Ukraine Crisis
The situation in Ukraine is becoming more dire by the minute. NATO is implying Russia is planning to invade Ukraine, whereas Russia denies this. Russia claims it will not allow Ukraine to enter NATO, as this would effectively put a hostile military alliance - NATO - right at the borders of Russia.
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
Comments (18084)
Supposedly the best way to invite more of the same was to look weak.
No, they were about power - like virtually ever other geopolitical decision that was ever made, western or otherwise.
That's the myth that those promoted War-on-Terror told us.
Deterring terrorist attack hasn't happened by fighting the Taleban in Afghanistan. It's been by tightening the laughable pre-9/11 security and basic police & intelligence work. Not fighting an insurgency in one of the poorest countries in the World.
Terrorist groups have been destroyed by police through the legal system in various countries. But who cares about how terrorist group are really dealt.
It's purported to have been from an analysis of the middle eastern society, and it's also a little wisdom garnered from the American Revolution. Societies vary in the lessons they learn. :grin:
Quoting ssu
How do you know? Do you have a crystal ball to see what would have happened if the US military would have just stayed home?
Quoting ssu
You're sounding a little bitter about the whole thing. What would you say Al Qaeda wanted most of all?
Before 911, Al Qaeda was split on whether to force the 'far war' to be brought into the 'near war.' The die was cast and the response surely wiped-out AQ. The result has advanced some of their aims, however. The triumphant bugles of the neocons have fallen silent.
It was not a matter of doing nothing or projecting maximum force. The Bush National Security Doctrine specifically discounted international instruments that would have treated AQ as a criminal gang. Whatever one thinks about that choice, it was an expensive one.
You may be right that a police operation would have been appropriate and might have worked better in the end. But IMO, you cannot compare 9/11 with prior terrorist attacks. Close to 3000 people burnt alive in downtown Manhattan.
In any case, the war in Afghanistan was sanctioned by the UN Security Council, including China and Russia. It did not make a mockery of our collective security system, and did not create a precedent for Crimea or other land grabs. The war in Iraq did that.
Power over land and people. So we agree that this is just a land grab.
No, clearly we don't agree.
The US participates in undermining terrorist plans around the world. I think the use of the military wrt Afghanistan was to get to terrorists who were being protected. Iraq was about locking down sources of radioactive material and democratizing the Middle East. That's the conclusions I came to, anyway.
"To delay the Ukrainian counteroffensive as the Russians complete their retreat, Moscow has left newly mobilized, inexperienced forces on the other side of the wide river, it added."
wtf?
The question is, do you use the DOJ/FBI/CIA or do you invade and occupy a country? In fact, even the Reagan/Clinton answer of punitive strikes into the country...and then leave the country alone seemed to have out of the question.
@frank, the truth is that the Domino Theory, the reason for the US to fight in Vietnam, was far more logical and clear headed (and in the end wrong) than the scaremongering reasons we got for the War on Terror. Which goes on even this day.
You think it's a great idea to invade a large country because of the actions of few individuals that weren't from that country, had no links to the officials of that country and that the majority (if anyone) hadn't even visited, but then had the financier of the attacks living in? Yes, the Afghan government dared to ask proof just why would they give OBL to the US. Such thing was non-negotiable.
The only reason was that the first Twin Towers bombing failed and hence it could be dealt as a police matter (as terrorist attacks usually dealt with). But the second one was a great success and hence the US politicians had to bomb somewhere. The American people craved for revenge and a police investigation would have seemed as if the politicians would not care. Hence war was the best solution for politicians.
Think about it for a while.
If you look at both the terrorist attacks that have happened or have been prevented, NO have had a link to Afghanistan. The Islamic State was what Al Qaeda in Iraq morphed into, and Al Qaeda in Iraq was not in control of the tiny cabal that Osama bin Laden had. It was a franchised movement. And the terrorists were usually estranged people likely with mental problems that could pick up from the net all the IS regalia needed to make them part of the IS.
But this is a topic for a different thread...
I don't think that the Taliban wanted the US to come after them. I think Al Qaeda wanted for the US to come after them.
Quoting Olivier5
And you hit the nail here. 3 000 killed and images of people leaping into their death isn't something that a politician can respond with an police investigation, especially if you have the armed forces of a Superpower. It's a slam dunk response to stay in power in a democracy. Only a Houdini of a politician could have gone this way and be successful.
Yet as we know (from Iraq and the War on Terror), the neocons wanted to use and did use this opportunity in their delirious idea that the US ought to try to gain hold of the Middle East before China grows too much (or something).
And then there is the question just how this war was managed and fought.
Again interesting topic, but for a different thread... like the late War on Terror thread.
Discusses also their potential use in Ukraine war.
Quoting Olivier5
:chin:
I don't think either of us cares to discuss it further, though
That was suggested by Olivier, and I stated that it may very well be correct.
Quoting jorndoe
Whatever works. Negotiations should be supported as strongly as we’re supporting Ukraine with weapons and training.
So what exactly do you disagree with?
Yes, very poorly.
Yet a fundamental difference with Iraq in my view, and respective to the argument I was making on precedent-setting, is that the war in Afghanistan was sanctioned by the Security Council.
Your classification of a decades old, complex geopolitical situation as "a simple landgrab", obviously.
This in addition to a likely destruction of the Kakhovka dam that would dump water from one of the largest reservoirs in Europe onto Kherson and other nearby settlements (presumably, after they vacate them).
In both cases this would be a false flag operation designed to fool no one who doesn't want to be fooled. This has become their signature move.
Quoting Mikie
I didn’t mean that you were blaming this war only on US/NATO. But as your line of reasoning goes (“do you think Putin would have annexed Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine had the US not (1) pushed for NATO membership, (2) supplied weapons, and (3) conducted military training?”), US/NATO expansion and meddling in Ukraine provoked Putin’s “special operation”, and therefore “US/NATO is to be blamed for the beginning of the war” where “beginning of the war” is Putin launching his “special operation”.
Indeed, that’s the kind of premise that Mearsheimer holds (along with his type of geopolitical realism) to support his controversial claim : “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault”.
And if you are not claiming that what is your point in asking me that question?
Quoting Mikie
“Taking seriously” means different things for different geopolitical actors depending on their strategy: for Russia it meant that the West should provide security assurance and of course “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” are the opposite of security assurance for Putin. For Germany it meant boycott any attempt to have Ukraine joining NATO (which is in line with Putin’s security assurance). For East-European countries (including Ukraine) it meant “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” because they needed security assurance from the US against the Russian revanchist threat!
Yet one can argue that Russian’s threats have been addressed the way Russia preferred to some extent by the West, proof of that is not only prominent Western allies' reluctance to welcome Ukraine candidature for NATO membership but also the many ways in which the US administrations avoided sending “lethal weapons” to Ukraine (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/obama-trump-biden-ukraine-military-aid-1.6371378). The irony in this is that, as far as I’ve understood, the first aid package including lethal weapons that was actually released for Ukraine came from Putin’s old sport Donald Trump after the Trump–Ukraine scandal came out (where the Trump–Ukraine scandal consisted roughly in Trump pressuring Ukraine to compromise Biden in exchange for lethal weapons!).
What I find particularly misleading in your claim is your “acknowledged by allies, experts, and our CIA as threatening and provocative” because the understatement is that since allies and some experts were against threatening and provoking Russia by “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” then those moves were illegitimate. But that’s a biased view, indeed one could as easily claim that other allies, other experts and other pentagon representatives were “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” with the intent not to provoke but to deter Russia!
In other words, we are facing here a security dilemma: while we can argue that NATO had no malign intentions against Russia (just legitimate security concerns) as plausibly as we can argue that Russia had no malign intentions against the West (just legitimate security concerns), it may certainly be the case the case that each side reads hostile intentions into the other’s actions, probably due to deep-rooted/historical mistrust! That’s why it’s a hopeless exercise to take any side to admit having been the first one to start the escalation.
Quoting Mikie
Again this example seems inspired by Mearsheimer’s article “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault” [2]. The problem is that there Mearsheimer was just talking about threat perception and intolerance signaling between state powers, and this was meant to prove the concept of “legitimate security concerns” (as opposed to imperialistic ambitions) in the case of Russia. No great power tolerates threats at their doorstep, fine hence my concession earlier (when I said I don’t deny “the fact that Putin’s concerns bear some strategic plausibility (having US/NATO so close to the Russian borders was too risky, even if NATO is a self-proclaimed defensive alliance)”). However there are 2 problems in the way you rendered Mearsheimer’s example: 1. I find your rhetorical question (“Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not”) controversial. If state A threatens state B in its proximity or state A invades state B, I could react differently depending on which state is democratic or authoritarian, because I prefer democracy over authoritarian regimes. 2. I find the reference to “President’s ‘real’ motive” highly misleading in the case of Putin for the following reasons: A) Putin’s ambition to challenge the Western world order is declared and perfectly in line with Russian revanchism (so Putin is not simply talking of having a buffer state, and the so far annexed territories aren’t a buffer state anyways!), B) Putin’s military-economically-ideologically projection outside Russian borders in Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe, Mediterranean, Baltic and Artic proves his ambition to expand the Russian sphere of influence on a global scale C) Putin’s real motives pre-existed him (revanchist nationalist ambitions aren’t an invention of Putin) and might last after him (even if Putin is deposed, whoever will replace him can end up being like him, strive to achieve what Putin couldn’t), and be inspiration for others (challenging the West is a study case for other potential Western challengers like China and Iran). So the geopolitical relevance of his actions and claims go beyond his personal motivations.
Quoting Mikie
Even in this case, I'm still looking after a bigger picture:
[1] [i]My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam[/i].
https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931
[2]
[i]After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington i! China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider
the expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia—a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear.[/i]
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf
[3]
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/world/europe/russia-open-skies-treaty-biden.html
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/kremlin-tv-chief-russia-must-annex-east-ukraine/
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-russian-military-escalation-around-ukraines-donbas
“Only”? I blame Putin for the war. NATO was a reason given for invasion — one that was given for years, clearly and consistently. The conclusion? That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that.
Quoting neomac
Russian concerns about NATO enlargement have been taken seriously. That was your assertion, as seen above.
Therefore, this statement:
Quoting neomac
Is meaningless. Russia was taking Russian concerns seriously, yes — that’s obvious.
Quoting neomac
So pushing for NATO membership by East European countries is an example of taking Russian concerns about NATO enlargement seriously?
“We take your concerns seriously by doing exactly what you’re concerned about.”
I’m not sure you’ve thought this through. You’re meandering into incoherence.
The point stands: the US and NATO did not take Russian concerns seriously — as was demonstrated above.
Quoting neomac
What was acknowledged was that Russia considered this a threat. I said nothing about legitimacy — we can argue that. Many of these experts may even argue it themselves — for example, that NATO membership and providing weapons is indeed a threat to Russia, but that it’s worth doing anyway. That does in fact seem to be the case for many officials: "We don't care if you feel threatened, no one tells us what to do or who can join our alliance."
Either way, if pushing for NATO membership, supplying weapons and military training, etc., is “taking Russian concerns seriously,” as you asserted, then the assertion is indeed baseless and wrong. If their concerns were taken seriously, these actions wouldn’t have been taken.
"I take your concerns about poking this bear seriously, but I'm going to continue poking the bear." Is this an argument?
Quoting neomac
What was the Russian threat in 2008, exactly?
Attempting to reduce all of this to “both sides have an opinion, so there’s really no way to tell” is a cop-out and is quite convenient, as it relieves you of having to learn about it.
Quoting neomac
I prefer living in the US over living in Iraq. The US invasion of Iraq was still wrong.
Even if Russia were a democracy, the war is wrong. The US ignoring the Russian concerns and contributing to escalating the crisis is also wrong.
Quoting neomac
So do I. I think to make claims about imperialism as the “real motive” without evidence, instead of looking at actions and statements, is very misleading indeed.
Quoting neomac
Sure — and escalating military training and weapons, turning Ukraine into a de facto NATO member, and doubling down on official NATO membership speaks volumes.
Quoting neomac
"Real intentions"? Again, let's stop simply declaring the "real intentions" of the US or Putin, and look at the facts. From the summit communiqué in June 2021 to the Joint Statement in September 2021 to the statements by Blinken in December (after Russia made clear demands about NATO) -- the words were consistent. What about the actions? Well, not only weapons were provided, but extensive military training, including with NATO forces. Did Operation Sea Breeze not match the declared intentions?
We're all against Putin, but there's no sense in ignoring facts in favor of a contrived, unsupported media narrative.
Quoting neomac
10 thousand trained troops a year (Obama), Trump supplying "defensive weapons," and Biden's long-held and continued hawkishness toward Russia (including what I've already gone over) -- hardly what you describe.
Quoting neomac
Except that this is the exact opposite of the truth -- and Russia knew it. NATO's involvement was getting more and more serious, which is why they wrote letters to both NATO and the US demanding "1) Ukraine would not join NATO, 2) no offensive weapons would be stationed near Russia’s borders, and 3) NATO troops and equipment moved into eastern Europe since 1997 would be moved back to western Europe." This was in December of 2021. Blinken's response: "There is no change, there will be no change."
Also in December, Putin said: “what they are doing, or trying or planning to do in Ukraine, is not happening thousands of kilometers away from our national border. It is on the doorstep of our house. They must understand that we simply have nowhere further to retreat to. Do they really think we do not see these threats? Or do they think that we will just stand idly watching threats to Russia emerge?”
Based on the statements and actions by the US and NATO, it's quite clear they weren't "naked and powerless," nor did Russia see it that way.
So this is another baseless assertion.
Quoting Boris Bondarev
Quoting Boris Bondarev
• US division ready to enter Ukraine in case of attack on NATO — TV (TASS; Oct 22, 2022)
• 1st Time In 80 Years, US Army Deploys ‘Screaming Eagles’ 101st Airborne Division Just Miles Away From Ukraine (The EurAsian Times; Oct 23, 2022)
• False flag? Russia says Ukraine plans to detonate a ‘dirty bomb’ (Al Jazeera; Oct 23, 2022)
As suggests, Putin isn't exactly approachable here. Peskov? Lavrov? Medvedev? How might the diplomats get on with it?
If Putin is actually going down the nuclear path, then Moscow will get all eyes-on, attention. I don't imagine they think that'd be a good move for Russia, or anyone at all. Anyone know specs of the Russian dirty / tactical nuclear bombs? (radius, time until area is safe, materials, yield, emp, delivery systems)
Quoting Mikie
Right. The aid to the Ukrainians makes the providers proxied elements. Though, I don't think the instigator meant to (ultimately) attack them instead (in this war anyway). Or maybe someone disagrees with this? Seems Iran has joined in, too (drones, personnel). Regardless, evidence suggests Putin wants to ultimately convert (all or part of) Ukraine to Russian oblasts; that part at least isn't proxy.
Note that in this scenario, the US would annex large parts of Canada, just as Putin is doing in Ukraine. Therefore, it would be a land grab, a manifestation of imperialism
Your endless NATO caca arguments fail to account for the annexion of Crimea, Dombass and Kherson. This is the proof of imperial ambitions, which you have conveniently decided to ignore because it undermines your narrative...
This is not "proof" of Imperial ambitions, as @Mikie describes above.
What you point to can also be explained by: NATO (an anti-Russian alliance) gets closer to Russia, who views an anti-Russian alliance as a threat, threat in a general sense and also specific threat to their naval base in Crimea, and when NATO starts to get too close, too threatening Russia preemptively acts to secure it's "national interest" (the same concept the US keeps going on about for decades to justify all of it's interventions around the world).
And this expanding towards Russia (that geopolitical experts that managed the end of the cold war, say will invariably lead to a war in Ukraine) is then mixed in with 8 years of Ukraine shelling ethnic-Russians in the Donbas.
So the idea that this war was somehow just completely unprovoked by US, NATO and Ukraine, is simply absurd.
Of course, provocation doesn't determine moral justification, but it is incompatible with the "pure imperialism" or "crazy" or whatever narrative imparted to Russia.
Why getting the narrative plausibly correct is important, is that some basic sense of reality is required to make good decisions; in this case reach a diplomatic resolution to the war.
For, either
1. NATO goes to war with Russia to implement by force the West's moral judgements, which maximises the risk of nuclear war, or
2. Ukraine imposes its will on Russia by force
3. Russia imposes its will on Ukraine by force
4. The war goes on forever
The justification for provoking Russia for 8 years by shelling the Donbas and doing nothing about Nazi's the West's own media would go and report on all the time, and the fanatical total war fighting including handing out small arms to civilians (which only get them killed) was number 1, that US / NATO would intervene with a no-fly zone. Zelensky and co. and a good part of the whole of social media seemed to genuinely believe that would happen. And now that Russia seems to be turning the tide, suddenly the 101'st US airborn is being talked up as doing exercises on Ukraine's border and may need to intervene (according to Patreus) ... why would there be this talk if option 2 was feasible?
And when it comes to option 2, in thousands of comments (over 7000 I believe) in this conversation, there has never been a single remotely plausible proposal of how Ukraine can "win" with pure military means.
Indeed, for months Ukrainian partisans were justifying the fighting because it would increase Ukraine's negotiating position ... and that was even Ukraine and Zelensky's justification from time to time, but where was the peace proposal to go along with that idea? Russia entirely withdraw from Ukraine, even Crimea!!
When it comes to 3, Russia does have the means to simply win. So if options 1 and 2 aren't happening, and 4 is unlikely, then the current Western strategy likely result is simply option 3.
However, how is Russia winning a good way to fight Russian Imperialism?
As for option 4. This might be "bad for Russia", for sure, but how is it good for Ukraine?
Although I have my doubts option 4 can be maintained forever, certainly war can be dragged on a maximum amount of time by bankrolling and arming Ukraine as much as possible, even if they are losing. But how's that good for Ukrainians anyways? Considering the lives and economic destruction it entails.
What's the alternative to these military resolutions?
Negotiated peace.
But if you want a negotiated peace, then Russia is going to get a lot of what it wants, easy to yell as a Westerner safe in their living room "Boohoohooo! Russia need to be punished for their Imperialism!" ... but how many Ukrainian lives are worth it to make that point? How many Ukrainian lives are worth it to make that point and Ukraine still lose the war?
Which is the core of my position: if NATO wants to punish Russia for its actions, it should spent NATO lives to do it. If we won't, then it's not our business and Ukraine can fight if it wants to with its own means, and if it can't win then it should sue for as good a peace as it can.
For, the idea there's some moral imperative to send arms is not only absurd, but also hypocritical.
If it's a moral imperative then we should be sending all the arms! Are we? No.
Even worse, NATO opens and lowers the arms and training and funding taps as it suits them, and won't hesitate to shut things down if it becomes politically expedient (just throw some shade on Ukraine, suddenly things aren't so clear, time to stop sending money into a money pit in Ukraine and spend it domestically, duty to own citizens and Ukraine state has duty to theirs and all that).
So, it's not a coherent moral position to begin with and hypocritical from start to finish.
Now, we could debate spending NATO lives to "show Russia" ... but we aren't because everyone knows no one in NATO gives a fuck about Ukraine beyond an expedient tool for US policy.
Additionally, the "Russian Imperialism" land grabbing left and right, makes zero coherent sense with the Russian military incompetence narrative, which is even less sensical than the "we support Ukraine by not actually supporting Ukraine but just sending weapons", with a nice insane "we can't negotiate as it's not our war, and Zelensky won't negotiate with Russia, as he shouldn't!, but will take every inch of territory back ... but also it's Putin that refuses to negotiate!"
Ok, the argument is the Ukrainians can take care of business themselves if we just send enough weapons.
But is that happening?
We've been told since September Russian lines are collapsing ... yet they're still there. We've been told since the start of the war that Russian economy and society will disintegrate and therefore no actual battle plan is required beyond sending more people to die.
Which is the heart of the matter. Whatever intentions you place on Putin, the question is what to do about it. Wars happen. Most wars are resolved by some diplomatic resolution.
This analysis by the former Finnish PM is just so amazingly shallow and dumb.
For example, he says he was right about Finland joining NATO and his "mistake" was not pushing for that hard enough while in office.
... But is Finland under attack? Would Finland joining NATO have stopped the Ukraine war somehow?
Did he advocate Ukraine joining NATO at the time ... or even now?
Moreover, he was literally physically there in Georgia negotiating with the Russians ... but fails to mention Russia invading only after NATO declared Georgia and Ukraine would be joining NATO, eventually.
He also says the "Doves were wrong" about economic integration, but fails to mention the 2022 war in Ukraine only happening after Nord Stream 2 was not licensed.
Maybe if that economic integration project went ahead, and Germany and the EU pretended it would for 10 years (why else would Russia and a bunch of Western contractors build it?), the war would have been avoided.
Maybe the doves were right, but the hawks under Biden, once in power, wanted this war and ended the doves peace-and-cooperation strategy to avoid war ... and what do we get? A war.
Hawks then run around, like this arrogant piece of Finnish shit, saying they were right?
But what were their Hawkish policies that would have avoided war? Nukes in Ukraine?
If you yell after the fact "haha I was right about the war happening" you need to actually point to what your alternative plan would have been that would have avoided the war. All the Finnish PM can point to is Finland could have joined NATO ... but would that have affected Russia attacking Ukraine.
Of course, if he made the logical link of Hawks were right and therefore NATO should have let Ukraine join, he'd have to square that with Ukraine wanting to join, requesting to join, begging to join, putting it in their constitution (whereas Finland was quite content not being in NATO and never made any request), but NATO not letting Ukraine in the club. Well, if it's obvious that NATO wouldn't have let Ukraine in any time before 2022 nor today ... nor ever, what's the hawk's great idea that would have avoided war?
Arm Ukraine? Even Blinken pointed out that arming Ukraine isn't a good plan as whatever capacity is built up in Ukraine, Russia will just double it, or quadruple it (and, the sub-text, feel threatened and therefore more likely to attack). Arming Ukraine and teasing "NATO partnership and NATO one day" is the primrose path to the destruction of Ukraine, as Mearsheimer puts it. Made them feel big and tough and therefore no need to negotiate in a level headed and compromising way with Russia.
What was the hawkish alternative plan to this exact scenario?
The Finnish PM does not even address any of the key facts or what hawks would have done differently to avoid war in Ukraine.
He's also just delusional about who's he's even criticising. The Dove's position he lambasts is not that Russia is not a military threat and therefore we had no fear of war all these years.
Rather, the Dove's position is precisely because Russia is a military threat and we should fear war, therefore we should be ever vigilant and diligent in diplomatic and economic cooperation arrangements that maintain the peace.
Knee jerk total sanctions was the hawks wet dream, but what did that accomplish? Did Russia collapse economically or was simply the costs of total war preemptively removed so that there is far less incentive to keep or return to peace?
Indeed, US policy hawks called central bank sanctions their "nuclear option" for decades, how they could effectively destroy Russia ... Russia then spends a decade preparing for this threat US policy hawks literally can't stop talking about.
Did the dove's plan really fail?
Or did the hawks finally get to do their insane plans and this is the result.
The attitude is more that of Hector in the movie Troy:
Hector: Tell me little brother, have you ever killed a man?
US policy hawks: No
Hector: Ever seen a man die in combat?
US policy hawks: No
Hector: I've killed men and I've heard them dying and I've watched them dying and there's nothing glorious about it.
I’m responding only for my arguments. If you want to talk about “imperialism”, you better clarify what you mean by it in a way that is clear what you would take as an evidence for the concept to apply, because otherwise we are just quibbling over a terminological issue. See here: “Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas,[2][3] often through employing hard power (economic and military power), but also soft power (cultural and diplomatic power).” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism)
So America is called “imperialist” (https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/05/putin-speech-ukraine-annexation-western-imperialism/) even if they didn’t annex territories while Russia under Putin made 3 annexations (Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk) and subtracted territories to Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Besides Putin’s mission to protect persecuted Russian minorities is a popular pretext common in those who have imperialistic ambitions (https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ethnic-russification-baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.html).
Quoting Mikie
That’s why you are blaming also US/NATO for this war, right?
Quoting Mikie
Taking a threat seriously means that one should not ignore the threat, but it doesn’t imply a specific course of action in response to that threat. If a mafia mobster goes to some business reclaiming his "pizzo", and the business owner manages to call the police to rescue himself instead of paying the mobster that doesn’t mean that the business owner didn’t take the threat seriously, on the contrary he did, that’s why he called the police. The points I was making with my comment were: first, we shouldn’t cling on the conflation between threat and expected response when we talk about “Taking Russian threat seriously” which has no other use than serving Putin’s narrative and therefore it prevents us from seeing US/NATO response as a deterring strategy (indeed, deterrence makes perfect sense against perceived serious threats!). Besides if NATO/US didn’t take Putin seriously, then also Putin didn’t take seriously “NATO membership, supplying weapons and military training, etc.” because if he did, he would have felt deterred.
Secondly, the Western response is mired in unresolved tensions between hardliners and softliners (since Obama, Westerners could have sent lethal weapons to Ukraine in greater stock much earlier than they did), while Putin response doesn’t suffer from comparable obstacles. And this observation is pertinent and non-negligible in a geopolitical perspective.
Quoting Mikie
So what? I’m more interested in testing the rationality of our expectations not in what we find desirable or moral. If all you have to offer is a list of scores based on your moral compass or desiderata, you are not intellectually challenging to me.
Quoting Mikie
I answered that already. In geopolitics, there are not only imminent military threats but also long term strategic threats [1]: nationalist revanchism was the most serious threat that Europe could think of after 2 WWs, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. That’s why Russia and Putin were under NATO’s radar. By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia. This was already enough to alarm the West and the ex-soviet union countries (including Ukrainians who have a long history of nationalist tensions with Russia). That’s why NATO enlargement was welcomed by ex-Soviet republics and not the result of military occupation and annexation by NATO, you know.
Additionally your myopic demands for evidence fails to take into account the initial assumption of my geopolitical reasoning: “You candidly admit that Putin’s perception of the threat was honestly felt (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s not justified) , but that’s pointless to the extent that all geopolitical agents (not only Russia) as geopolitical agent reason strategically. And strategic reasoning comprises threat perception, signalling and management , so if one must acknowledge that Putin/Russia felt threatened by US/NATO (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified), then one must acknowledge that also US/NATO/Ukraine can feel threatened by Putin/Russia (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified).”. So US/NATO felt Putin and the rising of Russian revanchism honestly threatening, even if, ex hypothesis, it wasn’t justified. Period.
Quoting Mikie
You are missing the fact that Biden froze the procurement of lethal weapons by the end of 2021 (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/appeals-ukraine-biden-admin-holds-back-additional-military-aid-kyiv-di-rcna8421) which were a more serious threat for Putin’s war machine than military training, defensive weapons and NATO promises. And again: NATO/US military support to Ukraine was meant as a deterrent (however weak), not as a buildup for a Russian invasion (here is another proof of concept: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/us/ukraine-war-missile.html).
Quoting Mikie
Again you are forgetting the issue of the lethal weapons. Not training, not NATO expansion, not defensive weapons, not the hawkish claims were the serious threat, otherwise Putin would have started his special operation much earlier. The serious military threat was the offensive weapon system provided to the Ukrainians against Putin’s expansionist ambitions.
Quoting Mikie
Retreat from what? Did Putin have evidence that Ukraine or NATO wanted to invade Russia? Or are we always talking about perceived strategic threats?
You keep presenting facts according to the Russian perspective but you didn’t explain yet why the West should act according to Putin’s way of framing the issue and related demands (NATO membership, no military training, no weapons for Ukraine) while letting Ukraine fall prey to Russia. How is that right? If Russia did something wrong in invading Ukraine according to your moral compass, what do you think it’s sensible to do about it? Besides you even claimed “So you don't believe Putin. Understood. I don't blame anyone for that. I don't blame anyone for not believing American presidents when they say things either. I think we should be very skeptical”, so what’s the point of objecting that the West didn’t take Putin’s demands the way he expected ?
Quoting Mikie
If Putin must be treated as a rational agent, then Putin couldn’t possibly start a military confrontation with a non-aggressive competitor against which, ex-hypothesis, he believed having no chance or little chance of winning. If Putin is a rational agent, we must assume he acted according to some rational expectations appropriate for those circumstances: namely, he believed to have a serious chance to get what he wanted and NATO/US couldn’t really deter him, so that he could plausibly claim to have won a war against the West, because that’s how his propaganda keeps framing the war. And even now that the military performance of Russia proved to be so poor on the battle field, Russia keeps escalating, mobilising people, threatening to go nuclear and celebrating his trophies (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63052207). What matters here, it’s not if he “really” wins but if his victory claims based on his military achievements sound convincing enough to destabilise the cohesion of the Western alliance, draw on his side resources and commitments from his anti-Western valuable allies and therefore inflict a big geopolitical blow on Western hegemony.
So here we stand:
[1]
And one wants to assess strategic threats, then one has to reason like Mearsheimer's here:
The only way to predict how a rising China is likely to behave toward its neighbors as well as the United States is with a theory of great-power politics. The main reason for relying on theory is that we have no facts about the future, because it has not happened yet. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we have no choice but to rely on theories to determine what is likely to transpire in world politics.
https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931
It is not incompatible with imperialism. In fact prehemmptively invading a neighbor because said neighbor is cozying up with rivals is precisely what a militaristic, imperialist regime would do.
Russian military incompetence is completely incompatible with the notion that Russian imperialism is something we should worry about. Ukraine will win on the battlefield, Russia for sure could successfully attack more countries and more certainly not NATO, and that's that.
Otherwise, what you're saying is that the mere imperialism requires only the mere intention to build empire and no actual means and that anyone who's the target of someone intention for empire building should be given tens of billions of Euro's of arms and economic support. For instance, if I personally have the intention to expand my empire to the adjacent homes in the area, they should all get tens billions of Euros of arms and assistance, because I do intend to expand my empire. Obviously, that argument makes no sense as I have no actual means to subjugate my neighbourhood into a system of vassal tribute.
You can't have it both ways:
1. Arms, intelligence and financial support to Ukraine is justified despite no discernible pathway to victory because Russian forces, despite being superior in strength in nearly every metric, is incompetent and they'll just randomly fall apart one day.
2. Arms, intelligence and financial support to Ukraine is justified as Russia is on a imperial expansion mission far beyond the borders of Ukraine and therefore we want to damage Russia's army regardless of the Ukrainian lives spent and even if Ukraine can't actually win because far from being incompetent, Russia is executing the war in a ruthless efficient way: nearly surround Kiev to shell to the ground Ukraine war producing industry and also fix forces while the south is occupied (nearly 20% of Ukraine and something the Russians can feasibly hold onto with limited force), then attrit the Ukrainians all summer in a giant cauldron in the South using only professional forces and the Donbas malitias and loads of artillery, bait the Ukrainians into disastrous offensives that exhaust their reserves, followed by a limited mobilisation and destruction of the Ukrainian power grid to "get the job done" once economic and political blow-back affects start hitting the West (like 3 UK PM's in 2 months, or whatever it is, move to the far right in Italy, massive protests in various EU countries). Look at these ruthless Imperialists!!! Quick, quick, throw some more Ukrainian bodies to slow down the Russian war machine.
More importantly, regardless of the argument, what would follow from a legitimate belief Russian Imperialism was a problem morally required to deal with, would be the conclusion that NATO soldiers go and standup to this Imperialism.
Saying something is a problem for me ... but not enough that I take any real personal risk to deal with it, is the same as saying it's not a problem for me, rather just an opportunity for others to suffer a cost for my benefit if they're gullible enough to believe my arguments but not look at my actions.
So, what did they do?
They put their own sailors in harms way and made the ultimatum to the Soviets that if they wanted to keep their nukes in Cuba, then it would be war.
Same could be done in Ukraine any day since 2008, or even before.
It's not done. Why? Because "Ukraine sovereignty" is not legitimately believed to be a goal with any real moral merit or commitment, rather a the Ukrainians belief and willingness to fight a losing battle, is a US opportunity.
Now, even if I believed Russia was some legitimate threat to Finland and the rest of the EU if Ukraine fell! I would still oppose bleeding the Russians with Ukrainian lives knowing there is no benefit to Ukraine for doing so over a negotiate settlement, requiring compromise, yes, but compromise is better than fighting for someone else's war game. Especially when there's no respawn ... and your enemy is in fact not a noob, despite the people wanting you to fight irrationally making that assurance.
The US didn't annex parts of Cuba nor obtained Cuban neutrality/Cuban demilitarization/regime change. And US reaction was against an actual nuclear threat.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_of_Pigs_Invasion#U.S._Government_personnel
https://news.antiwar.com/2022/10/23/101st-airborn-deployed-to-ukraines-border-ready-to-fight-tonight/
It already inspired Finland and Sweden to join NATO.
I think Putin has created a deep abiding hatred of Russia among Ukrainians, so I doubt relations between the two will be normalized as long as Putin is in power.
How do you know this?
The Russians have spoken about this red line for decades - you believe no talks happened between the United States and Russia about this situation?
And what good are talks when the United States blatantly states it wishes to cross the mentioned red line, and supports regime change just to prove its intentions?
Stop changing the subject.
The annexion of Crimea, Dombass and Kherson are evidence of imperialist ambitions. We are not talking of just beating Ukraine into Belarusian-type submission here, but of land and people grab.
They snatch children too. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted, deported, and forcibly adopted to the Russian Federation. The United Nations has declared that allegations are "credible", and that Russian forces have sent Ukrainian children to Russia for adoption as part of a large scale program.
You see, Russia has a big demographic problem. Many young people of both sexes have left the country. And yet the new Czar needs children for his future conquests.
It's only been two decades since their economy was devastated, so that red line is fairly young. :razz:
Not only is your premise here false, you don't even bother to understand the argument.
The point is that "doing something about it" (risking your own troops) is a corollary to "caring about it".
Ukrainian partisans seem to take it for granted that of course NATO can talk about Ukraine joining NATO for over a decade but never actually let Ukraine join NATO.
If it was clear to everyone in the West that Ukraine would never join NATO ... then talking about it, giving some little NATO crumbs of equipment and training and so on, has no moral justification, it is purely a provocation to start a war.
This was literally the point you were responding to with:
Quoting Olivier5
A point (Russian incompetence) that Ukrainian partisans have been asserting since the start of the war, and we just had a long exchange about it with many participants here, going into quite a bit of battle field minutia.
It's also a absolutely central point, as the "Russian incompetence" theory justifies war without a plan, since it's only if your opponent will defeat themselves that you don't need an actual plan other than to wait for that to happen, which is quite explicitly Ukrainian war strategy most of the time.
Quoting Olivier5
I see we agree that Russia has executed effectively on some critical Imperial aims.
The question I have been addressing is what can be done about it.
As I mention above, the available military outcomes are:
Quoting boethius
I argue that 1, 2, and 4 are unlikely compared to 3 as well as not necessarily being in the interest of Ukraine even it was feasible (forever war in particular), and diplomatic resolution is superior to testing which of the 4 military outcomes by further warfare.
A smaller state demonstrating a will to fight and a high cost of winning a war to a larger state is classic asymmetric strategy in war theory ... but not to then try to conquer the larger invading state but to resolve the conflict diplomatically on favourable terms.
Again, the cases people like to mention, in particular Finland, were not battlefield "victories" but fighting to a better diplomatic agreement (that involved "losing", giving up 20% of Finnish territory, and owing war reparations to the Soviet Union ... yet where are people's tears for this outcome in the real world or then arguing Finland should not have settled but kept fighting until they defeated the Soviet Union?).
I really don't know what the second sentence means. Who is the "instigator," and who does "them" refer to?
Quoting Olivier5
And I suppose this reaction to China's involvement -- as inexcusable as it would be -- would somehow prove that the US had "imperial ambitions" there all along, despite there being no evidence of it prior to China's actions? Nonsense.
There's no evidence of US "imperialist ambitions" in Canada today. I don't think that's controversial.
If, hypothetically, starting in 2025, China were on the doorstep, supplying weapons, training thousands of troops, and continually pushing for Canadian membership in a "defensive alliance," despite years of US warnings about this being a "red line," and then a reaction occurred in 2031 where the US annexed parts of Canada -- I suppose this would somehow make the claims true today? Of course not.
Likewise, there were no claims of Russian "imperial ambitions" prior to 2014. After that, it of course became the official reason. With no mention of the prior six years' warnings from Russia, which were recognized even within the US:
After the 2008 summit, Putin (reportedly enraged) had stated:
So yes, we can engage in revisionism if we'd like, and make up a story about how Putin was planning all along to take over the former territory of the Soviet Union, but almost no one was claiming that prior to 2014, which was as unsurprising an event as the US annexing parts of Canada in the above scenario. The difference: the US wouldn't wait six years to do so.
Quoting Olivier5
On the contrary, I've repeatedly addressed them. I've now done so again, above. What you are ignoring/dismissing, conveniently, is what led to the takeover of Crimea. It wasn't imperialist ambitions.
True, we can believe Putin -- out of sheer caprice -- suddenly developed an urge to take Crimea, and make other projections on what the "real motives" were by speculating about the inner workings of his soul; or we can look at the facts: the actions and statements leading up to the event.
Vladimir Putin’s Russian World Turned Upside Down
I, for one, don't want to see a Russia "limp[ing] along". If anything, I'd reserve that for their autocrats. Prosperity felt by the regular Russian on the street (or out yonder) is preferable. :up:
The nuke rattling can also backfire. Russia's Western neighbors don't host nukes (as best we know), surely that would have included Ukraine, had they become a NATO member. On the other hand, Russia's nuke placements are on neighbors' doorsteps. And Russia bulging seems likely to carry such weaponry along, or threaten to, which might elicit a reaction; after all, not everyone airs nuclear threats.
The systematic re-culturation efforts could be added to the domestic measures put in place by the autocrats (mentioned by Gioe and Styles), as an indication of the uncertain future prospects if the Ukrainians were to surrender.
Quoting Gioe and Styles
The struggle against a regress into autocratic regimes is real enough.
Elon Musk suggested a peace plan on Oct 3, 2022 and put it to the vote.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000[/tweet]
It would help if you quoted the entirety of my response:
There is no evidence that the was an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. The answer given is about Crimea as evidence. This has been addressed before as well.
I will just quote Mearsheimer, an expert on these matters, who puts it more succinctly than I could:
NATO in Ukraine presents 2 entirely real security problems to Russia.
First, is forward operating bases and missile bases in Ukraine, which we've seen happen in the Baltics despite the theory being they would be part of NATO but not host forward operating bases ... apparently Iran was such a big threat from that exact direction that missile bases needed to be there regardless.
So, even if NATO stated it would not forward deploy to Ukraine, you can't assume that would hold in the future.
Second, more importantly, long borders with NATO simply create a more volatile situation. Once Ukraine is in NATO it could stage a false flag, if no the Azov or Right Sector today then some more extreme organisation tomorrow. It may not be clear "who started it" etc. It's simply a security headache that any random altercation along a thousand kilometre border could immediately escalate to nuclear war. Not only can you legitimately fear a Ukrainian false flag, you can also fear either a mistake or then false flag of your own troops starting a nuclear war on purpose or by mistake. If fighting suddenly erupts, it may not even be clear to the leaders of any state involved of why, who, what is happening. Each side may interpret events as the other side making some pre-emptive move as the prelude to some military plan sparking a series of escalations.
It's essentially common sense for both Russia and NATO to want to minimise common borders to a manageable amount (the current borders are very small and not really any strategic threat either way: you can't invade Russia through North Norway and the baltic states don't have large enough militaries to be worried about ... and hundreds of thousands of NATO troops would be noticed).
It's also entirely reasonable position for Russia to invade Ukraine preemptively to avoid the far more volatile situation of NATO bordering Russia along hundreds of kilometres and (more importantly) a large country with a large population.
Why people with any sort of strategic military education at all (such as @ssu) argue that sure NATO was talking about allowing Ukraine to join but that everyone knew that wouldn't happen, that the threat was empty, and therefor Russia should not have reacted to an empty threat.
The problem with that argument is that if people are talking about doing something, even if it seems an empty threat tomorrow, if the situation changes and there's a moment of weakness they will likely seize the opportunity, so it is logical to react when you have the capacity to do so.
Now, NATO could have, instead of talking trash, just gone and done it: fly to Ukraine in 2008 or 2014 or anytime since, have everything pre-approved, and sign the documents overnight and "poof" NATOed.
Of course, that is and was never a remote possibility because NATO, including the US, simply doesn't care enough about Ukraine to expend any real political capital in Ukraine's interest. And no, supplying arms is not spending political capital but building up your political capital by doing the arms industry bidding.
NATO in Ukraine also presents a domestic political problem that people feel the unsafe with their arch nemesis that continuously calls them their enemy on their door step.
Western analysis seems to start from the premise that all Russians think like Westerners and actually want the West to conquer their territory or then just fuck them up generally speaking. We'll be welcomed as liberators!
According to Putin, NATO was planning to destroy Russia. He saw NATO as an existential threat.
Let's go with that.
Sure, US neo-cons went on for more than a decade about their "nuclear option" of shutting Russia out of the SWIFT system along with significant sanctions.
They called it the "nuclear option" because it would have (in their minds) the same affect as nuclear weapons and total destruction of Russia, just without the nuclear weapons and not (sufficient) reason for Russia to retaliate.
So, you have guys at the top of the US policy making circles constantly talking about their desire to "nuke you" (just with means of comparable destructive power without actually being nuclear weapons), along with installing forward operating missile bases and wanting to expand the "defensive" alliance forward to the border of Russia.
It legitimately seems threatening words and actions.
Likewise for a decade, Russia is blamed for getting Trump elected and orchestrating some high treasonous plot ... with 200 000 USD of facebook adds from some random add farm? Which was delusional scapegoatism.
History teaches that people who engage in delusional scapegoatism on a large scale often eventually act out violently against the object of their delusions.
One can argue that the threat from NATO was not sufficient justification to start a large war, but the idea NATO, in particular the US, wasn't constantly threatening Russia in action and rhetoric is just absurd.
• Putin's Russia is a present existential threat to Ukraine, to which the Ukrainians are responding
• until Putin's Russia has taken over all of Ukraine, the (supposed (or, say, future-hypothetical)) threat of NATO membership remains
• if Putin’s Russia was to take over all of Ukraine, then Russia becomes an increased substantial threat to others (like Putinian autocracy, nuclear rattling doesn't help)
See where this is going?
Quoting Elon Musk (Oct 3, 2022)
The US and NATO are primarily responsible for escalating this war, yes. Ultimately the decision was Putin's, and so I blame him for the war. Person A provoking someone doesn't mean person B has no choice but to slap A in the face. Still, we should be honest about the whole story, and not simply make up stories about why person B reacted.
Quoting neomac
Excuse me, but you're changing the words. You didn't say "threat," and neither did I. You said "Russian concerns." Your assertion is that "Russian concerns were taken seriously." They were not.
What were the Russian concerns? Again, they were made very clear after 2008. We can go over the long record again if you'd like, but I think it's fairly obvious. It was obvious to US diplomats, CIA directors, and allies that Russia believed Ukrainian (and Georgian) membership into NATO was an existential threat. Ditto weapons and military training, which were later concerns and likewise voiced consistently and strongly -- not just by Putin.
So, again, your claim is baseless. Russian concerns were not taken seriously.
Quoting neomac
What isn't intellectually challenging is playing games like this. You know very well that I didn't say "threats" above -- and neither did you. You also know very well that the above quotation is in response to the following:
Quoting neomac
[Emphasis mine]
So it's very strange that suddenly you say you're not interested in what we find "desirable or moral." I'm not interested in it either, which was the point. It doesn't matter if we prefer democracy or authoritarianism -- as you stated. What matters are the actions. We should react the same, not according to what we "prefer" (again, your words).
Quoting Mikie
Quoting neomac
Your history is very confused.
That's simply not the case. That wasn't the US's or NATO's position in 2008. I asked what was the Russian threat in 2008 -- because it was in April of 2008 that the Bucharest summit declared that Ukraine and Georgia would be admitted to NATO. Claiming the war in Georgia was a threat, and thus a reason for membership of NATO, is anachronistic. The war in Georgia did not break out until August of 2008. So that claim is nonsense.
The actions in Chechnya was the threat? Problems there had been occurring for years, internal to Russia. There was also no mention of that at the 2008 summit. It was not considered a threat, and it was not a reason for NATO admitting Ukraine or Georgia in April of 2008. It's worth remembering that Putin was invited (and attended) that summit. Strange to invite someone who was considered such a threat.
There was no Russian threat in 2008, which is when this all began, in April of that year in Bucharest. You've provided two examples of why. One was never mentioned by NATO -- or anyone else. The other is absurd, having happened after the summit.
So I ask again: What was the Russian threat in 2008 that began all of this?
Quoting neomac
Your "reasoning" is, and has now repeatedly been shown to be, very faulty indeed.
It's quite true that if the US/NATO felt that Russian revanchism was threatening, that this should be taken seriously as well -- even if we believe it unjustified. But that was not the case. Neither the US, nor NATO, believed this was true in 2008. That's why it was never stated. It's why Putin was invited to the summit. It's also why you can provide no evidence of it, despite being asked multiple times. So yes, my demands for evidence are quite singular -- because I'm interested in facts, not your rather confused reasoning.
If you have evidence that the US and NATO felt Russia was threatening in April of 2008, when they pushed for Ukrainian and Georgian membership, then provide it.
Or you could actually read the reasons given in the summit. It's online for free. In case you're unwilling to do so, I'll quote a part for you:
-- From the NATO website.
Quoting Mikie
Quoting neomac
Sorry, but you simply declaring that one thing is more threatening than another is not interesting. Ask the Russians if they felt it was threatening. It is their opinion that matters, not yours. And they've been quite clear, for over decade.
This distinction between "lethal weapons" and "defensive weapons" is kind of ridiculous. Everything the US has ever done, accordion to them, is "defensive." When we invade Iraq, we're "defending" Iraq. So that's already a sign of repeating propaganda. But think about it for a minute: what do you think "defensive" weapons are? They're all completely non-lethal? So machine guns are for "defense," therefore they can't kill? Are the FGM-148 Javelins simply "defensive"? Because those have been supplied as well. They certainly seem lethal to me. They're called "anti-tank missiles."
Furthermore, "lethal weapons" had already been deployed in Ukraine prior to December. Russia troops had already begun mobilizing at this point as well.
Quoting neomac
Again, more propaganda. Everything that NATO/US does is "defensive" and meant merely as "deterrents." Right. Unfortunately, the Russians see it quite differently. They view anti-tank missiles and military drills with NATO -- including Operation Sea Breeze -- as a threat.
Quoting neomac
See above. This "lethal weapons" and "defensive weapons" distinction is really absurd. It's also not your decision to decide what was and wasn't a "serious military threat." I suppose Sea Breeze wasn't a "serious military threat" to Russia, in your view? Nonsense.
But even if we take your premises seriously, what exactly are you referring to by the "offensive weapon system"? You understand that Russia had mobilized before Biden delayed the $200 million supply, right?
Quoting neomac
From NATO expansion.
Quoting neomac
Suddenly evidence is important, and not "myopic"? Interesting.
Putin didn't have evidence, because that's not what Putin was claiming. Putin never claimed NATO wanted to "invade" Russia. Your failure to even minimally understand Russia's position here is telling.
Quoting neomac
I've not once suggested that we let Ukraine "fall prey to Russia." I support US helping Ukrainians defend their country.
Quoting neomac
Encourage and facilitate peace negotiations. The most immediate action would be a ceasefire.
Quoting neomac
Maybe you're just incapable of having a rational discussion. But I'll repeat, yet again:
No, I'm not blaming the US and NATO for the war. The US and NATO were primarily responsible for escalating the war. That's a crucial difference. The blame for invasion is Putin's.
The second accusation is just pure irrationality, given that it was YOU who mentioned "preference," not me. As demonstrated above.
I never once mentioned "honesty, impartiality", or "lovefulness."
I have indeed mentioned peace. For good reason.
You do realise Elon cribbed his proposal from me.
Quoting boethius
(September 24th - Boethius)
Only thing I got wrong (compared to Elon's proposal) was that it was Elon, not the EU, that has enormous leverage to broker a peace deal.
Which is precisely why Canada has nothing to fear from the US, and is not seeking protection elsewhere....
Seems? It actually was threatening. The US wanted to destroy Russia, like wipe it off the map. Putin had no choice.
Insane hyperbole is a not good analytical tool.
We can acknowledge that NATO threatens "Russia" in various ways, some big and some small, without believing NATO has some actual plan they are actually intent on actually doing to "wipe Russia off the map".
We can attribute plenty other intentions to the US / NATO to explain their various threats, such as scapegoatism (of losing to Trump), need of an "other" to justify war expenditures (when the writing's on the wall in the middle east), wanting a conflict to sell natural gas to Europe (and make money), politicians laundering a bit of said money through corrupt AF Ukraine, and so on, resulting in stoking tensions without much care of the potential consequences. Aka. business as usual.
Everything isn't a nefarious plot all the time.
That's pretty naive.
Exactly. Likewise for US/NATO-Ukraine/Georgia in 2008. The reasons for membership were not some imperialist threat from Russia. No one made that claim.
Quoting Mikie
I'm just more optimistic than you it seems.
:victory:
Oh really? What were the reasons for Ukraine and Georgia and all the others to seek NATO membership, oh wise one?They wanted to visit Brussels?
There are all kinds of reasons for joining NATO. An imperialist threat from Russia was not one of them in 2008. Which is why you cannot provide one reference supporting such a claim.
There was no Russian imperialist threat before the 2008 summit. No one claimed that. That claim was made after 2014.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm
While he was invading Georgia? What kind of evidence were you looking for?
