, the West would use its economic leverage to help negotiate the best outcome, or then just have used its economic leverage before the war to try to avoid the war (such as Nord Stream 2; of which the logic of refusing to open it was not that the project wasn't mutually beneficial to Europe, or clearly a basis of peace for Russia, but simply that US wants to "contain" Russia, which is by definition promoting conflict and not peace).
And this is clearly not how the US and NATO are making decisions, but the only consideration is what harms Russia the most while not escalating into nuclear war, meaning Russia losing would be going to far. To sweep all the moral issues of this position under the rug, US and NATO just yell "Ukraine wants to fight! Ukraine wants the weapons!" but this moral hot potato does not somehow dissociate our actions from the consequences of our actions.
Any issues with the actual analysis?
It definitely seems to me that Zelensky is being pushed to the side, didn't even get to address the World Cup as he wanted, which, seems to me, the US would have made happen if it wanted; Qatar being a 100% US security dependent.
The interview is also quite extraordinary in its revelations, it's not some sort of "get to know the general" puff piece.
He literally states that Ukrainian will inevitably lose the war if it doesn't receive significant increase in assistance of heavy weapons, which are not on their way and may not even be enough (just that if the West put in another 300 tanks, 700 infantry fighting vehicles, and 500 howitzers then it's invested for double or triple or quadruple those numbers). He then references a military commander's concessions speech, Mannerheim, to the Soviet Union / Russia in a similar circumstance.
Especially considering Zuluznhy doesn't speak much to the press, it is even more difficult to believe this was just off-the-cuff remarks that the US administration did not approve of.
Now, it maybe pretty much ignored by Western media, but for certain Ukrainians paid careful attention to this, as well other policy makers in Europe and Russia. The interview is basically saying the writing is on the wall for Ukraine and some sort of concession speech is coming "if" significantly more equipment doesn't arrive which aren't on their way.
Of course, could all be part of some subterfuge to make the Russians believe Ukraine is giving up, when they aren't giving up! Or then just the private musings of the General without any indication of a policy change whatsoever. But that's difficult to imagine.
However, I would agree that interview doesn't commit anything, but I have a hard time imagining the interview was planned without the idea of setting up these options. I'd also be willing to believe that setting up a concession speech, Zelensky resigning, compromise with the Russians is coming from the Ukrainian side if they see there is simply no more viable path to victory, in which case the US is managing the process with controlled statements in the Western press rather than some confusing speculation engine of random remarks to Ukrainian press.
Just a side note, Zelensky doesn't necessarily need to resign, but could just become a figurehead, and the actual negotiation done by Zuluzhny. Then a Ukrainian election and Zelensky steps down from politics then. This is also a usual way to do these things. A lot of the conflict is portrayed as basically personal issue between Zelensky and Putin.
The Economist is a US outlet, really?
You guys live in your own world, where your own defecations smell like Channel n°5.
I don't see much discussion about this interview in Western media, seems to me very much "last weeks news" that was pretty much ignored.
Something can appear in Western media and still be ignored by Western media generally speaking. Lot's of pretty "big deals" appear once in the New York Times or somewhere and then are pretty much never discussed again, or it's a topic of the current news cycle and just goes away in the next.
When a topic is focused on in Western media it will have plenty of followup, different people's reactions and takes, questions to politicians and officials, analysis by scholars and so on, which can go on for weeks, months, or years.
For example, for 2 decades there was constant focus on the topic of "terrorism"; interviewing generals, academics, journalist opinion, analysis of policy (too much, not enough), all sorts of speculations, documenting and re-documenting their crimes, talking to victims, reporting people think it's really bad in various forms, etc.
After the withdrawal of Afghanistan, the issue is basically now completely ignored. BBC reported on some starving children in Afghanistan, but there wasn't much discussion about it, not a topic that was focused on. The word "terror" or "terrorism" appears 0 times on CNN, CNBC, BBC, The Guardian, Reuters front webpage (as of writing this), whereas Ukraine or Ukrainian appears on the front page on CNN 6 times, CNBC 4 times, The Guardian 22 times, and Reuters 4 times.
Interestingly the BBC does not have Ukraine as front page news on their website today (nor any analogue like "Kiev" or "Zelensky") ... could be the first time this has happened since the start of the war; make of it what you will.
The Economist is Western media, one of the most visible. Evidently, its competitors, such as the NYT, are not going to talk much about a scoop that escaped them. Why would they advertise for a competitor?
In my experience, American news outlets tend to ignore non-American ones -- it's part of their so-called exceptionalism.
The remarkable thing is that during those four administrations the United States policy has been constant, unchanged. That is no coincidence.
Additionally, the United States must have expected full-scale war because that's what they sought to prepare Ukraine for for years, through all kinds of military aid, from training, equipment, to joint military exercises, etc.
A "wir haben es nicht gewußt" from the United States I won't buy.
I agree what the Americans are doing isn't illogical from a realpolitik point of view.
Russia was weak after the Cold War, scarcely a great power. The Americans, seeing new great power competition on the horizon with China likely sought to end Russia as a great power permanently to avoid having to contend with two potential peer competitors in the future.
Instead, what it achieved is the exact situation it tried to avoid - Russia and China being united in their opposition towards United States hegemony.
Wow.
I read several of those articles and found the talking points of boethius and Tzeentch in bold relief. In some cases, they have been transcribing the text verbatim.
Ignoring an issue does not imply "has never been mentioned once" it just means paying little attention to it.
If you're ignoring someone or something, there's a spectrum to it, in particular if we're talking about large institutions.
But, please, post any analysis in mainstream media about this interview made today or in the last few days, certainly would be interesting to see.
If I search Zaluzhny in the past 24 hours on google, the top hits are:
1. https://vpk.name
2. Twitter (just linking to general search of Zaluznhy in twitter)
3. https://www.president.gov.ua
4. Medium
5. https://kyivindependent.com
6. https://infographics.economist.com
7. https://www.ukrinform.net
Which is not something I would predict of a topic of interest for the main stream Western media. I'm pretty confident that if a mainstream publication was talking about it, google would put it pretty near the top. And the economist.com page on it isn't even new content, just posting the an 8 second audio clip of the interview.
I agree it's not coincidence, just that it may not have been completely thought through, or then arming Ukraine post-Russia invasion was not the original plan.
Letting Russia conquer Ukraine, fomenting dissidence and sanctioning Russia would be an equally reasonable contingency in the case of a full invasion.
Certainly the US could not know ahead of time Ukraine would fight and not capitulate, so, in the least, they planned for both possibilities.
So when @ssu points out the US offering refuge to Ukrainian leadership, this may have been genuinely part of the plan "Ukraine is conquered by Russia".
However, certainly the US policy since 2008 has, at minimum, zero problem with provoking Russia into invading Ukraine, but I would guess the idea was that this would be a net-loss to Russia even if they took the territory (and need to deal with Ukrainian insurgence / nationalists for years). When US officials and policy wonks kept saying "we can give Russia's their Afghanistan" before and at the start of the war, they may very well have had that in mind, of Russia winning the conventional war and then needing to deal with an insurgency and dissidence and it's more than they can handle, and, for certain, pretext for the sanctions, selling gas to Europe.
That Ukraine fought tenaciously to halt the conquering and the massive social media response and so on, may have been unexpected and seen as a new opportunity after the war started, or that they were pushing for total war but wanted to be sure Ukrainian leadership was really committed (so offering the refuge is a way to evaluate that).
Evidence for this would be that the US / NATO didn't flood Ukraine with the ATMG's and Stingers before the war, so what exactly was the plan could have been pretty ambiguous (even to the US administration and bureaucracies).
Likewise, the US could not have been completely sure of Europe's reaction to the war. Germany and France could have opposed supporting Ukraine, or been vocal about the need for peace from the beginning or resisted sanctions etc. in one way or another, in which case plan total war via Ukraine may not be feasible. The current predicament maybe a case of being victim of one's own success, in that Europe was totally in with essentially no dissent, Ukraine was fighting well with what they had, total exuberance for war in Ukraine, Europe and the US, so everything was peachy at the time. The problem that creates being how to calibrate the harm you want to do to Russia, but not more, and then end the war when it becomes a net-liability rather than an asset.
Definitely seems to me the US has achieved all it would like to achieve in the war so far, but there's no easy way to end it.
The Zaluzhny interview could be indication they're willing to just do it. But I think we've been close to peace before when a new cycle of escalation is triggered and that goes off the rails, so could be a similar situation this time.
For one, Ukraine isn't Afghanistan, Ukrainians aren't Afghanis, etc. I don't think it goes without saying that the preconditions for a similar kind of insurgency are in place in Ukraine as they were in Afghanistan or other parts of the Middle-East.
Second, the Russians also realize what happens to nations who try to conquer too much at once. They've suffered through their failure in Afghanistan and then saw the Americans try and fail in much the same way.
There's a good chance that what we're seeing today in Ukraine is already a part of this new approach: conquer a piece of land and pacify it while keeping the conflict hot.
Thirdly, both Crimea and Donbass were annexed without any type of insurgency taking shape. It's possible that that is still to come, but again I don't think it goes without saying that it will.
Lastly, the American elite (the Bidens, for example) are deeply invested in Ukraine, and during the 2013 Maidan revolution they were already getting busy constructing a new Ukrainian government. I don't see how that fits into a picture where the United States is content to let Russia conquer Ukraine.
I think we can agree it's not all that coherent.
One driver of NATO expansion is simply you need to be in NATO to be able to buy certain weapons, but also you're obviously not going to be buying from Russia (even though that has happened, such as Turkey buying AA systems, it's at great US protest), so it's a good arms-client relationship for the US.
I would guess the main reasoning behind the policy is simply that the war on terrorism has to end sometime, so who's the next enemy?
It's easy to say "China's the near-peer-competitor" but it's a lot more difficult to demonise China as the new "other", due to their economic leverage. Whereas Russia is more doable.
The thought process could have simply been we're setting up Russia as the new enemy and focus of attention for when the war on terrorism ends, but they may not really have thought through how Russia may react to these policies.
I think what's clear is that the idea was to have a tense but balanced relationship with Russia, and especially find a way to sell Europe LNG.
So, if imagine myself as a policy analyst, or even card carrying neo-con, to the US intelligence and administration, recommending this pathway, my idea maybe not to harm Europe economically, or even Russia really, and I may not even have in mind a total war in Ukraine, but more ... just scare the Europeans a bit, get them to buy more arms and more LNG (perhaps just in the name of "diversifying"): what's good for US arms and Gas is good for the US, QED.
In parallel to these macro economic issues, US intelligence operations in Ukraine was also clearly in retaliation for Russia saving Asad.
So, how all these forces mixed within the US government and NATO more generally (and Biden's son sitting on a board of a gas company and whatever the biolabs were about and so on--just seems an absolute cesspool), and then with Russia and Ukraine, I could definitely imagine results in this outcome without anyone really having planned it, nor even viewed as remotely plausible or even preferred (at the time) when considered.
In particular, the desire to sell LNG to Europe maybe a problem that really had no short term solution until the war started, so it could have seemed like a blessing from the lord and too good to be true or giveup or mitigate the risks in anyway, and the policy then sort of takes on a life of its own.
LOL.
Just a quote from the White House page from 2010:
And this included:
Above seems quite something else than "steering towards this conflict". Oh! But as the year WAS 2010, the Russo-Georgian war had happened, and according to you the march to war had started. Of course Georgia, a war that had happened two years ago, was mentioned also:
Yes! Serious disagreements. Yet incremental confidence building measures seemed to have been noticed. And yet the differences are not so serious to prevent everything else mentioned above and even more... just on one meeting with the US and Russian presidents.
Hence this idea of the US starting the march to war in 2008 is quite biased and ignorant view, which picks some events and disregards everything else, but is well suited for Putin's present propaganda.
How according to some the US marches to war:
Quoting boethius
Hey guys!
Have noticed that the war between Ukraine and Russia actually has gone on since the year 2014?
And again the hubris of Ukrainians not having any role here... :smirk:
Two other things worth considering in explaining why the policy isn't all that coherent:
Cancel culture is now the preferred method of the elites to censure society, as it is de facto corporate power over speech. It's not online rage (whether genuine or fabricated) that is the actual mechanism of discipline but being fired by the corporation you work for or then suspended / demonetised / de-platformed by the corporation you work for.
However, anyone can be cancelled anytime, for what they are recorded as saying or even alleged to have said, and the rules of the cancel culture aren't really clear. What is clear is that any dissenting opinion of any kind runs the risk of getting you cancelled (if you are not already in a marginalised niche). If you want your risk of being cancelled to be zero, you need to have zero dissenting opinions from the corporate-mainstream.
So, when the war breaks out, there is fear and hesitation on anyone in a position of influence in any of the European or US institutions or mainstream media or even social media, to offer any criticism, but especially within the political institutions making the decisions. Everyone in these institutions will fear any dissent gets the cancelled if not now then in the future. Whereas before cancel culture the realpolitik, economic, as well as "what do we owe Ukraine?", realities may have been discussed in a fact-of-the-matter way by decision makers, it could very well be that once the social media pressure builds beyond a certain point, everyone falls in line and it's impossible to mitigate any risks, much less outright disagree with the policy. Indeed, that it's self-harmful, even irrational, can be proof-pooding that the motivation is truly just.
In parallel to cancel culture, essentially suppressing any critical analysis, at the bare minimum within, political institutions to arrive at coherent policies, there is also the essentially pure game theory problem, when everyone believes the other parties policies are an irrational bluff.
For example, US believes Russia's policy of threatening to invade Ukraine is an irrational bluff (and too bad for them if they do it!), and Russia believes Europes policy to risk losing access to Russian gas is irrational (and too bad for them if they do it!), and Europe believes Russia's threats are irrational because they pay them so much for the gas and the "time of tanks rolling across the fields of Easter Europe" are over anyways. Likewise, Russia may believe US policy, even if they do sell LNG to Europe, is irrational because the US does actually need its European allies and this will foment disagreement and resentment (such as Macron wondering why the US doesn't sell them gas at the same price in the US ... where's the solidarity?). Russia sees Ukraine as irrational for risking and then entering a war of total destruction of Ukraine, whereas Ukraine sees Russia as irrational for risking and entering a war that is super costly and embarrassing on the world stage. And, of course, both the US and Russia have thousands of nuclear weapons so can easily perceive anyone messing with them as irrational.
When everyone believes everyone else is irrational and bluffing, no ones policy is actually rational, especially if at someone point everyone needs to commit to their irrational bluff to prove they weren't bluffing to begin with (even if they were).
Cabinet approves action plan for annual national plan of cooperation with NATO in 2010
Quoting ssu
Ukraine is 100% dependent on NATO, in particular the US who calls the shots in NATO, for arms, intelligence, training and planning support, and bankrolling the entire government
Once you are completely dependent on a party, you are that party's pawn, whether you like it or not, whether you are convinced you want what they want or not. If the US changes policy, Ukraine has zero leverage to do anything about that, and if Ukraine complains about something (like not speaking at the World Cup) it doesn't matter what Ukraine wants, what matters is what the US wants.
Ukraine is a vassal state to the US, entirely propped up by US support and financing both by the US and by other European countries (on the insistence of the US), there is no way to argue that.
Because Ukraine's interest are not the same as the US interest, obviously bad outcomes for Ukraine (but acceptable to the US) are entirely possible.
Denying this is just not facing the potential cognitive dissonance of looking squarely at the suffering of Ukrainians right now.
2014 was clearly a US backed coup (we even have the audio of Nuland candidly calling the shots in Ukraine). That's not agency.
Furthermore, anti-Russian Ukrainian policies since, by factions or the government, since 2008, and especially since 2014, are in the context of Ukrainians truly believing they'll get into NATO ... if NATO knew that wouldn't happen, which Zelensky tells us NATO told him, that's a pretty big manipulation of Ukrainians. Again, being manipulated makes you a pawn and not a king.
Notice how many things were absent from was all the military cooperation going around then, and earlier in Central Asia even with CSTO members. The basic fact is that US and NATO has had a lot of military cooperation even with other CSTO members. Ukraine was actually neutral, unlike them.
US soldiers training with Kazakhstani officers in Steppe Eagle 2017.
Quoting boethius
Policies can and do come into existence after events. It's quite likely that ideas of a full-scale war with Ukraine came to existence after the astonishing success of capturing Crimea. In fact, the easiness of this brilliant operation can perfectly explain just why Putin would think that a 10 day operation is all what is needed to solve the Ukraine-problem once and for all.
You are confusing the ability to take the initiative and make large scale offensive maneuvers with the ability to defend it's territory.
I'd have no problem believing this is true.
It could have been the policy just to avoid an embarrassing result in the next round.
A lot of decisions revolve around avoiding embarrassment, so it's entirely possible the US planners did not think seriously beyond just trying to make sure Russia couldn't so easily take more of Ukraine, leading Putin to conclude, due to these actions being a threat and overconfidence from Crimea annexation, to "Putin would think that a 10 day operation is all what is needed to solve the Ukraine-problem once and for all".
Generally in large institutions, people have all sorts of elaborate theories and analysis and plans, but the logic and sequence of decisions is fairly simple, since a lot of people need to agree for anything to actually happen, and the complex analysis just explains why given people support given decisions at certain times (even if it's all mutually incompatible on the whole).
This was maybe true at the very start, and had Ukraine sued for peace then, it would have been significant Ukrainian agency just as you say, both the fighting and negotiating (especially if the US disagreed and wanted more fighting to bleed the Russians).
Ukraine had a significant stockpile of weapons and equipment, and I agree (wherever it came from, mostly soviet days) it was (at the time) the basis of independent decisions action.
However, in the months that followed essentially the entirety of the Ukrainian original armour fleet and other heavy weapons were destroyed and a significant part of its officer corp killed, and munitions stockpiles fired, transitioning to complete dependence on the US / NATO to simply maintain current lines, much less make any offensive operations.
Just treading water required thousands of rounds of artillery and other munitions a day as well as attrition of vehicles, and now also the electricity grid (requiring thousands of generators to try to cope with, which again Ukraine is 100% dependent on the US for).
Quoting boethius
I don't think the Americans' actions suggest they believed the Russians were bluffing, especially after 2014. They took the threat serious enough to intensify security cooperation with Ukraine.
Generally, I am reluctant to accept explanations that rely on the big players on the world stage making irrational or ignorant decisions. I think more likely the opposite is true - that they know more than we do, and I tend to try and make sense of their actions through that lens.
Quoting ssu
You implied that during the Obama administration there was a reversal in regards to the United States' Ukraine policy.
This is untrue, as is evidenced by the intensifying security cooperation between the US and Ukraine during this period:
From the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012:
From the NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2013:
I could go on and on. This is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to publicly available documentation on NATO-Ukraine cooperation.
I'm pretty confident that you have no idea what you are talking about, because the Economist IS a mainstream publication.
Quoting boethius
I would be interested in reading the Economist's interview of Zaluzhny, because I hold Zaluzhny as a genius, but wouldn't waste my time looking for someone else's commentary about that interview. I don't see the point.
No issues with your statement vis-a-vis the US.
The cancel culture aspect is to explain why Europe goes all in on the war and sanctions, which is a fantastic price.
European leaders (especially outside the France and Germany) are not better informed than a worldnews reader from reddit; they're mostly just banal bureaucrats that get up and read the headlines and get to work, manage scandals and to some extent governance, and score points against their political opponents when they can. Life is comfortable and there's no need to take anything too seriously.
NATO "takes care" of all their geopolitical concerns and military contingencies, which is another way to say the US does.
Why this matters is that the US could not have known for sure European leaders would fully back their policy in Ukraine, but it's an essential element.
The common narrative is that Zelensky was about to reach an agreement with Ukraine, but then Boris Johnson flew / train into an active war zone to convince him not to. An example of the narrative is as follows:
Quoting Responsible Statecraft
I have never heard of this Responsible Statecraft organisation before, but it's a good summary of the story and first hit on google.
Quoting Tzeentch
Bluffing about committing to a full scale invasion and getting hit with full sanctions.
I have zero recollection of anyone representing American foreign policy analysis ever talking about the desire to have a full scale war in Ukraine; however, they talked a lot, and for years, of their "nuclear option" of total sanctions and cutting Russia off from SWIFT and so on.
So, considering all the pieces that need to fall into place to have a total war situation (Europe, Ukraine and Russia all need to make key decisions, along with public sentiment also fully supporting the war; which, before February no one in Europe seemed to care much about), it seems more likely to me that the US support for Ukraine was to ensure there is at least some sort of war, in order to impose the sanctions the US wants and for them to stick.
This would just be applying the lesson of Crimea that if it's over too quickly, "fait accomplie", then the sanctions don't stick, Europe just keeps doing business with Russia.
And this analysis I definitely do remember reading, that the US would not want an invasion of Ukraine to end too quickly for these sanctions reasons.
Now, if you're trying to make sure a war doesn't end too quickly, you may, to your own surprise, get a much bigger war than what you imagined.
At least as far as the mainstream story goes, the US overestimated Russia's strength, thought Ukraine would fall.
So, in this context, if you just want to the war to last at least a week or two, time to use the chaos to push through sanctions and then scare Europe enough to buy hundreds of billions of arms, or then, if all goes well, last a couple of months to get Finland into NATO, you'd invest a lot in training and equipping the Ukrainians.
However, if the goal was to actually beat the Russians, Javelines (and hundreds of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and NATO howitzers and self propelled artillery etc.) would have been sent to Ukraine before the war started.
So, it can be the US was aiming for some sort of balance, relatively minor geopolitical adjustments, Russia the new enemy so we can forget about Afghanistan and so on.
Of course, I would agree that to the extent the possibility of Ukraine entering total war was considered, that the US policy establishment would view that as a good thing, but I don't see much evidence anyone was pushing for it until the Ukrainians made the "grand stand" (with Zelensky handing out AK's on the street and everything).
Usually, primary objectives of the US policy establishment are talked about for years and years. For example, invading Iraq and Afghanistan (destroying Syria and Libya too) was talked about for years and years and years: why, how, when, what would be the pretext etc. before they happen.
And, in this case, bringing down full sanctions on Russia has been talked about by the US political establishment since US became a net-exporter of fossil fuels again, in particular producing a lot of natural gas. And even a limited war in Ukraine could achieve "gas diversification" from Europe to US LNG, but the fact that US can't possibly replace Russian gas is maybe evidence that US was aiming more for some adjustments than a full scale war.
The other major evidence is that the US policy establishment talks all the time about China being the main threat, so having a big war in Europe is contrary to the "pivot to Asia".
This maybe the essence of Putin's discussion with Xi, that if the war in Ukraine is a lot bigger than America expects, this will overextend them between Europe and East-Asia.
Quoting Tzeentch
I definitely agree. Someone just following twitter and tictok and making decisions would be people like the Finnish prime minister, not a major power, but still in this situation you really needed nearly every European country to be fully on board, and dissent or logic for peace could have snowballed at any moment and put the breaks on the war.
However, even the great powers who have more information than we do, they cannot completely control events, especially as they are trying to foil each others plans.
So, certainly a big war in Ukraine was considered by the US, I just see no evidence that this was a preferred outcome before the war actually started.
I'd agree that they knew their actions would make a war inevitable, but a much more coherent policy would be "making Russia pay a price" with policy changes in Europe that benefit the US, but the war fairly limited in time and scope.
For, a limited war would have just been a repeat of Crimea annexation but the US get some of what it wants this round, mainly the sanctions.
And this is how the US policy establishment seemed to think about things prior to the full scale war, that there's going to be a Crimea "second round" in the Donbas and they need to do better than the first round, of Russia taking Crimea without a shot fired. All their actions prior to February 2022 I think are consistent with such thinking. To posit the US intended a full scale war seems to me to require too much knowledge or too much control of how all sorts of different parties would react in the span of about a week, which I don't think is plausible to do.
I think the US policy establishment was so exuberant about the war going big and the Ukrainians "holding ground" and wanting to fight the Russians fanatically and without compromise, because they were genuinely surprised by such a fortuitous turn of events.
(You should be able to read without subscription if you open the link in a private/incognito window.)
It is mostly narrative interpolation, and those who have been closely following the war won't find much that they don't already know, but some specific details are intereting. Here are some highlights (per NYT):
This popular narrative of "a motley group of Ukrainian defenders" that eviscerated Russian armored columns "with shoulder-fired antitank weapons" was challenged in a recent report by RUSI. They maintain that, contrary to popular belief, most of the Russian losses during their failed Kiev push were inflicted by conventional Ukrainian artillery.
Ukraine had a pretty sizeable army before the army:
It's not talked much about because it was essentially all destroyed, and it's awkward to ask "what happened to the the 12000 armoured vehicles, 2500 tanks, and 2000 artillery pieces, if they're all gone and you need more ... how does that square with winning?
However, all this equipment (even if only a part is in good working order) is going to do damage.
Where the javelins and stingers had a big effect is that Ukraine could harass Russian supply lines (that were stretched hundreds of kilometres through unsecured territory, especially the salient to East Kiev) and attack helicopters (that could otherwise fly around and destroy your artillery and armoured vehicles and tanks) with small groups of people all over the place. Any actual big battle (where the majority of losses occur) would still be mostly heavy weapons and artillery duels and not, as you say, a motley group of infantry standing up in the chaos with javelins; but 3-4 guys able to go out and blow up supply trucks and tank columns from kilometres away, has a big impact on the operation.
However, my point above was that if the US wanted to Ukraine to really "win" the war, then all these weapons systems would have already been in Ukraine; more to the point, why stop at javelins, why not already have supplied Ukraine with HIMARS, f-16s and so on, certainly train on any weapons system that maybe required, such as NATO tanks.
It's also repeated often that the US intelligence community own assessment would be Ukraine would lose within 72 hours, so maybe there was some "secret" analysis that said otherwise, but I have difficulty imagining anyone predicted the precise series of events required to get into a total war in Ukraine, much less caused all those events to happen.
It's been said that Putin postponed the attack several times and that it was the FSB pushing for the attack and Gerasimov and the military being hesitant. That Putin then made a "putsch" at the FSB afterwards does reinforce that this may be so. (The FSB was in charge of Ukraine, unlike other countries.)
Again we have to compare this to the 2014 operation: Russia did then get high ranking Ukrainian officers to jump on to the Russian side: for example Rear Admiral Denis Berezovsky, head of the Ukrainian navy, issued an order for the Ukrainian Navy to lay down it's arms and afterwards being dismissed, defected to Russia.
After such covert operation success and taking into account Russian bureaucratic culture, it's not crazy to assume that those in charge of covert operations in Ukraine promised similar results again. But that was eight years ago.
Former head of the Ukrainian Navy in new uniform in 2019:
Quoting boethius
I'm not so sure that there even then was a moment to sue for peace. Remember that in the south and east Russia was gaining ground as Ukraine concentrated on defending Kyiv. And Putin wasn't going to talk to the drug using neo-nazis.
Quoting boethius
Yes. Basically Ukraine went through it's stockpiles of artillery ammunition quite quickly and then afterwards Russia enjoyed fire superiority. And obviously then was very dependent on Western assistance.
I think the simple fact neither Ukraine or actually the West was ready for such a long war fought with ammo consumption of WW1 or WW2 level. The West has basically looked at short conventional wars. The conventional wars in the Middle East (which are somewhat comparable) lasted only some days. Only basically Russia has hoarded old stuff and ammunition for such a conflict. Yet neither Russia or even the West have a military industry to produce huge amounts of munitions. At least yet.
Quoting boethius
Where Ukraine needs that ammo is if makes large scale maneuvers. Then it has to attack Russian forces whereas if it is on the defensive, it can just pinpoint the fires to needed points. And even without artillery (or little artillery), Ukrainian infantry still can defend.
The parties considered too close to Moscow were dissolved after the outbreak of the Russian invasion in February, but their elected representatives kept their mandates and still participate in the life of the Parliament.
By Thomas d'Istria (Kiev) and Faustine Vincent (Strasbourg), Le Monde
The online exhibition is entitled "Pro-Russian parties, fuck off". It gathers a collection of leaflets, calendars and propaganda posters of the different pro-Russian parties that have succeeded one another in Ukrainian political life since the independence of this country, in 1991, until the beginning of the current war, on February 24. The slide show, available on the website of the Chesno ("honesty" in Ukrainian) organization, is a reminder of a time when a "fifth column" influenced Kiev politics, and when the vast majority of Ukrainians did not reject the "Russian world" wholesale.
After more than ten months of war, the political formations that were considered to be vehicles of Russian influence were dissolved by Ukrainian courts. The most important of them, the opposition platform For Life, the first opposition party in the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada), did not escape. While some parliamentarians of the former party opted to leave Ukraine, the majority remained, and continues to regularly attend Parliament sessions.
"The party has been banned but the deputies still have the right to sit as long as their mandates have not been cancelled," explains Oleksandr Salzhenko, one of the analysts of the Chesno organization, whose task is to decipher the political life of the Kiev Parliament. According to the country's laws, mandates can only be revoked in case of "loss of citizenship, resignation, death or a court decision.
This sometimes creates absurd situations. For example, Ukrainian MP and oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, co-chairman of the banned party close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was arrested by Ukrainian authorities in mid-April and was at the center of a prisoner exchange with Russia in September, is still officially a member of the Ukrainian Parliament. Other deputies continue to sit in key positions. Nestor Shufrych, who, according to Chesno, has long referred to the conflict in the Donbass as a "civil war" despite evidence of Kremlin involvement, remains today the head of the committee for freedom of expression.
The former deputies of the pro-Russian party have quickly adapted to the new reality of the war. Yurii Pavlenko, 47, says that he and his colleagues first wrote a statement condemning the Russian aggression. Later, they deleted from their party's charter all articles that "mentioned [their] desire for a good-neighbourly relationship with Russia," he says, sitting over a coffee in a Kiev bar. The deputies also voted to exclude a colleague from their party, Ilya Kiva, who had called on Kiev to capitulate on a Russian television channel.
More than ten months have passed. Today, Serhi Hladkoskok is a member of the new parliamentary group Reconstruction of Ukraine. At the end of October, he was in the European Parliament, looking for partnerships and money to rebuild the Kharkiv region. "Our objective is the same as that of President Zelensky, we want to rebuild the country," he told Le Monde. The elected official does not comment on the banning of his former party, and simply recalls that it is not the only one to have been banned after the invasion. "People should not look at the name of the party but what we do. For us, as elected officials, nothing has changed," he says. "We have remained in Kharkiv since the first day of the invasion. People have seen it and remember it, so they trust us."
In Kiev, on the other hand, civil society and some members of parliament remain highly critical of the presence of former elected officials of the largest pro-Russian opposition party in political positions. In recent days, a petition to discuss in the Verkhovna Rada the withdrawal of the mandates of former deputies has begun to circulate. According to Chesno, about fifty votes out of the one hundred and fifty needed to consider the proposal have been collected.
Political analyst Oleksandr Salzhenko remains skeptical. "It is impossible to deprive deputies of their mandates because of martial law, which prohibits amending the Ukrainian constitution and holding elections. There is still the possibility that people will not vote for them in the next elections," says the observer. "But then it will take years."
I have no problem with the idea such a narrative is true.
My position on this issue was that clearly the Russian military had a plan B of securing the land bridge to Crimea. The situation of "maybe we'll invade Ukraine" is also existing at least since 2014 and likely since 2008 so the idea things were not thought through and different contingencies planned for is not credible, which I don't think is your position.
The only difference I think we have on this topic is simply how what likelihood the Russian military, the Kremlin, FSB and Putin himself placed on certain outcomes (such as capitulation of Kiev or then military commanders).
I would, however, bet money that the nuclear deterrence relative the no-fly zone was preplanned (presenting Putin as unhinged etc.), likewise that they'd keep pressure on Kiev until the siege of Mariupol was completed, of course, in the event that Kiev does not capitulate.
Maybe they believed it was 80% likely Kiev would crumble or maybe 20% (worth a shot, and serves as a fixing operation if they don't accept the demands). And, as you say, maybe everyone involved believed something different about the odds.
Quoting ssu
Russia made the offer publicly, there were negotiations in Belarus, one narrative is that Zelensky was really close to accepting when Boris Johnson arrived to convince him otherwise.
Now, what are the sources of this story I have no idea, but it's honestly difficult to imagine Boris Johnson going into a theatre of war (in which the UK is not at war) for any other reason. Nevertheless, I don't like to assign fact to unsourced and/or unverifiable narratives, especially when propaganda is flying in every direction.
Quoting ssu
Definitely agree.
The assumption of the US is that they do everything with air power, which is definitely much better than artillery if you have air supremacy, which the US definitely assumes they will get in any conflict.
There's also value / weight ratio, as bombs and shells are super heavy, so if you're fighting on the other side of the world, a bomb (especially guide bombs) are going to be more valuable to transport to the war theatre than artillery shells. Bombs are way more flexible in where they can land but also cause way bigger explosions. Indeed ... when the US wants to fire shells at a place for effect, they even have a plane for that.
Other NATO countries just assume any conflict with Russia would be nuclear, and money is better spent elsewhere than a WWI style artillery plan.
As for producing more munitions, I think the fact the West has not really tried to significantly scale up, is a good indication of where this war is going.
Quoting ssu
The problem is that you need artillery to suppress enemy artillery (the other option being air superiority, but Ukraine doesn't have that).
Fact of the matter is, Russia is pretty well optimised for this kind of conflict. Its whole doctrine revolves around denying air supremacy and then relying on an artillery advantage.
It sounds bad to us Westerners that Russia doesn't have air supremacy and are still taking losses / can't fly wherever they want, but this is exactly what Russian doctrine is built for.
Absent air supremacy of either side, artillery is just so amazingly good, and even drones are mostly just a force multiplier for artillery, and the only defence against artillery is your own artillery for counter-battery fire as well as shelling advancing formations.
As we've seen, tanks are vulnerable without infantry support, and not only can artillery hit tanks (maybe not penetrate but still damage / disable) but artillery suppressed infantry. The only way to suppress artillery is with air or artillery.
What Ukraine can do is lay a lot of mines, but this only slows down an enemy and doesn't win any battles in itself. Where Russian partisans are generally wrong is that Russia is keeping lines static on purpose to draw more Ukrainians in, whereas I think the mines are a bigger factor in Russia's slow pace of advancement when they do advance (if they could advance faster that would be great to moral and propaganda, and I don't see less Ukrainian casualties in such a scenario).
Which is an additional reason why we may see another offensive elsewhere than the current lines, as the easiest way to avoid mines is to go around them. There are not really any good counters to mines except for the fact that the enemy can't literally mine the whole country as they'd then need to go through their own minefields to get anywhere.
In this photo released by the Dnipro Region Administration, Municipal workers dismantle a monument of Russian writer Alexander Pushkin in the city centre of Dnipro, Ukraine, Friday, Dec. 16, 2022. Ukraine is accelerating efforts to erase the vestiges of centuries of Soviet and Russian influence from the public space by pulling down monuments and renaming hundreds of streets to honor home-grown artists, poets, military chiefs, and independence leaders, even heroes of this year's war. (Dnipro Region Administration via AP)
Opinion: Russia has shouted about escalation long enough
[sup]— Keir Giles · CNN · Dec 20, 2022[/sup]
There are effective NASAMS, however expensive, some have been delivered, more planned (the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, the US).
Of course, when Russia generously sprays missiles throughout, there will be damage; seems clear enough that it's an attempt to bomb/force/intimidate the Ukrainians into submission.
Where these weapons would mostly be for defense (shield, not an escalation), they can (and will likely) also be used for attacks, though, whatever the Russian response might be, if any in particular.
Ukraine's Azov Regiment visits Israel: 'Mariupol is our Masada'
[sup]— Tzvi Joffre · The Jerusalem Post · Dec 20, 2022[/sup]
A ruse, an excuse.
Will the Putinistas keep it up?
Azov is literally riding around making Nazi salutes with the Nazi iron cross and the SS wolf's angle painted on their vehicles.
As verified by Forbs ... just, we shouldn't be too concerned.
They say there "was Nazis" but not anymore ... but where did they go even in that narrative?
Another of his sources is Brian Berletic, aka Tony Cartalucci, a far-right conspiracy theorist who has been amplifying Russian propaganda, and before that has championed Assad's regime in Syria ("independent Arab state that spends on human welfare and refuses to surrender to Israel"), Myanmar junta, and other such noble causes.
Before I posted 6 videos from BBC to Vice, investigating the Nazi's in Ukraine, and all concluding there is definitely Nazi's in Ukraine, with weapons, institutional power and even their own "youth camp".
Of course, main stream media doesn't investigate that kind of thing anymore, so people on the fringe do it, why expect otherwise.
In the case of the New Atlas video I posted, it's just breaking down a Forbs article that is a laughable level of apologetics, and just shows the source video of Azov guys going by on Western armoured vehicles with hitler salutes and Nazi symbols.
And in over 400 pages of discussion, no one has yet presented an argument that these Nazi's were nothing to be concerned about, other than to make the absurd claim that there's an equal amount of Nazi's everywhere.
As for Scott Ritter, I literally said preambled what I was repeating from Scott Ritter with "this is Scott Ritter's analysis", as I had not even read the article yet and if one was going to read into it, then Scott Ritters analysis would be accurate. I wouldn't be so confident Zuluhzny will be making a concession speech anytime soon, but I would put money on that option being setup with Zuluhzny speech so the there's some narrative coherence if it comes to that (both to the Western and Ukrainian audience).
Scott Ritter was literally a weapons inspector for the UN, and Colonel Macgregor a colonel.
Feel free to disagree with them, but the idea these two don't have expertise worth considering is laughable.
Now, both these guys analysing the war, and anyone else, who does not repeat Ukraine is "winning" are not welcome on the mainstream, so they literally do interviews everywhere from the extreme right to the extreme left. Why not?
The "other side" of the debate has been literally predicting Russian lines collapsing due to morale problems, and Russian economy collapsing due to sanctions, and running out of missiles and ammunitions and tanks and everything, and Ukraine taking less casualties than the Russians, and Ukraine's "winning the war".
None of which has come true in 9 months of the war.
Why would people that have made terrible predictions be more credible than people making accurate predictions.
Moreover, no one has a monopoly on analysis and prediction making, and I find the best way to keep an open mind is to just listen to as many points of view as possible.
Indeed, the only reason I got clued into a total war between Russia and Ukraine was even on the table, is because a Nazi predicted it in, if I remember correctly, the BBC video. And lo and behold it occurred, so even Nazi's can be right in predicting events.
Also, the people literally following the war everyday have a minimum of learning about their models and theories of the war. For example, most of the right wing analysts predicted Russia will hold on to Kherson. However, Colonel Macgregor predicted Russia would fall back to economise forces if they need to. So, what we learn is definitely the right is overconfident in Russia's forces, but that does not make their analysis not worth considering.
It's also interesting to listen to analysis from people with completely different world views, such as supporting Trump and denying climate change, which, in my opinion, they are totally wrong about.
In this recent exchange with and I think it's quite illuminating the effects of cancel culture on analysis and decision making.
Neither rebut anything, nor even bother to try to prove their allegations. What's their definition of "extreme right" and what makes people extreme right and why would it not be an ad hominem in this case etc.
And, on the subject of Nazis, they simply don't bother to address the main stream media (bbc, vice, guardian, reuters) reporting on these organisations before this year, don't even try to explain where these Nazi's supposedly disappeared to, the mere fact that only the "extreme right" or the "extreme left" needs to be linked to making making the same point, and everything can be dismissed.
Although I agree that some people close to decision making are "in the know", there is still a vast array of bureaucracies with people either fanatical adherents to cancel culture, like out friends and , or then afraid of career repercussions so not saying anything.
The effect of this on institutional processes I is something to contemplate as a major driver of events.
We are basically at the level of reification of social media causes du jour.
Interesting to know.
I see that Berletic is well established on the New Atlas platform.
I remember some of that messaging from the Syrian conflict. It prompts me to learn more even though I got burnt out by the Chechen wars and was hoping not to explore all of this again.
The Syrian conflict that didn't overthrow Asad as mainstream media promised and where Al Qaeda was literally a moderate faction of the "rebels".
Again, in terms of predicting events, how does accurate predictions make one less credible and totally wrong predictions make one more credible?
No matter what you want to happen, there's what actually happens.
Predicting Ukraine will win when they won't, is not "pro Ukraine" it's just wrong if Ukraine doesn't win. If you think Ukraine will win, ok, why, how, when?
And, for certain, accurate predictions are better for Ukraine than wrong predictions, as they help make better decisions. No one benefits from a wrong idea about the future. Of course, things are uncertain, which is what analysis helps try to clarify the extent that's possible.
I am an old carpenter and a stone mason.
I haven't made any predictions.
You're in the true adherent to cancel culture category.
However, even when would-be-critical thinkers see what the online mob can do, they hesitate to speak their mind.
Every political system we've seen based on severe censorship eventually loses its grip on reality and starts making terrible decisions.
How would you guess that from my life of work? What is your life of work?
I never said you did, I was pointing out the value of considering what someone who has made accurate predictions says, maybe they have some insights into the forces driving events, even if you disagree with their politics.
Indeed, the whole reason I try listen to voices from every political persuasion is because people from every political persuasion are involved in and co-determine what happens (to larger and smaller degrees).
For example, the storming of the Capital building in the US came as a shock to a lot of people on the left, but it seemed pretty natural to me having listened to what they were saying, and then basically doing exactly what they said they were going to do. I wouldn't say it was some sort of well orchestrated plan, but we're in an epoch of online mob forces.
But you said:
You put words into my mouth.
I don't care about your life work.
What I do know is that I post one video of a break down of a video that Forbs references (so vetted to some degree by a major organisation), with pretty much the bare minimum of analysis (such as the difference between a german army symbol and a Nazi symbol) that one would expect from a journalist, that Forbs doesn't do. The content of the video you can evaluate for yourself, if they're not Nazi saluting but just saying hello and the symbols are "ancient runes" or whatever and totally coincidence the Nazi's used them too, go ahead and argue that.
However, what does it matter that the bare minimum editing work was done by the New Atlas guy, and if Forbs isn't going to do it ... well why not the New Atlas guy?
But, even the Forbs article just gives rise to problematic questions, such as where did the Nazi's go? In this narrative that these groups "were Nazis ... but not anymore" ok, that would be great to know, but who (that is not a Nazi) does the dirty work of purging a Nazi organisation of undesirables? What was the motivation, what was their method of internal-de-nazification, when did this occur, where are these Nazis now that we know were there then ... but not anymore?
However, for you, just associating the person who did the bare minimum journalist work on the issue with the extreme right, and not even explaining what's so extreme right about him (and is Trump extreme right? ... isn't he just mainstream right as a a literal President? which pretty much anyone on the American right is going to defend, so is the idea we can't listen to what any republican says ever?). Otherwise, usually the "extreme right" accusation was people like Nazi's, which obviously the New Atlas guys doesn't like (and we have that in common, so why wouldn't I agree with him on this issue that Nazi's are bad, and Nazi symbols on NATO military equipment isn't a good look for NATO ... why would it be a good look?).
What makes you a fanatic of cancel culture is your idea that you can just start a circle jerk of "extreme right" if even the slightest association can be made with any reference whatsoever and certainly you believe that to be critical thinking.
Now, multiple your fanaticism by literally hundreds of millions of people with various bot farms as force multipliers forming an online mob that can get people fired, maybe you just like to participate in the virtue-signally, but certainly you could empathise with someone who's job would be on the line if they said something "controversial", such as, despite apparent short term success, and even if it really is success, Ukraine may not be able to "defeat" Russia in the war, may choose simply not to make that point.
This is just a general point, I don't say you made any predictions. I'm contrasting this "extreme right" of yours with the mainstream media.
The key word in an "if" statement is "if". So, just say you're not predicting Ukraine will win, and, to that extent, agree with the extreme right voices you reference that there is no reason to believe Ukraine will win, you certainly aren't predicting that.
However, insofar as your not predicting anything but just "extreme-right-reference-shaming" me obviously the alternative you have in mind is the mainstream corporate news (since, on this particular topic, the extreme left also doesn't like the Nazi's in Ukraine). However, if the mainstream media makes terrible predictions that don't come true on a topic, why would I increase my confidence in their analysis of that topic? Why wouldn't I see what others, so called "contrarions", have to say?
You keep making rebuttals to arguments I am not making.
Ah, I see, you're just virtue signalling that you've found the extreme-right association after 420 pages.
Ok, well, if you want to make an argument rather than say nothing at all, the main reference in the Russia will win or then the actually trying to change that result will likely escalate into nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine is Mearsheimer:
Above is his speech in Romania, which at the time there was not insignificant cancel culture going around that "he talked to in Romania! He talked to Orban!
Is he not credible with is paltry professorship? Or is extreme right? If so why?
If you have no interest in arguing his points, what's your basis of that?
If you are interested in arguing his points, what's your argument with them?
So feel free to argue something or then just point to whoever in all this analysis you agree with, so others can do the work of arguing on your behalf.
You put words in my mouth again.
Meanwhile in Germany:
German court convicts 97-year-old ex-secretary at Nazi camp
[sup]— Geir Moulson · AP News · Dec 20, 2022[/sup]
Did she make a run for it, in 2021, in her 90s? :grin: Anyway, a young peripheral at the time (and with her current age), she was given a mild sentence, no living in fear of harsh repercussions.
Quoting boethius
As far as the invasion goes, the concern (at least that I've commented on lately) is what Kyiv possibly could have done, is doing, to be deemed a Nazi rule — a Nazi rule is what the Putinistas have claimed, their public rationale, and it's bunk. I imagine Ukrainian Nazis are doing whatever such extremists do. Going by the report, those Azov folks ain't it (unless Mossad screwed up royally).
[sup]— ZLIVE-NEWS · Dec 20, 2022[/sup]
I don't personally think Lavrov is delusional, but this doesn't look promising. I suppose, if we're talking propaganda, working the Belarusians, then it does make some sense.
The narrative is so fragile that it cannot stand up to any kind of scrutiny, so the goal becomes to silence criticism. It's used in the domain of public discourse and in the political arena to silence political opposition.
However, I suspect for the "people in the know" as you put it, narratives are just a tool to influence the public, and they don't believe in them as fanatically.
The murderer accusing his victims of a "lack of concern". :vomit:
:up:
Quoting Olivier5
:up:
[sup]— Lidia Kelly, Robert Birsel · Reuters · Dec 21, 2022[/sup]
... so, "anti-sabotage drills" starting Oct 11 in Belarus, Russian troops arriving Oct 15, Putin + Shoigu + military staff meet to discuss their "special military operation" on Dec 16, Putin visits Dec 19, Lavrov speaks on Belarusian TV (about Ukraine) Dec 19, ...
Putin says Russian army must tackle problems it has suffered in Ukraine
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan, Jake Cordell, Andrew Osborn, Hugh Lawson · Reuters · Dec 21, 2022[/sup]
... while subtly diverting/distancing ...
Maybe Putin is pushing Lukashenko's Belarus into the war? That'd be a significant escalation. Would it still be illegal to call it a war? Maybe Poland and the Baltics (and Ukraine) should annex Minsk because of the danger it poses. Wouldn't dragging Belarus in be seen as a weakness, though...? I guess it could be played as Belarus accusing Ukraine of whatever transgression.
Lukashenko is doing a tightrope balancing act. Attacking Ukraine would be simply insane for Belarus. Starting from that the condition of the armed forces or the amount of Belarussian volunteers fighting already in Ukraine, one of the more stupid things to do. Yet once Belarus is such an important ally to Russia and for Russia the ability to use Belarussian territory and airspace as a safe zone from where to attack is already a huge factor. And I think the Belarussians and Lukashenko know this very well.
But I guess for Lukashenko rhetoric that hasn't got anything to do with reality is totally normal.
Kremlin says no chance of Ukraine talks as Zelenskiy travels to Washington [sup](via jpost, alarabiya)[/sup]
[sup]— Reuters · Dec 21, 2022[/sup]
Didn't really seem like there was much chance earlier, either.
Quoting Dmitry Peskov (Dec 13, 2022)
Crimea Donetsk Kherson Luhansk Zaporizhzhia constitute something in the range of a quarter of Ukraine, where Russia occupies a bit less at the moment, a sizeable part of Ukraine.
Any takeaways from Zelenskyy's visit to the US, apart from PR I mean?
(At least it's good to see that disagreement is open/unblocked (unlike ...), e.g. Gaetz, Boebert, though I'll have to admit finding it strange why anyone would vote for Boebert.)
Ukraine welcomes 'transparency' from GOP scrutiny of war aid, ambassador says
[sup]— ABC News via MSN · Dec 18, 2022[/sup]
... The Ukrainians did prepare a bit.
Quoting Martin Schirdewan (Dec 22, 2022)
That might be a bit optimistic; seems doubtful that Putin + team would get into talks on that background.
EDIT: Putin commented ...
Putin says Russia wants end to war in Ukraine
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan, Peter Graff, Frances Kerry · Reuters · Dec 22, 2022[/sup]
What stands out with the usual "unjustified losses", "prolonging the conflict", is that he could give the order now. Unless there are others (forcefully) expecting Russia to continue (and "crack" defense shielding), like people that ought to take up knitting. Maybe there's nervousness in the Kremlin about the Ukrainian support.
EDIT: Zakharova (peripherally) and Darchiev commented ...
Russia denounces EU for granting Bosnia candidacy status
[sup]— Daria Sito-Sucic, Tomasz Janowski · Reuters · Dec 23, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Maria Zakharova
Russian diplomat says NATO instructors must leave Ukraine before talks can start
[sup]— Edmund Klamann · Reuters · Dec 23, 2022[/sup]
No talks on security guarantees without recognition of true Ukrainian situation — diplomat
[sup]— TASS · Dec 23, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Alexander Darchiev
Taken together: No foreigners (EU bad too by the way), no aid, a fifth is now part of Russia, period, Ukraine to be on their own (and no voice in the matter) subject to Russian plans.
US believes Wagner mercenary group is expanding influence and took delivery of North Korean arms
[sup]— Kevin Liptak · CNN · Dec 22, 2022[/sup]
Quoting John Kirby
Quoting Yevgeny Prigozhin
Allegedly, prisoners with "serious medical conditions" are fair game, and Navalny of all people.
Navalny: mercenary boss visited his jail to recruit for Ukraine war
[sup]— Alex Richardson · Reuters · Dec 21, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Yevgeny Prigozhin
Quoting Alexei Navalny
With recruiting from state prisons, granting pardons, whatever, those groups (Wagner, Rusich, ...) are already plugged into the system. But how much of a difference are they making? Can they become a political force in Russia?
Prison inmates etc. don't make good soldiers, on the contrary. But it tells about the attitude...
The whole system is designed for there not to emerge any kind of power bloc that could rival Putin's power. That is the simple reason just why the Russian Army was and is basically so tiny even if armed forces in all are over 1 million strong (and now more). A Mercenary group and a Muslim warlord that runs a small part of Russia cannot overthrow Putin, but they know their worth and can say truthfully how bad the special military operation is going.
In truth this "separation" of military has had serious disadvantages in this war: the surprising advances of Ukraine in Kharkiv region earlier happened because the forces were mainly the National Guard units, which were designed for internal security. Fighting protesters and fighting an enemy army are two different things. Yet what should be needed to fight this war, a large Russian Army with unified command, would hand too much power to the generals from Putin.
Just like Hitler had both the Wehrmacht and the SS.
The opposition councillor who made the legal challenge said he knew it would go nowhere, but filed it to expose the "mendacity" of the system.
A St Petersburg politician has asked prosecutors to investigate Russian President Vladimir Putin for using the word "war" to describe the conflict in Ukraine, accusing the Kremlin chief of breaking his own law.
Key points:Vladimir Putin's reference to "war" runs afoul of the Kremlins laws against so-called fake newsThe legal challenge isn't expected to affect the Russian presidentInternal critics of Russia's war have previously faced harsh repercussions
Mr Putin has for months described his invasion as a "special military operation".
He signed laws in March that prescribe steep fines and jail terms for discrediting or spreading "deliberately false information" about the armed forces, putting people at risk of prosecution if they call the war by its name.
But he departed from his usual language on Thursday when he told reporters:
"Our goal is not to spin the flywheel of military conflict, but, on the contrary, to end this war."
Nikita Yuferev, an opposition councillor in the city where Mr Putin was born, said he knew his legal challenge would go nowhere, but he had filed it to expose the "mendacity" of the system.
"It's important for me to do this to draw attention to the contradiction and the injustice of these laws that he [Putin] adopts and signs but which he himself doesn't observe," he told Reuters.
"I think the more we talk about this, the more people will doubt his honesty, his infallibility, and the less support he will have."
In his challenge, filed in an open letter, Mr Yuferev asked the prosecutor general and interior minister to "hold [Putin] responsible under the law for spreading fake news about the actions of the Russian army".
Russia’s president built a power structure designed to deliver him the information he wants to hear, feeding into his miscalculations on the Ukraine war
Secret Service Members Found To Be Part of Far-Right Extremist Group—Report
[sup]— Darragh Roche · Newsweek vis MSN · Dec 13, 2022[/sup]
2018 Chemnitz protests
[sup]— Wikipedia · ongoing[/sup]
Some reemergence lately...
White Crusade: How to Prevent Right-Wing Extremists from Exploiting the Internet (pdf)
[sup]— Christina Schori Liang, John Cross · GCSP · Jul 2020[/sup]
Anyway, warring breeds hate. I'm expecting some of that among Ukrainians.
:/
Yes, ultranationalists are much alike in their way of identifying themselves through who they wish to expel or worse.
Eastern European nations have the extra twist of having had some of their populations participate in the Shoah. Other groups fought for autonomy against the Red Army or against the Germans depending on who was seen as the bigger threat. Ukraine had the special attention of Stalin before the war when much of the population was starved to death in order to eliminate the Kulaks. The swirling series of conflicting ends defies simple categories. The groups mentioned have a number of overlaps that History still has not resolved.
But to return to your point, Ukraine does have a lot on its plate if it survives.
I think the biggest problem is that basically Eastern European history isn't even looked at itself, but we in the West focus on the region either as a theatre for the implementation of the Holocaust or a geographical area where Germany and Soviet Union clashed during WW2. And then afterwards that these countries were either under Soviet rule or were their satellite countries. Some Katyn massacre is a side note some might know, but otherwise there is actually blissful ignorance especially what the Soviet Union did in the areas it occupied.
The real problem is that naturally during Soviet times anything critical to Soviet rule wasn't tolerated, history was only a tool for Soviet propaganda (and in Putin's Russia still is) and there wasn't much if any study what happened behind the Iron Curtain. Huge events, like just how long Soviet Union faced an insurgency against it's rule in the Baltics (and other places) is something people really don't know. That every tenth Lithuanian was deported to gulags hardly matters and the new countries simply cannot voice their own history.
Russian propaganda, which wants to white wash Stalin now, eagerly has played and will play the Hitler card and tries especially to portray for the American and West European audience East Europeans as nazi sympathizers and racists. After all, why would you support people who neonazis? And this works. This is evident in the case of Ukraine and obvious even in this thread, where a favorite subject has been for some to portray (and thus back up Putin's claims) Ukrainians being ruled by neonazis.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has participated in the support and encouragement of European and U.S. ultranationalists. Some of that is geared toward normalizing their agendas as discussed here by ORF. The violent and terrorist end of the spectrum can be seen in groups like the Russian Imperialist Movement. The international quality of that group is reflected in reports such as the following from OSCE:
Now, this element does not prove that the nation is ruled by this contingent alone. Russia does go pretty far in letting them think they are calling the shots. The brutality of the rules of engagement does nothing to belie that impression. At some point, actions reveal more than statements of intent.
Quoting OSCE
... and Rusich ... :/ The invasion wasn't about that stuff anyway. A ruse, an excuse.
And Viktor Bout busts out of prison to run to that end of the field.
Neil Young put it best: "A different story for every set of eyes."
Why would you go after those organizations you sponsor?
It fits perfectly the bullshit narrative which Russian propaganda is based on. That the cause is to fight "neonazis" while promoting and supporting neonazis and the far right both in Russia and abroad. I first noticed this absurdity few years ago when Finnish neonazi groups invited Russian far-right groups to "celebrate" Finnish independence. It's as odd as Russian Imperial Movement celebrating Karl XII's memorial day in Sweden. Perhaps they were there celebrating the defeat of Karl XII by Peter the Great? Then of course, the memorial day of the battle of Pultava would be the proper date.
They just can't help acting like movie supervillains, can they?
In related news: Putin gives eight golden ‘rings of power’ to CIS leaders, keeping another for himself
Meanwhile, Ukraine is looking at talks with UN as mediator.
Ukraine Wants Peace Summit At UN By End Of February
[sup]— RFE/RL · Dec 26, 2022[/sup]
Ukraine live briefing: Putin bans sale of Russian oil to countries involved in price cap; Kyiv seeks U.N. peace summit
[sup]— Kelsey Ables, Leo Sands, Sammy Westfall · Washington Post · Dec 27, 2022[/sup]
Putin + team is going to read the fineprint and opt out, is my guess, unless something changes.
Taking the reins would be pushing ahead with the proposal either way.
Russia's Lavrov: West and Ukraine Want to Destroy Russia [sup](via US News)[/sup]
[sup]— Lidia Kelly, Michael Perry · Reuters · Dec 27, 2022[/sup]
Notice how Lavrov's rhetoric would apply the same if Russia was to assimilate those five oblasts.
Apparently they ignore that Russia will just have to make due without Ukraine (if Ukraine + supporters have their way)?
Russia without Ukraine is doomed for destruction...? Absurd. That would take quite a lot, though admittedly Putin ain't helping.
Further east ...
A Russian critic of Putin died after falling out of a hotel window in India
[sup]— Niharika Sharma · Quartz · Dec 27, 2022[/sup]
Hmm seems like a trend of sorts? Critique brings bad luck?
Not Russia. Putin.
I see your rings of power and raise you the Borg:
Correct: As reported by many sources, Russia’s abductions of Ukrainian children are a genocidal crime.
Perhaps you can provide a source that proves this reporting is fake news.
Explainer: What is Zelenskiy's 10-point peace plan?
[sup]— Lidia Kelly, Michael Perry · Reuters · Dec 27, 2022[/sup]
[sup]1. Radiation and nuclear safety, focusing on restoring safety around Europe's largest nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine, which is now-Russian occupied.
2. Food security, including protecting and ensuring Ukraine's grain exports to the world's poorest nations.
3. Energy security, with focus on price restrictions on Russian energy resources, as well as aiding Ukraine with restoring its power infrastructure, half of which has been damaged by Russian attacks.
4. Release of all prisoners and deportees, including war prisoners and children deported to Russia.
5. Restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and Russia reaffirming it according [to] the U.N. Charter, which Zelenskiy said is "not up to negotiations".
6. Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, restoration of Ukraine's state borders with Russia.
7. Justice, including the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes.
8. Ecocide, protection of environment, with focus on demining and restoring water treatment facilities.
9. Prevention of escalation of conflict, and building security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including guarantees for Ukraine.
10. Confirmation of the war's end, including a document signed by the involved parties.[/sup]
The article has a few more comments. Unlikely that Putin + team will accept this plan.
Peripherally, regarding 2/5...
Larger Wheat Harvest in Ukraine Than Expected
[sup]— NASA · Dec 4, 2022[/sup]
Exclusive: Crimea showers Syria with wheat, Ukraine cries foul [sup](via US News)[/sup]
[sup]— Jonathan Saul, Maha El Dahan, Maya Gebeily, Nigel Hunt, Pavel Polityuk, Frank Jack Daniel · Reuters · Dec 19, 2022[/sup]
Hmm... :chin:
No sources have proven Russia has kidnapped Ukrainian children or committed a genocidal crime in doing so. Shouldn't you provide the sources proving that
Russia has moved Russian-Ukrainian orphans out of the Donbass territories Ukraine has shelled and to the safety of Russia. But that is neither kidnapping nor genocide
Proof is going to be difficult to establish from Russian documentation and witnesses until after the war.
There are many reports of Ukrainian parents trying to get their kids back from deportation as seen here: Ukrainians struggle to find and reclaim children taken by Russia.
I read your version of the story at Tass but it is does not match reports from Kherson by medical professionals and their families working to prevent Russians from taking their orphans. Several paragraphs from one article:
You can find similar reports from other occupied areas. While you work the search engines, I suggest looking into the career of Ombudsman Maria Lvova-Belova.
In any case, please point to sources beyond the Russian government-controlled media to tell a different story. It will make it more interesting.
Child abductions in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
[sup]— Wikipedia · ongoing[/sup]
Putin’s Advocate for Child Welfare Is Straight-Up Stealing Kids in Ukraine, U.K. Says
[sup]— Allison Quinn · The Daily Beast · Jun 16, 2022[/sup]
Canada sanctions Russian ‘architect’ of Ukraine child abduction scheme
[sup]— The Associated Press via Global News · Aug 25, 2022[/sup]
Children of war
[sup]— Alina Rohach · New Eastern Europe · Sep 12, 2022[/sup]
"Now, they are ours". Russia and child abduction, the evidence of trafficking.
[sup]— Jean-Marc Adolphe · les humanités · Sep 19, 2022[/sup]
Ukraine parents ‘want their children back’ from Russia
[sup]— Al Jazeera · Oct 7, 2022[/sup]
How Moscow grabs Ukrainian kids and makes them Russians
[sup]— Sarah El Deeb, Anastasiia Shvets, Elizaveta Tilna, Lori Hinnant, Cara Anna, Erika Kinetz · AP News · Oct 13, 2022[/sup]
Russia abducting Ukrainian children, putting up for adoption in Russia
[sup]— The Jerusalem Post · Oct 17, 2022[/sup]
How a Mariupol father survived a Russian POW camp and traveled to Moscow to save his kids
[sup]— Svetlana Martova, Sam Breazeale · Meduza · Nov 4, 2022[/sup]
Russia's forced deportation of Ukrainian children is genocide with identifiable perpetrators
[sup]— Halya Coynash · Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group · Dec 9, 2022[/sup]
20 children abducted by the Russian Federation were returned to Ukraine: among them is the daughter of a servicewoman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
[sup]— Khrystyna Velychanska, Julia Sokolova · Fakty ICTV · Dec 17, 2022[/sup]
Sorry, but if there was actual proof of Russia kidnapping kids, then there would be evidence from the Ukraine side and there isnt'. Without it, it makes no sense to make baseless accusations of kidnapping, much less genocide. As I said, Russia and the Donbass have admitted to moving orphans from places currently--and in the past--being shelled by Donbass; that is neither kidnapping nor genocide and is a good thing
In any case, Neither Maria Lvova-Bulova's biased claims or the others you report are backed up with any evidence at all. So, please point to sources beyond those biased, un-supported claims...even biased ones supported with evidence...as you haven't so far. It will make it more interesting
The Ukrainians' accounts do not count as any kind of evidence for you. What sort of verification of their experience would be meaningful for you?
While you acknowledge that the Russians have not provided any evidence for their account, you take it as the narrative to be proved otherwise. The Russians do admit that they adopt these children without proof of their origins.
Before claiming such absurd denials, why don't you go through piece by piece the for example the links that @jorndoe gave are baseless and untrue.
It's one thing to argue that the actions are "genocidal", just how common these actions are, it is totally another thing to claim there is no evidence at all of this as you are saying.
But of course you can argue that the only truthful media outlets is the Russian media (like Tass). I assume there you can find denials about the cases.
And there is no evidence of any genocidal actions and you haven't shown any evidence showing my saying so is wrong
And I never said Tass was the only truthful media...that's an absurd claim
While you acknowledge that the Russians have not provided any evidence for their account, you take it as the narrative to be proved otherwise. The Russians do admit that they adopt these children without proof of their origins.767384"]
No, accounts alone are not evidence; they need factual support which these accounts do not have. That's the verification that is needed. And I don't take any account without evidence. If someone claims Zelensky is a mass murderer, apparently you feel the denial of that claim needs as much evidence as the claim itself...it doesn't
And adopting orphans isn't kidnapping or genocide, particularly when they come from the Russian-ethnic Donbass. Sorry. Do you want those orphans to go without families?
Whatever verification you ask for from the Ukrainians should be required of the Russians whose account you refer to as factual. Your rhetorical question is a nice bit of agitprop.
Human Rights Watch, "We Had No Choice": "Filtration" and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia, September 1, 2022.
Amnesty International, Ukraine: Russia’s unlawful transfer of civilians a war crime and likely a crime against humanity, November 10, 2022.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Hilarious. First, you haven't said anything to show in your 8 remarks on this Forum, and one day being here.
If there's no evidence, then according to you, out of thin air Canada sanctions "Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s children’s rights commissioner, who has been accused by Ukraine of organizing the removal of children from the Luhansk and Donetsk regions".
Or since you think there's no evidence, how about the UN? How do they come to the following conclusion months ago:
see here
But seems like the UN or Amnesty International, as @SophistiCat mentioned, seem to be just promoting fictional anti-Russian propaganda. Or then we can look just what you have contributed here.
Pure classic trolling from you.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/01/02/trapped-in-the-trenches-in-ukraine
"Hilarious. First, you haven't said anything to show in your 8 remarks on this Forum, and one day being here.
If there's no evidence, then according to you, out of thin air Canada sanctions "Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s children’s rights commissioner, who has been accused by Ukraine of organizing the removal of children from the Luhansk and Donetsk regions".
Or since you think there's no evidence, how about the UN coming to the following conclusion months ago"
LOL, what is hilarious is your thinking I haven't said anything to show when that actually describes you. And sanctions and conclusions aren't proof of Russian malfeasance, just proof of Canadian and Ukrainian bias and opinion against Russia....all without support. And yes, since those groups you mention provide no evidence, they are just pushing propaganda....like others false claims Russia blew up the Nordstream or Ukraine's Azov batallions aren't Nazis
So, the only classic trolling has been yours
Uh-oh, someone's getting upset....and I am certainly not the "freak" in this discussion. None of those passages you provided showed any proof of any kidnapping or genocidal activity, and Human Rights Watch has close ties to the American defense industry
Nice try
Wrong. The accuser is required to support the claim, not the accuser. Using your bad logic, if someone accused you of being a murderer, you would be required to prove you are not or go to jail. So, the nice bit of agitprop is all yours
What you have not provided support for is your statement:
Quoting Lambert Strether
Quoting Lambert Strether
Any Ukrainian children that has been taken to Russia, shipped off by/to someone they don't know, will have to be documented in sufficient detail and publicly, especially so that remaining family/guardians can find them. So far, Russian kidnapp...err authorities haven't provided much. Some Ukrainian parents/families have nonetheless managed to find their children — already documented in posted reports — examples.
, support yes (a fair amount at that), deductive proof no (if that's what you're looking for). If you just dismiss what's been reported with a casual handwave, then you haven't contributed anything here, which might be why some have used the t word.
Anyway, personally I'm not inclined to repeat yet again. (In particular not to someone that waltzes in and repeats/parrots old cruft yet again.) :) Have a good New Year. :up:
It is turned into anti-Russian propaganda when people start referring to "deportations" and "genocides", trying to draw not-so-subtle historical parallels.
You have no idea Russia hasn't done these things. They're in a war, remember...neither country is freely exchanging information....and your own "evidence" supports the fact these children aren't being genocided. Kidnapping, indeed :roll:
"Support yes (a fair amount at that), deductive proof no (if that's what you're looking for). If you just dismiss what's been reported with a casual handwave, then you haven't contributed anything here, which might be why some have used the t word."
Sorry, but unfounded stories and anecdotes---even a fair amount--are neither support nor deductive proof. So, I dismissed nothing as nothing supportive was provided. You're the one dismissing that fact with a casual handwave so the t word better applies to you and your friends
I just joined the forum, so I can hardly keep up with what has been discussed before me. You, however, are clearly unable to counter what I said about Ukraine's cultural Nazi problem and Nazi problem in its military
Either way, have a happy New Year :grin:
Yep, they're support. Not deductive proof, but support, yep. Not sure why you'd contradict that. Oh well.
Quoting Lambert Strether
Quoting Dec 20, 2022 (765405)
Anyway, several references quotes observations whatever have already been posted in ? that regard. There's also a bit irony in that, given the claimants. :D
Quoting Lambert Strether
What claims are they again...?
Quoting Lambert Strether
Quoting Lambert Strether
Quoting Lambert Strether
Quoting Lambert Strether
Quoting Lambert Strether
Tu quoque'ish.
Quoting Lambert Strether
Isn't that what we call a poisoning the well fallacy, this being a philosophy forum an'all?
Sorry, Jorndoe, but that was an unhinged rant misrepresenting and/or snipping my points while making ridiculous and unfounded claims against them
I won't be reading or responding to your nonsense any further
Be well
Is not the matter to attend to is whether these events are happening or not?
The Russians are employing the language of "not-so-subtle historical parallels." Are you promoting a nihilism where nobody is talking about anything?
Sure.
How does pre-emptively framing Russia's actions as genocide help in figuring out what is happening?
It doesn't, of course, and that's not what this is about. It's about demonizing Russia, and I expect better from the people on this forum.
Quoting Paine
You would be the one promoting a cynical nihilism if your argument for why you should spread your propaganda is because the other side is doing it too.
And I for one expected better from this forum than endless obfuscation and lies in defense of a murderous dictatorship, but this is what we get.
UN and Amnesty International? I think that does it for you.
Quoting Lambert Strether
I think for a troll like you, that might be very useful for everybody to disregard your nonsense.
And the endless obfuscation and lies in defense of a murderous dictatorship has been those made for Zelensky and his--and the previous Poroshenko--regime, which has murdered Russian Ukrainians of the Donbass through shellings and torture-murders by its Azov Nazi battalion, not to mention its outlawing the Russian Orthodox church, all opposing political parties, and executions of prisoners of war
One has to remember that there's a war going on. The purpose isn't even to have a discussion, the purpose is just to repeat the position, however delirious it is, again and again. In hope that genuine participants would leave.
— Lambert Strether
UN and Amnesty International?
Yes, the UN has already admitted to lying about Russia supposedly taking Viagra to rape Ukrainian women and Amnesty said nothing about genocide and has proven to be biased against Russia this whole war....although they have been highly critical of Zelensky's regime and the Azov Nazis in the past
And since we each clearly consider each other to be trolls, we should not continue discussing any further. I certainly won't read any more of your posts
A fine bit of projection. :ok:
The most obvious and clear case (and totally separate from this issue) was many years ago when there was a classic ponzi scheme in my country. Once the scheme was up and they didn't make payments anymore, naturally the criminals had to distance themselves from the upcoming criminal inquiry. Hence some people had a genuine motive for making people to wait before contacting the police, believing that it was only technical glitch that would be restored. And hence normal financial threads went haywire: anyone stating the obvious, that this was a ponzi scheme, got immediately attacked and ridiculed and the first sites that reported the ponzi scheme got a huge amount of shit poured on them. Volume is of a quality of it's own, especially on a discussion forum and in the social media.
What surprised me was just how easily the discussion forums were changed, but then again, there was only a few sites here where economic and financial things were discussed. Hence a few people can do wonders.
The case above was quite obvious. But when you venture into politics, it's different and obviosly many do hold the views, but still the same mechanism can work.
Comrade Stalin said that, I think. Quantity has a quality all its own. Very true. Boethius used to write volumes.
[sup]— Jake Cordell, Kevin Liffey · Reuters · Dec 27, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Dmitry Peskov
:D Meanwhile, Kyiv is extremely concerned about 1000s of missiles/drones having bombed (and continue to bomb) Ukraine regularly, leaving behind destruction (and deaths).
As far as I recall (unreliable), three stray missiles have originated from Ukrainian anti-missile/drone efforts, in each of Poland, Moldova, Belarus, though I'd sort of expect more that haven't been found (yet).
While stray missiles certainly is a concern, it looks like the Kremlin is attempting to divert attention. Not sure if they're trying to goad Belarus, though a more active Belarusian role would be in their interest.
2022 Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure
[sup]— Wikipedia · ongoing[/sup]
National Bank: Ukraine’s GDP to fall by one third in 2022; Russian attacks on energy system imperil economy
[sup]— Dinara Khalilova · Kyiv Independent via Yahoo News · Dec 27, 2022[/sup]
His main thesis: "It's democratic expansion, not NATO expansion that has created this tension between Putin and the west and Putin and Ukraine."
Not much new for most of us here, but one of the arguments that he gives in support of this thesis is that relationships between Putin's regime and the West weren't always that hostile. What's more, NATO expansion wasn't much on the agenda until very recently - when there actually was no cause to raise this as a concern, since Ukraine wasn't going to be admitted to NATO any time soon, if ever. He recalls that in all the high-level talks where he was present (he was ambassador during Obama's administration) the expansion of NATO was hardly ever brought up.
McFaul also recently and famously said lying is part of diplomacy, so his credibility and veracity are not high level
I merely pointed out that both sides are making "not-so-subtle historical parallels" after you characterized that such language proved a statement was propaganda.
I don't share your view that the incidents being reported are only propaganda. If they are fabrications, that would be a terrible lie, as consequential as it would be if the Russians are correct that the massacre at Bucha was a staged photo op. Hopefully, investigations will bring more light to such incidents.
That's not my view.
Objective reporting is fine. Framing is propaganda.
It's the difference between speaking of displaced civilians or of genocides and deportations.
I hope and assume you're smart enough to tell the difference.
Why make it a matter of my capacity? That is pure troll.
Agreed. NATO is neither here nor there. The reason Putin panicked is his fear of the people.
[sup]— Jake Cordell, Kevin Liffey · Reuters · Dec 31, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Summary
Nothing new I guess, that's what he wants others to hear
• Nazis
• West out to destroy Russia
• existential fight
• historical territory (Ukraine)
• preserve Russia's greatness and independence
• call for nationalism
So, naught towards reconciliation/peace, more like the opposite :/
The point wasn't that it couldn't happen. The point was that you've given no credible reason to apply the notion to one 'side' and not the other. The pro-US position you and others espouse here is repeated no less fervently, no less hopeful that contrary voices will simply leave, no less seeking to dominate the space of discourse with a single narrative. You've all employed precisely the same tactics (if not worse) labelling any dissenting opinion as 'pro-Russian', dismissing sources other than your preferred ones as 'biased', treating views as 'beneath response' to try and maintain a sense that only your opinions are the 'serious' ones. These are all pretty much the standard tactics you describe.
I see you refer to the oft repeated John Mearsheimer argument. It has been championed by many commenters on this thread. For me, the most cogent challenges to his view come from writers Jan Smole?sk and Jan Dutkiewicz. Their article in The New Republic ends with:
Here is an article from an author critical of NATO after working there:
Myth 03: ‘Russia was promised that NATO would not enlarge’
He addresses particular points of Mearsheimer's argument. The Chatham House authors are interesting because many have had long experience in commerce and policy in the region.
It's unsurprising that some experts support the US's position. It would be positively alarming if every expert on the planet opposed their actions.
So all we have is some experts supporting one narrative and some experts supporting another. The only matter for debate then is why you believe one and not the other.
It can't be persuasiveness, unless you want to set yourself up as being even more expert that the experts such that you can judge between them on the merits of the arguments.
So what is it that draws you toward these two?
Did you read the articles?
Yes. I expect Mearsheimer has too. Since he hasn't reneged on his position I assume there remains room for expert, informed disagreement. Have I missed some response from those maintaining the contrary position?
I just realized that I had not provided a link to the first article. I edited to fix. Here it is again: https://newrepublic.com/article/165603/carlson-russia-ukraine-imperialism-nato
What makes sense to me in both articles is that the simplicity of there being only a U.S. position or not leaves out important parts of how the war developed. The criticism of the U.S. is fair on many levels but it often becomes too U.S centric in itself. Everything between Washington and Moscow becomes flyover country. So, the following paragraph points to an element studiously avoided in Mearsheimer's argument:
Beyond not accepting the zero sum game of the Great Powers argument, the merit of Lough's approach is that he considers developments between Europeans left out of the U.S. centric narratives. He also raises the question of how promises made to the USSR relate to one of the nations that appeared after it dissolved. I don't know if Mearsheimer every expressly addressed that.
That's because it is.
Besides Washington and Moscow, the only thing that matters is the performance of the Ukrainian military. There isn't any other actor worth mentioning. The Ukrainian people have been given a choice - fight or surrender. That's all the influence they have in this war.
That doesn't stop other actors from trying to appear important, though. The European Union has certainly elevated that into an art, tanking their own economy with sanctions that are apparently not even hurting Russia.
Quoting Paine
Kind of hard to imagine a serious scholar making that argument, but alas there it is.
Russia and the USSR occupy roughly the same land mass. They share roughly the same core strategic interests.
Those promises were made to the USSR to acknowledge their legitime security concerns and thereby promote peace and stability. The way they relate to Russia today depends on how eager we are for conflict and war with Russia.
Lough is putting the cart before the horse here in a way that is almost child-like.
Which particular statement of Lough's are you referring to? Or are you only responding to my description of it as a point of interest?
Quoting Tzeentch
Many of them have expressed that as their choice. Your version of them as soulless puppets is as dismissive of their agency as any version of colonial right you charge being exerted by other states upon them.
If you want people to take you seriously here, you'll need to take the strawmanning down several notches.
Quoting Paine
It's not a matter of agency. It's a matter of power, which they have comparatively little. It's unfortunate, but that's the way the world works.
At this point Ukraine is turning into the next Vietnam. You may make of that what you will.