Yes, I'm sure the war in Georgia, which occurred in August, was a big reason at the NATO summit.
Oh yeah. I guess that came later the same year.
Quoting jorndoe
This is alarming. It really is like preparing the narrative groundwork for using nukes.
After all, you could argue that making the Ukrainian territories Russian "made it possible" officially to use conscripts in Ukraine. Yet this also makes it possible to use nukes as the doctrine goes.
Please give ONE.Quoting Mikie
I quite precisely claimed that, otherwise you would not be arguing against it. Logic, anyone?
There was Hungary, Tchekcoslovakia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia...
Quoting Olivier5
Then you'll have to prove it.
I did already, but you failed to understand it.
RT Host Suspended for Calls to ‘Drown, Burn’ Ukrainian Children
The Moscow Times
Anton Krasovsky, a host at Russia’s state-funded broadcaster RT, was suspended Sunday after he made calls on the air to “drown or burn” Ukrainian children who viewed Russia as an occupier.
Anton Krasovsky’s remarks on his RT show broadcast Thursday sparked widespread outrage over the weekend. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba accused the Kremlin-controlled channel of “aggressive genocide incitement” and advocated for a global ban of RT.
Krasovsky, a pro-war presenter under EU sanctions, said Ukrainian children should be “thrown straight into a river with a strong current” or “burned in a hut” for calling Russians occupiers.
His comments came in response to an account by his guest, Russian science fiction author Sergei Lukyanenko, of his encounter with anti-Russian children during his visit to Ukraine in the 1980s.
The segment containing Krasovsky’s remarks has since been deleted from RT’s social media accounts.
RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan distanced the broadcaster from Krasovsky’s “disgusting” comments and said she was “stopping our collaboration for the moment.”
“Perhaps Anton will explain what temporary insanity caused” the controversial statement, Simonyan wrote on the Telegram messaging app.
Krasovsky later issued an apology, saying early Monday that he “got carried away on the air.”
“I apologize to everyone who was freaked out, I apologize to Margarita, to everyone who thought [the comments] wild, unthinkable and insurmountable,” he wrote on Russia’s VKontakte social network.
Simonyan’s rare punishment of an on-air personality for remarks on Ukraine stands in contrast to regular anti-Ukrainian rhetoric on Russian state television.
Kremlin-controlled broadcasters including RT actively support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and echo the Kremlin’s denials of war crime allegations.
Russia’s top investigative body, the Investigative Committee, said Monday that its chairman Alexander Bastrykin has ordered a report into Krasovsky’s statements after receiving a complaint from an online user.
In a since-deleted post, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova denounced what she called a “targeted information attack” against Krasovsky, calling the RT host a “fantastically talented” commentator of “obvious and truthful” information.
I'm talking about a very specific military threat (i.e. nuclear bombs), not about demilitarization, NATO membership, Ukrainian annexations (Crimea or Donbas). But as far as I know Putin requests didn't focus specifically and primarily on weapon systems, nor clarified what the existential threats those requests were supposed to address.
What premise is false?
Quoting boethius
Why would it be clear that Ukraine would never join NATO? Neither NATO open policy nor the Ukrainian willingness to gain its membership, nor the NATO/US administration was against it, but geopolitical concerns were interfering and Ukrainians were well aware of it. One might find this predicament regrettable for the Ukrainians and certain Western reluctance blameful. However your blunt moral accusations suggest a take on world affairs devoid of any realistic geopolitical expectations.
Russian propaganda is lazily reusing old material in its latest campaign. "Russian propagandists can't even be bothered to put any effort into their propaganda anymore, they're just phoning it in." Well, why bother when they aren't trying to convince anyone? What they actually want to broadcast is: "We are going to use nukes in Ukraine! Yes we are! We really are that crazy, so you better back off!"
This is not the first such accusations in this war. Earlier they were announcing imminent chemical and biological attacks.
No it doesn't help. What is an "imperialist bent"? What kind of evidence proves an "imperialist bent"?
Quoting Mikie
Mearsheimer hinges on his own version of realism and on what he takes to be evidence for geopolitical theory to be assessed. I find his position problematic for reasons I'm lazy to summarise. I already mentioned a few of them in my earliest posts in this thread. I might add some more later on.
Right, I changed the word without realising it and your objection as well as our equivocation are understandable. I can grant you that much. But my claims preserve their value once we deal with the terminological quibble I failed to remove: when concerns are expressed in resentful and intimidatory terms (like NATO expanded despite their promise! Ukraine inside NATO is our red line! An existential threat! Don’t do it otherwise you will regret the consequences! etc.) by a nuclear power claimed to have the second strongest army in the world at the expense of Ukrainians who, coincidentally, were historically oppressed by the Russians. So the expression “Russian concerns” looks to me just as an euphemism for “Russian threats” good for the narrative that presents Russia as a victim.
Besides one should account for the Western (European allies included) caution in providing military support to Ukraine that certainly benefited Russia more than Ukraine.
Quoting Mikie
You are conflating objections meant to address different issues. The first one was designed to address your China-Canada alliance thought experiment (where you concluded “How would that scenario play out? Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not”), and it can be rendered like this: take a chess game between D and A. If I know the game enough I can understand how the game is plaid on both sides. Yet I might prefer D to win because D is my beloved brother. So understanding the geopolitical game from both players perspectives, doesn’t commit anybody to impartiality as your China-Canada alliance thought experiment seemed to suggest (if US invaded a China-allied Canada, we wouldn’t excuse it as much as we do not excuse Russia for invading a Western-allied Ukraine, I would - using your terminology not mine - “excuse” the US, I would be biased toward the US, so not impartial, and fine with that).
The second one can be rendered like this: I’m interested in talking about the geopolitical game and moves, not in listening to scores based on how morally attractive you find players' behaviour, even more understandably so after having made clear I have a different moral compass from yours.
Quoting Mikie
I wasn’t after a chronological recollection of events, so for me a Russian war in August of 2008 is a Russian threat in 2008. But if you are looking for a chronological recollection of events then wikipedia may help:
[i] Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation in 2000, which had a profound impact on Russo-Georgian relations. The conflict between Russia and Georgia began to escalate in December 2000, when Georgia became the first and sole member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on which the Russian visa regime was enforced. Eduard Kokoity, an alleged member of the mob, became the de facto president of South Ossetia in December 2001; he was endorsed by Russia since he would subvert the peaceful reunification of South Ossetia with Georgia. The Russian government began massive allocation of Russian passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2002 without Georgia's permission; this "passportization" policy laid the foundation for Russia's future claim to these territories. In 2003, President Putin began to consider the possibility of a military solution to the conflict with Georgia.
After Georgia deported four suspected Russian spies in 2006, Russia began a full-scale diplomatic and economic war against Georgia, followed by the persecution of ethnic Georgians living in Russia.
By 2008, most residents of South Ossetia had obtained Russian passports. According to Reuters, Russia supplied two-thirds of South Ossetia's yearly budget before the war.[74] South Ossetia's de facto government predominantly employed Russian citizens, who had occupied similar government posts in Russia, and Russian officers dominated South Ossetia's security organisations.[75]
[…]
In early March 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia submitted formal requests for their recognition to Russia's parliament shortly after the West's recognition of Kosovo which Russia had been resisting. Dmitry Rogozin, Russian ambassador to NATO, hinted that Georgia's aspiration to become a NATO member would cause Russia to support the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian State Duma adopted a resolution on 21 March, in which it called on the President of Russia and the government to consider the recognition.[/I]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement
Quoting Mikie
Precisely, the unresolved ethnic tensions within ex-soviet republics were perceivable as a source of political instability and revanchist urges. And the way Russia under Putin handled it in Chechnya provided a precedent for other ex-Soviet Republics’ strategic minds to digest.
There is where the link between NATO and ex-Soviet Republics could have more likely been perceived as beneficial for both sides: “Ethnic conflict in Russia: Implications for the United States” (Jan 2008)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109308435930?journalCode=uter20
Quoting Mikie
Have you considered the prospect that you are not looking in the right place? Read more Brezinski, if you want to get deeper insight into US/NATO’s strategy.
Quoting Mikie
You may find ridiculous whatever you want, but there are unquestionable evidences that the history of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations wrt Russian aggression is marked by their reluctance to send lethal weapons to Ukraine (“How successive U.S. administrations resisted arming Ukraine” https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/obama-trump-biden-ukraine-military-aid-1.6371378) because - as it is evident now - the American offensive weaponry would have made the difference on the battlefield. The first package of lethal weapons actually released by the US in Sep 2021, didn't come from Biden’s administration, but from Trump’s administration, and its release was ironically the side effect of the Trump Ukraine scandal, as I said. Knowing from his intel that might have strengthened Putin's resolve to wage war, Biden held the second package of lethal weapons in late December likely as a diplomatic leverage. But it turned out to be too late, it just gave more time to Putin to finalize the military build-up before the war declaration.
Quoting Mikie
As I said, we are in a strategic dilemma whereby every player reads aggressive intentions in others’ deterring moves, so it’s an ineffective argumentative retortion to remind me what I already expressly and repeatedly acknowledged before you ever did. Both rival geopolitical agents can plausibly denounce threats from their opponents and plausibly deny their own threats, especially when there is historical mistrust on top of conflicting strategic interests. But I’m not the one who is clinging that much on “who started first” issue as you seem to do. Nor am I clinging on picturing the US/NATO/Ukraine as a victim of Putin as much you seem to cling on picturing Putin as a victim of US/NATO/Ukraine to show off your moral impartiality.
In any case, acknowledging the strategic dilemma is not enough good reason to refuse the distinction between lethal and defensive weaponry: indeed, even if technically vague or inappropriate, that distinction is understandably related to the type of weaponry that is capable of making a difference in undermining the Russian aggression (here you can find some reactions from Russian officials: https://medium.com/dfrlab/much-ado-about-javelins-525055175d75). In other words, the distinction between lethal/defensive is less related to the nature of geopolitical strategic dilemmas and more to the designed function and operational performance of the weapon systems in strictly military terms.
Quoting Mikie
And what does it mean to retreat from NATO expansion (in Sovereign States other then Russia and acknowledged as independent by Russia), if we exclude NATO invasion of Russian territories (from Sovereign States other then Russia and acknowledged as independent by Russia)?
Quoting Mikie
Evidence is important for rational assessment of course, “myopic” can be one’s way of assessing it. Now, asking for evidence that triggered support of Ukraine and Georgia NATO membership (as you did) was as legitimate as asking for evidence that triggered Putin anti-NATO reaction. And, as far as I’m concerned, the lesson here is twofold: threat perception is neither always grounded on actual direct threats but also on perceived strategic threats, nor is always voiced in clear/reiterated terms in public speeches (coz even vagueness - like the Russian nuclear threats - or offline diplomacy - like private negotiations e.g. “not one inch” eastward alleged promise - play their role). So e.g. Putin never specified what NATO existential threat is, nor what Russia was supposed to retreat from once Ukraine entered NATO. One can however guess what he might have meant in many ways based on geopolitical and historical considerations, along with experts’ feedback and public news/reports of course: e.g. in the case of Russia concerns about Ukraine threats might be persecution of Russian minorities, the Black sea fleet in Crimea, nuclear or long-range missile systems at the border, weaponry that could frustrate Russian land grab attempts, etc.
Quoting Mikie
Quoting Mikie
Right, where did I hear that already? You are claiming that facilitating peace negotiations and ceasefire can be more effective strategy in helping Ukrainians defend their country and its territorial integrity than by providing NATO membership, military training, or weapons to Ukraine? How so? Where are the evidence to support your claim from within your perspective? The conditions of peace negotiations by the Russians are unacceptable to Ukrainians, that’s why negotiations have failed. And if facilitating peace negotiations means to refuse the military support necessary to possibly conquer back their territorial integrity or preserve what is left, then that fails the strategic objective of helping Ukrainians defend their country. It sounds like saying: surrendering to terrorists' demands is the most effective way to fight terrorism, because if you do what they want they don't fight you back and you live in peace.
Besides once again, you are missing the big picture: the Ukrainian war is of global geopolitical significance, even more understandably so given how Putin framed the war in explicit defiance of the pro-Western global order (you didn’t miss his declarations right?). The US/NATO front while supporting Ukrainians is pursuing its strategic geopolitical goals as any great power is expected to do, because that’s the game I and Mearsheimer are talking about (despite the divergences which remain).
Quoting Mikie
Then I can’t follow your reasoning. If Putin is claimed to have started a war in response to the US/NATO/Biden administration attitude which didn't take Russian concerns seriously as Putin expected, and you believe this narrative to be enough supported by facts (given your line of reasoning “do you think Putin would have annexed Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine had the US not (1) pushed for NATO membership, (2) supplied weapons, and (3) conducted military training?”) then the US/NATO/Biden administration conduct is a one major causal factor (along with Putin) in the genesis of the Ukrainian crisis that dragged until beginning 2022 and led to this war. So unless you deny agency to US/NATO/Biden administration you logically have to attribute them some responsibility for the genesis of the war without denying Russian agency in directly starting the war, and if you disapprove of US/NATO/Biden administration conduct then you must consider US/NATO/Biden administration to some extent blameful. Indeed that’s in line with Mearsheimer’s argument in “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault”.
Quoting Mikie
Geopolitical reason or moral compass reason? Again I’m interested in listening the first kind of reasons.
You claimed Russia made no attempts at negotiating about their red line, despite the fact that Ukraine has been a hot topic for decades.
How do you know there have been no negotiations? Countries contact each other through unofficial, non-public channels all the time. The fact that you claim this implies you have some insight into these.
Second, you blame the Russians for a lack of negotiations (if such a lack there is). Do you not see a clear role for the United States, in the fact that they have made statements and carried out actions that imply they have no desire to negotiate?
Quoting Putin (Dec 23, 2021)
I think he meant nuclear implicitly. (Something substantial at any rate.) Surely he knows there aren't any though (that we know of), at least not on Russia's western side, which is also where Ukraine is. Doesn't seem like he's referring to Germany Italy Turkey (or China India for that matter). It's possible he's including (defensive) missile intercept systems, those intended to take down missiles, but now it's getting further off from his statements.
My reading: No missiles / nuclear weapons installed close to Russia's border, which might happen if Ukraine was to become a NATO member.
Other readings?
Was he talking about measures that were taken to prepare for Iranian aggression?
No it implies that I couldn't find anything to support otherwise from the available resources.
Quoting Tzeentch
The point I was making is simply that as long as the existential threats are generically formulated, the only thing that remains to address is what Russia demands to restore its sense of security. While if the threat was more specific one could propose solutions (other than the ones proposed by Russia) favorable to Russia.
Quoting Dmitry Peskov
No talks here, at least nothing initiated by the Kremlin.
Ok, fair enough I suppose.
What is non-specific about no NATO membership for Ukraine?
Could be. When experts on Russia are a little confused by his statements and actions, I'm not going to put much weight on my own speculations. :grin:
Let me answer this one on behalf of the Putinistas. It's quite simple: an American imperialist bent is true by definition, without the need for any particular evidence. But a Russian imperialist bent cannot be true because anything Russian is holy.
Over time, you can probably find a few conflicting statements from Putin + team. (And a lot of bullshit.) Not generally reliable as such. Expect more if Putin is sticking around for another 14 years (aljazeera, usatoday).
Yep.
"The benefits of NATO membership include more than just security benefits and collective defense but also disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and scientific collaboration through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program."
But we don't have to guess. All we have to do is look at what Ukraine and NATO were saying in 2008. There were all kinds of claims -- about "stability," etc. There was no one claiming Russian imperialism as a reason. Neither the US, nor NATO, nor Ukraine. Putin was invited to the Bucharest summit, in fact -- an odd move for an imperialist threat.
Quoting Olivier5
Yes, you are claiming that now. Notice the past tense in the statement above. I'm referring to the 2008 summit. Note also that by "no one" I don't mean "no person on planet earth," but none of the relevant players: the US, NATO, and Ukraine. I will also be generous and include any expert on the subject or even credible journalists at that time -- feel free to cite any.
So yes, you've made the claim that Russia was an imperialist threat before 2008. That claim is incorrect.
Funny that no one -- not the US, not NATO, not Ukraine -- was giving that reason at the time. I'm interested in their opinions, not yours. But feel free to supply evidence. You haven't yet. To be fair, I imagine it'll be difficult to -- since there is none.
But if I'm wrong and there is evidence, I have yet to see it -- and you certainly haven't provided it.
What doesn't help?
"imperialist bent" is meaningless. I said "an imperialist bent on expanding...". So do you mean, "What is an imperialist?" I think you know very well what that means.
If Putin was an imperialist, or had imperialist ambitions, as is now claimed -- why was that not stated as a reason for NATO membership in 2008? Where is the evidence of that prior to that summit? Can you cite any source whatsoever -- even a weak one -- where this was being claimed?
This must mean that you like Putin.
Sure "expanding", also because "an imperialist bent on contracting" doesn't sound right, does it?
I'm asking you what constitutes evidence for "an imperialist bent on expanding". What would prove that concept?
Quoting Mikie
NATO (very well aware of Russian elites’ anti-NATO dispositions) never planned to take a confrontational attitude toward Russia. Some NATO advisers were prospecting the European Union as way to draw Russia toward a pro-Western attitude.
If there were both statements and actions that demonstrate it. There were neither before the 2008 summit -- which is why "imperialist ambitions" weren't once mentioned.
That NATO needed to expand to ward off Putin's "imperialist ambitions" is nonsense. It's always been nonsense.
That's exactly right.
Quoting neomac
Ah, so that's what everyone was secretly thinking, but it was never stated explicitly. And the evidence that would lend them to secretly believe this was what, exactly?
Anyway -- you admit it was never stated as a reason. That's a good start, I suppose. Feel free to cite any sources at or before the 2008 summit that support your other claim.
This is a Brookings Inst. essay about the history of Russo-American relations.
Republicans claimed that Putin was a bad actor, but didn't depict him as imperialistic. The only reason to suspect that he might become imperialistic would be that Russia has a long history of it.
But also note that the essay doesn't say Putin felt overly threatened by NATO, in fact he defended the placement of a transit hub on Russian soil.
So the tension we see now is a sign of the failure of Obama's "restart" of the relationship.
Whatever was possible at the beginning of the invasion is not available now. If the Russians had any kind of discipline in their rules of engagement, they could have established a language of limited goals that could lead to negotiations. Threatening to kill people is all they have talked about so far. Which agreement or disagreement from the past can serve as a template for progress in the situation? That is not a rhetorical question. On the other hand, nothing discussed here has yet to approach it.
The response by the Ukrainians to the invasion was not expected by many. Their continued existence makes future negotiations not as simple as some kind of Partition of Poland, as advocated for by some. Nobody involved will be allowed to return to some glorious past.
2 intensifying border wars show Putin is losing sway in his neighborhood while Russia struggles in Ukraine (businessinsider; Oct 24, 2022) ... via yahoo, msn
More bombing isn't really the best. Forget Ukraine, it's markedly more costly than keeping those various borders from erupting. :)
Quoting Michael Peck
Ups and downs in support for Ukraine ...
Quoting Mark Gollom · CBC News · Mar 5, 2022
The 2022 invasion changed things.
Great, Russia kicks off a nuclear exercise Oct 26 ("Grom"), and NATO is currently running one, Oct 17-30 ("Steadfast Noon").
Russia has notified the U.S. its annual nuclear exercise has begun, U.S. officials say (CBS News; Oct 25, 2022)
A bit of coinciding war + ? games + ? rattling.
Are you really saying that Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech republic all joined NATO in order to benefit from humanitarian assistance?
Oleksandra Matviichuk has a point she wants to make. The Ukrainian lawyer heads the Centre for Civil Liberties, a human rights organisation that this month jointly won the Nobel peace prize. And she wants to use her platform to call for international action against Russian human rights violations now.
The body she heads has patiently documented more than 21,000 examples of war crimes committed by occupying Russian forces since 2014, including many from after the invasion in February. But, speaking quietly and with controlled emotion, she complains: “I haven’t any legal instrument to stop the Russian atrocities” – no immediate way of bringing perpetrators to court.
The criminality appears vast when listed. “After the large-scale invasion, we every day documented different kinds of war crimes, like intentional shelling of residential buildings, churches, hospitals, schools, the shelling of evacuation corridors,” Matviichuk says. “We received requests for help from people in the occupied territories because they were abducted, tortured; we recorded sexual violence, extrajudicial killings.”
Staff from the Centre for Civil Liberties were among those who travelled through Irpin, Bucha and towns and villages north-west of Kyiv after Russia abandoned its attempt to seize the city in March. “I will remind you,” she says, that bodies were found lying uncollected in the streets, or dumped in mass graves. “And what was Putin’s response? He provided medals to the army unit that was staying in Bucha.”
Russia, as governed now, shows a “genocidal character,” she argues.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/oct/26/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-russian-forces-battle-kherson-kyiv
Again, for the third time, what kind of statements and actions would demonstrate to you an “imperialistic bent”? Statements should be like "Me, Mr. Emperor Putin feel imperialistic bent" and actions should be like
???
Quoting Mikie
Quoting Mikie
Geopolitical strategizing requires anticipating events in medium-long term based on a deep understanding about history, society (people and their leading elites) and geography, not on arbitrarily recent chronology of news and public speeches accessible to any avg dude, like you and me. And it's done behind doors for obvious reasons and without consulting any avg dude, like you and me. They didn’t even consult Mearsheimer, go figure!
The debate over NATO expansion behind doors was complex and nuanced, with a blend of more hawkish and more dovish attitudes toward Russia. But nobody underestimated the “imperialistic bent” of Russia, nor conflated real geopolitical strategizing (affecting the deep state) with current presidents’ preferred posture and official propaganda.
Quoting Mikie
That’s why you should put aside Mearsheimer for a while, take a deep breath, and start reading Brzezi?ski.
Quoting Mikie
From:
[i]
THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
======================================================================= HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
[b] COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS [/b]?FIRST SESSION?__________?OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________?Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[/i]
Comments about the Russian “imperialist bent” were of the following kind:
[i]
Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.
[…]
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.''
[…]
Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.
[…]
Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan- European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the beginning of the next century is also Russia . A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration [/b] does not see this as a legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to protect the democracies they have already established from external aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.
[…]
Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my own position. My position is not that we should accommodate Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, and even further, and considerably further, than the current proposal envisages.
[…]
The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite. They certainly speak with authority. [b]Moscow is opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as final[/b]. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.
[/i]
Comments about Ukraine were of the following kind :
[i]
If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of it.
[…]
My estimate here rests on the fact that including the Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th country, Ukraine, on the horizon.
[…]
The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.
[…]
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of political, economic and military maturity before they can become members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just ``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a collection of economic and political basket cases and both organizations would be unable to function effectively.
[…]
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
[…]
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.?[/i]
https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1584054018145685504
[tweet]https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1584054018145685504[/tweet]
(Why doesn't the tweet link work?)
My 2 cents:
This just shows what this war can be seen as a war that didn't happen then, but has happened now due to the breakup of the Soviet Empire. This is on the one hand extremely puzzling as this happens decades after the breakup of the Soviet Union. But as Putin has seen the breakup as this freak accident and has had these ambitions to make Russia great again, it was unavoidable I guess. But as Russia needs to pull out it's forces to be sent to the war in Ukraine, it's grasp is collapsing in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
So basically what Putin is doing is truly destroying not only his army in Ukraine, but also destroying Russia's regional power status it has enjoyed in the former Soviet republics (that have not joined NATO). Now the hollowness of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) can be seen as two member states are having border skirmishes with each other and one member, Armenia, is facing hostilities with Azerbaijan and Russia is not doing anything (or cannot do anything) about it. When members of a defensive alliance have hostilities between each other, then the organization is only a shell without any meaning.
(And this actually is forgotten about NATO: one of it's objectives is to keep it's members out of war between each other. In the case of Greece and Turkey, it has been rather successful.)
Many wars show how this war could end...badly for Russia.
A failure to make peace:
- The Korea war. Only an armstice exists. DMZ drawn where the fighting brought it to be.
- The Minsk memorandums, the present war prior to February 24th 2022.
Minsk I:
Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists agreed a 12-point ceasefire deal in the Belarusian capital in September 2014.
Minsk II:
And now of course, these are totally meaningless as the puppet-states have been, as anticipated, annexed into Russia just like Crimea.
A peace after a humiliating loss for Russia:
- The Crimean war with the peace treaty signed in Paris.
A peace after a humiliating loss for Russia number 2:
- The Russo-Japanese war and the Portsmouth peace treaty.
Plus Japan got the southern part of the Sakhalin Island, but Russia didn't have to pay reparations for Japan.
Okay, it looks like Russia has gone too far to jump start a Minsk III. The annexations also make an armistice line an unlikely option because Ukraine would view that as a de facto relinquishing of territory. Russia's destruction of civilian infrastructure deepens the motivation to keep the structure of sanctions after any kind of cease fire.
The idea of a U.N. referendum is interesting. It seems like that would require restoration of occupancy by refugees who headed west and the return of those deported east.
It's not looking good for Humpty Dumpty.
I think Krasovsky took a bit of heat for that one, and Zakharova was a bit too trigger-happy with a "template" response. :)
Quoting RT Host Suspended for Calls to ‘Drown, Burn’ Ukrainian Children (Oct 24, 2022)
"Close call m'am, ya' could'a gone down with'im." Makes you wonder how frequent bullshit responses are (from government officials at that).
Russian TV presenter says sorry but faces probe for call to drown Ukrainian children (Oct 24, 2022)
‘Accountability gap’: Nobel peace prize winner warns Russian war crimes going unpunished (Oct 26, 2022)
https://news.usni.org/2022/10/18/accelerated-chinese-timeline-to-seize-taiwan-raises-questions-on-pentagon-priorities
https://www.npr.org/2022/10/19/1129652322/ukraine-us-midterm-elections
@jorndoe it depends on the browser: the twitter link still doesn't seem to work on my firefox.
Even if we see peace or cease-fire at some point, most of the west will probably not do business with Russia. The lesson has been learned: "never trust them, they will use a deal as hostile leverage".
Russia will be blocked until it has changed into a proper democratic state with low corruption. So basically, since that won't happen overnight, Russia will probably collapse in the long run and fracture into smaller nations that want to get out of the national bullshit while healing their relations with the west.
Most of modern society in developed nations as well as third world nations soon to be considered developed has been built around a globalized infrastructure of goods and tech. Cut off from that it's basically setting a nation back 50 years. So the choice for any nation is to either work peacefully with each other or risk ruining themselves and their people's ability to be on par with the rest of the world. That might work to some degree and in some nations better than others, but at a certain point, people won't accept it. Generally speaking, most people want to reach some basic liberal and human rights and if a nation blocks the people from that too much it will break the back of that government, either over time of political degradation or by the hands of the people.
Just look at Iran, if the people keep on pushing against that totalitarian bullshit, it will, at some point break into a takeover of power and could change Iran into a nation completely different from today (closer to how it was before the 1979 revolution). All it takes is a single event that makes people organize opposition.
What that would be like in Russia is unknown, maybe the police shoot someone who flees drafting, who knows, but I would not be surprised if there are oppositional groups in Russia figuring out how to stand up against Putin's regime and waiting for the perfect time to do so. It might be that they're waiting for Putin to be removed from power and in the following political turmoil they will push for change and take over. And what would happen if draftees were to organize not just to lay down arms but to turn around their weapons towards their own leaders? We've already seen things like soldiers killing their officers or groups of draftees organizing a laydown of arms as a massive group. If all the elite fighting forces are in Ukraine, then how many forces can be used to defend Putin and Kremlin if the people take up arms?
When I spoke about this in the earlier days of the war, I was heavily criticized for being naive, "to think that Russia would fall" was a preposterous idea. At this time I don't think anyone would argue against it being a possibility. People who didn't have insight into how bad the state of the military was in Russia before the war thought that Russia was an unstoppable freight train if they dared to wage war against someone, but they weren't, they were rather pathetic. And with the decline in almost everything that makes up modern Russian society, I don't see how the trajectory for Russia right now is anything but utter state collapse. I mean, Putin is also getting older, if he dies of anything in five years, that's not enough to rebuild the economy and what's been domestically destroyed by this war. So eventually, Putin will disappear and if Russia is in the same bad shape as it is now, that would definitely collapse the region, especially if someone takes over trying to "be Putin", people might just snap and initiate a revolution to remove the corruption at the top.
All of this is of course speculation, but not so much as it was a couple of months ago.
https://www.ft.com/content/e28b0aa8-0260-4249-9954-4e346ebda68a
The article is paywalled, but I'm sure folks know how to read this - or find the same info elsewhere. Not good.
Then use reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-has-notified-us-about-planned-nuclear-drills-pentagon-2022-10-25/
Yes. Do be careful with the copyright issue, unless you took this for another site saying similar things.
Edit: Yep, much better.
If you don't have an armstice, you can have a frozen conflict then. Basically that both sides lick their wounds and refurbish their materiel for an possible offensive, which then doesn't happen. Even if in this scenario people don't die and missiles don't fly (or fly very rarely), it will be extremely costly for both sides.
Here becomes the nuke option, even if unlikely, an option. The sinister option "Escalate to De-escalate".
Let's say that the Russians retreat from Kherson and make the Dniepr basically the front line and destroy all bridges. This means a river crossing has to be made, which pose a singular point of entry. There are just so many amphibious vehicles and the supply has to go over a bridge or ferry, so such entry points are needed. Now these points of entry could be destroyed and made extremely difficult to pass by using tactical nuclear weapons.
Of course this is unlikely and the obvious escalation would be to simply make an underground nuclear test. As those tests have been done nearly all the time during the Cold War, NATO wouldn't have to respond.
Or even on a lower level, have annual excersizes, were you launch some missiles capable of carrying nukes (as seems to be intended now).
[sup]1. Economy on 'War Footing'
2. Bomb Shelters
3. Signage
4. Moscow Police
5. Emergency Evacuation Drills[/sup]
Part of this, I'm sure, is rather to instill a sense of urgency in the population. No one is marching on Moscow, or has suggested so; it's the Ukrainians that are bomb targets here. Putin is trained as a spy (military, assassin, all that), which, I guess, is reflected in some of his moves.
Quoting Foreign Policy
The foresight and follow-through of US and British foreign military engagements never fails to disappoint...
Putin's Su-30 'Flanker' jet detects & shoots down Ukraine military aircraft | Max payload: 8,000 KG
[sup]— Hindustan Times; Oct 24, 2022[/sup]
Ukraine Situation Report: Russia’s Ka-52 Attack Helicopter Fleet Has Been Massacred
[sup]— The Drive; Oct 25, 2022[/sup]
Russian Assault Repelled as Repeated Attacks in Donetsk Fail: ISW
[sup]— Newsweek; Oct 26, 2022[/sup]
Russia dealt setbacks in Ukraine's Kherson, Bakhmut, and Luhansk, Kyiv and pro-Kremlin bloggers say
[sup]— The Week; Oct 26, 2022[/sup]
Russian Losses In Ukraine Soared To 480 In Just One Day, According To Kyiv
[sup]— HuffPost; Oct 26, 2022[/sup]
Difficult to verify, but seems coherent across.
[sup]? Source: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25 (Critical Threats; Oct 25, 2022)[/sup]
Lines aren't moving much at the moment despite the destruction.
The Ukrainians are expected to make a further move on Kherson.
The Russians are expected to...well, bomb away.
Exactly what threat is NATO to Russia?
(And, what threat is Putin's Russia to Ukraine?)
To warrant the destruction?
Quoting Russia steps up Ukraine ‘dirty bomb’ claim in letter delivered to UN · The Guardian · Oct 25, 2022
Nuclear materials are identifiable.
Russia Calling for ‘Desatanization’ of Ukraine (Truth or Fiction? Oct 25, 2022)
Apparently so, however weird. By government officials, first deNazification, then deMilitarization, now deSatanization. :D What's up in Moscow anyway?
Quoting Anton Gerashchenko (Oct 26, 2022)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1585303861467938817[/tweet]
Meanwhile, real life on the ground, translations via Katya Soldak, Polina Raskazova, google:
Quoting Telegram (Oct 26, 2022)
They'd have to flee a good way though, can't just get on West Jet to Lviv.
In this case the next foreseeable concern for US/NATO would be - as it was for Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the Russian nuclear arsenal (and even nuclear plants) remaining in the hands of ex-Russian sub-states (with all their unresolved border issues) and the Chinese hegemonic ambitions in est/central Asia. Likely even Turkish and Iranian, at least in central Asia.
Yes, it would be a mess. But it can also be leveraged. The west could initiate trade agreements and transactions with such states as long as they give up their nukes. It might sound like a loss for them, but since their nation will likely be much smaller, their existence is much more fragile and the west would probably block them even more if they keep holding onto their nukes. So for them, their quality of life gets a massive bump if they give up nukes and that might be preferable. (Using "the west" as a broad term for nations opposing Russia in this conflict).
Of course, with tensions around their borders, they might lock into a Russian-based cold war for decades, slowly suffocating themselves with their finger on the button to eradicate their neighboring nation. It all depends on how stuck up their own ass they are.
The problem isn't really that there will be new nations with nukes, that can be resolved with diplomacy. The biggest problems are broken arrow scenarios in which nukes go missing in the turmoil after Russia collapses. Terrorist organizations could end up with tactical nukes or with knowledge make suitcase bombs out of old bombs. This could become one of the most dangerous terrorist situations in history.
It's actually viable for the UN to go into the new fractured Russia and seize control of the nukes before that gets out of hand. Nato and the UN would need to hastily initiate a plan to acquire all nukes, maybe even by force, in order to have the situation under control.
Sure, that too. About this I read a study of 2005 (https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_859_5.pdf) reporting:
[i]There is great concern that terrorists could obtain nuclear or radiological weapons and
detonate them in a large city. [b]The authors analyse the technical requirements for and obstacles to obtaining such weapons. What difficulties would have to be surmounted?
Could these problems be solved by a terrorist organization without direct support from a State possessing nuclear weapons? The authors conclude that nuclear weapons are most likely out of reach for terrorists[/b]. However, radiological weapons may well be used by terrorists in the future. The possible consequences of such an attack are discussed. [/i]
The thing to remember is that if a state fails and collapses, most of the people with technical knowledge of nuclear weapons would also be subjects for terrorists to recruit into their organizations. If successful, they won't need state support.
:ok:
Yeah, not actually.
We already saw this didn't happen in the case of the Soviet Union collapsing. Or with the sad case of the Iraqi scientists building Saddam's bomb.
Those people will be on the kill list of many intelligence services.
And that's why knowledge of nuclear technology, which is now basically ancient tech, hasn't proliferated: if anyone is so stupid to try to sell services to terrorists, that's a guarantee you will get on the CIA/Mossad hit list. And actually, those people (with the tech knowledge) know this.
The key difference is that the number of nukes and people behind them is much higher by the collapse of Russia than anyone else. It's by a large magnitude different. And a collapse of modern Russia would be different from the Soviet collapse seen as Russia would be fractured into more states than before and each state would set its own agendas rather than deal with a larger main state as was the case after the Soviet collapse.
My point is that it only takes one scientist and one nuke to get into the hands of terrorists and seeing as how much of the Russian army is infected by right-wing extremists and downright nazis, what would happen if neo nazi terrorists get hold of a nuke? Most people think of Islamic terrorism when mentioning terrorists, but that's probably not what the outcome would be with nukes from Russia. Neo nazis and right-wing extremists are a much more probable group to weaponize themselves with nukes. And seen how the governments of the world slowly move towards such extremism, like in Italy, it's a major threat to the world if that would happen.
Don't know if China or NATO would do something, but I imagine so.
Preferably, Putin's Russia would simmer down on the warring, and focus on building instead, in my opinion anyway.
Actually, the Soviet collapse was far more dangerous as:
a) there were A LOT MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS then than now in Russian arsenal
b) several countries, from Ukraine to Kazakhstan got nukes. Their capability, not Russia's, was the serious question during that time.
c) Unlike in the situation of Soviet Union, the Russia autonomies wouldn't become immediately independent. The last thing Moscow would do would be leaving it's nukes unattended in a secessionist part of the country.
d) as there is already a history of this, people can anticipate these issues far more better.
And lastly, Russia actually is in far better shape than the Soviet Union was when it collapsed. There aren't any bread lines in Moscow. Then there were, even in Moscow and Leningrad. I've seen them myself and how horrified Muscovites were when even bread was in shortage. (I visited the place when in the last year before it dissolved.)
Aww, that's lovely. Shame not every refugee is equally as 'Ukrainian' as this pretty young Arian TV bait you've dredged up for the virtue-hungry masses.
Still, I'm sure all that will change on Ukraine's path to Western enlightenment...
20 Years of Immigrant Abuses
...oh.
Latest step in our descent into absolute fucking lunacy. Well done everyone.
We're not content with merely heading towards annihilation, we are racing to it, with enthusiasm!
https://news.antiwar.com/2022/10/26/us-accelerates-plan-to-deploy-upgraded-nukes-to-europe/
Russia's fossil fuel exports will decline, both in absolute and in relative terms. Russia used to export 75% of its gas and 55% of its oil to Europe. Asia will not make up for the loss of the highly lucrative European market. Russia's share in oil and gas exports will fall by half by 2030, and it will lose 1 trillion dollars in revenue.
Good to know the 10,000 dead didn't die for nothing. Take that Russia! Perhaps we throw some Lithuanians at them next, see if we can't put a dent in their precious metals exports too. Fingers crossed we don't annihilate civilisation in nuclear holocaust first, but hey, can't make an omelette without breaking eggs...
You mean that Ukrainians preferring to save their lives over the Africans' are morally on the same level than Russians bombing their "brother" Ukrainians and Africans?
Quoting Isaac
That's the West. And also that's the West: Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international non-governmental organization, [b]headquartered in New York City (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Rights_Watch).
https://humanrightshouse.org/human-rights-houses/moscow/
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2022/press-release/
I'm struggling to think of anything more dumbfoundingly bigoted than thinking the fight for human rights is a 'Western thing'.
If Russia explodes, I would think China could try and take a good chunk if Siberia.
Anyway, I'm wondering how many (varying) avenues for diplomacy are possible.
The UN, US, EU, China, London, ..., try to initiate/establish something?
Something more direct between Moscow/Putin and Kyiv/Zelenskyy?
A different way to go about it?
Earlier in the thread, some folks argued against the US and London being involved; there are still other possibilities, though.
(Maybe one of us should call up Moscow/Kyiv? :smile:)
Talks/negotiations are kind of needed, at the very least desirable, yes?
Anders Åslund's suggestion came up earlier, others have been aired, it just seems like that ship has sailed long ago; the Kremlin (and Putin) appears to be on a wretched warpath.
'The East' doesn't treat refugees any better than 'the West'.
No.
Quoting neomac
Whatever it is that’s convinced you of it prior to the NATO summit. I’m not interested in surmise and gut feelings.
Quoting neomac
Prior to 2008? Who?
Quoting neomac
Which they did…
Quoting neomac
That’s nice. That’s not Russia’s attitude.
Quoting neomac
Right…
Quoting neomac
Right…
Still not seeing anything that demonstrates imperialist ambitions, beyond speculation about the possibility of it in the 1997, before Putin came to power. The article seems pretty slanted— with no evidence whatsoever given to justify it beyond “it’s happened in the past”.
Regardless, I asked about the threat of imperialism prior to the NATO summit because the claim was that NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions. No one was claiming that prior to the summit, as you’ve now demonstrated by failing to produce anything that shows it.
There was no imperialist threat. As Mearsheimer notes — who isn’t an “average dude” but who, unlike you and I, has studied this for decades and is considered a foremost expert on it— this claim is an invention, started especially after 2014. It’s useful as a deflection of what actually transpired. A nice story to tell now— but ultimately untrue.
Arguments based upon authority are the weakest kind.
Since you have no independent view of the matter, what would Mearsheimer accept as evidence of intent?
That is a very interesting development. While being pissed off by the U.S. could be a powerful motive, I wonder how much the rise of the Salafist parties played a part in these troops resisting the Taliban. That struggle played a major part in the Chechen wars.
If this group went full Merc, that sort of thing won't matter. Pretty nihilistic, after all that has happened.
How's that going...?
Greece: Pushbacks and violence against refugees and migrants are de facto border policy
Croatia: Damning new report slams systematic police abuses at country’s borders
Slovakia: Hate crime against refugees and migrants widespread but unreported
Refugees crossing Channel tell of beatings by French police
... You know, had I not just been so thoroughly educated here on this thread about the true enlightenment values of the West, I might have been confused into thinking these countries were encouraged to join so that they could provide the richer states with a source of cheap labour, rather than to help them improve their benighted Eastern attitudes... but that would be crazy, right?
Quoting jorndoe
Did you read about the recent shitshow in the US? The ship didn't 'sail'. It was burnt down, smashed and then sunk - without any assistance from the Kremlin.
It's exactly the kind of warmongering rhetoric we see repeated here that's preventing progressive politicians from even talking about peace-talks. All we can hope for is something through one of the back-channels, something away from the baying blood-lust of the social medal frenzy. Maybe there are a few diplomats still working on both sides who aren't either kleptocrats or more concerned about their Twitter profile than avoiding war. I think we have to hope that there's someone in the Russian cabinet and someone in either Ukraine, or one of the NATO governments, who are prepared to risk their necks speaking to each other against the wills of their respective leaders.
You're right, of course, but to back up @Mikie I did also have 'a bit of think about it' from my armchair and reached the same conclusion.
A 'Western thing' more than in authoritarian regimes like Russian, Chinese, Iranian which are antagonizing the West (indeed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorial_(society)#Persecution). Keep struggling and playing dumb.
If "diplomacy" means a cease fire on the lines now, that would be most beneficial to Russia's war aims. Putin could justifiably say his war has been victorious and once he has refurbished his war material in a few years, he could start the war again and finish the nazis once and for all.
If "diplomacy" means Russia withdrawing from the territories that it has occupied, that isn't going to happen as they are now part of Holy Mother Russia.
Either one side has to be defeated on the battlefield or the war isn't going nowhere (for a long time) and then "diplomacy" can take hold.
But for some people here the only issue is to criticize the West and about the situation in Russia, China or Iran, they don't simply care.
Do you have the slightest idea why Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Czech republic all joined NATO, then?
Do you have the slightest idea why Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization?
Because they sought some amount of protection against possible aggressions, I suppose. It's not clear that Russia is in a position to deliver any security in this space though, as seen now by the currents wars between Azerbadian and Armenia and between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
To that I already answered: “That’s why Russia and Putin were under NATO’s radar. By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia”.
Then you asked me for evidences about Georgia prior to the Summit and I gave you the link to wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement (which case BTW presents -similarities to what Putin is doing now in Ukraine)
Overall, Putin showed a much more assertive politics and foreign politics compared to Yeltsin, as nobody could fail to notice [1]
Quoting Mikie
I feel compelled to prove my claims and my objections not whatever you feel the need to be convinced about. And if you lack a deeper understanding of geopolitics (including Mearsheimer’s views) than what you are showing with such objections, that’s all your problem not mine.
For example the claim that “NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions” is conceptually myopic: however it was presented by American administrations in public, the big concern about Russian (not Putin’s!) imperialist bent was present since the collapse of Soviet Union (so prior to Putin’s presidency). This threat perception was felt by everybody in that debate, and especially by Eastern European countries. The attitude toward this threat was not to deny it but to decide how to address it either by expansion of NATO (as a defensive alliance) primarily and/or by using the EU market and institutional integrations.
If your argument was geopolitically compelling, it would be even more easy for you to question the evidence of Yeltsin’s “imperialist bent” compared to Putin’s given that NATO expanded over 3 ex-Warsaw Pact states during the Yeltsin’s presidency, and there were discussions to integrate ex-Soviet Union republics. Russia was at its weakest point after the Soviet Union collapse, what was the threat then?
Besides your arguments can be retorted against you. What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? And now that “the West is trying to destroy Russia”? Also Putin and Putin’s administration sent ambiguous messages about Nato expansion, after all [2]
Your reasoning is conceptually flawed for the following reasons:
Quoting Mikie
If you have your argument from authority, I have mine: for the third time, read Brzezinski who wasn’t just an academic (from Harvard) but also an actual United States National Security Advisor. Not to mention that I find Mearsheimer's views inconsistent wrt his own assumptions.
[1]
Russian President Vladimir Putin has just said that his country is working on the development of new nuclear weapons, claiming that they'll be so advanced, no other nuclear power will be able to match them. Besides sparking speculation by saying that Russia needs the weapons to deal with future security threats - President Putin was particularly vague about what these threats might be - the news has also raised fears that we could be about to see a renaissance of the old nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. https://www.nci.org/06nci/10/RNW%20Putin%20nuclear%20posturing.htm (18-11-2004)
“Join Nato and we'll target missiles at Kiev, Putin warns Ukraine” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/12/russia.ukraine
“Defying the United States, Russia agreed in July to sell $1 billion in combat aircraft to Venezuela. The deal marks the latest in a series of Russian arms sales to a state that has increasingly clashed with Washington over different ideological approaches to Latin America and the developing world.”
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/VenRussia
NATO members say they share the goal of bringing the adapted accord into effect as soon as possible, but had maintained collectively that they would not ratify the agreement until Russia fulfilled commitments to withdraw military forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia made those pledges in conjunction with the adapted treaty’s completion, and many NATO governments saw them as prerequisites for concluding the adapted treaty. (See ACT, November 1999. ) Notwithstanding the lingering presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia, NATO recently suggested that some of its members might soon begin their ratification processes on the adapted treaty. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-01/russia-suspends-cfe-treaty-implementation
At Munich security conference in 2007: President Putin continued in a similar vein for some time. "The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres - economic, political and humanitarian, and has imposed itself on other states," he said. It was a formula that, he said, had led to disaster: "Local and regional wars did not get fewer, the number of people who died did not get less but increased. We see no kind of restraint - a hyper-inflated use of force.” The US has gone "from one conflict to another without achieving a fully-fledged solution to any of them", Mr Putin said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (10 February 2007)
the Kremlin has neither forged an EU entente against America nor widened its “partnership for peace” with Washington. Instead, it has demanded concessions for the accession of former Soviet bloc nations into the European Union, sniped at the West for NATO expansion, conducted a mammoth nuclear exercise, announced the successful development of a new ICBM to defeat America’s National Missile Defense, and vigorously sought to carve out “imperial” spheres of influence in Moldova, Georgia, and the CIS.5 All these give solid reasons to think that an “integrationist” interpretation of Putin’s international strategy is one-sided and does not grasp the continuity of Russian strategic thinking. While unveiling Putin’s strong desire for inclusion in the international community and selective engagement with the West, this approach fails to capture the aspects of great power thinking which guided his strategy from the very beginning. In his “manifesto”, Putin mentioned about derzhavnosti as one of Russian traditional values on which has to be based Russia’s revival in the 21st century. Therefore, for Putin, Russia can revive and successfully develop only as a great power recognized and respected in the world. In this regard Putin warned the possible opponents to this idea in international community that it is too early to bury Russia as a great power.
https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/767/76701018.pdf (January 2006)
[2]
02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:
[i]Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.[/i]
https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html
[i]
During his November 2001 visit to the United States, Putin struck a realistic but cooperative tone:[/i]
In an interview that month, Putin declared,
Putin even maintained the same attitude when it was a question of Ukraine someday entering the Atlantic Alliance. In May 2002, when asked for his views on the future of Ukraine’s relations with NATO, Putin dispassionately replied,
A decade later, under President Medvedev, Russia and NATO were cooperating once again. At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, Medvedev declared,
From the end of the Cold War until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO in Europe was drawing down resources and forces, not building them up. Even while expanding membership, NATO’s military capacity in Europe was much greater in the 1990s than in the 2000s. During this same period, Putin was spending significant resources to modernize and expand Russia’s conventional forces deployed in Europe. The balance of power between NATO and Russia was shifting in favor of Moscow.
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/
From whom?
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/04/nato.russia
[i]The pair have already outlined a potential deal to avert a crisis over Washington's planned missile defence system in Europe, involving a string of safeguards to ensure it could not be used against Russia.
Bush has insisted the system is a shield against a potential Iranian missile attack on Europe or the US, but Moscow sees it as an attempt to blunt Russia's nuclear deterrent.[/i]
In other words
- No evidence stronger than Russian development of new nuclear weapons in 2004 and Russia suspension of CFE Treaty in 2007
- Putin's speculations about threat perception from the US despite Bush administration assurances
You mean the war in which;
1) European and US envoys were dispatched to negotiate peace within just three days of fighting.
2) The President of France negotiated a ceasefire
3) Russia and a number of other countries recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as separate republics
...which tentatively ended the war.
The exact solutions currently being vociferously rejected with regards to Ukraine.
Oh, and do you even reslise how absurd it is to include Chechnya in your list of evidences of imperialist expansion?
Various folks. To Tajikistan for instance, the greatest threat (since the civil war) is seen as a possible Islamist contagion from Afghanistan. Armenia fears Turkey and Azerbadian. Etc They are not overly concerned that the EU or US will invade them, if that's what you're asking.