How is my comment an example of the strawman argument? You charged that the Ukrainians have to accept one set of conditions or another. You say that neither possibility involve choices they are making for themselves. You pour crocodile tears upon them with:
Quoting Tzeentch
It doesn't get more imperial than that.
I am still curious if you have a particular objection to Lough's actual argument.
So, what sort of verification would compel you to take these charges seriously?
Can you explain the long term consequences of this war?
In what way is this too US-centric, rather than, say, just exactly US-centric enough?
Quoting Paine
And what do you think is the cause of this 'studious avoidance'? Is Mearsheimer losing his mind? Paid by the Russians? I mean Mearsheimer obviously doesn't think he's studiously avoided it. He thinks he's covered it (or that it's not relevant), so what's the cause of this discrepancy?
Quoting Paine
In what way is this the 'merit', rather than, say, the flaw? Obviously Mearsheimer didn't consider developments between Europeans relevant (or he thought he'd covered that), otherwise he would change his position. Since he's more expert than you, you're not really in a position to judge whether the inclusion of these developments is meritorious or mistaken. You can only decide who to believe and you don't have sufficient expertise to do so on technical grounds.
There are several expert-informed arguments regarding this war that have been put forward, many opposing each other. None of us here have sufficient expertise to decide between them on their technical merits, so we must be doing so by some other means. I've been trying, for the last 400 pages, to get at what some of those reasons are. All I've got so far is that whatever they are, people are so embarrassed about them that they'll try literally anything to avoid talking about them.
I never referred to the Ukrainians as "soulless" - that's a misrepresentation of my argument and a tasteless one at that, aimed specifically at framing me as anti-Ukrainian.
Quoting Paine
I stated specifically that the Ukrainians have a choice between fighting or surrendering.
Quoting Paine
It's the reality. Sugarcoating won't do the Ukrainians any good.
Quoting Paine
His point is that no formal promises were made, and Russia isn't the USSR.
I've already given you my objection to that sentiment.
This is classic example of what I'm talking about. There's no 'argument'. Lough makes two points...
...and...
These are both certainly possible alternative ways of looking at the issue.
One could say "only formal guarantees matter" or one could say "no, informal guarantees and implications are equally important explanations"
One could say "the modern Russia is not the inheritor of guarantees made to the former USSR" or one could say it is.
Neither are matters of fact, like gravity or 1+1 being 2. They are alternative ways of looking at the issue. So the question remains as to why one would choose to look at it that way and not the other.
Thanks for the article. It nicely exposes the willful ignorance and parochialism of westplaining Ukraine. One phrase strikes a false note though:
This suggests some sort of parity between Western and Russian intervention in Ukraine over the last 20 years. But that's blatantly false. I am not even sure what they meant by Western intervention, other than the West just being there as a major presence on the world stage going about its business. That can't be ignored, of course, but that in itself doesn't usually merit the characterization of "intervening." As far as anyone knows, Western dealings with Ukraine were open and consensual. It's not like they strong-armed and corrupted Ukrainian officials, penetrated the military and security apparatus, attempted assassinations, played power games with gas supply, issued threats and ultimatums, and finally intervened militarily - Russia provably did all of those things.
On the matter of agency:
It is pretty insane to think that Ukrainians defending their country against Russian invasion are merely doing someone else's bidding. Now, if we look at Russian fighters, there is some truth to that characterization. By all accounts, when Russian soldiers were ordered into Ukraine on February 24, it came as a shock to them, as it did for the rest of the country. They had a very vague idea of what they were fighting for, and still do. And that is reflected in the poor troop morale on the Russian side, which just about everyone acknowledges. The difference with Ukrainian defenders is stark.
Besides, Ukraine is a very different country than Russia. Whereas Russia has been living under a progressively more repressive autocratic rule for the last 20 years, Ukraine has had two democratic revolutions over the same period. Even during the most oppressive years of Yanukovich's rule, they still had opposition representation in politics, and a lively and diverse media landscape. And since Yanukovich's fall they have elected and then voted out one president and voted in another. Who wasn't doing so great before the Russian invasion, by the way: Zelensky's ratings were pretty low going into 2022. So to assert that Ukrainians are fighting for Zelensky is just as insane as to assert that they are fighting for NATO.
On the chess board, the frontlines haven't moved much recently, despite much blighting.
Roughly four questions of relevance ...
1. How is voluntary exposure to so-called "Western culture" destroying Russia? Is this up to Putin to decide for all Russians anyway...?
2. What has Kyiv done and continues doing to be labeled a Nazi regime? Needing to be liberated/assimilated by Russia, under Moscow/Kremlin control?
3. What dire existential threat is NATO to Russia? Say, is Russia doomed to destruction, can't go on, without Crimea being a part of Russia?
4. What warrants depriving Ukraine (the chance) to develop via (further democratic) self-determination/governance?
Inquiries (not answers), derived from public statements, including supposed rationale for war.
Russia as a great power would cease to exist for the foreseeable future if (parts of) Ukraine were to become militarized by an anti-Russian military alliance.
I've gone over the reasons for this several times, but most importantly Crimea and southern Ukraine is what connects Russia to its strategic allies like Iran and Syria, and they're also what connects the Russian heartland via rivers to the oceans through the Sea of Azov (Volga / Volga-Don Canal / Don / Sea of Azov).
That's disregarding Ukrainian defense/resistance, which weakens Russia.
I suppose something similar would hold for other areas; Crimea stands out for mentioned geographical-political-military reasons.
Russia without isn't doomed for destruction, though, but militarily (and resources-wise) weaker.
In other words all the people who are likely to think otherwise.
Imagine if Northern Ireland policy were decided entirely by consulting only the population of England. Or more accurately for Ukraine...ignoring the population of Northern Ireland, but consulting the population of Switzerland.
Somehow I doubt one could do a poll in Donetsk right now.
No. I don't suppose they could. Nothing in which difficulty renders a poll about ceding territory which doesn't even consult the people living in the fucking territory concerned anything less than a sham.
That such polls are done is entirely understandable.
That they're cited by people not even involved in this war to prop up the blatant war profiteering of the most powerful nation on earth is not.
Why the outrage?
Obviously we haven't gone over some tipping point in the war where the outcome would be obvious. Hence the long term consequences are totally up in the air. Countries can have dramatic humiliating losses in war and still continue as if nothing, with no true change of policy or any critical self reflection: just look at how the US has nearly forgotten it's longest war in it's history, that finally ended up in a humiliating withdrawal that caused an immediate collapse.
As long as Russia has it's imperial ambitions and it's leaders see the dissolution of the Soviet Union as an unfortunate accident, basically North and Eastern Europe will see it as a potential threat (some even as an immediate threat) and this will create the tension independent of the outcome in Ukraine.
The British understand that they don't have an empire anymore. Any Brit calling the UK to invade and annex Ireland back to Great Britain would be seen by others to be a crazy person. The Austrians understand it too: nobody is having dreams to bring back the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The French still behave as a colonial power in Africa, but try to hide from their own population and others.
Yet the Russians see still Imperial Russia as what Russia is. That's the basic security problem that Russia creates for Europe.
Ha! I wouldn't say we're replying to each other. Technically, maybe, but in spirit, no.
There's two types of post from the pro-US contingent, either spam-posting pro-US news stories, or dismissing anti-US posts as being pro-Russian (or worse).
We could pretend to be experts, analysing the data as if we knew better than those who've already done that work...but short of a ego-stroking LARPing game I don't much see the point. Which leaves the only real matter for discussion our ideological bases. The reasons why we choose one expert over another (presuming we've rightly eliminated from serious discussion those who can provide no expert support for their positions).
In my view, a discussion between laymen on this subject can only really consist of idle speculation (sometimes fun), or ideological conflicts and their exposition. What we have here is neither. Facebook nation has twisted every discussion into nothing more than a crude exercise in tribal taxonomy.
You simply don't see that Nordic or Eastern European people would (or could) have ideas of their own in this case. And to simply forget the role of the Ukrainians in this war is, well, condescending. Because this war is a matter especially between Ukrainians and Russians, not the West Europeans and the Americans.
Quoting Isaac
Likely for you the issue is so distant that it's some kind of LARPin game. And of course, the war might be something that absolutely doesn't affect your life.
I can take my car now, drive 20 kilometers to the Russian border and see the closed shopping mall where my family could go shopping high end products and eat, but now has gone bankrupt thanks to absence of Russian tourists because of the war. The border crossing is now even more empty than it was during when there was the Soviet Union there. That was thirty years ago.
Pro-Putin operatives in Germany work to turn Berlin against Ukraine
In Germany some are clamouring for a change in course on Ukraine. Key figures in the campaign have links to the Russian state or far right, a Reuters investigation has found.
By Polina Nikolskaya, Mari Saito, Maria Tsvetkova and Anton Zverev
Jan. 3, 2023, noon GMT
... Reuters found that some of the loudest agitators for a change in German policy [towards Ukraine] have two faces. Some use aliases, and have undisclosed ties to Russia and Russian entities under international sanctions, or to far-right organisations. ...
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-germany-influencers/
You're framing it as an error, or an oversight without arguing the case. Yes. I'm ignoring (largely) the role of the Nordic countries, the Eastern European nations and the Ukrainians. Not because they don't have a role, but because it's not radically different to the US's. Big industry lobbyists push political agendas which serve their interests. they do so in the US, Europe, Sweden and Ukraine. Influence over media agendas manipulates a proletariat, the support of which is then used to justify the original objective. There's little point in discussing which flag they operate under, especially considering most are multi-national companies.
The notion of independent nation states with their own culture and unique objectives belongs to a colonial era of World Wars and imperialism. But it's hellish convenient when the arms industry needs another war.
So if you think it's an error, argue the case. Why do you still believe in nation states? What leaves you unconvinced about the massive influence corporate lobbying has over foreign policy? Why should we believe polls and vox pops are anything but cynical attempts to manipulate data to appear favourable to powerful interests.
Here's what we have...
1. American (and other) arms industries and energy companies are making a fortune from this war. Plus a swathe of American industries will benefit from the crippling of Russia. American senators and representatives are open about the fact that it's in America's interests to fight Russia in Ukraine.
2. American government and corporation have several channels, both legitimate, and clandestine, through which they can manipulate global affairs, and they're one of the most powerful forces in that game
Nether (1) nor (2) are even contested, they're taken as established facts.
You're asking us to believe that despite (2) being true, (1) just happened anyway, by chance. That despite having the power to bring X about and X being in their best interests, they didn't actually bring X about, but it just happened anyway.
Imagine if I could compel you all to write "Isaac is great" for your next posts, we all know I have the power. Then you write "Isaac is great" for your next posts, and I say "I didn't do it, it just happened anyway". Would you find that default position remotely plausible?
Everything that's happening in Ukraine is happening almost exactly in a way that benefits powerful interests who we know for a fact have sufficient influence to steer events such as these. And benefit them, not just in an ordinary way, but to a level virtually unprecedented in history. Profit margins the likes of which have barely been seen before. And you want me to believe they just got lucky. They nobly restrained themselves from exercising the power no-one disputes they have and were rewarded by God for that restraint by getting the thing they wanted anyway?
It's just absurd on it's face. If very powerful interests benefit massively from something they had the power to bring about, they brought it about.
If you think "the proletariat" in these countries are so high on the opium of media agendas, I would beg to differ.
First and foremost, on a thread about the war in Ukraine to ignore the Ukrainians is something I would think being an mistake as they themselves surprised the West ...and of course Putin too.
Then for example the change in Sweden and Finland, where any discussion of joining NATO wasn't going anywhere before, suddenly a huge reversal from a small minority to a huge majority happened basically overnight left the politicians to desperately to change their stances and react. (For example after 24th February our social democrat prime minister first proposed that NATO membership should be discussed in the social democrat party meeting in the summer, then had to backtrack and had to start immediate negotiations with her party's members of Parliament and with other parties.)
Or then we could go and discuss just how unprepared the "military-industrial complex" was with the events. Prime example would be Germany, with it's huge problems in rearming even if it wanted to do it.
Yet, if you ignore all above and other issues just because "their role isn't radically different to the US", then that just doesn't give an accurate answers to what is happening.
But I guess that doesn't interest you, because it seems to be the typical tankist view. And all other talk is just pro-US propaganda.
Quoting Isaac
Sorry, but we aren't as post-nationalist / post-nation state as you think (or hope) we are. Try not to think of other people as being like you. (And weren't you from the UK? Didn't you have Brexit some time ago?)
And Russia is the example of classic imperialism in this case, btw. The world is far more similar to the 20th and 19th Century you imagine.
Well, it all goes further still ...
CNN Exclusive: A single Iranian attack drone found to contain parts from more than a dozen US companies
[sup]— Natasha Bertrand · CNN · Jan 4, 2023[/sup]
Quoting Gregor Rodehüser (Infineon)
Quoting Dec 15, 2022
Quoting Nov 14, 2022
Quoting Dec 15, 2022
The workings of capitalism, free/open enterprising, redistribution/resale, globalization, etc, ...
All it takes is one threat or aggressor (or fear), and we find ourselves in a predicament. I guess the fearful can DIY or pay others. If such initial threats could be done away with, or perhaps sufficiently minimized, then the predicament wouldn't be much of a concern.
The quote above, though, converges on conspiracy theory. Whether such a nefarious conspiracy exists or not, threats and predicaments persist just the same. :/
Don't forget tensions between democracies and autocracies/dictatorships here.
Exposed Outpost Russian Threats to Baltic Security and Transatlantic Responses
[sup]— Vasquez, Akturan, Shura, Li, Rajski, Sarkes, Castro · European Horizons, University of Chicago[/sup]
The war in Ukraine is all about democracy vs dictatorship
[sup]— Kacper Szulecki, Tore Wig · Review of Democracy, Central European University · Apr 9, 2022[/sup]
(don't think the Finns are into doing a land grab :grin: hey @ssu, up for grabbing Kaliningrad, or, heck, Estonia?)
The real "conspiracy" is probably found in the various lobby groups that influence US policy through means which are perfectly legitimate within the American system. And the same likely happens in Russia, but I suppose we know less about Russia's lobby groups.
Go on then. Differ. For what reason do you think they're not?
Quoting ssu
You're just reverting to your preferred narrative again. this is pointless. Experts disagree. If experts disagree, you are not qualified to determine which experts are right and which are wrong, you can only choose which you believe. Therefore the only matter for discussion is why you made the choice you made. That matter cannot be the technical grounds since you're not qualified to determine the technical grounds.
So do you want to discuss the reasons why you choose to believe that narrative, as opposed to the alternatives? Or do you want to pointlessly keep pretending that a couple of laymen can actually judge which of these experts are right and which are wrong - as if we knew?
Quoting ssu
...and we're back to square one.
When was the last post you voluntarily posted that was critical of US policy toward Ukraine? When was the last post in which you registered anything but unwavering support for the US? I can't think of a single post. So you are ignoring US-issues (relating to Ukraine). I'm ignoring non-US issues. I've given an explanation for why I'm ignoring non-US issues. What's your explanation for why you're ignoring US-issues?
Again, you're trying to make this one-sided. As if focussing on the US were the only ideological move. Painstakingly avoiding focus on the US is no less an ideological move.
Quoting ssu
Go on. In what way does the power of the nation state over-rule that of the corporation? What examples do you have of the populace restraining the will of the multi-national? In what part of the world are multi-national corporations struggling to get by because the will of the people is so dominant?
Which makes all this "denazification" rhetoric all the more insane on its face. Timothy Snyder characterizes Putin's regime as schizo-fascism.
You don't seriously think anyone is stupid enough to fall for that?
Step 1. Define anyone opposing the centrist policy as a 'Putin ally'.
Step 2. Voilà. Non-centrists are automatically Putin allies by definition.
Unless you're about to furnish us with a definition of 'ally' which hasn't just been hand crafted to fit your propaganda.
Why yes, anti-democratic forces in general.
Hilarious argument. And quite high a pedestal you again put experts. And especially we are talking of here and now and the future, not 19th Century history, where indeed an expert (called a historian) could show his expertise on domestic politics of various countries. But this isn't a discussion of history.
Quoting Isaac
Start with sanctions. Start with how Western Corporations have withdrawn from Russia, for starters. It's a bit backwards (but typical from you) to assume a war started by Putin and a small cabal around him, has actually happened because of the Western military industrial complex. An industry, which actually isn't at all developed to arm this kind of conventional war and basically has, just as the American political elite, focused on China.
Quoting Isaac
Unwavering support for the US? Lol.
I've posted quite many times about the American policy of constantly trying to reboot the US-Russian relations without really thinking how this did increase Russia's appetite. And for example, earlier when Russia kidnapped an Estonian intelligence officer, which in case even then Finland and Sweden condemned, the Obama administration stayed mute. So could the US have done something to prevent February 24th 2022? Likely a stronger response after the annexation of Crimea could have prevented this enlargement of the war.
Quoting Isaac
Well, you're ignoring a lot. Really, ignoring Ukrainians in a discussion about war in Ukraine is a bit hilarious. :smirk:
Listen actually to what they say and notice how their world view is actually very close, especially when they depict what they are against. It's not an accident that it was national socialism that was the most ugly combination of an ideology.
And I think there actually isn't anymore the similar ideologies present as in the 20th Century, but typically neither the radical right-winger or the radical leftist has such historical knowledge of the past of their movements. Both extremes (left and right) are experts on rebranding themselves.
Quoting SophistiCat
Actually in the 1990's the "extreme left" and "extreme right" in Russian politics was the other way around than here.
There's something very sinister when people start to march with many different kinds of flags around. It's a sign of the political system collapsing and fringe groups taking power.
Quoting SophistiCat
Well, it all starts with having the largest conventional war since WW2 in Europe being forbidden to be called as a war, but having to be called a "special military operation".
The basic problem is that Putin simply loves the insane rhetoric. Why, the Soviet Union was built on that. We called it here "the Lithurgy": meaningless talk just to prove you are obedient to the system.
Observation: Putinistas tend to be radicals ?
Not: Radicals are Putinistas
(Rashists?)
Maybe I read it wrong.
Rafael's SPYDER defense system evolves to shoot down ballistic missile threats
[sup]— Yonah Jeremy Bob · Jerusalem Post · Jan 4, 2023[/sup]
Send some to the Ukrainians.
Your point is well taken that the influence factor from the U.S. and Russia is not equivalent in terms of coercion and punitive consequences. I read Smole?sk and Dutkiewicz to be saying that the U.S. helped prevent a repetition of the Lukashenko effect rather than manufacture a coup. The authors are looking at it as a local struggle with different lines of support. In their efforts to acknowledge a center of gravity in Eastern Europe, they look back at a history of sometimes being helped and not helped by nations in the 'West'.
From that perspective, seeing wars as proxies fighting in the service of others is a self-fulfilling prophesy. And that leads to your observation:
Quoting SophistiCat
Agreed. I am interested in how the zero-game perspective is accepted by default. The authors of the article are challenging the notion that nations following their interest in other places render these conflicts to be only about them.
I did not mean to represent your argument as a matter of intent.
You have yet (to my knowledge) to represent the Ukrainians as choosing to fight for their own reasons rather than at the behest of others outside the country. My charge is purely a deduction from that observation.
Arguments based upon authority are the weakest kind.
On what evidence? What actions determine one is a 'Putinista'? Not official alliances. Not declarations of support. Not direct acts of support (arms sales, financial aid).
What identifies the 'Putinista' in this laughable theory is simply that they don't support current US policy. Anyone not voicing full-throated support for a military solution is a 'Putinista', So by definition, 'Putinistas' are radicals. It's not a discovery, it's a definition.
It's nothing but a transparent effort to smear the left (typically seen as well-meaning, if too ideological) by associating the with the far-right (more typically seen as 'evil', or at least very selfish). It's such an obvious ploy that I didn't think anyone would actually give it any serious consideration, but I suppose I didn't account for everyone...
They have been shown and discussed even on this thread. A true Putinista is obviously someone or a movement/group who supports and works for Putin's objectives and agenda.
Like the Ruskii Obraz. Which Russian government supports as part of "managed nationalism" and has used the neonazis for example against Navalnyi:
Or the Black Hundreds, a reborn movement out of the ultra-conservative historical movement from the Russian Empire (which supported the Czar's autocratic rule and was fervently against any liberalization or modernization of the Russian Imperial system). And promotes the Russian nationalism that Putin favours and even sent volunteers to fight in the Donbas in the early stages of the conflict.
Or how about the Night Wolves?
But of course, these groups and their ideology, agenda and their ties to the Kremlin can be ignored, because according to someone here...
Quoting Isaac
Which is hilarious.
Still conflating what I wrote at least. Radicals is still the word here. And still not all. (Can't speak for others of course.)
The comment was...
Quoting SophistiCat
"Europe and America". Not "Russia".
Try reading first and commenting second. It works best that way.
Go on. So If I argued that Ukraine was overrun by Nazis and you retorted that experts within Ukraine have shown that to be false, I would have the stronger argument?
Still doesn't make a difference: A true Putinista is obviously someone or a movement/group who supports and works for Putin's objectives and agenda.
Not as you say, everybody that is critical of current US policy.
And fun fact, the Europeans that are Putinistas, are obedient workers for Putin. Here's a Finnish Putinista (holding the Finnish flag) alongside others. He actually moved to the "liberated" Donbas some time ago.
So where are these people in sufficiently represented in America and Europe to make the quoted claim?
Referring here to ?
Actually he is totally correct that many share parts of the ideology that you can call them allies as @SophistiCat said. In short, leftist and right-wing populism enjoy a common ground if actual policy implications are left out. Populist conspiracy theories are their main course. Right wing and left-wing populism share a lot. The other one just puts a lot more "bankers" being "Jewish bankers".
We had a little discussion about this, Putins new supporters, on this forum ...six years ago. See here.
The claim was...
Quoting SophistiCat
Not "share some common ground with each other".
So the evidence, other than merely a failure to support mainstream policy, of "allies" of Putin from the American and European left sufficient to constitute the claimed trend...?
And notice that many times it is as @SophistiCat said, very strange bed fellows on just what and who Russia has supported. For example, Russia could support UKIP and also The Scottish National Party, even if these are quite apart from each other. Of course, the support for UKIP was for Brexit and for SNP for Scotland to exit from the UK. So there's a logic of simple opportunism.
And to add here, I'm not saying either the UKIP or the SNP are Putinistas. Even if someone (especially in UKIP has had a nice word for Putin earlier).
Every party in that chart is right wing. And all money gained by them from Putin is outweighed a thousand fold by financial ties with normal centrist institutions like gas purchases and real estate.
So...
the evidence, other than merely a failure to support mainstream policy, of "allies" of Putin from the American and European left sufficient to constitute the claimed trend...?
It's really simple. Just name the left wing groups in America and Europe who are allied with Putin. A simple list will do, no need for a chart.
The claim was about the extreme left and the extreme right, not about the left.
Go on then... The extreme left organisations in America and Europe which are 'allied' with Putin to a greater extent than centrists are...?
I would start by saying that the link with Putin is clearer and stronger with the extreme right than it is with the extreme left, in my opinion.
Talking about my country, the main party on the left (stradling with the extreme left), La France Insoumise (LFI), has condemned in unambiguous terms Putin's aggression and the crimes of the Russian army on civilian populations. They were more lenient towards Moscow's foreign policy before the invasion, understandably. Nevertheless, even after the invasion, not all their MPs have voted in support of arm deliveries to Ukraine.
As for the French extreme left, most of their micro-partis have a troskist history, so they are historically anti-USSR and anti-NATO. Today this translates into a neutral stance vis à vis this war: neither for Putin nor for Zelensky, as they put it.
So none 'allied' with Putin then?
The point I was making, which no one seems to be able to counter, is that this idea that both the far left and the far right support Putin is just a transparent attempt to smear opposition (particularly left-wing opposition) to US policy.
There simply are no 'allies' of Putin on the left outside of Russia that have any significant impact, and financially, the centrist mainstream have supported his regime with vastly greater effect than any 'radical' group could.
But none of that matters, of course, because @SophistiCat's aim is simply to make support for US policy sound all reasonable and worldly-wise, and opposition to it sound radical and driven by a negative ideology. It's about controlling the narrative. The facts don't really matter.
I would go further, and say that Putin has no impactful allies anywhere in the western world. If any kind of influential "Russia lobby" existed, surely some type of public debate would have formed over the fifteen year period that led up to the war in Ukraine.
Instead we have seen no debate whatsoever, and for example a stance that is critical of the role of the United States in Ukraine, while supported academically, is nowhere to be found in public discourse and even stigmatized.
Alarmism about a "Russia lobby" is probably the work of actual lobbyists trying to, as you said, control the narrative.
Politically, you might be right, economically it's business as usual.
Famously, Germany's Gerhard Schröder was until only recently on the board of two Russian state owned energy companies. And according to Robert Horvath (specialist in Russian politics at LaTrobe University)
Several US Congress have shares in Russian state owned companies.
According the UK intelligence committee report..
according to data from the official Working Party of the Council on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM)
...with Disclose (French NGO) reporting
...but, hey, all small-fry compared to the absolutely massive support Putin gets from some bikers and the as yet unidentified left wing radicals...
I don’t think the Cat is trying to do that. He’s only pointing at the convergence of extremes, a well known phenomenon.
Quoting Isaac
I can agree with that. They have no impact whatsoever.
Quoting Isaac
I don’t think he cares that much about USFP. The US is far away and unreliable, although under this president, they are far better than under the previous one, and so are we, Europeans.
If @SophistiCat is anything like me, he cares more about Ukraine, Russia and Europe. The future of the whole of Europe is at stake, the way I see it. I mean ´Europe´ geographically, including Russia.
That’s minuscule. What did the Russians get for that money? One plane? A hundred rockets?
So? The point was only countering the notion that extreme left wing groups are notably allied with Putin. so unless you can find some extreme left wing group which gave €153 million to promote Putin's military capabilities, then you've no argument.
The simple fact is that centrist, mainstream political groups support Putin more than the extremes on either side, and within those extremes no one has provided any evidence at all of any left-wing support whatsoever. So the claim that...
Quoting SophistiCat
...is just plain false. Financially, he's gained more from mainstream centrists. Politically, his support is only far-right. By no metric of 'closest' or 'ally' do the European extreme left even figure.
It's not my argument that the European far left is in bed with Putin, though some of them hate or mistrust NATO enough that they cannot take Ukraine's side.
Note that nobody gave Putin anything. We were talking about (minuscule) sales, not gifts.
Lone Putin Observes Christmas at Kremlin Church
By AFP
Updated: one day ago
Russian President Vladimir Putin stood alone at a midnight service at a Kremlin church as he marked Orthodox Christmas darkened by Moscow's assault on Ukraine.
Putin attended the service at the Cathedral of the Annunciation, originally designed as a church for the Russian tsars.
He stood alone as Orthodox priests in golden robes conducted a ceremony holding long candles, pictures released by the Kremlin showed.
In previous years Putin usually attended Orthodox Christmas services in Russian provinces or just outside Moscow.
The Russian Orthodox Church observes Christmas on January 7.
In a message released by the Kremlin on Saturday, Putin congratulated Orthodox Christians, saying the holiday inspired "good deeds and aspirations."
He also praised the Orthodox Church, whose influential head Patriarch Kirill has fully backed Putin's offensive in Ukraine.
Church organisations are "supporting our soldiers taking part in a special military operation," Putin said, using the official Kremlin term for the offensive in Ukraine.
"Such great, multifaceted, truly ascetic work deserves the most sincere respect," he added.
Patriarch Kirill has called on believers to support pro-Russian "brothers" during Moscow's offensive in eastern Ukraine.
In a sermon last year, he said that dying in Ukraine "washes away all sins."
[quote=“boethius;764955”]It's "your endgame" because you're the one proposing it[/quote]
[quote=“boethius;764955”]You are "siding with the West" and you propose an “endgame” that is sufficient for the West (The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power) ... so i.e. an endgame you support.[/quote]
That’s my claim: "My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another.” In other words, one thing is how I understand (not “propose”) the geopolitical endgame of geopolitical agents NATO/US/WEST, another is if I find it desirable and why. So by talking about “my endgame” is misleading because I’m not a geopolitical agent, I’m not West/NATO/US, I’m not the player. Checkmate the opponent is the expected endgame of those who play chess not of the audience or supporters watching the game.
Talking about my understanding and my reasons to prefer one side over the other is neither “proposing” nor “recommending” anything, that’s your language and your aim, which you shouldn’t project on to me. Indeed, I find it twice delusional: as an avg dude, I’m far from assuming to know better or enough how to play the game to “propose” or “recommend” anything to anybody about geopolitical issues, or to have any significant impact on this war directly or indirectly through my posts here.
[quote=“boethius;764955”]You then literally just say the exact thing I just says, just you're issue is my "framing".
Again you are conveniently framing the issue as it suits your narrative. Ukrainian lives (namely casualties) are not “The instrument to ‘inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power’” but the collateral damage of Ukrainian decisions to fight back Russian aggression, direct damage inflicted by Russian decisions on Ukrainians, and indirect collateral damage of Western decisions to support Ukrainians in fighting back Russian aggression. As collateral damage is Ukrainian lives, this poses a moral dilemma of course. — neomac
Collateral damage to Ukrainian lives would make sense if NATO was fighting with Russia in Ukrainian territory, then Ukrainian lives lost would be unfortunate collateral damage.
That's not the case, NATO isn't fighting.[/quote]
Talking about Ukrainians casualties as “collateral damage” was an objection to your picturing Ukrainians casualties as “instrumental to” fighting Russia. What’s evident is that Ukrainians casualties (among soldiers and civilians) are not instrumental to the West, but to Russia. It’s Russia which kills Ukrainian soldiers and civilians to damage Ukrainian manpower and moral to fight, not the West. Whatever “evil” second end you attribute to the West still needs to be demonstrated.
[quote=“boethius;764955”]Why is there a moral dilemma? Because achieving the policy objective you set (and US / NATO doesn't have much problem admitting to) of inflicting enduring damage on the Russian military is not the same objective as Ukrainian welfare, which I have zero problem saying can involve some fighting (the first weeks of fighting is certainly preferable to total capitulation and humiliation, but it's after demonstrating your honour on the international stage, is the optimum time to sue for peace and accept a compromise as a smaller nation) but (regardless of when peace is sought) fighting for the welfare of Ukrainians is a much more constrained criteria than fighting to harm the Russians. Saying "they both want to fight the Russians so they both want the same thing" is simply totally wrong: "fighting the Russian insofar as it's in the interest of Ukrainians" is a very different objective than "fighting the Russians insofar as it damages the Russians".
This is why "the US / NATO fighting to the last Ukrainian" has been a focal point of debate since the beginning of the war, because, obviously, if the goal is simply to maximise damage to Russia then what follows from that would be "fighting to the last Ukrainian". It's a way of saying the objectives of Ukraine and US / NATO are not the same, which US / NATO don't really have a problem saying.
For example, saying Putin and Russia must "pay a cost" for breaking the international "rules based order" is exact same idea, maybe with slight "narrative framing" differences. It is not saying "we must ensure Ukrainian welfare is the top priority, which may require compromise with Russia”, but it clearly means the priority is damaging Russia so the war is costly, which means pouring arms into Ukraine as they are doing the fighting, which means Ukrainians are the instrument of this policy, not the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are all who benefit from the "international rules based order" and if the entirety of Ukraine is sacrificed for this policy then "mission accomplished”.[/quote]
I argued against this already in previous posts, so I’ll expand a bit more. From the plausible assumption that separate geopolitical agents have different endgames, you can conjecture a case of intentional exploitation by the West of the Ukrainians ("the US / NATO fighting to the last Ukrainian”, “pouring arms into Ukraine as they are doing the fighting, which means Ukrainians are the instrument of this policy, not the beneficiaries”). I get it, this possibility is consistent with that single plausible assumption. But there are other plausible assumptions to consider: a part from missing a conceptual point about the notion of “sovereignty” which I’ll discuss later, your conjecture doesn’t take into account what relevant factors can likely and significantly constrain such possibility.
On one side, the conjecture of the Ukrainian exploitation by a greater power is not historically implausible, indeed that’s arguably what Russian empire and Soviet Union actually did. And that’s arguably the historical reason why Ukrainians (like Stepan Bandera) preferred to collaborate with the Nazis to fight Soviet Union (Nazis didn’t oppress, murder and exploit Ukrainians as the Soviet Union did), and to join now the Western sphere of influence more than Russian sphere of influence. The Ukrainians have already decided long ago that the advancement of their welfare & lives is better served outside the Russian sphere of influence and they are ready to fight for that and sacrifice lives as they fought and sacrificed lives in the past. Add to that the potential benefits of Westernization as experienced by other Eastern European countries previously under Soviet Union sphere of influence that joined EU/NATO (like their neighbour Poland) unlike other Eastern European countries which remained under Russian sphere of influence (like their neighbour Belarus).
On the other side it’s not reasonable to expect that Westerners military support to Ukraine is just about Russian military defeat and smearing campaign against Russia to deflect from Western hypocrisy and exploitation. As I said elsewhere, power is not grounded only on brute force and deception but also on consensus, reputation, cooperation, partnership wrt competitors, so it’s on those grounds too that the West is competing against Russia. And that’s how the West managed to appeal to Eastern European countries previously under Soviet Union sphere of influence. Given the Ukrainian willingness to join the Western sphere of influence and the Ukrainian strategic importance to the West, there is significant room for a consensual, mutually beneficial and long term systemic political, economic, security integration. So this war can clearly become a crucial testbed for building the mutual trust between West and Ukraine amenable to greater cooperation. And Westerners can’t reasonably build trust through broad and crass exploitation of Ukrainians as “cannon fodder”, nor reap the benefits of Russian military humiliation by letting Ukrainians lose (especially after the discrediting conclusion of the American war in Afghanistan and China’s incumbent military threat). BTW these circumstances are very different from the ones surrounding the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. That’s why to me the analogy to those cases to discredit the West or the US doesn’t hold in a relevant sense.
Said that, real life is rarely linear and predictable as one could argue under plausible assumptions, in any case the impression from the news I read so far is that the West is more hesitant (for certain reasons, including not provoking Russia to actually escalate to the worst scenarios despite the escalatory threats) about providing military support to Ukrainians than the Ukrainians are about fighting with whatever they get from the West and despite the risks of escalation (BTW, interestingly, even Poland and Baltic states do not seem to worry too much over possible Russian escalations, despite being the closest targets to Russia). It has never been the case that Ukrainians didn’t want to fight, and the West forced them to fight against their will. On the contrary there are evidences that show Ukrainians pressuring Westerners to increase their military support (more weapons now) or even change the nature of engagement (no flight zone, Russia attacked a NATO country, etc.) or making bold declarations about their possible victory (namely getting back all occupied/annexed territories, including Crimea and Donbas) despite Western hesitancy or lack of commitment or vagueness about this. There are even plausible evidences of Ukrainian actions within Russian territory (e.g. the killing of Dugin’s daughter) not supported by Westerners and therefore arguably exploitative of Western trust by the Ukrainians.
And notice that I’m not conflating “Ukrainians fighting against their will” with “Ukrainians fighting against their interest”. But while I find the latter case open for debate way more than the former, at the same time I find a view that identifies Ukrainians’ interest independently or even in open conflict with what Ukrainians actually want more hardly defensible (the way you downplayed their views as in “territory and national pride” exemplifies such kind of patronising attitude). What’s Ukrainian best interest will likely remain controversial, one way or the other. And inability to fix such controversy in a principled way is something we must learn to live with.
[quote=“boethius;764955”]Sure, but as you yourself admit there's a "moral dilemma" in the Western support of Ukraine for the purposes of harming the Russians, as it is not the same thing as supporting Ukrainian welfare.
So, if Ukrainian welfare is sacrificed for a goal that is not Ukrainian welfare, the moral responsibility for our policies cannot just be then shifted to the Ukrainian leadership and "Ukrainian people" (insofar as we equate them with Ukrainian leadership), we are still responsible for our own policies and what we are trying to achieve. Just because you want to kill someone doesn't mean I am justified in giving you the weapon to do it. Even if you were justified in your desire to kill (say self defence) and I was justified in helping you do that, even then it does not justify any form of lethal support. As Isaac pointed out, self defence vis-a-vis your neighbour doesn't justify nuking the whole city. As the provider of lethal support, I'd still be responsible for the outcome and how my actions contributed to the outcome.
Whenever the cost to Ukraine of the Western policy is pointed out, essentially all the supporters of the policy here and elsewhere just throw their hands up and say “Ukrainians want to fight!" and seem to believe that completely unburdens them of the consequences of the policy.
But as you say yourself, there's a "moral dilemma". If you want to support this policy and argue in good faith, then solve the moral dilemma, rather than move the goal posts around for your own arguments so much that the "game" your playing is now entirely made of goal posts. We're literally walking on goal posts.[/quote]
Here the problems I see:
First, let’s notice that you didn’t offer any positive example or criteria to clarify what form of lethal support are justified to you.
Second, and more importantly, there is a huge inconvenience with moral judgements: while legal judgments can count on certain conditions that to some extent enforce epistemic convergence among a plurality of subjects with potentially conflicting interests, that’s not the case with moral judgements. A legal system has a unique and codified body of detailed norms, procedures, ways of appealing to them followed by experts that ensure the judgement comes to an end and is applied to actual cases of legal infraction denounced with a minimum of pertinent evidence in a codified format. Moral judgement is hardly the result of a moral system analogous to the legal system: indeed it’s an inalienable task that anybody can engage in at any time, with different sets of principles that can be applied differently by different individuals in different circumstances (you yourself admit the possibility of moral agents with different values), evidences can be volatile or easily replaced by unconstrained hypotheticals (e.g. in the case of moral hazards or conflict of interests), and remains open for debate. This inconvenience impacts also the issue of “taking responsibility” for certain policies. Indeed, the difficulty of ensuring epistemic convergence in the moral domain spurs controversies also on moral responsibility attributions.
This predicament shows the importance of the international legal system as a reference: as long as a state is considered “sovereign” responsibility for its policies can not be shifted to a superior authority or shared with allies or international aid (no matter what the power relations with other countries is). So even if the West does knowingly and intentionally provide useful military aid to Ukraine to fight against Russia for whatever second end, Ukrainian decision to fight against Russia thanks to the Western military aid and accountability for collateral damages, is entirely on Ukraine as a sovereign state. So no other government than the Ukrainian one is expected to not only commit to but also make full sense of the imperative “we must ensure Ukrainian welfare is the top priority, which may require compromise with Russia” from the Ukrainian perspective.
The legal notion of “sovereignty” offers also a clear understanding of who is the victim and who is the aggressor in this war. No Russian security concerns can obscure the fact that Russia is violating the territorial integrity of a widely acknowledged sovereign state (by Russia too) and forcing a revision of international relations built around such acknowledgement. Russia didn’t suffer any actual/imminent aggression from Ukraine to justify this war against Ukraine and annexation of Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian resistance is morally defensible as a right to self-defence. So ZERO legal (and moral) legitimacy for Russia, as confirmed by the UN resolutions.
Also political regimes help understand political agency and responsibility attribution. In Western democracies the decision process is more distributed over people and time than in authoritarian regimes, and it relies on accountability conditions harder to manipulate by any central government than in autocracies, that’s why it’s harder to pin down the responsibilities of NATO enlargement threat on Biden than Putin’s reactions to such threat. Even if you believe that the American lobbies are so powerful that can rig the game, the problem is that policies in support of Ukraine and against Russia (sanctions and military aid) are shared by many Western countries each of them with their powerful lobbies and their military/intelligence expertise , so it’s unlikely that such policies would be adopted by these Western countries if such policies didn’t make sense to them. And it’s also unlikely that Ukrainian politicians, intelligence and diplomacy significantly failed to have a good grasp of Western understanding of this war, interest in this war and support to Ukraine in all these months.
You can still spin your conspiracy bias to speculate about evil and impunity everywhere among Western political elites and lobbies, then my objection still remains, national and international competition among political elites and lobbies plus unintended consequences can still create favourable conditions for Ukrainian welfare. And if you want to speculate against that too, I’ll leave it at that, yet I do wonder what on earth are you hoping to achieve against such all mighty forces.
Concerning the issue of “solving the moral dilemma”, what do you mean by it? Decision makers may be honestly facing some moral dilemma, favour one horn of the dilemma for certain reasons (however controversial!), act accordingly, and yet be plagued with doubts for the rest of their lives. What would you say in this case? Was the moral dilemma solved or not? As long as moral choices involve uncertainty and strategic choices indeed involve uncertainties one has to live with moral dilemmas and the controversies they spur (e.g. consider nuclear bombing Japan in WW2 as a moral dilemma, was it worth it? What could we say then? What could we say now?).
I have argued the justifications you present are insufficient, such as a UN general assembly vote being some sort of "normative / legal justification", or, even if it was (which it isn't), then totally incompatible with supporting the US despite the US ignoring UN generally assembly votes all the time. More importantly for the actual debate we're having, the “normative / legal" argument isn't your actual justification but rather supporting the West, and US hegemony in particular, generally speaking.[/quote]
Here the problems I see:
First, legally speaking, the UN resolution is a legal justification for national policies, it has legal consequences, it’s not just a demoscopic survey. If the UN resolution established that Russian is illegal, and a government takes countermeasures against Russia because, among others, it violated international law, then the UN resolution is taken as a legal justification of such measures. Indeed what would be the point of having a General Assembly resolution if it had zero effects on national policies? Evidently, states that are not attacked by Russia nor suffering violations of bilateral agreements by Russia, still need a plausible reason to issue policies against Russian aggression in support of legitimate Ukrainians’ solicitations. The UN resolution does the job. As we said, and you agreed on it, if international law resolutions are not binding or coercing, yet they can succeed in coordinating the behavior among states. And that is what happened.
Anyway, second point and most importantly, that’s an irrelevant point wrt what I was originally arguing, which is about strategy and threat perception (that’s why I accused you of shifting polemic target from strategy to legal). Strategy for geopolitical agents is about threat perception and response to counter actual/potential threat. One can then add rational constraints on threat perception and response to deepen the analysis. Now, strategically speaking, Russia is clearly an actual threat to the West: it has means to threat the West, it has motives to threat the West, it acted against Western interests in many significant ways, and its propaganda is expressly and bitterly against the West and West-led World Order. The case of the UN resolution corroborates this point: since that resolution expresses the Western wide condemnation of Russian aggression, discounting or discrediting such resolution by Russia signals intentional opposition to Western will and defiant delegitimisation of the Western World Order (https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-race-and-ethnicity-racial-injustice-moscow-23bb0ba759d877c4525082e921544910).
Third, you keep framing your objections by assuming a notion of “justification” which I neither am committed to nor I find conceptually intelligible. Indeed, you yourself are incapable of offering anything that one can positively consider as a “justification” in this war. You can just shift the burden of proof on your opponent and then object how they fail based on your arbitrary conjectures. Not to mention your tendency to repeatedly misunderstand and caricature your opponent’s views which make it hard to converge on anything relevant to the topic. Said that, in my exchanges with your and others, I offered arguments to clarify my understanding of Western decision makers and arguments to clarify my political support to them. To me an argument can broadly count as “justification” if it’s validly inferred from certain shared premises (“shared” by those who understand them and/or find them empirically plausible in a similar way). So if I and you share premises and inference rules we MUST converge. If we don’t, then either it’s a limited and recoverable intellectual failure (which we should be able to fix in a few iterations affordable to avg dudes as we are) or you are simply unintelligible to me. Justifications in support of a certain policy may depend on different domain-specific premises (moral, legal, political, strategic, etc.) and among these arguments there might be some significant convergence in their conclusions. I find Western policies justified based on different but converging domain-specific assumptions which I tried to expose to you and other opponents. So until you prove you share enough facts, concepts and understanding of related arguments the way I do, it’s hard for you to sound intellectually compelling to me.
[quote=“boethius;764955”]There are four central issues to what you actually believe.
1. First being the justification of US hegemony in the geopolitical struggle with Russia, but more importantly China. Now, like yourself, I prefer to live in the West than in China or Russia, however, this is equatable with seeking hegemonic control / influence / containment of China and its neighbours. My approach would be a "lead by example" policy and not picking fights that get hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and injured and destroying half or more of the Ukrainian economy, in seeking to harm Russia, which benefits China so seems to me entirely counter productive on the geopolitical hegemonic "chess game" in any case.
2. Bringing to the second point which is this policy really does advance US hegemony and Western leadership of the whole world.[/quote]
Not sure what you mean by “lead by example” policy. Could you explain by means of historical “lead by example” cases?
Anyways, it seems you are repeating the same point exposed earlier. Briefly, the US should accept all Russian deal-breaker demands in return for peace in Ukraine, and get ready for China. OK let’s say the US does what you recommend. What if China attacks Taiwan, encouraged by Western recoil from the human and material costs of the war? What would the US be justified to do then? Fighting directly against China? Or start a “proxy war” like in Ukraine? Wouldn’t the US meddling in China’s sphere of influence risk any nuclear war escalation then? Wouldn’t be Taiwanese people pawns of American hegemony? Or worst American lobbies? Does the US have greater chance to win against China than to win against Russia? If Russia won’t win but it won’t lose in Ukraine, wouldn’t it be the same for China in Taiwan? What would the UN Security Council’s resolution likely be then?
BTW what do you think Russia will do then, support China or the US or remain neutral? Or what if then Russia attacks again Ukraine (or Moldova) while the US is at war with China? After all Russia didn’t keep its promises to Ukraine already once (see Budapest Memorandum), not to mention that recognising Ukrainian independency in 1992 or so didn’t mean shit to Russia either, and that Putin does not consider Ukraine a separate nation from Russia.
[quote=“boethius;764955”]3. And lastly, that the sacrifice of Ukraine to advance this policy is morally justified. At least the US was fighting in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and there's at least honour to that and suffering the consequences of the policy. It is impossible to ignore the fact that when parties are armed to do the fighting for us, that this creates an intense moral hazard, moreover when any criticism of the leadership and war is banned in the country, we wholeheartedly condone and promote propaganda for "morale" purposes and winning the "information war" with Russia (i.e. we cannot even say there's some sort of informed consent) and (make matter morally worse) we produce a lot of the propaganda ourselves (encouraging belief that the side we need to fight can "win" when our military and civilian leadership may be fully aware that is very unlikely) leading to decisions on false pretences, and, also important, if pouring money and arms into the country is de facto bribing the leadership of that country who benefit immensely in both legal and illegal ways from all this money and arms pouring in.
4. That anytime the goal posts change to "Ukrainian sovereignty!" then why aren't Western armies in Ukraine defending this alleged priority?
These are not "accusations" but just what your position actually entails. If harming Russia is the objective, and Ukrainians are doing the fighting, and the West is arming and bankrolling and "advising", then it simply goes with that position that it's entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that this setup will result in Ukrainians fighting beyond their own self interest (which I have zero problem recognising involves some fighting).
In other words, we may have already (I would definitely argue this), and if not, may very well in the future, sacrifice Ukrainian welfare to pursue the West's priority in this situation, which is, to boil it down, "not letting Putin get away with it!”.[/quote]
Here the problems I see:
First, you are offering a list of conjectures whose plausibility rests only on what you claim conceivable. Without evidence there is no way to assess if your conjectures are actually true or even likely nor how relevant they are wrt what is at stake.
Second, it seems you can’t imagine other than worst scenarios (especially discrediting the West) while ignoring factors (i.e. how risky and costly abusive behavior can be, or how beneficial honest cooperation an be) that hedge against such scenarios.
Third, the limitations of liberties is normal and legitimate praxis during war time even for any Western democracy. Indeed, even if the limitations of liberties wouldn’t preventively reduce the risk of abuses, yet reviewing mistakes and responsibility can be done afterwards once the emergency is over. Most importantly, acknowledging such moral hazard would not be enough to give up on such limitations. Were this the case any democracy would be highly vulnerable to any authoritarian regime that does not need to worry about morality, people’s welfare and accountability. In other words, in order to avoid a moral hazard (Westerns exploiting Ukrainians), you are submitting to a greater moral hazard by letting Russians re-play the same game (including the nuclear blackmail because if it worked once, it could work again) once they have recovered from this war, which will certainly be facilitated by an immediate pro-Russian peace deal. Worst then this, your argument severely undermines Western democracies’ security concerns in favor of any authoritarian competitors (China included) because literally anybody can always conjecture worst scenarios like escalation to MAD, exploitation by greedy lobbies, greater numbers of deaths, etc. that would make any military opposition and security countermeasures worth it. That’s the fallacious slippery slope I was talking about.
Fifth, your recommendations to Western decision makers are grounded on de facto irrational expectations because they totally ignore or underestimate something that decision makers of any country in the whole known human history have to realistically deal with as top priority, namely security concerns, instead of taking into account what realistic conditions and to what extent they can be harmonised with people’s welfare.
[quote=“boethius;764955”] Does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?! — neomac
“Justification” has a social function definition of justifying to others. If a judge asks for your "justification" for some actions, the request is to justify to the judge not yourself. When a justification is only to oneself, we say "self justification" to clarify that no one else is intended to be convinced by the argument.
For example, if you were caught taking something and this led to a trial, "I wanted it" is not a good justification in this context; this self-justification goes without saying and not the issue at trial (no harm in mentioning it, obviously you took the thing because you wanted it) so if you started your explanation with "well I wanted it" unlikely anyone would disagree, but a adequate justification in this context would be some right to the thing (there was a deal for example, that the counter party is now denying) or then some particular circumstance (some emergency, for example, or then you actually thought it was lost and took it to "return it" to the owner etc.).
That's just what the word justification means.
Of course, one can propose nothing is justified, there is no justice, all moral language is for the purposes of rationalising and manipulation. But, even in this position, the word "justification" still refers to the attempt to convince others your actions are just. (only everyone, perhaps even yourself, is always deceived about it, there is no "actual" justification for anything, life has no purpose other than pursuing your inclinations and desires, which are accidental to your genes and upbringing and themselves not justified either, just nothing else to do).
Anyways, essentially no one, certainly not myself, argues that a position is justified only after a everyone agrees, which creates immediately the problem of why anyone would believe it's true if it's not true until everyone believes it's true. The "truth" (or then meaninglessness of the issue) of a justification is independent of anyone's belief about it. Your actions maybe justified and a judge and everyone else disagrees. Indeed, your actions maybe justified and you yourself are convinced it was actually wrong later.
The point of getting into the meaning of justification, is that what people propose as their justification maybe a lie. So, it is entirely reasonable to speculate as the real motivations behind what people do. Now, the actual (secret in this case) justification maybe true and following from that the lies about it are also justified, or then maybe both are not-justified. Or, the more confusing situation but entirely possible, is one uses a true justification to advance a hidden objective that is similar to but not actually the same or even compatible with the true justification.
For example, I maybe entirely justified in helping a traveller in distress, but if my true intentions are to simply gain this travellers trust for the purposes of stealing from them, then my actions up to that point only appear entirely justified but it is in actuality part of a deception. So, a true justification can also be a lie, that it only even possibly revealed in the future.[/quote]
Here the problems I see:
First, let’s remind that you claimed of me “so you support Western policies regardless of justification” and you also claimed “‘justification’ still refers to the attempt to convince others your actions are just”. In all my posts (not only with you) I offered moral, legal, and strategic reasons to back up my claims about the Western support of Ukraine and my picking side, if that doesn’t count to you as an attempt to convince others my claims are “just” in the sense of “justified” or grounded “some emergency” (e.g. the Russian security threat to the West) or “some right” (e.g. supporting Ukrainian right to self-defence) then I don’t know what is. In other words your accusation against me is false according to your own understanding of “justification to others”.
Second, you may claim I didn’t succeed to convince you. But I don’t see how this constitute a rational challenge even within your conceptual framework: indeed you believe that one can be justified independently from others agreeing with him. So I can be justified even if you disagree with me.
Third, concerning you, since you also believe that even “true justification” can still be a lie, and that even lie can still be “justified”, you seem up for an endless speculative regress. No wonder if you prefer doing something entirely different: indeed it’s “entirely reasonable” (why “entirely reasonable”? It could also be “entirely paranoid”!) for you to speculate about hidden objectives as defamatory as possible (only concerning the West/US of course, because Russia has no hidden objectives, no evil lobbies, no fighting to the last Caucasians and Asians as “cannon fodder” for the holy invincible Rus’ warrior race, no worst scenarios for Ukrainians after surrendering to Russian demands you feel like speculating about, just pure and legitimate intentions from Russia right?) regardless of truth/falsity of any justification, to convince others that you do not have hidden objectives and your online anonymous recommendations are so powerful that can actually save lives, you yourself are demonstrating exactly how your “moral language is for the purposes of rationalising and manipulation”.
We may not be able to, but we try nevertheless. For example, the Byzantine Empire would argue theology with the various caliphates they were in contact with. Neither side expected to convince / convert the other, but they would still make the attempt. Lot's of reasons for this: vis-a-vis the other party in the debate it can be simply a sign of respect to argue one's position, as it recognises the other party's arguments at least have the merit of being responded to, and it can also be for the purposes of just maintaining a polite dialogue with people you may need to deal with to avoid wars or do business etc. or then it could be for internal reasons of just impressing your own court with "proofs" that the heathens are wrong (or for all these purposes) or then just an obvious task of one's own theologians to prove the faith etc.
However, what’s a norm, what's normative, and what's legal are not the same thing. Certainly the goal of society is to harmonise all three, and for some things that happens to be the case, but you cannot deduce one from another. Simply because something is a norm does not mean it it normative nor legal. From my position in corporate management, people break the law literally all the time with no consequences.[/quote]
Here the problems I see:
First, I asked you “how can we possibly justify (in your terms) our position to others if they do not share our values or we can’t assure that little or no corruption exists?”, the fact that people try things doesn’t mean that what they try to achieve can be possibly achieved. You can try to fly by flapping your arms yet that doesn’t mean it is physically possible for you to fly.
Second, I don’t remember you clarified anywhere the difference between norm, normative, and legal. To me “norm” and “normative” is like “law” and “legal”, so the distinction is more grammatical than semantic. While the distinction between “norm” and “law” is semantic, “laws” are a subclass of “norms”. Nothing more fancy about it. The point however is that I asked you about “how we can possibly justify” our position to others, while you are talking about the difference between norm, normative, and legal, and pointed to the fact that society’s goal is to harmonise all three. So you didn’t answer my question at all.
Third, to me, when we try to rationally justify our claims/actions to others, we are showing what consistent set of rules we expect people to follow or commit themselves to under some realistic conditions. So I don’t see how we can successfully justify anything to others if the set of rules and/or the understanding of what can be achieved is not shared. In the case of our exchange, since the disagreement persists, then we likely do not share relevant consistent set of rules and/or expectations about what can be realistically achieved (e.g. in the case of corruption or moral hazards). We do not even seem to agree on several relevant concepts (e.g. normative, security guarantee, straw man argument, justification), go figure.
[quote=“boethius;764955”] what do you mean by “require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians”? — neomac
This was discussed at length near the very beginning of this discussion, but, in short, if you want to negotiate a dispute with a party the first step is to recognise legitimate grievances of the other party (i.e. grievances that you yourself agree are reasonable and can do something about). Generally, everyone has some legitimate grievances in any situation, and the more complex the situation the more legitimate grievances everyone has, if you want to negotiate a settlement then the first step is to layout all the grievances of all the parties on the table and see if everyone can at least agree those are all legitimate points of view. The other essential starting element is the leverage each party has. Based on these two things, perhaps it is possible to come up with an arrangement acceptable to all the parties that is preferable to further conflict.
If you ignore someone's grievances then they are unlikely to accept anything you propose. Now, "legitimate" is prepended to "grievances" as maybe someone grievances are simply unreasonable (at least to you) and you can do nothing to solve them. “Legitimate grievance" is something you yourself agrees the counter party has a point about and an agreement would need to resolve, compensate or address in some way.
The position that Russia is 100% wrong about everything and has no legitimate points or grievances, is simply the position of refusing to negotiate and the choice of more warfare, which maybe justified, but the West and Zelensky like to present demands obviously Russia would never accept and just deny any problems on their own side. Like the very real Nazi's with significant influence, whether there is enough to justify invasion or not, it's clearly a legitimate grievance that the West should also have a problem with. Also expansion of NATO is also a legitimate grievance, considering NATO is quite clearly an anti-Russia organisation. Engaging in the self-justification of NATO expansion, just insisting that of course it's anti-Russian because Russia is the threat and countries want protection from Russia and getting into NATO and expanding NATO closer to Russia is not a threat to Russia because NATO's intentions are pure, people can do ... but, if you don't intend to negotiate. Obviously, my "anti-you" alliance will be perceived as a threat from your point of view. That Westerners can say we place these missiles closer to Russia but that's not like "a threat" to Russia is dumb if the goal is to negotiate with Russia.
A negotiated peace would be by definition a compromise. An uncompromising peace is what's called a surrender. So, listing uncompromising demands that Russia then obviously rejects, is a convoluted, bad faith way of saying there is no desire for negotiation, the surrender of Russia is preferable, for the purposes of propaganda. The problem is if you can't actually force Russia to surrender then this sort of language prolongs the war.
The problem the West has created by encouraging Zelensky to be uncompromising and make delusional statements while also insisting all negotiation must be with Zelensky, without the other powers involved at the table, is that basically any compromise on anything is now a Russian in Zelensky's framework.
Peace negotiations can be dealt with as quid-pro-quo without recognising any legitimate grievances, like a prisoner exchange, so why would this be required as a first step for a peace negotiation? — neomac
In order to engage in a quid pro quo, you need to recognise those are in fact legitimate grievances (such as return of prisoners) to then arrive at an agreement about it. Your own side negotiating needs to do this process at least internally (hear what others have to say, what they want, etc.). Whether something is recognised explicitly in public is a form of compensation, and is not a requirement as you say. However, anyone doing any actual diplomacy with Russia (with an intention of resolving the conflict) would need themselves to evaluate legitimate grievances that are reasonable to address in a settlement, and likewise anyone simply analysing the situation and trying to what sort of resolution the war is possible must do the same (to have any chance of proposing some practical insights).
Is it something that needs to be officially recorded anywhere? With what potential/likely legal and propaganda cost/benefit and strategic implications?
What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”? — neomac
As I explain above, the important recognition is internal to the negotiating parties (if they genuinely seek a resolution; if not you just say whatever you want). How these legitimate grievances are then recognised in an agreement can be through explicit recognition and compensation (but this is pretty rare in a settlement, as one of the benefits of a settlement is not recognising any wrong doing), so usually it's simply recognised in compensation and horse-trading, and between nations there can be entirely secret arrangements.[/quote]
I too welcome the possibility of an affordable compromise that takes into account all parties’ interests to some extent and spare further bloodshed, at some point. Yet I find very problematic talking about Russian “legitimate grievance” the way you do for the following reasons:
First, let’s notice that there is some mismatch between your notion of “justification” and your notion of “legitimacy” (as in “legitimate grievance”) because the former doesn’t require agreement (“Your actions maybe justified and a judge and everyone else disagrees”) while latter does (“‘Legitimate grievance’ is something you yourself agrees the counter party has a point about”). The mismatch seems confirmed also in your previous statement (“Like the very real Nazi's with significant influence, whether there is enough to justify invasion or not, it's clearly a legitimate grievance that the West should also have a problem with”). And this mismatch may explain your wording in the case of the prisoner exchange where prisoners to be returned are considered “legitimate grievance”. However, even if hearing what somebody wants is necessary for an effective quid-pro-quo, to my understanding that doesn’t equate to a recognition of a “legitimate grievance” as you unexpectedly suggest. To me, “legitimate grievance” is more commonly understood as “justified grievance”: i.e. “legitimate grievance” is a complaint about shared legal/moral/contractual rules that have been violated, not a request expressing what somebody wants or a complaint about one failed to get, or expected to get for whatever other reason, and which doesn’t need to be controversial (from your own example “if you were caught taking something and this led to a trial, ‘I wanted it’ is not a good justification in this context”). And clarifying what “justified grievances” are among parties can also help settle responsibility attributions.
Second, let’s also notice that talking about Russian “legitimate grievance” doesn’t even seem to follow conclusively from your own conspiracist speculations. Indeed, either Western agreement about Russian “legitimate concern” is honest, but then how come that all of a sudden there are no more hidden objectives or worst scenarios you can speculate about against the West? Or Western agreement is dishonest, so there are hidden objectives motivated by Western greed, lust for power, cynicism, phobias, but against whom this time? Ukraine, Russia, the West itself or else? In any case, it’s hard to understand how, given your own speculations, practically the West/NATO/US doesn’t give a shit about Ukrainian lives (it wants to sacrifice them), the Ukrainian president doesn’t give a shit about Ukrainian lives (he cares more about national pride and territory), Russia doesn’t give a shit about Ukrainian lives (they are killing them), and yet all the three can still manage to agree on the right peace deal that saves Ukrainian lives and welfare from greed, lust for power, cynicism, phobias, corruption of any administration involved in this war. If so, why should we believe that agreeing with Russian legitimate grievances and its demands as bad or worst than losing more Ukrainian lives? After peace, both Russia and Ukraine could still prosecute, repress, torture and kill a number of Ukrainian civilians accusing them of collaborationism which is equal to the number of killed Ukrainian civilians at any time during this war + 1.
Third, if Russian “legitimate grievance” (like NATO enlargement, denazification, Crimea) is taken as “justified grievance” to support Russian demands (otherwise what would be the point of talking about Russian “legitimate grievance”?), then their alleged “legitimacy” clashes with how I understand Western shared notions of politics [1], geopolitics (when great powers compete they do not ought to be fair or treat each other equally, what they primarily ought to do concerns more likely their national security, even if at the expense of other countries’ national security), international law (sovereignty, UN charter, treaties), history [2], morality (how can Russians aggress and kill their “brother” Ukrainians just for “territory and national pride”?). Unless, of course, Russian grievances and related demands are reframed entirely to make them compatible with Western shared notions, which implies that Russian deal-breaker demands won’t be accepted as such: e.g. concerning Crimea, there could be a UN supervised referendum about the autonomous or independent status of Crimea. Or alternatively there is a way to freeze the war, suspend and address matters of rights at a later time, in the hope that time could fix what can not be diplomatically fixed now.
Fourth, concerning the public/private nature of the Western acknowledgement of Russian grievances, if the recognition is public then there might be great reputational costs that one needs to be taken into account. Given the incompatibility I was talking about previously, I can’t figure out this situation other than a zero-sum-game i.e. more legitimacy for the West than less legitimacy for Russia, and vice versa. So by addressing Russian requests the way I suggested above, without delegitimising the West this could be a serious problem for Russia. On the other side, if that acknowledgement remains private matter, the problem is that [i]verba volant, scripta manent[/I] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verba_volant,_scripta_manent) and the situation is analogous to the alleged promise from the US administration to the Soviet Union administration to never expand a single inch east. If that promise actually occurred as a private agreement, it allows plausible (if not legitimate) deniability. If it didn’t occur, then Russia can again invent its own alternative truth about Western recognition of its legitimate grievances without any such private recognition from the West actually happening. So the only evidence that has a stronger chance to pierce people’s mind in favour of Russia is a public recognition of Russian legitimate grievance as an admission of Western/Ukrainian culpability or weakness. After all how serious can be taken a recognition of Russian legitimate grievances if it’s just matter of responsible people coping with the tantrums of a delusional dictator with a bunch of “white lies" behind doors? Conclusion: if Putin is de facto striving for international status and recognition (in line with changing the World Order with his Chinese ally), then he must likely pursue public recognition of his “legitimate grievances”.
[1]
“During Ukraine's post-Soviet history, the far-right has remained on the political periphery and been largely excluded from national politics since independence in 1991.[2][3] Unlike most Eastern European countries which saw far-right groups become permanent fixtures in their countries' politics during the decline and fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the national electoral support for far-right parties in Ukraine only rarely exceeded 3% of the popular vote.[4] Far-right parties usually enjoyed just a few wins in single-mandate districts, and no far right candidate for president has ever secured more than 5 percent of the popular vote in an election.[4] Only once in the 1994–2014 period was a radical right-wing party elected to the parliament as an independent organization within the proportional part of the voting: Svoboda in 2012.[4] Since then even at the height of nationalist sentiment during and after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Russo-Ukrainian War far-right parties have failed to gain enough votes to attain political representation.[4] The far-right was heavily represented among the pro-Russian separatists with several past or current leaders of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk linked to various neo-Nazi, white supremacists and ultra nationalists groups. The importance of the far-right on both sides of the conflict declined over time.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Ukraine
[2]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holodomor
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_nationalism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_imperialism#Internal_colonization
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russification#Late_1930s_and_wartime:_Russian_comes_to_the_fore
The main on is of course NATO expansion. When Russia mentions moving missiles and forward operating bases and so on closer to Russia is a threat to Russia, that's obviously true. One of the quid pro quo agreements with Russia in the expansion of NATO was that missile bases wouldn't advance. The actual military threats are hardware and personnel, not the actual NATO treaty, so bringing countries into NATO is one thing, and actually advancing NATO hardware, systems and soldiers is another.
In terms of real military analysis, the central military justification for Russia war is that NATO installed a missile base in the Baltics. That NATO says it was to protect against Iran and is only missile defence is entirely meaningless if you want to negotiate an end to a conflict with Russia.
There is actually a stable form of NATO enlargement in making NATO bigger but not only moving little to no hardware closer to Russia but the Easter-European states themselves becoming more stable vis-a-vis Russia and also each other and both lowering their defence expenditures because they are in NATO as well as depending on NATO command structures to function so unable really to do any independent military actions anyways. For, previous to NATO expansion you can have disputes between East-European countries entirely unrelated to Russia or NATO but that then draft Russia and/or NATO into the conflict and the it growing into a regional conflict and getting out of control. Prior to NATO directly threatening Russia with advancing missile bases and proposing Georgia and Ukraine join NATO (and notice the combination of abandoning the quid pro quo of not advancing advanced hardware will also wanting to expand right to Russia's border, is something any general would say warrants a war, and there'd be only political reasons not to go to war; this is a sad reality of NATO's actions over the last decades, that this war is totally provoked and any NATO member would evaluate things militarily exactly the same as Russia has).
So, obviously if NATO wants peace with Russia it will likely have to recognise it has to take a less threatening posture with Russia. [b]Advancing missile bases is particular stupid if the goal is peace. Obviously, neutral Ukraine are removing the missile base would be one way of recognising this grievance. If you want Ukraine in NATO, then to convince the Russians you'd need to propose a lot more compensation for that, but that seems essentially an impossible deal, but maybe there's some sort of "NATO light" version or something.
There are definitely the Nazi's in Ukraine.[/b] As a Westerner I don't think that should be acceptable to the West, let alone the Russians. And if you look into the issue with reporting pre-invasion, these are definitely Nazi institutions with enormous power and influence in Ukraine. It should be, first of all, Western policy to not support and arm Nazi’s. That Western media lauds these "ultra nationalists" as "the best fighters" that Ukraine simply needs, is even more outrageous.
The rights of Russian speaking minorities that, fact of the matter is, Ukraine started oppressing in total contradiction to the West's "values and policies" about minority rights, is also simply an entirely justified grievance, which is text-book prejudice due to ethnicity and language that the West claims to be against.
There have been war crimes also by the Ukrainians, but generally in a peaceful resolution to a war, all the war crimes are ignored. As with any settlement, one of the main benefits is not admitting any wrongdoing.
We had trials against the Third Reich ... because we won. There was no trials of Western war crimes even if they were of comparable or worse nature than some convicted Nazi's.
Benefits of winning is also likewise not needing to admit any wrong doing[/quote].
Here you are no longer delving into hypothetical thoughts, you clearly state as a matter of fact “war is totally provoked”, “these are definitely Nazi institutions with enormous power and influence in Ukraine”, “The rights of Russian speaking minorities that, fact of the matter is, Ukraine started oppressing”, “There have been war crimes also by the Ukrainians”. And you count them as “legitimate grievance”. Besides since you talk about “entirely justified grievance” and “in total contradiction to the West's ‘values and policies’” (unquestionable proof of Western hypocrisy right?), the gap between “legitimate grievance” and “justified grievance” seems now bridged by the reference to Western shared rules. You look pretty convinced about all this.
I would disagree on matter of facts and legitimacy/justification (as I pointed out in the previous comments). But I’m not surprised to hear them. Such alleged “legitimate grievances” are perfectly in line with a propaganda technique called “accusation in a mirror” where Russia is accusing the West/NATO/US/Ukraine of violations Russia itself is arguably committing in a more significant and more documented way than Russia can ever prove against the West, no matter how much grains of truth there are in Russian accusations. Indeed, an ex-KGB agent ascended to presidency and established a more authoritarian and personalist regime like Putin, may well rely on all kinds of psychological warfare and disinformatia practiced during the cold war, multiplied by the channels made available by the current technologies (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firehose_of_falsehood), right?
Besides your loose notion of “legitimate grievance” enables any non-controversial grain of truth in Russian propaganda against the West or Ukraine to ascend to the status of “legitimate grievance” despite the fact that other relevant contextual considerations may severely undermine their status of “legitimate grievance” as I understand this notion.
Anyway I’m gonna add a few more thoughts on such “legitimate grievance”:
Concerning NATO expansion, if the issue is “the actual military threats are hardware and personnel, not the actual NATO treaty” then the issue is not NATO expansion but NATO offensive military capacity from Ukraine and American bases. While I understand that might constitute a future security threat to some extent because a country like Russia with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world plus more discretionary military doctrine as deterrence and offensive apparatus in case of existential threat can be hardly seen as a vulnerable state and liable to NATO aggressive attacks (and “any NATO member would evaluate things militarily exactly the same” as I said), this could have been handled differently especially in a time where: A) NATO was at its low in terms of popularity given the isolationist trends in the US (president Trump being in line with such trends) and the greater focus on China, the opposition of France and Germany to NATO expansion in Ukraine and to increase military budget, and NATO unpopularity among interested parties (Ukrainians didn’t want to join NATO until Crimean annexation, Finns and Swedes didn’t want to join NATO until the beginning of this war by Russia). B) If West/NATO/US was hostile to Russia as the US was against the Soviet Union globalisation to the point of ensuring Western stable dependency on Russian money and resources (enabling Russian blackmailing strategy during this war), wouldn’t have been possible. C) The issue of offensive military capacity could have been handled diplomatically the way the Cuban missile crisis was, or even better by Russia giving costly security guarantees to all Eastern European countries (including Ukraine) that were tempted to join NATO. But it wasn’t, because it’s not matter of NATO offensive military capacity, to Putin (and the military-economic-intellectual elites he surrounded himself with) it was all about hegemonic status and capacity of ideological, political and military projection outside Russian boarders on the world stage like the US and China. In other words, Russian “legitimate grievance” about NATO expansion and “justification” for their atrocities against their brother Ukrainians is all about hegemonic status and what goes with it (“territory and national pride” as you would say).
Notice that the concept of “provocation” would have no justificatory power if we didn’t reason in terms of agency (so responsibility) and shared rules (like we do with law & moral). If “provocation” has merely causal explanatory power (like stimulus and reflex response), then the US too and Ukraine too responded to the threatening stimulus (actual, future or imaginary as you wish) constituted by Russia. In other words, all geopolitical agents are de facto security maximiser systems that respond to perceived threats by reflex: Russia perceives threats from the West and it reacts accordingly, the West perceives threats from Russia and it reacts accordingly, whatever the consequences are for anybody involved, period! And you can navigate up-stream the causal chain of actions and reactions back to human prehistory in search for who was the first one to begin (maybe God?), so good luck with that! Anyway, in that case, “legitimacy” is void of any justificatory meaning, and “legitimate grievance” equates to “perceived threat to counter” and “provocation” is whatever the “provoked” recipient perceives as such: Hitler’s extermination of Jews was a response to a legitimate grievance, Soviet Union’s genocide of Ukrainians was a response to a legitimate grievance, all terrorist attacks (including decapitation videos) committed by jihadists were a response to legitimate grievance, the US war against Iraq and Afghanistan were a response to a legitimate grievance (including all American lies and propaganda). Even if Russia launched a strategic nuclear bomb to Kiev on the 24 February, that would still be a response to a legitimate grievance.
On the other side if “provocation” has justificatory meaning what are the shared moral/legal/contractual rules and the agency that would grant such meaning to “provocation”? In international relations the shared rules are the ones provided by international law centered around the notion of “sovereignty” (and related right to self-defence) and NATO expansion didn’t breach international law rules nor security treaties or even official agreements with Russia (BTW, United States could also withdraw from JCPOA, thanks to Putin’s “outstanding” and “talented” orange-faced girlfriend, remember that?). While Russia manifestly breached Ukrainian sovereignty by aggressing Ukraine and annexing Ukrainian territories without even having the pretexts US exploited in occupying (but not annexing pieces of) Iraq and Afghanistan for a regime change like WMD (by an authoritarian and expansionist regime) and sponsoring terroristic attacks overseas (by an Islamist regime). In other words, respecting Russian hegemonic status and sphere of influence outside its boarders (Ukraine included) is shared rule neither within western moral standards nor within international laws. From a geopolitical point of view, the hegemonic status can clearly be the object of contention between competing great powers and result from certain power dynamics depending on available means and effective strategic usage of such available means. But, in this domain, the political (if not moral) imperative is that each sovereign state should prioritise its national security over others. So NATO “provocations” (expansion and support to Ukraine) may be effective moves (despite Mearsheimer’s theories and diagnosis) by the Western powers if they disrupt Russian projection power, and therefore they would be strategically justified (which is different but not incompatible with saying that they are morally or legally justified).
In any case, Russian craving for hegemonic status is neither a moral nor a legal/contractual obligation/commitment to other states, so violating Russian expectations based on its understanding of its power relations with the West constitutes - pace Mearsheimer - no legitimate grievance. Just sheer self-entitled imposition against the West/NATO/US, with no Western-acknowledgeable “justification”. Otherwise it wouldn’t be the end of the West-led World Order. And since the legal/moral notion of “legitimacy” is also important to settle issues like justice and reparation (for Ukrainian killed, deported people, other war crimes, etc. and all other material damages in Ukraine), talking about “legitimate grievance” is ultimately a demand for impunity.
Concerning Ukrainian neo-nazi extremists and war crimes, even if we ignore the fog of lies that Russians spread around these subjects, there are certainly facts that Western governments don’t need to overlook, because Ukraine is not part of the EU/NATO yet, so investigation/policies against far-right extremism and war crimes (like with corruption) may be required for Ukraine to join the West. Currently, however, the assessment of such facts can be deeply biased by pro-Russian propaganda. Indeed, Russia has a much bigger problem with war crimes and far-right extremists than Ukraine (https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/if-russia-serious-about-de-nazification-it-should-start-home). Not to mention that Russia (especially under Putin) is a notoriously active promoter of far-right and neonazi movements in the West. So, frankly speaking, Putin does not have a problem with Ukrainian neonazi because they are neonazi, but because they are anti-Russian (which feeling now is more widely and intensely felt in Ukraine thanks to Putin’s special military operation)! In other words, talking about “denazification of Ukraine” is just a rhetoric trope that can be more conveniently exploited by Russian propaganda for domestic and Western audience (however different the historical memories about the Nazi period may be) instead of “Russification of Ukraine”.
So whatever issue Ukraine has with far-right extremism and nenonazi, that can not be used by Russia in defending its international rights or to support its demands given all that the West can justifiably retort against Russia. What’s worst is that given Putin’s authoritarian regime and long reign, responsibilities concerning both accusations (wrt far-right extremism and war crimes) can be more easily pinned on Putin than on Zelensky.
All I can agree with is that for several reasons the grievance about Crimea and Russian minorities in Donbas were more amenable to international law solutions (even more balanced between Russia and Ukraine) and therefore more easy to legitimise. For the same reasons, I wouldn’t be surprised if, at the negotiation table, the Westerners would still be more open on those points than the Ukrainians, despite the annexations. Yet there are also non-negligible economic reasons why neither Ukraine nor the West will concede those regions that easily for good reasons: with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia extorted related Black Sea shelf reserves of oil and gas owned by Ukraine, so preventing Ukraine from becoming a potential energetic competitor that the West is interested to integrate (https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2014/05/27/the-energy-dimensions-of-russias-annexation-of-crimea/index.html).
[quote=“boethius;764955”]Finally what kind of legitimate grievances against the Russians (notice how the negotiation requirements are framed around pro- and cons- for Russia, because they are the ones really need convincing not the West or the Ukrainians) is Russia required to recognize as a first step? — neomac
Yes, the negotiation from our Western perspective is mainly around the pros-and-cons for Russia, since it's them that we are negotiating with.
The first step in negotiating a settlement is coming up with a compromise of the key issues that you think is acceptable to the other party, the "deal breakers". There can be a long list of minor stuff, in this case economic arrangements of how to rebuild Ukraine or then dropping sanctions and so on, but there's no point in addressing secondary issues if there's no possible compromise on the deal breakers.
The deal breakers in this war for the Russians are concerning NATO and Crimea. There maybe someway to negotiate the other big issues, such as Russian speaking rights in Donbas and so, in a way that de-annexes these territories (such as the proposed referendums to be part of Ukraine, autonomous in Ukraine or independent) or then simply recognises the annexation (such as another referendum to join Russia that the international community recognises).