I mean: The Russian government began massive allocation of Russian passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2002 without Georgia's permission; this 'passportization' policy laid the foundation for Russia's future claim to these territories (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement )
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-soft-power-works-russian-passportization-and-compatriot-policies-paved-way-for-crimean-annexation-and-war-in-donbas/
Quoting Isaac
I talked about geopolitical ambitions (obvious in the Caucasian region) and arguably a case also for "Russian imperialism" since the Chechen war was a war for independence against "Russian imperialism" and perceived as such not only by the West (About 15,000 Caucasians and their supporters demonstrated in Ankara Sunday. Addressing the rally, Nationalist Movement Party leader Alparslan Turkes said, ``We support the independence of our Chechen brothers. We want the world to stop Russian imperialism.'' https://www.csmonitor.com/1994/1227/27071.html). Interestingly here is the view of Ukrainians about it:
The Chechnya crisis was condemned by the entire cross-section of Ukrainian political parties immediately after the launch of the covert war to topple President Dudayev in summer 1994. To centre right national democrats (Rukh, Union of Ukrainian Officers, Ukrainian Cossacks and the Congress of National Democratic Forces), writers and intelligentsia as well as the radical right nationalists (Ukrainian National Assembly and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) it is a question of 'we told you so' about Russia's long-standing imperialist intentions which will sooner or later turn against Ukraine. 'In this situation the signing by Ukraine of a Treaty on Friendship with Russia will be regarded by the world community as moral support for Moscow's imperial policies', the Democratic Coalition 'Ukraine' believed. 'Russia demonstrated to the world its inability to renounce forceful dictatorship and armed intervention in deciding political problems', Rukh's leader, Viacheslav Chornovil, said. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists applauded the Estonian example of wishing to recognize Chechnya's independence. The Communist Party of Ukraine also condemned 'any forcible resolution of any kind of conflict' , The communist head of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, Borys Oliynyk, described Russia's military intervention in Chechnya as 'aggression' and its tactics as 'genocide'. The socialist chairman of parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, also came out against the use of force in Chechnya. Moroz's Socialist Party believed that, 'The Russian democrats are reaping the fruits of their own anti-national policy on the Soviet Union's collapse’.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634939508400925?journalCode=ccas20
@Isaac try harder, you have all my humanitarian support!
This isn't particularly about East West North South, at least my comment wasn't.
Kyiv wouldn't be checked much to join the international drug trade, yet it remains that
And joining Putin's Russia has come up as well. :D (They're in the process of being joined.)
The Ukrainians chose.
[sup]The President took part in the final plenary session of the 19th meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club (Oct 27, 2022) • Full text of Putin speech and answers at Valdai Discussion Club (Oct 28, 2022) • Hear Putin warn the world faces 'most dangerous' decade since WWII (Oct 28, 2022)[/sup]
Good grief.
So, anyway, what avenues remain possible?
The Turkish Daily Sabah wrote:
‘Ukraine, Russia have moved away from diplomacy, peace process’ (Oct 11, 2022)
The Turkish government has made some attempts.
It would be more accurate to call it a case of imperial retention as the independence movement came from the slow recovery from when "The Stalinist regime fallaciously accused the Chechens (and the Ingush) of massive collaboration with the German invaders, and then deported them en masse on February 23, 1944."
This might be why some people get nervous when Putin starts calling them Nazis.
So why would you need any more specific an answer in the case of Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech republic? Might the answer not likewise be "various folks"?
Quoting neomac
Brilliant. Russia was 'imperialistically' retaining territory already within its borders. Some of the stuff you come up with is priceless. But Ukraine, I take it are not 'imperialistically' retaining Donbas? Their right to their borders being different, of course, because they're the good guys.
Quoting Paine
Why 'imperial' retention. Are the UK 'imperialistically' retaining Northern Ireland?
Are Spain 'imperialistically' retaining Catalonia?
Is Russia entitled to any land at all? Or are we just going to say anything more than a shed outside Moscow is just rampant empire building?
It's frightening how easily narratives get shored up against all odds, even to the point of redefining the language to make it fit.
Quoting jorndoe
Fewer and fewer, thanks mainly to the war cheerleading we're seeing such shining examples of here.
As I said before, I think unsanctioned back channels are our main hope now.
It would not be a redefinition of language to note an important difference between your examples and a "retention" involving the Massacre of Civilians in order to preserve this "entitlement."
Should the Ukrainians be consulted over whether Russia is entitled to their lands?
After the collapse of Soviet Union one could question that Chechnya was within Russian borders.
The First Chechen War took place from 1994 to 1996, when Russian forces attempted to regain control over Chechnya, which had declared independence in November 1991. Despite overwhelming numerical superiority in men, weaponry, and air support, the Russian forces were unable to establish effective permanent control over the mountainous area due to numerous successful full-scale battles and insurgency raids. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chechnya
As noted, when Ukrainian territorial integrity is brought up (victims), the Kremlin turns the headset off (and continues the bombing), which makes negotiations harder. :/
Turkey has tried with little success, though they seem in a fair position to do so; maybe they could do another round, inviting China to apply pressure against the destruction. :up:
Of course it would. Entitlement to the integrity of a country's borders is not predicated on the means by which they execute such entitlement.
Quoting Paine
Which Ukrainians? The ones living in Lvov 600 miles away from Donetsk? Why the hell ought they have any say? Why not the people of Rostov, a mere 50 odd miles away? Nationalism is bullshit. There's no such entity as 'the Ukrainians' to even ask.
One could question that Crimea was in Ukrainian borders.
Are we really going to rehash the whole 19th jingoism? I suppose that would go well with our rush to world war three, rampant nationalism did a good job of warmongering back then, its got a good track record.
Using what exactly would one go about 'questioning' the properness of a border?
Ought we test the genetic stock of the population either side?
If Nationalism is bullshit, what is the principle supporting this claim:
Quoting Isaac
Sure one can! Borders are matter of international recognition. And indeed: At first Crimean authorities attempted to claim that it was a sovereign Republic albeit with a relationship with Ukraine. On 5 May 1992, the Crimean legislature declared conditional independence, but a referendum to confirm the decision was never held amid opposition from Kyiv. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Crimea_(1992%E2%80%931995) )
So in the end the control was restored without war.
Quoting Isaac
Your pointless blabla doesn't take into consideration that I was talking about perceived threats, and Russia was perceived as a threat by the West and not only. I'm not committed to any specific way in which different actors understood the Russian imperialistic threat, nor ground my reasoning based on the specific case of Chechnia. But if playing dumb makes you happy, keep enjoying, by all means.
And how would I tell 'them'. There's 40 million. Do you really imagine 'them' to be one homogeneous mass with a single opinion?
It's patently absurd to think that some lines on a map drawn by a few men in a gilt-laden hotel room decades ago somehow captures a gestalt that emerged from nature.
How exactly do you propose we identify a 'Ukrainian' in a way that isn't racist? Living there? That would strip citizenship of all refugees. Family there? That would strip immigrants of their citizenship in their new home. Passports? Accents? Feelings?
What criteria would you like to use to distinguish a 'Ukrainian' who has a right to be asked about the future of Dombas (even if they live 600 miles away and have never been there) from a Russian who has no right to be asked even if they live a stone's throw away on the border?
They are loudly telling themselves. The question of those who don't see it that way is a reasonable one. But that issue is different from you stating without qualification:
Quoting Isaac
'They' are not. Some people are, others aren't. It's you who are reifying such a situation into a 'they'.
Otherwise, answer the question. By what criteria are you identifying the Ukrainian from the Russian by such a means as confers on the Ukrainian a right to a say over the future of a piece of land they've never seen but denies it of the Russian living and working within spitting distance.
I answered your question with specific threats for Tajikistan and Armenia. But you and Mikey Mouse here cannot answer my question.
Honestly, the answer is obvious and you know it. Central European states have been oppressed by the USSR and its servants for so long. They joined NATO, an anti-USSR alliance, as soon as they had a chance, and they did so to seek protection from Russia. You know that it is true.
Yeah. :/
That's the language of both attacker and defender though, and most others.
Maybe some day...
Indeed. But less commonly the language of unrelated bystanders, which is what's different here. We might expect those living in Ukraine to be nationalistic (it's a common enough narrative). We might similarly expect the attackers to be nationalistic in their desire to see the territorial lines re-arranged. What's weird (and more than a little distasteful) is the degree to which people who've never had even the slightest connection to either Ukraine or Russia are affecting this sudden passion for the integrity of either party's borders. On what possible grounds would we care?
I use "they" in the hope they are reporting what they think in polls such as these.
I imagine you will dismiss it as fake news. But it is by means of gathering reports in some way that we will learn the answer.
They just beg the question because the polls already have decided who to ask and who not to ask.
Why did they not ask the Russians who live on the border of Donbas? Why did they ask the population of Lvov 600 miles away? What does it mean that a pre-stratified sample shows exactly the results you'd expect from the very act of stratification?
The point is not "If we pick an arbitrary grouping, what would they, on average, think?" the point is "why are we asking that arbitrary grouping and not this other?"
By what means does the view of the average citizen of Lvov gain any legitimacy whatsoever on the question of the future of Donbas, but the view of the average citizen of Rostov not?
Your entire argument is based on taking snippets and tying them together into a construed narrative, while you're ignoring or denying what is blatantly obvious.
You don't know what methods were used. There was an attempt to canvass the eastern oblasts. I figure that has to be very difficult to do in the state of war with so many refugees and deported people. I am interested in how many supporters of the 2014 invasion still support the Russian state after they have gotten a taste of their love.
But I didn't bring up the poll to argue for a proper resolution of the conflict but to point out that there are enough self-identified Ukrainians around to undermine your claim:
Quoting Isaac
That's exactly the claim I was addressing. The poll didn't rely only on self-identified Ukrainians it pre-stratified the sample. It didn't ask a random selection from the population of the world and then proceeded to identify jenks breaks or something. It determined in advance a group of people to ask on the grounds of their being 'Ukrainian'. It begged the question of whether such a natural grouping exists by asking only what they already thought that group was.
Notwithstanding the methodological problem. You've not addressed the issue of the ground on which any such self-identified group has a right to whatever territory it believes it possesses.
You are confused. And probably you didn't follow the reasoning which you tried to address.
One has to distinguish the evidence about threat perception from the evidence that support threat perception. The evidence about threat perception is e.g. statements by the head of state that "any attempt at NATO expansion to Russian borders is seen as a direct threat" the evidence that support the idea NATO expansion to Russian borders is a direct threat is e.g. placing nuclear strategic missiles in Ukraine. I asked the latter (What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? And now that “the West is trying to destroy Russia”? ) you now offered me the former.
The reason I asked for evidence that support threat perception is not because I believe there is none, but because whatever evidence is going to be offered, is still questionable as to its geopolitical implications, especially within a security dilemma where players read aggressive intentions in other player's deterring moves. That's why it's a hopeless endeavor to question threat perception when it's grounded in historical mistrust.
Admittedly, I haven't seen much here on the Uyghur situation. Maybe most just agree more on that, don't know. (I've only come across one person arguing in favor of the Chinese government, and that's a good while back.)
Say, the old Canadian Indian residential school system has received fair attention, albeit not so much here on the forums. That's historical, though.
These two ? came to mind because of the uncanny parallels with the annexations.
The requisite quote spam ...
[sup]"The penalty good men pay for indifference to public affairs is to be ruled by evil men."
— paraphrasing Plato (-429 — -347) *
"A peace may be so wretched as not to be ill exchanged for war."
— Tacitus (56 — 120)
"All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing."
— paraphrasing Edmund Burke (1729 — 1797) *
"Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing."
— John Stuart Mill (1806 — 1873)
"First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for the Communists and I did not speak out because I was not a Communist.
Then they came for the trade unionists and I did not speak out because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me."
— Martin Niemöller (1892 — 1984), 1946
"People cannot be free unless they are willing to sacrifice some of their interests to guarantee the freedom of others."
— Saul Alinsky (1909 — 1972), 1971 via archive, openculture, influencewatch, also check Article IV here (1789)
"Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented."
— Elie Wiesel (1928 — 2016)[/sup]
[sup]Putin rules out use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine amid war; ‘Dangerous’ (Oct 28, 2022)[/sup]
Chances aren't looking great. :/
A fair assessment can (ought to) take place without going by any one particular person's story (Putin, Biden, Mearsheimer, Stoltenberg, Zelenskyy, and Winnie-the-Pooh came to mind while typing).
Whatever that may be (if any) would be put in context with the observed bombing killing destroying shamming threats re-culturation efforts.
Or, maybe, if sufficiently unclear, this could be a topic to clarify?
I just wanna say: this is the outcome of playing hardball. Any sign of a lack of resolve on the part of NATO would have encouraged whistle britches over there to use tactical nukes.
Sure. Add also the fear of losing the "alleged" status of great power. My point wasn't to deny we can figure out ways to disambiguate it, the point is that vague expressions like this have a rhetorical force both for mass propaganda and at the negotiation table, and can blend well with Putin's own personal fears.
The term "existential threat" in geopolitics means that a country feels one of their core strategic interests is being threatened. In the case of Russia, what is being threatened are Crimea and Sevastopol and the central position of power they grant in the Black Sea.
The importance of this position cannot be stressed enough, since it is the only western port that isn't at the mercy of NATO to grant access. The Baltic Sea is completely encapsulated by NATO, and the White Sea is bottle-necked at the GIUK gap.
With Turkey as a more or less neutral player, through the Black Sea Russia gains access to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Gulf, etc - places that connect Russia to its strategic allies.
This is almost certainly the reason the United States made a bid for Ukraine, since countries like Iran and Syria are adversaries to the United States and have probably played a large role in its failure to control the Middle-East.
In 2008 NATO blatantly stated they wished to incorporate Ukraine, which would have included Crimea, which once again would have put Russia at the mercy of NATO. In 2013 the U.S. overtly supported, likely covertly orchestrated, regime-change in Ukraine. The 2014 invasion of Crimea was a direct reaction to that.
The 2014 invasion was only a temporary solution for Russia however, since Crimea was in a precarious strategic position, being pretty much undefendable in a future conflict.
My view is that the main strategic objective of Russia's invasion of Ukraine was the establishment of land access to Crimea, which seems a very logical conclusion based on the areas Russia now occupies.
Quoting jorndoe
That's war, unfortunately. When countries wage war, and especially when vital interests are at stake, all semblance of humanity goes out of the window. Threatening, intimidation, destruction, nothing new under the sun - for the record, the United States never shied away from any of these practices either.
Re-culturation (or "westernization", if you want the American equivalent) is essentially the modern "solution" to insurgency threats, which are always on the mind of any nation seeking to occupy others.
It also serves as a method to make the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine a foregone conclusion. When the primary culture of the people living there is Ukrainian, a future war over it could be framed as a liberation. When the primary culture is Russian, it can only be framed as a reconquest.
Simple. One could use nationality, or self-identification. Eg anyone with the legal papers, or anyone self identifying as Ukrainian, gets to be seen as Ukrainian.
The nation called Ukraine does exist. It's not a bizarre idea or a fancy or something impossible to delimit.
I don't know of much condemnation of Israel that isn't about methods, not borders. But sure, it happens all the time. So does racism. Doesn't make either any less distasteful.
The point I'm making here is that the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is utterly irrelevant, an administrative matter. It has zero moral weight. Yet maintaining it is adopted as a moral crusade by those for whom its location is meaningless, those who probably don't even know where it is right now.
Such affectation would be nothing more than pretentious were it not for the fact that these people are vociferously advocating the continuance of a bloody and devastating war to keep this arbitrary line where is currently is.
The idea that there's two immutable 'nations' and that it matters whose flag is over which bit of land is the cause of this war, not the solution to it.
Russia's problems aren't solved by reducing their territory at enormous human cost. They're solved by changing the government. Same goes for Ukraine, same goes for the US. How much land each one has is largely irrelevant. The quality of their governance over that land is what matters. It's insane to think that the best strategy for improving the lives of any given population of people is to engage them in a bloody war so that a slightly less awful government might govern the land they happen to be on, it's crazily inefficient, not to mention barbarous.
One could use headwear too. Anyone with a green trilby is a 'Ukrainian'.
Or we could use length of index finger, over 9cm and you're in.
Much of the Isreal-Palestinian conflict for the past half century has been about borders, those of 67 vs those orior 67. I.e. the status of the "occupied territories".
It was an attempt to show the stupidity of your response. We could identity Ukrainians by any means we like. The point was to justify that choice.
Why does having the right piece of paper, or worse still, the right 'feelings' confer on a citizen of Lvov the right to have a say in the future of some land 600 miles away that they've never even seen, but denies that right to someone living and working within a stone's throw of its border?
If I declared I now 'self-identified' as a Ukrainian, do I get a say?
Quoting Olivier5
I didn't question what the war was about though did I. Try reading first and responding second. It's in the fucking quote you took the time to highlight...
Quoting Isaac
...do you see it now?
The poll in question asked for their opinion and the sampled folks gave it, nothing more. I don;t see the problem.
Then you should be able to answer the question. It's not a complex one.
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Paine
So if your answer is, yes, anyone with the right piece of paper should be consulted, anyone without the right peice of paper doesn't get a say, then I'm asking why.
Why does having that piece of paper confer a say in global affairs denied to others?
My answer is that it's an administrative matter. We have (or struggle to have) representative democracies and to administer those we need, as a matter of pure pragmatism, to subdivide the population into administrative units.
But my answer fails to give any moral weight to the hierarchical arrangement of those units. So I'm asking, whence the moral weight being applied here?
The right of 'the Ukrainians' to be in charge of what goes on in Donbas seems to be being given moral weight, not just administrative pragmatism. I'm asking for the source of that moral weight.
Not "why do they have a say?"
"Why ought they?"
How do you assign moral weight?
Do I have to explain morality, is the notion unfamiliar to you?
Some classes of human activities are 'moral', they concern a loose affiliation of behavioral types we've grouped under that umbrella term for various reasons (although some consider there to be only one reason, but that argument's irrelevant here)
When someone asks "what is the moral weight behind that?" they are asking for reasons why the behaviour in question belongs in that group and not some other.
If someone claims that choosing which hat to wear has moral weight, I'd expect an explanation by way of pointing to how the choice of hat is similar in either consequence or virtue to other classes of behaviour we call 'moral'.
It wasn't my quote. I was paraphrasing @Paine's "...be consulted", so the question is better directed there lest this whole discussion be based on a mistranslation.
That said, the notion of 'Ukrainians' being the morally appropriate group to decide what course of action ought be followed with regards to the progress of this war is a common enough one. I take it to mean, fairly simply, that in a case of disagreement, 'having a say' means that your view takes precedent in some way over someone else who voices a contrary opinion. That might be by way of voting for authorisation, or it might be simply the moral weight given to an opinion. I don't think the practical method by which the 'say' is implemented matters here.
I didn't say they ought not be consulted (a moral proscription is very different to the mere opposite of a moral prescription), so I'm not sure why you're asking this question but...
We can only, pragmatically, consult a limited number of people (when using methods such as voting or polling, for example), so some people will have to be not consulted in that sense.
There are numerous reasonable candidates for what we might use as a threshold of elimination, but pieces of paper are pretty low down that list. I'd say geographic proximity, and economic and social connectivity might be near the top.
The question, however, was about the moral weight, not pragmatics. I don't see any moral argument for why anyone ought not be consulted. I suppose mental incapacity, possibly...
So you ought to agree that there is no moral issue in consulting them. In fact, that would be expected in a democracy.
Yep, that's right.
What question do you think that's an answer to?
I asked what moral weight there was to consulting the citizen of Lvov and not the citizen of Rostov.
You've given me a reason why I might expect the citizen of Lvov to be consulted.
I didn't ask why I might expect them to be.
I asked why they ought to be - what gives their view greater moral weight than mine, or yours, or the nearby Russian's
A priori, nothing. A poll is just not a moral statement.
I suppose one should also consult the opinion of the nearby Russians, the pro-Russian folks in occupied territories, etc. But there's a technicality there: this 15 years jail sentence for criticizing the war in Russia.
Right. Then we're in agreement. There's no moral weight whatsoever to the opinion of the 'Ukrainians' over the opinion of anyone else with a stake.
So we can finally ditch all this bullshit about how it ought to be "up to the Ukrainians" whenever someone brings up some view as to what course of action is best.
The discussion here was originally, though, about territory. About who has a legitimate say over which government governs which territory. My point being that if one were to consult anyone other than the people directly living there, then those neighbouring the territory (on both sides of the border) would be the next most important people to consult - not people 600 miles away who just happen to share the same passport.
All of this is directed at the argument that there's no moral weight behind the location of any given border. The struggle to keep it in its current location is not a moral struggle, it's nationalistic, not noble.
I don't think it's that simple. It is definitely up to the Ukrainians what course of action Ukraine follows.
In what way?
Quoting Isaac
I didn't ask "How does one assign moral weight? " I asked "How do you assign moral weight?".
And the reason why I'm asking is because you claimed:
Quoting Isaac
How do you decide that the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is irrelevant, merely an administrative matter? On factual terms, there are people who see borders and national identity not as irrelevant nor as merely an administrative point.
So your claim "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is utterly irrelevant, an administrative matter" is a moral claim, right? something like : "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine ought to be considered irrelevant, and bearing zero moral weight", right?
And since you claim "When someone asks "what is the moral weight behind that?" they are asking for reasons why the behaviour in question belongs in that group and not some other".
Then I'm asking you, what reasons you have to hold such a moral prescription: "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine ought to be considered irrelevant, and bearing zero moral weight".
Directly, it's up to the actual soldiers, diplomats and support staff doing the fighting/negotiating (they could refuse).
Less directly, the government of Ukraine will instruct those soldiers, diplomats and support staff and so strongly influence their actions.
Less directly still, the government's funders, supporters, lobbyists and pollsters will influence the government's decisions.
Absent a referendum or election I don't see how the Ukrainians en masse are going to get a say, certainly not above that third group of government influencers which, without doubt, includes the US and most major EU countries.
Matters that have moral weight tend to relate to issues of humanitarian needs or virtues. Either the behaviour in question can be shown to lead to some material harm to human welfare, or it is non-virtuous in some way. Moving a border (in general) is neither.
I don't have a unique personal opinion on the matter. 'Moral' is a word in the English language, I don't have a private definition of it.
You might as well ask why the action of propelling oneself through water is 'swimming'. That's just what the word means it refers to a particular type of behaviour. If we were to disagree over whether treading water constituted swimming, we might have a profitable discussion. If you suggested that doing the tango constituted 'swimming' you'd just be wrong.
In addition to my response above, Ukraine is not currently a democracy. Opposition parties have been banned, severe restrictions on free press are in place, and no timetable for elections exists.
I would definitely argue that the average citizen of the US has more of a say (via lobbying their politicians, who lobby the US government, who lobby/fund the Ukrainian government), than the average citizen of, say, Lvov. The Ukrainian government aren't currently listening to lobbying from citizens and have suspended normal democratic processes.
But maybe you have some other mechanism in mind. By what mechanism do you propose the average citizen of Lvov is going to take part in the decision as to what course Ukraine now follows?
These are exceptional circumstances calling for extreme measures. Ukraine is still supposed to be a democracy and hence is supposed to lift those measures in peace time.
If you want to argue that their democracy is suboptimal, I agree.
Quoting Isaac
I would argue otherwise, on the ground that US citizens have currently limited say on anything their federal government does, least of all in foreign policy. I guess you might say their democracy is suboptimal.
How is the UK fairing there, BTW? Would you qualify your current governance system as 'optimal'?
Quoting Isaac
That is true, and leads to the issue of troop morale.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, they have a very big role right now.
Quoting Isaac
Yes yes yes. But pollsters poll people. Supporters are people and so are funders. You are saying that the government needs the support of the people,and all that is true.
Quoting Isaac
Via polls, via their financial support, their discipline or lack thereof, and their physical engagement as soldiers.
I didn't say they weren't a democracy without reason, but the fact that they currently aren't simply renders you statement untrue. Ukrainians are not currently determining the course Ukraine takes. The government of Ukraine are, unilaterally.
Quoting Olivier5
And yet you say of Ukraine...
Quoting Olivier5
...and when I ask how the Ukrainians are going to get a say absent any democratic process, you answered...
Quoting Olivier5
Minus the physical engagement as soldiers, how are any of those factors any different in the US?
Quoting Olivier5
Far from it. Our government, as most others, is dictated to by lobbyists and takes shockingly little notice of any other advice. The point is, that compared to Ukraine, I'd wager it cares slightly more about the opinion of the people (if only in a self-serving re-election bid) than the Ukrainian government does, divested, as they currently are, of either the need for re-election, nor the need to counter opposition groups and media.
You've given no mechanisms for citizen involvement present in Ukraine, yet absent in the US/UK. But the US/UK have at least a veneer of democracy (needing re-election), so in any comparison their citizens would have (if measurable at all) a marginally higher chance of influencing events than the citizens of Ukraine do.
Add to this the fact that, if a citizen of the US/UK did manage to influence their government even to the tiniest degree, that government then has the power to multiply that influence on world affairs because they are a very powerful government. Ukraine is not.
I think the only exceptions here are the actual army which, by virtue of being the tools used for the jobs currently, have an enormous influence on the course of events, particularly the generals etc.
But the Ukrainian army might just about reach 300,000, maybe 1,200,000 including reservists. Their population is 40 million. A good sample size, but hardly representative.
I don't see any justification here for the claim that Ukrainians are dictating the course of events in Ukraine. The main actors are clearly the Ukrainian Government, The Russian Government, the armies of both nations, and the funders like the US, UK and EU. Next down would be the major influencers like the big media organisations and the main lobbying groups. I really don't see actual Ukrainians getting into the top ten even.
How do you know that “in general” is neither? One could argue that humanitarian needs are best handled within established administrative units. Indeed, in the specific case of Ukrainian and Russian border, your generalisation doesn’t seem to hold, Russians could argue that moving the border is meant to protect Russian minorities in Ukraine from persecutions. Ukrainians could argue that preserving the border is meant to preserve all the material resources in that Ukrainian region which are relevant for the wellbeing of Ukrainians.
Quoting Isaac
The weird thing is that prominent dictionaries like marriam-webster, oxford and cambridge do not mention the word humanitarian in their definition of moral nor vice versa.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/humanitarian
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/moral_1?q=moral
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/humanitarian_1?q=humanitarian
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/moral
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/humanitarian
Yes. Hence the need for such arguments, as opposed to the unsupported generality that there's some moral weight to national identity alone. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself.
In the cases you describe, the moral weight is given to the objective (protecting minorities, or welfare needs). The actual method has no moral weight beyond an assessment of whether it actually works.
Moving a border at tremendous cost of human life is not an efficient, or conscionable method of either protecting minorities or securing resources. War has catastrophically failed to do either, in virtually all cases.
Quoting neomac
Yes, they all take the much more parsimonious route of simply referring to 'right and wrong'. I thought that would be an unnecessarily cumbersome intermediate step.
If you prefer, consider my use of broadly humanitarian or virtuous actions as being those that are considered 'right' and their opposites 'wrong'.
Not sure if your distinction between ends and means wrt national identity is morally relevant.
For example I see no mention of such distinction here:
[i]Article 15
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
[/i]
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Quoting Isaac
I find your generalisation objectionable again: if Russians mange to annex and see acknowledged the Donbas regions, it's likely that the Russians living there are not going to suffer from alleged genocide and persecutions for generations to come.
Besides I still fail to understand how you calculate efficiency: what's the formula you are using?
Quoting Isaac
Parsimonious? Maybe but "humanitarian" is not mentioned even once either here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/
https://iep.utm.edu/modern-morality-ancient-ethics/
Quoting Isaac
OK what do you mean by "broadly humanitarian"? do you mean human rights as in universal-declaration-of-human-rights ? Or do you mean human rights as in universal-declaration-of-human-rights and pacifism (or rejection of war)? Or yet something else?
Well, you argued otherwise upthread, saying that the soldiers were the primary actors, the governments only second to them, because soldiers can disobey, run away or surrender. And then we agreed that a government at war needs the support of its people in the rear, otherwise it will crumble sooner or later. Note that the people does the fighting too.
In the end he aspirationally talked up autonomy, the end of Western hegemony and reorientation to the East (Belt and Road, etc.)
Ukraine was barely mentioned in the main speech, but it came up in the subsequent Q&A. This is what he said about Ukraine:
Thanks for the concise write up of the speech as well as Q&A.
To add some philosophical context, here is an interesting interview with Michael Millerman, a sort of Western expert on Dugan (the philosophy Putin allegedly represents, directly or indirectly).
I find it interesting that Dugan derives the culture wars ultimately from the universals debate in the middle ages.
I profoundly disagree with the argument, however.
It seems clear, however, as Michael Millerman notes, that Putin's speech is fully embracing this Dugan world vision.
There's lots in the UDHR that is not about morality.
If you think nationalism is a moral cause then I can't stop you, but I don't think you'll find many people using the word that way.
Quoting neomac
I don't see how. My knowledge of history is not exhaustive, but the longest actually genocidal regime I can think of might be something like the Khmer Rouge or maybe Stalin's regime. Neither lasted for "generations". I'd be broadly supportive of the idea that mis-governance is responsible for more death overall than war, but I can't see any evidence that the difference in treatment between any two governments is, in general, even in the same ball park.
Quoting neomac
It's not that complicated. Mostly deaths, but a pretty standard notion of basic welfare - water, housing, security, freedom from abuse - basic stuff. I can't see how this is remotely complicated. Human welfare isn't an undiscovered planet, or some misunderstood facet of quantum physics. We've been around for millions of years, we know what we need.
Quoting neomac
As I said, human rights are meant as a basis for law, they're not the same thing as humanitarian goals (though there's much overlap). I mean, just as above, the basic aspects of human welfare.
The primary actors and the primary decision makers are not the same thing. The soldiers could refuse to carry out orders, but they have no mechanism to devise and disseminate contrary orders. Decisions are made unilaterally by the Ukrainian government.
Quoting Olivier5
We agreed no such thing. You argued that the US populace had no influence on government policy, then argued the exact opposite for the Ukrainian populace. I just pointed out the incoherence.
Quoting Olivier5
What all 40 million of them? That's excellent news, Russia will be swamped within days.
Putin's speech does reflect Dugan's vision. As a challenge to world order, it is difficult to imagine how the clash of civilizations is supposed to work when Putin and his gang of oligarchs gain and maintain their wealth through participation in the despised 'unipolar' system. The Russian economy will collapse if separated from globalized markets and resources.
Efforts that recognize the difficulty of preserving traditional forms of life in the face of 'unipolar' economy call for the opposite of imperial schemes. They wish to establish 'communities of communities' to increase the agency of people to shape the world around them. The relative independence of communities is not something one will find in the Cheka playbook that Putin absorbed in his youth.
As for the argument that the 'loss of universals' is what is destroying the idea of human nature, it is funny to have Heidegger be the champion for that cause. As Strauss pointed out in Natural Rights and History, deconstruction through historicism is what undermined the view of humans as having their own nature. And whatever else Heidegger may have been, he was an historicist of philosophy itself.
Well maybe I wouldn’t call it “nationalism” for its political implication (often associated with a negative undertone), but how about “patriotism”?
Patriotism is the feeling of love, devotion, and sense of attachment to one's country. This attachment can be a combination of many different feelings, language relating to one's own homeland, including ethnic, cultural, political or historical aspects. It encompasses a set of concepts closely related to nationalism, mostly civic nationalism and sometimes cultural nationalism. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriotism)
Besides those in the West who believe that morality is beyond nationalism/patriotism, are more likely now the minority, given the revival of nationalism, not only in the West (e.g. the patriots in America), but especially in the rest of the World at large including Russia, China, India, Brazil.
Not to mention that the moral universalism (e.g. women’s rights) has been associated with colonialism, and contrasted with moral relativism.
Quoting Isaac
Others do. Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and Chechens lament centuries of oppression and/or persecution from Russia.
Quoting Isaac
If that’s true, go figure how worse mis-governance plus ethnic persecution/oppression must be.
Quoting Isaac
The complication doesn't come from expressing needs, it comes from satisfying them as freely as possible without others perceiving this abusive/exploitative. Millions of years ago we couldn't satisfy even basic needs (food and health) as consciously as we can do now, go figure needs socially-induced that we couldn't possibly have millions of years ago (e.g. electricity or wearing a hijab).
Quoting Putin · Feb 24, 2022
Quoting Putin · Oct 27, 2022
? a couple of dire statements from this year not using «The term "existential threat"» verbatim, instilling that sense of urgency ("hyperbolic" or perhaps "fear-mongering" better than "dire"?)
Novorossiysk (Black Sea) and Rostov-on-Don (Sea of Azov) are more or less on a stretch of Russian coastal real estate from Veselo-Voznesenka to Adler (close to the Sochi Olympic Park). Rumors will have it that Putin spent a bit to develop Taman (just east of Kerch) since 2008, also on that stretch.
Maybe Putin should have used resources to further develop Novorossiysk and Taman for example, instead of spending them on (starting) a costly war ... bombing killing destroying shamming re-culturating. :up: But when you're the top dog Russian autocrat that's not enough apparently, and so an old-fashioned land grab it is. :down: There'd instead be less destructive jobs, perhaps praise instead of people fleeing, lost tanks, bodies, a Ukraine with increasing Russo-haters, heavy international sanctions, real threats.
As long as Turkey is a NATO member (has been since 1952, supports Ukrainian territorial integrity), Russia's further southbound sea access remains «at the mercy of NATO», if that means much here, it's any supposed NATO threat that's to be assessed here in the first place. NATO would instead limit Kremlin's free military actions; maybe that's what he meant by "develop freely".
This is going nowhere, as usual with you.
A country at war cannot go on long without popular support for the war. That is true of democracies such as Ukraine, and valid for dictatorships too. If the Russian populace turns anti-war in its majority, Putin will jave to vie for peace.
[s]Dugan[/s] Dugin's imperialist world vision:
“Through rebirth as an empire, as an Orthodox empire, Russia will set an example for other empires?—?the Chinese, Turkish, Persian, Arab, Indian, as well as the Latin American, African… and the European. Instead of the dominance of one single globalist “empire” of the Great Reset, the Russian awakening should be the beginning of an era of many empires, reflecting and embodying the richness of human cultures, traditions, religions, and value systems.”
Great Awakening Vs the Great Reset
Dugin, Alexander
Alexandr Dugin is really a "Putin whisperer" in the way he has promoted this semi-fictional historical view of Russia and it's role in the World. That Putin's speeches are many times long historical presentations just reek of Dugin's attitude. It might be confusing for a Westerner to follow some Putin's speech that start's from talking about the Rus and the Middle Ages, then goes on to the Russian Revolution and the Great Patriotic War. We in the West might skip that as just "nonsensical jargon", but it truly reveals the imperialist heart of Russia that both Putin and Dugin admire. This is an ideology of an Empire and thus genuine imperialism. Talk about a man on a mission. The references to culture wars, to Russia being very Christian and so on are just to try to lure the far right in the West.
Come to Russia...
Which then begs the question: how credible is the West in it's promise to attack conventionally Russia? Is that believable enough to Russia and Putin?
It isn't only about access, but also about control of the Black Sea (just like access isn't an issue when it comes to the Baltic or the White Seas - at least not during peace time). There is no real alternative to Crimea for any nation seeking that control. Consider for example also how weapon installations in Sevastopol can reach the Bosporus due to their central position in the Black Sea.
However, Russia wasn't just going to lose control over the Black Sea, but also to see it fall into NATO (read: 'enemy') hands.
You'd be a fool to think they were going to let that happen, yet that's exactly what the United States did, and Ukraine is paying the price.
It seems you are stuck in a feedback loop containing all the things Russia "should have done", how bad Russia and Putin are, etc. while all of those things should have made it exceedingly clear what the consequences would be of trying to change Ukraine's neutral status.
You and many others are stuck yelling 'Boooo!' on the sideline, without really understanding why things are happening and why they are unfolding the way they are.
Quoting jorndoe
But you just keep repeating your story instead. :brow:
By the way, I already mentioned the Uyghur situation and the old Canadian Indian residential school system because of the uncanny parallels with the annexations — re-culturation. You might notice some of Putin's statements about "The West", NATO, whatever, bear resemblance to extremist manifestos (going as far as rambling against democracy). We've seen the type of rhetoric before. But that's not an argument, just an observation.
Quoting jorndoe
And I took the time to explain it to you in detail. If you're not interested in what I have to say, don't ask me to explain things to you next time.
You're not interested in hearing anything that doesn't confirm whatever media propaganda you've been binging on, and that's a problem I cannot help you with.
Quoting ssu
It is true that Russia is not undergoing the culture wars in which ultranationalists of other nations participate. Putin has been adept at telling them what they want to hear. But getting the thumbs up from the Russian Orthodox Church that his is a just war is important. Things would be different if they even declined to comment. But they continue to bring balloons and pom-poms to the funeral.
Similarly ...
Quoting Putin · Dec 23, 2021
By the way, it seems clear enough that various parties were naïve or not paying attention. Putin's gunmen waltzed right in and grabbed Crimea. :smile: Something, according to your story, Putin apparently would do with or without Ukrainian NATO membership, for control. Back to the threat assessment.
Russian navy ‘repels’ drone attack on Crimea’s Sevastopol (Oct 29, 2022)
Ukraine war: 'Massive' Crimea drone attack, Russia suspends grain export deal, clocks controversy (Oct 29, 2022)
(Made me think of Star Wars for a moment.)
Yep. Very popular. So's football. What's that got to do with morality?
Quoting neomac
There have been considerable tensions in these regions for centuries, yes. Largely because of the same racist shit that you and others here are peddling - that it's 'The Russians' who have been oppressing 'The Chechens' or 'The Tartars' or 'The Ukrainians'' all this time, as if there existed one contiguous entity which all born there become that must be expelled or blamed for all it's past expulsions. It's all bullshit. There's just people. Some of them are monstrous cruel, others saints. Most somewhere in between. 'The Chechens' haven't suffered centuries of persecution by 'The Russians' because there's no such thing as 'The Chechens' or 'The Russians' there's just people.
And in what way does changing a border solve any of this? Confining the genetically evil 'Russians' to a smaller unit? Better just to erect a massive fence to keep the bloodthirsty [s]Orcs[/s] Russians in their place.
The deaths you're referring to here - Ukraine, Chechnya, Crimea - are all the result of disputes over fucking borders and of the kind of racism about so-called ethnic groups that you are so vehemently flag-waiving for.
Humble them, scare them into a more respectful attitude. Impress on them the idea that others matter and can fight back when attacked. If they fail to understand the message, kill some more Russian until the message is understood. Like done with Germany and Japan.
You could ask as ironically what the fact that Mahsa Amini was killed by the morality police for wearing hijab improperly has to do with morality. Your irony has however no analytical value: if you stipulate that morality has to do only with humanitarian goals the way you define them and through the means you find more appropriate, that's an ad hoc move. Humanitarianism wasn't even a big deal among founding fathers of the Western/Christian morality: Aquinas and Sant Agustine didn't see any moral issue with slavery. There was a bloody civil war in the US ideologically around the subject of "slavery" and its morality. So I believe that for many Westerners and avg people nationalism/patriotism can not be qualified as moral now, especially after 2 WWs, yet I wouldn't relate morality to humanitarian goals as you believe it to be.
As I said, nationalism/patriotism is growing everywhere and in many authoritarian regimes is perceived as a moral-imperative.
Quoting Isaac
Fixing border issues is a solution to all problems that could realistically and actually be solved by fixing border issues everywhere in the entire known human history.
Quoting Isaac
Well I'm fine with the universal declaration of human rights. See Article 15:
And I find unrealistic to expect people to give up on whatever they value whenever it doesn't seem compatible with the humanitarian goals the way you intend them.
From an analytical and explanatory point of view, you have really nothing challenging to offer.
I knew you were a dick, but...
"Quoting Olivier5
Fuck off.
Dugin's influence is often overstated. His reputation as "Putin whisperer," "Putin's Rasputin" is largely self-created. He is a shrewd self-promoter, but he is probably better known in the West than at home. In Russia he is a fixture in the imperialist nationalist circles, and he has some influence among the siloviks, but Putin doesn't talk to him; they probably never even met. Nor is it likely that Putin reads Dugin: the latter once lamented that Putin doesn't read the right books.
Ironically, Dugin's star went into decline in 2014, during Maidan revolution in Ukraine. He was fired from his position as head of a department in Moscow State University and banned from TV after he called for killing of Ukrainians. Hard to imagine now, when exactly that is being put into practice, although there is an echo in the recent firing of the chief of RT's Russian language division after he called for drowning and burning of Ukrainian children. There have been various speculations as to exactly why Dugin fell from grace, but nothing is known for certain other than that he never quite recovered from that fall.
Putin's regime is not an ideological one, and Putin doesn't need some bearded philosopher to set the agenda for him. He needs flexible, undistinguished and, above all, loyal underlings. That today Dugin's ideology resonates with Putin's is probably more a coincidence than a causal link.
Not sure what you mean by "ideological regime", but I might disagree on that one. Putin's speeches are replete of myth-building claims, philosophical references, and civilization clash rhetoric
e.g. Ivan Ilyin is among the philosophers who directly influenced Putin, Solzhenitsyn (often cited by Putin) and Dugin.
[i]Piotr Dutkiewicz: Mr President, I would like to return to the words you have just said, that Russia should rely on Russian values. By the way, we were talking about this at a Valdai Club meeting the day before yesterday.
I would like to ask you which Russian thinkers, scholars, anthropologists and writers do you regard as your closest soul-mates, helping you to define for yourself the values that will later become those of all Russians?
Vladimir Putin: You know, I would prefer not to say that this is Ivan Ilyin alone. I read Ilyin, I read him to this day. I have his book lying on my shelf, and I pick it up and read it from time to time. I have mentioned Berdiayev, there are other Russian thinkers. All of them are people who were thinking about Russia and its future. I am fascinated by the train of their thought, but, of course, I make allowances for the time when they were working, writing and formulating their ideas. The well-known idea about the passionarity of nations is a very interesting idea. It could be challenged – arguments around it continue to this day. But if there are debates over the ideas they formulated, these are obviously not idle ideas to say the least.
Let me remind you about nations’ passionarity. According to the author of this idea, peoples, nations, ethnic groups are like a living organism: they are born, reach the peak of their development, and then quietly grow old. Many countries, including those on the American continent, say today’s Western Europe is ageing. This is the term they use. It is hard to say whether this is right or not. But, to my mind, the idea that a nation should have an inner driving mechanism for development, a will for development and self-assertion has a leg to stand on.
We are observing that certain countries are on the rise even though they have a lot of unsolved problems. They resemble erupting volcanoes, like the one on the Spanish island, which is disgorging its lava. But there are also extinguished volcanoes, where fires are long dead and one can only hear birds singing.[/i]
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66975
And I want to close with the words of a true patriot Ivan Ilyin: “If I consider Russia my Motherland, that means that I love as a Russian, contemplate and think, sing and speak as a Russian; that I believe in the spiritual strength of the Russian people. Its spirit is my spirit; its destiny is my destiny; its suffering is my grief; and its prosperity is my joy.”
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465
Finland and Poland could potentially end up hosting nuclear weapons.
Seems sort of unlikely that it will happen (to me at least); Finland would then become a Russian neighbor (border-sharing) with nuclear arms, of which there aren't a whole lot contrary to what Putin suggested.
But, unless Russia simmers down perhaps, it could become reality, more or less following Putin's moves.
I can't help but wonder, though, if a more conflict-prone or tense world is what Putin wants.
(Chaos levels the playing field, in chaos all are equal, until someone can use order to take control — a strategy alongside divide and conquer.)
Has non-proliferation taken a backseat? :meh:
Just how Orthodox Russia is quite questionable as the atheism of the Soviet Union did have an effect. I am for conservative values, but when those conservative actors align with a dictatorship, I am against it. In fact nothing can be detrimental in the long run as the Russian church openly supporting a dictator, that now seems to have made quite horrific blunders.
Is he banned from Russian television?
I'm not so sure how much Dugin's star has faded as his speeches is quite well taken now as there is a war between Russia and Ukraine. And let's not forget that his daughter (presumable killed by the Ukrainian intelligence services trying to kill him) is now a martyr for the Russian side in this war. Obviously not the smartest moves that Ukrainians have done as Dugin is a civilian. But I guess an easier target than lawful targets as military commanders.
I haven't seen this article, but I guess it's more of the journalists (Lauri Nurmi) imagination than anything else: if nobody hasn't talked about them and hence no official entity has forbid them, guess that means that Finland could "potentially" have them. Finland isn't even considering having permanent NATO bases. Just where they are isn't so important... as long as they are on the continent.
In my view this is a way to start working on the unity of the Finnish people for NATO: make the case into a hot potatoe and divide the people. Enjoying an 80% support is too much for some. Let's remember just what these nukes are about: the very old free fall tactical nukes that usually go with F-16. Not only would Finnish aircraft have to be upgraded for this mission (as you cannot just put B61 nuke on to a rack of any aircraft).
I meant that Putin's regime doesn't have a founding ideology - the kind of ideology that animates the masses, at least in its early years. Such was the case with Communist, Fascist and Islamist regimes, but "Putinism" doesn't have this pedigree. The regime's control over mass media, for example, was always a sloppy, cynical affair, in which carefully curated news and propaganda shows went hand-in-hand with Western or Western-styled TV series and commercials for Western products. (To a large degree, that remains true even today.) Alternative media was marginalized but not entirely banned. Whatever ideology there is, it is ad hoc, tactical, often inconsistent. It is pandering, rather than revolutionary, mining old tropes for ready appeal.
The ultimate proof text of Putinist ideology is Putin himself - and yes, of course, Putin has his influences. He does like citing Ilyin - a Russian monarchist political thinker, who was sympathetic to Nazism and Fascism (like I said, there is a lot of cynicism, inconsistency and fakery in this ideology, if it can even be called such).
Some great work by the people @Olivier5 encourages us to
Quoting Olivier5
of.
Sure hope these guys get what's coming to them too. Bloody Russians.
Putin used a graphic of Florida getting nuked to show off new Russian weapons (Orlando Weekly; Mar 1, 2018)
[sup]Putin shows video of nuclear attack on US (Newsy; Mar 1, 2018; 42s youtube)[/sup]
Quoting Clip Of Russian President Vladimir Putin State of the Nation Address (C-SPAN · Mar 2, 2018)
What to make of it?
Those Russians got what was coming for them in the dictatorship of Vladimir Putin. Great that the World hasn't forgotten.
I don't understand how any of that is a response to the point I was making.
I'm merely calling out @Olivier5's disgusting use of calls to nationalist violence. More disturbing still, now it seems everyone is basically fine with someone on this forum calling on people to "kill some more Russians"
I've flagged the post but clearly calling for the killing of people based on nationality is something the forum's moderators are fine with.
I somehow think a call to "kill more Americans" would not have met with such moral decrepitude.
Yes. It's horrific that such a phenomenal group have been persecuted by Putin. They were dissolved in late 2021. No one gave a fuck...
...until now, when its conveniently trotted out to justify a proxy war. No. Back then we were still happy to buy the bastard's oil and gold, still happy to have his cronies prop up the London property market...
They did. At least in Belarus and Russia.
Belarus:
Government authorities have repeatedly sought to silence Ales Bialiatski. He was imprisoned from 2011 to 2014. Following large-scale demonstrations against the regime in 2020, he was again arrested. He is still detained without trial. Despite tremendous personal hardship, Mr Bialiatski has not yielded an inch in his fight for human rights and democracy in Belarus.
Russia:
Civil society actors in Russia have been subjected to threats, imprisonment, disappearance and murder for many years. As part of the government’s harassment of Memorial, the organisation was stamped early on as a “foreign agent”. In December 2021, the authorities decided that Memorial was to be forcibly liquidated and the documentation centre was to be closed permanently. The closures became effective in the following months, but the people behind Memorial refuse to be shut down. In a comment on the forced dissolution, chairman Yan Rachinsky stated, “Nobody plans to give up.”
Ukraine:
[i]The Center for Civil Liberties was founded in Kyiv in 2007 for the purpose of advancing human rights and democracy in Ukraine. The center has taken a stand to strengthen Ukrainian civil society and pressure the authorities to make Ukraine a full-fledged democracy. To develop Ukraine into a state governed by rule of law, Center for Civil Liberties has actively advocated that Ukraine become affiliated with the International Criminal Court.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Center for Civil Liberties has engaged in efforts to identify and document Russian war crimes against the Ukrainian civilian population. In collaboration with international partners, the center is playing a pioneering role with a view to holding the guilty parties accountable for their crimes[/i]... and they didn't even report war crimes from Ukrainians?!
It's like discussing with three year olds...
To kill a mass murderer who is on a murdering spree is morally justified.
If they keep on murdering Ukrainians, Russian troops ought to die. If they don't want to die, they are welcome to lay down arms and surrender at any time.
And Chechen troops? Syrian troops? The mixed nationalities of Wagner and Rusich? The Ukrainians fighting on Russia's side?
You can't slither out of it that way. You said "Russians", you meant "Russians". If you meant 'invading armies' there's already a term for that.
It's just racism. Lazy racism isn't an improvement on properly planned racism.
They too are welcome to surrender, if they don't want to die.
Not what I asked.
I asked why you didn't mention those nationalities if your target was the invading forces, not the Russian people.
Quoting neomac
Quoting neomac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Olivier5
We were talking directly about @neomac's false claim that there was some contiguous entity called 'The Russians' which deservedly had the hatred of the another such entity called 'The Chechens', and you responded that 'The Russians' ought be killed until they got the message.
No mention of armies, nor invading forces. Just racist bullshit.
Never made such claim. You need to creatively rephrase my claims to make a point, otherwise you would quote me. I'm responsible for what I write not for what you understand.
Besides my or Olivier's position would still be plausible, even if it were false or racist as you claim.
So for what reason are you insulting me or Olivier? Besides you support humanitarianism, insults are a form a psychological violence, which doesn't sound as supportive of human wellbeing.