There is, for certain, no compromise Ukrainians and Westerners would be happy about, but the alternative is more war, more death, and potentially Ukraine losing anyways, which people will just blame Ukraine for not "fighting hard enough" but people should be far more unhappy about compared to a compromise now or at any point previous in the war.
Which is why the issue of the cost to Ukraine of more fighting is simply ignored in Western media, and even in this forum: so that if Ukraine comes out a big loser in all this, well that's what they wanted, what are you gonna do, all we did was give some of the weapons that they wanted, as any friend would do.[/quote]
To me other notions to clarify are those of “victory” and “loss”. They may have a meaning on the battlefield, and another in political and strategic terms, especially in the long run. Even if Ukraine manages to reintegrate all the occupied areas except Crimea and Donbas, this may count as a military loss for Ukraine and a military victory for Russia. But it could arguably count as a more significant political loss for Russia than for Ukraine, since the political price of this “special military operation” could still be too high for Russia to bear. Indeed, Russia wouldn’t make any substantial progress since 2014 wrt its ambitious objectives yet it would end up in much worse conditions: no regime change and no denazification (even the “neonazi" Azov fighters are being returned to Ukraine in prisoner exchanges), so the security threat would still be there if Ukraine joins NATO or gets security guarantees from the West, the military/intelligence failures looked of epic proportion, Russian political reputation among allies is sinking (CSTO alliance is not faring well, Russian annexations were acknowledged only by one of its members, Khazakstan is flirting with China), NATO will likely expand, sanctions are hampering Russian economy and technological upgrade (which is also essential for Russian military capacity), the American archenemy’s influence in Europe is getting stronger while Russian energetic integration with Europe is being severed, and Russian closer partnership with China (which will not replace the economic partnership with Europe in the short period) doesn’t look as a boost in hegemonic leadership, but a self-demotion in geopolitical rank and influence (Central Asia may definitely drift under the Chinese sphere of influence). And that is the opposite of the status recognition that Russia was striving for. From history, we know that Russian humiliating defeats have political repercussions and can lead to regime change/reforms. And this, in turn, could have unexpected favorable repercussions also on the Ukrainian territorial claims over Donbas and Crimea in the longer run.
Anyhow such geopolitical victory doesn’t depend just on Russian means, resolution, or escalation threats, but also on Western cohesion, resolution and vision in addressing the Russian security and economic challenge. This will also be an example also for other authoritarian regimes, like China. And an important premise to repair or rebuild more convenient relationships between the West and the Rest in the interest of everybody.
Quoting boethius
Here the problems I see:
First, you seem asking me to solve an equation whose form and variables are unknown. What does “lose” for Ukraine mean in quantifiable terms? What’s the likelihood of loss and win and how did you calculate it? What’s the time range you are considering? What’s the cost threshold that if exceeded will make the cost unreasonably high? What quantifiable parameters would make you consider a Western plan a “‘coherent workable’ plan to actually ‘beat’ Russia”?
Second, you yourself do not have provided any positive example of what such equation would look like in this or any other war in human history to show at least what you expect others to provide. You just hinted at cases (“Talk to the Vietnamese, talk the Kurds, talk to our liberal "friends" in Iraq and Afghanistan, talk to the Libyans and Syrians”) as examples of Western failures, suggesting an unscrutinised analogy with the Ukrainian case. So you yourself are not using the equation AT ALL to assess if Western attitude deserves to be supported or not in the Ukrainian case. Why don’t we try something different? You support Russian “legitimate grievances” that motivate Russian “special military operation”, the cost to Ukraine is immense, face the reality and explain how it's worth it so far, how the same or multiple times more cost would be likewise worth it, or even the entire destruction of Ukraine would be worth it, if Russian “legitimate grievances” enough acknowledged and demands are enough met. What would be an “unreasonably high cost” for Russia to have some sort of “win”?
Third, since your arguments against the Western attitude are in terms of number of casualties, defamatory/dismissive claims about Western (e.g. encouraging the Ukrainians to fight even though they know the Ukrainians will lose anyways or will completely destroyed, not fighting directly) and Ukrainian (e.g.“territory and national pride”) intentions/motivations, while acknowledging Russian “legitimate grievances” and unstoppable resolution (starting with the “nuclear blackmail”), arguing against such anti-Western policy arguments as I did in my exchanges with you and others is all there is to do on my side. Indeed, I’m very suspicious about your “accounting approach” because as far as I know, nobody and certainly not avg dudes like me and you can figure out a reliable plan to grant an optimal military victory and international security/economic/political fallout for this war as for any war in the entire human history (in the hindsight everything would likely appear to us questionable and suboptimal for one reason or another e.g. were the nuclear bombs over Japan really necessary? ). Strategic decisions by political administrations are constrained by all sorts of unpredictable/volatile factors. Political administrations have to creatively work their strategy out based on educated heuristics (guided by teams of experts), educated understanding of other relevant peers’ available options and preferences (so any move must be assess wrt other players’ available strategies, allies and enemies included) and longer terms goals (e.g. stretching over decades). So one way warring governments can topple one another is by overloading decision capacity with many pressing decision conditions at any level (e.g. economic, political, military) which will in turn increase the risk of committing fatal/cascading/cumulative mistakes to the advantage of the opponent. And notice that, given the Western support, the Ukrainian administration can rely on a likely wider and more effective pool of advisors and intelligence than the Russians. I also deeply doubt that at any given time the most valuable information available to decision makers (including how the strategy is performing so far) is available for public consumption by avg dudes like us for obvious security reasons. So avg dudes’ reasoning is twice frustrating because the avg dudes’ bounded rationality adds up to the bounded rationality of decision makers. And your peace deal recommendations suffer from such cognitive limits: the number of casualties doesn't literally say anything about what the best strategy in the long run is.
Besides I doubt that lives (as a biological condition) and well-being (as quantifiable material prosperity) are the unique or most politically relevant units by which one should measure costs and benefits of the war. Indeed the existential motivation behind major involved players in this conflict (like Ukraine, Russia, and the West) is more about shared/identitarian understanding, acknowledgement and possible achievement of what makes life worth living, so recognition (of self-determination for Ukrainians, and hegemonic status for Russia and the West). And this motivation can go deep into blood and bones of an entire society when people with their network of family, friendly, emotional and generational ties experience discrimination, humiliation, persecution, coercion, injury, rapes, torture, kill, threats, destruction and deprivation of their material and psychological means of subsistence or sense of safety because they hold a certain national identity instead of another. So Ukraine will likely keep fighting against the Russian aggression as a cancer which requires a hard, almost intolerable, treatment at least until it becomes intolerable.
Concerning the West, if Russia like a terrorist Islamist State (after all the religious pro-war propaganda against the satanist West is strong in Russia too) has proven means and will to wreck people and countries partnering with the West, destabilise Western economy (commodity blackmailing), politics (by supporting far-right movements in the West and soliciting the Rest to ally with Russia against the West), security (nuclear threats) in pursuit of such recognition the West can’t possibly let this happen without losing its own existential struggle for recognition. In other words, the West can’t possibly back up AGAINST powerful and aggressive authoritarian regimes that strive for recognition in OPPOSITION and at the expense of the West. So, since the clash of irreconcilable world views and (moral/legal/political) order is the deepest reason of this war, it’s irrational to now admit as possible the acknowledgment of Russian “legitimate grievances” just to avoid further bloodshed. For both “legitimate grievances” AND war bloodshed’s meaning ALONG WITH the value of the lives that have been already sacrificed to this war and the value of the lives that might be again sacrificed if Russia (or its emulators) were still in condition to start another war, threat or oppress sovereign countries and partners of the West still DEPENDS ON that clash of irreconcilable world views.
Four, I’m suspicious about causal claims such as “Western attitude (of which the policy of the leadership entirely depends) has caused immense suffering”, because they are ambiguously suggesting implicit and unscrutinised responsibility claims. Indeed the Western attitude is just one indirect causal factor of this War, among more direct causal factors which depend on Russian and Ukrainian attitude. My assumption is that for assessing responsibility, causal claims are not enough, one needs to assess agency and decision making process, along with beliefs and intentions against shared standards.
And again, the real leftist "Putinistas" can be found in the People's Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. Where the two-headed eagle of Russia is in harmony next to the hammer and sickle.
Al Jazeera puts it well, with the example of Brazil:
Lula has said that Zelenskiy is "as responsible as Putin for the war".
These are just facts. I don't claim these are hypotheticals.
Quoting neomac
Yes, these totally factual things, documented by our own the Western media (before they got the memo that these subjects were off limits), and are legitimate grievances.
Legitimate grievance does not mean "justified". It's a concept you need to negotiate with people.
For example, a murderer, who's just confessed to a murder, could have a legitimate grievance that the police didn't bring him his coffee as they said they would.
Now, if the police don't want anything more from the murderer and seeing as coffee isn't a right, no one recorded the promise of coffee anyways and even if they did there's no damages or relevance to the confession and legal process etc., they could just walk away and say fuck the murderer and his coffee, I ain't doing shit for this sack of crap. So, the coffee remains a legitimate grievance of the murderer but in the grand scheme of moral things a broken promise of coffee is in no way comparable to murder and there's no legal consequence to breaching this contract.
However, let's say the police want the murderer to keep talking: where's the body? Who else was involved? What was the motivation? etc.
Now, the murderer says "I won't talk more until I get my coffee". I'm pretty sure any detective on the planet would get this murderer a coffee, even if they don't really want to be nice to the murderer. Why? It's a legitimate grievance that needs to be resolved in order to agree on a cooperative action to keep conversing about the murder.
Had the murderer said "I'll talk more, but police are wearing the colour blue, and I hate blue, and to compensate that I want to be let go, all charges dropped etc." doubtful any detective would view this a legitimate grievance reasonable and reasonable demand to resolve this grievance, to continue the conversation.
So, back the Russian and Ukrainian war. If you don't want to negotiate with Russia then there is no need to reflect on their legitimate grievances. However, if you do want to negotiate (want to convince the other party you're dealing with to do something using mere words) then resolving legitimate grievances (in one way or the other) is an essential part of the negotiation process.
The reason the word "legitimate" appears instead of just saying "grievance" is because in a negotiation people start high and settle lower; so, first off, there maybe a whole list of grievances and perhaps many are just padding the negotiation position and aren't really thought of as legitimate by the party presenting them (things they plan to let go of in basically horse trading). Likewise, some grievances maybe authentically felt by the counter-party, but our own side views them as illegitimate and will never satisfy them; but maybe it's possible to come to an agreement anyways if there remains overall enough "compensation" for letting go of the grievances. For example, right now Turkey is making all sorts of demands on Sweden to join NATO, and maybe they will "stick to their guns" or maybe they are just trying to maximise purely economic compensation (NATO: solve our inflation problem if you want Sweden) and so just throwing out these other grievances as it would be "impolite" for Turkey to directly say what they are actually after; so, if that were the case, the grievances are purely nominal and Turkey will just say whatever until their implied economic demands are met (and not by Sweden, but the the EU and US who could solve their inflation problem).
Of course, you can argue that Russia's grievances don't matter, even if some are true, as there is no reason to negotiate.
However, if you want to negotiate, they it's necessary to reflect on how the counter-party views things and what issues need to be resolved (for them, not for you) in order to reach an agreement (you negotiate with "the other" not yourself). Of course, it is the same for Russia negotiating with Ukraine and the West, and a successful negotiation is going to adequately resolve the grievances in the context of the other important factor which is leverage. The more leverage you have in a negotiation the more of your grievances you can seek to have resolved and the less grievances of the counter-party you need to care about. For example, perhaps 2 nuclear bombs being dropped on Japan for no military reason is a legitimate grievance, but they lost the war and had no leverage so the US could and did ignore that little detail.
Of course, if your goal is:
Quoting neomac
Then there is no reason to want Ukraine to negotiate with Russia, but rather it's better to just spread propaganda to increase the will for Ukrainians to fight even if they don't "stop" Russia and their country is completely wrecked as well as increase motivation of the West to supply arms and so on.
So, it's understandable that you are unable to follow any conversation about the steps of negotiating a resolution to the conflict, as you do not want the conflict to end until "as much enduring damage" is inflicted on Russia.
And again, "not stopping the Russians" includes an immensely costly the war for the Ukrainians and then simply losing the war. This is not compatible with Ukrainian welfare. Even in a losing position, one party to a war still has the leverage of being able to inflict more damage and can use that to get more concessions than total military defeat.
That just says exactly what I argued. 'Allied with Putin' is being defined as 'anything which disagrees with US policy'
Lula is not 'allied with Putin' in any way shape or form. He disagrees with US foreign policy and thinks it resulted in the war. He disagrees with the US narrative.
It is one of the more disgusting aspects of the Facebook generation that there can be no room for disagreement any more. If you're not pro-US, you must be pro-Putin. It's pathetic.
They definitely do have meaning on the battlefield, but I understand since Ukraine isn't achieving these "victories" as of late you've made up some different meanings for victory to cope with that.
Quoting neomac
You are just completely delusional. The West does not represent the "interest of everybody" and is not seeking, in this war or any other policy dimension, solutions that are in the "interest of everybody".
Even more bizarre, you don't hesitate to just flat out say US's actions are justified due to their hegemonic position (and just ignore the fact that if Russia wins, then they are the hegemon, and therefore justified in your framework, in the region).
Quoting neomac
These are your problems, not mine. I don't care about beating Russia.
I'm not a Russophobe. I didn't live in fear of Russia before this war, I don't live in fear of Russia now. I do fear US escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, but this is a fear of the international dynamic that's been put in place, mostly by the US "meddling" in Ukrainian elections and internal affairs.
My position in this debate is that a negotiated peace is preferable to more war, Zelensky is an idiot, but the West (US / EU) easily has the leverage to negotiate a resolution to the conflict and just ignore the fact Zelensky is an idiot.
And, "loss for Ukraine in quantifiable terms" is easy to define: tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians dead, economy wrecked, massive emigration, and not even achieving anything further on the battle field since last spring but forced to accept Russia control over it's current occupied territory, maybe more. This would definitely be a loss for Ukraine.
Now, if you want to wax whimsically that even if Ukraine loses the war Russia is harmed "enough" geopolitically and there's some Western geopolitical victory of some sort, then even if that were true, Ukraine gets no benefit, so the end result is using the Ukrainians for our own geopolitical ambitions: aka. sacrificing Ukraine to harm Russia.
I am entirely willing to sacrifice an entire country in war campaign, wars take sacrifice, I am the kind of person who would not hesitate to sit down and write an "equation" concluding millions, or hundreds of millions of people must be sacrificed for what I believe to be right (if it makes sense of course), but I am only willing in a war in which I am actually fighting in and my own country takes losses in the country being sacrificed. This was the old way: "you want us to make a fanatical stand to slow down and attrit the enemy, you get your fucking asses fucking here and do some dying too, otherwise we're suing for peace or straight up surrendering and not damaging our country for nothing".
For example, the UK wanted France to resist Nazi invasion, and so sent an expeditionary force to help with that. It's common sense.
Without that, we are not "allied" with Ukraine, we are cynically manipulating and exploiting them for entirely different geopolitical reasons (in the case of Europe, self-defeating geo-political reasons) with minimum risk to our own soldiers lives and so minimum cause to sit down and really reflect on what are doing and the consequences of our leaders decisions.
As long as I can be pro-US while disagreeing with their foreign policy many/most times, and still not be pro-Putin.
I believe this is the point @Isaac is making. Criticism of US foreign policy isn't "pro-Putin".
Yup. I was being facetious. He and I agree there.
Ah ok, I haven't been following the conversation for a couple of weeks.
It is truly a bizarre transformation of it being totally normal to criticise US foreign policy, this entire last century, to any criticism is now pro-Putin. Likewise, for the arms industry, and not just in the US but also in Europe, who don't benefit from the war and it's purely ideological and informed by propaganda ... which, ok, most people view the world that way, but European leaders one would assume have a more sophisticated view of the world and would be pushing propaganda due to some underlying motivation. Motivation of the US is pretty clear, but it's really hard to interpret European leadership's motivation in this and come up with a different interpretation to: they're both really dumb and don't really understand anything and / or then just cowards in the face of social media pressure.
Exactly. What we're being asked to believe is that..
a) the US despite funding, arming, and training Ukraine, despite providing intelligence, despite a propaganda and media censorship campaign the likes of which hasn't been seen for decades... are in fact barely involved in this war
b) Lula, mentions something which Putin also mentioned in one of his speeches...and thus is now an ally of one of parties in this war.
The majority of European "leadership" is an ideologically driven bunch inspired by the likes of Klaus Schwab. Authoritarian to the core, they'll jump on every crisis opportunity to further their personal agenda and tighten the reigns on the population of Europe.
Crises give governments extraordinary powers, and they are currently using those to pass all sorts of far-reaching legislation, from attempts at forced vaccinations during covid, to mass-surveillance, digital IDs and digital currencies. Notice the common thread - control, control, control.
Although I agree with the basics, they still require economic strength to pursue their personal and legislative agendas, which for decades has involved the "realpolitik" move of accessing Russian resources.
If it was purely ideological driven they would have broken with Russia a long time ago, not made new pipelines and so on. There's been clear disagreement with the US on policy for decades, clear motivation to stay on friendly terms with Russia and trade. It would not be plausible that EU leaders build up dependence on Russia just to have a crisis and push through their agendas.
I would completely agree when it comes to Boris Johnson, but there weren't other European leaders joining him in Kiev to convince Zelensky to keep fighting.
In other words, it's difficult to interpret European leaders, apart from Boris and maybe Poland, as being motivated to cause the war to happen and escalate it, there's just also a complete lack of evidence of any motivation to prevent the war, or pressure a peace settlement once it started.
Additionally, we now get mixed messages from these same leaders about the war now.
Rather, it seems to me the central European leaders really did have a mentality of scolded school children.
Which is stupid alright.
He is right.
They predictably did not succeed in beating the great powers at their own game, and got used as a pawn instead. The United States is doing the minimum it can to maintain its credibility as a military ally, while mostly just watching as Ukraine gets clobbered by the gorilla it told the Ukrainians to pick a fight with.
Even if they had succeeded at causing a United States intervention, did they honestly believe Ukraine wouldn't pay a horrible price for that?
I wouldn't go so far as to say Zelensky is as responsible as Putin for the war. Russia is principally responsible for the war. Zelensky, his predecessors and the United States are principally responsible for the conflict that sparked the war.
The subject is different. While Poland is country with his own history, language, culture and system, Ukraine is basically a little Russia. Putin's behaviour is not good and he is responsible of criminal wars.
But please... don't let the nationalists as Zelensky say that they are "Western world" and so "different from Russia" when they even share the same alphabet. In the other hand, we do not see any move by Ukraine to end this war... he is acting selfish and is choking the world economy just for his nationalist business. He is acting like the rest of the world is not in trouble...
Did Poland act as Ukraine is now acting? I think not...
This war has to end and Ukraine must accept his reality.
Ookey... So Ukraine does not have its own history, language and culture and does not have a right to exist as a sovereign nation (no matter what its people think). In that case they totally deserve to be invaded and subjugated. Got it :roll:
Quoting javi2541997
Very selfish indeed. Why can't they just quit their resistance to the invasion and let Russia rampage over the rest of the country? No one would care (except for Ukrainians, but they aren't even a people, so they don't count).
Not all the Ukranians are opposed to Russia. The more closer you go to Russian border you would see that their citizens root for Russia instead of Western world or NATO. This is a complex issue and it is not about all Ukrainians are against the invasion. Probably, the citizens of Kiev are nationalists but I doubt if the citizens from Jerson or Crimea have the same feelings.
The situation is dynamic. Whatever sentiments were prevalent before the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Russians have been busy. There is the departure of Ukrainians and the theft of their property as noted here:
The same article notes the influx of population into Crimea:
Before the 2022 invasion, the problem of Internally Displaced Population in Ukraine was still a major issue years after the annexation and the establishment of the Independent Republics. It is difficult to find exact numbers of IDP's and refugees who have fled the country since 2/2022.
According to the 2001 census, the breakdown of ethnic identity in Kherson was:
Ukrainians - 961.6 (82.0%)
Russians - 165.2 (14.1%)
Belarusians - 8.1 (0.7%)
Tatars - 5.3 (0.5%)
Armenians - 4.5 (0.4%)
Moldavians - 4.1 (0.4%)
Gosh, that can't be right. When Russia annexed it recently, they had a vote where over 90% of the population approved. That is a lot of heart and mind to win over in just 20 years.
("Everyone bad" —the thread :grin:)
Putin + team responsible for attacking. Kyiv responsible for defending.
Attackers decide actions for defenders to deal/contend with. Responsibility/blame uneven, asymmetric.
Attackers' background increasingly autocratic, suppressive, ... Defenders move toward more transparency, democratic standards, ...
Invasion/attacks multipronged, like conventional (e.g. artillery), intimidation/terrorism-like (bombing throughout, building instability, insurgency), cultural (e.g. re-enculturation, suppression), political (e.g. narrative-hijacking, annexations by fakery, land grab, propaganda). That's what the defenders then have on their hands, but have a good deal of foreign aid/support.
Argumentative commentary losing sight of this stuff is kind of suspect.
Putin + team more or less blame "the West" (a couple or so continents I guess), which they cast as out to destroy Russia, a dire existential threat. Kyiv cast Putin's Russia as a threat to Ukraine (and others), and wants them to leave.
These are some of their public rationales/justifications.
Of course Ukraine does not have its own history, language and culture. It's an arbitrary line on a map, it's absurd to think it somehow contains a natural grouping of language, history and culture.
Tell me, how did the people who determined where the line should be ensure that it encompassed such a natural grouping? Were studies done, where polls taken? Because as I recall learning it, it was some politicians in a negotiating room that drew the line. Did Lenin consult ethnographers in 1922? Did Krushchev cede Crimea because his anthropologists insisted the 'culture' there belonged to Ukraine?
No country's boundaries are carefully drawn around natural breaks in culture and language. It's one of the reasons we have so many fucking wars.
In this case, you'd be blind to ignore the fact that the Russian-speaking population in the east of Ukraine have a different language to the rest, the suppression of which was instrumental in the pre-2022 war.
What did you just write?! If the “concept” (intention or extension) of “legitimate grievance” needs to be negotiated then you yourself can not claim as a fact that those I listed are “legitimate grievances”: main parties didn’t negotiate anywhere what “legitimate grievances” Russia may be acknowledged to have.
[quote=“boethius;770994”]For example, a murderer, who's just confessed to a murder, could have a legitimate grievance that the police didn't bring him his coffee as they said they would.
Now, if the police don't want anything more from the murderer and seeing as coffee isn't a right, no one recorded the promise of coffee anyways and even if they did there's no damages or relevance to the confession and legal process etc., they could just walk away and say fuck the murderer and his coffee, I ain't doing shit for this sack of crap. So, the coffee remains a legitimate grievance of the murderer but in the grand scheme of moral things a broken promise of coffee is in no way comparable to murder and there's no legal consequence to breaching this contract.
However, let’s say the police want the murderer to keep talking: where's the body? Who else was involved? What was the motivation? etc.
Now, the murderer says "I won't talk more until I get my coffee". I'm pretty sure any detective on the planet would get this murderer a coffee, even if they don't really want to be nice to the murderer. Why? It's a legitimate grievance that needs to be resolved in order to agree on a cooperative action to keep conversing about the murder.
Had the murderer said "I'll talk more, but police are wearing the colour blue, and I hate blue, and to compensate that I want to be let go, all charges dropped etc." doubtful any detective would view this a legitimate grievance reasonable and reasonable demand to resolve this grievance, to continue the conversation.[/quote]
The example starts with an actual (not merely alleged) promise by the police to the murderer to satisfy a petty demand (a coffee) that grants plausibility to the “reasonable” “legitimate grievance” by the murderer (can there be unreasonable “legitimate grievance” then? Or “legitimate grievance” means “reasonable grievance”?) whose relevance ultimately depends on its instrumental value in furthering police goals.
I guess you have in mind the “not one inch eastward” promise which NATO enlargement has putatively violated. But it should be clear why that example is no good analogy: as far as I know, there are no records of such promise (so its actual content and its implications remain unknown, even if it actually happened). In other words, we are talking about an "alleged" promise. One could still concede that there were at least informal assurances, however they didn’t involve the US and Russia, but representatives of the American administration and representatives of the Soviet Union administration, so those assurances were realistically bond to political fate of those administrations (like the JCPOA which, differently from this alleged promise, was a very much recorded agreement and Putin’s “outstanding” and “talented” orange-faced girlfriend withdraw from). The alleged promise or informal assurance wasn’t a petty demand at all since its about critical security concerns of two major nuclear-weapon states, so top priority (and for top priority things informal assurance isn't ideal unless there is no material time to formalise the assurance, of course). Besides Russia is far from being as impotent and self-discrediting as a confessed murderer in a police station: indeed, it's a sovereign state with self-entitled expansionist ambitions and means to make lots of human, material and economic damage to other countries. So question of “legitimacy” can make a difference in terms of propaganda and international recognition wrt peer competitors. Russians could have averted the perceived threat from NATO enlargement by becoming more democratic and less corrupt to the benefit of Russian economy and welfare after the end of the Cold War, yet Putin preferred to invest Russian economic resources and Western trust to nurture Russian oligarchs&siloviki, military buildup and play a power game on the world stage at the expense of the West, most certainly of the US. Unfortunately “if you take a stick and you poke a bear in the eye, that bear is probably going to fight back” right?
Finally, if “promise” is your paradigm case to clarify the notion of “legitimate grievance”, I don’t see how this could clarify other Russian “legitimate grievances” you were talking about.
[quote=“boethius;770994”]So, back the Russian and Ukrainian war. If you don't want to negotiate with Russia then there is no need to reflect on their legitimate grievances. However, if you do want to negotiate (want to convince the other party you're dealing with to do something using mere words) then resolving legitimate grievances (in one way or the other) is an essential part of the negotiation process.
The reason the word "legitimate" appears instead of just saying "grievance" is because in a negotiation people start high and settle lower; so, first off, there maybe a whole list of grievances and perhaps many are just padding the negotiation position and aren't really thought of as legitimate by the party presenting them (things they plan to let go of in basically horse trading). Likewise, some grievances maybe authentically felt by the counter-party, but our own side views them as illegitimate and will never satisfy them; but [b]maybe it's possible to come to an agreement anyways if there remains overall enough "compensation" for letting go of the grievances.[/quote]
My point still is that if one side will see the “authentically felt” request (which is different from “legitimate”, “justified” or “reasonable” request, right?) as “illegitimate” but there is a possibility to find an agreement anyways then there is no need to acknowledge the grievance as legitimate AT ALL. Agreeing on a compensation doesn’t equate to acknowledging the legitimacy of the grievance (so no pre-established moral, legal, contractual right/rule that has been violated) but to offering a cost-effective and non-coercive way to let the grievance go away. The semantic link you suggest (“The reason the word ‘legitimate' appears instead of just saying "grievance" is because in a negotiation people start high and settle lower”) is confused and misleading because “legitimacy” is normally understood wrt a pre-established moral, legal, contractual set of rights/rules, and not wrt the acceptability of a negotiated outcome as negotiated prices are on a horse trading. It’s precisely because these are 2 different things that “maybe it's possible to come to an agreement” (negotiated outcome acceptable to both parties) even if “our own side views them as illegitimate” (wrt a pre-established moral, legal, contractual set of rights/rules).
[quote=“boethius;770994”]Of course, you can argue that Russia's grievances don't matter, even if some are true, as there is no reason to negotiate.[/quote]
I’m arguing against your notion of Russian “legitimate grievance” even if Russian grievances may be grounded on partial truths. And even if there are no Russian legitimate grievances as far as I understand them, there might still be a good reason to negotiate at some point if the negotiation has a cost-effective way, acceptable to all involved parties, to let the grievance go away.
[quote=“boethius;770994”]Of course, if your goal is:
Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! Yet if the endgame was stopping Russia, the quickest effective way would be for the West to force Ukraine to surrender to all Russian demands, or not even start a “proxy war” against Russia in the first place, right?! But that’s neither the Western endgame nor the Ukrainians’. So YES concern for the Ukrainian welfare is LITERALLY and REASONABLY compatible with not stopping Russia if that means Ukrainian surrender.
As always, I’m responsible for what I write, not for what you understand. — neomac
Then there is no reason to want Ukraine to negotiate with Russia, but rather it's better to just spread propaganda to increase the will for Ukrainians to fight even if they don't "stop" Russia and their country is completely wrecked as well as increase motivation of the West to supply arms and so on.[/quote]
I don’t see any evidence in support of the idea that Ukrainians will be significantly encouraged to fight by foreign propaganda. The evidences available to me support the idea that all the Russian atrocities Ukrainians are suffering from (that strikingly echoes Russian historical oppression) constitute well enough motivation for Ukrainians to keep fighting. Western propaganda is mainly for domestic consumption to boost cohesion and support for Ukraine, precisely because the West is not experiencing what Ukrainians are experiencing, do not understand all the relevant stakes as strategic decision makers do, and the West is still plagued by info-war and pro-Russian propaganda like yours. Indeed, the very reciprocal claim of yours is true: it's Ukrainian propaganda which is very much active to encourage Western administrations and general public to support Ukrainian even more. Not surprisingly, there are people here who even complain about such "selfish" and "childish" attitude on the Ukrainian part at the expense of the West (so the Ukrainians are the ones to exploit the Westerners, go figure!) .
[quote=“boethius;770994”]"not stopping the Russians" includes an immensely costly the war for the Ukrainians and then simply losing the war[/quote]
That’s your speculation whose plausibility is questionable for the many reasons I pointed out. And this won’t change no matter how many times you repeat it.
Quoting boethius
If you have this wrong impression, it's because you do not understand my reasoning. Or more likely you are playing dumb. Since your analysis is poor on facts, logic and depth, the best you can do is to rely on arbitrary speculations, sophisms and accusations, like the attack ad hominem you just offered.
Indeed, questioning the notion of “victory” and “defeat” is not only very much legitimate wrt all analysable dimensions of this war (military, political, economic, moral, strategic, etc.) as I’ve been discussing for a while now, but absolutely nothing unheard of (https://www.npr.org/2018/01/29/580811124/military-victory-but-political-defeat-the-tet-offensive-50-years-later). There is even a very well known expression that relativizes the notion of “military victory” to other relevant contextual considerations: “a Pyrrhic victory is a victory that inflicts such a devastating toll on the victor that it is tantamount to defeat. Such a victory negates any true sense of achievement or damages long-term progress” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrhic_victory).
So e.g. “Putin should heed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent advice to him – that this is not an era of war – and desist before Russia sinks while trying to achieve a Pyrrhic victory.”
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-editorials/ukraine-escalation-russia-is-only-looking-at-a-pyrrhic-victory-putin-must-heed-modis-advice/
Quoting boethius
Why delusional?
I did not claim anywhere that “the West does represent the ‘interest of everybody’”, yes?
It’s reasonable to expect that sovereign states have their national interest as top priority, yes?
And that doesn’t exclude the possibility of cooperation among sovereign states pursuing each their own national interest, yes?
Quoting boethius
You are messing up with my claims again. As I said many times, justification depends on shared assumptions. Justification in strategic terms is not the same as justification in moral or legal terms, although they may converge. Russia and the US are competing for hegemony, i.e. extending their sphere of influence beyond their borders at the expense of the competitors to the point of becoming dominant. This is somehow “physiological” to geopolitical entities and geopolitical theories may explain why is that. One can still question the rationality of geopolitical agents’ strategic choices based on pertinent and reasonable strategic assumptions. I discussed Russian vs American strategic reasoning wrt both threat perception and response. And my conclusion is that overall the US is following a more reasonable and effective strategy than Russia (compare just the military, economic, reputational damage is Russia suffering wrt the US so far). On the other side, the aftermath of this war will more clearly determine whose strategy was more effective and likely update the hegemonic status of the competitors. But also notice that doesn’t exclude the possibility that aleatory or now hidden factors may favour the US or Russia’s hegemonic struggle at some point independently from the relative rationality of their respective strategy. Anyways, I’m interested to discuss about rational strategies (that’s what I mean by “strategically justified”) and outcomes that depend on them. That’s all.
Quoting boethius
What?! You are expecting from me to provide such an “account” but I find your request unreasonable, especially because it’s not me playing the geopolitical game. All I can discuss is how I understand the game being played and my reasons to support one side or the other, but as I argued neither require such unreasonable accounting. So no, it’s not “my problem”.
[quote=“boethius;771000”]I'm not a Russophobe. I didn't live in fear of Russia before this war, I don't live in fear of Russia now. I do fear US escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, but this is a fear of the international dynamic that's been put in place, mostly by the US "meddling" in Ukrainian elections and internal affairs.[/quote]
So you are not Russophobe but Americanphobe?
Quoting boethius
Ukrainians may still disagree with you because they managed to preserve their sovereignty, made a future aggression against them (or any other country at risk) by Russia more unlikely, and may rely on Western partnership for rebuilding their countries. Besides, depending on what “some Western geopolitical victory of some sort” for “our own geopolitical ambitions” actually implies for the Ukrainians, the fallout could be the collapse of Putin’s regime and then this in turn may benefit Ukrainian claims over annexed territories, or if Ukraine is stable enough (with or without annexed territories) the West can integrate it more deeply to its economy, political and security system as it happened to other Eastern European countries previously under Soviet Union influence.
Quoting boethius
Dude, I don’t really see the point of making it personal. I don’t know you and even if what you claim about yourself was true (and not just virtue signalling), it would be irrelevant to me. BTW you can always enlist in the international legion for Ukraine (https://fightforua.org/ ) where you will certainly find American and British people volunteering to fight for Ukrainians as courageously as you claim to be (and you don’t like virtue signalling, right?), or else you can recommend greater engagement from the West in support of Ukraine instead of recommending against it.
Anyways, the kind of beliefs you suggest such as “Westerners are coward because they are not sending their troops” or “Westerners can’t truly call themselves Ukrainian allies until they send their troops” or “Westerners are exploiting the Ukrainians because they are not sending their troops” are really beside the point. By far. States are expected to prioritise their national security depending on threat perception, and if they do it rationally, they do not engage in random tests of courage just to make you happy. Western military interventions don’t need to be with boots on the ground if available air forces and long range missiles can do the job more effectively. The problem is that American decision makers have to be careful about (domestic and international) consensus much more than authoritarian regimes (e.g. the nuclear blackmail wasn’t available to Nazis as it is to Russians), and Western coordination is harder to achieve since the complexity and uncertainties of the game leads to non-negligeable unresolved conflicting interests/views within the West: e.g. French understanding of European security is very much different than the American one, Germany has currently limited military capacity/culture and is still struggling with the economic downsides of this war and its global implications, the US is struggling for domestic stability and concerned by the incumbent security threat represented by China. So the problem is more cohesion and vision, then cowardice.
Moreover Ukrainians are asking for Western support and Westerners are providing it, if that’s fine with them and for that reason they call Westerners their allies, I don’t see any terminological issue here. The idea that Westerners are exploiting the Ukrainians because so far they didn’t directly and officially engage in Russia with their military forces, is very much dependent on the moral compass one takes into account or committed to. As far as I’m concerned, the moral imperative for Western governments is still Western national security (NOT Ukrainian security, welfare, lives! Ukrainian security, welfare, lives is the moral imperative of Ukrainian government! So if they feel exploited it's on them to denounce and argue for it in the first place), and I believe Westerners would likely intervene more directly in Ukraine against the Russians, as the British intervened in support of the French against the Nazis, if the perceived threat from Russia was as intolerable as the Nazis threat was to the British. That’s why Ukrainian propaganda tries its best to show how serious the Russian threat to the West is and encourage the West to provide greater military support or even to substantially change the nature of the military engagement in favor of a more direct participation (e.g. by declaring no-fly zone). So while you claim that Westerners are Russophobe and cowards, I claim that Westerners do not seem, as you would say, enough “Russophobe” (by coincidence, you aren’t Russophobe either yes?) and that’s why they are more reluctant to engage (by coincidence, you are more for peace negotiation than greater Western engagement, yes?), but not necessarily cowards (by coincidence, you are not coward, yes?) unless one takes the Western fear of escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war as a form of cowardice (by coincidence, you fear the US escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, yes?).
And even if these circumstances would still count as a case of “exploitation” (mainly thanks to those Westerners that, like you but only by coincidence, are not “Russophobe” and fear escalating the conflict to essentially accidental nuclear war, and therefore they do not want direct engagement, just peace negotiation and consensual surrender by the Ukrainians), for the Ukrainians the lesser evil is still to be “exploited” by the West, instead of cave in to Russian demands and “legitimate grievances”.
Finally, if we are talking about a strategic plan where consequences are taken in due account, suggesting that you are “entirely willing to sacrifice an entire country in war campaign” clashes with your “exploitation” objection against my views, since even in your case the sacrificed country would obtain no benefits anyways (no matter if your own country takes losses in the country being sacrificed, still your country will survive while the other is entirely sacrificed). And suggesting that you “would not hesitate to sit down and write an ‘equation’ concluding millions, or hundreds of millions of people must be sacrificed for what I believe to be right (if it makes sense of course)” overlooks the fact you can not even offer intelligible examples of such ‘equation’ in the Ukrainian case (BTW what was the British ‘equation’ for deciding to support the French with their troops against the Nazis back then?). If we are talking about principles independently from the consequences, then the ‘equation’ would be trivial since we are allowed to ignore the consequences by default, and there would be no costs to calculate. So for example if Ukrainians are fighting for recognition of their self-determination no matter what, they may fight until their country and people are entirely sacrificed to that cause. And the Westerners would not be exploitative if they were committed to the Ukrainian cause no matter what, so e.g. by sending as many troops as necessary to prove they really care about the Ukrainian cause beyond any doubt (to you of course). The problem is that you also dismissed the Ukrainian fight for principle (just “territory and national pride”) given the number of casualties (“the cost to Ukraine is immense”, and notice that the root meaning of “immense” is “immeasurable” so no soluble “equation” whatsoever) as if no “fighting for principle no matter what” justifies any number of casualties (unless it’s for denazifying for good and exclusively Ukraine, maybe?). And since one can’t realistically expect that Western states fight for the sake of Ukrainian national interest (BTW did the British send troops in support to France against the Nazis just for the sake of it no matte what, or for their national interest?), any support of the Ukrainian fight by the West would be exploitative by default, with or without sending its own troops. In other words, your conjecture is just wishful thinking even within your frame of thoughts.
Wow, I wish the world cares about Syria, Afghanistan or Africa as much as with Ukraine. Everything would be so damn different.
Yes, these so-called supporters of Ukraine really, really care for them - so much so that they don't mind how much blood is spilled in exchange for a piece of land.
It's good that they don't care nearly as much about those other countries you mention. With friends like these, who needs enemies?
We've done caring about Africa, did you not see Band Aid? Africa should be all sorted now. It's Ukraine's turn. I shouldn't wonder a lot of flag-waiving and social media posts will have that problem knocked into shape with no lesser a lasting success.
The US 'befriending' Libya...
?
The obvious answer is yes, they did fight also, but didn't get the needed aid to continue the fight. Poland was overrun and divided by Hitler and Stalin (the latter who invaded Poland 16 days after Hitler).
Nearly every fifth Pole died in WW2. That is the highest casualty rate of any country during WW2.
And Polish fighters, who could get away from the country fought in various theaters of WW2 and the Polish underground resistance made the famous Warsaw uprising, wrongly thinking that Stalin would come to their help. Only in that uprising over 15 000 resistance fighters were killed and about 150 000 to 200 000 civilians were killed.
So bit confused on what you are trying to say here...
I couldn't have said it better.
Oh please you made me laugh :lol: after colonial era we left those countries killing themselves for tribe issues. Nobody took part on Rwanda civil war, Egyptian Coup de État; Republic of Congo bloody wars; Liberia conflicts with diamonds, and a big etc... the media simply doesn't care because they are "far away" from us. In those African countries only went some humanitarians without the back up of their countries.
Saying that Rwanda had the same support as Ukraine in nowadays is denying the reality.
The US has many such friends everywhere.
These friends are all evil incarnate until a few bombs brings them freedom and democracy....
I didn't used Poland as an example. It was @SophistiCat.
Anyway, what I meant is that Poland (in WWII crisis) didn't act struggling Western side or Soviet block just for national issues. Let's be honest, nobody cared about Polish destruction and chaos. After WWII, Poland began to live a very complex situation and USA administration or the Bank of England didn't support them with tons and tons of money.
Poland did not regain its independence after World War Two. After the great conflict, the Soviet Union, which had first attacked Poland as Hitler’s ally in 1939, seized the entire Polish territory, with the open connivance of the triumphant Allies: A post-war war. The years of 1944–1963 in Poland
This was obvious in 2014. The creation of Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics obviously show that there were those in support of them, yet important cities like Kharkov (or Odessa) didn't follow the pattern.
But even then, it has been said that for example if an actual referendum, not a staged one, would have been for Crimea to join Russia, there would have been a large minority supporting this, but not a majority.
And before 2014 the ties to Russia were totally different. But the simple obvious truth is that Putin had ambitions over Ukrainian territories. Annexing territories and bombing people make people change their minds, obviously. So things are different in 2023 than they were in 2021 or prior to 2014.
Really?
I remember that both France and the UK declared war on Germany.
I think that doesn't sound like "nobody cared". The simple fact that these countries were too weak to do anything, but to start the "phoney war". And France got overrun in the next year.
Abso-fucking-lutely!
Here, for example, are some people enjoying some of the freedom and democracy brought by US bombing campaigns in Yemen ...
They do look pleased, don't they?
And after the stirling work done by US military support in Afghanistan... some of the grateful population enjoying the freedom and democracy thereby brought about...
We can only look forward to the roaring successes their involvement in Ukraine will no doubt secure...
Well, some bombs are better than others, apparently. Putin's bombs hurt more. Ergo, lets guarantee he uses more of them.
Good times...
I mean afterwards. When WWII ended. Nobody cared about Poland, Hungary, Czech, etc...
France and UK declared the war, yes. But we should recall some facts: the British royal family's connection with Nazis (The Duke and Duchess of Windsor were sympathetic to Nazi Germany)
The resistance of Charles de Gaulle fighting against the Nazis, while France controlled (and continued to control...) all African possessions.
What I want to mean: hypocrisy. The states and organisations only act when they see it is worthy for their own interests and I don't understand why the Western world is caring that much about Ukraine. I feel I am not seeing something.
Here, let me help.
Socialists recently at Spandau...
National Socialists when they were last at Spandau...
Spot the difference?
Hint - count the number of brutally murdered members of ethnic minorities in each photo.
Yes, and also, we mustn't forget that people who die in wars die more than people who die from starvation, or air pollution, or lack of medical investment... so it's so much more important to prevent those deaths (obviously by selling them weapons) than it is to prevent deaths by any other cause (which, coincidentally, is also achieved by selling them weapons).
It's all irrationality to the highest degree. Nationalism is poison, be it Russian, Ukrainian, American or whatever.
Combine that with modern weaponry and a comfortably-at-home support team rooting for "victory" and you get all those deaths you mention. As a bonus, you get to feel good for "supporting the good guys".
It should be added that it's actually supporting the death of the good guys.
:roll:
Unfortunately your reading comprehension is so low we need here a dictionary intervention.
Quoting Cambridge Dictionary
Quoting Collins Dictionary
"Legitimate grievance" is a mainly legal expression to make the distinction with a "grievance" that may or may not be legitimate.
For there to be a grievance, someone need only to complain about something, which could be anything, no matter how unreasonable.
For example, an executive may come into the CEO's office and say that there's a problem with a client and they received a letter with a long list of grievances.
The CEO may then reply "are there legitimate grievances?"
The question is not about whether the client feels their grievances are legitimate, but what this executive thinks. The answer will be the executives opinion about the merit of the grievances.
Legitimate grievance is a concept utilised on one side of the negotiation table to discuss the list of grievances on the other side.
In the context of business, if I'm the CEO and you an executive in the firm, and we agree this client has legitimate grievances, it means we believe the client would have a strong case to sue us, so we should be nice and try to solve the problem. If we concluded there was no legitimate grievances it means we think we can tell this client to take a hike. Of course, that remains our opinion and others may disagree or then we may disagree with each other.
In non-legal contexts (like the police promised coffee but that could not give rise to a law suite), or then the war (which has no legal authority to resolve it), the concept of legitimate grievance simply expresses what you think does actually need to be resolved in some way for the other side to do what you want. The police may have no legal compulsion to get a murderer a cup of coffee, but they may feel this grievance is indeed legitimate, they did say they would do that, and so they should comply if they want the murderer to keep talking.
Legitimate grievances is what you discuss on your side about the other side, trying to determine or guess what's actually important to the other side that your side is willing to do. The police may recognise the murderer's grievance of being arrested and no longer free is heart-felt and the murderer rather not be in prison; so, sure, it's a grievance but the police are unlikely to view it as a legitimate one, whereas coffee perhaps they can do.
So, when I say, for example, Nazi's in Ukraine is a legitimate grievance, it's expressing my opinion that we in the West should also not want Nazi's in Ukraine.
For a negotiation to conclude, there is rarely an agreement on what are all the legitimate grievances but the end result is simply the terms of the agreement.
The whole point of settling (for example in business) is often to be able to avoid ever needing to recognise the grievance was legitimate, and substituting money for the explicit recognition and potential legal public relations consequences if the matter went further. "We recognise no wrongdoing" is a typical phrase of any settlement between a corporation and the government. Of course, the whole reason they are settling is because, internally, they see the grievances in question are indeed legitimate and they have indeed done wrong.
So, now that (hopefully) you know what words mean, you are free to argue that Nazi's in Ukraine is not a legitimate grievance, or the oppression of Russian language speakers, or NATO missiles in the baltic, or indeed Russia has no legitimate grievances of any kind.
You are also free to argue that these may very well be legitimate grievances, but Ukraine has many more legitimate grievances, etc.
And, if you want the war to continue, for instance to maximise the damage on Russia, then it simply doesn't matter what may or may not be legitimate grievances for anyone: the war continues and feelings don't matter.
However, it's when you want to negotiate a settlement that the other side may accept, then it is necessary to consider things from their point of view and what grievances they have and which are legitimate (according to yourself).
A successful negotiation will parse everyone's legitimate grievances (at least satisfactorily enough for all parties to agree to it) and everyone's leverage (at least satisfactorily enough that no party feels they have enough leverage to demand more, as otherwise they would demand more and the negotiation continues).
Negotiation is not some absolute moral question, it is likely the moral issues remain unresolved and all parties feel the most wronged.
Negotiation is about arriving at agreements, which requires considering the perspective of the counter-party and how they see the world and what they would see as potentially resolving the situation and preferable to further conflict.
As far as smug self-righteousness goes, it is difficult to surpass its glory when you dismiss the will to defend oneself as a slavish pursuit of an ideology.
Defending a nation state is not self defence, the nation state exists only ideologically.
If the cost of the defence far exceeds whatever the purported benefits in well being to the majority of people are, then it is indeed a slavish pursuit of an ideology.
You are free to argue that the cost to Ukraine so far is worth it and overall "defending" Ukrainian interest, likewise baiting the war in the first place by continuously asserting the joining of NATO ... without ever joining NATO and NATO explicitly telling Zelensky that the "door would remain open" but they would never be allowed to join.
Even more absurd, when the war started it was all about defending Ukraine's "right" to join NATO, as all parties pretty much agreed that Ukrainian neutrality would end the war and so reasoning to reject that was needed by the parties pushing war. You cannot be more ideologically motivated than fighting and dying for a hypothetical right to join an organisation that won't let you ever join in practice.
There is honor in fighting even for a cause that cannot be won.
The issue is the continued cost of doing so, in terms of lives at stake, not to mention those pesky "externalities" that are hurting the whole world. And further problems that may arise if escalation continues.
There comes a point in which one must consider the costs of further loss of life.
Yes, plenty of smugness - from those who aren't fighting, rooting for those who are dying.
The people in Ukraine who are fighting Russians are fighting because they were attacked by Russians. Whatever arrangements could have been made before that are not germane any longer. To only view the unfolding of events that might have been is to ignore what is happening now.
Yes, neither you nor I are fighting. But you are willing to explain to the one's fighting why they are dying. To leave their view out of the picture comes from standing above them.
It seems your reasons for your views stand on a better foundation than mine, given the apparently curious comment that you know that those who are dying all share the same view.
So, then, we are on equal footing, standing "above" the dead. The difference seems to be that I want the war to end sooner rather than later, while you opt for the opposite - the obvious consequences of such a view needing little elaboration, as we daily see.
Make of that what you will.
Quoting boethius
Fine with me, but you are no longer talking about legitimate grievance here.
Quoting boethius
The case can be considered strong precisely because pre-established laws and contracts can grant legitimacy to the grievance to the client.
Quoting boethius
You are evidently confused. One can think that something needs to be resolved independently of the legitimacy of the grievance. If somebody is negotiating a ransom with a kidnapper that doesn't imply in anyway that laws, moral or contracts give legitimacy to the kidnapper' demand. An agreement is found for pragmatic reasons not because a right has been acknowledged. Indeed, even after agreement and the transaction take place, the police can still be after and find the kidnapper, and return the ransom to the victims without the kidnapper having a say about the legitimacy of keeping the ransom just because he and the victim found a pragmatic agreement.
Quoting boethius
Oh it's your opinion about what Westerners should do and not a fact about Russian legitimate grievances. I thought so.
Quoting boethius
Sure there might be demands that are legitimate. But you made a list of what you take to be legitimate grievances from Russia, without offering any plausible argument in support of their legitimacy wrt pre-established set of moral/legal rules that the West and Russia share. In any case the point is that for Russians the acknowledgment of "legitimate grievances" (like "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault") has less to do with negotiating some material compensation like miserable kidnappers and more to do with things like violation of promises by the Westerners, lack of due respect of Russian sphere of influence, right to defend Russian minorities the way they see fit, right to oppress any independent national movement within their sphere of influence through Russification, right to be treated on the international stage as a superpower very much like the US and China, the extraordinary privilege for states like Ukraine to be dominated by Russia, and the like.
I want the conflict to end now. I am not the one fighting it, however.
Once again, you would have the Ukrainians merely be pieces on a board game.
You're speaking about pieces on a board game from me? Who are the ones giving Ukrainians arms with no echo of a though given about what the costs are nor who dies?
You think these "friends" of Ukraine give a flying f**k about them?
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/us-has-big-new-goal-ukraine-weaken-russia/
I repeat, it is nice to see how so many people care about Ukraine, but don't give a damn about all the other on-going conflicts in the world.
Keep fighting the good fight.
Your observations do not support the little regard you have for Ukrainian motivations.
They do show why you view their agency to be unimportant.
You mean to say that your horse is higher because you don't care about anything (besides your income, natch)?
Well, if you believe that "states and organisations only act when they see it is worthy for their own interests" then it should be obvious why the Western world is caring about the biggest war in Europe since WWII. But another reason is that not everyone in the Western world is a selfish rat, and governments and organisations in democratic nations care about public opinion.
And your observations do? Given that all Ukrainians share the same motivation?
Because surely they all want to die to defeat the Russians.
I am agree in this point. Nevertheless… those persons are the minority. In most of the cases we would see that each state or organization would act selfishly.
But yes, I follow your point and view. We should estimate those whose interests are not trickster.
Exactly. The reason why so many in this discussion cannot seem to get their heads around viewing this in any other grouping than by nationality. As if Zelensky (net worth $20 million), Putin (net worth $70 Billion), and Biden (net worth $9 Million) were not all in the same group, and far more separate from the working classes of Russia, Ukraine and America who each have far more in common with each other than with any of their ruling classes.
As if a flag carried more significance than being able to afford a roof, food, or medical care.
How on earth would you know that? Weren't you earlier berating @Manuel for...
Quoting Paine
How are you not doing exactly the same here. Maybe some are staunch nationalists. Maybe some want to expunge all Russian influence from Eastern Ukraine and welcome the chance. Maybe some don't give a fuck who's in charge but Ukraine has conscription and has banned men from leaving the country...
Russia has been a sort of deterrent within the alliance against conflict, but now Putin's Russia is busy elsewhere (Ukraine), and apparently neglecting the alliance.
As far as power-strategies go, it's in Putin's interest to keep them in check, and, at the same time, have them "keep each other in check".
In principle, more small states are easier for Putin's Russia to "manage" (dominate), than few large states, as long as they don't work (too closely) together.
What might the Kremlin do (if anything)?
Laissez-faire could get out of hand I suppose. Unless 3rd parties intervene? But then...
(As an aside, it might be interesting to count/compare occurrences of "pro-Ukraine", "pro-Putin", "pro-US", "pro-whatever" in the thread.)
I referred to the ones who are fighting and the ones who support those people. There are a lot of them. I won't bother posting more evidence for that as it is dismissed as propaganda. Nobody has yet to post evidence to the contrary unless you count the polls conducted by Russia.
Obviously, there is more than one perspective. The politics before the invasion has been interrupted by an attack upon the whole country. The willingness of Russia to kill civilians seems, in part, to divide those who want to fight. Please report when you hear of that happening.
This is an improvement from when you did not see any kind of Ukrainian identity as being germane to what is happening. It takes Ukrainians for them to do bad things to each other.
The compulsion to serve is an important issue. It has been a deal breaker in many wars. The way you present it as an elective is odd. That would be more a reflection of intent if Ukraine was trying to invade Russia.
Sure. Yet, so far, you just happened to offer recommendations in support of all Russian "legitimate grievances" and deal-breaker demands perfectly in line with Russian propaganda's recommendations (practically, copy and paste). Now you wanna teach me that Russian propaganda is not pro-Putin, yes?
Quoting boethius
Your recommendations clearly serve Putin (=pro-Putin) so you love Putin and hate the US (=Americanophobe), yes?
Still don't. There's no such thing as a Ukrainian identity. Ukrainians identify in all sorts of different, occasionally completely incompatible ways. That's why there was a civil war going on before this invasion.
The idea that an arbitrary line on a map encompasses a unique identity is patent nonsense.
Quoting Paine
I'm simply saying that, in a conscripted army, motivations to fight are even more diverse than in a free one. Even in a regular army people's reasons might range all the way from borderline psychopathy to heroic selflessness. Most common seems to be nationalism. In a conscripted army, you can add to that range the fear of reprisals for refusal.
The idea that 'Ukrainians' are all fighting for the same reason is, again, patent nonsense.
As such, we cannot possibly 'take into account' their agency. They are not an agent, they are hundreds of thousands of separate agents with separate goals, taking them into account is nigh on impossible. It's certainly not something to be done by clinging slavishly to the account of their agency given by parties with a strong vested interest in presenting it a certain way.
This is in regards to why those selfish Ukrainians are giving their lives to defend their country, instead of "accepting the realities" and letting Russia steamroll over the rest of the country, as it originally intended (and apparently still does).
Hacked Russian Files Reveal Propaganda Accord With China
[sup]— Mara Hvistendahl, Alexey Kovalev · The Intercept · Dec 30, 2022[/sup]
To the extent they're observable/quantifiable, effects might be interesting.
The matter of agency is whether the common response to being invaded has been to fight back. The issue has come up here in the context of those saying that such a response is insignificant because the people fighting are only ciphers in a proxy war. Your observation about personal reasons is an equivocation between different ideas. If there had been no willingness to fight back, siding with Ukraine would have been merely a feeling of regret rather than a life-or-death attempt to repel invaders.
Your argument is similar to boethius in the way the invasion itself plays no part in how the participants in the struggle are seen to have responded to it. Your willingness to take note of all the different motivations leads to an odd inverse assessment of their relevance.
What distinguishes your account of irrelevance from Putin saying Ukraine does not exist outside of Russia?
Picking up details and individuals, or the fact that the countries were colonial powers, doesn't make us to recall the fact that UK and France went actually to war with Germany.
And afterwards, well, there was the Cold War.
Quoting javi2541997
And one if not the most important interest is their own security, their survival. Russia has had wars now with two of it's neighboring countries, has forces in all that aren't in NATO (or applying to) except China. If it would be just that, it would be one thing. But it isn't. The basic insecurity arises from that Russia makes territorial claims and has annexed parts from other countries and has made it clear by the words of Putin that it doesn't respect Ukraine's sovereignty, but sees it as an artificial construct.
Russia's actions basically has made the security threat quite real. Without the territorial annexations and claims it really would be different.
Ukraine has the most powerful military in Europe by far, and there's been no sign whatsoever the other European countries have any interest in trying to catch up. Instead, they're sending whatever is left of their militaries to Ukraine, further diminishing their own capability to defend themselves!
Furthermore, they're pursuing a policy that has as its logical effect that a large force build-up by Russia will take place, yet again, there's no sign whatsoever European countries are gearing up to meet a Russian war machine they themselves are helping to create.
That in no way implies to me these countries are afraid they'll need to defend their borders any time soon. This is just an argument of convenience.
Why is self-interest hypocritical? Am I being hypocritical if I look after my own interests first? Are you?
States do not have ethics as much as they have interests. The USA invaded Iraq and Afghanistan because the government thought it was in this country's interests to do so. It didn't make sense to me in either case, but then... who am I?
I think it is in the interests of NATO states to oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One could oppose the invasion on moral grounds, but that might be more hypocritical than self-interest. Europe didn't care that much about the USSR invading Afghanistan--who, outside a small circle of friends, did care? But Ukraine is WAY TOO CLOSE for comfort, being right up against NATO's and the EU borders.
The invasion of Ukraine is just appalling -- absolutely atrocious manners. Total disregard of international etiquette. Euro-invasions just aren't done these days! Didn't Vlad get the memo? That's all ancient history. Ukraine isn't going back to Moscow and Catalonia isn't leaving Madrid.
There's the hypocrisy.
Do you mean that once they get their heads around viewing Zelensky (net worth $20 million), Putin (net worth $70 Billion), and Biden (net worth $9 Million) in the same group (because of course so many here don’t see that, and desperately need guru Isaac tell them, indeed guru Isaac has a zealously edited record of all millions, billions, trillions and zillions of dollars that each and single Master of the Universe directly sucked out of millions, billions, trillions and zillions of working class children’s blood, right?), obviously it’s going to be evident that Ukraine must surrender to Russian deal-breaker demands and acknowledge its legitimate grievances in a peace deal, and affording a roof, food, or medical care carries more significance than a flag?
Or you mean that if Ukraine actually surrenders to Russian deal-breaker demands and acknowledges its legitimate grievances in a peace deal, there is a greater chance that so many in this discussion will finally get their heads around the fact that Ukrainian, Russian and American working classes have far more in common with each other than with any of their ruling classes? And that being able to afford a roof, food, or medical care carries more significance than a flag?
Oh no… you must certainly mean that if Ukraine surrenders to all Russian deal-breaker demands and acknowledges its legitimate grievances in a peace deal, we all are so much closer to have the working classes of the world united in rebellion against their ruling classes, and finally able to afford roof, food, or medical care for all humanity ever after, right? "Power to the Imagination!", right?
And caricaturing people’s views is so abso-fucking-lutely fun, right?
Quoting Isaac
Sure, I guess it’s the same for people who have to pay taxes: some agree with the taxes and are fine with that, some would have preferred softer taxes, some really hate paying taxes. So what?
Quoting Isaac
One thing is the agency of individual citizens, another the agency of government. The choice of Ukraine to fight with armed forces of conscripted individual citizens is taken by the Ukrainian government. So, first of all, do you have any compelling arguments showing that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate or is taking decisions violating national/international laws? Do you have compelling evidences showing how wide is the lack of support of the Ukrainian government?
Coz, you know, literally anybody can have strong vested interest in presenting Ukrainian agency in a certain way. Even anonymous members of this forum like you: e.g. if you are paid to spread pro-Russian propaganda, or if you are personally so frustrated by your material and social life that you can’t help but enjoy sharing your populist fantasies and memes with likeminded people, or if you are abso-fucking-lutely determined to sparkle a new glorious revolution with your old friend Engels in order to at last end capitalist exploitation on earth or at least break free from your asylum.
Quoting Isaac
Of course?! It’s really baffling how many intellectual failures you can so skilfully concentrate in just a few lines.
First of all, of course, Ukraine has its own history, so much so that there are historians expert at it and giving lectures about it like “Timothy Snyder: The Making of Modern Ukraine” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJczLlwp-d8)
Second, who on earth is arguing that arbitrary lines on a map contain natural grouping of language, history and culture?! Nobody. So what else may be the purpose of objecting to imaginary claims as if they were actually made by your targeted interlocutors other than scoring imaginary points?!
Third, it’s precisely the fact that grouping of language, history and culture are not natural but cultural that they may very much need inheritable historical record in order to preserve or extend such non-natural groupings over time.
Four, even our notions of natural groupings (e.g. racial division of human beings) have their history which in turn may very well depend on non-natural groupings’ history (like the emergence of states supporting universal human rights against racial discriminations and a public education denouncing pseudoscientific racial beliefs).
Presumably it is in Russia's interest to possess Ukraine, whatever the Ukrainians want. It is in Nato's and the EU's interest to resist.
That "states follow their interests" is an axiom that has exceptions. At least, it is sometimes damned hard to figure out what the interest is. China might want to occupy Taiwan, but it seems like it would not be int their interest to do so. If they invade Taiwan, it probably won't be an act of national interest -- it will be something else--like satisfaction of a long-standing resentment that Taiwan got away.
Went right over my head. Fair enough then, I agree with your point of view.
Catalonian issue is more complex than press and media show. It is even a subject of a separate thread, but please do not waste your precious time in something worthless as Catalonia-Spain conflict. It is an endless political conflict that we the Spaniards are living during centuries. They do not have a solution and we either have.
To be honest, I think the only way to understand this, you need to be Spanish and living here between Barcelona and Madrid.
Yes? What connects the acceptance that there are motivations to fight back with somehow having to pretend those motivations are more politically important that the object of the most powerful nation on earth? The former is an argument about their mere existence, the latter is an argument about their importance in determining if western policy is morally acceptable.
Quoting Paine
So now I'm taking too much notice of Ukrainian motives? If we ignore why Ukrainians are fighting, that's bad, but if we talk about all the different reasons they might have for fighting...that's bad too. No, the exact amount of notice to take of why Ukrainians are fighting is just enough to justify US foreign policy and no more. Once we've established that they want to fight back, that's it policy justified. No don't look any deeper as to why they might want to fight back, it might start coming undone...
REALLY???
Or is somehow Sweden, Finland, the Baltic States not in Europe?
I beg to differ here.
Quoting Tzeentch
And that obviously would have continued if Russia hadn't annexed Crimea and started this war in 2014. And NATO would have been happy in it's new role of international operations, not going back to it's old role of collective defense.
To have a country that basically ran down it's military and focused on international operations (because the Cold War was over, remember?) make a hasty 180 degree turn and opt to join NATO after 200 years of non-alignment tells that some countries are worried about their security. So yes, they are worried about Russia.
Yeah, Ireland and Portugal aren't worried about their security when it comes to Russia. They don't have bellicose neighbors. Especially when UK and/or Spain aren't declaring that they (Ireland or Portugal) are artificial countries and basically they belong to be part of their nations again. If the case would be so, that the dissolution of Spain-Portugal or Ireland not being part of Great Britain would be viewed in London and Madrid as the greatest accident or tragedy that has happened, they would be uneasy and commit to national defense on a totally different level.
I'm not going to bother correcting you. You just said that Ireland does not have bellicose neighbours who challenge their rights over territory.
There's a difference between actions and rhetoric. The former being worth taking note of, and the latter generally being no more than windowdressing.
None of these states have militaries that are on a modern operational level, nor have they taken any steps towards making them so.
Isn't it strange that countries that supposedly live in fear of invasion every day take no steps towards protecting themselves?
Quoting ssu
It did continue. Nothing changed since 2014 in relation to Europe's appalling military condition, something which it has been called out for by the United States on several occasions.
The only military that made significant improvements since 2014 is the Ukrainian military, because they legitimately feared a Russian invasion.
It should speak volumes that Ukraine, a relatively poor country, sports Europe's most effective military. And it is taking a beating as we speak. Yet, despite pursuing a policy that practically forces Russia to expand its military, there's not a hint of urgency in Europe's military expenditures.
Many countries can have border disputes and tense relations. Worst in Europe are perhaps Greece and Turkey, who likely have avoided a full-blown war because both are members of NATO (and thus honor NATO's article 1.) But these tensions aren't as high as the probability for war is very, very low.
But of course, things could have gone differently even not so long time ago with UK and Ireland:
Exactly. And also true of foreign policy in general. No efforts were put in place to significantly reduce reliance on Russian exports, no efforts were put in place to seriously address ties to Russian investment. No efforts were put in place to win over Russia's allies abroad.
The rewriting of history has begun. Now, apparently the country we all happily relied on for energy, and foreign investment. The one whose allies we happily rattled. That country we apparently always knew was a serious military threat because of it's obvious imperialist intent. It's not at all a hastily constructed narrative to promote war profiteering.
Really? Haven't taken any measures?
Let's take the example of Sweden:
So Sweden has introduced back conscription, has deployed troops on Gotland island (where earlier there were none) and increased military funding. And has a lot more exercises with NATO forces. From 10th of March last year:
And I can say from my own country that the local armed forces have increased their level of readiness substantially. Key reservists could spend a month or more in military exercises last year, which was unheard of earlier. Naturally the administration has opted publicly to be very low key about it. The Kremlin gets the message.
Wrong.
UK doesn't have any imperial aspirations towards Ireland... except naturally the part of the Island that it has. And that was the issue. Have you heard any politician arguing that Great Britain should take the whole island of Ireland back? I don't think so.
That's why Russia is so different.
Classic.
Sweden has roughly 24,000 active military personnel. That's less than one tenth of the Ukrainian military when the invasion began, while Sweden has thrice the GDP of Ukraine.
Moreover, its military is outdated and mostly comprised of late '80s materiel.
It's a textbook example of a military that was left to atrophy after the Cold War ended.
It will take more than the Swedish government announcing "plans" to drag it out of the mud. Besides, that type of rhetoric is to be expected since they wanted to and did join NATO. They could hardly send the message that now that the United States will be covering their defense bill, they'll be sitting on their loins and spending the defense budget on social security and "progressive" government projects instead, but we all know that's exactly what is going to happen.
You have to differentiate between governments doing things, and governments doing things that are actually proportional to what you're proposing they are facing. You proposed they face a threat to their survival and a Russian invasion.
That's clearly not what is driving their actions.
Especially Sweden is likely acting on a potential deterioration of the security situation in Europe in the mid to long-term (which is markedly different from facing a existential threat or imminent invasion) and figured the economically smart thing to do is join NATO, because then the United States will be paying their defense bill instead of them having to pay it themselves.
I much sooner accept it when a country like Poland claims they fear an invasion, because they are actually acting the part. They have a functional, well-maintained military and their defense spending (read: their actions, and not just words) reflects that perceived threat.
Poland has double the GDP of Finland, yet its military (active personnel) is five times the size of the Finnish military.
Again, when we analyse the actual actions of states and put them into perspective, we are presented with a very different picture than what you are trying to paint.
Not ot mention that we're building up civil duties, improving shelters, and we're now aiming for 2% of GDP going into defensive expenses. We're also aiming to put advanced radar planes on rotation over the Baltics to monitor in real-time the entire region. As well as aiming to double our 2 brigades to 4 brigades to cover requirements of Nato, meaning we can have 2 brigades abroad where needed with 2 as a defensive line.
Quoting Tzeentch
If some people think that Sweden isn't reacting to what's happening in Ukraine, they're obviously ignorant or badly educated on the matter. It was decades since we last did something like this. And what about Germany? They're building up its military with the largest amount of GDP funding in Europe. Who's even thinking of Europe "not doing anything" to improve their defenses?
Not to mention that Sweden has one of the most powerful air and sea units. We beat Nato with less than a quarter of their strengths based on strategy, experience and high tech sea weapons.
Quoting Tzeentch
You think all we have are plans? :lol: You don't know what is going on here, obviously.
Quoting Christoffer
Quoting Christoffer
...
Quoting Christoffer
You haven't done anything yet.
Oh, please educate me about what has been decided and not been decided by our parliament and military. The argument was that European nations hasn't taken any measures based on what is happening in Ukraine. All of these things are measures and some are already in motion or completed. So what's your point?
'Aiming' is not a measure, it's political rhetoric.
And the argument was supposed to be supporting the notion that Europe considered itself under growing threat from Russia since 2014. A couple of political gestures toward some token military changes hastily cobbled together to make a NATO application look less needy are hardly evidence of a long known serious threat.
Phew! That's good to hear. Global climate change is sorted then.
Aiming with actual actions taken to put it into reality. It's not rhetoric if we're actually mobilizing towards it. As a person with actual insight into the military in Sweden, they're not in "stand by" mode while waiting on 2 new brigades and advanced Baltic surveillance. We're already mobilized in defense mode and constantly increasing defense.
What you read about us is what media gives you, which is a very shallow perspective of what is going on here. You don't know anything and I or any other swede with insight into details won't ever tell you either since it's part of our national defensive instructions during a time when Russia is actively doing cyber attacks and activating sleeper spies. We just caught two top Russian spies who we've been feeding bad intel to over the course of five years since discovery.
You really do believe that we're just sitting still and passive as a nation? Get real
Quoting Isaac
Without measures to take action, there won't be any actions taken. But I guess since you need to fire in every direction that's even remotely criticizing your viewpoints, you will fall to the level of criticizing semantics when there's nothing else. Big yawn
Caring about something is not hypocritical unless it is not genuine. And don't see any reason to believe that most Europeans who object to the Russian invasion on moral grounds are insincere. That they allegedly didn't care that much about the Afghan invasion may be unfortunate, perhaps even hypocritical (if they used hypocritical rationalizations for their indifference), but that doesn't make their present reaction hypocritical.
Do you care about anyone in your life? Do you ever help anyone? Or do you worry that not caring about every person in the world to the same extent and not helping everyone who needs help in equal measure would make you a hypocrite?
Do people care more about some things and less about others but equally have some care for both?
The reason the Ukraine has gathered more attention among Europeans is pretty easily explained. It's within Europe, it's based on the history of Europe with the cold war being a major part of our history. As well as more ties between nations in Europe than nations outside of Europe.
I find the whole "hypocrite" criticism pretty ridiculous actually. If someone is shooting outside your window, would you react the same way as if someone shot outside of a window of someone else's house hundreds of kilometers away?
And then there's the factor of world war risks, of nuclear war. Of course such threats gain attention more than nations that does not pose such risks to the world. Even if China is far away from Europe, Europeans will definitely be following everything surrounding an eventual attack on Taiwan. Or the missiles North Korea is firing off right now.
Calling it hypocritical when people have more attention on one conflict over another is like if you had a family member with cancer and you put much time into attention on that person and that type of cancer and someone would call you out for not caring for all cancers and all people with cancer.
You have peace when countries accept the present drawn borders. From history you can always find different borders. Longing for justice, that the present borders are wrong, is the usual way tyrants start wars.
I would disagree. This isn't the late 90's or the '00s as then you would have a point. And that just shows how willing European countries were to embrace a normal Russia into the community.
As @Christoffer pointed out, Sweden has done a lot. A Country capable of producing modern fighter jets and submarines (and of the latter one "sank" in an exercise an American carrier) and has the potential to create nuclear weapons (as it earlier had a nuclear weapons program), I wouldn't regard as an example of atrophy. Not anymore and especially if you make then the difference with Poland. Hence NATO is actually happy to get Sweden and Finland into the organization as the countries increase the strength of the alliance. Besides, countries that base their defence on total defence.
In short, you can ridicule and belittle West Europe's rearmament perhaps starting from Germany itself. No European country is armed to the teeth and willing to use force like Israel. Only perhaps France comes in close with both capability and willingness. And yes, the German armed forces are a mess, but one really shouldn't underestimate Europeans. Things actually have changed in the last years. And February 24th did have effects like 9/11.
I was not objecting to your consideration of different motives. What is fallacious is your argument that the diversity of motives proves that the willingness to fight a common enemy is merely an illusion. You take the lack of commonality as a premise and act surprised when it appears in your conclusion.
You repeat Putin's thinking verbatim: Ukraine does not exist. The resistance being encountered by Russian forces is not Ukrainian. Therefore.......QED.
This reminds me of a conversation I had with my friend from Baluchistan after the Coalition forces took Kabul. He said:
"I appreciate the U.S. trying to put down the Taliban but I don't think they realize that there are millions of the motherfuckers."
If a world war broke out and we were involved, the amount of engineering we're capable of within the industries we have already established, would put us at a huge advantage in an alliance. We don't have to invent an entire industry, we could basically almost just flip a switch and scale things from there.
The radar planes we will put over the Baltic is made by us, it's a new design made for the requirements of the Baltic region. Any other nation without such an industry would have needed to commission something from another nation, go into trade agreements and deals and have to keep having a line of trade for maintenance of those assets. We can do that ourselves when needed and scale it if needed.
What is happening now is that even if Sweden and Finland were outside of Nato, we would still hold a very tough frontline of northern Europe, Finland having ground advantage and Sweden holding sea and air advantage over the Baltic ocean.
Quoting ssu
I find many African nation's decision to try and keep the borders as they are to be very rational. Even if they're a result of colonization and past conflicts, because they've collectively realized that fighting over such border lines just leads to suffering and destruction of any attempt to build up society. They are smart and morally responsible in their reasoning that it's pointless to keep bitching about such things. That doesn't mean if someone invade their land and try to claim parts of it to be valid, only that they've decided that these are the borders and that's the end of it. Just like Norway and Sweden doesn't bitch about our border, which is a pointless and stupid thing to do in modern times.
Putin destroying Russia's status and economy just to gain some more land because he feels it belongs to him is so outdated and laughable. I mean, we can read about in wonder how Alexander the Great invaded and expanded his empire, but those times were so different. There was an enormous cultural and religious bias back then that almost every nation followed. If he were to be resurrected today and he tried to do the same, people would laugh at him, just like we laugh at Putin's childish strong-man ideals. We've all grown out of such old childish civilisations and anyone who stays in that mentality is considered to be a nutcase.
One might expect that if, A) European nations were living in fear of an imminent Russian invasion and, B) Swedish military manufacturing would play a role of any signifance should such an invasion take place, the Swedes would be in big business right now.
Yet we see nothing of the sort, probably because neither A nor B are true.
Shh!
Everything I'm telling you are national news and in the open.
How's that working out for the citizens of Iraq? Libya? I suppose the ethnic violence in Rwanda was just a bit of high jinx. Somalia? Sudan? Myanmar? Literally any civil war ever...
So the Ingushetia region of Chechnya should have remained part of Russia? Kosovo should have stayed in the remnants of Yugoslavia?
You do say the daftest things sometimes...
Where have I said that?
You mean in general, no such thing? If you mean the same in all respects, then sure. Yet, a good lot of Ukrainians have come together against the invader doing their "Slava Ukraini" thing or whatever. I'd count that (even if temporary) as a kind of Ukrainian identity marker or proclamation.
A potential badness here is hate engendered by the invasion. And slogans can become symbolic among extremists, partake in evolving into spurring whatever aggression, and so hate lives on, cycles of badness.
Anyway, Ukrainians have come together against the invader. They don't have to be the same in all or most respects to self-identify (and act) as such.
Quoting Tzeentch
Err yes, Europeans are worried about security. Except, (collectively) they're kind of politically impotent in that respect.
There was a general air that Russia wasn't really much of a threat, which is changing to some degree. You'll find plenty of voices against the EU and cooperation (and NATO for that matter), which plays right into Putin's hands (hmm almost have to wonder if there's an influence there somewhere :chin:). Now watch European politics fumble about. :smile:
“You cannot pick and choose”
[sup]— Annalena Baerbock · German Federal Foreign Office · Jan 12, 2023[/sup]
Let's see then.
I've already laid out an argument why I don't believe that's true, the most notable point being that there's barely any nation within Europe that maintains a military that can grant a credible deterrent, except Poland. If Poland says they're worried about a potential Russian invasion, I believe them, because they consistently act the part.
Hundreds of Russian doctors sign open letter asking Putin to ‘stop abusing’ Navalny
[sup]— Elena Giordano · POLITICO · Jan 11, 2023[/sup]
Defiant Navalny has opposed Putin’s war in Ukraine from prison. His team fear for his safety
[sup]— Nic Robertson · CNN · Jan 13, 2023[/sup]
Germany calls on Russia to allow Navalny to receive necessary medical aid
[sup]— Alexander Ratz, Miranda Murray, Rachel More · Reuters · Jan 13, 2023[/sup]
The plot thickens further...
How was a Canadian engine used in an Iranian drone in Ukraine?
[sup]— Aron Reich · Jerusalem Post · Jan 13, 2023[/sup]
Sure, but same goes for a load of people getting together to do anything. Run a marathon. Clear mines. Save lives in wars zones. There's nothing unique about getting together to fight a common enemy which creates some moral purpose which we then are under an obligations to respect. The Nazis got together for a common goal.
The argument given is not just that Ukrainians have some kind of common identity, but that that identity ought be reflected in international borders and that we, hundreds of miles away, ought respect and support that no matter the cost.
It's absurd. And getting together for a common aim doesn't even begin to justify $50 billion spent on preserving it. Did the starving millions not have sufficient 'identity'?
What I was thinking of when I typed 'hypocritical' was countries terming the Russian action in Ukraine as "immoral". Countries like the USA, for instance, who have carried out invasions in the pursuit of national interest. To whatever extent the USA claimed its invasion of Iraq or Afghanistan was in pursuit of 'moral ends' was hypocritical in several ways.