But we can't exclude that either:
Russian political analyst Dmitry Babich shed doubt on Dugin being the target, saying that Darya was “more popular than her father” at the time of the incident. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/23/will-darya-duginas-killing-influence-the-russia-ukraine-war
I did quote you. That's what the quote function does. People can read the full posts, they're linked to the quote in question for that reason. I'm not re-pasting the entire discussion.
We were clearly talking about national identities. Anyone can read as much from simply looking back over the posts that have been linked to by the quote function.
Quoting neomac
So? I don't give a shit about plausible. I'm talking about racism. I'm talking about the perpetuation of the notion that there are distinct 'ethnic groups' of humans who have characteristics which are inherited, who can be held responsible for the crimes of their previous generations, who can be seen as more likely to repeat those crimes, who can be 'taught a lesson' as if en masse.
In short, the kind of racism you're peddling here with your stories about how 'Chechens' or 'Ukrainians' have been oppressed for generations by 'Russians'.
All the people involved in the Holodomor are dead. All the people involved in the Caucasian War are dead. Virtually all the people involved in Operation Lentil are dead. The current crop of people living in Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya have nothing whatsoever to do with those crimes - they're not responsible for them, they're not 'ethnically' more likely to commit them again, they're not genetically predisposed to that sort of thing. They are utterly irrelevant. Bringing them up perpetuates exactly the kind of ethnic animosity that drives these wars. It's disgusting.
There might be differences, yet I’m not sure if they are enough to support your claim. The expression “Putinism” would be more insightful if it referred to distinctive/identifiable Putin’s ideological beliefs that he promotes and make a difference with his socio-cultural environment’s, but your claim that Putinism consists in “mining old tropes for ready appeal” doesn’t seem to support that, it simply suggests that Putin’s not an original ideologue. And even if, as you suggest, Putin’s motivations were cynical and not genuine by exploiting the nationalist/imperialist tropes, I wouldn’t qualify a regime “ideological” based on the honesty of its leader (and assumed it's clear what "ideological regime" is as opposed to "non-ideological regime").
Quote the original claim of mine where I stated "there was some contiguous entity called 'The Russians' which deservedly had the hatred of...", you liar.
You ask disingenuous questions. You know perfectly well that I meant Russians forces in Ukraine and their allies, not the population of Vladivostok, Moscow or St Petersburg.
So is racism plausible or not?
Quoting Isaac
Is this a factual claim or a prescription?
Quoting Isaac
I find seafood disgusting others don't. But I don't insult people for that nor object against that. Even if I managed to prove that they indeed like seafood.
So you don't understand what you quote in your own messages?
Quoting Isaac
Putin started his career extremely likely with a false flag operation killing ordinary Russians, perpetrated what could be said to be a genocidal war in Chechnya, has been against any grass roots organizations like the Memorial. And then has started this mindless war that surely will kill a lot of people more.
And for Russia to lose the unfortunate fact is that Russian soldiers are going to die. But it's not Russian civilians. Ukraine isn't making retaliatory strikes against civilian targets in Russia as Russia is doing in Ukraine.
There's no such claim, it was a long discussion. I'm not citing the entirety of it again. As I said, people can read it from the links in the quotes provided.
Quoting Olivier5
Then what you said was completely irrelevant, as shown by the context I provided. The discussion started with a comment about how 'Ukrainians' deserved a say in the control of Donbas. I disputed that such a group existed with that right. If you just want to spout off more virtue signalling about how much you dislike what the Russian forces are doing, do it in someone else's discussion, don't respond to me to do it.
Quoting neomac
You have to ask?
Quoting neomac
Seriously? You think a dislike of racism is akin to a dislike of seafood?
Quoting ssu
So?
What has any of that got to do with the discussion about the realism of ethnic groups?
Yeah, I think Dugin is still in the doghouse for whatever reason. He used to have his own program, appeared on panel discussions and such. Not any more. Doesn't hold any prominent academic positions either.
Quoting ssu
That was a very strange affair.
Mr Strawman inventing his own topics of the discussion, it seems.
Then this claim of yours is a lie: neomac's false claim that there was some contiguous entity called 'The Russians' which deservedly had the hatred of because I never made such a claim, and you knew that.
Quoting Isaac
Should I ask again? I want you to state what you claim to be plausible or implausible, so I can quote you, and not creatively rephrase claims as you do.
Quoting Isaac
I think that you do not have the conceptual tools to make such distinction rationally compelling for the discussion at hand.
You can read the discussion from here if you're confused
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/752250
I said...
Quoting Isaac
If you dislike people selecting partial quotes to make a point you might want to set a better example.
Quoting neomac
What?
"Virtue signaling" is just another name for ethics.
If there is no such group as "the Russians", then how is it even possible to speak of anti-Russian racism?
You didn't quote me. Neither selectively nor entirely. Besides what is the partial quote I made of you that you find so problematic wrt what I claim against you? And why?
Quoting Isaac
You play dumb and argue in an intellectually uncooperative way. Your position is embarrassingly self-defeating at any level one wants to see it.
No it isn't. Look it up.
Quoting Olivier5
I never claimed there's no such group. My claims are of the form "there's no such group as "the Russians", which...". It's about the properties of any such group. The group 'the Russians' shares the property of having Russian passports. No other.
Quoting neomac
That's right. One cannot 'quote' the entirety of a discussion. I cannot 'quote' your entire position. I paraphrase it supported by selected quotes. It completely normal procedure, exegeses are not composed entirely of quotes.
A discussion is not my claim, and your exegesis of what I claimed in a discussion is not my claim. Period. And that's important to expressly acknowledge precisely because your exegesis might be pretty shitty. And that's not the first time I (and others) noticed it. You are prone to strawman your interlocutors.
Of course. The solution is to correct that shitty exegesis, not demand proof of it. Thus isn't an exam, it's a discussion. If my exegesis is incorrect, just correct it.
Quoting neomac
People's propensity to use accusations of this sort to avoid uncomfortable arguments is neither here nor there. I doubt there's a single person on this forum who hasn't been accused of strawmanning or similar rhetorical devices. Certainly everyone that has accused me of it has also been accused of it themselves in turn. It's quite a common trick. A rhetorical device, ironically, that, despite being extremely common, people seem to think is very clever and conclusive.
Yes that's how you shift the burden of proof on your interlocutor. It's always your opponent that must catch up to whatever bullshit you claim about them. This is your rhetoric trick. An intellectually miserable one.
Quoting Isaac
I have enough evidence of that. And don't expect the liar to admit his own lies.
Keep insulting people, dude, that's the best argument you can offer to support your humanitarian goals.
So do Russians exist or not?
So your claims are like "there's no such group as "the Russians", which..." share the property of having Russian passports.
But then you claim also:
Quoting Isaac
If a group exists, called the Russians, and defined by their nationality, is that a bad thing because hey, nationalism is caca?
What is there to comprehend? You have no clue what you are talking about.
U.S. accuses Russia of "weaponizing food" after halting Ukraine grain exports (Axios; Oct 30, 2022)
The logic seems clear enough, yes? Putin values the warships being intact (untouchable) more than he values those people getting food. To me, that doesn't seem approachable as such, though he should be (regularly). What's next? Hold food hostage for Kyiv (London, Tampa Bay)?
Do I seriously have to explain racism to you.
"Black people have dark skin" - fine.
"Black people are all criminals" - not fine.
"Russians have Russian passports" - fine.
"Russians oppress Chechens" - not fine.
"Roma mostly come from Europe and Anatolia" - fine.
"Roma are all drug addicts" - not fine.
"Russians mostly speak Russian" - fine.
"Russians are responsible for the atrocities of 50 years ago because they live in the same place" - not fine.
This really isn't the place for this, there are courses you can go on if you need help.
Your logical acumen is very poor.
"Russians oppress Chechens" doesn't have the logical form of "Black people are all criminals" or "Roma are all drug addicts" (notice the use of the quantifier "all").
"Russians oppress Chechens" (like “tigers are striped”, “ducks lay eggs”, and “ticks carry Lyme disease”) is a generic proposition which does not carry information about how many members of a given group have the alleged property, therefore it can not be reduced to a quantified (e.g. universal) proposition.
Fucksake, it's not about the fucking numbers. Even if some black people are criminals it's not OK to say "blacks are criminals"
Generics can be used to convey or suggest racial stereotypes and incentivize forms of social discrimination, but the claims I (and others) made here about "Russians" (like "Russians oppressed Ukrainians" or "Russians are oppressing Ukrainians") are not meant to convey nor suggest such racial stereotypes, and related forms of social discrimination. Those generics must be understood in the historical, military, cultural and political context I (and others) have specified. If you are intellectually blind to such uses, that's your problem: "you have to meet a minimum standard of comprehension" to sound rationally compelling.
The project aims to gather information related to persons of the following categories:
https://www.spisok-putina.org/en/personas/
But then it follows that there is a set as "all the Russians". Like, a nation of Russians.
But if such a nation exists, and legitimately so, what's wrong with nations, exactly?
:up:
Very accurate and quite scary quotes, even some comparisons of Russia to Nazi Germany and the like.
Again, very reminiscent of how mass propaganda was discovered in WWI, turning an isolationist nation to a war crazy society in a short amount of time.
And we still have to say, that what Russia is doing to Ukraine is criminal. Because that's not obvious. If we survive this, be ready for the demonization of China, which has been developing a good deal since Trump and not slowing down with Biden.
One of the way how navies fight is to create a blockade against the enemy country. And naturally that is against all shipping to and from the country. Russian navy can perform this from out of the reach of Ukrainian missiles and drones. Yet the Sevastapol naval base is in reach of Ukrainian weapons.
As I said. Lazy racism is not an improvement on carefully thought out racism. Absolutely nothing that happens today is justified by the actions of people from generations past, or those who happen to share a passport. No wars, no animosity, no ethnic violence...nothing.
There's no "historical, military, cultural and political context" in which becomes OK to extend the crimes of some people to all who happen to share a passport, just as there's no "historical, military, cultural and political context" in which it would ever become OK to say "Blacks are criminals, or "Jews are greedy".
There's no "historical, military, cultural and political context" in which the oppression of some people who happened at the time to be Ukrainian by some people who happened at the time to be Russian has any justificatory weight whatsoever on decisions made today about the current group of people who happen to be Ukrainian and the current groups of people who happen to be Russian. They are completely different groups of people.
Define "lazy racism", lazy boy.
Quoting Isaac
Quote me where I claimed that. What is "extend the crimes" supposed to mean?
Quoting Isaac
People may be different. But culture and national identity may still be the same. You are just repeating your moral claims, not making them more rationally compelling.
Nothing. Who said there was anything wrong with nations? They're a very efficient means of administering (hopefully) enfranchised populations. Same for electoral districts of any size. A very pragmatic solution to the problem of representation.
Nationalism is not the mere acknowledgement that nations exist. Do I have to explain nationalism too?
Why not? Do you have interesting lies to share about it?
To my mind, it's hard to have nations without borders, and hence without getting occasional wars over these borders.
Yes, it's truly terrifying. What I think is most frightening about it is that there's so much less human involvement in social narratives these days. Algorithms polarise viewpoints then the political classes respond to the newly polarised viewpoints to push their agendas and under pressure, those same companies who run the algorithms then censor content according to the whims of the very veiwpoints their own algorithms created. As Katie Paul at Reuters put it recently "driven as much by business considerations and news cycles as by principle". Meta algorithms make the news cycles, then Meta censoring staff respond to them as if they were naturally occurring features of society.
If you have anything to say about nationalism then why not join the conversation? Otherwise I'm not sure what your rambling on about the practicality and consequences of having borders has to do with anything being discussed.
Talking about "Russian endemic cruelty" is wrong as if it was some genetic issue for Russians, however there is no overcoming the fact that Russia hasn't had a democracy as we have in the West and it's a police state, not a justice state. There are plenty of Russians that have moved to the West to show that Russians are quite the same to us. Yet what is typical for the West is that atrocities like My Lai or Abu Ghraib do create an outrage, whereas in Russia those Russians pointing these things out, they are killed and organizations banned, as was with the Memorial -organization (which for some unknown reason @Isaac quoted).
The fact is that the Russian armed forces is a direct descendant of the Soviet Army and hardly has had much actual reform. And Putin's dictatorship has shown it really doesn't care about issues like the laws of war. The only thing that actually will decrease this is the nature of the war being a conventional one with front lines as the whole country isn't the battlefield for the ground forces.
(From the Chechen War)
The fact is that many Russians are totally similar to us and would want Russia to be a democracy and a justice state, however once you have this kind of system, that system and it's violence prevails. People are one thing, the system and how the government operates is another. Hence it was quite easy to anticipate that similar actions that happened Chechnya or Syria would also happen in Ukraine.
Hence Isaac's pathetic racism card is one of these attempts to draw the focus away from this war and what Putin is doing in Ukraine and to get to what he is really enthusiastic about: to blame the West.
Yes.
The claim I disputed was...
Quoting neomac
In support of the claim that...
Quoting neomac
It's absolutely racist to suggest there's any link whatsoever between past war crimes ("generations" ago) and a current or future propensity to commit war crimes on the basis of shared nationality.
That's exactly the claim that was being made. It's a racist claim. It's nothing whatsoever to do with merely "pointing out" war crimes. It's pointing out past war crimes and additionally saying that because they were committed by Russians they have some bearing on the likelihood of future Russians committing similar crimes.
What followed was a load of nationalistic horse shit designed to double-down on a position which should have just been dropped.
Quoting ssu
So now explain how simply moving the geographic location of this monstrously awful system in any way makes the world a better place.
Why would I need to come up with an alternative? I think dividing the world into lines of nations and electoral districts is an excellent way of administering representative democracy.
I think sending thousands of men, women, and children to their bloody deaths over where those lines are is absolute fucking insanity, and cheerleading such reckless inhumanity from the sidelines is morally decrepit.
And yet you can understand the UK resistance to Nazi Germany. So what gives?
Quoting ssu
You do realise both Ukraine and Chechnya were part of that same system, right?
So is it impossible to change, or isn't it? Ought we be suspicious of ex-soviet systems or oughtn't we?
It's all just convenient narrative building. When you want to justify anti-Russian racism you'll claim that systemic institutionalised attitudes are unlikely to change...
So what about Azov?
Oh no, Azov only used to be brutal neo-nazis, they've all changed now. New narrative, new rules. Now it's super easy for a brutal institution to change its ways overnight... Because it's convenient for your preferred narrative.
We've already talked about that. You embarrassed yourself by claiming that the difference between Nazi Germany and 1930s England was about the same as that between Donbas and Russia. I don't see the point in putting you through that again.
Even with Nazi Germany we attempted a peaceful rearrangement of borders first. As was entirely right. Hindsight bias is a curse.
We have, but you haven't. Why was the UK resistance to Nazi Germany not an "absolute fucking insanity"?
1. Parts of it were. The bombing of Dresden was a disgrace.
2. We'd tried a peaceful resolution to the border disagreements, it hadn't worked.
3. We'd previously promised to defend Poland (again, in an attempt to avoid war), we then did.
4 England at the time was a fully fledged democracy and had been for decades. Germany was an open dictatorship with openly racist agendas.
5 Hitler's invasion of Poland wasn't a stage in a protracted civil war with Pro-Nazi insurgents in Poland.
6 We now know that some of Hitler's intent (and practice) with regards to concentration camps was known to the allies. Concentration camps (and the like) are industrialised killing. One of the few methods of genocide which have a faster kill rate than war. Going to war to prevent genocide, on that scale, may be appropriate simply by necessity.
The details are not important. I might be wrong about 1938. I'm not an historian. The relevant issue is that whether there was an alternative means to achieve the same humanitarian goal determines whether a war is just. The borders are still irrelevant, it's about preventing the people within them suffering harms. If the only way to do that is war, then war is just.
So have we with the 2 Minsk agreements
Quoting Isaac
We are helping Ukraine protect itself, and ourselves by the same occasion.
Quoting Isaac
Funny that you'd call it "England", an ethnic term, rather than the UK. In any case, at the time what was at war with Germany was not a democracy by any measure, but an empire, the British Empire, which had its fair share of concentration camps and racially-based apartheid.
Moreover, Russia today is a dictatorship with an obviously racist agenda.
Quoting Isaac
So Hitler was less prone than Putin to entice civil wars in neighbouring countries. So what?
Quoting Isaac
The death camps became known only much after and were never a motive for the war.
It seems that according to you, some nations (the English, the Russians) exist and have a right to self-defense, while some others (the Ukrainians) do not.
Yes, and both are targets of Russian imperialism. With the case of Chechnya it was trying to free itself from the Russian federation. Yet Chechnya was colonized only in the 19th Century to Russia.
Quoting Isaac
As surely as peaceful the Germans are today, Russia and Russia can surely be a democracy that doesn't have imperial ambitions. But Putin's dictatorship has those, which you cannot deny or just brush aside as you try to do.
The Baltic States are also ex-Soviet, and have managed pretty well to create democracies. They aren't ruled by dictators.
Quoting Isaac
No it's not. Your are just making hapless attempts to portray others as racists in a quite futile way.
Quoting Isaac
Again nonsense. There was a fear just where would Ukraine be going when you had the Right-sector winning in elections prior to the Revolution 2014 and the far right's participation in the Maidan revolution raised concerns (which obviously Russia used for propaganda purposes). Yet the extreme-right suffered a defeat in the elections in 2014 (which the Russian propagandists forget) and afterwards there have been other administrations.
They're not the same, and they don't relate to the 2022 invasion.
Quoting Olivier5
But we didn't declare that we would in advance as a means of preventing the war.
Quoting Olivier5
Nonsense. England was a full democracy by any standard that somewhere like Ukraine might be measured, certainly nothing like Germany was at the time - the two were miles apart. As to the British Empire, I agree, but that didn't affect the people living in Europe. The point is purely about how to bring about the best humanitarian ends. Germany was invading Europe, so the question was whether war with Germany was going to bring about better humanitarian ends to the people of Europe than simply agreeing to the change of border. The former would bring way more mass death and destruction than they currently were experiencing, but so would the latter. In the case of Ukraine, it's not so clear. War to move the de facto border back again will bring way more mass death and destruction than they were experiencing, but it's nowhere near so clear that simply moving the border would.
Quoting Olivier5
No it isn't. It's an authoritarian democracy where the leader is able to manipulate election results. It has no specified racist agenda.
Quoting Olivier5
So it makes our intervention much more justified. Virtually 100% of Poland did not want to be ruled by Hitler. This is not so in cases of civil war. We should not intervene on one side or the other of civil war (other than for humanitarian reasons) because by it's very nature the people there are divided.
Quoting Olivier5
You don't know what the motives are and no, the death camps were not know about much after. Hitler was actually being arranged for war crimes by 1944.
So? Both were soviet systems. You said the system couldn't change. It did.
Quoting ssu
Right, so there's absolutely no justification behind @neomac's claim about "generations" of abuse in future. Russian are perfectly capable and likely to change regime-type and approach to war. Other ex-soviet regimes have done so. There's therefore no reason whatsoever to assume that Donbas in Russian hands would yield "generations" of abuse.
Quoting ssu
Exactly. You're claiming with Azov that it can (and did) change it's attitudes within the space of a few years, yet you're claiming with the Russian army that the attitudes are systemic and unlikely to change. That's just hypocrisy.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-azov-battalion-mariupol-neo-nazis-b2043022.html
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30414955
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/09/ukraine-must-stop-ongoing-abuses-and-war-crimes-pro-ukrainian-volunteer-forces/
“Racism”, as I understand it, refers to beliefs (typically unproven) about biological traits (the “race”) which encourage a social discrimination (typically morally questionable). Since I never made claims about Russian “race” or presuppose beliefs about Russian “race”, my claims can not be considered racist. My point is that besides biological traits there are also socio-cultural traits/products/patterns that are shared across individuals and generations (e.g. language, habits, ideologies, historical tropes, administrative organizations, military doctrine, economic infrastructures, nuclear arsenals). Acknowledging their existence, studying them (as social scientists, historians and anthropologists do) and form expectations based on them doesn’t equate to, nor implies, nor suggests the belief that cultural traits/products/patterns are pre-determined by or strictly associated with biology or genetics or phenotypic traits, and therefore it has nothing to do with racism. Even acknowledging that not all socio-cultural traits are perceived as compatible (e.g. Russian authoritarianism as I understand it, is not compatible with Western democracy as I understand it) is racist. And even expressing a deep preference for the latter and rejection of the former can be considered “racist”.
So either you are making a preposterous usage of the word “racism” or you are being intellectually dishonest. Tertium non datur.
Capability depends on material and cultural factors that can be geopolitically at stake: ex-soviet regimes have done so, by joining NATO or EU (in around 15 years), not by remaining within the Russian sphere of influence (Russia itself after 30 years has grown more authoritarian and imperialistic).
Then I suggest you educate yourself on the matter.
Quoting https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-guidance/race-discrimination
Distinguishing correlation and causation is pretty basic stuff. What proof do you have that joining NATO/EU was the cause of the changes and not a consequence of them?
Again if you do not clarify the way you use words (as I did), despite you have been asked to, that's matter of your personal intellectual honesty. And you proved you have none.
Picking a definition from official source provides evidence of a certain usage, sure, but not a universal usage, and certainly I'm not committed to such usage which I find preposterous. For me racism has to do with race, a biological concept, (hence the word "racism") and has to do with discrimination which is morally if not legally questionable. Period.
If you want to extend it to nationality or ethnicity (as non-biological factors) fine but you have to clarify it, since nationality doesn't necessarily imply a correlation with a specific "race" (American is one nationality but not one race) and can be better rendered with the word "xenophobia".
But that's not all. The other key concept is discrimination. Your own source specifies how this is to be intended [1]. Where did I claim we should discriminate Russians in the sense specified by your own source exactly?
Besides your own source doesn't support the claim that nationality or ethnicity is nothing else than having the passport of a given nationality.
[1]
[i]Different types of race discrimination
There are four main types of race discrimination.
Direct discrimination
This happens when someone treats you worse than another person in a similar situation because of your race. For example:
if a letting agency would not let a flat to you because of your race, this would be direct race discrimination
Indirect discrimination
This happens when an organisation has a particular policy or way of working that puts people of your racial group at a disadvantage. For example:
a hairdresser refuses to employ stylists that cover their own hair, this would put any Muslim women or Sikh men who cover their hair at a disadvantage when applying for a position as a stylist
Sometimes indirect race discrimination can be permitted if the organisation or employer is able to show to show that there is a good reason for the discrimination. This is known as objective justification. For example:
a Somalian asylum seeker tries to open a bank account but the bank states that in order to be eligible you need to have been resident in the UK for 12 months and have a permanent address. The Somalian man is not able to open a bank account. The bank would need to prove that its policy was necessary for business reasons (such as to prevent fraud) and that there was no practical alternative
Harassment
Harassment occurs when someone makes you feel humiliated, offended or degraded. For example:
a young British Asian man at work keeps being called a racist name by colleagues. His colleagues say it is just banter, but the employee is insulted and offended by it
Harassment can never be justified. However, if an organisation or employer can show it did everything it could to prevent people who work for it from behaving like that, you will not be able to make a claim for harassment against it, although you could make a claim against the harasser.
Victimisation
This is when you are treated badly because you have made a complaint of race related discrimination under the Equality Act. It can also occur if you are supporting someone who has made a complaint of race related discrimination. For example:
the young man in the example above wants to make a formal complaint about his treatment. His manager threatens to sack him unless he drops the complaint[/i]
When you're making up your own definition of racism to avoid the charge you should probably stop digging.
So did any diplomacy preceding WW2.
The rest of your post is similar. Just saying no no no without any argument.
If one war was just, then other wars can be just too. Including this one.
What arguments did you provide?
Quoting Olivier5
...is not an argument.
Quoting Olivier5
...is not an argument.
Quoting Olivier5
...is not an argument.
Quoting Olivier5
...is not an argument.
Happy to treat like with like.
Very much so. Heck, we even went so far as to ban Russia Today on YouTube and other platforms. Of course, these can still be reached online. But the idea here being that it is insane to consider how the Russian government (Putin and his allies, essentially) views this issue. Obviously a big mistake, for so called defenders of "free speech". That arises in Europe when it comes to Muslims. Not here.
If one war was just, others can be. Including this one. That's an argument.
No I'm not making up my own definition [1]. But the meaning of the word can be stretched depending on context and needs. So if you do not provide your definition (even if I asked), I'll use mine of course. That's why it's matter of intellectual honesty to clarify the terms used when needed.
Besides it doesn't really matter. You didn't prove that I'm racist according to your own definition. You didn't provide any evidence that I support the discrimination of Russians based on their nationality or the possession of the Russian passport.
Congratulations for your epic fail.
[1]
[i]Racism
Racism is the belief that groups of humans possess different behavioral traits corresponding to inherited attributes and can be divided based on the superiority of one race over another. It may also mean prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against other people because they are of a different race or ethnicity. Modern variants of racism are often based in social perceptions of biological differences between peoples. These views can take the form of social actions, practices or beliefs, or political systems in which different races are ranked as inherently superior or inferior to each other, based on presumed shared inheritable traits, abilities, or qualities.[2][4] There have been attempts to legitimize racist beliefs through scientific means, such as scientific racism, which have been overwhelmingly shown to be unfounded. In terms of political systems (e.g. apartheid) that support the expression of prejudice or aversion in discriminatory practices or laws, racist ideology may include associated social aspects such as nativism, xenophobia, otherness, segregation, hierarchical ranking, and supremacism.
While the concepts of race and ethnicity are considered to be separate in contemporary social science, the two terms have a long history of equivalence in popular usage and older social science literature. "Ethnicity" is often used in a sense close to one traditionally attributed to "race", the division of human groups based on qualities assumed to be essential or innate to the group (e.g. shared ancestry or shared behavior). Racism and racial discrimination are often used to describe discrimination on an ethnic or cultural basis, independent of whether these differences are described as racial. According to the United Nations's Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, there is no distinction between the terms "racial" and "ethnic" discrimination. It further concludes that superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust, and dangerous. The convention also declared that there is no justification for racial discrimination, anywhere, in theory or in practice.[/i]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racism
Excellent argument. I should save that one up for anybody arguing that diplomacy hadn't been tried, they'll be absolutely trounced.
Any opinion on my actual argument that restructuring borders hadn't been tried?
Quoting Olivier5
Another corker. Anyone arguing that this war cannot be just will be absolutely quaking in their boots.
Any thoughts at all on my actual argument that supporting only a military solution is an inefficient and unnecessarily harmful solution to the border dispute?
I didn't talk about causation. But since we are at it, tell me what would be the difference between causation and correlation in history and what would count as evidence of causality in history.
Your claim was...
Quoting neomac
X achieves Y by Z.
So how does Z bring Y about if Z doesn't cause Y?
Quoting neomac
Really? A cause is when some action leads to another, a correlation would be when two actions are related, but one may have resulted in the other or vice versa (the matter being unclear), or the two events are co-caused by a third.
In your example, the Baltic States may have developed more open democracies because they joined NATO/EU, or they may have done because of their own internal political movements and joined NATO/EU as a consequence.
Quoting neomac
One event preceding another would help. There being some plausible mechanism by which the former event brings about the latter would be good too. Some documents, speeches, photographs... The usual.
Yeah, It's a question of 'how scared do you want to be' that determines how deep you look.
The recent court filings from the Eric Schmitt lawsuit, reported in The Intercept make a particularly good horror story...
Used to great effect with the Hunter Biden Laptop story suppression...
But sure...nothing like that would happen with any of the important issues like war and global health...
Note here there's no concern whatsoever about disinformation relating to actual US cover-ups Guantanamo, Asange, NSA spying... Just the familiar stories we all know from the last few years...
But it's alright because it's the government intervening, and the government aren't going to lie are they...?
Oh fuck.
It's, in a way a natural evolution of traditional propaganda as developed in the early 20th century. We just so happened to develop the internet, and why wouldn't those power not use this to their advantage?
One of the saving graces for the internet is that, if you know how to use it, you can find very good information, which would otherwise be extremely difficult to obtain.
One must assume "they" (CIA, FB - all these government and corporations) have everything on you in terms of information, and will use that info according to how they see fit.
Wars such as this one provides just more example of such a system on controlled information works.
By "Putinism" I meant, for lack of a better term, the regime that has formed in Russia during Putin's rule. We don't really know what's in Putin's head, and ultimately, that's not what matters most (excepting Putin's biographers). What matters is the character of the regime, and that we can see without the benefit of mindreading.
In another thread, I said:
Quoting _db
This quote should give some context into why I am asking these questions. I'm not trying to troll here. Tons of people are getting injured and killed and I want to know why this needs to happen.
Your bullet points of questions refer to a Ukrainian state. A generous portion of the 11,300 comments on this thread concern whether it exists or not. It is lost or found between the interests of Russian and other nations.
When you speak of choosing between lesser or greater evils, the experience of actual war has superseded the calculation of peace bought at the cost of oppression.
How would an accurate response to your set of speculative questions provide a possible way to end the conflict?
It is, yes, but there's this element of a polarising effect with social media too that I think classic propaganda had begun to lose. Opinions can get so rapidly built up into 'movements', with so many people relying on only one news source and lay readers being so involved in building stories without checking fact like a journalist might.
I think up to the late 50s newspapers might well have been able to play the role social media plays now, of presenting a relatively polarised narrative (complete with only one side being the 'sensible' one and the other the 'mob'), but in the 60s to 90s I think that position became untenable. We saw a growth of counter-culture movements with intellectual support that presented quite a wide field of options.
That was, in my view, progress against the strength of propaganda, which the rise of social media has reversed. We're now back to the pre-50s era of two opposing narratives on everything (again where one is the 'sensible' one and the other the 'mob'). That should worry us from an analytical perspective, but even without analysis, it should worry us simply on its face that we're back to the situation governments found favourable in the 50s, the height of McCarthyism and cold war nuclear brinkmanship.
Well then, we agree.
In all four cases @_db refers to 'the state' as the decision-making body. No one is denying the existence of a decision-making body in Russia and Ukraine which has the power to make the unilateral decisions that are mentioned in the questions, nor is the existence of such bodies under any genuine threat on either side. The Ukrainian government definitely exists, no one is denying it and there's no credible threat to their continued existence as a legislative body (despite the individuals therein being under personal threat) that would prevent them from making the decisions in question. Likewise with Russia. So I don't see any difficulty the contention about Ukrainian national integrity would present in answering the questions.
I think my answers have been given already, but since you asked openly and no one else has replied...
Quoting _db
I think this is best answered by the various indices of human development, backed up by reports from the likes of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. Political freedom would be substantially reduced, and most likely free elections would be curtailed. Relations with the EU obviously stopped (but it's unclear what meaningful effect this would have on the population). Belarus is close as example of a Russian puppet state. Other aspects of human rights - security, health, welfare - would have stayed much the same as the two countries are barely any different in those aspects (both pretty bad), and recent new EU members have seen their social welfare programs crushed by EU/ECB rules.
Additionally now, of course, you have to factor in reconstruction. Ceding territory, that's in the hands of the Russian states, not ceding, it's in the hands of the IMF and the US. The IMF hasn't a very good track record on social welfare in its vassal states, worse that Russia's (which is already bad). But Russia is now in a much worse economic situation, so less capable of splashing out on the kind of infrastructure improvements it put in place when, for example, annexing Crimea.
There's been talk of a Chechnya-like series of ethnic cleansings, but I think the likelihood of such atrocities would depend on the means by which the territory is ceded. If Russia win outright, it's possible (though I still think unlikely). If the territory were ceded as part of a negotiation with global parties involved (UN, US), then I think it's far less likely.
This uncertainty is measured against 1000 casualties every day the war continues and no realistic chance of that ending for at least a year or so, if it ever ends (there'll always be a border and Russia will always be the other side of it). Plus every additional day of war makes the decision about reconstruction costs even harder as Ukraine get into even more debt.
Quoting _db
Very little in the latter case (never invaded), but in the former, I'm guessing there'll be fallout in political terms - possibly a loss in Putin's power, which might be a good thing (but we don't know who's waiting in the wings).
Quoting _db
I think this depends entirely on the method by which the territory is ceded. Had there been a referendum in Donbas, a declaration of independence (even if later leveraged by Russia to gain some degree of political control) and Crimea officially handed over then geopolitically I think the effect would have been negligible. There's been virtually no noticeable effect of Belarus's submission to Russian influence. No effect of the Ossetia, Moldova, Chechnya border disputes. Even the various regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan have made barely more than a dint in the general trend of global affairs.
If the territory were actually ceded directly to the Russian state I think there'd be more slightly more impact, especially if it were as a result of Ukrainian defeat (a more buoyant Russia might be a more dangerous one).
Quoting _db
Virtually nothing - status quo. Perhaps the defeat would topple Putin, but a leader toppled by humiliating defeat is unlikely to yield a more liberal, compromising one. If the only reason Putin goes is because he wasn't strong enough to carry off an invasion we don't even want to think about who's going to replace him.
---
By and large I think the answers all depend heavily on the manner by which the territory is ceded. Planned, negotiated settlement with preferably the involvement on the UN would be best, getting less promising the more we veer toward Russia simply winning it.
One issue of geopolitical impact is the result of either a win or a lose for Russia on destabilising a volatile region now flooded with weapons. Anyone concerned about things like Nuclear weapons in the hands of a dictator like Putin ought be tens times more concerned about the region breaking up Yugoslavia-style into a dozen, nuclear-armed warring regions.
The other thing I'd say that's probably more important, but is treated as a non-issue by the Hawks is the question of what happens next. War is not the only way to bring about regime change.
No. If you can't understand what I write, there's little point in explaining again.
Here is the problem: temporal correlation doesn't equate to causality (that's your initial objection, correlation is not causality), the concept of "mechanism" presupposes the notion of "causality" (so back to square one), some (how many?) documents, speeches, photographs can be considered causal factors only if one can prove that there is more than correlation between those factors and what ensued. So I'm asking you again: what would be the difference between causation and correlation in history and what would count as evidence of causality in history? Here is an example: NATO enlargement caused the war in Ukraine (you can choose any alternative example of historical causal explanation that you believe correct). Show me the evidence you have that there is causation and not just correlation. Until then for me you have no clue what you are talking about.
Quoting Isaac
In both cases they achieved that outside the sphere of Russian influence. Even in this scenario, it doesn't matter to me which is cause and which is consequence, the end status is still the same: those states estimated to benefit from joining the West more than from remaining under Russian influence.
Yes, if the leaders actually democratize, reform the system and not have the country lead by a dictator. The Baltic states did this. Russia didn't. Belarus didn't. And so on.
Quoting Isaac
That regime change has to first happen. And that isn't easy. Otherwise, it doesn't look good. Do you know how long the insurgency lasted after WW2 in the Baltic States. And how long did the abuse afterwards of the Baltic people?
In a similar fashion there's no reason whatsoever to assume the North Koreans couldn't have a democracy and functioning society, just like the South Koreans as they all are Koreans. But for that to happen the regime in the north has to change. And so is in Russia. You simply cannot just treat Russia as totally similar to your own country. Putin Russia will not go down easily, but it surely is trying hard to go off a cliff.
Quoting Isaac
Hypocrisy?
A small battalion of volunteers that then were rearranged to a bigger unit with other units, which then was overrun and surrendered to Russians? And then this poster children of the media (thanks to Russia's nazi arguments) you compare to a whole armed forces organization?
That's simply ludicrous.
You have to understand that basically Russia is an imperialist nation trying to cling on to it's old colonies and conquered countries. Some countries, like Switzerland, can make it quite well as having ethnic minorities, but Russia is basically a country that has conquered these lands and people. And is desperately trying to do that now.
For this reason there has to be a huge regime change in Russia. What basically could do that is a disastrous war. That can lead in the best option for Russia to change. But then a lot should change.
I don't "have to understand" your preferred interpretation at all. You may desperately need me to, but that's your problem, not mine.
The way things seem to you to be is not the same as the way things actually are. That's why discussion platforms like this exist.
I'm pointing out the flaws in your position (the one opposing mine). If you don't want to hear them, or refine your arguments in response to them, then don't post your opinion on a public discussion forum expressly designed for that purpose. Write a blog.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/magazine/russiagate-paul-manafort-ukraine-war.html
So Trump was just another tool, another Putinista.
So you're trying to show how ludicrous my ideas are by insisting I "understand" yours? How's that work exactly?
Let me give it a try...
You have to understand that basically Russia isn't really an imperialist nation trying to cling on to it's old colonies and conquered countries. Some countries, like Switzerland, can make it quite well as having ethnic minorities, and although Russia is basically a country that has conquered these lands and people, it's not particularly desperate to do that now.
Hope that's helped everyone.
So that's that settled.
a) There was Trump
b) There were the "Trump"-people,
c) There were others, that had nothing to do with Trumpism, but Trump picked them...and they stayed for a while, far longer than the pro-Russians like
(Not all in the Trump administration favoured Russia:)
Hence the influence of Paul Manafort (and others) was very brief.
Quoting Isaac
Perhaps I should have underlined the word "Ukranian." You do not regard that government to be legitimate agents of those people or that they even exist. You say:
Quoting Isaac
Whatever agreements made by that government would have to be accompanied by an acceptance by Russia that such a state exists. That is going to take far more than the grudging acceptance of Minsk II because invading the entire country put an end on Ukraine having sovereignty. It is absurd to think one could recognize a government but "fix" their leadership with "denazification."
Quoting Isaac
Claiming this is the case is a form of denying the existence of the Ukranian state. When discussing Chechnya, you said this about their attempt at independence:
Quoting Isaac
After adding up this subtraction of Ukranian identity to the views put forward by many here that the Ukranian state is merely a proxy for NATO powers, I resubmit the proposal that the thousands of comments on this thread mostly concern whether Ukraine is a nation represented by its present government.
This is one of those very peculiar and strange things in international politics and really interesting to find out what history will say about this.
At first Trump genuinely seemed like some kind of a sycophant to Putin. That obviously poised the question what the Russians had on Trump. But then again, this is Trump, the most bizarre US President there ever has been, who genuinely was a fanboy of leaders with dictatorial aspirations. Yet the ineptitude of Trump meant that this didn't have any kind of effect on the policies the Trump administration actually did. This ineptitude is forgotten: Trump's lack of genuine leadership skills meant that he was unable to create a cabal that would have gone through for example with an autocoup.
So for example, in the Helsinki-meeting between Trump and Putin Trump suggested a joint-venture to tackle cyberattacks (!), a proposal that was dead immediately. Not to forget the humiliation of Trump say he believed Putin more than his own intelligence services.
Yet Michael Flynn, the ex-national security advisor who urged Trump to use the military to seize ballot machines, was as the advisor for Trump only for 24 days. And this is the norm: the openly pro-Russia people in the Trump sphere were kicked off quite quickly.
Hence Trump basically gave only a scare to NATO, just as the Capitol attack and Trump's actions then did for Democrats.
Yet Trump still does matter. Even today in the war:
Where have I said anything of that nature?
Quoting Paine
That's right. There's no entity which one could justifiably ask about the 'right' apportionment of territory. One might as well ask hat-wearers, or Arsenal fans, or redheads... All perfectly identifiable groupings of people, none of whom (like 'Ukrainians') have any naturally occurring claim to some particular territory.
Quoting Paine
Yes, considerably more.
Quoting Paine
So invading Afghanistan, invading Iraq, invading Kosovo...these actions all put an end to the sovereignty of those places?
Quoting Paine
Why?
Quoting Paine
What? Claiming Russia isn't imperialist is denying the existence of Ukraine? What the fuck are you on about?
Quoting Paine
You can resubmit it all you like, it isn't a substitute for an actual argument. A Ukrainian government exists which is capable of making unilateral decisions about Ukrainian military action and diplomatic agreements. If you want to deny that, or claim others deny that, you're going to have to do a lot more than vague hand-waiving at some "adding up".
That is a very insensitive thing to say you fucking biggot... the proper term is internet provocateur (provocateuse for females)
Ahhh shit... this whole Russai-Ukraine thing is getting old fast. I say let Europe burn.
Yes, and the point I was making is that you and Russia don't consider it representative of the people who live there.
Not really the best; all those nukes and Kinzhal don't help either, and at the fingertips of a creepy autocrat?
Having gone down that trajectory matters — we take it into consideration when making assessments, important people use it when making decisions.
All the bombing killing destroying shamming re-culturating really doesn't help.
I guess some don't want to get dragged along downhill, and some don't want to implicitly or explicitly assent to (reinforce/encourage/support) the regress.
Why would anyone jump onto a degenerative path/trend (toward an unknown future)?
Firstly, it's not a matter of opinion, the Ukrainian government have banned opposition parties, censored opposition press, and have conducted neither referenda, nor elections. They are, by all common standards not currently a democratically representative government.
They are, however, the current incumbents and were voted in by a largely free and fair election, so are the best representatives the Ukrainians currently have.
Where have I said that they don't represent the Ukrainian people?
Notwithstanding that misrepresentation, it doesn't matter one jot for the question that @_db was asking. All that matters for that question is that a body exists which is capable of giving military or diplomatic instruction.
It wouldn't matter if they were a dictatorship, one could still ask if they ought cede territory, or how they ought instruct their military for the good of the population they have legislative power over.
History will say that he was a Putin lapdog. Because he was.
So Russians, in your view, are powerless to prevent this inexorable slide?
With over 20% of the world's land mass. It is patently clear that the consequences of removing Russia from this highly tuned global economy - for any length of time - must inevitably cause the existing global economic systems to become unworkable.
This is not the 19th or 20th century. Countries all over the world have, now for several decades, restructured their economies to become specialists in select industries where they possess comparative advantages.
Russia may not be an advanced country but until we can 3D print commodities, the exclusion of Russia from the global economy means a significant reduction in living standards across the world.
What are the odds that pampered westerners will stoically endure this looming impoverishment?
The short answer is that Russia is a police state. There are more political prisoners now in Russia than in the later years of the Soviet Union. A ruinous path can be followed easily.
Putin punched a long time way above his weight limit: made huge gambles and they paid off. Yet those successes made him unable to stop and still keep on gambling. In hindsight it might seem that if Russia would have stopped at just annexing Crimea and not instilling an insurgency in the Donbas, he might have won easily. So why couldn't he stop?
The reason has some similarities to the hypothetical historical scenario if Hitler would have kept his promise to Neville Chamberlain and Chamberlain's declaration of "peace in our time" wouldn't be what it is now, but viewed as one of the greatest achievements of successful diplomacy in history. (Which of course in reality it wasn't, but quite the opposite.)
The simple fact was that the Third Reich and it's armament program was all bent for war. The deficit spending in pre-war Nazi Germany was simply reckless in the long run. Actually it had it's first cracks in 1938 as Schacht had to finance the Mefo-bills by dubious methods forcing banks to buy them. Such an armament program would simply be ruinous for the economy if it would just be in existence in peacetime. All the rhetoric wasn't made for peaceful coexistence. It all had been so easy until it came for Poland. So why stop there the grand project?
Even if Russia's monetary and financial policy is different, In Putin's case the kleptocratic system around him simply cannot create the economic growth that would hurl Russians to a level of prosperity as in the West. GDP per capita is a higher in the Baltic States than in Russia, which were earlier lower. And seeing that the East European countries that have joined the West are far more well off than those who have not is the reason why Ukrainians demonstrated against their government by waving EU flags.
The bad economy would simply be a reason to change the leadership in any democratic nation. And since Putin cannot give economic prosperity, Putin chose the other objective: to make Russia great again and rebuild the lost Empire. That empire building is done by Russia in a defensive manner: all what Russia is doing is defending itself by enlarging itself. As Catherine the Great said: "I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”As we have seen from even this thread, some in the West even believe this line from Catherine the Great. That obviously Putin was somehow pushed to invade Ukraine, hence the culprit is the West. That we are critical towards our governments, as people in a democracy should and can be, has lead some to amazing self-flagellation and believe the Russian propaganda.
Hence once on this road, it seems there is no other option for Putin to fight the war to the end or hope the West will get tired of supporting Ukraine. Likely outcome is that this will be ruinous for Russia (as it is for Ukraine). But perhaps Putin might hang in their like Syria's Assad.
Who cares? The Russian economy is rather small. You think the world economy will tank if we boycott Portugal?
Anyway, on the long term, chances are that the pampered westerners will cry just as loud as the pampered easterners when they suffer and die from climate change-induced famine.
Portugal btw. was the last Western country to hold on to it's African posessions by fighting colonial wars (in the 1970's) thanks to having a fascist regime. The regime was finally overthrown in the Carnation Revolution and finally Portugal ended it's wars in Africa. Before the revolution the colonial wars both in Angola and Mozambique were draining like 40% of the Portuguese governments budget. (The hasty and immediate retreat of the Portuguese from both countries created unfortunately a void that lead to civil wars in both countries)
Hopefully Russia would have a similar coup?
In principle at least, if everyone would just oust the autocrat circle, then new paths would open up. Not likely, could turn wickedly chaotic too.
Better if the Russian justice system was to weigh in for real — here's more conjecture on my part — and charge them with fraud, abuse of power, corruption, (attempted) murder, threats (cause fear of harm), obstruction, shamming, covering things up, illegal money/other acquirements/handling, whatever, for all to see, giving leeway to moderate voices and a process of real and transparent democracy, then things would look up. Could that happen? Well, in principle, yes. How likely...?
But this is speculation, the earlier comment was more like observation.
Quoting Isaac
Russia claims Ukraine is being run by a dictatorship. They also say that Ukraine is an integral part of their nation. Any deal they make with the Ukraine government will have as much water under it that the previous ones have had.
If the Ukrainians are found to employ anything like the disinformation regime used by Russia on their citizens or conduct the war as barbarously as they have, that would make your method weighing of the cost of surrender against the cost of resistance more reasonable. Such circumstances would also reduce the support Ukraine receives from other nations and increase the number of those who view the Ukraine government as an equivalent of the Diem regime in the Vietnam war.
In this case, the existence of the state is directly tied to its legitimacy as an 'entity' of the Ukrainians.
Those don't say the same thing at all. If you don't understand something I've said, you can just ask. Don't just assume.
Quoting Paine
Where?
Quoting Paine
No it wouldn't because neither case are postulating war. How each nation conducts itself in war is therefore irrelevant. It's how each nation conducts itself in peacetime that is being compared since the decision assumes peace would result. Otherwise the decision is pointless.
Quoting Paine
How? You're not making any direct links, you're just reasserting your original claim.
How would it be a different decision if Ukraine were an autocratic dictatorship? They'd be in exactly the same position with regards to weighing territory loss against the cost of continued war.
Right, good.
So to avoid...
Quoting jorndoe
...one could either topple the regime responsible, or make sure one lives outside its borders.
I don't see how that gets us any closer as to which.
Might not ethnic Russians in Donbas want to become part of Russia to help...
Quoting jorndoe
...?
Might not the US just as easily help this latter goal as help keep Russia's borders static?
The question is over whether to support war to keep Russia small, or support revolution so that it doesn't matter where Russia's borders are.
They would not have the same level of support that has allowed them to repulse the Russians as much as they have. The people fighting would not view the change of government as significant if the leadership was as brutal as the Russians. Both factors shape any kind of negotiated deal.
I only mentioned Portugal as a random example of a small economy, but you are correct , at least formally speaking. Note however that South Africa was still a de facto colonial state untill the end of the apartheid, and that Rhodesia until the 80's was in the same situation: not quite a colony anymore, but not yet a true African country.
What evidence are you basing that assessment on? Brutal regimes have put up substantial armed resistance many times in the past, it's clearly not the case that brutal or dictatorial regimes are unable to muster a strong defense.
Quoting Paine
Again, on what evidence are you basing this? People in general defend attacks against their sovereignty for all sorts of reasons, it not always, in fact rarely is, an humanitarian metric regarding regime type. Most often it's simple nationalism. The German army was able to sweep through Europe, for example, based on nothing but racism and nationalism.
Quoting Paine
They do. But the shape of the deal wasn't the question.
Quoting Isaac
Don't know. You really think that's realistic (or a game-changer)? There hasn't been much indication that the autocrat circle is going away. (Hmm I kind of like the other potential development, the Russian justice system pulling weight, it could work wonders for trust too.) But it's all conjecture and idle speculation.
Quoting Isaac
For the time being, I'm guessing (conjecture on my part) that it's a (perhaps panicky) response to old news
After all, Ukraine is facing a real, present threat, analogous to the more hypothetical threat where Putin victimizes his Russia ...
Quoting Putin · Feb 24, 2022
Quoting Putin · Oct 27, 2022
And that real, present threat is at Putin's hands, at that. Anyway, Ukraine + supporters have now become a bigger problem for Russia(ns). By the way, Russo-hate has grown in Ukraine, around here we don't particularly hate Russians.
Well, there's three ways it could go - no revolution (Putin remains), good revolution (democracy, or at least more enlightened dictator), or bad revolution (the region collapses into a half dozen little Putin-a-likes warring each other). The first seems likely if Putin wins, the second or third if he loses. The third option is the worst, so win or lose doesn't seem to matter much as far as long term stability is concerned.
My point really was that regime change is by far the better option here. Reversing border changes saves a few people from Putin's regime (at huge human cost), changing the regime saves millions. The latter is better, and the latter is independent of where the border is. In fact it's slightly more likely to happen the more anti-Putin people are actually part of Russia.
Quoting jorndoe
No. I don't think it's very realistic right now. But we were comparing it to war. I don't think regaining the contested regions by military means is remotely realistic either. The former has the advantage of being unrealistic but relatively low human cost. The latter is equally unrealistic but destroys several thousand lives every day it's being tried.
Quoting jorndoe
Yes, me too. Could be a really positive move.