So, I don't think the USA is supporting Ukraine for solely moral reasons (though supporting Ukraine seems moral enough to me).
Does this clarify my use of the term?
Who is "we"? We are not a natural group you know. The idea that an arbitrary string of characters like "we" on a forum post encompasses a unique identity is patent nonsense. The idea that "we all" happily relied on Russia for energy and business for the same reason is, again, patent nonsense: people's reasons might have ranged all the way from pro-Russian business profiteering (true for the major leading economies in Western Europe especially Germany) to borderline pro-Putin political profiteering (e.g. Trump, LePen, Salvini, Farrage) to all-sorts of anxiogenic media coverage profiteering (great recession, Islamic terrorism, immigration, pandemic) exploited by pro-Russian info-war and troll armies. Not to mention that "we all" gave for granted that NATO was enough deterrent to discourage aggression of such magnitude and proximity by a greedy authoritarian and nuclear-weapon power. And that's why "we" apparently didn't know Russia was a serious military threat until Russia invaded Ukraine and to some extent "we" still don't know apparently.
NATO has also helped dull national attention to defense.
Switzerland and Sweden have a tradition of neutrality.
Maybe those days are over?
, ah, the border-free no-nation world again.
Easy enough to understand, except we're not there.
I guess one might hope for a better humanity; thorough cooperation, participation, ethics of being part of the larger world, non-aggression, etc?
Was it Sanders that said something like "not us and them, it's all us"?
(Incidentally, I don't think Putin could be part thereof, not if wielding power at least.)
Anyway, the "Slava Ukraini" thing is clear enough in this case, a self-proclaimed (partial) identity, with "throw the invaders out" connotations.
From what sources are you getting this information? Most sources that I have seen do not reflect this view. There has been a long ongoing call from U.S. to have other NATO members fork out more dough. But that gets complicated when reviewing how nations develop defense on their own compared to their commitments to NATO.
Actually, the Catalonia-Spain conflict resides on level 1197 of my things-to-worry-about queue, just above the future of Nursultan Nazarbayev, deposed boss of Kazakstan.
These countries' active military personnel and materiel combined add up to a fraction of what, for example, Ukraine is currently fielding to fight the Russians. That information is publicly available, aka you can simply Google those numbers.
They have neither the manpower nor the equipment to wage prolonged war, even if we assume all the materiel is up-to-date and functional, which is a big 'if', considering pretty much every European country gave up on the idea of large-scale land warfare and neglected that part of their armed forces over the last decades.
I tried googling the numbers and did not get matching results. What is your preferred database?
Edited to add forgotten not. Apologies.
These are the moves you have repeated for hundreds of pages.
:rofl: :up:
Sweden, 23,600 active military personnel
Estonia, 7,200 active military personnel
Latvia, 16,700 active military personnel
Lithuania, 23,000 active military personnel
Finland, 23,800 active military personnel
(first hit on Google if you type: "
~100,000 active military personnel, spread out over a massive area.
These numbers clearly in no way present the image of countries that are fearing an invasion. For reference, Ukraine had over 300,000 active military personnel at the onset of the Russian invasion and it has only a fraction of these country's combined GDP. Hell, Sweden alone doubles Ukraine's GDP.
Quoting Benkei
Europe combined comes fairly close to equaling Russian numbers, or perhaps slightly surpassing their numbers, but that doesn't convey the full picture. The issue is with operational readiness of European armies, who have been neglecting their armed forces and thought large-scale land warfare to be a thing of the past. Sources elude me for a moment, but experts have theorized that Ukraine and possibly Poland are the only nations in Europe that could have kept up with the type of combat seen in Ukraine today. Not the French, not the Germans, not the British, etc. despite their armed forces being relatively sizable, and their equipment likely better than the Ukrainians'.
In regards to the idea that one can defend against a force with one third of its number - that's military shorthand, but reality can be much more stubborn than that.
When the Russians invaded Ukraine, they did so with a force of roughly 200,000, against a Ukrainian force of 300,000.
Or when the Germany army invaded France in 1939, they roughly doubled France's number and France got, as we all know, completely swept aside.
No. We're not in a world where Russia are going to withdraw from eastern Ukraine either. Why the sudden burst of pragmatism?
The topic was the motives and objectives of 'Ukraine'. Since 'Ukraine' is an arbitrary line drawn on a map, it doesn't have any unified motive, nor objective and if one were to take an aggregate (vote, poll, whatever) the outcome would be different depending on where you put the line without any hint of a natural break.
As such appeal to such a notion morally is absurd.
Of course, appeal to such a notion pragmatically is very useful (democracy is a pragmatic appeal to the aggregated will of an arbitrary group of people), but that's not what's going on here. Not only does Ukraine not currently have a functioning democracy (a pragmatic problem), but the the results of any such democratic process don't carry great moral weight. My country democratically voted for Brexit. They were wrong to. It's wrongness is not somehow superseded by its being the 'will of the people'.
It is wrong to risk the lives of innocents over a border dispute. It being 'the will of the Ukrainians' doesn't make it less wrong.
Nothing in there says anything like "willingness to fight a common enemy is merely an illusion.". If you want to argue against the media-bogeyman version of one who is opposed to the war then start a blog. If you want to argue on a discussion forum, then read the comments that are posted and respond to them.
The comments you cite say that there is no such thing as a Ukrainian identity, history, language and culture. I've also argued that there's no such thing as the will of the Ukrainians, or the motive of the Ukrainians. I've argued that no such thing exists because Ukraine (like all other countries) is an arbitrary line drawn by powerful people based on the amount of resources they had the power to control at the time. It does not in any way 'capture' some natural grouping of people all of whom think alike. It would be no more real then me taking a quick glance at the posts on religion here and announcing that "the belief of TPF is that there is a God".
None of this prevents groups of people from ephemerally having common goals. what it does is remove any moral weight behind that commonality. Large groups of people can agree on a course of action and still be morally wrong about it.
Yes, Isaac, there can be civil wars.
Quoting Isaac
Daft like you arguing that Ingushetia is a part of Checnnya and Chechnya has somehow broken away from Russia?
You're really funny.
In other words: "the willingness to fight a common enemy is merely an illusion." Fighting people who kill your friends and neighbors may look and feel like a shared purpose but in reality, it is merely the struggle by elites to control people and territory.
It is an interesting theory of social organization. But it does not include a self-evident mechanism for how the coercion is brought to bear. Is there some kind of fear of anarchy as depicted by Hobbes? Repression of instincts ala Freud? Or more like the class struggle discussed by Marx? It certainly rules out a view of 'natural' society put forward by Locke.
Quoting Isaac
Not only the idea that “national identities” are not natural groupings is pointless because nobody is arguing otherwise, but it is also fallacious to suggest, as your argument does, that natural groupings would justify moral claims because they are not arbitrary. Indeed, it’s a naturalistic fallacy to argue that from natural groupings (like “we are all human beings”) we can imply moral claims (therefore “it’s immoral committing to arbitrary groupings like national identities”). On the other side, non-natural groupings can justify moral claims to the extent that moral commitments (along with feelings and pragmatic reasoning) constitute non-natural groupings, like national identities, religious identities, political identities, etc.
And even if you still consider such “national identity” or patriotic commitments arbitrary because allegedly based on arbitrary lines drawn on a map, that wouldn’t be enough for you to consider them wrong, indeed you also believe that moral claims are ultimately arbitrary as arbitrary preferences [1]
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
A part from the Brexit example (where is the argument supporting the claim that the democratically chosen Brexit was morally wrong?), who on earth is denying the possibility that “the will of people” can be morally wrong? Nobody, right? From that possibility doesn’t follow at all that Ukraine doesn’t actually have a moral right to self-defence against Russian aggression. So either you provide compelling arguments supporting the claim that Ukraine does not have a moral right to self-defence against Russian aggression. Or you provide compelling arguments supporting the claim that the Ukrainian government doesn’t have legitimacy to exercise such right.
The moral claim that “It is wrong to risk the lives of innocents over a border dispute” is not enough compelling because it could be also wrong to risk lives and freedoms of innocents by surrendering to the demands of a genocidal regime.
[1]
[quote=“Isaac;682633”]My moral claims are arbitrary. My preferences arbitrary.[/quote]
One side of that line is ruled by a ruthless autocrat.
The other side is a democracy, observing fair respect for human rights.
As far as I can tell, the differences are stark enough.
(I suppose we might ask where people would prefer to relocate.)
So, the line may certainly be arbitrary in one sense, yet there's a clear enough political demarcation.
One of suppressive ruthless autocracy versus democracy and rights, and then some.
And that matters.
The otherwise arbitrary border also differentiates how people on each side live (or presently can live), and their trajectories, which matters in particular if one side wanted to take over the other.
In one sense arbitrary, in another not so much.
Right. so...
Quoting ssu
...is patently false.
Quoting ssu
The question was whether it should (as the USSR wanted (the Chechen-Ingush ASSR) or shouldn't. There's no 'right' answer, there's no God-given lines we 'discover' by examination. there's just power plays.
No. Not 'in other words' at all. What I've said about the lack of cultural natural groups and the issue of unified common goals are totally separate. you can't just pretend I said the same thing by putting "in other words..." in front of it. Either argue against what I've actually written or don't bother.
Quoting Paine
Here's not the place to start debating the merits of the various theories of social conformity. You've already alluded to several, so you're clearly aware that such theories exist. It seems odd then that you would want to say the notion lacked any mechanism. It seems even a cursory glance at any sociology or psychology textbook would provide you with a dozen such mechanisms without having to lift a finger.
No need to reply as Christoffer said it already:
Quoting Christoffer
Quoting Isaac
about countries fighting wars. Obviously there are other kinds of wars too, but see above. As I said, there can be civil wars. And insurgencies and terrorism acted by groups and individuals etc.
:up: :100:
Especially if people making this flawed argument then do make moral claims for taking up arms etc. if there's another state as the attacker.
* * *
I think there's few if any here that would support the Saudi-led intervention into Yemen and the fact is that nothing has happened after Afghanistan became again an Emirate making the argument of the invasion extremely dubious in the first place. The "preventing a safe Haven for terrorists"-argument for the continuation of the Afghan war was in my view false and actually far worse even than the domino-theory of Vietnam war (which also was in error). Would many women opt to work outside their home in Afghanistan and would many Afghans opt for a Western-oriented Afghanistan? Yes, but that wasn't the reason to invade Afghanistan.
Could in 2014 the war in the Donbas be called a civil war or insurgency? Partly yes, but even then the active participation and central role of Russia was obvious. Has the war changed? Obviously after February 24th 2022.
I was trying to figure out how your view of society worked. You declare the self-identification of persons as participants in a group to be meaningless in regard to the polity they find themselves within:
Quoting Isaac
This line you draw between the appearance of a will and the forces actually driving events is not a self-evident fact. It is a part of a theory you are using to interpret events.
Putin Thanks Church for Supporting Ukraine Invasion in Christmas Message
[sup]— Evan Gershkovich, James Marson · The Wall Street Journal · Jan 7, 2023[/sup]
(? covers more than Putin)
Former Moscow-linked Church claims religious persecution as security raids heat up
[sup]— Scott McLean, Svitlana Vlasova, Matthias Somm · CNN · Jan 15, 2023[/sup]
Persecution of Christians in Ukraine?
National security concerns?
What's your take?
Seems unlikely that it's religious (to me at least), except politics has spilled into religious space with some force/fervor.
Perhaps analogous to...
Christians 'cannot stand idly by': Russian priest arrested after denouncing invasion of Ukraine
[sup]— Mike Thom · CHVN Radio · Mar 12, 2022[/sup]
Russia-Ukraine war: Priest detained for criticising Putin
[sup]— Aleem Maqbool · BBC · Jul 17, 2022[/sup]
Either way, persecution versus security, religious versus political, are easy controversies to raise, and derail.
Good, so we're agreed then that keeping borders where they are is neither a guarantor of peace, nor necessary to ensure it.
Where have I declared any such thing? This is pointless if you you're just going to make up stuff I said. If you ever feel like engaging with what I write by all means pick this back up, but I don't see the point in keep responding to stuff I haven't said. If something I've said is confusing, you can just ask. You don't have to guess.
Especially when moving borders is quite rare these days in conflicts... especially the ones the US does. Last time the US made annexations like Russia was I think in the Spanish-American war. Hence Russia war and annexations are quite rare in the World of today.
I quoted you and tried to make sense of it. I am not trying to put words in your mouth.
If one rejects any kind of "thinking alike" in forming polities, that doesn't explain how such polities come into being. Saying: "I've argued that no such thing exists because Ukraine (like all other countries) is an arbitrary line drawn by powerful people" does not explain it by itself. There is more to life in society than saying where its boundaries are.
There is a gap between two things you are saying. If you find this observation to be moronic, ignore it.
And if you do so, I will return the favor.
Except...
1990 — Namibia gets independence from occupying South Africa.
1991, May 18 — Somaliland declares independence from Somalia but is not recognized by any other country.
1993, May 24 — Eritrea breaks off from Ethiopia.
1994, February 28 — Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands transferred by South Africa to Namibia.
2008, August 14 — Bakassi transferred to Cameroon by Nigeria
2011, July 9 — South Sudan formally obtains independence from the Republic of Sudan.
1990, May 22 — North Yemen unites with South Yemen. August 2 — Kuwait annexed by Iraq
1991, February 27 — Kuwait is liberated from Iraq; Saudi Arabian–Iraqi neutral zone is officially recognized as being disbanded, it had been de facto disbanded since 1981.
1994 — Under the Oslo Agreements, Israel transferred parts of the West Bank (Areas "A" and "B") and the majority of the Gaza Strip to the rule of the Palestinian National Authority.
1997, July 1 — Hong Kong transferred to China by the UK as a special administrative region.
1999, December 20 — Macau transferred to China by Portugal as a special administrative region.
2002, May 20 — East Timor gains independence 3 years after the end of its occupation by Indonesia.
2004 — Russia ceded Tarabarov Island and eastern part of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island to China as part of permanent border demarcation.
2005, August — Israel dismantles its settlements in the Gush Katif region of the Gaza Strip, and the remainder of the Gaza Strip, most of which had already been transferred to Palestinian rule in 1994, becomes administered by the Palestinian Authority, until 2007 when the territory is seized by the military wing of Hamas in a violent coup d'état.
2005, Israel dismantles its settlements in the Northern Samaria region of the West Bank.
2015, June — The India–Bangladesh border is removed of most of its enclaves and exclaves.
2021, November — The Qatar-Saudi border was demarcated, giving Qatar access to the entirety of Khawr al Udayd[4]
1990 — East Germany unites with West Germany on October 3. Transnistria declares independence from the Moldavian SSR but is not recognised by any country.
1991 — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania restore their independence from Soviet occupation. With the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is split up into a further 12 independent states, including the European states of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The independence of all the former Soviet republics is recognised by December 26 (except the Baltic states, which the Soviet Union recognized on September 6).[by whom?] Slovenia (June 25) including the former "zone B" of the Free Territory of Trieste, Croatia (June 25), and the Republic of Macedonia (September 8) all declare their independence from Yugoslavia. Croatia and Slovenia are formally recognized on January 15, 1992 and Macedonia in April 1993.
1992 — Bosnia and Herzegovina declares independence from Yugoslavia on March 1 and is formally recognised on April 6. A civil war breaks out, and as the result of the war, two largely autonomous entities are formed: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The remaining of Yugoslavia becomes the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (renamed to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003).
1993, January 1 — Czechoslovakia is dissolved into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the "Velvet Divorce".
2003 — Lithuania's share of Lake Vištytis increases to about 383 ha (about 22% from 2.2%) from a new border treaty with Russia.[7]
2006, June 3 — The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is dissolved; Montenegro and Serbia each become independent states.
2008, February 17 — Kosovo unilaterally declares independence from Serbia and is recognised by just over half (101 out of 193) of UN member states.
2014, March 18 — Russia annexes Crimea from Ukraine, following an internationally unrecognized plebiscite.
2016, November 28 — Belgium and the Netherlands swap land near Lanaye and Oost-Maarland over the discovery of a headless body several years prior, which the Belgian authorities could not access without crossing Dutch territory. The border has been straightened out and now runs down the centre of the Meuse River.[6] The change took effect on 1 January 2018.
2020 — While Nagorno-Karabakh remained an internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan, the four UN Security Council resolutions, adopted in 1993 and demanding immediate withdrawal of the Armenian occupying forces from all occupied regions of Azerbaijan, remained unfulfilled until 2020. In 2020, a new war erupted in the region, which saw Azerbaijan retake control of most of southern Karabakh (Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan, Qubadli, Hadrut districts) and parts of north-eastern Karabakh (Talish, Madagiz). A trilateral ceasefire agreement signed on 10 November 2020, ended the war and forced Armenia to return control of all of the remaining territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh."
1999 — Panama Canal Zone returns from joint US–Panamanian control to Panamanian control. A previous important development was the 1979 change from US control to joint US–Panama control, with plans for full Panamanian sovereignty at some point after that.
2010 — The Netherlands Antilles is dissolved, as Curaçao and Sint Maarten become constituent countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, while Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius become special municipalities of the Netherlands.
2022, June 14 — Hans Island is split between Canada and the Danish territory of Greenland.
1994 — The Republic of Palau is formed from the remainder of the Trust Territory of the Pacific, as an independent state associated with the U.S.
Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_national_border_changes_(1914%E2%80%93present)
...but apart from those 41 examples in the last 30 years, it's virtually never done.
It's not that there's no polities. One could create any such grouping - {all dog owners} - for example. It's...
1) a border does not create such a grouping other than {all the people who live within that border}
...and following from (1)...
2) there's no.moral weight to any aggregation of views from those grouped by such means.
The aggregated views of {all the people who live within that border} has no meaning. It's just a random means of stratification unrelated to the opinion being aggregated.
As such, all this talk of Ukrainian agency and Ukrainian objectives is nothing but propaganda. There's no moral weight at all to the happenstance aggregate opinion of all the people who happen to be encompassed by an arbitrary spatial line.
To illustrate. If we did want to use the opinion of the people affected to influence our decision... Why aren't we asking those on the Russian side of the border? They'll definitely be affected.... Why are we asking people on the Western border of Ukraine (hundreds of miles away) but not just over that border... Why are we asking the rich Ukrainian businessmann (who arguably has the resources to weather most storms), but not the Yemeni child who might not live in Ukraine but will undoubtedly be more affected?
A series of non sequiturs. What one earth does “The aggregated views of {all the people who live within that border} has no meaning” even mean? The aggregated views of “all human beings” has meaning? The aggregated views of “all religious people”? The aggregated views of all supporters of Barcelona football club? The aggregated views of any random family on earth? The aggregated views of the working class? When does an aggregation of views according to whatever grouping function, has meaning at all? What does determine the moral weight of the aggregate opinion of all people grouped in a certain way?
Each period is allusive in its meaning, its logic link to what precedes or follows, and its polemic target. Pure mystification.
Quoting Isaac
More than illustrating, its muddling even further. Who is “we”? The Western citizens? The Western governments? The participants to this thread? You mean Biden, any ordinary dude in the West, or me should go ask a Yemeni child (what age? 5 years old is fine?) what he thinks of the “special military operation” of Putin in Ukraine and if he agrees on the West to military aid Ukraine and sanction Russia? You mean that if he says yes, then Biden should support Ukraine and solicit the Western leaders to do the same, and if he says no, then Biden shouldn’t? You mean a 5 year old Yemeni kid can decide for the president of the United States what the United States should do? Or you simply mean that state presidents should go around ask random people of other countries what they think about the war to let them influence his decision about what he should do as a president of the USA wrt the war in Ukraine? Are you crazy?! Did you do that yourself?! Did Putin ask a 5 year old Yemeni kid if he agrees on continuing to bomb and kill Ukrainians whatever it takes?!
Why the hypothetical form “If we did want to…”? What happens if we didn't want? Are you giving us other options? Do we have to choose randomly among them? Can we use dices?
The word 'polity' does not mean a grouping by means of a shared property. The first meaning given in the OED is: "Civil organization (as a condition); civil order." It comes from the Ancient Greek: polis. The Republic by Plato is titled: Politeia. A better translation than the 'Res Publica' of Latin would be 'What makes a City. The City refers to a place. Different places have different polities.
Polities obviously include formally articulated forms of governance. But they cannot be recognized 'as a condition' without placing them alongside other institutions, both those formally established and those preserved through custom. Who gets to do what varies greatly. Perhaps any discussion of polity requires the context of history. Conditions in a Hindu caste society are much different than a community in the Iroquois nation, for example. Participation and exclusion take place in the context of polity.
This central element of life in society is not recognized by your statement:
Quoting Isaac
This atomizes the participation of each individual in their location to the point that they are not in a place. It is like a theater filled with a hundred Descartes who have nothing to do with the other Descartes sitting next to them.
I grant that if one takes this condition as a premise, any sense of a shared space becomes arbitrary. But nothing you have presented demonstrates that people actually live like that.
The infamous Whisky War. :)
Quoting Isaac
The Meuse conflict was resolved easier than the San Juan wetland conflict, but at least Nicaragua abides by UN's verdict.
The list has a few items related to the USSR (past Kremlin rule).
Quoting Isaac
Moscow is further away still.
Quoting Isaac
...? Nah.
Though, I'm wondering, is there an (implicit) argument against democracy ("majority dictatorship") here somewhere?
Ukrainians figure out how to take down Russian bombs:
On Dec 30[sup]th[/sup] the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces released its daily battlefield update, noting that their soldiers had shot down a significant number of Russian missiles and drones. Ukrainian forces were able to shoot down 58 cruise missiles as well as 23 unmanned aerial vehicles in a 24-hour period according to the General Staff. December was a difficult month for Ukraine as the country saw several major missile and drone attacks that not only damaged key infrastructure but also killed nearly a dozen civilians. On Dec 16[sup]th[/sup] a fresh barrage of missiles knocked out power in Ukraine and put the whole country under air raid alarm according to CNN journalists Olga Voitovych and Eliza Mackintosh.
[quote=Denys Shmyhal (Ukraine Prime Minister · Dec 16, 2022)]They have set a goal to leave Ukrainians without light, water, and heat[/quote]
But Shmyhal also said something interesting, pointing out that Ukrainian air defense forces had shot down 60 of the 76 missiles fired at the country—a figure that has revealed a big change in the war. Whether it be with German-supplied Flakpanzer Gepards or with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), Ukraine has gotten very good at thwarting Russia's air campaign. Back in October of 2022 Russia's military strategists switched tactics and began targeting Ukraine's critical infrastructure as a way to weaken morale and collapse the country's will to fight. Russia's escalation initially worked well. One attack on Oct 10[sup]th[/sup] involved 80 missiles and 24+ Iranian Shahed kamikaze drones which killed 19 Ukrainians and wounded 100+ more according to the Atlantic Council.
[quote=James McKinley (New York Times journalist · Nov 18, 2022)]nearly half of Ukraine's energy grid has been knocked out by recent Russian missile strikes[/quote]
Today Ukraine's energy grid remains fragile but it is still operating and still providing power to citizens because of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' ability to shoot down Russian missiles. Part of the reason why Ukraine has become so successful at shooting down Russian missiles is because of the equipment it has received from its Western allies. In early November, according to CBS News, Ukraine acquired its first shipments of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems as well as its first Aspide Air Defense Systems.
[quote=Lloyd Austin (US Defense Secretary · Nov 16, 2022)]The NASAMS systems had a 100 percent success rate in intercepting Russian missiles as the Kremlin continues its ruthless bombardment of Ukraine[/quote]
But it isn't just expensive equipment that has made a difference. Igla-S MANPADS have proven to be very adept at intercepting incoming Russian missiles. During the Dec 29[sup]th[/sup] attack, a MANPAD was filmed shooting down a low-flying Kh-101 cruise missile according to Tanmay Kadam of the Eurasian Times.
[quote=Tanmay Kadam (Eurasian Times · Dec 29, 2022)]The missile was detected visually by a group of Ukrainian air defense personnel deployed in the zone of the flight of the missile, following which one of them fired on the missile from Igla MANPADS[/quote]
This wasn't the first time a cruise missile had been shot down by a Ukrainian soldier armed with a MANPAD. In October, Dmytro Shumskyi was credited with downing two Russian missiles in Chernihiv with an FIM-92 Stinger.
Questions:
How is this taken in the Kremlin? Should a change in their tactics be expected?
Seems clear enough that taking down the bombs have saved lives. Expensive, but surely worthwhile?
(oh hey, good to see you back)
Not likely. Terror against civilians has been their favored tactics practically from the beginning of the invasion, or rather since the leadership realized within the first few weeks that the blitzkrieg failed and that Ukrainians were not welcoming their "liberators" with open arms. This is nothing new for Russia: they did the same in Chechnya and in Syria. The campaign to destroy life support systems for millions of people in the middle of winter is just the latest escalation of that tactics. It had long been called for by hardline supporters of the war inside Russia, and Putin seems keen to please them, although they are a small minority.
The only change that I am seeing is in the state propaganda rhetoric. In the past crimes against civilians were denied at all levels, however implausibly. Now, while the Russian MoD hypocritically claims that the strikes are aimed against "military control centers and energy infrastructure linked to them," state media and lower-level officials are openly acknowledging and even praising the destruction of critical civilian infrastructure. And they are not shy about articulating the reasons for attacks against civilians: it is to destroy their will to resist and turn them against their government. That the tactics didn't work before and isn't working now doesn't seem to give anyone a pause and doesn't prompt any change in thinking at the top.
As for the effectiveness of the air campaign, it may be less effective than hoped for, but as long as a percentage of missiles and drones gets through, it does its job. Note also that some munitions are better at getting through the air defense than others. For example, Ukraine has no defense against the Kh-22 missile that destroyed the apartment complex in Dnipro (and earlier destroyed a shopping center, also causing dozens of casualties). Patriot might have shot it down, but it is not deployed yet, and Ukraine will never have it in anything like sufficient quantities to protect its major population centers. In any case, all Russia needs to do is launch more than the defense can shoot down. The only potential issue for Russia is the depletion of its stocks of long-range munitions at a much faster rate than the industry can produce. But they are already supplementing their dwindling stocks with hundreds of cheap Iranian strike drones, and according to Western intelligence, they are also negotiating to buy Iranian ballistic missiles.
Destroying critical infrastructure, civilian or otherwise, is not a crime under IHL. You'd be surprised at how much is permitted under IHL as long as the use of force is proportional to the military advantage gained.
Deliberately targeting non-combatants is clearly forbidden, however when non-combatants are injured or killed during attacks on military targets (again, critical infrastructure is a legitimate military target) this is still not a crime and assuming the criterium of proportionality is adhered to is considered collateral damage. This applies even if civilian casualties were expected beforehand.
Ironically, a lot of IHL is written through a military lens. For example, while it is not allowed to purposefully undertake actions to starve a civilian population, it says nothing about freezing a population as a result of destruction of the power grid.
The likely reason for this is because civilian food stockpiles are by and large not interesting military targets, whereas the power grid is an important military target.
In short, doing things on the battlefield that are considered criminal under IHL is a complicated matter.
Yes, that's why I referred to any such grouping.
Quoting Paine
I have no idea what this means, I'm afraid. Everyone is in a place, so we could include that place in our groupings. Let's say 'East of the Dnieper' is such a place. How does that change the moral weight given to the opinion of the people there?
Quoting Paine
Nor does it need to. I'm making a moral argument. Moral arguments are about the way things ought to be, not about the way things are.
It's relevant only insofar as the majority decision in some place carries only a pragmatic weight, not a moral one. Majorities are not just automatically right. The 'right' course of action in Ukraine is not determined by consulting the Ukrainians and going with the majority. Gun laws in America are wrong, no matter what the majority say.
We're currently supporting Ukrainian fighting, even to the retaking of the Donbas and Crimea. That means we (the ones doing the support) have a moral decision to make as to whether that course of action is right. It's not just automatically right because a majority of Ukrainians want it. That would be patently absurd. Hence the 'agency' here is irrelevant. Since the US, UK etc are not bound by the enfranchised of Ukraine, we are under no obligation whatsoever to support the results of consulting that polity.
Even the Ukrainian government, technically, are elected representatives. They're supposed to represent the interests of the polity, not necessarily do exactly as they say. But we, other states, have absolutely no obligation at all to do what the polity in Ukraine says they want.
Amnesty International: Russian attacks on critical energy infrastructure amount to war crimes
International Federation for Human Rights: Russia’s attacks against energy infrastructure violate international humanitarian law
Reuters: When are attacks on civilian infrastructure war crimes?
BBC: Is attacking Ukraine's power grid a war crime?
It is a description that shows the result of only considering "groups" of individuals and their opinions to adequately represent people living together in a particular society. All the different ways people work, judge themselves, mate, educate children, and govern themselves are not simply an aggregate of their opinions.
Opinions, by themselves, do not do anything.
Quoting Isaac
You present the absence of Ukrainian agency as a fact, authorizing the removal of their voice from any moral calculus. You champion Mearsheimer's theory of International Relations as the best explanation of the events unfolding in Ukraine. You discount previous behavior by Russia as indicative of anything happening in this conflict.
All of your 'moral' arguments are made upon the basis of what you have argued to be happening.
I've literally said that people could be grouped by any means (used dog owners as an example, if I recall). Owning a dog is not an opinion.
Quoting Paine
We're not talking about what opinion 'do' so I don't see the relevance of this. we're talking about the moral weight one ought give the aggregated opinion of a certain grouping.
Quoting Paine
Where? I'm arguing the exact opposite. That one could create any grouping at all and get an aggregated opinion. We could take into account the aggregated opinion of {all the people east of the Dnieper}, we could take into account the aggregated opinion of {all the people who've held a Ukrainian passport for more than 10 years}, or {all the people who own a Ukrainian flag}... I'm asking why we ought to take into account the opinion of your chosen grouping {anyone living within the current borders of Ukraine}.
You've not yet provided any reason at all why the aggregated opinion of that particular group matters to us more than the opinion of any other group.
Quoting Paine
Yes. What's that got to do with the argument here?
Quoting Paine
Some. Not all. Is that something you consider particularly unusual?
One thing that should be noticed is that it's missiles only, which shows basically that Russia failed from day one until today to cripple Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airspace is too dangerous for Russian Air Force to fly in. The lack of air superiority is extremely important: Ukraine can move it's formations around an they aren't taking losses when not engaged on Russian ground forces. Another issue is that it's cities, not the Ukrainian army, which is a far harder target to get at, are the target. And to use for example surface to air missiles in the surface-to-surface role is quite inefficient as the missiles don't have a similar high explosive charge as actual artillery missiles and rockets.
Yet I think that creating simple "el cheapo" rockets/missiles to this role is quite possible even with the sanctions etc. Scuds were made in the 1950's and then there wasn't much computer chips around. Russia is likely transforming to a wartime economy and likely changes to the military industry can be done in a year or so. Hence likely a continuation of the missile barrage against Ukrainian cities will continue and I'm not so sure if the missiles will run out.
You do realise any means necessary includes nuclear weapons?
Or are you just talking virtue signalling nonsense to y'a boyz?
Argues that Putin's success would entail uncontrollable nuclear proliferation, whilst his defeat will deflate the attraction of nuclear weapons.
No. It argues that "If nuclear threats or the actual use of nuclear weapons leads to the defeat of Ukraine..."
It offers no argument at all suggesting that "any means necessary" will prevent that eventuality.
Clearly some means might, other means might fail so catastrophically as to bring it about.
No one here wants war to escalate. The debate is about the best means to prevent that.
Even if true for some reason, that somehow Russian defeat would make other states look at nuclear weapons and not be as "attracted" to that sleek cold steel, what's the plan to actually "defeat" Russia?
Because if there's no effective plan, then even in the context of this idea there's nothing effective to do. So, failing a first option that is unworkable, the next option that is feasible and would actually reduce nuclear proliferation is the major powers getting together and resolving the conflict and continuing to cooperate to reduce nuclear proliferation.
This has been the deal since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that the major powers will reduce their nuclear stockpiles, lower nuclear tensions and be generally more reasonable, and in exchange the non-nuclear powers will not seek nuclear weapons.
The country that eroded this deal was first and foremost the United States in invading Iraq and bombing Libya (countries that gave up their WMD programs to be "reasonable" parties to the WMD deal, which signalled to everyone else that the deal isn't honest but the US may attack you anyways for being a more reasonable global citizen: more reasonable than a dictator with plenty of WMD stockpiles), and the country that started to pull out of the non-proliferation deals is the US, and the country that kept baiting advancing its nuclear umbrella all the way up to to thousands of kilometres of Russian border for over 2 decades is the US.
The cause of nuclear proliferation since the non-proliferation global status quo is definitely the United States.
What the part of the world that finds nuclear weapons attractive learns from this conflict is that (Russian) nuclear weapons is an effective defence against US actions: Russia with nuclear weapons has deterred a no-fly zone whereas Libya without nuclear weapons got no-fly-zoned to rubble (with the insane logic that anything that could potentially support indirectly something that could fly is any imaginative wary whatsoever, is a legitimate no-fly-zone target, which is 1984 level nonsense).
Quoting Isaac
The argument is completely nonsensical; all non-nuclear nations that might develop nuclear weapons would be for deterrence purposes, and mainly from the United States and not Russia or China or other neighbour's, they would not look at nuclear weapons as a means to expand their territory.
Thousands of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them are required to threaten the entire planet.
:up:
Germany has taken the common sense position that they'll supply main battle tanks if the US supplies main battle tanks. Totally reasonable, someone asking you to do A, and who can also do A, should be willing to also do A if they want you to do A.
Otherwise, the argument structure that you should do something I'm equally capable, but not willing to do myself, is called manipulation.
It's unclear which and how many Western tanks will be supplied to Ukraine, but what is clear is that if the will to "help Ukraine" was genuine these tanks could been supplied from the beginning, or, at minimum, Ukrainian tank brigades trained on these systems since February (or even before) in the event Ukraine loses a significant part of their entire tank fleet as well as all the other soviet equipment that could be scrounged here and there.
We can also safely conclude that all the reasoning provided before for not supplying Western main battle tanks was completely spurious and lies (which was in any case obvious), if suddenly the story is changing now.
As for the effectiveness of Western tanks themselves, this is now very much sub-optimal conditions. Lot's of experienced Ukrainian tank crews have been lost who could have made use of the Western systems.
In addition to the attrition of tank personnel, there's the logistical challenges. Of course, this could have been easily mitigated by fielding just one Western tank company since the start of the war to work out logistical issues in case it turns out that "anything Ukraine needs" includes Western tanks.
The complexity and maintenance of Western tanks is the major practical problem in suddenly fielding them, and it's very unclear how effective they can be in the remaining skillset and when they'll be effective. Operating tanks takes a considerable amount of skill, even starting with just manoeuvring without getting stuck, and tanks are of limited supply so it's not a case where people can just be thrown into it and we'll just assume the survivors learn something.
It's definitely an open question, even with proper training, how effective Western tanks would be against Russian tanks. Russian tank doctrine is more smaller tanks; with one less crew that also helps permit more tanks. What sort of proficiency Ukraine will have with these tanks is anyone's guess.
However, Western tanks will also remain vulnerable to drone and air power. If the Western tanks are effective against other ground units, this will increase Russian motivation to engage certainly a lot of drones but also their attack helicopters. Artillery may not be so effective destroying Western tanks but may damage them (a problem amplified if they are difficult to repair) as well as of course suppress and degrade supporting infantry and other vehicles. Electronic warfare seems to have become pretty effectively employed by the Russians.
On the offensive, both ATGM's (which the Russians also have) and mines are an additional problem.
To summarise, Western tanks at this stage maybe very late in the game, too late to have a major impact; certainly better than nothing but now fielded in sub optimal conditions, and the requirement of air power and electronic warfare to support the tanks remains, which likely we'll start to hear about if Western tanks start to lose against Russian combined arms or just tank-on-tank engagements (whether because Russian tank doctrine is good enough or just Russian tank crews are far more experienced at this point).
On the political side, there's a major symbolic element to the supply of Western tanks, definitely gives the impression this is NATO's war.
In terms of narrative for Russia they can credibly say they destroyed Ukrainian war fighting capacity and are now even more directly against NATO than before. Why this matters is first on the international scene of countries friendly to Russia it undermines the narrative of Russian incompetence in dealing with the much smaller Ukrainian army; it's difficult to continue to say Russia has underperformed if the West needs to send in Western tanks and difficult to continue to say that it's actually Russia that has lost a significant amount of tanks and not Ukraine. The supply of Western tanks, in itself, boosts Russian "strength" perception, which is what matters most to countries friendly to Russia.
Domestically, the supply of Western tanks simply confirms the Kremlin's narrative that they are actually fighting NATO and not Ukraine. This narrative is important in terms of increasing toleration for losses. If we compare the current scenario to one in which Ukraine was not helped at all by the West and the current front lines is 100% Ukrainian military achievement, it would indeed be a completely military debacle for Russia (an argument that the West continues to make regardless of the facts, but this only plays to a Western audience). The counter argument of course to Russian military debacle is that they are fighting NATO, which is out to get them, and therefore it's a harder fight requiring more sacrifice. Western tanks is a sort of step change in the symbolism of this argument; Russia can credibly say domestically and to their international audience that they defeated Ukraine and are now battling NATO tanks.
The optics of Western tanks being destroyed in Ukraine may also undermine support in the West for the war, lead to self-reflection of Western omnipotence as it maybe the end of the drip-feed escalation ladder, so if that doesn't work ... then maybe best to compromise.
That the move maybe underwhelming militarily and also counter-effective politically, is potentially a good explanation of why Germany is getting cold feat and the US just flat out says they won't deliver their tanks.
The UK committing 10 Challenger 2 tanks is, my guess, was meant to just break the taboo and get other countries, mainly Germany, to commit significantly more Leopard 2 tanks. Only 10 tanks was selected as a mitigation factor in the event they are all destroyed ... they can then say "well it was only 10 and no one else sent any tanks so what-are-you-going-to-do, don't blame the Challenger, blame Germany". Will be interesting to see if these tanks even get to Ukraine and fielded if there's not a deluge of other Western tanks.
Again, how do you actually prevent a Russian victory?
Sanctions haven't worked, international fighters haven't worked, the great Ukrainian offensive hasn't worked, the drip feed of new weapons systems hasn't worked, and there is likely no air defence even possible for defending the Ukrainian electricity grid.
If the real threat is Russian victory, how is that actually prevented?
If you can answer this question, then feel free to move onto the next question of likely the only situation in which Russia uses nuclear weapons is ... losing and not winning, and how would Russia using nuclear weapons to avoid limited defeat (likely successfully) in Ukraine (and also now there's a major power clearly willing to use nuclear weapons) somehow put other nations off building their own nuclear weapons?