Quoting jorndoe
Indeed. As is any speculated military progress, so we're comparing like with like here.
Quoting jorndoe
Yes, I assume it's a temporary measure, but we can't pretend it doesn't have any effect (they wouldn't have done it if it had no effect). It means that, for the time being, dissent in Ukraine regarding the government's course of action is not being properly recorded or represented, which is extremely relevant to the kinds of arguments @Paine and @Olivier5 were making about legitimacy derived from popular support. Currently, we have no proper measure of that.
Quoting jorndoe
Seriously? We've had calls for them to be killed so as to teach them a lesson. We've had racist comments about their 'tendencies' to oppress. I think hatred of Russians is growing pretty strongly outside of Ukraine too.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1588160941665189888[/tweet]
It is true though that Russia (unlike Portugal) is an important source of energy and raw materials for other countries, and cutting out that dependency will be difficult - for those who even wish to do that: unlike Europe and the US (which had a small exposure), the rest of the world, Asia in particular, is gladly lapping up the spoils.
Even in the absence of normally functioning representative institutions, and in the presence of censorship of domestic anti-government propaganda and fog of info, there is enough input to assess support/consensus for the Ukrainian government. For example, as far as I know:
- No Ukrainian street demonstrations have been organised against Zelensky as in Russia against Putin or his war:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-protests-more-than-1300-arrested-at-anti-war-demonstrations-ukraine
https://www.npr.org/2022/09/24/1124939236/russia-protest-putin-mobilization-draft-ukraine-war
- Ukrainian polls are widely pro-Zelensky:
https://www.iri.org/news/iri-ukraine-poll-shows-strong-confidence-in-victory-over-russia-overwhelming-approval-for-zelensky-little-desire-for-territorial-concessions-and-a-spike-for-nato-membership/
- Ukrainian social network is widely supportive of Zelensky and against-Russia:
https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/ukraine/publications/personalities-of-public-opinion-the-influencers-dominating-ukraines-wartime-social-media
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/generation-ua-young-ukrainians-are-driving-the-resistance-to-russias-war/
https://www.prweek.com/article/1788344/ukraine-winning-propaganda-war
- Ukrainian expats are widely pro-Zelensky and oppose Russian invasion:
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-zakordonni-ukrayinci-ce-myaka-sila-sho-t-72165
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60634736
- No Ukrainian VIPs and artists against Zelensky. Compare to Russia:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/19/russian-pop-star-alla-pugacheva-condemns-putins-war-in-ukraine
https://www.thedailybeast.com/putin-moves-to-crush-russian-artists-speaking-out-on-ukraine-war
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60814306
https://www.dw.com/en/russian-artists-speak-out-against-the-war-in-ukraine/a-60946690
- Ukrainians returning from abroad to fight Russian invasion (couldn't find evidence of the same reaction from Russian expats):
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-poland-migration-8de0893dfcf7db46e6a6acf9911104a4
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/over-66200-ukrainian-men-have-returned-abroad-fight-says-defence-minister-2022-03-05/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-19/ukrainians-return-home-by-the-millions-even-as-war-rages-on?leadSource=uverify%20wall
- Ukrainian fierce resistance against the Russian oppressor (consistent with the Ukrainian historical aversion against Russian oppression [1]):
https://theconversation.com/unexpected-ukrainian-resistance-continues-to-thwart-russias-initial-plans-for-quick-decisive-victories-189507
https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-popular-resistance-is-a-big-problem-for-russia-184956
Not to mention the fact all the international investigators on the ground that could report all they see and hear from Ukrainians that could report about Ukrainian people’s lack of support for Zelensky if there was any (as much as they can report about Ukrainian politicians averse to Zelensky).
Indeed even Russians don't question the Ukrainian support for Zelensky: that's why Russians have moved from the rhetoric of liberating Ukrainians from a nazi regime to a more genocidal approach on the battlefield and national TV propaganda.
Finally, it's plausible to expect greater internal cohesion against external threats when the perceived threat is collective, the leadership is trusted, and convergence on how to deal with the threat is strong enough.
[1]
Polls for joining NATO is showing a trend averse to Russia since Russian annexation of Crimea: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Popular_support_to_NATO_integration_of_Ukraine_in_Ukraine
Point well taken. It's an important difference. For all I know, a recession could be coming our way in Europe. Inflation is already here. It'll be a hard winter for a lot of us, folks everywhere.
This said, I still think -- or hope -- that the global economic system can survive, that it is not so fragile as to crumble because of one war. If there's a virtue to capitalism, it's resilience. As you said, what does not get sold in Europe finds a buyer elsewhere, and world prices adjust the whole thing.
This of course is assuming no nuclear or otherwise escalation... Otherwise all bets are off and I might soon meet ya'all in hell.
Or heaven. Let's stay positive.
Those 'mil analysis' guys eh! What are they like. I was saying only the other day to some my soc psych homeboys just how cool those guys are.
Sure hope they release some more cutting edge data on Twitter soon, maybe one of them could do a spread in Vogue.
[sup]• ‘I hate them’: Dmitry Medvedev’s journey from liberal to anti-western hawk (The Guardian; Aug 1, 2022)
• Ex-president deletes post claiming Vladimir Putin will invade Georgia and Kazakhstan (Mirror; Aug 2, 2022)
• War in Ukraine Has Sparked a New Race to Succeed Putin (Carnegie; Aug 4, 2022)
• “Whoever resists will be destroyed” State Duma’s Volodin threatens Ukraine with “tougher response to terrorist attacks” (Euro Weekly; Oct 13, 2022)
• Russian lawmakers vet new bill against LGBTQ 'propaganda' (ABC; Oct 27, 2022)[/sup]
What to expect?
[sup](Will they be sending homosexuals to "conversion therapy/camps"? Jail? ...?)[/sup]
, hasn't verbal fire mostly been directed at Russian politics and Putin + team? Rather than all Russians I mean?
So one poll and a lack of media report... In a country where opposition media reporting has been banned.
I don't know how familiar you are with the general consensus on what constitutes a legitimate mandate, but it's rarely done by lack of pop star opposition.
No one is arguing about the extent of general support for Zelensky and continued war, I've no doubt it's substantial. The point was about legitimate mandates. But, as ever, any point that isn't bland regurgitation of Western propaganda is lost.
Not recently, no.
The country is as at war, so democracy can not function as normal: e.g. do you have any examples of countries invaded by a foreign power that run democratic presidential elections while at war? I don't.
Yet, if/when possible, we can still assess consensus/support for the government through other indicators.
Quoting Isaac
Can you quote me where I claimed otherwise? VIPs, artists, and pop stars can be influencers with followers and amplifiers of the people's voice so it's important for politics and politicians to have them on their side, supporting their propaganda. For example, for 43 years the people of Iran have been denied representation at the United Nations, recently, the pop star Nazanin Boniadi changed that. And that's of great importance for the Iranians who oppose the regime. So it's unreasonable to dismiss the "soft power" of such prominent people (Zelensky was a popular actor before becoming president, are you familiar with that?), especially after showing - as you did, even in your last post - so much concern for the impact of propaganda. In any case, that's just one indicator that adds up with others I listed, of course.
Quoting Isaac
Zelensky is the president so he has the legitimate mandate to be the president also during wartime according to the Ukrainian constitution (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Ukraine#Duties_and_powers). What's so hard to understand, dude?
If Portugal possessed over 20% of the World's commodities and an untold volume of unexplored resources, sanctions against Portugal would also prove difficult and cause devastation to the world economy.
What is apparent is that the presumption that the modern economy is driven by technological know how and financial instruments is at least partially wrong. The uninterrupted supply of cheap energy and commodities is at least as crucial if not more so, as no amount of technology can replace it.
Similarly, there is something fundamentally misleading citing per capita GDP as a measure of comparative economic strength: functionally, there is little difference between an apartment in London or an apartment in Moscow, yet the London apartment maybe valued at 2 million pounds whilst the Moscow equivalent is valued at 200k. Similar comparative price disparities occur across wages, services and assets.
Economic historians believe that specialisation and trade is the driving force of economic progress since the beginning of time, and that this specialisation on the global scale, that we enjoyed pre-2020, is precisely what has enabled a world of 8 billion to enjoy the high standards of living we became accustomed to.
Removing Russia from the global economy runs against this economic truism and means countries all over the world will need to either diversify their economies back to pre-1980s levels or other countries will need to step into the breach to fill the gap left by Russia's exclusion. All of which means, if not permanently then at least in the short to medium, increased costs, decreased efficiency and a reduction in competitiveness across the global economy.
But as It now appears baked in that China and India will continue to receive cheap Russian energy and cheap Russian commodities whilst western countries pay significantly more. Countries like China and India will possess a significant competitive advantage over the likes of Germany, France, Japan and South Korea. Over any significant period of time, demand for Western Products will fall causing a drop in standards of living in those countries.
Assuming of course - which is daily appearing more difficult - our political leaders don't render this whole discussion moot by triggering a nuclear exchange.
I wasn't speaking generally of populations who support war. I was expanding on my comment that is germane in the present circumstances:
Quoting Paine
I wasn't wondering why it was the case. I was pointing out one of the consequences of it being the case.
That being said, yes. Roosevelt was elected in 1944. The UK ensured consensus by using a coalition of parties. Neither banned opposition. And that's the point here. A government's mandate requires a robust opposition to hold them to account, otherwise the mandate is meaningless because the public cannot be expected to simply find out how things stand of their own accord. There's bound to be popular support for a war, especially a defensive one, if any reporting of potentially opposing facts about it is banned.
You're essentially arguing in favour of an autocracy by saying "well if the people didn't support it, they'd demonstrate, so it's got a mandate". It hasn't.
And to be clear, none of this becomes no longer true just because they have a reason for doing all this. I might have a good reason for putting a hat on, it doesn't make the consequences of my putting a hat on go away.
A society which has banned opposition parties and press is one in which the government are not properly being held to account, and as such that government does not have a legitimate mandate. It's that simple.
Are you net even the least bit suspicious about the messages you're regurgitating. Only a few years ago, Ukraine was barely talked about, but when it was, it was in reference to human rights abuses, illegal arms dealing, kleptocracy and corruption. You're now spitting out this storyline that they literally are doing nothing wrong. No government in the world is that good. No population in the world is that homogeneous. Does this narrative of the angelic government with virtually 100% popular support not even strike you as a little suspicious? In a country that has banned the reporting of opposing views? In a country which is now a cause celebre for the most sophisticated intelligence network in the world. In a country whose allies include one which has direct control mechanisms over the world's social media platforms? ... None of that raises the slightest suspicion about whether the presented narrative is entirely accurate...?
Quoting neomac
Constitutions do not determine the legitimacy of mandates. If Putin wrote a constitution in which it was guaranteed that he was ruler for life, would you argue his mandate was legitimate?
It fascinates me that you people can seemingly hold such contradictory beliefs at the same time. We have these almost consecutive arguments - on the one hand this a just war because it is fighting for the ideal of democracy and Western freedoms over the Russian tyranny, then without even pausing for breath, you're now arguing that democracy's not all that important after all and governments can run off a few opinion polls and some celebrity support without that causing any major issues. It's really quite a talent.
Since when has the size of a comment constituted an argument in favour of it's soundness?
Quoting Paine
Again, this is false on the face of it. Brutal regimes have also had international support. Look at Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Quoting yebiga
Over any significant period of time, there's a climate Armageddon coming and the globalised economy, which created the climate crisis, just dies with the rest of us.
In the meantime, there'll be ups and downs.
If you're confused about my arguments you can just ask. It's far more productive than simply assuming the worst possible interpretation you can think of. Look again at what I've written. Have I argued anywhere that the elected president doesn't have a mandate?
I think so.
Well then you have a choice, you can either continue with your confrontational lack of charity in interpretation, in which case we've nothing more to say on the matter, or you can tell me which parts of my argument gave you that impression so I can correct your misunderstanding. Up to you.
I disagree with the examples and the main claims.
None of the above countries were invaded. Coalition parties in the UK and in the US made sense simply because they didn’t include any party collaborationist with hostile foreign powers. And even if one sees the Ukrainian war in terms of civil war (as often the war in Ukraine has been described), it’s preposterous to expect a coalition between opposing parties that see one another as the enemies: it’s like expecting the Federal government to form a coalition with confederates during the Civil War, or the coalition that fought against the fascists in Italy build the new state by including the fascist party.
In democracy, government's mandate would require a robust opposition to hold them to account as long as there is enough convergence on matters of national sovereignty/security. This point is particularly critical when the Ukrainian central government (unlike the US and the UK in WW2) is still in the process of state building against legacies from the Soviet era, interfering social-political-economic-criminal ties with Russia and therefore wide mistrust in democratic institutions and political parties.
Quoting Isaac
He got the mandate when he was elected as president for peacetime and wartime. Period. And if the capacity of parties to guarantee representativity can be problematic in Western countries with more robust democratic institutions (e.g. when the voter turnout is particularly low and parties do not collect enough votes), go figure in countries which still have weak democratic institutions. That’s one more reason to value the informal support for political leaders. Since there is large support for Zelensky it’s preposterous to question his legitimacy just because he didn’t build a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties.
Quoting Isaac
Zelensky didn’t change constitution as you suggest. And even Western democratic constitutions generally give extraordinary powers to the president in wartime. Besides we have a different notion of political legitimacy. I'm talking about political legitimacy in terms of actual formal and informal support. Formal support (through binding institutions: e.g. constitutions and laws) doesn’t need to be grounded on “democratic” institutions as Westerners understand them. Yet Westerners might be more interested in tracking informal support where formal support is not as representative as in full-fledged or functional democracies.
Your notion of “legitimacy” is more in the domain of what ought to be within the limits of your wild imagination, I guess.
Quoting Isaac
Not simple, simplistic.
Quoting Isaac
Not as much as I am suspicious about your intellectual skills and honesty. I’m responsible for what I write not for what you understand.
Quoting Isaac
If you see a contradiction, you have to blame your poor logic acumen and your attitude to caricature your opponents’ claims to make a point.That’s not talent though. Just embarrassing intellectual misery.
That's your way of framing what is at stake, not mine. The geopolitical implications of this war go beyond the fate of the Ukrainians themselves. And its irrational to ignore them.
As I've said maybe half a dozen times now, once in the very post you're responding to...
Quoting Isaac
It may well be preposterous to expect such coalitions from Ukraine. It doesn't obviate the consequences of not having one. It would be preposterous to expect me to fly by jet to my next conference. The preposterousness doesn't have any impact on the consequence that I may be late as a result.
Quoting neomac
Yes, that's true. I've been discussing the legitimacy of that mandate. The claim you're responding to was incorrect as written.
Quoting neomac
Nonsense. Even a tyrant coming to power on a wave of popular support is illegitimate if they do not have means of being held to account. It's a basic tenet of democracy. Popular support is not the be all and end all - that support must be well-informed and that requires a free press and an opposition.
Quoting neomac
Then stop responding to my posts as if I shared your notions.
Quoting Benkei
I agree there are more straightforward, wider points. But the reason I'm pursuing the line of legitimate representation is that often the first counter to...
Quoting Benkei
...is very often "well, that's up to the Ukrainians". I disagree with that notion for the reasons I've been expanding on. I don't think there's any clear moral justification for a citizen of Lvov to have a say in what goes on in the Donbas region (600 miles away) than there is for a citizen of Rostov (less than 100 miles away). The reason they get a say is purely pragmatic, the way representative democracy happens to be subdivided into states. So the point about legitimacy is relevant only insofar as it's important to recognise that the actual details of the policies Ukraine are following have not travelled through any process which gives them legitimate mandate (they have not been subject to a system which can properly hold them to account and so advise a populace such that they can give well-informed consent.
But I agree the main issue can be addressed with a more simple metric.
Yes, that's the plan, but I need to know what it is you don't understand. I'm not going to just blindly rephrase everything I've written in the hope of landing at random on the aspect you didn't get.
How would you define "at any cost"? However you turn things, there's gonna be suffering. The problem is when the evaluation of the best solution becomes a black-and-white dichotomy of life and death without ever evaluating if a life becomes worth living or if deaths further down the line are at a greater number than in the short term. When someone argues that it's good that Ukrainians are fighting back against Russian and reclaiming their land and people from the horrors of Russian war crimes, they get criticized for somehow not caring for the ones dying because of the fight or other consequences of the war ongoing. But then what about the people they have freed, the ones who survived the war crimes, who cry in the arms of the Ukrainian soldier who freed them, or the unseen consequences of pushing back Russia showing other nations with similar warmongering leaders that it's not worth it, like China and North Korea? Just putting down arms and sacrificing Ukraine to Russia just to end the war might show China and North Korea that they have the same power and that the rest of the world is powerless to do anything meaningful about it. So what suffering might that lead to if we don't stand up against the tyranny that Russia has shown the world?
The main question is, how do you evaluate "at any cost" when there's no answer that is objectively good? Do you just hold onto a strict "no-death" ideal or might that be too naive for the complexity of this conflict and beyond? Instead of branding interlocutors with being "for" or "against" "at any cost". What "cost" is worth it when the consequence of giving in to Russia's demands may be much more severe than people seem to realize?
That other people disagree with you about those wider consequences doesn't mean they haven't considered them. They've been discussed at great length here. Often with you, even.
Just trying to frame disagreements over subjective speculation as the naivety of whichever party disagrees with your subjective judgment is disingenuous.
I'm not doing that, that is you framing things in that way, as you always do with your strawmen and why you have dragged this thread down to your level. What I call naive is the black-and-white point of view where everything is only about a life-and-death dichotomy because that is, objectively, an extremely simplified way of looking at this conflict, disregarding any domino effect of short-term decisions just to save lives in the here and now. That you interpret that as me "calling people naive for disagreeing with me" is intentionally strawmanning and changing the very context of what I wrote. This is why your arguments are constantly low quality and why this thread is mostly bullshit today and why I rarely come back here. Mods should rename this thread to "Strawman discussion about the Ukraine war", because that's basically what this thread is.
Exactly. People have not "disregarded" domino effects, they just disagree with you about what they are, how likely they are, and how to measure them.
The fact that you see the world one way doesn't make people naive for seeing it differently. Your opinions are not facts. That is, there is a difference between you thinking that X will result from Y and it actually being the case that X will result from Y.
The irony...
Quoting Christoffer
So what? In your example the goal is to be at the conference on time (and you failed it). While Zelenesky’s goal is not to have a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties (and he succeeded it). The point is that that’s a rational goal, because when national sovereignty/security is in severe danger there must be enough convergence and commitment on matter of national sovereignty/security for a coalition between otherwise opposing parties to efficaciously deal with such an emergency.
Quoting Isaac
If that’s how you understand legitimacy, you better clarify it because: [i]In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a regime. Whereas authority denotes a specific position in an established government, the term legitimacy denotes a system of government—wherein government denotes "sphere of influence". An authority viewed as legitimate often has the right and justification to exercise power. Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse. In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular regimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential elite[/I] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_(political)). And all that doesn’t necessarily require democratic ways of holding political leaders to account.
BTW is Putin a legitimate leader according to your way of understanding political legitimacy?
Quoting Isaac
So what? It’s rational to act in accordance to democratic rules under the assumption that there are sufficiently robust democratic institutions. While a central government which is still struggling for its sovereignty and territorial control, can’t operate under such assumption. Obviously.
Quoting Isaac
Without clarifying what you mean by “legitimacy”. And if you do not clarify your own terms, then I feel encouraged to apply my understanding of them.
Quoting Isaac
I don’t see why: that’s how I can discover where our notions diverge, for example. And if we aren’t sharing same notions, I can still question your notions.
How do you disregard the fact of Russia's war crimes? The fact of China's interest in Taiwan? The fact of North Korea's recent aggressions? The fact of how Russia treats its own people? The fact of people being killed when opposing Putin?
These are facts and a solid foundation for any speculation that revolves around the possible consequences of just letting Russia get what they want. Disregarding these facts is just ignorant and not a valid foundation for any counter-argument. These consequences are things seriously considered in every place where serious discussion about the war is happening, but in this thread, such dismissal is somehow approved to be a valid disagreement regardless of how weak any premisses is in support of such disagreements are.
This is why this thread is shit.
Quoting Isaac
The irony is that you are blind to these simplifications because I've yet to hear any actual consequence analysis of such a simplified position. I'm waiting to hear it...
Are you having trouble reading?
Quoting Isaac
No one is disregarding those factors, they are disagreeing with you about the likelihoods, weights, and values.
Quoting Christoffer
Just look at the two bolded words and explain to me how they yield a single unequivocal answer. A probability, by definition, has two options.
Quoting Christoffer
And they are seriously considered here too. Pages and pages have been written about them. People just disagree with you about the likelihoods, weights, and values.
A tenth time then...
Quoting Isaac
Quoting neomac
No, that's precisely how I'm using the term. It does not merely mean the same as 'lawful', it is about "right and justification" as your quote specifies.
Quoting neomac
No. He has neither the right nor the justification for wielding the power he does.
Quoting neomac
An eleventh time maybe will make some in road...
Quoting Isaac
Quoting neomac
On what grounds then? I argue someone doesn't have a legitimate mandate, you argue that they do because you use a different meaning of 'legitimate'. That's neither a critique nor a line of questioning. It's just a declaration.
Quoting Christoffer
This from Charles A. Kupchan, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Remind us again what your qualifications are? Professor of what? Which university? Senior fellow where?
If you read the full article...
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/opinion/russia-ukraine-negotiation.html
...you'll see how professor Kupchan is not ignoring the fact of Russia's war crimes. He is disagreeing with you about how best to avoid further incidents. How professor Kupchan is not ignoring the fact of China's interest in Taiwan. He is disagreeing with you about how best to deal with it. How professor Kupchan is not ignoring these other implications. He is disagreeing with you about how best to handle them.
What do you mean by "right" and "justification" as distinguished from "lawful"?
Quoting Isaac
And? What's your point in highlighting the consequences? What lesson is there to learn in there?
Quoting Isaac
We have been through this already. Terminological issues can be settled through stipulation whenever terminology diverges from some standard usage or triggers misunderstanding. What is substantial however is conceptual consistency and explanatory power behind the given terminology.
That which is 'lawful' is that against which there is no law. Taking property from Jews was lawful in Nazi Germany, but it was neither right nor justified.
That which is 'right', in this context, is that which derives from rights in some way (either natural rights, or concepts of justice), as in the expression "I have a right to know why you said that", it's not claiming anything about the law. I have a right to keep my property, but it may not be justified to have excess.
That which has 'justification', in this context is that for which some reason (or reasons) can be given that refer usually to either desirable consequences or virtues which are causally related to the act in question. "blowing up that bridge was justified because it prevented greater harm in the future ".
Quoting neomac
That when we say that some decision about Ukraine is rightly "up to the Ukrainians" we currently have no legitimate method of asking them, we are talking about a (currently) autocratic government without opposition. As such we are mistaken if we legitimise Ukrainian strategic decisions on the grounds of a Ukrainian right to self-determination.
Zelensky's apparent recent decision to refuse negotiations until there's regime change in Russia, for example, is not a legitimate decision of the Ukrainian people. We have no moral reason to support it on grounds of self-determination alone.
Cheers.
It is doubtful that this would be sufficient reason by itself to justify sending billions of dollars to Ukraine, particularly when there are even worse crises occurring in the world in which the West is conspicuously not involved in, in the way it is involved in Ukraine.
What really seems to be the reason the West is so obsessed with this regional conflict is that this is the perfect opportunity to drain the resources of Russia in a prolonged proxy war. It gets dressed up as a moral crisis ("democracy is threatened by the ravaging Russian hordes").
The reality is that the West is willing to fight to the last Ukrainian.
There is also the ideological premise that it is rational and honorable to defend one's country against a foreign invader. Fleeing from one's country when it is attacked by another country is considered cowardly and there is an incredibly strong distaste of people who do so. I recall a particularly interesting paragraph in one of David Graeber's essays that touches on this premise:
Probably living under Russian dominion would be worse than living under Ukrainian dominion, but getting butchered on the battlefield is by far the worst and it seems absolutely ridiculous to claim that Ukrainian sovereignty is worth this risk.
[sup]Some Putin quotes: Dec 23, 2021, Feb 24, 2022, ? Oct 26, 2022, Oct 27, 2022
Some earlier comments: Oct 16, 2022, Oct 18, 2022, Oct 28, 2022[/sup]
So, not nuclear really.
But maybe foreign troops close to Russia's borders. Maybe just foreign (NATO) troops in the host country? Albeit stationed for defense, they could be seen as threatening.
@Tzeentch seems to suggest that Putin's geo-objectives require control of Crimea. (Then in case of war with Ukraine, Sevastopol or a base alone wouldn't do?) Maybe or maybe not to the extent of non-control being an existential threat? A bit up in the air. Doesn't depend on NATO specifically, though. Rather, NATO would instead have gotten in the way of Russia grabbing Crimea, and the following invasion.
[sup]• Putin Admits Annexation of Crimea Put in Motion Weeks Before Referendum (Haaretz; Mar 9, 2015)
• Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot (BBC; Mar 9, 2015)
• With Trump on his side, Putin admits Russia staged the ‘referendum’ to annex Crimea (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group; Jul 17, 2018)
• From 'Not Us' To 'Why Hide It?': How Russia Denied Its Crimea Invasion, Then Admitted It (RFE/RL; Feb 26, 2019)
• Putin Admits He’s Worried NATO Could Help Ukraine Get Crimea Back (The Daily Beast; Feb 1, 2022)
• Putin admits Ukraine invasion is an imperial war to “return” Russian land (Atlantic Council; Jun 10, 2022)[/sup]
What else, though?
As a primary justification for war, this stuff seems to matter, yes?
[sup]On the strategic (chess game, objectives) side, SophistiCat posted something; not much else lately.[/sup]
It is not clear who would be doing the appeasing in your description. Is it the man behind the curtain using Ukrainians to fight a proxy war or a choice Ukrainians are making for themselves?
The answer to who is calling the shots relates to how an end to the war can be negotiated.
I think this is one of the confounding factors in any moral analysis. The idea that a worse country (in human rights terms) ought not take over a better one seems a simple enough metric, hence the "fighting for democracy" narrative, but in amongst that narrative we hear, like little Freudian slips, a far more distasteful nationalism. The sense that Ukrainians are fighting 'for Ukraine', that they fight because 'Ukraine' is under threat (not their lives, their homes and their well-being - 'Ukraine'). It's these little fur-balls of nationalism that choke many of the routes to peace. No territorial concessions (even if they would save lives, homes and well-being) because they would not save 'Ukraine'). No negotiations with Putin because, even though literally any concession at this stage might save lives, homes and well-being - it would humiliate 'Ukraine'.
Quoting Paine
So if we're going to consider 'The Ukrainians' as one of the options for shot-callers, then we'd better understand by what mechanism they might do so. How exactly do you see 'The Ukrainians' making an informed choice on this - with no elections, no referendums, no opposition parties, and an almost complete press blackout on any anti-government news agendas?
Not to mention the fact that the sub-set of Ukrainians that really matter here are those living in Crimea and Donbas. Even if 'The Ukrainians' in the wider sense could be informed and consulted, then how do we weigh the voices of those actually effected against those 600 miles away? We might as well consult 'The Eastern Bloc', or 'The Slavic Peoples', or 'The Black Sea Region', or 'Eastern Europe'...
And if we rule out 'The Ukrainians' on the grounds of there being no plausible mechanism by which they could possibly make a relevant, informed choice, then we're left with - Zelensky's Government, the US Government, The UN and Putin's Government as the potential shot-callers.
Does it then make a difference? None of them live in Donbas or Crimea. All of them are wealthy enough not to have to suffer the consequences of their actions either way. So what difference does it make now who calls the shots on this? Wealthy elite or wealthy elite? We get to choose accents.
What are you talking about? We've gone over all of these issues multiple times.
Hundreds of pages have been dedicated to the issue of nuclear war, which everyone seems to agree should be avoided.
The "big" consequence that you fail to mention in your "serious arguments".
It just so happens that the rest of the world also has a right to self-defence in the sense of avoiding conflict in the first place.
For example, if you provoke a bunch of people in a bar and get into a fight, perhaps I recognise your right to self defence once you are attacked. However, that does not place any onus on me to support you in anyway. It would be nearly universally agreed that my right to self preservation by simply walking away from the situation far supersedes any obligation to support other people's right to the same.
Of course, a critical factor of evaluation is my power to do something. If I could help get a better outcome (no one hurt and, certainly no one killed) by doing something at no, or exceedingly low, risk to myself people would generally agree that does become a moral obligation at some point of common sense and easy actions. However, if my only way to affect the outcome is to throw myself into the fight or then give weapons (forks, knives, guns) to the side I think is more justified, in this sort of classic drunken brawl situation essentially no one would agree that I have any obligation to put myself at risk and likewise giving someone a weapon in a drunken brawl is questionable at best (murder / manslaughter at worst if someone dies by my weapon; there would need to be very particular circumstances in which "supplying arms" actually leads to a better outcome).
What does all this mean in the situation in Ukraine? In short, there may simply be no effective actions as bystanders outside the fight that lead to a better outcome, regardless of any moralising at all.
The harms of the war to Ukrainians and poor people around the world are considerable, it must be weighed in the balance of what compromise may end the war.
Sure, a compromise can be a "win" for Putin, but if there's no way to effectively "punish" someone who commands thousands of nuclear warheads then we simply have to live with that.
You seem to conflate terrible outcomes of rash and ill-considered policies to escalate the situation but "not too much" with the intended outcome.
We understand very well your intended outcome -- I would not say it is by definition justifiable (a lot of questions would need to be actually answered in a serious way, as you lament) -- but the discussion has been stuck since the beginning on how the intended outcome of Biden / Zelesnkyites can actually be achieved.
If there's no way to impose Western desires on Putin by force without creating far more harms than a compromise that ends the war, then the entire operation is simply a virtue signalling gesture.
But to who? The dead?
The dim view you have of the Ukrainian government has no immediate bearing on their stated purpose to restore their territory. The issue is how far support from other nations will go to achieve this goal. That issue falls within the question Benkei raised. Clearly the support cannot continue at "any cost."
It is unlikely that your moral calculus will be used to figure out what the limits will be.
No, indeed. I really can't think why anyone would come to believe it might, but at least you've clarified the matter should any such benighted souls be reading along.
Quoting Paine
In what sense is that 'the issue'? I can see it being 'an issue', but why 'the issue'? We were talking about who is "calling the shots" as you put it. Are you saying that support from other nations is the sole determining factor here?
If so, then the opinion of those other nations' populations seems to take on a more substantive weight. I mentioned as much a little while back, but you must have missed it.
So, given that the support of other nations is critical, you'd agree that the course of events is now dictated largely by those other nations (and by proxy, their populace, to the extent public opinion matters to them)?
More than virtue, the defence of Ukraine sends a signal of strength. And it sends it to Putin, essentially.
I think the escalation to WW3 is severely overstated. It seems as if people have long forgotten that similar wars where on one Super Power's enemy was eagerly supported by the other Super Power were more of the norm in the Cold War. In the Korean War the Soviet Air Force and the USAF fought each other over the skies of North Korea, and both sides just kept it as a secret.
Even if Kherson falls to Ukraine, it's not a desperate situation for Putin.
Ah yes, happier times...
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/the-ussr-and-us-came-closer-to-nuclear-war-than-we-thought/276290/
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/5-times-cold-war-almost-ended-nuclear-eruption-197443
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/nuclear-close-calls-cuban-missile-crisis
I'm off to jump to sixteen flaming buses on a motorbike because, after all, Evil Knieval got away with it, so it must be just fine. No need for any alarm.
In fact, hang it, why don't we just invade Russia? After all, what was the battle of Stalingrad really, but a lot of high jinx?
For Ukraine to defend itself from an Russian attack is different from NATO attacking Russia.
But if you listen to Putin, it seems to be the same.
There might be 4 possible promising consequences in doing this:
- Heavy conventional retaliation: like destroying the Russian strategic infrastructures (e.g. Black Sea fleet), no fly zone in Ukraine, bombing Russian army in occupied (but not-annexed) territories.
- Possibly turn the Rest of the World and of Europe definitely against Russia.
- Possibly turn the trend of American domestic divisions (at least wrt Russia) in line with the current anti-Putin stance more favorable with the Biden at the next elections.
- And therefore also possibly turn Russian support for Putin (especially inside his own entourage) against Putin.
And what are exactly the natural rights or concepts of justice or rights-not-claiming-anything-about-law that Zelensky has violated in not having a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties?
Quoting Isaac
For Zelensky, the desirable consequence of not having a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties, is that the response to Russian invasion is going to be more resolute, military decisions are not going to be ratted on and therefore chances to regain control over occupied territories are greater.
Quoting Isaac
“Up to the Ukrainians” means up to the governmental representatives of Ukraine that were democratically voted to act as such in peacetime and wartime? “Autocratic government without opposition” (where “opposition” = “Russian collaborationist parties") which in wartime is perfectly legitimate and perfectly compatible with democracy (Italian democratic governments are not supposed to make political coalitions with anti-state mafia representatives, you know). No we aren’t if the current Ukrainian government is fighting for national sovereignty and security against foreign invasions. One could claim that Ukrainians do not give a shit about Ukrainian self-determination. But Zelensky’s government has great support from Ukrainians, even despite the censorship that he rationally applied over press and opposition, even the losses they have suffered sofar. So what on earth are you talking about?
Quoting Isaac
Political representatives do not delegate decisions to the people they represent, otherwise what the hell is their job supposed to be, people could literally decide everything by referendum. But it doesn’t work that way in normal times (there are no referendums on fiscal matters), go figure during wartime. I don’t know wars of national self-determination based on referenda, usually they are led by strong leaders with great popular support.
Quoting Isaac
So my comments on legitimacy through popular support and how to measure it when democratic tools are not available was pertinent. And your constraining “legitimacy” to “democratic” legitimization is twice misleading: there are other forms of legitimacy (informal support) that can be measured, and Zelensky was democratically (formally) legitimized to be the chief leader of Ukraine in peacetime and wartime.
More bold statements without any evidence or argumentation and complete ignorance of the implications.
Unfortunately, when conclusions are both unsound and invalid it takes a bit longer to explain so amazingly false.
For example, assuming the premise is true, that NATO has shown "strengths" by supporting Ukraine while knowing that support to Ukraine will not be enough to actually win against the Russians, then one must actually argue why it's moral to instrumentalise Ukrainian lives in that way simply to "send a signal". Are you really embracing the position that any amount of Ukrainian death and suffering is justified as long as it "sends a signal" from NATO to Putin?
However, the entire entire idea that military support support to Ukraine (but not "too much") is a signal of strength is extremely debatable.
What has the war demonstrated so far? Apart from placing significant limits on type and quantity of arms supplies, obviously NATO will not commit their own troops and planes into this kind of border dispute. Is that a signal of strength?
Likewise, of the arms and training and billions of dollars of economic support as well ... Russia has still been occupying a significant part of Ukraine for nearly a year. How is it "strong" to let them do that. Saying "get out Putin!" and following up that statement with kicking Putin out would be "strong" and "powerful", sure, but has that happened? Will it happen? Even if it does happen, how many Ukrainian dead are worthwhile to attain such an objective?
Then there's squaring this belief of needing to show "strength" to Putin with the belief the Russian forces are entirely incompetent and essentially their own worst enemy. What need to show strength to an incompetent?
Ah, so you'd agree that since we know there's majority Russian speaking minorities in the occupied territories, we can safely conclude they do indeed want to separate from Ukraine even if we reject the legitimacy of the democratic tools in play?
Certainly if Ukraine's right to self determination is just cause, so too is Crimea and Donbas and the other regions?
As long as there's "legitimacy through popular support" (or at least it's possible to just say so) then Russia is simply coming to the aid of people completely justified in their right of self determination and under attack by Ukraine since 2014.
A part from the fact that with Sweden and Finland joining NATO the NATO border to Russia would be twice as much (and Putin practically said it's not a big deal)
But there are some basics that you and other Pollyannas here do not seem to fully grasp when you so cheerfully cite Mearhsheimers&co who see NATO enlargement as a mistake and want to push Ukrainians to surrender as much as Putin can feel satisfied.
It’s these assumptions that one should keep in mind when citing these people. They do not calculate the endgame of this war in terms of saving Ukrainian lives nor in terms of selling less/more something (shale gas, weapons, hamburgers) to let some big corporations sniff more cocaine, fuck Filippino trans, in a golden villa, and making jokes about the billions of poor Yemeni kids that explode under American bombs AT ALL.
Of course. Or at least I find it plausible.
Quoting boethius
I'm not rejecting anything. I'm just saying that in wartime democratic institutions do not work as in peacetime. But that doesn't mean that during wartime political representatives are not legitimate representatives in a democratic sense!
Quoting boethius
Right to self-determination can be handled through international law. Otherwise in the messy way it is handled now. (I didn't use the expression "just cause" on purpose because it requires further elaboration).
Quoting boethius
Sure so Putin would claim.
Quoting boethius
For me a discussion of rights makes sense wrt a legal system, in this case international law and related international recognition. Beyond that self-determination is matter of national interest against other national interest.
Communication between the nuclear superpowers has deteriorated a great deal. The diplomacy that existed a few decades ago no longer exists. If there were already several extremely close calls back then, it stands to reason that we're in an even more delicate situation now that communication is gone.
It should also be noted that although the parties themselves were banned, their elected representatives were not ejected from legislatures, and members of local governments from those parties continued in their capacities. (Unlike, for example, members of the banned British Fascist party, who were interned until the end of the war.) The Opposition Platform simply renamed its faction in Ukraine's parliament.
You should take the obvious truth a little more seriously than that.
War has little to do with virtue, usually, and much to do with strength. Nobody has ever done a war or supported a war for "virtue" or for "virtue signaling". That you would even consider it shows how detached from reality you are.
"Virtue signaling" is just your way to put the fact that Ukraine has just cause and Russia does not.
But this war and the western support to it does signal something: a newfound resolve to push back against Putin's plans even at a very high cost
Quoting boethius
Not at all, but it's indubitable that a signal of strength is being sent by NATO and Ukraine.
Quoting boethius
For one, all these weapons and munitions cost a lot of money, right? For two, distributing too many weapons to Ukraine raises the risk that some may find their way to the black market. For three, Russia can also seize NATO material, allowing them to study them up close to find weaknesses and hacks. Therefore, it stands to reason that NATO countries should provide whatever support is necessary for Ukraine to defeat Russia, but not more. This explains for instance why tanks haven't been provided: they cost too much, can't afford to lose them to the enemy, etc.
Quoting boethius
It's for them Ukrainians to decide on that question. Nobody is forcing Ukraine to fight.
What a disgusting sentiment. :vomit:
No surprise, of course. But his sophisms are worse than just failing to get facts right.
Well spotted. I've also noticed that making scrambled eggs is different from frying them.
Neither observations have the slightest relevance too the inanity of your suggestion that the risk of nuclear war "isn't all that bad" because we got away with it last time.
Quoting neomac
I've already said. democracy gains it's legitimacy from a well-informed, free electorate. we have a right to know what our government's are up to, a right to hold them account and a right to have institutions in place to do those tasks on our behalf.
Quoting neomac
Good for him. why would I judge the justification on the basis of his desirable outcomes? A bank robber might claim his actions were justified because he wanted the money. Does that make him justified?
Quoting neomac
It doesn't. It means up to the people who have citizenship of Ukraine. The meaning could not be simpler.
Quoting neomac
No it doesn't...
https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/2022/11/03/ukraine-risks-being-locked-into-endless-war-in-bid-for-perfect-peace/
Quoting neomac
I didn't mention anything about needing referenda. I'm talking about a lack of fully free opposition. Referenda wouldn't even solve that problem. You need a properly informed electorate for that.
Quoting neomac
Yes, but a survey of pop stars is not one of them.
Quoting neomac
And your qualifications are...?
Quoting SophistiCat
https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3434673-nsdc-bans-prorussian-parties-in-ukraine.htmlhtml
Quoting https://schillerinstitute.com/blog/2022/09/25/update-on-the-banning-of-opposition-political-parties-in-ukraine/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/20/ukraine-suspends-11-political-parties-with-links-to-russia
If you're having trouble counting, we could go through the basics.
1) There's no mechanism in place by which they can make an informed decision, nor tell anyone what it is.
2) They literally are being forced to fight. The country has mandatory conscription and adult males are banned from leaving.
They are better informed than you and me though.
Quoting Isaac
These are the orders of other Ukrainians, not NATO officials. So nobody (non Ukrainian) is forcing Ukraine to fight.
Sure, but again in wartime democracies do not work with electoral consultations of a well-informed, free electorate to take decisions of national security. Are you crazy?
Quoting Isaac
You wrote: 'justification', in this context is that for which some reason (or reasons) can be given that refer usually to either desirable consequences
Now the legitimately elected president of Ukraine has the reasons I explained referring to the desirable outcome that I pointed out. What else do you need?
Quoting Isaac
It's not you who decides the meaning of the words. Political representatives are called representatives precisely because they are elected by the Ukrainians to take political decisions that best satisfy their preferences. So the Ukrainian government represents Ukrainians in international politics.
Quoting Isaac
Dude, your article starts with "Talking peace is not popular in Ukraine right now. "
But ok I noted down what the results of a survey on 3 cities on the front line is.
Yet it doesn't falsify the claim that Zelensky has still great support in Ukraine.
Quoting Isaac
And I addressed that too. Banning parties collaborating with the enemies is perfectly compatible with any democracy at war.
Quoting Isaac
Yes it is, for the reasons I explained. It's part of the informal support among other indicators I listed. Indeed, the president Zelensky was a popular actor before becoming the president, did you know that? Do you think it was just a coincidence? That his popularity didn't play any role in his elections?
In Italy the M5S is founded by a very popular comedian, Giuseppe Grillo, do you think that this is a mere coincidence?
Are you familiar with the concept of "influencer"? Propaganda works also through artists, pop stars, and other kinds of VIPs, do I really have to explain it to you?
Quoting Isaac
Did you just stop reading where you stopped the quotation or are you just playing dumb as usual? I didn't question Mearsheimers&co qualifications, I questioned your and other Pollyannas' full grasp of Mearsheimers&co views wrt the subject "legitimate security concerns".
Because implicit in Isaac's message is that the West should abandon Ukrainians because that would save Ukrainian lives.
I've had it with that idiotic nonsense and thought you knew better.
How so?
Quoting Olivier5
And that helps the legitimacy how?
Quoting neomac
Twelfth time now...
Quoting Isaac
Quoting neomac
Good reasons.
Quoting neomac
I'm not trying to falsify it. I'm not claiming Zelensky doesn't have popular support. I'm claiming we don't know for sure in any specific strategy. You're the one claiming we do know. You're wrong.
Quoting neomac
Thirteenth time the charm...
Quoting Isaac
Quoting neomac
So? Are you suggesting propaganda induced opinions are well-informed ones?
Quoting neomac
Yes, the question was - with what qualification? On what ground is your 'grasp' the 'full' one? Do you have any citations from experts to back up your interpretation.
https://jacobin.com/2022/05/peace-talks-diplomacy-negotiations-ukraine-russia-war-biden-johnson
Notably, other countries have kept pressing for peace, or at least cease-fires. Why hasn't the US?
So what qualifies you to claim professor Menon's opinion is "idiotic nonsense"?
Simple: it is legitimate for NATO to help Ukrainians fight this war but not to force them to do so.
Quoting Isaac
By virtue of being on site, having relatives and friends in Ukraine and Russia to whom they can talk, speaking the languages and following local news, etc. And the government has access to intell. ..
And your theory is?
My knowledge claim amounts to questioning your claim that we do not have “proper measure” to assess legitimacy through popular support. As I said there are formal and informal ways to express popular support for a government. Informal support exists in democracy and outside of it, and it can be measured through various indicators. In political theory (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_(political)#Forms_of_legitimate_government) there is no analytic or explanatory reason to restrain “legitimacy” and its measuring to what one can formally get from normally functioning democratic institutions. If you do it, it’s for propagandistic reasons, not to well-inform.
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Since you keep playing dumb, here is what you get wrong on the consequences. The consequence is not that Ukrainians ended up having an “autocratic government”, the form of government didn’t change: in wartime democratic regimes do not function as in peacetime, that’s all. The consequence is not that Zelensky’s strategic decisions are illegitimate, but that they are legitimately taken by a democratically elected president to act as a representative of Ukrainian people in peacetime and wartime accordingly. The consequence is not that Ukrainian people didn’t decide as in peacetime, but that they (as people from any other democracy on the planet) do not get to decide about national security in wartime as much as they do not get to decide about fiscal policies in peacetime. Besides the consequence which you see so problematic is not even that Ukrainian people are not deciding, but that the government didn’t have a coalition to Russian collaborationist parties, but since this too is perfectly compatible with democracy, there is no reason to see this consequence as problematic from a democratic point of view.
Better now?
Quoting Isaac
The objective of propaganda is not to ensure that citizens are well-informed (according to what standard? How well-informed vs persuaded by propaganda are democratic citizens in peacetime really?), but that doesn’t necessarily imply misinformation, nor that propaganda is an illegitimate or ineffective way to earn political support, just because it doesn’t inform well enough. Unless you have in mind one single form of legitimacy for ideological reasons.
Quoting Isaac
With the same qualification you pick Mearshaimer&co’s claims to support your views.
“On what grounds”?! “Citations from experts” (as if I didn’t do it already)?! “Interpretation”?! Have you ever fucking read Mearsheimer really?! Do you know his theory called “offensive realism”?! Did you read anything about geopolitical theories and in particular realist theory at all?! It’s like asking me grounds, citations, interpretation about aritmetics. Not to mention that you yourself couldn't cite any Mearsheimer's or Putin appeasement claims from geopolitical realists assessing this war in terms of Ukrainian casualties (even less in comparison to Yemeni casualties), or greedy military industries/banks&co wanting to suck blood from the rest of the world.
No, dude, I am not here to recover your ignorance on such basics. On the contrary, I’m satisfied at denouncing it and mocking it as it deserves.
As if the US is doing this single handedly. Utter bullshit.
The White House has stated that its position on this conflict is that by supplying Ukraine with a seemingly-inexhaustable supply of military aide, it will bring about peace in Ukraine. War is peace.
Quoting _db
On the one hand, you recognize that abandoning Ukraine is not the best way to help Ukrainians. On the other, you condemn the White House for supplying aid to Ukraine.
I'm not going to ask you to clarify this because I suspect that you'll just continue waltzing sideways instead of discussing the issue.
Military aid. It has refused to support proposals for diplomatic negotiations that could lead to peace, even when these proposals have come from Ukrainians themselves.
The US appears to have an agenda for Ukraine, and doesn't care if the Ukrainians agree or not.
Okay, so discussion is over then, I guess.
On what grounds?
Quoting Olivier5
Ukraine is nearly 800 miles wide. I know it's quite flat, but either Ukrainians have very good eyesight, or them being "on site" makes no difference at all. Virtually everyone not directly on the front line is getting their information from sources. Just like the rest of the world.
Quoting Olivier5
And how do these friends and relatives obtain an over view of the strategic situation?
Quoting Olivier5
Yeah, right, because apparently no one in the foreign press speaks Russian or Ukrainian. You've heard of Google translate?
Quoting Olivier5
The local news that's been banned?
Your narrative falls apart at the slightest analysis. Ukrainians are not an homogeneous mass, we don't even know if they all support Zelensky's current strategy, and even if we did all the measures usually in place to ensure well-informed mandates are missing. There's no reason at all to assume 'Ukrainians' are calling the shots here and even if they were, there's no moral incentive to act on their expressed preference.
I know. It's false. If we had proper measure (the ones you cited as showing support) I wouldn't so easily have been able to find a poll to the contrary. These are not proper measures of support. They are heavily biased, heavily flawed methods of obtaining a very general impression.
In addition, the lack of opposition parties and opposition press means that any support thus measured is unlikely to be well-informed and so even less useful as an indicator of genuine support.
Quoting neomac
No. On account of being a bunch of un-evidenced, or occasionally blatantly false, assertions.
Quoting neomac
Propaganda is OK. Autocracy is OK. Banning free press is OK. Conscription is OK. Denying human rights is OK.
Remind us again why you think Russia must be stopped.
Quoting neomac
I have no qualification to pick Mearsheimer. I don't need a qualification to pick a view, nor to interpret it. It's what we do when we take a position on affairs we're not personally expert in.
You, however, do need some qualification if you want to claim a view or interpretation is wrong, more than merely disagreeing.
Then you should be able to answer a very simple question. By what mechanism does a citizen of Lvov gain information about the strategic situation on the front line 600 miles away and the diplomatic situation in the Parliaments of Ukraine and Russia which are unavailable to a citizen of the UK or the US?
It's a really simple question. It just requires you to identify the data gathering and communication method Ukrainians use that other nationalities do not have access to.
It's an irrelevant question. It has no import on the issue at hand, which was:
Quoting boethius
I answered that the Ukrainians would be best placed to answer that. You implied they were poorly informed but that is simply not true. Nobody has perfect information of course but relatively, the Ukrainians are in a better position in terms of access to information on the war in Ukraine than foreigners, by virtue of being closer to it.
You may want to argue otherwise but that amounts to the ivory tower syndrome: the belief that from your distant armchair you can tell what's happening on the ground better than the people who are actually on the ground. I find it ridiculous.
Beside, their lives are on the line, not ours. That too places them in a more legitimate position to decide "how many Ukrainian dead are worthwhile to attain [their] objective".
Deny it all you like, Ukrainians exist and they have collective agency.
By what mechanism? If you're going to support your ridiculous claim you need a mechanism, you've failed to provide one.
By what mechanism do those within Ukraine get an overview of the strategic situation on the front line and diplomatic channels which is denied non-Ukrainians? Without such a mechanism your claim is just hot air.
Bullshit. Utter callous, nationalist bullshit.
Millions are facing starvation because of this war, and thousands of rich Ukrainians will remain completely untouched by it, including many of those actually making decisions. Wars don't affect people on the basis of what fucking passport they carry. They affect, unsurprisingly, the poorest, the working class. And they affect whomever they touch, passport or no.
This is a very general statement. You want to make it more specific, otherwise it's not empirically or logically testable. What's the actual proposition here? Like, that poor people worldwide are going to suffer from high food and energy prices? So Ukrainians should lay down arms and submit to Putin so as to help Africans?
Pushing the idea at an extreme so that you can fathom it: if you were visiting planet Kepler-186f, landing on it and exploring it, don't you think you'd have a better feel for it than from your average living room in Wigan or Trenton?
Yes. But your average Ukrainian is not visiting the front line, nor are they visiting the negotiation rooms in Parliament, so the analogy is irrelevant.
There are journalists, intelligence agents and amateur social media posters who all have a better grasp of the situation in those two areas than the average Ukrainian. They publish their information online for anyone to read.
Ukrainians learn about the situation on the front line and negotiation rooms from media. Same way we do. They don't all fucking go there in person, there's not a queue where all 40 million of them slowly file past to get a first-hand view.
Here's an example...
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63528183?at_medium=RSS&
It tells me about Zelensky's latest announcement. A journalist found out for me. 15 hours ago.
How do think the average Ukrainian found out? Did Zelensky go round their house? Did he shout it from the rooftop?
Here's a feed giving me information about the war...
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/nov/06/russia-ukraine-war-live-besieged-bakhmut-harder-and-harder-to-survive-in-says-official
It tells me how hard the citizens of Bakhmut are finding it to survive.
How do think the average Ukrainian found out? I found out 4 hours ago via a Reuters reporter who actually spoke to people there. What would a citizen of Lvov have to get any different or more accurate report?
Are you talking to me? I never made such claims.
Quoting Isaac
But you didn't. The poll doesn't survey the popularity of Zelensky among Ukrainians: Ordinary Ukrainians on the front lines are divided on a ceasefire and negotiations.
Besides also in peacetime, in democracy, you have people voting against what turns out to be the winning party or refusing to go to vote, that has no bearing on the fact that that party has democratically won.
Quoting Isaac
Where opposition = "Russian collaborationist". Zero problem with that in democracy. Besides the "Russian collaborationist" can just run propaganda and misinformation as Russians do on national TV, so there is no guarantee that having such opposition people would be more well-informed.
Quoting Isaac
It's enough to have read Mearsheimer's to realise how clumsy it's your attempt to making a point in favor of your views by citing him. You are incapable of understanding my own claims (I suspect you do not even understand your own claims), so it's no surprise that you do not understand what "legitimate security concerns" means in Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory. Or you do but you are playing dumb. In any case I'm not handholding you through fairly simple concepts, you need a minimum level of comprehension.
So?
Quoting neomac
I didn't ask if you had a problem with it. Your lack of concern for the proper functions of a free democracy is noted. I'm explaining the consequences.
Quoting neomac
In your case, it clearly isn't.
Quoting neomac
You've yet to demonstrate that. Disagreeing with you (a layman) does not constitute "not understanding". Disagreeing with a consensus of experts constitutes "not understanding". Disagreeing with you is practically a badge of qualification in the field.
Quite a few Ukrainians of both sex are "visiting" the frontline.
Quoting Isaac
But all these sources like ISW are available to Ukrainians too, on top of their capacity for direct observation and interview.
Quoting Isaac
Still, the citizens of Bakhmut know better about it.
I really don't think there's a point. And randomly, this is why I think progressives are breaking up the Democratic party. They're mirroring the extreme positions of Trump supporters. The will of the people disintegrates.
By a resident of Kherson, as told to Kseniia Kelieberda and Miranda Bryant for The Guardian
Sun 6 Nov 2022 01.00 EST
More than eight months after Kherson’s capture by Russian soldiers, the city is heavy and gloomy. Everything is frozen, hidden. After 3pm, there are no people on the streets. In the morning they go out to buy groceries and then they sit at home.
Kherson is being robbed by the Russians. Everything is taken out: monuments to Suvorov, Ushakov, Potemkin and Margelov were removed from their pedestals; barges, fire engines, ambulances and office chairs. They break into apartments. Even the windows of the city hall have been removed. A total organised plunder of the city is under way. Cars carry loot to the river and from there they are transported by boats to the left bank.
A car with a loudspeaker drives around the city urging residents to leave and text messages are sent during the night. But, like me, many of my friends stayed. We buy food and store water. We do not believe in forced evacuation. People are said to be taken to remote regions of Russia – but these are rumours.
There is practically no internet in Kherson. Communication has disappeared and even Russian TV channels have stopped broadcasting. That’s why there are so many rumours. We hear Ukraine’s artillery duel with Russia and we wait for release.
Russian soldiers can stop you on the street and detain you. They can break into your apartment and take anything.
I’m used to living like this. I’m feeling philosophical.
In some ways, the living conditions are normal. There is water and electricity, heating works, rubbish is taken out. There is food, but food prices are rising daily. Some shops and hospitals are closed. Although medical equipment has been removed, I read on Facebook that the doctors of the city’s first maternity hospital are delivering babies. Somewhere they found an old gynaecological chair, tools and medicines, and they work. In war, too, children are born. Three pharmacies remained in Kherson. The rest were evacuated. I don’t need medication. I do not complain about my health.
For the past few months, I have been preparing food for the winter. Occasionally, I meet colleagues at work, acquaintances. If there is internet, I advise employees. Sometimes I go to the dacha. I’m reading – mostly fiction and memoirs – and improving my culinary skills. Last Thursday, I met a colleague and went to the grocery store. While I cooked, I talked with relatives. In the evening, I read for two or three hours. Last week, I made 11 litres of grape juice with grapes I picked at the dacha. It took over six hours. In the occupied city, the days go by slowly and monotonously. You need to find something to do.
I don’t feel safe. Russian soldiers can stop you on the street and detain you. They can break into your apartment, search it and take away anything. My apartment has already been searched and we were detained at the dacha, which is near the Antonovsky railway bridge. They thought that we were gunlayers. They beat me up and threw me in jail. They took away my travel equipment – backpacks, tent, money, a phone and a laptop – but nothing incriminating was found and they released me a day later under house arrest. Now the city is in chaos. I will go to the dacha again, to help my friend move to the right bank. Everyone who lives in the dachas have been told to leave by the end of the week.
Those who wanted to leave Kherson and could, left. But we did not have humanitarian corridors and organised evacuation to Ukrainian territory. To leave was either very expensive or you needed your own car. Those who couldn’t afford to leave stayed in Kherson.
All my pro-Ukrainian acquaintances ignored Russia’s “evacuation”, which was mainly used by collaborators and their families, and those who were frightened by their false claims that Ukraine would blow up Kakhovka hydroelectric power station and attack Kherson. This is a journey into the unknown.
I believe that “evacuation” is a voluntary deportation of the population. Blackmail and intimidation of people are used. People were transported by boats across the Dnieper, and then they were transported by buses. We don’t know where these people are. There are various rumours.
I’m not hiding. I live in my apartment. I’m not alone. My cat, Hunter, lives with me. There is a family Telegram chat where every morning there is a roll call – they write to me from Kyiv, Chernivtsi, Bucharest. If there is a connection, I talk to them.
We know what’s going on with everyone.
There are few civilians left in Kherson now. I think 25% to 30%. I live in a multistorey building with 260 apartments. In the evening, no more than 20 windows are lit. Before the war, about 350,000 people lived in Kherson.
Soon, I think the right-bank part of the country will be liberated and that Ukraine will win. I am preparing to fight. I have built up food and water stocks, prepared the gas burner and decided on a reserve place to live. I stocked up on Hunter’s food as well. It is very hard to wait but I believe in liberation. I think it will happen this month.
Life has changed dramatically since Russia’s invasion. For people in occupied Kherson, the main thing now is to survive. I think about what will happen after the war.
When the occupation is over, I dream of seeing all my relatives and friends and returning to a peaceful life. I want to work, relax, travel. Faith in the imminent liberation of the city is keeping me going.
We want to create a family agricultural company and I will definitely go to the Camino de Santiago with my wife. Maybe someone else will join us, too. We had planned to do it back in 2020. But the pandemic happened, then the war. In the 21st century, only bloodthirsty savages are capable of this. They have no place in the civilised world.
So popular support can be measured through indicators others than the ones provided by formal democratic institutions. Indeed the poll you provided is again an indicator to take into account, that however doesn't invalidate the claim that Zelensky has great support from Ukrainians.
Quoting Isaac
I didn't talk about me I talked about democratic institutions as such. And I gave you historical examples to prove the point.
No sensible person would consider Italy a failed democracy because it doesn't admit a mafia party or a fascist party or a North Korean party within its party system. On the contrary, we may consider Italy democratic precisely because it doesn't include such parties. And if you do not understand this, you are a danger to democracy.
Quoting Isaac
You are explaining nothing. You are just iterating on your piece of propaganda not meant to well-inform anybody.
Quoting Isaac
Why on earth would I?! Your intellectual clumsiness is just so fun to watch, dude, why would I give you another chance to get things straight? You have no fucking clue even what you are asking when you say "You've yet to demonstrate that". Priceless.
So? There's 40 million Ukrainians. And the desperate, terrifying and bloody circumstances of the soldiers on the front line are hardly good conditions from which to get a good strategic overview. That's why armies have intelligence units and a command structure.
Quoting Olivier5
I didn't say they weren't. You're trying (and failing) to make the case that they're better informed. I'm not making the case that they're less well informed.
Quoting Olivier5
Which is miniscule compared to the size of the population. Journalists have access to direct observation and interview too.
Quoting Olivier5
They do. It doesn't give them any better an overview of the whole strategic situation.
Quoting neomac
We've been through this. It does literally indicate that. Zelensky is committed to a policy which this poll indicates does not have great popular support.
Only within the sample of Ukrainians that the survey was specified to be representative of: namely "residents and displaced persons in three Ukrainian cities close to the southeast battlefields this summer" (so in an area were pro-Russians are more likely to be found)
Indeed. But then, aren't these Ukrainian intelligence units and command structure better informed than you and me?Quoting Isaac
I am not trying to make a case here, it just seems obvious to me, that's all.
Quoting Isaac
A capacity for direct, primary observation is generally held in higher regard epistemologically than the capacity to read secondary data in the newspaper.
Quoting Isaac
What would you call "the whole strategic situation" exactly? Where does it start and end? And who has got a good view of it? God?
I'm not so sure of that, actually. US officials have been in contact with their counterparts.
We forget just how little interaction there actually was during the Cold War. There weren't many times, for example, that the US and Soviet leaders met.
For example, Carter and Brezhnev:
Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader that Reagan met in his second term in 1985. He didn't meet Andropov or Chernenko. Then there had been eight years that the leaders of the two Superpowers had met.
And the assumption that because Russia has nuclear weapons, it can invade other sovereign countries and we can't even give these countries aid to defend themselves is simply stupidity. Or insanity.
A conflict that the media had forgotten. The sides in the Ethiopian civil war came to an agreement.
However for those hypocrites who say they are for peace, but in fact de facto support Putin in this conflict (because they are against the West and don't care a fuck about anything else), it should be noticed just how and why a settlement was reached in the Ethiopian civil war. In short: The government won the war. But it could also face a continued insurgency, which would be even more disastrous for Tigray and the whole country. Hence both sides called it quits. At least for now.
A short but thorough examination how this was done, especially the peace terms are laid out:
Hence when talking about either an armstice or peace in Ukraine, one has to understand that the situation on the battlefield is the only reason both sides will make it. Just like in Ethiopia.
All surveys apply only to the sample. Whether the stratification is specified or not.
Your study, for example, was limited to Ukrainians outside of donbas, over 18, with access to a mobile phone and internet connection, and with sufficient free time and willingness to take part. That biases the results against the very people the survey I cited aimed to capture.
It was also funded by the US. It doesn't take too much imagination to think what might have become of any less flattering results the US funded.
Quoting Olivier5
Yep. But possibly no better informed than US intelligence. None of which has any bearing whatsoever on what the average Ukrainian knows. I can read the reports from such units no less easily than a Ukrainian can.
Quoting Olivier5
Indeed, but it's a capacity that is extremely limited. Only a tiny handful if Ukrainians have a sufficiently large social circle to gain anything more than a tiny vignette of what's going on directly. The rest they obtain from media reports, same as us. Same as we do in our own country, by the way. I've no direct idea what's even going on in my nearest city. I read about it in the newspaper. I live about 20 miles out of the city. I know no one who lives there and I rarely visit (my university is in the next city along, and my work is in London). I've no idea (directly) of what's happening 20 miles away, let alone 600.
Quoting Olivier5
I don't think that has a clear answer. What it does have, though, is thresholds. If I asked exactly what constituted a clear overview of a company, no one could specify, but we can all point to people unlikely to have such a view.
[b]• Patrushev: West has created an empire of lies, involving the destruction of Russia[/b] (Rossiyskaya Gazeta; Apr 26, 2022) [sup]english via google translate[/sup]
A couple or so continents are out to get Russia, they're more or less fascist- or Nazism-bound. The victim, Putin's Russia, will set it right. [Have nukes, by the way.]
Egbert Fortuin offers an analysis of some of the topics:
Quoting Ukraine commits genocide on Russians: the term “genocide” in Russian propaganda • Egbert Fortuin • Sep 7, 2022
• As one of Vladimir Putin’s closest advisers on Ukraine, Nicolai Patrushev spreads disinformation and outlandish conspiracy theories (The Conversation; Jun 7, 2022)
Talks negotiations diplomacy would be great. :up: (suggestion: a neutral intact, otherwise free sovereign, Ukraine)
• China's Xi meets Germany's Scholz, urges Ukraine peace talks (CTV News; Nov 4, 2022)
• The Biden administration is encouraging Ukraine to support peace talks with Russia nearly 9 months after invasion began, WaPo reports (Business Insider; Nov 6, 2022)
What do you say to someone like Patrushev, though?
I'll be sure to add that to my collection of 'stuff ssu reckons'.
Any thoughts on an actual argument?
Sure, and anybody must take into account the limits of sampling to reason more clearly. But there is a difference in a survey that is designed to address the popularity of Zelensky in Ukraine and another designed to address the popularity of a strategy in 3 cities in south-east Ukraine.
And again, this is not the only indicator. That's one that adds up with many others, including also formally democratic indicators. And any popular support indicator in its individuality (including formally democratic indicators) may be misleading and miss something of non-negligible political value in determining popular support for or against a government.
Speculative.
Quoting Isaac
I would think that this is false. They live through this war, and have friends and brothers on the front.
Quoting Isaac
So your question was unclear then, since what constitutes "the whole strategic situation" remains unclear.
Sure they do, sure.
Putin frames this "concern" in dire terms (just like Patrushev), employing it as a justification for war. Been trying to figure out exactly what existential threat NATO was/is to Russia, but came up short, for the most part anyway — here.
Ironically, Putin's Russia has proven an actual present existential threat to Ukraine instead (to which the Ukrainians + support are responding). And, until they've taken over all of Ukraine, the supposed NATO threat remains. With Finland + Sweden it may now grow? Yet, if they were to take over all of Ukraine, then they'd become an increased substantial threat to others by the same thinking (Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia come to mind at first) — not that they weren't before, including nuclear-wise (2018). Putin's activities have all by themselves put Russia/ns at greater risk. See where this is going?
I suppose Putin and Patrushev might come to terms with the fact that any trust there may have been is lost, Poles, Romanians, many others. Simply telling Ukrainians that they're Russian doesn't seem the way to rectify. Let the warring shamming propaganda slide?
Quoting _db
Maybe that's become a factor? Maybe most want Putin to leave the Ukrainians alone, and quit it already?
• U.S. privately asks Ukraine to show it’s open to negotiate with Russia (The Washington Post; Nov 5, 2022)
(Public talks have a chance of exposing bullshit, though.)
There is, yes. The latter tells us a lot more about support for particular strategies in the areas where is actually matters, as opposed to an almost meaningless generic support among people who are no more affected by the issue than any other.
Quoting Olivier5
It's bullshit. No one has so many "friends and brothers" on the front that they can personally accumulate a first hand overview of the strategic position.
Quoting Olivier5
Not in the least. That's why I mentioned thresholds. You could not possibly identity the point where purple becomes red, you couldn't say exactly how much violence is too much violence to allow a child to watch on TV. Nothing about these failures to clearly define something prevent us from knowing what is definitely outside of the definition. I couldn't clearly define exactly what 'music' is (how melodic does the noise have to be?) but I know that my hat isn't a piece of music.
I don't need to know, or define, exactly what having a strategic overview would entail. One bloke having 'a bit of a look' from his window isn't it.
I think the Russian tragedy is in the Slavophile attitude of seeing everything "Western" as bad and dangerous to the "true Russian state and Russian heritage". That the West is there to destroy every good in Russia. It's all a huge conspiracy against Russia to destroy Russia and the Russians.
Perhaps the cause for this is that modernization, or Westernization, has been forced by a violent system starting with Peter the Great and other autocratic regimes. And when autocrats force with an iron fist modernization however bening in the end, the way it's introduced is the problem. Because I think just as Greece, Russia and Russian culture is part of the West.
It matters to them because their lives and living is more exposed to the war than in other areas. But it matters to the rest of Ukraine too because they might lose their territory, men and resources to fight a foreign power. Besides those areas are more pro-Russian so it's easier to find Ukrainians there who would more likely want Zelensky to make concessions to Russia, than the other way around, and if Putin is right in claiming that pro-Russian separatists called him in their defense against the Ukrainian government, then they are now paying also for the gamble pro-Russian separatists there have taken, as much as Ukrainians are paying for provoking the Russian bear with a stick in the eye, right?
I am not talking of getting an overview of the strategic position, though.
• Do Putin and Kim have an 'arms for horses' deal? Russia sends North Korea 30 thoroughbred horses by train after Pyongyang shipped Moscow artillery shells in bid to bolster its bungled Ukraine invasion (Daily Mail; Nov 5, 2022)
• Foreign fighters in Ukraine speak out on their willingness to serve: 'I had to go': (ABC News; Nov 6, 2022)
, Putin's Russia sure regressed. :/ Not all Russians (I'd say), but the autocrat circle is in control.
More nationalist bullshit.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116152
8 million children. Did anyone ask them whether they want the war to continue so that Ukraine doesn't lose any territory? No. Because apparently they haven't got the right fucking passport.
Disgusting.
On the other hand, just think about if all war efforts throughout were transformed into supporting those 8 million children... (Some might even regain faith in mankind.) :smile: "And that's why :point: you should vote @jorndoe in the next election." :grin:
Yeah. This from UNICEF in October. It's not enough.
The war needs to stop as quickly as possible, countries just aren't independent any more, the idea that all Ukrainians have to consider is what other Ukrainians want to sacrifice for their territory is ridiculous. The idea that it's all we have to consider is obscene.
"Legitimate security concerns" is not fashionable anymore?
Quoting Isaac
But if you believe that "lots of global events cause that level of damage - from local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" why are you specifically concerned about the Ukrainian crisis?
Quoting Isaac
And did anyone ask them whether they want the war to continue so that Russia will appease its legitimate security concerns? Neither.
Not to mention that this war is not matter of Ukrainian losing territory to Russia or Russian national security concerns. It’s matter of power struggles and world order between authoritarian vs democratic regimes: in particular, it’s about Putin wanting his threats against the Western-led world order to be taken as damn seriously as his threats against NATO enlargement, if not more. What do you say? Should we take him damn seriously?
[quote=“Isaac;754454"]Disgusting.[/quote]
And how is your disgust helping the 8 million children so far?
This article was bad enough to get its own Wikipedia entry:
• What Russia Should Do with Ukraine (Wikipedia)
• What should Russia do with Ukraine? (RIA Novosti; Apr 3, 2022) [sup]english via google translate[/sup]
What's wrong with these people?
This is true and sad. Hopefully the end will be such humiliating that the kind of nonsense will finally be brushed off. Yet that might be too much to hope.
I remember reading memoirs of a Finn written in the early 1920's that had served in the Imperial government in St. Petersburgh until the fall. He said he had met even Rasputin, but one his most damning remarks weren't at the Bolsheviks, but especially the Black Hundreds, which according to him were absolute poison for any sane and rational reform to happen, but lulled the Czarist regime to think that the people support them.
:100: :grin:
I have no idea what you're talking about. What has the pragmatic acknowledgement that Russia had legitimate security concerns (if you poke them, they'll bite), got to do with the ethics of supporting a war affecting millions according only to the objectives of those with a particular passport?
The only link I can see is moral culpability in both cases. We ought not have provoked Russia - knowing what would happen and we ought not continue to finance a war which risks the starvation of millions.
Do you see some conflict in those positions?
Quoting neomac
It's the title of the thread.
Quoting neomac
No it isn't, don't be naive. It's produced by conflicting national interests, not Steven Segal.
Quoting neomac
More like it.
Quoting neomac
Yes, very seriously. If you think 'war' and 'serious' are synonymous, then God help us.
It won't surprise our most faithful readers who know you as a serial liar, but this Unicef quote has nowt to do with Ukraine. This quote is from a press release about Somalia and does not mention Ukraine.
https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-warns-unprecedented-numbers-child-deaths-somalia
I understand that for the putinistas, the Ukrainians are responsible for all the world's problems, and their identity needs to be erased otherwise the universe will crumble. But don't erase the identity of Somalians in the process!
Scholz admit that German industry is heading for the Schiesser; Industrialists are shutting down plants all over Germany as the increased energy costs begin to bite. And many of those Industrialists are jumping ship, and loading up to unprecedented levels of investment in the USA and doubly so in China.
The European Consensus is firmly against both Russia and China, who we are told don't share our Values. So any visit to China is going to attract speculation. But as no-one - especially Scholz - is permitted to admit that the Post WW2 Germany Economic Miracle has hit a reef, the search for a fix to keep the German Economy afloat needs to occur surreptitiously as forlorn as Brussels and Washington are watching Scholz carefully.
Although no one can say it, everyone knows it. Scholz's industrial caravan to Bijeing is a glaring admission that Germany is in a major economic crisis. Xi - in his inscrutable CPC style - delivered Scholz a scornful dressing down, detailing the foolhardiness of Germany Policy towards Russia and schooled him to pressure Zelensky to the Peace table.
Of course Xi promised to work in harmony with Germany but what if anything else was agreed on is uncertain. Interestingly, paranoid circles are concerned that the trip maybe just the first step for Germany to enter a tripartite alliance with China and Russia. It's a compelling idea - one no doubt appealing to those German Industrialists - but then Germany would need to relinquish those precious western values .
Bullshit. It's about the famine in Somalia which literally every expert in the world agrees is (and continues to be) exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine. That you'd seek to de-legitimise the starvation of millions just to score a cheap point for you pro-Ukrainian virtue signalling is a disgrace. You should be ashamed.
UNICEF’s Deputy Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa, Rania Dagash
07 June 2022
So I'll ask again...
The war in Ukraine severely increases the risk of starvation for millions in Africa by
Simple question - do those millions at risk of starvation because of the continued war get a say in whether it's worth it or not?
Why yes they do. Macky Sall, the president of Senegal and acting chair of the African Union,, pushed for the cereal export deal brokered by UNCTAD and Turkey. By visiting Moscow, he made sure Africa had a say. This deal is credited to bringing food prices down to pre-war levels:
That's not having a say in whether the war is worth it, is it?
That's having a say in what to do about the consequences.
At what point did the US consult the African Union about the impact of their continued funding for the war?
Worth what?
Quoting Isaac
The voices of Africa are heard in the UN General Assembly, among other places. Only half of them voted for the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion in March. This sent a message.
The damage. As I've explained above. The costs are measured in millions of lives.
Quoting Olivier5
Dodging the question again.
I didn't ask "At what point did the US consult the African Union about their plan to condemn Russia"
Regardless, this is about your claim that it is proper only to consider the opinion of Ukrainians when deciding whether to continue funding the war. Are you now going back on that position?
I'm at risk of dying of cold because I cannot afford the heating bill. So I get a say. And I say that defeating fascism is expensive and costs many lives, but also saves many lives. One can never make the pragmatic calculations of such global events, because no one knows the future, and no one knows the alternative future brought about by making a different decision. War is disgusting and starvation is disgusting, and if we all thought you knew how to end them, we'd all vote for you.
And yet someone has to, and we either participate in holding those decisions to account or we wash our hands of the whole dirty business and let others decide for us.
Currently, our governments have decided war is for the best (though anyone who thinks they have defeating fascism in mind has been living in a cave for the last few decades). We either hold that decision to account, or we give over our responsibility to them. Do you trust your government to make that choice well, without public scrutiny? I don't.
And to think the only way to fight fascism is with war...
So here we are. Discussing the courses of action our governments are taking so as to give, or withhold, our support. Holding them to account in the public fora.
...ought we not?
I think we ought, but I think we ought to do so carefully, with respect for differing opinions.
I certainly do not trust my (UK) government to do what is best for most people in the UK let alone the world. And that is a question I also don't know the answer to, - in the case of a conflict between the interests of the world and the interests of the people it represents and governs, does a government have a right or a duty to do what is best for the world?
The cost is not actually measured. You are talking of an economic theory, which is to say that everything and every countries are connected, and thus some consequences beyond Ukraine and Russia are to be expected. The poor worldwide will suffer the global consequences. But how many and by how much is not being measured. Whatever methodology one cooks up for doing so would be awfully complex, and open to many criticism.
Because you see, the world poor also suffer from the consequences of millions other things, first among which comes disenfranchising in their own country. Their lack of political and legal rights lays at the root of the problem. Poverty is powerlessness.
Quoting Isaac
Not at all, for the very simple reason that I never ever professed such an opinion.
To a point. I don't have any truck with racism, or nationalism. I'm not going to act as if militarism is an OK opinion to have, or that war crimes, and human rights abuses are OK if you happen to be this month's media darlings. It's not OK. Some opinions are not suitable for polite discussion.
Quoting unenlightened
I think everyone does, km not sure how else our globalised society is going to work. It may be in Brazil's best interests to capitalise on their timber resource, but the rest of the world need to breathe. It may be in India's best interests to use cheap coal, but it's not in Hawaii's for them to. It may be in Ukraine's best interests to keep pushing on to recapture Crimea, but Somalia need them to get back to farming wheat.
Short of a global government I don't see any other way than national governments developing an international conscience.
Of course it's measured, don't be stupid. Governments, NGOs, corporations, don't just make random guesses as to the impact of their interventions. The measurements might not be accurate, they might be open to interpretation, but they're not absent.
Nor are they so wide that 'anything goes'. We may not know exactly what factors lead to the famine in the Horn of Africa, but we know damn well it wasn't an excess of funding. We know stopping food supplies won't help. Your appeal to relativism only gets you so far. There's limited 'alternative facts' you can spin on this.
Quoting Olivier5
Absolutely. Corrupt autocracies are to be avoided. As are foreign powers like the IMF dictating government policy by poverty exploitation.
Losing territory to an autocrat is a sure fire way to lose autonomy. So is getting into odious debt trying to avoid the former.
Quoting Olivier5
Yeah, right.
Agreed. You have no idea about what you yourself are talking about, go figure!
Quoting Isaac
Precisely, that’s why you are living in your fantasies. You must properly connect ethics with pragmatics if you want to rationally commensurate what should be achieved (in terms of desirable ends) with what can be achieved under given geopolitical circumstances.
Quoting Isaac
Here 3 problems:
Quoting Isaac
Sure why not? Since you just happened to find a study that highlights the effects of the Ukrainian crisis instead of the effects of "local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty”, you thought it was worth quoting it to me because of the title of the thread, despite the fact I was the one who first linked a survey titled “Global impact of the war in Ukraine: Billions of people face the greatest cost-of-living crisis in a generation” while you were the one claiming that the Ukrainian crisis doesn’t deserve such highlight compared to"local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty", right?
Quoting Isaac
Are you crazy?! I - not you - am the one claiming that the core issue is about the Western countries national interest in conflict with the national interest of an authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran. You are the one trying to sell us the idea that 8 million dead children in Yemen ought to be the core issue of this conflict as if it made geopolitical sense!
And talking explicitly in terms of hegemonic power clash is Putin too, not his friend Steven Seagal: https://intellinews.com/putin-calls-for-a-new-world-order-in-his-annual-valdai-speech-260759/
LOL. They do do guess, not totally randomly of course. Sometime they don't even care to guess. Someone has to pay for the info, otherwise why collect it? And that is the case with the number of deaths attributable to the conflict outside Ukraine: nobody cares to count. In fact, a reliable body count does not even exist inside Ukraine.
Quoting Isaac
That is correct. Countries that help Ukraine do so for all sorts of reasons and might stop their support whenever they feel like the cost is too high, or some other reason. My point, instead, is that the belligerents are the ones deciding when to stop the war, and how and when to negotiate to that end.
So what you mean to say is "Yes, that's right, they don't just randomly guess", but it seems you're allergic to agreeing with anyone not on your team.
Quoting Olivier5
Ah right, so you've come on just to make a blindingly obvious point that my 10 year-old nephew has no trouble with. Good effort. What's next on your agenda? Telling everyone that the Pope's catholic?
Quoting Olivier5
It's not my fault if you are wasting your time chasing windmills. Next time try and understand what I say rather than shoot first and think later.
...
Quoting Olivier5
Fun fact: Drya Platonova/Dugina - Dugin's daughter who was car-bombed, allegedly by the Ukrainian intelligence - closely cooperated with the present-day Black Hundreds publishing company, and knew its founders well. One of her texts was to be included in "Book Z", a collection of texts about the invasion that the publisher is planning to release later this year.
I have discounted Dugin's influence on Putin here, but lately there have been rumors that since Darya's death, Putin, or at least his administration, have taken a greater interest in Dugin. Dugin, along with another odious ultra-nationalist figure, Alexander Prokhanov, have reportedly been invited for consultations to Kremlin, and their idioms have been cropping up in, e.g., Medvedev's ridiculously ferocious social media posts.
Putin's regime has an ideology problem. It was never really ideological, as I have previously said. What could pass for ideological messaging from the top was amorphous, inconstant and uninspiring, for the most part. As in the late Soviet era, there was an unofficial social contract where the populace was discouraged from participation in politics and activism, and in exchange those in power would leave them be, provide safety from wars and major upheavals, as well as some basic prosperity. Keep your head down, and you'll be fine.
That contract was already fraying before the invasion: prosperity was declining and the future didn't look promising. And then the contract was shattered entirely. The unthinkable happened, and then again and again: an invasion into Ukraine that turned into a protracted war that isn't going well, sanctions and isolation that ordinary people are beginning to feel, and then the ultimate blow: mobilization. The authorities are asking a lot from the populace, but have nothing to give in return. So they feel like they have to come up with some inspiring ideology at last. Or at least they feel like this is what Putin expects of them. Dugin, Prokhanov, etc. - they sound like they are in tune with Papa (as they call Putin among themselves), so they may finally find some use.
Note that contrary to you in that older exchange, I just did explain clearly and simply what my position was as soon as your confusion about it became apparent.
Russia’s Potential Drawdown from Kyiv Fractures Pro-War Voices at Home
— James Beardsworth; The Moscow Times; Mar 30, 2022
Quoting Alexander Prokhanov
Quoting Ramzan Kadyrov
• Russian schools to teach new course on Crimean "reunification" (Nina Achmatova; AsiaNews; Dec 4, 2014)
• Russia moves to eradicate Ukraine from schools in occupied Mariupol, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (Halya Coynash; Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group; Jul 4, 2022)
• Ukrainian TV host shows textbook to Russify school students in occupied Mariupol (Andriy Bednyakov; The New Voice of Ukraine; Sep 14, 2022)
• Ukraine's Lightning Counteroffensive Has Russian Teachers Rethinking Plans To Work In Occupied Areas (RFE/RL; Sep 17, 2022)
• ‘No way I could work for the Russians’: the Ukrainian teachers resisting occupation (Shaun Walker, Pjotr Sauer; The Guardian; Sep 18, 2022)
• Ukraine war: Tortured for refusing to teach in Russian (Zhanna Bezpiatchuk, Sofia Bettiza; BBC; Oct 1, 2022)
Re-culturation. (OK, I made that word up.) There's something a bit sinister about this stuff ...
• 29 thousand Crimean ‘Youth Army’ recruits taught to hate Ukraine and be ready to die for Russia (Halya Coynash; Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group; Feb 7, 2022)
• Russian State Patriotism and Putin?s Invasion of Ukraine (Jussi Lassila; ZOiS; Apr 6, 2022)
• Young Army Cadets National Movement / Yunarmia / Yunarmiya (Wikipedia)
EDIT: wrong word
Of course we have to remember that during the late Soviet times " ideological messaging from the top was amorphous, inconstant and uninspiring, for the most part". We and others called it the Lithurgy. Communicating with Soviets was basically listening to these lithurgies, which basically was the way for Russians to speak and show as Soviets that they were on the party line. What they talked in their own kitchen among friends was totally different. And this has continued to the Putin era.
What we cannot know exactly is just how popular this present lithurgy is. It's still like neocons of G.W. Bush administration: they had a huge impact on US policies, but quickly faded away and became unpopular among the masses (especially after Trump among the Republican voters too). The present "war-party" ideologues in Russia are actually also a rather small cabal.
Of course, this imperialist ultra-nationalism needs desperately some kind of victory in Ukraine. Ukrainians will fight and as long as the West will assist this poor country, Ukraine can push Russia into a humiliating defeat, which likely will make the imperialists a laughing stock and justified culprits for this war.
Their only hope is that the West fails to do this, to support Ukraine. This can happen because of the absurd appeasing manner of fearing "escalation". Now Putin is supported only by the far right and the far leftists (as seen here on this forum), yet this mental block of fearing escalation might be the real hope for Putin. If Ukraine is pushed into an armstice on the present lines (or even with Kherson liberated and the front-line going on the Dniepr-river), it still will be a victory for Putin. Retaking Crimea would be possible for Ukraine only next year at the earliest.
As one commentator put it: the West support for Ukraine is strengthened by Ukrainian victories and Russian attrocities.
George Beebe, the director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute, said the reports are a stark reminder that the war “could rapidly escalate into a direct U.S.-Russian confrontation.”
The risks of escalation in the Ukraine war are rising fast
The Underappreciated Risks of Catastrophic Escalation
The risk that the war in Ukraine escalates past the nuclear threshold
Putin’s Risk SpiralThe Logic of Escalation in an Unraveling War
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129792 - talk of possible nuclear weapons use could lead to a “dangerous spiral”.
Ukraine has path to victory, but prospect of defeat risks dangerous escalation from Russia
...but of course, everyone who disagrees with you simply must be absurd because you are Way, the Truth and the Light.
How about reinstating the Kharkiv Pact with a neutral intact, otherwise free sovereign, Ukraine (though it could frustrate the extremists)?
Say, having some UN observers or whatever scour about would probably be fine with most, including the Ukrainians. We're not talking Israel-Palestine here. Elections could be independently certified for some time. Maybe any internal conflicts could be addressed over time. People could get on with life.
Did that ship sail?
As an aside, this review makes the book seem interesting: How to Un-Rig an Election by Alberto Simpser
I'd be in favour of literally any agreement which ended the fighting. The less territory in Russian control the better though, so if they'd go for your intact, sovereign Ukraine, then great.
But why on earth would the Russians just give up donbas and Crimea? They de facto owned Crimea before the recent invasion, and donbas was wavering. What do you think Ukraine could offer that would persuade the Russians to give up Crimea?
Quoting jorndoe
Ahh Bayer to the rescue, phew...
This would be the same Bayer who plead guilty and pay a fine of $66 million to settle charges that it participated in an international scheme to fix prices of rubber chemicals. Who were fined $16.2 million for fixing the prices of aspirin and other over-the-counter meds in Germany. Who agreed to pay $18 million to settle claims it conspired with other manufacturers to inflate the price of certain plastics. Who paid more than $257 million in global settlement of the FCA and criminal allegations that it attempted to evade paying required rebates to state Medicaid programs for sales of Cipro and Adalat.
Sounds like it's not just Russia and Ukraine relying on convicted criminals to help resolve this crisis.
But I forget, literally everyone who isn't Russia are saints with nothing but the shining light of freedom guiding their pure hearts. I'm sure Bayer will save the day and not just fuck everyone over for as much profit as they can squeeze out of whatever emaciated husk they deign to leave behind, like they've done with every single other contract they've touched.
Actually, the option might as well be put forth. As a starting point at least, a way out. Try to get China behind it. Put the diplomats to work.
But the Putinistas may not care. Might not be realistic. Can't say I'd be optimistic as it stands. At least everyone would know if that was the case.
A blocker could be if the Ukrainians were to demand repairs or some such. Maybe the international community could step in, instead of Russia, don't know, it's all hypothetical.
Zelensky sets terms for negotiations with Russia
[sup]— Clyde Hughes; UPI; Nov 8, 2022[/sup]
Ukraine’s Zelensky Sets Conditions for ‘Genuine’ Peace Talks With Russia
[sup]— Matthew Luxmoore, Laurence Norman, Marcus Walker; WSJ; Nov 8, 2022[/sup]
• compensation for losses
• territorial integrity (per UN charter)
• bringing war criminals to justice
• guarantees against recurrence
That's more or less four of Anders Åslund's six items: 1, 2, 3, 6,
one of which (6) also was brought up by Oleksandra Matviichuk.
(hey, mine is more future-oriented)
Mykhailo Podolyak is skeptical...
[tweet]https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1589902425196212227[/tweet]
‘Hundreds’ of Russians killed daily as Donetsk is ‘littered with bodies’
[sup]— Nataliya Vasilyeva; Telegraph; Nov 8, 2022[/sup]
Civilians grabbed from Podmoskovye and shipped off to the frontlines? :/ Apparently, that's what those taken captive says.
Peace terms that the other side are never going to accept are little more than a gloss on a continued war effort.
Quoting jorndoe
...trouble is, Minsc II already had "Pullout of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and also mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine" - Yet according to Reuters "While Ukraine's armed forces of more than 200,000 servicemen are less than a quarter the size of Russia's, they have been significantly boosted since 2014 by Western military aid, including supplies of U.S. Javelin anti-tank missiles and Turkish drones.", and 102,000 (estimated) foreign paramilitaries.
It's going to take more than non-NATO membership on paper (if that's all that's on offer), it needs to be in practice.
Quoting jorndoe
...already an agreement. You can't go to Russia and offer them something they already have.
Quoting jorndoe
...seriously! Does it look like Russia gives a flying fuck about preventing atrocities? Possibly could play to a home audience as a win, but with the change in tone now in Russia, I don't think that will work as well as it might have a few months ago.
Quoting jorndoe
...as above, staging and revolutions are not prevented by paperwork. There needs to be more of an international commitment to stop interference.
Quoting jorndoe
...but their naval base is currently in their territory. I don't see how this constitutes an offer, it's a concession. Russia currently hold Crimea (have done since 2014, and most of Donbas. Ukraine aren't offering to pull out of those regions, their offering to not attack them. A peace deal doesn't start with "we won't attack you if..."
Quoting jorndoe
This ship has sailed. The Western propaganda machine has been ramped up to such a volume no politician without a deathwish is going to be seen 'trusting' Russia. They've burnt their own bridges there.
Quoting jorndoe
Russia could save war resources any time, on the terms you suggest. It's expending war resources trying to hold its new territory, it's not an 'offer' to allow then to stop, they can just stop.
Quoting jorndoe
I don't think Russia cares about Sweden and Finland in NATO, both countries are well 'Westernised' already, they're a lost cause as far as the 'Western' influence Putin fears. weapons-wise, there's already missile bases in Poland etc. It's not the strategic loss Ukraine would be. Might be worth something though...
Quoting jorndoe
...go on...how do you see this working? Do you think there's a significant opposition in Russia that would be satisfied by such an agreement?
Quoting jorndoe
.., if the lifting of sanctions were actually part of the agreement (rather than assumed on trust) they'd be a boon, but not enough alone. sanctions aren't that bad, and Russia can hit back just as hard (look at the fuel crisis faced by Europe this winter).
Quoting jorndoe
I think Putin is one of the radicals.
...
These all seem like 'icing on the cake' type sweeteners, but there's no actual offer under them to sweeten. Ukraine will have to give something more substantial, some cake for the icing to sweeten.
It's a pattern repeated over and over - War -> reconstruction requirements -> corporate opportunity to screw everyone.
I can't think of a single example from history where that's gone well for the inhabitants. Can you?
I don't think at this stage that Ukraine are going to want any kind of realistic deal, but it's not their opinion that matters to us, we're concerned with the grounds on which we ought approve the funding of this war. I think the offer of a realistic peace deal (and Russia's rejection of that offer) ought be the bare minimum grounds on which we fund a foreign war. If no such offer is made, I don't see we have any moral grounds to be involved. Peace has to be our priority, not territory.
Right, like a formal neutrality agreement, involving external parties like the UN, NATO itself, whichever.
Quoting Isaac
Except some number of their statements complain about that on their doorstep (been mentioned in the thread a few times by now). But, in a formal neutrality agreement, this would be put to rest.
Quoting Isaac
Whether they do or not, it would at least no longer be an excuse of theirs, it'd be credibly monitored by independent parties (like the UN).
Quoting Isaac
In a war zone. Not a neutral zone in which they'd have an agreement, a formal lease.
Quoting Isaac
Don't give up so easily. Lives (and infrastructures) are at stake, right? Might take some time, but, hey, small steps.
Quoting Isaac
Not if they wish to continue warring. It's proven costly.
Quoting Isaac
OK, so we're beyond NATO and a neutral Ukraine here. We're talking Putin against a couple or so continents. If that's his real actual beef, his reason for war bombing killing destruction, then he's already steered onto a path with a markedly larger conflict, not ending with Ukraine. That could be. Without some effort, I suppose we'll eventually find out, though I (personally) hope not.
Quoting Isaac
Don't know, but I'd be surprised if all of Russia is going all-out blood-lust. People have fled the country, some have tried avoiding getting sent to war, some poorly (or un-)trained new soldiers have reportedly surrendered to Ukrainians. Jussi Lassila's post from Apr 6, 2022 suggests less Russian enthusiasm than what meets the eye. But, hard to tell.
Quoting Isaac
That's the bad part, where we might hope he's not a goner entirely. :/ There'd be no telling what's next.
Quoting Isaac
The suggestion could be a start. Try getting China in on it. Something.
It looks like a tautological claim. On a charitable reading, the example would be: Germany, Italy, Japan after WW2.
If further "reconstruction" doesn't necessarily presuppose war, then I'd include also ex-Warsaw Pact states and Soviet-Union Republics that joined the West (i.e. through NATO and/or EU) after collapse of Soviet Union.
Interesting. Which American corporations were significantly involved in those reconstructions?
Yes, I think UN involvement will be essential to the success of any plan.
Quoting jorndoe
I think Crimean neutrality might be a offer worth considering, but militarily, Ukraine don't have a hope in hell of re-taking Crimea without huge losses.
I think any deal which doesn't include territorial losses is just pie in the sky. The Russians know that any territorial regains now are going to be a massive slog for Ukraine, they're unlikely to settle, when they know Ukraine are bluffing (about how easily they might wage war on Crimea).
The point about any deal is that Ukraine has to offer something fairly substantial because the two sides are pretty equal right now at the current border. Both are exhausted, both have taken huge losses, both face economic collapse (though less so Russia), both face political upheaval if they achieve anything short of victory.
So if all's roughly equal at the current front line, I can't see why one side would see a massive loss of territory as a reasonable deal.
What?
You could throw in the whole of Europe after WW2.
Indeed, I took just the most notable examples to me.
Quoting Isaac
You wrote: "War -> reconstruction requirements -> corporate opportunity to screw everyone"
Now if your claim - non-charitably understood - refers only to corporate contributions to reconstruction that, as you would say, "screwed everyone", then claiming "I can't think of a single example from history where that's gone well for the inhabitants" is practically a tautology: there is no corporation that didn't "screw everyone" in a set of corporations that were selected precisely because their contribution "screwed everyone", obviously.
If your claim - more charitably understood - refers only to corporate contributions to reconstruction as such, then one must take into account the Marshall Plan after WW2. Not surprisingly, Chomsky commented (in "The Umbrella of U.S. Power"): “the generosity was largely bestowed by American taxpayers upon the corporate sector, which was duly appreciative, recognizing years later that the Marshall Plan “set the stage for large amounts of private U.S. direct investment in Europe,” establishing the basis for the modern Transnational Corporations, which “prospered and expanded on overseas orders,... fueled initially by the dollars of the Marshall Plan” and protected from “negative “developments” by “the umbrella of American power.” (The former citation comes from the U.S. Commerce Department in 1984, the latter from a "Business Week" article, in 1975).
The Marshall Plan was a US government loan instrument. It was not a corporate reconstruction contract, which is what I was referring to with Bayer.
More importantly, as economist Tyler Cowen shows, the countries that received the most Marshall Plan money (allies Britain, Sweden, and Greece) grew the slowest between 1947 and 1955, while those that received the least money (axis powers Germany, Austria, and Italy) grew the most. So the extent to which Chomsky is right proves exactly the point I was making. The plan hindered growth in recipient countries to the benefit of American corporations.
Paul Hoffman, head of the committee for the distribution of Marshal aid admitted in his memoir, "the aid did not in fact help the economies of Europe. The primary benefit was psychological."
A congressional report on the plan later concluded that
It did, however, make American firms extremely rich by recycling tax dollars and forcing European countries to rely on American exports.
Vladimir Putin is weakened and his opponents are preparing to strike
[sup]— Alexey Minyaylo via Chris Brown; CBC; Oct 7, 2022[/sup]
Putin’s No-Win Trap
[sup]— Kirill Rogov; Wilson Center; Oct 13, 2022[/sup]
What Could Bring Putin Down?
[sup]— Daniel Treisman; Foreign Affairs; Nov 2, 2022[/sup]
Putin is losing his grip and facing regime collapse, says Russian KGB expert
[sup]— Yevgenia Albats; The Sun; Nov 5, 2022[/sup]
Vladimir Putin's regime is being threatened 'from within', reveals Ukrainian official
[sup]— Volodymyr Ohryzko via Luan Trimi; Oh My Mag via MSN; Nov 8, 2022[/sup]
Would be great (maybe). Not holding my breath though.
The neutrality deal was to accommodate Putin's demands, "NATO threatening us", "deNazification", "demilitarization", that stuff. Their tune has changed some, and might continue to change.
Russia declares expanded war goals beyond Ukraine's Donbas
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan; Reuters; Jul 20, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Sergey Lavrov · TASS · Oct 11, 2022
[sup]? very careful not to suggest "war" by the way :smile:[/sup]
Conjecture on my part: If they thought it feasible, they'd grab all of Ukraine, and start re-culturation immediately. Down the line, who knows. On that angle, the demands are more like rationalizations for public consumption. The demands have become increasingly fake-looking (almost ridiculous), but decision-making and such depend on understanding their aims, which may not have much to do with peace anyway. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are being bombed throughout, not pretty.
The neutrality thing addresses the demands, but if their aims are too different, then they wouldn't accept it, perhaps even as a starting point for talks.
Does this really look that sinister to you...?
Quoting USAID and Bayer partner to support Ukrainian farmers and address the global food security crisis (Oct 11, 2022)
I suppose maybe it is. I'd run with it, though. (Foodstuff, millions of children, ...)
[sup]— The Moscow Times; Nov 8, 2022[/sup]
Basic military training course to be added to Russian school curricula next year
[sup]— TASS; Nov 9, 2022[/sup]
Military training and "talking about important things" will take up 10% of the study time
[sup]— Novye Izvestia; Nov 9, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Sergei Mironov
Quoting Steve Rosenberg · Nov 9, 2022
[tweet]https://twitter.com/bbcstever/status/1590261429726490624[/tweet]
Moscow's busy these days. Some years after 2023, Russia will be increasingly militarized, at least that's what it looks like.
Moscow orders retreat from Kherson
The Russian defense minister ordered on Wednesday, November 9, the withdrawal of Russian forces from the right bank of the Dnieper River in the Ukrainian region of Kherson, which includes the regional capital of the same name, target of a large Ukrainian counter-offensive for several weeks.
"Proceed with the withdrawal of soldiers," Sergei Shoigu said on television, after a proposal to this effect by the commander of Russian operations in Ukraine, General Sergei Surovikin, who acknowledged that it was a decision "not at all easy" to take. "The maneuvers [of withdrawal] of soldiers will begin very quickly," assured the general.
The announcement was received with skepticism in Kiev. "We see no sign that Russia is leaving Kherson without a fight. Part of the Russian [troops] is still in the city" in southern Ukraine, said a presidential adviser, Mykhailo Podoliak, blasting "staged television statements" from Moscow.
https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/11/09/guerre-en-ukraine-moscou-ordonne-le-retrait-des-forces-russes-de-la-ville-strategique-de-kherson_6149238_3210.html
Yeah, I see what you mean. There's a line to walk with any deal between offering Putin a face-saving off-ramp and offering him a sweetener that he actually wants. The two might not be the same. I do think Putin genuinely wants trade access (oil) and he wants a seat at the 'big boys table', but I don't buy for a second that he's actually concerned about Nazis.