This argument is nonsense built on-top of nonsense.
For those wondering about the tank situation. According to the article "U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was in Germany on Thursday to meet new Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, shortly after Pistorius was sworn into office," but I'm not sure if that means today or then next Thursday, so unclear when we'll find out if Germany "sticks to its guns" so to speak or capitulates.
Although I'm highly skeptical Western tanks would be enough to "defeat Russia", enough of them would help create a stalemate, which I think is what US is aiming at currently; calibrate the drip feed into a stalemate.
What I expect is on people's minds is that simply maybe not enough and a massive fleet of Western tanks being destroyed in Ukraine would be a major embarrassment. It cannot simply be assumed
Definitely, the only reason for this is to change policy and not need to deal with journalists bringing up previous statements all the time.
Nevertheless, Germany may still capitulate on their current policy, or then the change of ministers is to increase their negotiation position with a more credible threat that they may not do as they're told, and get concessions elsewhere.
However, considering the embarrassment of Leopard 2's being all destroyed in Ukraine, which not only can't be excluded but maybe the likely scenario (from the German perspective who knows this system best), it may simply be impossible for Germany to undermine themselves to that extent simply to be a good student of the US and no other practical reason.
Left as it is, the situation is actually a really great advertisement for German arms, as the American position is essentially: Well, German tanks are better than our tanks in an actual war, so yeah, take that Germany, fuck you.
There maybe little need to risk this recommendation from the Pentagon for a primary military export by sending them to be destroyed in Ukraine.
The current German government doesn't seem to possess the same backbone, nor insight into international politics. But even they seem to understand that forcing Russia to build up its armed forces whilst simultaneously giving away their own seems like an odd strategy.
Well said.
Agreed.
If Russia won any territory here, the only way one could invoke the threat of nuclear weapons as a factor would be in keeping US involvement at bay.
So the message, correctly, would be "getting intercontinental nuclear weapons will prevent the US from getting involved in your territorial and regional disputes".
Since the US has been responsible for the deaths of nearly half a million civilians in it's wars just since 9/11 https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians - that may prove to be a good thing.
(not that I'm claiming that message makes any more sense - just a reductio)
The only message which does make sense is, of course...
Quoting boethius
... but any journalist who can, with a straight face, argue that the best way to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict is to provoke a nuclear power, has lost any right to be taken seriously.
... but then it's The Atlantic, so ...
You might be interested to look at historical analyses of US Lend Lease aid to the UK, and later the USSR. The aid was critical, more so to the UK, eventually supplying a large proportion of all UK material and a substantial proportion of food as well.
It's hard to argue that the US was "drip feeding" the Brits or Soviets. All internal documentation suggests that the Western allies were extremely concerned that the Soviets would capitulate, even into early 1943, when the threat of Soviey collapse had long passed. However, in both cases, aid to either was fairly anemic over the first year. Setting up supply chains for the amount of material needed for a major war is not easy.
It's even harder today given the amount of training required to operate and maintain modern MBTs and IFVs. The quickest way to get vehicles out would be to set up maintenance facilities in Poland and have them staffed by NATO personnel. This takes time too though, getting building leases, giving assignment orders, moving heavy machinery. You also need a plan for moving equipment within Ukraine without getting it blown up.
It makes sense to stockpile some stuff in Poland and not to turn it over yet, as the material can be neatly laid out in warehouses without fear of Russian missile attacks. The deployment of Patriot Missiles to Ukraine, itself not easy, was probably a prerequisite for defining high value shipments.
Point being, people underestimate how long this stuff takes. Even if the decision to go ahead with giving out Challenger 2s was mostly made almost a year ago, it still might take until now to get them out. For one, it makes sense to train people abroad where missile strikes can't hit the equipment.
If the prior Lend Lease is any indication, peak flows won't start until late 2023 or later.
I would not be surprised if the M1 is deployed, but perhaps it won't be. It's an absolutely atrocious fuel hog and hard to maintain. The US uses specialized refueling vehicles and crews to make the huge demand work. The thing is even heavier than the giant Merkava, and less than ideal for Ukrainian mud.
The difference is that:
- The Nazi's did not have nuclear weapons that could strike the US, which severely limited military options to "lose slowly"
- US administration intended to join the war and were looking for pretext and did join the war (so not hypocrites)
- The UK, Empire + Common Wealth, and the Soviet Union could plausibly defeat the Nazi's, obviously even easier with the US directly involved, so it was not supporting a lost cause. And by "defeat" in the context of WWII meant actual defeat of Nazi Germany which was not only possible but did in fact happen.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Where do I argue the US drip fed arms to the UK or Soviet Union in WWII.
Did the US severely limit the kinds of weapons it would deliver to the UK or Soviet Union?
There's a drip feed of weapons to Ukraine because of cold hard facts.
Are you seriously trying to argue that because the US named both programs the same thing they must therefore be the same thing?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
No, the quickest way was a year ago when the war started to start solving these problems in the event "whatever support Ukraine needs" requires Western tanks, or even anytime since 2008 when it was first declared that Ukraine would be joining NATO eventually ... one day ... maybe ...
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Maybe a reason Russia is keeping the fight in South-East Ukraine 1000 km from Poland.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Maybe people on the internet who don't have a clue about anything underestimate how long things take, but that's not my case (the person who explained all the lead times required) and it is not the case of NATO decision makers. No one involved underestimates the time things take, and NATO was fully aware that it would take significant logistics and training to introduce Western MBT into Ukraine, and they were and are completely cognisant that not preparing that months in advance and only "getting around to it" when Ukraine is in desperate need is setting Ukraine up for failure. Now they are severely tank-deficient and this will severely limit their ability to defend, not to speak of launching any counter offensives to relieve pressure or at least get some victories somewhere for propaganda purposes.
Furthermore, anyone with a pencil and paper could have worked out that this moment in the war would come as it's simply impossible that Ukraine would have basically a 4-1 tank attrition ratio in their favour required to simply stay par with Russia: therefore, Ukraine is going to run out of tanks and will need more ... and Russia isn't going to supply them their tanks and old soviet stuff lying around is both limited in quantity and quality, therefore, ipso facto, the only option will be Western tanks and if the idea is for Ukraine to "win" the logistics and training for that eventuality would need to be carried out at or before the "how long this stuff takes".
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The two situations are not remotely comparable.
Both the UK and the Soviet Union had their own war industries and the US had to first ramp up production for it's own defensive purposes as well as deal with U-boats in the Atlantic. It was not the case that the UK and Soviet Union essentially depended 100% on the US for arms, funds, and material and the US was preparing to enter the war itself (so needed to prepare that).
In this situation the Ukraine military and government is kept on life support by continuous Western aid and has essentially zero war material generating capacity of its own.
Therefore, if you want Ukraine to "win" you need to do things very differently than in WWII and send massive amounts of material before and at the start of the war and all the systems necessary to be effective, since if there are no other armies that are going to enter the war and it has to be all "Ukraine" then you need to maximise the force multiplication of their original professional force: tanks, planes, artillery, helicopters, air defence, missiles and vehicles of all kinds, and while we're at it some submarines and torpedoes, and then rationalise the logistics and training as you go.
If you actually had as a goal Ukrainian "victory" you wouldn't have these months long deliberations about the next weapon system when the previous weapon systems failed to produce "victory", you'd supply directly everything Ukraine can use to force multiple in the present and train out-of-country on every weapons system that Ukraine may require in the future. That is what "winning" through Ukraine as a proxy force would look like.
Now, if you say "well, if NATO did that then Russia would just start using nuclear weapons, so they can't" then you are simply saying that NATO's policy is to not let Russia lose.
For, it wouldn't matter to Russia how they lose in their calculation to use nuclear weapons, just that they are actually losing; there is no "the fair way" to supply Ukraine in a way that produces victory but Russia says, "well, that's fair, you got us, played by the rules so we won't use nuclear weapons but accept defeat".
And that is the dynamic at play here. If NATO policy was "nuclear weapons be damned, glory to Ukraine!" then they would have been sending and training on every weapons system Ukraine does or might need since the start of the war or even before.
It's truly bizarre.
It's basically kindergarten level of analysis.
Define "Russian victory" and provide evidence from Russian officials in support of it.
It's the Atlantic article arguing that a Russian victory must be prevented to avoid nuclear proliferation.
It is the people who are proponents of this position that must explain how they actually prevent a Russian victory so as (for completely non-sensical proposed reasons) prevent further nuclear proliferation, or then proponents of the general position of:
Quoting Wayfarer
To explain what means are included in the "any means necessary" and how these means actually "stop" Russia (i.e. avoid a Russian victory).
Of course, proponents of this position that realise there is very little chances of evicting Russia from all the former Ukrainian territory and then that actually ending the war and Russia saying "yep, defeated" are free to move the goal posts around and explain how Russia "winning" some things (like the land bridge to Crimea) isn't really "winning" because they could have won even more things.
My own position is that the situation should be resolved by negotiation, in which case no side will be completely victorious but some compromise worked out.
However, in simple military terms complete victory would be one side forcing the unconditional surrender of the other side; allies were definitely victorious in WWII.
If Russia ends up in the long run with more territory but does not actually defeat Ukraine then it's up for debate if the price paid for the land was worth it overall, certainly not an outright victory over Ukraine, but of course Ukraine would have paid orders of magnitude, possibly 2 or 3, higher price and didn't win anything. If the "strategic defeat" concept proves true (which now seems extremely unlikely as Russia seems to have transitioned their economy successfully) then perhaps it's a "win" for NATO, loss of some sort for Russia (not great, not terrible), and a clear immense and unmitigated loss for Ukraine
Why would countries have sent Ukraine weaponry back in 2008? It had a pro-Russian government through 2014, and there was a path towards soft "annexation" ala Belarus for Russia.
Western countries didn't give Ukraine much by way of military aid pre-invasion over fears that it would provoke Russia. I think it's quite fair to see the West was caught flat footed at the outset of the war, without good plans for what it should do in the event of a full scale invasion. The Germans and French vocally disagreed with the US about the threat of war, and even top level US diplomats seemed skeptical about an actual war right up until the invasion.
Hence, things taking time. The other problem was that the West wasn't sure:
A. How likely aid was to provoke Russian escalation.
B. How likely Ukraine was to collapse. You don't want to give them a ton of equipment only to see the Russians take control of it (see: the collapse of the ANA and US aid becoming Taliban material).
Ukraine's long term survival didn't seem obvious until later in the spring of last year.
Anyhow, as far as the comparison, while it is clear now that Russia and the UK could have likely eventually defeated Germany, it was far from clear in 1941-43. US policy makers certainly didn't think it was clear, and even after it entered the war it planned on having to invade Europe with a much larger force, leaving Japan until later. But aid flows were still slow. Point being, even in a case where they obviously wanted to get aid onto the battlefield ASAP, it took over a year to get things in gear.
Do you not know the basic facts of the discussion?
Quoting 2008 Bucharest summit - Wikipedia
Ukraine did not have a government that was pro-Russian, or then Wikipedia is way off in stating "Ukraine had hoped to join the NATO Membership Action Plan" and Ukraine would have made it super clear this wasn't the case, they didn't want an invitation to join NATO, certainly don't want NATO to declare they'll be joining someday, they're pro-Russian!
Ukraine had a government until 2014 that was non-delusional enough to strike some sort of balance between Russia and the West, and played successfully one against the other (successfully getting a good deal from Russia to maintain the status quo, which was far preferable to Ukraine than the current war, which was an obvious risk in trying to spur Russia completely to anyone with a modicum of realism).
Yes, much of what Russia is now lobbing at ground targets was not primarily intended for that purpose. And the problem with that is not only the size or penetration, but targeting as well. For example, the Kh-22 missile was originally designed to target aircraft carriers, so it has plenty of charge - enough to destroy an apartment complex in Dnipro. But, like most anti-ship missiles, it has radar homing, which works well for large metal bodies in open sea, but not for concrete structures on land. So on land it can hit hundreds of meters wide off target.
Quoting ssu
Iranian drones that Russia is launching against Ukrainian infrastructure were found to be assembled from many Western components that Iran wasn't supposed to have. But over the years Iran has learned how to get around sanctions, so that they can manufacture their weapons in quantity. If Iran can do it, so can Russia. Indeed, sanctioned components have also been found in recently manufactured Russian munitions and drones as well.
Still, we are likely going to see primitivization of their weapons production, just as we are already seeing primitivization of civilian production (car manufacture, etc.)
I can't see how you square...
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
...with...
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
...?
It's not like literally every analyst thinks Ukraine are going to survive long-term now. Some do, some don't. Seems the same as before when some analysts thought there would be a war and some didn't.
You seem, if I'm reading you right, to be saying that it's obvious Western governments didn't prepare Ukraine for war before 2022 because only some (not all) analysts thought there'd be a war. Then you use exactly the same argument for why it's now obvious they do prepare Ukraine for war (some analysts, but not all, think they'll survive).
It seems hard to avoid the conclusion that Western governments pick and choose which analysts to believe depending on which support the policy they were rooting for anyway
When they didn't want to arm Ukraine, they listened to the ones saying there'd be no war. When they want to arm Ukraine, they listen to the ones saying Ukraine has a good chance of surviving and more weapons will work.
Western countries didn't give Ukraine tens of billions in aid before Russia invaded because they did not think Russia would actually invade, how Ukraine faired in said invasion isn't the main question there.
You are conflating the question: "will Russia invade," with "will Russia prevail in annexing Ukraine or a large portion of it, and/or destroying the government and replacing the leadership with one it chooses."
Those are two different questions. There is a very simple explanation for why governments wouldn't spend in excess of 100% of their annual defense budgets on hardware for another nation before a war actually started.
This is leaving aside the fact that public announcements of equipment deliveries are based on political/diplomatic considerations and may have little to do with when announcements were decided internally. If Ukrainians crews are using the Challenger 2 and Leopards in the early spring you'll know that the plans were in action months ago.
If I had to guess, the string of announcements in tanks and IFVs is an attempt to get Russia to rethink a spring offensive, although I don't think anyone thinks this is likely to be successful
That's not true. Some analysts thought Russia would invade. Others didn't. Western governments chose which analysts to base their policy on.
Likewise (even more so) with Ukraine's chances of achieving their objectives (with military aid). Some analysts think them reasonable, others think them very low. Western governments chose which analysts to believe.
Since we're not privvy to the full range of analysis, nor (most of us) qualified to assess its accuracy, our task, in holding our governments to account, is to analyse their reasons for those choices.
That's the analysis you're dodging by just blithely saying "no one", and "it's obvious".
It's never obvious and there are always dissenting voices, which means it's always a choice, and therefore there's always a reason for that choice.
It's basically an issue of time: Russia can transform it's military industrial complex to wartime in year or two. The idea that sanctions work is nonsense, especially in a country which does have the knowledge to produce missiles and tanks.
Classic example is Iran and it's F-14 Tomcats. The Shah had gone on an amazing weapons buying spree and then after the revolution the new regime had these state-of-the-art advanced fighters, which had their maintenance and spare parts banned. The standard rhetoric was that they will have to be grounded, because Iran lacks the spare parts. Well, these fighters were successfully used in the Iran-Iraq war and I think even today they fly. The ban has just prevented there to be any flyable F-14 in the US (as spare parts are banned).
Hence the talk that Russia will go out of missiles. or tanks, is false. What can happen (or did happen) is that for time they cannot use them as much as earlier, and the lack of armed vehicles put the Russian forces on defense for some months and incapable of large operaions in several locations. But in spring it can be different.
I think the problem is that we compare the situation of Russia to the situation of the US and West Europe. The error is that both the US and Europe are at peace time and every aspect of peace time arms manufacturing is present with all the red tape, the haggling and the limitations starting from the fact that the arms industry is made to produce small quantities highly costly equipment to equip a small peacetime army. It's not like you put the factory to work in multiple shifts 24 hours to feed the Moloch of a conventional large scale war. Hence when a weapons manufacturer claims that the production is x amount in a year, that refers to what has been produced at peacetime.
But once a society has gone into mobilizing civilians to the front, I can assume it can handle the military industrial complex with similar sweeping changes and gets full focus of the society.
The US and Russia are reluctant to offer a clear definition of "victory" and "loss". There are plausible military (e.g. keep Russia military engaged on all fronts) and propaganda reasons for that (i.e. offering plausible deniability in case of military defeat). However, as I said elsewhere, propaganda consumed by the general public is not all that matters, because general public is more focused on the present while strategic goals concern longer terms goals. Besides the leaders’ understanding of the realistic and relevant implications of this war, may differ from official propaganda (for once they are much more nuanced because they reason in terms of relative power), so I wouldn’t focus so hard on military outcomes independently from strategic concerns.
To me, if at the end of this war, Ukraine remains a sovereign non-pro-Russian non-Russified non-demilitarised country (even without Crimea), NATO members will increase in number and military capacity at the expense of Russian security, the overall Russian military projection capacity and reputation will be significantly decreased, the Russian propaganda machine in the West wrecked, and Russian economy impoverished & decoupled from the West long enough (whatever else being equal like the Rest relative neutrality), then Russia has much more likely lost its strategic power competition against the US and the power status it wanted so badly to be acknowledged by the West. So it doesn’t matter if Russia keeps Crimea&Donbas and sells this as a victory against the US/NATO/West to the Russians. Anyways, I’m not sure that the West is ready to leave Crimea to Russia, neither that the Russia nuclear threat is enough deterrent for all annexed regions (including Crimea). Besides this year is going to be decisive also for the future presidential elections, in Russia before the US. So there are domestic politics incentives pressing for a resolution of this war. We will see.
We're not talking about their definition, we're talking about whatever definition proponents of the idea "Russia must be defeated" or "Russia can't be allowed to get a victory" in various forms for whatever reasons.
Of course, the goal posts can be moved around within the framework of these proponents of the position or then any other discussion.
It should the authors of statements like "Russia must be stopped" in various forms or "a Russian victory in Ukraine must be prevented because it would encourage more 'rule breaking' or nuclear proliferation etc." to very precisely define what they mean "stopped" or "victory", otherwise they are of course setting themselves up to just move the goal posts later.
Quoting neomac
Of course, that this is or will happen is debatable and we are of course debating it.
But, for the subject at hand, it's easy to say as long as Russia is sufficiently harmed then the war is worth it, but at what cost to Ukraine is worthwhile to achieving these goals that are not analogues or close proxies but have only abstract connection to Ukrainian welfare?
If you're willing to say "if Ukraine has lost 100 000, then that's worth it for the harm to Russia so far, and another 1, 2, 3, hundred thousand dead would be worth it" then say so, rather than complain it's emotional blackmail. You are only considering the harm to Russia and not the harm to Ukraine, for you position to be coherent you must either state unlimited harm to Ukraine is worthwhile to achieve limited harm to Russia or then there must be somewhere you draw the line: 500 000 KIA, a million?
And, "they haven't / won't lose that much!" is not an answer to this question. You are free to say 100 000 KIA would be worth it, but no more, and then argue Ukraine has only lost some 15 000 or whatever the Ukrainian government number is and there's a ways to go before you'd consider the idea the harm to Ukraine is disproportionate to you objective. You are free to place the number much higher or then at simply then simply all Ukrainians dead would be in principle acceptable to you if Russia is harmed in the way you describe. Certainly, I think we'd all agree that all Ukrainians dying is unlikely, but it is either the morally acceptable sacrifice to achieve your goals in your framework and "anything goes" or then there must be a line somewhere between tolerable and intolerable losses for these military objectives. No military objective is worth unlimited losses to achieve (in this case it the losses are limited to Ukraine, not unlimited to all NATO, which you are not advocating getting involved; of course, by the same logic Ukraine cannot rationally accept unlimited losses to achieve NATO's objective, so it is necessary to manipulate them to do so, if the cause be just).
My point is that, if we talk strategy, nobody can specify a unique and accurate account of "victory" and "loss" during wartime the way you seem to expect (neither in this war nor in any other war). Possible but uncertain outcomes can be more than anybody can count and accurately account for. So any possible outcome (plausibly resulting from certain political choices) leading to significantly increased power asymmetries for one player wrt his opponents, especially if it engenders a relatively stable and beneficial trend over a long period (decades, generations) can count as a strategic victory.
Quoting boethius
To my understanding, the West is interested in having Ukraine and living Ukrainians withing Western sphere of influence. And it's also interested to treat Ukraine as a sovereign state and therefore let Ukrainians decide how much they want to fight for their self-determination against Russia with Western. Besides it's Ukraine that is interested to convince Westerners with their fight and self-sacrifice that they should support Ukraine not for the sake of Ukrainians but for the sake of harming an expansionist Russia.
Quoting boethius
There must be, that doesn't mean you can determine it beforehand, or that it's on me to determine it. I don't think that Ukrainians are suicidal, just capable of greater sacrifice than certain Westerners or Russians could expect.
Yeah, you can't wash your hands of it so easily. It's your governments making the decisions, it's your job to hold them to account. It's just morally bankrupt to throw up your hands and say "it's not up to me" that's just basically inviting authoritarian rule.
First have to quote that article on what it says about Russian propaganda, which has been prevalent in the discussion here too:
Yet coming to the actual issue, this is simply obvious:
But to the core of the article, which is this:
In my view a Russian win even without the use of nuclear weapons will create a very severe Cold War and Cold War mentality. Putin has attacked his Poland, there's no going back to a "Munich settlement", a "reboot" of US-Russian ties as Bush, Obama and Trump all enthusiastically tried (of course, Trump could try again if elected). The attitude is shown in the article very well by quoting our prime minister Sanna Marin. What here should be noted that Marin is a social-democrat, and earlier Finnish social-democrat Presidents and prime ministers worked eagerly with Russia and it's leaders and made the very fabric of what now is truly a historical term, Finlandization.
(Finnish cartoon from the Cold War: President Kekkonen and social-democrat prime minister Sorsa on a well trodden route to Moscow. Current social-democrat prime minister and Finnish president (conservative) are different.)
Now Russian tanks and missiles are expended in Ukraine. The simple fact that now it is quite empty behind our border when it comes to the Russian military. The chief of Finnish military intelligence has estimated that it will take the 2020's for Russia to rearm: so large have been the materiel losses. Hence there isn't a threat right now, but with a victorious Putin, it's going to be very, very tense. Then the military buildup starts in earnest.
The trouble is that your arguments are based on lies.
See how easy it is to dismiss all dissent by just claiming they're lies without offering a shred of evidence to that effect?
I'm starting to wonder if there's a big disaster at the end of this tunnel. (One which Russia won't survive).
They can't? Why not?
Roughly speaking, you think that Western governments are morally objectionable for their support to the Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression.
I think that Western governments would be morally objectionable for not supporting (or not supporting enough?) the Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression, as long as Ukrainians are willing to fight.
In any case it’s not on me nor on Western governments to decide to what extent Ukrainians are willing to fight with whatever military aid they get from the West.
Why?
Quoting neomac
Obviously not. I don't see what that's got do with the issue. The question is whether we should be providing military aid in the way we are, and/or should be doing anything else. That fact that Ukrainians will decide what Ukrainians will do is (despite the bizarre frequency with which it's raised as if it were some Solomonesque insight) trivially uninteresting.
But apparently the US military thought it was possible.
Agreeable?
After all that, it is difficult to process:
Quoting Isaac
As a starting point? That suggests that the most important moral issue here is where everybody is and who's in charge of what.
Surely the most important moral issue is the welfare of ordinary people?
Quoting Paine
Short of adding that to my collection of 'things Paine reckons' I'm not sure what I'm supposed to do with that. discussion might be promoted if you were to tell me why any of that causes such a difficulty.
The quotes you've selected seem mainly around the point that the border of Ukraine is arbitrary (has nothing to do with any natural breaks in culture).
The final asserts that the question at hand is one of how much moral weight to put on any aggregated opinion (particularly that of those who happen to be within this arbitrary border).
I can't see a problem there.
(Some spare. Finns have Leopard 2 tanks in the tank museum and even have put them as monuments on a highway where the armoured brigade is.)
The UK, which has it's tank force basically down to one regiment, is giving one tank company (14 Challengers) to Ukraine. On the other hand there are about 3500 Leopard 2 tanks produced with ample amount of older Leopard 2A4 tanks around, which still is quite potent.
Germany, for some ludicrous reason, is now waiting for the US to give tanks too before it will (could?) give Leopards too. Which basically is a farce: tiny amounts of three different main battle tanks which only two (Leopard 2 and the M1 Abrams) have similar main gun ammunition and all have different logistical systems. Leopard 2 would be the optimal role as a) many countries are willing to give them and b) the Abrams is more complicated to take care of. Likely Ukrainians can sustain them (as like the Patriot SAMs). Likely we are talking about the equipment to basically one armoured brigade, yet likely the modern tanks would be used in company-size battlegroups spread around the front.
Either it's the typical German feet-dragging or then Putin has bullied Scholz too much. Basically this is ridiculous political micromanagement when you already have committed yourself to support one side, but then make one single weapon systems quite a buffoonery. As if one weapon system would be either an escalation or some wunder-waffe that would change everything in a war where the combined arms is the real issue.
Stop complaining about the actions of other governments. This is supposed to be a thread about Ukraine! It's Russia who are to blame for Ukraine's situation, not anything Germany are doing, you're just trying to shift blame. Blaming other countries just plays right into Putin's propaganda.
This is a war between Russia and Ukraine. Germany are not involved, so what they do, or don't do is irrelevant.
Briefly, I take national security to be the moral imperative of legitimate governments of sovereign states. If the Ukrainian government is legitimate and pursuing national security by resisting Russian aggression, I take it to be morally unobjectionable.
If a Western government is legitimate and pursuing national security in supporting Ukrainian resistance, I take it to be morally unobjectionable. “National security” is a strategic notion and it’s essential about all available assets a community has to pursue its biological and cultural needs considering time span, uncertainty, and competitors. So there are 2 important reasons why we need to take into account what the Ukrainian government wants for a moral assessment: needs and decision making.
Quoting Isaac
My clarification is related to the comment of mine you misunderstood and objected to:
Quoting neomac
That doesn't seem at all intuitive. Why would you think maintaining control over resources a moral imperative? Is it, for example, a moral imperative for me to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can?
The reason is obvious.
The United States can not and will not commit itself to a Ukrainian defense, because getting involved in a protracted land war with Russia would basically cede world hegemony to China without a fight.
The Germans know this, and they are none to keen on getting thrown the hot potatoe of taking leadership in that protracted land war instead of the United States. In some part because it simply can't - Europe does not have the military capacity to fight Russia. In other part because Europe has absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose in a land war with Russia.
Thank God the Germans have some sense of how this game works. Merkel understood it too, that's why she blocked the American efforts to stir up a conflict in Germany's backyard.
Physics hasn't changed that much since 1944, Tzeentch. You don't know what you're talking about.
Ok. Thanks.
https://liveuamap.com/
It seems to me the situation is rapidly deteriorating. Soledar fell relatively fast, Krasna Hora seems next in line to further cut off Bahkmut from supplies, which in turn is getting surrounded.
Further, as the Russians advance several salients seem to be forming, most notably the urban agglomeration south of Bahkmut.
Can the Ukrainian army deal with this?
Media are relatively quiet around this issue. The emphasis is on the battle for Bahkmut, but as it stands the Russians seem to be aiming to surround and possibly siege the city.
Umm...nobody is committing themselves to Ukrainian defense except Ukraine itself and Germany surely isn't. If it sends Leopard 2 MBTs along all other stuff already there, it really doesn't do any difference. The US is sending Patriot missile systems and 150 Bradley IFVs to Ukraine. And they (the US) are training Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 combat aircraft. So what you are saying doesn't make sense.
Quoting Tzeentch
Isn't the UK already giving tanks to Ukraine.
First of all, NATO and EU is actually committed to give arms support for Ukraine and Germany has already given military hardware for Ukraine. Now if Germany prevents other countries, like Poland to give weapons to Ukraine, that may further question the validity to buy armaments from Germany at the first place.
And basically it's just make supply and logistics worse when instead of one modern main battle tank you will have possibly three doing basically the same job. Leopard 2 would be the most logical choice.
Quoting Tzeentch
The Germans actually only showed that this attack (February 24th 2022) wasn't at all about NATO: because German's openly before the attack declared that they wouldn't allow Ukraine into NATO. But guess what: Putin attack and tried to capture Kyiv.
But perhaps the American effort you are talking about was somehow to make Putin argue that Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhia are integral parts of Russia and Nikita Khrushchev's act of giving Ukraine Crimea was illegal and in any case the Communists made the mistake in the first place of having Ukraine not part of the Russian Federation.
When I say commit, I mean commit to a Ukrainian victory, obviously, which is going to involve NATO boots on the ground.
And yes, you're right that nobody is doing that, and Germany is responding to that very fact by not doing that either.
Quoting ssu
At the onset of the Russian invasion Ukraine was already a NATO member in all but name. Statements by Germany at this point aren't worth anything, since Ukraine entering the US sphere of influence was a de facto reality.
The United States had been supplying and training the Ukrainian military overtly for at least a year, and covertly most likely since after the 2014 Crimea Crisis. Obviously any German "guarantees" at this point meant nothing to the Russians and it's a little naive to use that as "proof" the Russian invasion wasn't about Ukraine entering into NATO. Even if Ukraine didn't enter formally into NATO, by the onset of the Russian invasion it was a full-fledged US ally, barring the fact that the US hadn't guaranteed its independence.
Why???
Quoting Tzeentch
Nonsense.
Being a member of a mutual defense pact means that other members come to your defense literally. No country has any defense agreements with Ukraine to come to help them in case of war. And Ukraine (foolishly) believed the words of Russia, the US and UK stated in the Budapest memorandum.
Quoting Tzeentch
Wrong. The biggest European country saying NO to membership, with likely a lot more countries having similar doubts was evident and means a lot in NATO. Don't confuse the words of US Presidents (Bush etc) as being the same as NATO countries giving the green light.
If you didn't notice, for example the war in Iraq wasn't a NATO operation. Hence NATO isn't a rubber stamp for the US.
And do notice, unlike now with Sweden and Finland waiting for Hungary and Turkey, no country made any bilateral defense agreements with Ukraine.
:D Let's stick to the topic at hand
[sub](pattern (rhetoric): quote from original ? reword (more generic, different scope, whatever) ? comment on that instead)[/sub]
This is literally adressed in my post:
Quoting Tzeentch
______________________________________
Quoting ssu
What do you think such a statement really means, when the United States is already training and supplying Ukraine like its gearing up for another Vietnam? You need to get a sense of reality.
No one cares about what the European nations say, because they don't have any credible military deterrent. At no point did Ukraine look to Europe for defense in case of a conflict with Russia, it looked to the United States.
It is a good sign when the European nations, like Germany under Merkel, show that they understand how the game is played and don't blindly prostitute their countries to the United States agenda, but that's all it is. Germany saying no to NATO membership for Ukraine doesn't mean a thing when the United States simply circumvents NATO by turning Ukraine into an ally on a bilateral basis.
Ukraine manoeuvred itself into a grey area where it was both almost a NATO member and almost a US ally. In both cases, what mattered is that the United States would guarantee its independence and provide a credible deterrent against Russia.
Russia didn't fear the European armies. Those were non-existent anyway. It feared the United States, whether it involved itself in Ukraine through NATO or through other means. After Germany blocked Ukraine membership to NATO, the US sought those other means and the end result is the same.
It's the only point of disagreement, so unless we're all just going nod and congratulate each other on how virtuous we are then it's the only thing to discuss.
Does Ukraine's territorial claim have any moral weight?
Your comment seemed to suggests you think it does (primary issue - invaders go home). Not primary issue - make sure everyone is safe, fed, housed and cared for.
Ukraine's territorial integrity is not more important than people's welfare even if Ukrainians themselves think it is. Majorities don't make things right. Morality isn't different in Ukraine depending on what the population think.
There are children, future children, millions affected outside of Ukraine...
So the question of what moral objective we have uppermost, far from being off topic, is the most important topic.
I'd say the welfare of the most vulnerable is uppermost. That should be our starting point. Do you disagree?
It's comments like these that make me take them less seriously here. (Sanctimonious indignation or something?)
It is what it is.
When you've got substance to bring to the table let me know.
The assistance Ukraine got...which in earnest only happened only after Russia attacked Ukraine. Finland and Sweden have had for a long time have had training exercises with NATO, had the capability to operate with NATO and did participate in NATO operations ...and didn't belong to NATO and had no guarantees from NATO. And membership wasn't going to happen.
And these were two EU countries, which Ukraine isn't.
The big difference is that they applied to NATO and vast majority of the alliance accepted in their own Parliaments and some NATO members have given security guarantees for both countries. Unlike Ukraine. Ukraine's NATO application simply was left aside. No NATO Parliament started to discuss it. You had only vague promises... because NATO couldn't accept that Russia have a veto-vote.
In fact, it is you who should get a sense of reality: with totally ignoring actual Post-Soviet history of Ukraine and Russia's huge influence in the country can someone say Ukraine was geared up like (South) Vietnam for war ...or everything happened because of US actions, like John McCaine visiting the country or Bush promising NATO membership for Ukraine.
In fact, the February 24th attack 2022 by Putin just shows how much Russians assumed to have Ukraine in their pocket. Last time when they invaded, the Chief of Ukrainian Navy changed to Russian uniform and Ukraine didn't oppose military the quick invasion.
Your example is misleading.
First, I’m talking about moral imperatives for governments, not moral imperatives for ordinary citizens. Maintaining control over resources can be a moral imperative as much as a forced collectivisation of means of productions by a communist government to ensure the end of human exploitation on earth (which you likely must sympathise with) can be a moral imperative.
Secondly, the goal is “national security” and not “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can”. And even if maximising national security would somehow equate “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can” under certain circumstances (like the ones prospected by Mearsheimer’s theory of International Relations that you champion [1]) so be it.
[1]
BTW if that’s your worry, you must listen to your favourite expert:
[quote="Isaac;773952”]You champion Mearsheimer's theory of International Relations as the best explanation of the events unfolding in Ukraine. You discount previous behavior by Russia as indicative of anything happening in this conflict. — Paine
Yes. What's that got to do with the argument here?[/quote]
That’s the theory of International Relations you champion:
[i]My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.[/i]
https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931
Your point was that EU countries blocking NATO membership was a big deal.
Then how do you explain this:
Ukraine defense minister says Kiev is a “member of NATO de facto”
Also, why do you only respond to half my post?
It isn't made so just by you saying it. Why does a nation gathering more resources become moral when a person doing so would not?
Quoting neomac
That's the same thing. 'Security' in this context means nothing more than 'I control it, not someone else'. The fight is over the control of the resource-crucial Donbas region. Russia wants it. The West want it. Ukraine wants it.
Quoting neomac
Where in any of that does it even mention morality?
Just the way as the Ukrainian defense minister admits it in the article: Ukraine is not de jure member of NATO, which means that Russia didn't attack NATO, Russia attacked Ukraine. And that is my point: it is Ukraine's war. Hence it is quite expendable. NATO Ukraine is either past lies of American Presidents or now Russian propaganda: both false and only political rhetoric without any connection to reality.
Hence Ukraine's situation is, with similar reasoning, the same as was for the former (now collapsed) Afghan Republic. With that country you could argue similarly that because Afghanistan and it's Former Afghan National Army were trained by the US and NATO, armed by the US and NATO and financed by the US and NATO countries and only having the exception to Ukraine that there were ALSO troops from the US and NATO fighting in the country, that Afghanistan was a de facto NATO country.
And oh by the way, that regime collapsed. And people just forgot about it's humiliating end.
Quoting Tzeentch
Likely for the same reason you don't answer to all the questions I make you: limited time and these threads explode.
Although I would like to hear just why you think Ukrainian victory will need is going to involve NATO boots on the ground, as you said here .
Your question is misleading. To understand my point one needs to get one step back. Moral rules like legal rules do not grant compliance by themselves. What’s worse is that differently from any legal system moral rules do not offer a procedure to resolve moral disputes , so a community can rely on central governments that are committed to promote a certain moral code within their sovereign territorial domain. How can governments comply to their commitments ? Through power (coercion, wealth, propaganda, etc.). Securing power within a sovereign territorial domain is how governments can both exist/function and accomplish their moral commitments wrt their people. Notice that these are transversal considerations wrt regime/ideology (communist, fascist, capitalist, theocratic, democratic, authoritarian, etc.).
In other words, governments to gain moral legitimacy (whatever the ideology and regime are) are also morally compelled to pursue/secure power.
And that’s also how the notion of “sovereignty” can ground legal/political relations among states also in moral terms.
Quoting Isaac
No it’s not, because there are also non-pragmatic normative constraints (i.e. legal, moral) that one doesn’t need to ignore nor dismiss as Mearsheimer would do, like the ones related to the notion of “sovereignty”. Russia violated Ukrainian sovereignty. Ukraine is defending its sovereignty. And the West is helping Ukraine to secure its Western countries’ sovereignty (NOT Ukrainians’ sovereignty, that’s the Ukrainian government’s task!) against Russian strategic threats.
Quoting Isaac
Exactly. But that's not a problem for me, I'm not the one championing Mearsheimer's views. You are. You are championing a theory of international relations which is incompatible with the kind of moral imperatives you think States should comply with. That’s why your moral arguments are just wishful thinking by your own standards.
Why would governments need to use power to comply with their commitments? If government A and government B both have similar commitments it's not morally necessary for either government to have power over that territory in order to bring about it's moral objectives. Clearly either government will do the job.
The idea that governments need to secure territory in order to carry out their moral commitments only applies if the alternative government (the one competing for the territory) doesn't share those commitments. If it does (or if it's even better), then it doesn't make any difference, the moral commitments will be met, just by a different government.
It's as if I make a committent to care for an elderly relative and then set about murdering any rival carers on the grounds that I need to see them off so that I can keep the commitment I made. It's an absurd argument.
Quoting neomac
So? What's any of that got to do with the moral case? Why would anyone else care about Ukrainian sovereignty?
Quoting neomac
If you can't understand the difference between how things are and how things ought to be then that explains a lot about your failure to engage with any moral arguments.
You are beating around the bush. You responded to my earlier post by stating that it's supposedly a big deal that Germany blocked NATO membership to Ukraine, and that it somehow proves that NATO membership for Ukraine wasn't the driver behind this conflict:
Quoting ssu
That's what we're discussing.
And what I'm arguing is that what the other NATO countries thought about NATO membership for Ukraine is completely irrelevant, because the policy that the United States pursued made Ukraine a de facto member of NATO anyway, whether the other member states liked it or not.
Coming back to my point, the Europeans do not play a role of significance in this conflict. It's the United States that can stand up to Russia, and the Ukrainians had no illusions about the Germans, the French or the English coming to rescue them.
Quoting ssu
Because Ukraine will run out of Ukrainians before Russia runs out of Russians.