The problem with demilitarisation is that it's already in the Minsk agreements so a new agreement would says what?
Quoting jorndoe
Maybe, but the "if they thought it feasible" is doing lot of work there. Who would? Ukraine's enormous, they had trouble holding Chechnya and that's actually in their territory already. Talk of Putin's imperial ambitions is propaganda, it's absurd. He's barely been involved in more than a few border scuffles - compared to the US's wars in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq... If Putin had the slightest imperial ambitions he'd have attacked Ukraine decades ago, what was he waiting for?
Quoting jorndoe
Month's ago the demands were; neutral Ukraine, Independent Donbas, Russian Crimea. It was nothing short of criminal inhumanity that they were not considered as a starting point for a peace deal.
Quoting jorndoe
I think neutrality, and Crimea might be lines in the sand for Russia, but we don't know. The reason we don't know being largely US warmongering.
Quoting jorndoe
Well they're not going to write down their real plan in the bloody press release are they!
What's sinister is a set of circumstances which have, in the past, turned out to be nothing but a way of transferring money from the poor to the rich. In this case, who knows. If we don't learn our lesson from every other such occasion, then I suppose we'll find out in a few years' time when Bayer are arranged on criminal charges again. My guess (for what it's worth) would be that the corn seed is a Bayer GMO patent which ties the Ukrainian's in to what can then be ever increasing profit margins. We've seen that before.
Don't think a whole lot do. Except perhaps in Russia, hard to tell. Either way, it keeps coming up from Putin and compadres.
Fascism Comes to Ukraine -- From Russia
[sup]— Cathy Young; RealClearPolitics; May 21, 2014[/sup]
Quoting Full text: Putin’s declaration of war on Ukraine · Feb 24, 2022
Can Ukraine have a ‘Nazi problem’ with a Jewish president?
[sup]— Shaked Karabelnicoff; Unpacked; May 15, 2022[/sup]
Anyway, if that can be scratched off, then their interest in Donbas was another from the get-go, and that was/is among their demands. And, if they had ulterior plans, then it'd be helpful to understand what they were/are, especially for decision-makers.
They're apparently moving further east as well. Maybe trying to isolate the Melitopol region somewhat? It's unclear how many poorly trained soldiers are present, though.
Interactive Map: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
Ukraine Interactive map - Ukraine Latest news on live map
Russo-Ukrainian War - Google My Maps
Ulterior motives are important, but so's the gloss (often more so). There is a significant neo-Nazi problem in Ukraine, it did ought to be dealt with, and it did form part of Putin's public justification. That makes it an issue worth talking about, regardless of the fact that Putin himself clearly doesn't give a fuck.
But all this is hypothetical because corporate media has made it political suicide for politicians to pursue any route other than Putin's military defeat, they've dug their own grave. The progressives in America couldn't even suggest negotiations. What kind of shit hole country can even fucking discuss peace?
Reuters give some more detail: they cannot supply Kherson well enough for its defence; they are afraid to lose too many men for nowt.
Russia abandons Ukrainian city of Kherson in major retreat
By Mark Trevelyan
LONDON, Nov 9 (Reuters) - Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu on Wednesday ordered his troops to withdraw from the occupied Ukrainian city of Kherson and take up defensive lines on the opposite bank of the River Dnipro.
The announcement marked one of Russia's most significant retreats and a potential turning point in the war, now nearing the end of its ninth month.
In televised comments, General Sergei Surovikin, in overall command of the war, reported to Shoigu that it was no longer possible to keep Kherson city supplied.
"Having comprehensively assessed the current situation, it is proposed to take up defence along the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro River," said Surovikin, standing at a lectern and indicating troop positions on a map whose details were greyed-out for the TV audience.
"I understand that this is a very difficult decision, but at the same time we will preserve the most important thing - the lives of our servicemen and, in general, the combat effectiveness of the group of troops, which it is futile to keep on the right bank in a limited area."
You're making progress.
Surely they (the UN) plea for the fighting to stop, yet notice:
Hence Russia should withdraw from the occupied territories. Furthermore:
And this is the issue: Russia has to withdraw from the occupied territories. Period
Otherwise the "De-escelation through escalation" principle is successful.
Quoting Isaac
Less territory the better, but in fact any agreement to end the fighting. Anything goes, yeah right.
Russia seems to be withdrawing from Kherson. At least that seems then to be better for Isaac. :wink:
More grants than loans.
Quoting Isaac
You mean it was centrally planned? Yet the private sector was significantly involved, e.g.: Also established were counterpart funds, which used Marshall Plan aid to establish funds in the local currency. According to ECA rules, recipients had to invest 60% of these funds in industry. This was prominent in Germany, where these government-administered funds played a crucial role in lending money to private enterprises which would spend the money rebuilding. These funds played a central role in the reindustrialization of Germany. In 1949–50, for instance, 40% of the investment in the German coal industry was by these funds. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan#Implementation)
[i]Washington’s official commitment to Europe also encouraged American private industry. Some of the big corporations had investments and production facilities in Europe whose expansion and modernization they were now more prepared to consider. Other firms, with a strong dollar in their hands, similarly contemplated attractive participations in European companies that were looking for American technology, new production techniques, work organization, management, and
marketing.[/i] (https://www.learneurope.eu/files/8113/7509/5720/Plan_Marshall._Lecciones_aprendidas_s_XXI.pdf)
BTW, and more in general, if both central planning and corporation initiative are always a way to screw people, what's left for you to hope for?
Quoting Isaac
That's reported in the section dedicated to "Critiques of the Marshall Plan" which are all taken into account. But the real conclusion is significantly different:
Accomplishments. While, in some cases, a direct connection can be drawn between American assistance and a positive outcome, for the most part, the Marshall Plan may be viewed best as a stimulus that set off a chain of events leading to a range of accomplishments. At the completion of the Marshall Plan period, European agricultural and industrial production were markedly higher, the balance of trade and related "dollar gap" much improved, and significant steps had been taken toward trade liberalization and economic integration. Historians cite the impact of the Marshall Plan on the political development of some European countries and on U.S.-Europe relations. European Recovery Program assistance is said to have contributed to more positive morale in Europe and to political and economic stability, which helped diminish the strength of domestic communist parties. The U.S. political and economic role in Europe was enhanced and U.S. trade with Europe boosted.
So, even if we shouldn't overestimate the immediate and direct economic impact of the Marshall Plan, there isn't enough to support the idea that the Marshall Plan was just a "corporate opportunity to screw everyone" either.
And yet you, it seems are as incapable of basic comprehension as you were 300 pages ago.
Quoting ssu
Quoting ssu
Neither of the quotes you cited say this, only that territorial integrity is a goal. As it should be. The less land in Russian control the better. The matter at hand right now is how much we ought be willing to pay for that boon.
It is your notion that considering the need to avoid escalation is "absurd" that the citations are aimed against.
Quoting neomac
As I've said before your lack of imagination is your problem. Unless you're fresh out of high school or you've been raised in cult of fundamentalist neo-liberals, you'll know full well that a wide range of solutions have been proposed which are neither government controlled nor corporate profit engines.
Quoting neomac
Indeed. But that wasn't the claim was it? Your claim was that the Marshall plan countered my position. To do that it would have to have been a) constituted of corporate reconstruction contracts, and b) an unquestioned success. It was neither.
You should understand how nuclear deterrence works.
And just how lousy the weapon is, actually.
Like what? Name a couple of these solutions.
Quoting Isaac
Well the original idea I was addressing was about post-war reconstruction as "corporate opportunity to screw everyone". To question it, it's enough to prove that the post-war reconstruction supported by the Marshall plan was not just a corporate opportunity to "screw everyone", because to some extent and in some cases it succeeded. Besides I do not understand what is so specific about "corporate reconstruction contracts" that can not be applied to the Marshall Plan, since grants and loans in the end trickled down to the private enterprises involved in the national reconstruction. For example, this article (https://worldcrunch.com/business-finance/-2657196800) talks about "Rebuilding Ukraine" with something like a Marshall Plan. Among the examples of Marshall Plan success that were cited there was this one:
[i]The Italian economic miracle was notable for such features:
• restored monopoly: monopoly companies (Fiat, Edison, Montecatini etc.) had priority in receiving loans and financial aid under the Marshall plan, which led to the capture of foreign markets by Italian monopolies and an increase in industrial production;
• the agrarian reform of 1950-1955: the redemption of land allotments with an area of more than 100 hectares by the state and their further sale to citizens in installments;
• Italian supply of materials for the production of U.S. military equipment during the Korean War (1950–1953).
Result: Italy had fully recovered from the war by the early 1950s, and industrial production tripled between 1953 and 1962. However, in the late 1960s, the monopolization of the economy led to corruption and inequalities in the development of individual regions of Italy.[/i]
(where Fiat, Edison, Montecatini are big private corporations)
If Russia is to come forward as a serious participant in peace talks, the question of whether people will be allowed to return to where they used to live will be front and center.
According to the maps, the Zaporizhzhia high dam which has a hydroelectric plant and supplies water to Crimea is now in the Ukrainian controlled area. Nevertheless, either side is capable of blowing up this dam at any time. The immediate result would be a wall of water carrying debris cascading down the Dnipro valley washing everything in its path into the Black Sea.
The Russian withdrawal to the South could be a recognition of a stalemate along the river caused by the presence of this threat, as neither side can occupy Kherson without incurring the possibility of great loss of men and equipment at any time.
That'd be because you wallow in ambiguity like a pig in his mud. But here too, you seem to be making progress. :-)
There's indeed that threat. The theory is that the Russians leave Kherson only to flood it once the Ukrainians step in. But the terrain in Kherson is not favorable to such a plan. The left bank is much flatter and lower than the right bank, so the Russians there would be flooded, not the Ukrainians.
I'll take what I "understand" from experts in their field thanks, not some neo-liberal twat off the internet.
In case it's the scale you disagree with...
This from Princetown University Science and Global Security Unit
That's right. Yet what you've provided is evidence that some people think "it was not just a corporate opportunity to "screw everyone", because to some extent and in some cases it succeeded". I already knew that.
But I guess when your line has been to attack the Ukrainians as being neonazis and repeat Putin's line including the West being the culprit and aggressor in the conflict, even to ridicule the whole reasoning for Ukrainians to defend themselves from an aggressor (because we are all people and national borders don't matter), it's quite understandable that you then promote the idea that West should abandon Ukraine because Putin makes nuclear threats. Especially when Russia was forced out of the only regional capital it had taken (but still occupies about 15% of Ukrainian territory), peace at any cost.
Just shows that it's actors both the far left and the far right that support Putin in the West.
You've repeatedly insulted my intelligence ("you don't know much if anything", "you don't understand"...), and my morality ("support Putin", "putinistas" - a known war criminal), and you have the gall to start bleating about ad homs...
And no, it's not just ad hominems. It's expert, after expert, after expert, all denying your imbecilic claim that we don't need to worry about nuclear escalation.
Again a strawman.
It's not that we shouldn't worry about escalation. I've pointed way earlier the potential danger of the "Escalate to De-escalate" -doctrine and the fact that Russia far before this war in it's large military exercises ended them usually with using the nuclear option that would end (or freeze) the conflict.
And is Putin's regime threatened? Nope. He still sits in the Kremlin. Nobody is invading Russia.
It's just your peace at all cost immediately sends the wrong information: if you are losing, your way out is to use nuclear blackmail. Isaac approved.
So? A nuclear armed state can hold the world to ransom. So much the worse for nuclear arms proliferation. Perhaps America should have thought of that before it pursued such a risky strategy as the massive anti-nuclear proliferation campaigns have been warning them about for decades.
Now what? What would you have us do? Pretend that Putin can't hold us to ransom just because we don't like that fact? Risk 90 million dead in the first few hours because Putin's a bad man and your limited imagination can't think of any other way of dealing with that than fighting him over territory?
What's your plan to deal with the very real risk of escalation the experts are warning will arise from us not giving Putin a face-saving off-ramp?
Are you seriously suggesting that Putin not getting the slapped wrist he deserves is a comparable risk to nuclear holocaust?
At this stage, nuclear escalation is an emotional fantasy entertained by some low-level bureaucrats and angry pundits in Russia, and by some knee-jirking western pundits.
I won't build a nuclear shelter in my garden just yet.
Yeah, right. So the top performing superforecasters from the US Government IARPA Good Judgment Project were asked "Will a nuclear weapon be detonated in Europe as an act of hostility before 30 April 2023? "
The results are...
Quoting https://www.swiftcentre.org/will-russia-use-a-nuclear-weapon/
...but you know, they did forget to consult a couple of messianic dicks off the internet, so perhaps just "some knee-jirking western pundits" after all, eh? I'd get down there sharpish to deliver your Delphic armchair 'reckon', they'll be keen to lap up such informed wisdom.
Incidentally, they were also asked "Will Ukraine retake all Russian-controlled territories in Ukraine?"...
Those experts are not on the Internet yet? You found about them how?
I would expect several rounds of escalations to have to happen, which would likely have to include NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine, before initiating a nuclear attack even becomes a serious possibility for Russia.
With that said, if the Russians would ever be under serious threat of losing Crimea, and all conventional options were exhausted, likely they would resort to nuclear weapons. I guess my point is that that state of affairs is not yet very close.
What is likely happening is that Russia is using nuclear threats to manipulate the foreign public - fear mongering, to erode domestic support in NATO countries.
Yes, I agree. I don't think it's a coincidence that the estimates of nuclear escalation were similar to the estimates of Ukraine taking Donbas. I think they might be linked.
Quoting Tzeentch
Maybe, but as Samuel Charap warned "Between volunteers from NATO countries, all this NATO weaponry, reinforcement of Poland and Romania...they might connect dots that we didn’t intend to be connected and decide they need to pre-empt." A lot of the fear is about misinterpretation of events not intended to provoke (but close enough).
Quoting Tzeentch
Yes, I think that's true, but given the risk/benefit environment, it would be nothing short of criminal recklessness to call that bluff.
Supposedly someone inside the Biden administration, not Blinken, had discussions with a high-ranking government official, discussing "red lines", allegedly Russia was told that a mass retaliation would incur a reply by NATO.
I don't know how reliable this info is, but if it is true, it is laughable that NATO can say that "this is a war between Russia and Ukraine", while all the time stipulating what Russia can or cannot do. Imagine Russia and China doing this to the US.
It's stranger than fiction.
A trap? Or did a deal go down behind the scenes?
Since Cherson may have served as a springboard for future Russian offensives, it seems to me Cherson may have been conceded to Ukraine as a form of 'guarantee' that Russia will not make a bid for Odessa / Transnistria.
Peace talks / a cease-fire may be close.
As pointed out, there isn't actually credible nuclear ransom. The US or NATO isn't fighting Russia. Russia isn't attacking the supply lines in Poland. Nuclear deterrence between NATO and the Russia does holds there's no NATO aircraft enforcing a no-fly zone in Ukraine, even if Ukraine desperately wanted there to be that. Places like Yugoslavia and Libya that did happen. In Ukraine it didn't: NATO isn't going to escalate as Russian deterrence works. And vice versa.
You can always hope that the conflict would stop and of course, that it doesn't escalate. That's a bit different to insist on stopping the war on any terms whatsoever.
Quoting Tzeentch
The simple fact is what was already known for a long time: Russia has problem to supply the troops in Kherson region because of the chokepoints of the bridges across the Dniepr. The commanding Russian general Suvorikin acknowledged this: that it simply wasn't possible to supply the troops. Russia wouldn't sacrifice it's best troops, the paratroopers of the VDV for nothing. Yes, now the threat of Russia taking Odessa and contacting the forces in Transnistria has indeed subsided.
The nuclear ransom is exactly what's preventing NATO planes and troops in Ukraine.
If this was pre-nuclear era, we'd already be in WWIII general global conflict, almost guaranteed.
Saying Russia is deterring NATO acting on it's legal and moral beliefs to liberate Ukrainian territory, is exactly the same as saying Russia is holding the territory at nuclear ransom.
Explaining that NATO policy is to go up to the nuclear response line ... but not cross it, is the same as explaining one of the above.
Deterrence and ransom is different.
Putin implying that Ukraine cannot be assisted or otherwise he will use nukes is more of ransom/sabre rattling. The nuclear sabre rattling is an attempt to decrease the military aid to Ukraine.
Russia defending itself or it's aircraft from attack by in the end having nuclear weapons is deterrence.
Quoting Manuel
I think it is reliable, but for the US and NATO to say they will respond to use of nuclear weapons is more an answer to deputy-chairman of the security council and former Russian president Medvedev saying that NATO wouldn't do anything if Russia used nukes in Ukraine.
[quote]"I have to remind you again - for those deaf ears who hear only themselves. Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary," Medvedev said, adding that it would do so "in predetermined cases" and in strict compliance with state policy.
When describing a possible strike on Ukraine, a Slavic neighbour which Putin describes as an artificial historical construct, Medvedev said NATO would not get involved in such a situation.
"I believe that NATO would not directly interfere in the conflict even in this scenario," Medvedev said. "The demagogues across the ocean and in Europe are not going to die in a nuclear apocalypse."
Which actually may be so, but to that kind of statement NATO/US has to rattle it's own sabres. And anyway, the first thing would be to make a simply underground nuclear test in Novaja Zemlya.
Also of note, the timing is likely relative US elections.
Also noteworthy is Ukraine claiming that Russia is not withdrawing troops and it could be a trap to inflict further damage on Ukrainian troops. Although that may have changed, it is revealing that Ukraine seems to say they are not in a position to re-conquer the city by force--important subtext--and may also simply be true, and what Ukrainian officials called a "staged event" (which is the definition of a press conference) is to encourage removing as many civilians as possible to turn the city into a battle space.
The prevailing wisdom has been that Ukrainian offensives would stop in autumn and winter, and Russians were trying to make it until then. Of course, supplying troops is different to supplying a whole city of civilians. Or maybe the city will be evacuated but not the area around the damn (i.e. a bridge head maintained non-the-less throughout winter, just abandoning supplying any civilians). It maybe the case that Ukrainians cannot supply the city either.
Quoting ssu
This will only be true once Russian troops are actually withdrawn to the Eastern side, but as far as I know there hasn't been an announcement to withdraw from holding the damn, a position that could be used to simply siege Kherson in the spring if the Ukrainians move into the city. Keep in mind that Ukraine may not be able to supply the civilians in the city either throughout winter, so they may simply not move in for that reason.
So it's not clear what the Russians are even intent on doing at this point, other than strongly signalling not supplying any civilians there.
What is clear is that the Ukrainian offensive for Kherson did not simply break through and successfully siege the city. So to evaluate the military meaning of all this we would need to know casualty figures on both sides, which we don't.
With all the talk of negotiation (on both sides and other parties(like the US and telling Ukraine to say they're open to negotiation and mentioning "Ukraine fatigue") it seems a strong signal that both sides are hurting pretty bad, but I still fail to see any evidence Russian forces, government, economy is about to simply collapse and the front seems stable going into winter apart from Kherson.
At least the discussion of talks shows that there might be a deadlock in the battlefield.
I agree. The war can still continue.
Also crossing the Dniepr is a big difficult operation for Ukraine. And let's not forget that this is one of the poorest nations in Europe that has it's economy severely wrecked. But when the threat is existential, that there's no electricity or people have to go hungry to sleep isn't going to change the will of the Ukrainian people. It's more a question of Western resolve to aid Ukraine. The Russians can take a beating also, and still continue the war.
The difference between deterrence and ransom is strictly a legal one.
If I point a gun that may deter you from doing action X, if I'm in the right and you'd be in the wrong, then using the word ransom would make no sense. However, if I'm in the wrong and your in the right (such as if you leave I'll shoot you, unless you give me what I want, such as money) then I'm holding you at ransom.
Ransom always involves deterrence (come and get the thing or people I'm holding ransom, I'll I destroy them and try to destroy you too), as if you do not have some illegal leverage of deterrence then you're clearly not "holding" anything, much less at ransom.
NATO claims the conquered Ukrainian territory is not legally occupied by Russia and they should give it back, so it is entirely reasonable to say (from NATO's point of view) that Russia is holding the territory at Ransom using nuclear weapons, which is what prevents NATO from simply implementing their conception of the law.
Ransom is entirely apt analogy for the situation if you believe Ukraine has been wronged ... or, if you want to be really precise, if you think NATO has some moral or legal commitment to Ukraine given their stated beliefs and what prevents them from acting on those beliefs is nuclear weapons.
For some reason, people do not want to recognise the common sense reality that nuclear powers (including the United States) can do a lot without anyone being able or willing to do anything about it because of said nuclear weapons, as this delusion is required to maintain the belief that compromise should be rejected and that somehow Russia can be "defeated" while also avoiding nuclear war (have your butter and money of the butter, as they say in French, which makes more sense than having cake and also eating it ... which is just the common sense reason for having the cake in the first place, but I digress; what is the heart of the matter is that the West wants to maintain the belief that we can and should impose our will on Russia by force but also wait, wait, wait not too much force so as to avoid nuclear war, and simply ignoring both the conflict in principle and priorities as well as moral and political issues of this position).
Not just some people. Some experts and that's not all. Probably you missed a couple of things about the expert you cite, Tyler Cowen (as much as you did about Mearsheimer). His article “The Marshall Plan: myths and realities” is a critical view of the Marshall Plan from a liberal (if not Neo-liberal) and anti-keynesian point of view and the conclusion is that the right liberal free market policies and not central planning policies recommended by the US were the main factors to boost growth [1]. So the first fun fact is that while you were insinuating my neo-liberal fundamentalism ("Unless you're fresh out of high school or you've been raised in cult of fundamentalist neo-liberals") yet you cited an expert whose views about the Marshall Plan (or in general [2]?) are more in line with neo-liberal views then mine. In other words, he would credit the post-war growth to the properly freed market forces than to the central planning that the Marshall Plan implied!
The other issue is that Tyler Cowen’s article doesn't offer any in depth study of how the Marshall plan worked in the case of Italy[3] (like these studies did: https://books.openedition.org/igpde/14777 [4] , http://www.giorcellimichela.com/uploads/8/3/7/0/83709646/marshall_plan_draft.pdf [5]), especially wrt the role of private corporations which is relevant for my objection to your idea of post-war reconstruction as "corporate opportunity to 'screw everyone'". Besides, in his closing remarks, while praising the role of good free market policies vs keynesian central planning, Tyler Cowen added: “In most cases, this phenomenon was encouraged by European leaders themselves, such as West Germany's Ludwig Erhard and Italy's Luigi Einaudi, rather than by outsiders.” Yet the fun fact is that Luigi Einaudi himself argued in a long interview: “The Marshall Plan is indispensable for the recovery of the Italian economy” [6]
[1]
[i]U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic poilicies
Policy makers and aid proponents should no longer view the Marshall Plan as an unqualified success. At best, its effects on postwar Europe were -mixed, while its impact on the American economy was negative. The basic problem with foreign aid is that economic growth is not a creature of central planning and direction. Growth is the result of individual initiative and enterprise within a sound legal and economic framework. Government can only supply the framework. Anything more will result in the well-known problems of central or socialist planning: the impossibility of rational economic calculation, the creation of perverse incentives, and the stifling of entrepreneurial initiative, among others. Foreign aid programs always will be plagued by such problems.
In most cases, and certainly in the case of the Marshall Plan, the government-to-government character of foreign aid encourages statism and central planning, not free enterprise. The best way to promote free markets in other countries is to allow their businesses to trade with the U.S. without government interference. This freedom of trade includes not only exporting and importing, but also lending, borrowing, and labor emigration and immigration. [/i]
[2]
Israel still has some problems with living standards and income inequality, but it is a classic case of neoliberalism — at least in the economic sphere — mostly working out as planned.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-06/israel-s-economy-shows-that-classical-economic-theory-still-works?leadSource=uverify%20wall
[3]
Italy, moreover, seemed to be seeking market solutions for some of its economic problems but was actively hindered by ECA administrators. The Americans in charge of the ECA in Italy continually were expressing concern about the Italian governments's "excessive" attention to balanc-ing budgets and controlling monetary expansion. U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic policies.
[4]
[I]
A provisional conclusion on the impact of the Marshall Plan, therefore, must be that :
- it made a significant contribution to the investment effort of the Italian steel industry in the Reconstruction ;
- it allowed Cornigliano to become the leading firm in the market for thin flat products, thereby establishing the newly formed alliance between Fiat and Finsider at the forefront of Italian manufacturing industry ;
- it allowed many small private producers to reequip themselves and thus participate in the rapid growth of electric steel taking place during the Fifties. The Sinigaglia Plan, therefore, attained only partial success in reorganizing the industry, which also meant that the feud between State-owned and private firms dragged on.
[/i]
[5]
[i]
In this paper, we have examined the effect of the Marshall Plan on the Italian postwar economy. [b]The modernization of transportation systems was associated with (i) an increase in agricultural production despite a decrease in the number of agricultural workers, (ii) more widespread adoption of modern agricultural machines, and (iii) an expansion of the industrial and service sectors . These findings indicate that, in addition to influencing Italian institutions, the Marshall Plan had beneficial effects on local economic development. Within each Italian macro-region, the amount of ERP reconstruction grant money had a profound impact on the economic growth of otherwise similar nearby provinces.
[/i]
[6] https://loccidentale.it/il-piano-marshall-indispensabile-al-risanamento-delleconomia-italiana/
Yes, we agree.
And as we agreed months ago Russia is waiting to see how winter plays out. Already European CEO's are starting to warn about gas supplies in 2023.
So, I think Russia has largely succeeded in this basic objective.
Of course, it is far from clear how winter will actually play out.
There has been several of these general mood swings of clearly wanting to stop the war on all sides ... followed by more war up until now.
When the US administration mentions Ukraine fatigue, I think it is safe to assume these are the Europeans. I think it is also safe to assume Europe could essentially force an end to the conflict if Germany and France wanted to.
The solution would need to be highly creative at this stage, giving both Ukraine and Russia something they want (such as Ukraine EU membership, and ending sanctions against Russia), which, any compromise, will be a victory for Russia due to the West setting the standard of their own success and fully "defeating" Russia including in Crimea.
So, any resolution to the conflict will be temporarily embarrassing, but politicians seems to be starting to calculate the real harms to their own citizens is a higher political liability.
Not nuclear weapons as a first response. What I heard was that the US would sends troops along with other NATO member countries to fight inside Ukraine, if Russia proceeds with the expected escalation coming winter. If this happens (US troops go inside Ukraine), then we are really playing with lava, not fire.
Of course, anyone using the first nuke, must know what the consequences will be, not only for their country, but for the world.
Where did you hear this?
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senior-white-house-official-involved-in-undisclosed-talks-with-top-putin-aides-11667768988
That's the article which speaks of preventing "escalation", the rest of the info comes through Colonel Macgregor:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJvLVc0gA6M
As for the US troops, here:
https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/increasing-the-us-military-presence-in-poland
and
https://www.army.mil/article/261041/us_armys_warhorse_battalion_assumes_command_of_battlegroup_poland
I don't have a wsj subscription. :sad:
There were two articles about Poland?
Putin wants the world to forget Ukraine
[sup]— Anton Barbashin; Al Jazeera; Nov 3, 2022[/sup]
Seen that before, and history has. (Perhaps more among religious extremists.) Aligns with the anti-West rhetoric.
What should we expect, though?
Of course Putin wants the US to go away. That's not to say the US shouldn't, just that it might well be what Putin (really) wants for Christmas.
Those other articles aren't paywalled, you should be able to see them.
A similar one was published in the NYT, about 3 days ago.
Chapter I, Article 2 of the UN Charter:
Yes, and that’s what the Russian top brass is counting on: a more defensible position, from which they can bomb Kherson to the ground. Reason for which they emptied it, and even took with them the remains of Potemkin. They want to flatten the town while fixing the Ukrainian forces on the right bank of the Dniepr.
Voices from the trenches: Ukrainian soldiers near Kherson share what they feel and fear
[sup]— The Kyiv Independent; Nov 9, 2022[/sup]
Mad Dash to Flee Village Swarming With Putin’s Drunken Troops
[sup]— The Daily Beast; Nov 10, 2022[/sup]
With cell phones being so common, a good deal of footage can be found of bombings, kamikaze drones, tanks exploding, and such. The destruction seems senseless.
Quoting Olivier5
Others reported the same. They don't seem all that bent on defending this "piece of Russia" (annexed). Maybe the severe threats are more ad hoc...?
Analysis: Russia's planned Kherson retreat a double-edged sword for Kyiv | Via MSN
[sup]— Reuters; Nov 10, 2022[/sup]
Putin makes top brass take the fall for Kherson humiliation – and that’s no accident | Via MSN
[sup]— The Telegraph; Nov 10, 2022[/sup]
But weren't they about Poland?
Quoting DShRG Rusich (Nov 9, 2022)
Ironic that the Russian army has bloodthirsty neo-Nazis in their employ. Nothing new though I guess.
NATO requirements might come from a proposal (a couple of documents) put forth by Russia in Dec 2021, some 7 years after Crimea, which includes
A peace deal (or two, Feb, Sep) in 2022 explicitly with no Ukraine NATO membership was negotiated by Dmitry Kozak but ditched.
So, what's the big deal with NATO anyway? Or, recalling some quotes (Putin et al), what existential threat did/does Ukrainian NATO membership pose against Russia?
It's questionable whether the latter can pose such a dire threat.
In 2022, no Ukrainian NATO membership seemed to go down in priority. (Recently, an intact annexed Kherson Oblast also seems to have gone down in priority.) Maybe it was all replaced with the Mar 2022 conditions above?
Anyway, they seem noticeably keen on keeping Crimea Russian. Also a land corridor via Donbas in addition to Kerch. Not a lease on otherwise neutral ground or whatever, but secured Russian land, which any strong military would have gotten in the way of (and still might).
What kind of answer is that? I've supplied a stream of qualified experts talking about the very real risk of escalation to nuclear weapons and your counter is to cite some nobody from an internet forum? Is that the best you can do?
Quoting neomac
Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of the Cowen article? If I want an economist's critique, I'll ask an economist, not some nobody on an internet chat forum. You're not qualified to say to what extent Cowen's conclusions are reasonable.
I made a point about post war reconstruction being always an opportunity for profiteering, you said that wasn't true because of the Marshal plan. To maintain that critique you have to show that it is not possible that it's true - ie that no experts think that. Not that some experts don't think that. All that latter shows is that there's disagreement. I've stated a position and supported it with relevant expert opinion. You're also entitled to your opposing position supported by expert opinion.
If you want to start claiming my position is actually wrong, or untenable, then we have an asymmetric argument. To support my position I only need to show it's plausible. To support yours you need to show mine is actually impossible. A much higher threshold of evidence.
Now we could argue ideologically about which of the two opposing plausible positions we ought to support. But we cannot argue technically about which position is most plausible. We're not economists (at that level). If a fully qualified, peer-reviewed economist thinks the Marshall plan did not significantly contribute to the successful reconstruction of postwar Europe, then you are not in a position to gainsay that, no matter what your little Google-Scholar trawl dragged up.
Nice piece. This journalist, Igor Kossov, seems pretty good. I’ll follow him from now on.
The figure is just a guess, nothing more.
The important point is not in the number 9. It is that this war has increased the risk of nuclear escalation, compared to pre-february level. And it is now not negligeable. It follows that this war cannot continue for several years without running a significant risk of nuclear escalation.
I agree with their forecast, interpreted as such.
First and foremost, this is a sabre rattling response to Russia's sabre rattling, the potential use of nuclear weapons with conventional forces. And this response hasn't been official. It has been given to the media by other retired people, who have said that this kind of response has given to Russian counterparts behind closed doors, not openly.
This means that Joe Biden and the West haven't drawn a public red line like Obama did in Syria (and failed).
If Russian would use nukes, the claimed Western response would be to target Russian forces in occupied Ukraine and the Black Sea fleet. The response would be done by the Air Forces and cruise missiles. For ground forces to go into Ukraine is a huge, slow operation.
But let's think just how credible the Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons is. What do they really gain? Would China really support this? Besides, that Russia withdraws from Kherson shows that cool heads prevail and they can make rational battlefield decisions and aren't confined to what it politically looks like. After all, the military leadership announcing that they will withdraw from Kherson is a humiliating defeat for Putin.
Nothing new, but dramatic changes can happen.
Alexandra Polinova from the now banned Memorial said the obvious: it is actually Russia that needs to decolonize.
There should be another narrative than the imperialist one when it comes to what Russia is. This narrative creates the reality were Russia sees necessary to intervene and dominate it's near abroad. First and foremost, the collapse of the Soviet Union, is seen as a mistake. An unfortunate accident. Russia is seen to be an multi-ethnic Empire and therefore it should obviously control what has been part of the Empire. And this makes everybody so nervous about Russia. It's not acting as a normal country. Yet the imperialist narrative dominates official Russia. It is fomented with the huge conspiracy that the West is against Russia, hence to defend itself, it has to attack.
Is change possible?
Russia does have the groundwork of a legal system, if truly used, to make it to be a justice state. But there should be a dramatic change, something equivalent of a revolution. Otherwise views that are in the West confined to the political fringe will stay dominant in Russia. Putin just bowing out won't change the political landscape, if someone then just inherits the security system.
Quoting jorndoe
This is what is basically left now for Putin. No overthrow of the Ukrainian government and replacement with a pro-Russian regime, no larger Novorossiya.
Crimea may be the real question.
Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of my of assessment of the Cowen article? You cited Tyler Cowen to support your claim. You assessed an expert source as good enough to support your claim or question mine, even though you are no expert. Now I'm claiming you are wrong also based on the source you yourself cited.
Your questioning my expertise is unjustified. If you have teeth issues you go to a dentist not to a gynecologist, I suppose. Why is that? Because you are supposedly enough well educated to distinguish a gynecologist from a dentist, even though you can hardly be called an expert on any such matters or even an expert at distinguishing gynecologists from dentists, right? And if you are not enough educated, you can still learn these kinds of assessments from other educated people who are not experts either.
The article main point is focused on policies and the conviction that Marshall Plan’s related keynesian recommendations weren’t effective (liberist, pro-free market policies were!). It’s not focused on the contribution of the private sector to the Italian reconstruction with the money of the Marshall plan at all! But that's what's relevant for my objection to you, and what's should be relevant for you to counter it.
To distinguish the scope of my studies wrt Tyler Cowen’s article, and related main findings one doesn’t need to be an expert. It must be educated enough and read it carefully.
Quoting Isaac
I didn’t claim anywhere that the Marshall Plan was everywhere a success, my exact words were: “If your claim - more charitably understood - refers only to corporate contributions to reconstruction as such, then one must take into account the Marshall Plan after WW2”.
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
These are false alternatives. One could simply argue that his position is more plausible than yours. That’s what I’m doing.
No. One couldn't. Not unless one is a qualified economist. Neither you nor I are in a position to judge the relative plausibility of economic theories.
Same goes for military analysis, geopolitics... All the other issues you seem to want to try this on. You are not qualified to judge them on their technical merits, no matter how much things seem clear to you.
Quoting neomac
Because we are qualified to judge those matters. There's no body of knowledge about things like this, every human is just as qualified as every other. Rationality, ethics, art, values, ideology... We can, and do, discuss the relative merits of these matters because we're all equally qualified to do so.
If you disagree with Cowan's ideology we have a matter for discussion (though I too disagree with his ideology, so it might be quite a short one). If you disagree with his conclusion I couldn't care less, because you're not qualified to judge the validity of his conclusion.
I don't care about Tyler Cowen’s conclusions either. I'm just questioning what you can infer from it wrt your claim that post-war reconstructions is "a corporate opportunity to 'screw everyone'". Indeed he's article is not focused on the contribution of the private post-war corporations e.g. to the Italian reconstruction at all (as the studies I linked are)! And given his liberal position, I guess he would not agree with your claim either [1].
Quoting Isaac
I disagree. To distinguish the scope of the studies I linked wrt Tyler Cowen’s article, and related main findings one doesn’t need to be an expert. It must be enough educated and read the articles carefully (especially if one wants to draw inferences from them).
[1]
Notice also that your original claim required just a single counterexample:
Quoting Isaac
Yeah, it could well be sable rattling. Nukes would only be used if NATO fights Russia, in Ukraine they would serve little purpose outside of mass murder, with little by way of military advantage, if any.
I don't know, but, it would be good to tone these things down, as much as possible.
This is very naive.
Although tactical nukes have never been used in a battle and we don't "know" what affect they would have, the idea we can assume they would be useless seems ill advised.
Significant effort is placed on making as big conventional bombs as possible for certain tasks, tactical nuclear weapons just allows bigger bombs for those purposes, for example destroying hardened (but not nuke hardened) command bunkers may only be possible with nuclear weapons.
There's definitely a lot of negative political consequences to using nuclear weapons, but the idea they wouldn't provide any tactical military advantage is I think extremely foolish. The relevance being that the purely military motivation to use them is genuine, and therefore political effort should be made to avoid that happening (setting a path of the banal and regular use of tactical nukes in wars to come and insane proliferation of everyone "needing them", a process already happening due to the war so far).
There is possibly "sound military reasons" the US and Soviets developed things like the nuclear artillery shell, nuclear bazooka, nuclear mines, nuclear air-to-air missile, nuclear torpedos, even a nuclear bullet was made at one point of californium.
The reasons these tactical nuclear weapons systems were developed in vast quantities was that their developers envisioned their utility.
Ukrainian intelligence agency tells remaining Russian soldiers in Kherson to surrender
If they use them in Ukraine, not as a reaction to NATO getting directly involved, then by using them they will get NATO directly involved. Which would soon escalate to full on nuclear war. Therefore, the advantage of using them in Ukraine, as the situation currently stands, if of no advantage to Russia, outside of reminding NATO of the consequences of direct conflict.
But that's the threat of use, not the actual use. Actual use as of now, would be suicide.
Also not a fact. There is really no rational reason for NATO to intervene even if Russia uses nuclear weapons.
It's precisely because of this basic rational situation (that NATO has no actual alliance with Ukraine, no legal basis to directly intervene, and no political or moral reason to risk full scale nuclear exchange to make a point about Ukrainian borders), that the weapons systems and information to Ukraine has been a very slow and controlled process, seeing how each weapons system plays out before providing the next, is because Russia may indeed simply resort to tactical nuclear weapons rather than face defeat by NATO weapons systems.
Keep in mind that since the start of the war, or even before, NATO could have provided and trained on things like F-35 and all related weapons systems, NATO tanks and other tracked vehicles, long range HIMARS, cruise missiles, etc.
The reason we don't see more advanced capabilities, but the line is drawn at short range HIMARS, is because sophisticated enough NATO weapons systems may provoke a nuclear reaction and NATO has no rational response to that.
Hence, the policy is to supply Ukraine ... but not too much as to create both motivation and justification for the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
The entire situation revolves around nuclear weapons and the fact no one has any rational desire to use them or see anyone else use them (including the Russians, as otherwise they would have just opened with a tactical nuclear barrage).
So, it's a geopolitical puzzle NATO is trying to solve by getting what they want by force without the Russians resorting to nuclear weapons in response. Russia is of course just trying to get what they want by force the ol' fashion way, counting on NATO not intervening "enough" due to said nuclear weapons. NATO's policy position is basically trying to answer the question of is there an "enough" force (vis-a-vis supplying arms) that implements their policies but is not "enough" to provoke Russia into a nuclear response.
And this basic dynamic is what is driving the apparent "stability" of the front lines. If Russia has too much success NATO pours in arms to stop it, otherwise it risks severe embarrassment that the mighty NATO can't even slow down the Russians with all their fancy equipment and satellites, but if Ukraine has too much success the other way then NATO stops pouring in more weapons so as not to provoke a nuclear response.
The resulting situation is an attritional war in which there are conventional options that are more effective than nuclear weapons (such as shutting down Ukrainian electricity grid).
Where nuclear weapons would be seriously considered by the Russians is if the front line collapse we keep hearing about (a real front line collapse, not just mostly orderly withdrawal from a region, but Ukraines actually winning militarily and no other way to stop their advance) actually happens. In such conditions tactical nuclear weapons can destroy critical hardened bunkers, critical logistics hubs, as well as advancing armour columns.
However, it is precisely because nuclear weapons would be useful to stop any otherwise actually unstoppable Ukrainian offensive that (in my view) NATO limits weapons supplies to very limited gains in non-critical regions that the Russians can tolerate.
For example, it is certainly embarrassing to withdraw from Kherson, but it's something the Russians can tolerate; it is a tiny nuisance compared to some real advance in Crimea about to take the port of Sevastopol, to put things in perspective of NATO is no where close to providing Ukraine with the weapons systems and training required to even attempt to achieve.
There is severe negative political consequences of Russia using nuclear weapons right now, which explains why they haven't used them.
However, it would not be suicidal. There is zero reason for the Russians to believe and zero reason for any official or officer anywhere in all of NATO to believe, that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be met with a US nuclear response.
Indeed, when the offensives were gaining ground and it seemed like front lines really were totally collapsing (and the fact only then did the Russian strike the power grid for the first time and also blowup a damn I think indicates it was a real risk from their perspective as well; maybe not no where near as high as the Western media belief of the war essentially being over and Ukraine won at that point, but still a big enough worry to act upon), the US took great efforts to explain to Russia and the media that there are conventional response options to the Russian use of nuclear weapons at the US's disposal.
Logic being that it would be morally and politically justifiable for the US to retaliate with conventional weapons and Russia would have no moral or political justification to respond with nuclear weapons against the US, and so if they could not respond in kind conventionally then it does make sense.
However, the Russians can also retaliate conventionally to a US conventional retaliation, such as cutting undersea communication cables and blowing up satellites, even cause a full on Kesler syndrome, and the Russian made clear to explain to the Americans and the media that they can and would do these things.
Fortunately for the world these scenarios did not play out, but that would be the likely next phase of a nuclear strike in Ukraine. The followup question would be what the US retaliation to the Russian retaliation would be, and the Russian response to that, and if that cycle would end by one of the parties or would a conventional retaliation, if bad enough, provoke a nuclear retaliation.
Questions no one knows the answer to.
Why anyone with any actual experience of geopolitical diplomacy including people like Kissinger advocate a diplomatic resolution of the conflict and the West compromising and also ending the charade that they have no moral imperative, political responsibility, and negotiation leverage to negotiate but that it is "Ukraine that must do so".
At the time of voting in the annexed regions:
Voting results:
Quoting Putin
Quoting The Kremlin said that the Kherson region remains a Russian region · Dmitry Peskov · Nov 11, 2022
Well, what has been conveyed to Russia is that NATO would reply seriously, taken to mean, destruction of the Russian military by conventional means. How the heck does that not practically guarantee a nuclear response?
I mean, Russia can claim to be able to destroy these satellites and underseas communication, but with NATO next door, how much time will they have? A direct confrontation between Russia and NATO will almost certainly lead to a catastrophe.
If it did not, and NATO felt quite confident Russia would not use nukes, then it could have implemented a No-Fly Zone and limit Russian advances. So that signals that they know what's at stake.
Ukraine is "almost in full control" of Kherson according to Yuriy Sak, an adviser to Ukraine's defence ministry.
Cheering crowds greeted Ukrainian troops as they arrived in the only regional capital to have been captured by Russian forces since its invasion in February.
Earlier, Ukrainian flags appeared in Kherson after Russia said it had completed the withdrawal of thousands of troops.
But Sak says some Russian soldiers left in the area are taking off their military uniforms, and trying to blend in with locals.
The Kremlin's spokesman meanwhile rejects that losing the key southern city is a humiliation for Vladimir Putin.
Source: BBC
Child abductions in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]
Ukraine parents ‘want their children back’ from Russia
[sup]— Al Jazeera; Oct 7, 2022[/sup]
How Moscow grabs Ukrainian kids and makes them Russians
[sup]— AP News; Oct 13, 2022[/sup]
Russia abducting Ukrainian children, putting up for adoption in Russia
[sup]— The Jerusalem Post; Oct 17, 2022[/sup]
How a Mariupol father survived a Russian POW camp and traveled to Moscow to save his kids
[sup]— Meduza; Nov 4, 2022[/sup]
Are they trying to mitigate a demographic type problem or something?
(They seem to have the machinery in place and running; I'm vaguely reminded of a recent TV show.)
Earlier, I read those reports with a grain of salt, but they've been consistent for some time now.
I am concerned that even if Russia tried to start returning children, the process of reversing adoptions would be a bureaucratic nightmare. The reports of children being sent far east suggests an intention to make the abductions irreversible.
Kherson is not "free". None of the critical fundamental freedoms (freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom to associate etc.) are currently available in Ukraine (on both sides of the conflict).
Furthermore, as has been discussed multiple times there is no noticeable difference in governance quality between Ukraine and Russia.
Kherson has been reconquered by Ukraine, and, at best, you could say it will be free later, maybe, someday.
Quoting Olivier5
It has not been fast. The offensive to take Kherson started in September, and Ukraine has not really defeated the Russians militarily. Ukraine has suffered significant losses to pressure the Russians to simply leave, while Russia has suffered a political embarrassment and loss of a bridge head, but no catastrophic collapse of their armed forces in the regions as was predicted and promised by pro-Zelenskyites.
The conflict is now entering "winter mode".
At the moment there seems signals to negotiate on all sides.
Quoting Olivier5
This is accurate, the war is not over and the withdrawal was orderly and not thousands of Russian troops cutoff and surrounded and holding on for weeks and months without Russia being able to rescue them and ultimately surrendering.
We have not witnessed Russian lines collapsing due to the hypothesised low moral and a massive rout and chaotic fleeing and swimming across the river. Which even if that's still not "losing the war" would be at the level of humiliation.
However, as I mentioned months ago, taking Kherson would be the first (small) step in taking back by force all the other regions.
So, Ukraine has made that first small step, but not in a decisive military way and with significant casualties.
That's extremely far fetched.
Supplying arms is one thing. US et. al. supplies a lot of arms to a lot of people, as do the Russians and Chinese. It is historically not considered an act of war; people got to make money somehow.
Also, as important, supplying arms does not risk any of your own troops.
There is zero reason to believe that NATO would attack Russia ... even more so if what you say is true and doing so would "practically guarantee a nuclear response". Certainly there is no rational basis to take actions that would guarantee your citizens being nuked if there is no need to.
Ukraine is not part of NATO and has no alliance with any NATO country.
There's plenty of political reasons not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine (why they haven't been used) but there is zero reason to believe a NATO conventional response, much less nuclear response, is a practical deterrent.
The reason not to use tactical nuclear weapons is mainly China and India would not approve, along with the Russian population, and also Russia itself does not want further proliferation of nuclear weapons which the use of a nuke would super charge (Russia has nukes already, so zero interest in other parties getting them).
However, one can imagine some short term military crisis large enough that the above considerations are no longer paramount. Hence, NATO is careful not to create such chaotic circumstances with their drip feed arms supply policy.
What helps this drip feed policy is that Russia simply withdraws rather than risk some chaotic military collapse (i.e. NATO can calibrate their support to "pressure" but not enough for Ukraine to actually route the Russians, at the cost of thousands of Ukrainian lives to make up for a lack of weapons systems); the long term consequences of this situation seem far from stable.
Yes but then, according to the same Kremlin buffons, there is no war in Ukraine...
That's just another blatant lie.
The United States pressured Ukraine to show willingness to negotiate a few weeks ago.
Then Russia gives up Kherson as a form of 'guarantee' that no offensives for Odessa or Transnistria will take place.
Russia is probably well-prepared to defend against any Ukrainian offensives (apparently several defensive lines have been created), thus this situation with Kherson in Ukrainian hands is a stable state of affairs for both sides.
My guess is some form of peace talks are going to take place soon.
You can't ban the opposition parties, ban dissenting media, ban people leaving the country, impose marshal law (i.e. no due process), and then call what you have "freedom".
And whenever these subjects come up, Zelenskyites love to explain how they are obvious and necessary measures to fight a war. Zelensky is fighting a war!! Zelenskyites will say.
Which Zelenskyites are free to argue, but the premise is that Ukrainians cannot be free, at least for now. You can argue they cannot be free for now to fight a war for freedom! But your statement was about freedom in the here and now.
Russia has been building massive fortifications all along the front.
The strategy since September seems to be to just defend at minimal cost to themselves and maximum cost to the Ukrainians, committing to the defence of a few places, and relying on the area under consideration simply so large that Ukraine simply cannot advance all that far in such conditions. For all the praise in Western media and social media, sometimes declaring the war already over, at the rate of Ukrainian advances it would not just several years but about a decade to push the front back to the pre-invasion lines. And that does not take into account that as Russian territory in Ukraine decreases it becomes easier to defend what remains (and obviously Crimea is an even bigger problem for an attacker).
The situation now is compatible with Russia organising new offensives or just calculating that setbacks like Kharkiv and Kherson are bad, but as long as they hold a large area on the map it's still a winning position, so they can just be in a defensive posture for years and years.
Quoting Tzeentch
I hope peace is reached.
However, the purely logistic and military reasons to withdraw from Kherson are sufficient to explain the move as well. Especially since Russian generals took a lot of effort to explain in detail the decision, and key political figures like Kadyrov immediately expressed their support of the decision. If this was a move in some sort of diplomatic game, we might expect it to be more surprising and unexplained.
The reality on the ground in Kherson was supplying the military and the civilians was a major hassle and the Ukrainians were shelling the damn that would if not drown plenty of Russian troops outright would cut them off entirely from resupply. Apparently Russia attempted to drain the reservoir but that didn't work.
If the damn is simply at risk of failing at any time, then withdrawing from Kherson is essentially necessary. For all the embarrassment of the withdrawal, thousands of troops drowning or being permanently cut off would be far worse and immediately people would be ridiculing the Russians for not knowing the risks and taking the necessary measures!
The dynamics of damn failure is also relevant to note. Any cracks lead to leaks, and leaks of high pressure water develop exponentially after a certain threshold of water movement. Once slow seepage turns into rapid water movement, high pressure leaks basically turn into abrasive water cutting machines and rapidly expand until structural failure. If Ukrainians are shelling the damn, it may also be difficult to bring in the large engineering project required to fix any problems.
So, although it could be also part of some diplomatic process, the purely practical reasons to withdraw also provide sufficient explanation.
Russian official media has been pretty tight-lipped about the "Kherson maneuver", as it is described by the MoD. In sharp contrast with Kharkiv retreat, most milbloggers and nationalists, as well as public figures like Kadyrov and Prigozhin stick to the party line this time around. Looks like they finally got the message.
There have been mixed messages coming in about the retreat. Many expected this to be a bloody rout, and there were early reports to that effect. Some experts asserted that it would be impossible for the Russians to pull out in anything less than a week. Others describe it as a well-organized retreat. We'll know more in the coming days, but on balance so far it looks more like the latter. Apparently, they had been preparing this for weeks before the official announcement, and managed to pull out most of their working equipment in the meanwhile. (Also, they looted everything they could from the city, from museum collections to toilets and sinks, and trashed what they couldn't take - but that's nothing new.) Their best fighting units withdrew as well, but there have also been reports about some units that were told to change into civvies and piss off any way they can.
This changing into civvies trick had been reported by locals many times, even before the retreat. I am not sure what's up with that. Perhaps the military were mixing with civilian evacuees in order to avoid becoming targets for Ukrainian strikes when they crossed the river?
You're always going to have the problem that some troops are needed to protect the retreat who, which is particularly more problematic across a water body.
In the evacuation of Dunkirk troops with this task were instructed to simply fight to the death. In the case of Kherson things aren't as desperate and it was planned in detail, so the last troops holding position and then trying to escape in clandestinely might be the only feasible plan for the very last troops.
Of course, could also be just rumours spread for some purpose by either side or then just spring up spontaneously.
I read this passage you cite several times, but I don't see where is he calling to execute Putin.
First he seems to say this is the last retreat that's acceptable to him, a line has been reached, but what goes with that is the current situation is still acceptable, just any further embarrassment and he'd be really angry, for realz.
Duggin also just mentions the autocrat is "fully responsible" which seems pretty far from literally meaning execution. I've been "fully responsible" for a lot of things in my corporate career, yet my fellow board members have never executed me.
The opposition paries are not banned.
Quoting SophistiCat
Likewise, only pro-Russian media, were banned, not all independent media, and people can leave the country as much as they want if their aren't men of a certain age cohort.
Quoting Olivier5
Love the way you guys are so buried in your own reality you've had to start quoting each other.
This was headline news ... are you sure you've been following the same conflict?
Quoting Ukraine suspends 11 political parties with links to Russia
Quoting Olivier5
"You're free to do what the king says! And to fight in the king's army!! Can't you see it!!! Can't you see the freedom!!!"
Now, if I remember one of the recent discussions, the idea proposed was Ukrainian state decision to wage uncompromising war was "democratish" due to mere presence of the elected representatives somewhere in the mix.
However, I'm pretty sure that concept of democratic legitimation of decisions requires elected political parties not being banned. Feel free to argue otherwise, if you would have us see you enjoy those freedoms of political expression that you are totally fine denying to others (as long as someone is alleging they are "linked" to Russia or "pro" Russia in some way, no matter how vague).
It doesn't seem the Russians are free to redeploy their forces further east because that would invite Ukraine to push directly toward Crimea.
You know as well as I do that the Ukrainians are much freer than the Russians.
Yes, there does appear to be a lot of performative art in the preparations. On the other hand, the trenches being dug near Belgorod are less likely to be employed than the one's in Crimea that are in the path of Ukraine's stated goal to take the territory back.
https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/getting-closer?fbclid=IwAR1Wvtzz3bT3Ar_x8sSuPtpwSEQWxIF4KLIQhuylm64jgzJQTX0YrDJ3GdY
This part is particularly chewy:
Pretty fancy language if you are simply objecting to your neighbor stealing all your stuff and people.
On a hill at Bomma near the mouth of the Congo dwells Namvulu Vumu, King of the Rain and Storm. Of some of the tribes on the Upper Nile we are told that they have no kings in the common sense; the only persons whom they acknowledge as such are the Kings of the Rain, Mata Kodou, who are credited with the power of giving rain at the proper time, that is, the rainy season. Before the rains begin to fall at the end of March the country is a parched and arid desert; and the cattle, which form the people's chief wealth, perish for lack of grass. So, when the end of March draws on, each householder betakes himself to the King of the Rain and offers him a cow that he may make the blessed waters of heaven to drip on the brown and withered pastures. If no shower falls, the people assemble and demand that the king shall give them rain; and if the sky still continues cloudless, they rip up his belly, in which he is believed to keep the storms. Amongst the Bari tribe one of these Rain Kings made rain by sprinkling water on the ground out of a handbell. (The Golden Bough - J.G. Frazer)
Quoting boethius
Agreed. But Dugin's complaint might sound now more ominous than ever to Putin.
After eight and a half months of Russian occupation, the Ukrainian forces were greeted with emotion by the population of this city in the south of the country.
By Rémy Ourdan for Le Monde (Kherson)
Posted today at 06:57, updated at 09:12
The fog of dawn still envelops Kherson when the first inhabitants appear on Freedom Square, only about twenty at first. Few of them had the privilege to participate in the first celebrations of the city's liberation, the evening before, dancing around a brazier. Many, in Kherson cut off from the world, heard only a distant and uncertain echo of the historic event of November 11, through the stories of neighbors, or because they saw, in their street, a column of Russian soldiers leaving or Ukrainian fighters entering the city.
The first visual confirmation of the recapture of Kherson by the Kiev armed forces, for these people who had no access to television or social networks during the night, comes at dawn on Saturday 12 November: a Ukrainian flag is planted in Freedom Square, in front of the deserted building of the regional administration. It floats in the wind on what was a monument dedicated to the heroes of the Maidan revolution, destroyed by Russian forces in the first days of military occupation.
There are also these four police officers on duty around a van, who seem to be wondering what they are doing there, alone at this early hour, in a city which the Ukrainian general staff fears is still infested with plainclothes Russian agents, or soldiers from Moscow who missed the hour of departure before the bridges connecting it to the other bank of the Dnieper were cut.
A first military jeep appears in the fog. Three special forces commandos emerge, bearded, drawn features. Immediately grabbed by the inhabitants, entwined, congratulated, they quickly put on a smile that had perhaps disappeared from their face over the months of fierce fighting. The three fellows, in control of their emotions, seem almost surprised by the intensity of the welcome, by the gestures and the words of these Ukrainians who cling to them as one would cling, after a long time under water, to a lifeline.
"Surreal"
“Are you real? ! asks a woman . She wants to touch them, kiss them. Another woman brings yellow and blue ribbons – the colors of Ukraine – from her shop. People ask soldiers to write a word on them with a black marker, then wrap them around their wrists or pin them to their coats. On the other side of the square, men hoist a flag on the roof of the Ukraine cinema. "These Ukrainian flags everywhere, I can't believe my eyes" , a lady is moved.
The central square is gradually filling up. The soldiers of the 28th Mechanized Brigade, at the forefront of the battle for the reconquest of the Kherson region, arrive at the city center. Then there are the police forces. After eight and a half months of occupation, suffering, silence, emotion overwhelms Freedom Square. The people of Kherson are in tears. Young girls hug the soldiers. Children wave flags. Everyone wants a hug, a shoulder to rest on for a second, a smile to share.
In a city without electricity, without water, without phone, everyone takes out a cell phone with a miraculously charged battery and takes pictures. Memories to look back on later. "As soon as the phone network is restored, I will send these pictures to my children abroad," says one woman. "You won't have to wait too long," smiles the special forces officer. He orders a soldier to deploy three Starlink antennas in the square. After a few minutes, the first phones begin to vibrate, releasing jams of waiting messages. The satellite network is so quickly taken over that it quickly becomes overwhelmed, impossible to make any call or send a picture. No matter. It's time for joy.
In the center of Freedom Square, one takes pictures in front of the destroyed monument, where residents lay flowers in tribute to those who fell in 2014 for the independence of Ukraine. In front of the Ukraine cinema, waiters at Topy, the only café open in a ghost town where all the curtains are down, take out five tables on the terrace and start serving hot tea and coffee. "It's surreal..." murmurs a young man. "It's almost as if this is peace, normal life."
A humiliating retreat for the Moscow army
Some inhabitants, seeing the presence of a journalist, start to spontaneously evoke the months of occupation, "the fear of the Russians", "the lack of everything", "the wait for the return of our guys". A woman is indignant: "Why is Putin doing all this? Why this war? Ask him this question in your newspaper!" Another tells us that "the Russians stole everything, the food in the stores, the books in the libraries, the carpets in the wedding hall, and even the little train in the kindergarten!"
Although it was less sudden than in the Kiev region and less chaotic than in the Kharkiv region, the retreat from Kherson was just as humiliating for the Moscow army. It marked the third bitter failure of the Russian war in Ukraine, while the city, conquered on 2 March, was the only Ukrainian regional capital to have passed under Russian control.
Zhanetta, a doctor whose apartment overlooks the square, saw "these checkpoints where Russian soldiers were stopping men, searching cars, searching phones." "The Russians said they were there 'forever'. We looked at them from our windows, without saying anything. We were waiting for our soldiers so impatiently," she says in a choked voice.
Anton, a young photographer who aspires to work for the press, was unable to document the occupation. "I was too scared. I only left my house twice in eight and a half months," he says. Once to see a friend downstairs. The other time, it was to try to flee Kherson, towards the territory under Ukrainian control. We went through about 30 checkpoints and at the last one, the Russian soldiers wouldn't let us through. It was a terrifying journey." Olga, a young psychologist who specializes in medical checkups for sailors in the port of Kherson, also didn't venture onto the streets of her city during the occupation. "The Russians came once to search my house. Then I stayed at home with my parents."
"This is the best day of my life!"
A man parks an old black Soviet-era Pobeda at the curb. Strollers gather to admire the antique. The car is equipped with six speakers, and it blasts I Have Nothing by Whitney Houston. "Don't walk away from me/I have nothing, nothing, nothing/If I don't have you," Whitney sings. "You, Ukraine," sing the young people surrounding the car.
Olga shares a bottle of "Ukrainian champagne" with another woman. They drink from the bottle, like so many others in Freedom Square. "This is liberation. This is the best day of my life," says one man. Some begin to improvise dances. The Ukrainian anthem aside, the most popular tune is Chervona Kalyna ("Red Berries"), an old song that rocker Andriy Khlyvnyuk "Boombox" covered in the days after the Russian invasion and which became a rallying song of the Ukrainian resistance. Soldiers' jeeps that continue to drive through Kherson also play it. The crowd is waving flags and singing at the top of their lungs.
Shortly before sunset, the three guys from the special forces leave. The back of their pick-up has become a kind of altar covered with offerings: flowers, chocolate bars, children's drawings... Those of the 28th Brigade also leave, followed by the policemen. They return to their bases, away from the city. Oleh, a police special forces fighter, is one of the last to sign flags and ribbons. "I have no words to express what I feel, my emotion," he says modestly. I am from Kherson. This is my hometown, I used to live here." Oleh does not want to talk about his departure in February, or his war. Another day, perhaps. "Please, write 'Glory to Ukraine' on this flag," a little girl asks him.
Night falls. In the distance, Ukrainian artillery fires a salvo of shells. The war is not over," says a soldier. Our comrades are on the front, advancing towards other territories to be liberated. We have received orders to spend a day or two in Kherson to see the population, but tomorrow we join them." In the darkened city, the girls stop dancing. "I am a little afraid that the Russians will punish Kherson for being so happy," says Natalya. Liberation is good, but it is not yet peace.
How much should Putin + team be allowed to get away with scot-free?
[sub](Similarly, is there a point at which enough is enough and hands-on international intervention is warranted?)[/sub]
Assimilating and re-culturating all of Ukraine? Grabbing Crimea and Donbas? Plain old-fashioned genocide? The child abductions? Nuclear deployment? The destruction? All or none of the above? (there are a few options/limits here, these are just examples)
Surely there are limits somewhere as to what can be tolerated, though I'm guessing it differs depending on who you ask including what the responses should be.
Exactly. "Or what?" Is the only relevant question. Putin ought no get away with so much as throwing litter if the punishment is easily administered and without undesirable ramifications.
The whole point of this debate is the cost and method of preventing the humanitarian harms Putin's actions cause. It's no good preventing them, for example, if the humanitarian cost of prevention is higher than that which is being prevented.
It's a common propaganda trope to present only the negative which the campaign de jour is against, never the cost of the campaign itself.
"What ought we let Putin get away with?" is a pointless question without it's counterpart - the consequences.
Personally I'm not up for sitting in a nuclear wasteland with nothing but my schadenfreude at Putin's defeat. Somehow I think that as the next Putin-a-like takes up the reins of tyranny left behind, the value of that smugness might fade.
[sub](Involves future conjectures and isn't quite simple. For one, you can't ignore the Ukrainians themselves, had they said "Let's shut down the government and have Moscow take over", then surely that'd be fine with most. For another, I don't think the child abductions can be swept under the rug.)[/sub]
I seriously doubt it. Putin has never met Dugin and never referenced him.
We were first told the sanctions would compel powerful oligarchs to overthrow Putin any day ... any day. Dugin is an ersatz replacement in that narrative.
Thinkers without power maybe dangerous to history, even civilisation as a whole, but rarely any specific individual has been murdered by thought.
Quoting jorndoe
Why would there be limits in evaluating consequences?
Or do you mean to say "yeah, yeah, yeah, we should consider some consequences but we still must impose limits on Putin," as if to say Putin is a rambunctious school boy and we the school master, and sure, boys will be boys and invade a country or two on occasion, but there must be some limits placed on the young lad.
To repeat @Isaac's point, if we can't do anything about Putin's nuclear weapons, our means to discipline him by force maybe extremely limited.
So far, NATO has certainly accepted the limitations of only supplying arms and information to Ukraine, and extremely limited arms that are of no real danger to the Russian forces as a whole or significant damage on Russia itself. The consequence of this is that it takes millions of traumatised Ukrainians and tens' of thousands, if not already hundreds of thousands (we don't really know), of Ukrainian deaths and casualties to use Ukraine as the striking rod against Putin's arrogance.
If we know (i.e. NATO is firmly decided in their policy to not actually help Ukraine win, but just let Ukraine believe that) that Ukraine can't win and that a compromise would be better in nearly every metric of wellbeing for Ukrainians, on both sides of the front, then the first question that arises is if this is a moral manipulation of Ukrainians for our Western purposes (whether cynical geopolitics or some genuine moral stand against Putin to make sure he "doesn't get away with it" in line of how we held to account Bush and subsequent US regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan and didn't let the US get away with it along with torture and other law breaking ... oh sorry, never mind--but, even putting aside the hypocrisy, the moral question remains of punishing party A by manipulating party B to engage in the actual costly fighting and great harm against their self-interest).
Then, even worse, if the policy is not to allow Ukraine to "win" and every single day a compromise will net them more good than bad ... how do we know such an outcome is even adequate punishment to Putin? If he's not going to actually lose?
Historically, an army that wins a war is often far stronger at the end than at the beginning, even with a lot of casualties (US after the civil war and Russia after WWII are typical examples of extremely costly wars nevertheless "strengthening" the winning party).
Hmm? I'm not sure you read my comments right.
The limits are between what to tolerate and not to tolerate, what they may get away with and not get away with, and this may be informed by perceived consequences of doing this-or-that or not doing anything. Gave some examples (not exhaustive).
I'm not sure if would run with doing nothing (at all?) due to a perceived threat of ? world war 3. If so, then that would be one example of a limit. I'm sure others would entertain other limits.
So, that's what limits was about. (You have any to recommend here?)
As an aside, James Longman from ABC News posted some maps (Nov 12, 2022)...
[tweet]https://twitter.com/JamesAALongman/status/1591421964778098690[/tweet]
Nevertheless Following the murder, Putin became “seriously interested” in Dugin. He sent him a telegram of condolences, and has since encouraged the administration’s contacts with the philosopher. It was one month after Daria Dugina’s murder, on September 30, that Putin first used one of Dugin’s favorite slurs: “the Anglo-Saxons” (in the sense of the presumed Anglo-American hegemony in the West). A Kremlin insider explains this as a direct result of Dugina’s death — and the way it was exploited to show Putin that “the enemies” are attacking “the upholders of traditional values,” those values being, of course, very dear to Putin. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/11/03/hawkish-times-need-hawkish-people
Quoting boethius
Sure, there is not even a single grain of truth in what they write. Putin's elite supporters are happy more than ever after the glorious retreat from Kherson. And "everything is going according to plan", right?
BTW you too stop spreading Western propaganda [1], the withdrawal is not an embarrassement at all: The Kremlin remained defiant Friday, insisting that battlefield developments in the Kherson region in no way represented an embarrassment for Putin.
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-kyiv-europe-moscow-7dcca261a8af0641f9a3c11cc7f644b0
[1]
Quoting boethius
This would be true if any daughter of literally anyone in Russia was murdered by a Ukrainian operation.
And war policy hawks, even "philosophical" one's like Dugin, are rarely, if ever, some sort of threat. It would be like saying The Project of a New American Century and company, was a threat to Bush since he didn't invade Iran like many were insisting.
It's naive grasping at straws this whole narrative that Putin will be personally overthrown by someone for some reason. The oligarchs didn't overthrow Putin, the protesters in the streets didn't overthrow Putin, neither the rank and file or the generals, and Dugin is just now next on the list of people that have not overthrown Putin.
Quoting neomac
How does this even respond to my comment.
Live in extreme hyperbole with zero grip on reality if you want.
Not even the Kremlin's position is that everything is going "according to plan". Again, a delusional narrative born from the obvious fact that the Northern offensive by the Russians served to fix troops and attention there, and away from the south (which obviously worked in that respect), but somehow its necessary for Zelenskyites to get into all sorts of mental gymnastics to "prove" the Russian army is incompetent and does nothing right ... despite occupying nearly 20% of Ukraine and large gas fields.
Certainly plan A would be Kiev just capitulate, but clearly the plan B was to conquer strategically useful territory that could be plausibly held with a relatively small force; territory that is largely Russian speaking, links to Crimea and secures fresh water to Crimea and has been conquered held now since February, which is good evidence it is plausible to hold it.
Likewise, there's plenty of legitimate subjects of debate. Militarily, perhaps the Northern offensives "worked" in facilitating the conquest of the South, but was nevertheless too costly. Just because something achieves its objective does not mean it is cost-effective.
In the same vein, even if the South can be plausibly held, that's not a long term guarantee and enough
NATO arms and Ukrainian cannon fodder will retake it piece by piece. That Russia has held the territory until now and likely for at least a year, only demonstrates that the plan was plausible and executed well enough (to succeed in the plan for likely over a year).
Beyond military considerations, there are plenty of domestic political and economic and geopolitical subjects of debate as well. Useful subjects to debate. For example, will the anti-Wester coalition Russia is building going to last and going to succeed? That's far from clear, but what is clear is it is being build bric by bric.
Instead of constructive debate between positions that have merit, we (living in the real world) mostly must simply deal with endless rank hypocrisy from Zelenkyites.
For example, the "meme" of "everything is going to plan," which no Russian official has ever said (saying one thing was part of "a plan" is not the same as saying literally everything that has happened and all Ukrainian decisions and setbacks are "part of the plan"; Russian officials described this withdrawal from Kherson as a difficult decision, but the pros outweigh the cons, and not "the plan all along", so the critique is just dumb), is thrown at the Russians ... well, are things going according to plan for the Ukrainians?
When the offensives started we were made all sorts of promises about Russian lines collapsing, morale so bad the entire Russian army would essentially just disband into the fog, taking Kherson by force and encircling the Russians there (not just Russia withdrawing), and pushing deep into Russian territory all the way back to the Russian border!!
Has that plan happened?
Did you read my comment? I literally describe your thought process.
"Tolerate" and "get away with it" implies some power to do something about whatever is the annoyance.
Power that may simply not be there to impose our ideas.
Why people that go down this path of actually describing how the West will "hold Putin to account" invariably end their own analysis in Nuclear war, but Zelenskyites then make the insane conclusion that therefore Russia will be nuked if it continues and simply escalates to more force if Ukraine has some success against less force.
Whereas the correct conclusion is that since basically any method to really harm Putin may result in nuclear war, NATO won't go there as there's zero reason to take such risks on behalf of Ukraine, and the current situation is actually more described as a "freinemies" situation between NATO and Russia in order to completely screw Europe and make the world far more militaristic (good for US, UK and ... Russian! Arms industry) and far more profitable for fossil exporters (just like the US and Russia!).
For, remember my hypothesis in this conversation: NATO could defeat Russia in Ukraine, even just via arms, training and information supplies, but chooses not to, instead drip feeding weapons systems that are insufficient to actually defeat Russian forces and cause real and not merely perceived propaganda problems in the Western echo chamber (aka. pressuring the Russians to leave an area can be presented as some great victory in Western media, and just common sense tactical decisions in Russian media; which is far from an actual military problem of lines collapsing and thousands of troops being surrounded and sieged for months in a city with no way to resupply or relieve them, a situation that would actually create a real threat to Putin's grip on power).
And NATO chooses not to ... because of the nuclear weapons.
Sometimes US policy hawks simply admit this is indeed the policy, but better to bleed the Russians in Ukraine than "fight them here". Again, completely delusional argument, which, at least on the part of US policy hawks, is at least not a genuine belief but just propaganda rhetoric to justify a policy that benefits the US arms and fossil industries.
In case of good old-fashioned :death: genocide in Ukraine at the hands of the invaders, would deployment of NATO/Polish/US/Romainian troops directly in Ukraine be warranted? Would doing so be unacceptable due to a perceived threat of ? world war 3?
In the current situation, are sanctions warranted, but Ukrainian support should be withdrawn towards forcing a peace deal where, say, Crimea and Donbas become parts of Russia, and that's then the accepted goal? Except, if the invaders were to (want to) absorb additional regions, would additional actions then be the way to go?
Are the child abductions acceptable collateral damage, and so there's nothing further to be done here? (To show an extreme limit, I'm guessing no one would nuke Moscow due to this.)
Those are examples you might say are warranted or acceptable, or where something else should be done (or not done). You'd (probably) want to add justification as you see them, but those are examples of limits. Where are they?
The UN has made a principled statement about what's un/acceptable by vote, but has limited mandate of action:
Quoting United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/2
You clearly did not read what I wrote the first time, therefore I repeated it. What else do you expect?
Quoting jorndoe
First, let's correct your statement to say "perceived genocide in Ukraine" to remove the propaganda technique of presenting your emotional driver as certain but any basis of criticism of your plan of actions as less certain.
We would not know what the actual risk of WWIII, but likewise we would not know if there is an actual genocide or something simply staged by Ukrainian intelligence and purported to be a genocide.
Which is exactly the situation we currently have. Ukrainian intelligence continuously alleges various forms of genocide in Ukraine, West continuously cites nuclear weapons as the reasons for their caution and not directly intervening ... and throws some doubts on Ukrainian claims when necessary.
The result of this calculus that exists right now as the basis for NATO policy is not intervening directly in Ukraine. So, in terms of what NATO would do about such a scenario, the scenario is literally what we have right now, and NATO's non-direct-intervention is your answer.
Likewise, there is since years literally this exact same scenario in China where the West perceives a genocide ... but we don't do anything about it due to nuclear weapons and no way to conventionally invade China anyways.
Quoting jorndoe
Again, propaganda. Collateral damage to what NATO actions?
Collateral damage is unintended consequences of your own actions, not someone else's.
There's lot's of actual dictatorships in the world, not mere "authoritarians" doing all sorts of horrible things. Why doesn't the West intervene in all of them to protect human rights? The nominal answer is the West simply does not have the power to do so and cannot be "world police" (ironically an expression used to ridicule the idea of intervening in situation there is no policy to do anything about, but also an expression used to justify US intervention as the "world's unipolar superpower" to intervene when it is the policy). The real answer is of course US policy always happens to align with US geopolitical interests and interventions, whether "humanitarian" or not, are always justified as humanitarian and (at least partly) for freedom or whatever, but mention the same logic in some other situation and even worse propping up a worse regime (like not only failing to invade but supporting and selling arms to places like Saudi Arabia -- how much "freedom" exists there?) and one is immediately brandied as the most naive of geopolitical connoisseurs.
Quoting jorndoe
If you actually do intend to stop just re-posting lists of feel-good propaganda without making any point, and want to actually engage in debate, the fallacy in your reasoning is confusing moral limits with "power to do something about it" limits.
Morally, we should not (by definition) place any limits on the goodness of our intentions and intended outcomes of our actions. We should strive to bring about as good a world as possible for all life and humanity.
If you ask "should we do better if we could do better?" the answer is essentially by definition that better is better than not-better, so we should definitely prioritise that.
However, our power to actually bring about our intention is severely limited.
Terrible things happen in China, North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Egypt, the United States, such as torture. We don't invade China or the United States to correct problems because we have no practical means of doing so.
If the reasons for our inaction are geopolitically clear (we need Chinese totalitarianism to keep communist workers from unionising and making our stuff more expensive, along with total disregard for dumping toxins in the environment and creating "cancer villages", again, so our stuff isn't too expensive), then there isn't even a debate. The idea of trying to cut China off from the global trading system and collapse their economy and government doesn't even come up as an option to achieve our moral goals, much less pour arms into any groups willing to fight with the The People's Liberation Army.
We are only debating Ukraine in the first place because the US sees some geopolitical benefits for fuelling the war. Those benefits are arguable, but clearly the US administration perceives them as practically achievable or then just distraction from the cowardly withdrawal of Afghanistan and domestic inflation woes. Whatever the case maybe, the fact that you naively ask such questions without mentioning all the "bad" situations we do nothing about, don't even consider doing anything about, is what is wrong with your world view.
The correct formulation of your question is first whether the situation in Ukraine has any practical way of being ameliorated through violence and the support of violence, or it is in a category such as China or North Korea or Iran or Egypt of Uzbekistan or the US, that we can't do anything about with external violence and the support of violence, whatever is happening there anyways?
Second question would be is violence and the support of violence to achieve our noble ends even the best tool available, or negotiation and compromise?
For example, the nominal justification of sanctions is to apply pressure as leverage to compel the other party to do what we want, not simply punish their civilian populations (that would just be cynical and counter productive to our humanitarian aims). Now, has a position even been formulated that the sanctions would be dropped if Russia does A, B, and C.
If the answer is "withdraw from all Ukraine including Crimea" well obviously the Russians won't accept that. So, the final question is what level of compromise with Russia is preferable to more bloodshed.
If your answer is "no compromise!" then you are simply a violent fanatic and do not actually have any humanitarian or freedom or political rights objectives, but your mentioning of such values is "limited", as you might say, to unsound and fallacious arguments to serve your propaganda.
If your policy is to fight to the last Ukrainian in uncompromising and childish diplomatic positions (like "I won't talk to Putin! I won't come out of my room until Putin is gone!!!" ), then Ukrainian welfare, much less anyone else's, is not your objective, just living vicariously a violent delusion through the deaths of Ukrainians.
I think I've made my preferred solution quite clear - end the war, cede territory if need be, then support those Russians (and newly 'Russian' Ukrainians) who are fighting for regime change in Russia. And while we're at it, do the same in America so we're less likely to get into this mess again. Reduce nuclear weapon stocks to near zero. Reduce our reliance on oil (truly at the heart of all this). Oh, and end global capitalism.
As @boethius points out, you seem to be implying that we're holding back some sanction we have available to use for if Putin does something really bad. He's already done something really bad. He's invaded another country and taken little to no care over the civilian casualties caused in doing so. Did you think we were in some way OK with that? There's literally nothing we can do that wouldn't make matters worse. We're already making matters worse just by profiteering, but that has tolerable consequences (tolerable to them, that is).
What is this punishment you think we've been holding in reserve for child abduction that we we decided would have been 'too much' in response to Bucha?
We allowed a kleptocrat to inherit a stockpile of world-ending scale weapons and did nothing about it. Not only did we do nothing about it, but we encouraged him to make more, and then poked him with a big stick to see if he'd bite. The Ukrainians are now lying in the bed we made.
This is a good example of the limits of our knowledge. there have been no child abductions. UNICEF's director for emergency operations, Manuel Fontaine, said during a press conference that the organization does not have any evidence at present to back up Kiev's accusations. There has possibly been child abductions. The UN said it found the reports credible.
So what are you suggesting we unleash?
Flatten Moscow because it credibly might have abducted children, if and when we actually get any evidence?
Pre-emptive nuclear strike just in case?
So Uganda?
Quoting https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/29/abduction-children-africa
Ought we have bombed them too?
Nigeria? DRC?
Quoting https://www.unicef.org.uk/press-releases/concerns-deepen-over-attacks-against-children-and-child-abductions-in-parts-of-west-and-central-africa/
NATO boots on the ground there too?
We're sure going to have our work cut out.
In Iraq
Quoting https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/09/child-kidnapping-abduction-iraq.html
Hey, maybe we ought to invade!
Quoting boethius
What propaganda? It's not about NATO in particular.
Quoting Isaac
I'm not in particular.
Quoting Isaac
Punishment is your word. The parents/peers want their children back. Wouldn't you? If that's impossible, then so be it, I guess.
You folk are reading extras into my comments here.
Quoting jorndoe
Then I'm afraid the point you're making remains opaque. Is having your children abducted horrifying? Yes. Did we really need to point that out?
You're going into ramble mode.
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting Isaac
My point? I asked questions.
Quoting jorndoe
Try again.
I prefer to think of it as rhetoric, but 'ramble mode' if you like. The point is not eradicated by the elimination of any particular methodology. It doesn't answer the question. If not nukes then what? and more importantly, why Russia, why now? Why not Uganda, Nigeria, DRC, Iraq... Because Russia is the bogeyman of the day, should our response be based on the latest social media efforts?
Up to 2,000 children might be involved in the Russian 'kidnapping'.
Quoting https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/yemen-acute-hunger-unprecedented-levels-funding-dries
2.2 million.
That's a thousand children for every Ukrainian child who (at this stage) might have been kidnapped.
Wars aren't free, front pages have limited space. So our capacity to act is not infinite. Which should be our priority? How many poor starving black kids do you get to one western-looking white baby in media attention these days, anyone know the going rate?
[sup](Besides, the rest of the world matters too, and that does not mean Ukraine doesn't.)[/sup]
I take it then that you downplay that Ukrainian situation, "collateral damage accepted", nothing further to see here? Is that in/correct? To return to my comment, that would indeed be one response setting out a limit (or absence thereof perhaps).
It's not downplaying it to place it in context. The question of what we do in Ukraine can't be answered without answering the question of what we do that instead of. We only have one army, one front page, one pot of charitable giving, one pot of 'sanction tolerance', etc. So, yes this thread's about Ukraine, but the question is always "Is the situation in Ukraine, more important than the situations elsewhere that would otherwise be calls on our attention/resources?" That's still a question about the Ukrainian situation, still very much on topic.
As to your specific question about child kidnapping, as I've said, there's no confirmed collateral damage to accept at this stage. There is the 'credible' possibility of collateral damage, as yet unconfirmed. That matters because the consequences of what we do about it need to measured against cold hard facts, not media flame wars.
So to answer your comment directly. Yes. A limit I would definitely place on lethal force is that we at least have some evidence beyond word-of-mouth that the atrocity we're punishing actually took place. It's good that UNICEF are investigating, and I agree with the use of limited force to allow them to continue that investigation (should they find themselves blocked), but I think it's madness to go in guns blazing in response to reports from a situation where both sides are engaged in heavy propaganda.
Remember the 'credible' 45 minute WMDs?
Maybe a peace criterion could be a guarantee to return all such children otherwise unharmed no later than a month after a cease-fire? (Just tossing something out there.) Easily contrasted by auto-enrollment in organized Russian governmental machinery...
Are you suggesting that “literally anyone in Russia” whose daughter got “murdered by a Ukrainian operation” could become Kremlin ideologue? Coz that’s what the linked article was about.
Quoting boethius
The analogy doesn't hold to me. First Putin's regime is authoritarian, more pyramidal, more relying on strong man figure and censorship of opposing views: so the more disgruntled voices by political and intellectual elites who once supported him unconditionally become public the greater is the pressure on the leader. Secondly, Dugin’s complaint is not important because of him, but because it might express a feeling deeply shared also among people within Putin’s closer entourage and since military defeat may increase a dictator’s odds of forcible ouster, perceived defeat may be as well insidious.
Quoting boethius
Western propaganda is not only for Western consumption. Putting all the blame on Putin, stressing his military humiliations and suggesting regime change can be instrumental to boost Putin’s paranoia at the expense of his entourage and offering a way out to potential high rank defectors as soon as things are going to look intolerably shitty to them. That’s part of the psychological warfare which is meant also to provoke decisional mistakes in Putin and his entourage. And if the mistakes were not enough for a coup from his entourage, they might still be enough to trigger a regime collapse.
Quoting boethius
Yet,
“Putin says: everything is going to plan in Ukraine”
https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-putin-russia-idUSS8N2UP08I
“The work is proceeding in a calm and rhythmic way. The troops are advancing and reaching those endpoints that are assigned as a task at a certain stage of this combat work. Everything is going according to plan”
https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/06/30/2736617/russia-s-operation-in-ukraine-going-according-to-plan-putin
And in state run TV:
[I]“We’ve been told that everything is going according to plan. Does anyone really believe that six months ago the plan was to be leaving [the city of] Balakliya, repelling a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region and failing to take over Kharkiv?” usually pro-Putin political expert Viktor Olevich said on the state-run NTV channel, the Moscow Times reported.[/i]
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/12/pro-kremlin-figures-voice-frustration-after-ukraine-routs-moscows-forces-a78769
BTW I use memes like this for mocking not for their truth value.
Quoting boethius
Did Western/Ukrainian officials state: "Everything is going according to plan"?
Quoting boethius
Can you quote these promises?
Seeing the distance between what people in this discussion think is happening, it seems like any possible talks would have to start with some very basic steps toward living in a shared reality. The Russians would have to explicitly acknowledge that Ukraine is an actual state with the right to protect its sovereignty. This is going to be difficult to admit after selling the war as a fight with NATO itself. Why would Ukraine accept establishing anything less than that as a minimum requirement?
Without that first step, agreeing to investigations of deportations, war crimes, the targeting of civilian populations and the financial liability for repairing destroyed things would be meaningless (in the pre-Beckett sense).
Now that Russia has officially annexed 5 oblasts, any territory deal will either have to be done by fiat as an arbitrary drawing of boundaries or a process of referendums to challenge the nice results given by the Russian authorities. The Ukrainians have been adamant about not considering the former and the Russians are not likely to agree to a referendum 'rematch'. It would require a sharp change of rhetoric.
Another possibility, as pointed out by ssu, is a freezing of the conflict, where neither side concedes anything, but the front lines don't really change. The liberation of Kherson makes that seem less likely. There are certainly many commentators who say that such a stalemate is where things are going despite that development.
End the Ukraine war well
[sup]— The Hill; Nov 13, 2022[/sup]
? some of the same as you,
[sup]— Henry Sokolski; The Hill; Nov 13, 2022[/sup]
:D Like a catch-22 with Rosatom sort of sitting comfortably in the middle. A good time to go green? (OK, with current tech that won't do, I think.) Switch to other import, gradually at least? Where will the produce end up if the imports are canceled? Either way, it seems capitalism and slowness to change have made the decisions for now.
So you're asking a hypothetical? The answer would be the same.
Quoting jorndoe
It's not made so simply by you saying it. You have to argue the case. In what way does comparing Ukraine's situation to the situation in other countries 'downplay' it? I've not lied or hidden any truths about either situation. I've not made that comparison for no reason (I stated the reason clearly), so I'm lost as to why it might be considered 'downplaying', other than it not toeing the current party line.
Quoting jorndoe
I'm not saying I'd wait for evidence before responding to your question. I'm saying "wait for evidence" is the response to your question. That's what I think we ought to do (in this case). Investigations are underway, they ought to be allowed to complete their work.
If it turns out that thousands of children have been forcibly adopted, then UN diplomats ought to support local authorities in securing their return, just as they ought do in all those other countries I mentioned which are suffering from a similar problem.
Quoting jorndoe
Under what threat? You (nor anyone else on this thread) have given absolutely no reasons why Russia would accept any terms at all, let alone the undoing of this 'repatriation' they've apparently just done. For whatever reason, Russia wants these children in Russia (assuming they're doing what they've been accused of) and your solution is to say "please don't"?
Do you think that this should have happened in Chechnya? Do you think the Chechen separatists ought to have recognised that Russia was an actual state with a right to protect it's sovereignty? What about East Timor? Should they have acknowledged that Indonesia was an actual state with the right to defend its sovereignty? Kosovo? South Sudan? Ought these places too have respected the right of their previous states to protect their sovereignty?
My sense is that such peace deal will include a right of return for all Ukrainians presently in Russia, whether willingly in Russia or brought there against their will. Children included.
Russia is apparently more interested in snatching people than in stealing land. But in the end they will have to return both.
Go on. Explain your argument. A Russian diplomat is prevented from signing a document (and thereby constraining his government to act in accordance with that document) by what means? What exactly stays his hand?
Peace means an end to fighting. Russia could end fighting tomorrow even if the entire country had collective amnesia and forgot Ukraine even existed. Acknowledgement of the existence of spurious entities such as 'states' is not a requirement for peace.
To have peace, the Russian government would have to commit to a series of actions (such as withdrawing troops behind a line clearly marked on a map attached to the treaty).
All they need is GPS.
In order to question whether the Ukrainian government ought control Crimea, it is necessary not to hold the view that there exists a geographically bounded entity called 'Ukraine', otherwise the question is meaningless. Likewise for 'Russia'.
If one holds the view that there exists a geographically bounded entity called 'Ukraine', then the question of where it's borders ought to be is already answered - wherever the edges of this entity called Ukraine are.
Negotiations over borders only make sense in the context of governments who recognise that the question of who controls what parcels of land is one entirely settled by international agreements such as the one under consideration.
Just interested in how you square this within your narrative. As I see it, Biden's fighting this war because the arms lobby lobbied him to. He's funding Russian nuclear weapons because the nuclear lobby lobbied him to.
If you (presumably) think Biden is fighting this war, not because the arms lobby lobbied him to, but because it's 'right', then why is he also funding Russia's nuclear weapons? Is that 'right' too?
If Biden sometimes does things because they're 'right' (but powerful lobbies just coincidentally happen to benefit), and yet sometimes does things solely because those powerful lobbies benefit (no 'right' involved), then on what grounds do you think he chooses? And most importantly of all, why do you believe that (as opposed to the much simpler explanation that his actions are guided in both cases by powerful lobbying interests)?
It is a requirement IFF you want to make peace with said entity. Logically speaking, you cannot make peace with a non existing entity, can you?
You don't have to 'make peace' with a state. Stop shooting people, stop bombing people. Just don't shoot and bomb. Job done. Peace. No 'states' required.
How do you explain United Nations Security Council Resolution 777? With whom did they agree that the state of Yugoslavia no longer existed?
What is illogical, for you about the statement "I believe that Russia ought to be in control of all the land up to the Dnieper, but I agree not to shoot or bomb anyone in that area nonetheless". How is that not a peace agreement?
Quoting Isaac
Quoting jorndoe
? A blocker, even if reasonable or to be expected? A recipe for no peace; probably more of those.
Quoting Isaac
And yet
Quoting Isaac
Anyway, am I then to understand that the situation with the children, by your take, is irrelevant, does not figure in any limitation where
Quoting jorndoe
?
That would be a response to my comment.
Quoting Isaac
You can deny them all you like (maybe even come up with a better world without them of some sort), yet that's our present world. Simply dismissing them isn't helpful here. (Besides, you're starting to read like @NOS4A2. :wink:)
I can't answer that question because you've not answered my request for clarity on it. 'Tolerate' how?
Are you asking me if I tolerate child kidnapping morally? If so, what an absurd question, I simply refuse to dignify it with an answer.
Are you asking me if we ought to do something about the accusations of child kidnapping? - If so, I've already given that answer - yes investigate it as UNICEF are already doing.
Are you asking me if (assuming the accusations are true) we ought do something to Russia (militarily) we're not currently already doing? - If so then I've already given you that answer too. No. We're currently doing all that it's possible to do (and much more) without risking making the humanitarian situation worse.
I can't find an interpretation of your question I haven't already answered.
If peace negotiations have to agree to the legitimacy of the current political map in order to take place, then how are border changes ever legitimised?
Russia aren't denying Ukraine exists in the sense that they'd say "what country, I can't see any country". They're saying that it didn't ought to have the borders it currently does (some are saying that it didn't ought to exist at all - just like Yugoslavia). No one is saying that currently there's no such thing as the Ukrainian government and therefore nobody to negotiate with. They're saying that the current powers of that government ought to change.
You realise that the concept of 'agreement' implies two (2) entities agreeing on something, right?
Yes. The supplicant and the enforcing power. Neither need be a state.
Again, United Nations Security Council Resolution 777 agreed that Yugoslavia no longer existed. With whom did they agree?
Not sure you are referring to here. What "enforcing power" do you have in mind, and what "supplicant"? The latter term is odd in the context of a negotiation between equals.
The supplicant changes depending on the term. Article 1 might make Russia the supplicant (we promise we'll remove our troops behind this line), in article 2, Ukraine might be the supplicant (we promise we'll not launch any attacks over that line).
All that matters is that each party has to power to carry out that which they promise, and (usually) that there's some enforcing power to mitigate any lack of trust.
Neither need agree that the other ought to have those powers, only that they do.
But the further point I was making is that article 2's supplicant (in my example) need not even be Ukraine. Any party with power to commit acts Russia may prefer not committed would do. NATO, the UN, the US...France...
Ok so your "supplicantS", plural, would be Russia and Ukraine. Who would your "enforcing power" be?
As I said:
Say, is it acceptable to return the children? :up: Is refusal acceptable? :down: I don't see any good reason that the Ukrainians would tolerate that the Russian government and the pseudo-parents insist on kidnapping.
Quoting jorndoe
And so refusal might be a peace blocker, which really would be too bad. For that matter, is there a sufficient reason that anyone would let them get away with it? Already illegal in most places (for a reason). Could repeat your choice of words: "Disgusting".
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting jorndoe
I'm guessing most would be behind the Ukrainians here. And that would set out a limit, thereby answering my comment. Different from one you'd put forth? If this is descending into a rhetorical exercise, then I'm not all that interested, though there isn't a sub-forum for that.
Quoting Isaac
In whichever way? Countries are presently a political reality. As mentioned, you may deny that reality, that just isn't very helpful. Do you think you can convince the Russians and Ukrainians with such a side track? Besides, expecting agreement in all things is a bit naïve.
Not quite. One article might contain a promise from NATO. Who the supplicant is depends on the commitment the article is about.
As to enforcing powers, the UN pass for the closest thing we have to a global legal system. An agreement endorsed by the UN has a greater staying power than a bilateral one.
Quoting jorndoe
...you're still not specifying what 'not tolerating' consists of. What action indicates 'not tolerating'?
Quoting jorndoe
I'm afraid I just don't understand what you're saying here at all. It seems you're talking as if there were some obvious understanding between us which need not be said out loud, but there isn't. I cannot make any sense out of that paragraph.
Quoting jorndoe
No one is denying that countries exist, not even the worst Russians. They're claiming Ukraine didn't ought to exist. Not that it currently doesn't. Indeed, the fact that it currently does exist seems to be their main beef.
I'm also not claiming that countries don't exist. I'm claiming they don't have a right to exist. They may exist, cease to exist, or change the nature of their existence, entirely according to whatever is best, there's no intrinsic right.
The UN cannot enforce anything. Therefore, there's no enforcing power here. Therefore, your conceptual framework doesn't work. Come to think of it, there's no supplicant here either. In an international treaty, there are parties, the signatories, and they strike a deal, an agreement. And since you cannot agree anything with someone who doesn't exist, the first step in drafting such an agreement is usually some form of mutual recognition, which often features in article 1 of the agreement, for this reason of logical anteriority.
My comment was not an attempt to establish a general right to sovereignty, applicable to all situations. The observation was to underscore a minimum concession from Russia that could possibly interest the Ukrainians from stopping their fight.
Quoting Isaac
What Putin has said is the following:
Quoting On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, President Putin
From this perspective, the organization calling itself the government of Ukraine is not a nation protecting its interests but an instrument of foreign powers. The only parties to negotiate with are the foreign powers. Your idea that one could make a deal with a state but not recognize the people speaking for it is not possible in practice. I am not sure it is even an idea.
In any case, since the invasion of Ukraine was based upon this rationale put forward by Putin, how could any deal be made without specifically withdrawing the claim? Otherwise, the only deal possible would be between the "West" and Russia to partition the lands in dispute.
Ah, the usual switch.
Loose ground on arguments about what is the case, switch to moralising "virtue signalling is just ethics".
Loose ground on moral arguments switch to what is the case " that's not how things are done".
It's transparent and tiresome.
This comment began this section...
Quoting jorndoe
"Should..." An ethical argument about what ought to be the case.
If you now want to discuss what actually is the case, make a new point, don't hijack this one.
I think it's Ukraine that want Russia to stop their flight. Ukraine are no threat to Russia right now, they're not invading Russia.
Quoting Paine
Make an argument then. What exactly is preventing Russia making the following deal with Ukraine...
"We don't recognise your right to rule over Donbas, but we will withdraw our forces from there if you stop shelling us"
What physically stops that deal from being struck?
I'll ask you the same question @Olivier5 keeps dodging. With whom was it agreed that Yugoslavia should no longer exist? Who was the 'other party' in that agreement?
No switch at all. Even ethical discussions have to be logical. Ethically, Russia should withdraw its troops and try and negotiate a peace agreement. with Ukraine. Logically, it cannot do so without first recognizing the entity called Ukraine.
To come back to the topic at hand, the issue of illegally displaced people and adopted children would have to be addressed in any such peace agreement, alongside the issue of war prisoners. I would think through a system of 'right of return' for Ukrainian adults and children currently in Russia.
Russia has annexed the oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea. The Kremlin today: "This is Russian territory."
Quoting Isaac
Agreeing to a cease fire is far from negotiating an end to hostilities. It is like agreeing to exchange sets of prisoners or to not bomb grain ships. Brokers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia permit minimum contact between the enemies in such cases. That is hardly the stuff of mutual security guarantees.
Too bad. Maybe I should mention that action is subsequent to figuring things out? Usually anyway. (I don't think Putin is manning the artillery in Ukraine these days. Sleepwalkers aren't part of the considerations.)
Quoting Isaac
Still not helpful. :D
Quoting Isaac
All over the place here, "Flatten Moscow", ditching countries, rhetorical exercises, ...
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting jorndoe
Still wondering if you're expecting everyone to agree (let alone Putin and the Ukrainians). Sometimes people resort to democracy.
Speaking of flattening, crazies are everywhere (Nov 12, 2022) (again):
[tweet]https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1591472331368861697[/tweet]
Maybe they're just doing their thing for the heck of it.
Go on. What is the logical barrier?
Quoting Olivier5
It would have to first be established that it actually took place. Moscow are denying it. Logically, how can they make a peace deal involving the return of children they don't agree are even in Russia to be returned?
Quoting Olivier5
It was also not a twenty-first century agreement. Tell me how that's a difference which makes a difference.
Not really, no.
Quoting Isaac
You should be able to figure that out by yourself. It's elementary.
But that would only be relevant if the deal were to stop Ukraine invading the 'new' Russia ie the deal involved the ceding of Ukrainian territory to Russia. Is that something you see being part of the deal? If so, then how might such a deal be struck whilst Russia also recognises Ukraine's territorial integrity?
Quoting Paine
OK so change my offer to...
Quoting Isaac
You can't say that's not a peace deal. What prevents Russia from making such an offer?
At least make the bare minimum effort to ground yourself in some kind of reality.
Although I agree with your criticism of false dichotomies and barriers to peace tossed around to justify more violence without any coherent plan, I think it's useful for us and people following this thread to note that international relations are not legal relations, which has already been discussed by is worth repeating.
There is no guarantees in any international agreement as there is no world court and world police system that enforces agreements.
The reason to make an international agreement is one of three options:
1. You yourself don't intend to abide by it, but it serves some deceptive purpose. For example, some Zelenskyites boast that Minsk I and Minsk II agreements Ukraine never intended to honour but it was a clever deception to buy time to build up their forces to crush the rebels. I'm not sure if this is true, but it is said. People who deny Ukraine had such intentions claim it was in fact Russia never intending to honor the agreement and just buying time to ready their invasion force. So, a good example of making an agreement with zero intention of honouring it in either scenario.
2. You intend to honour the agreement, you hope the other party honours the agreement but you have no power in the situation and you can't do much about the situation if the deal isn't honoured. For example, losing a war and surrendering is such a situation; maybe the victors honour whatever peace deal was agreed, or maybe not and just do as they please once they take over administration.
3. You intend to honour the agreement only if you believe the other party will as well. One reason to believe they will honour the agreement is you think they just have that high a character, but, failing such an esteem (such as with you enemy you've been fighting a war with), the alternative is simply that there is a system of interests in place that would compel the counter party to abide by the agreement.
What simply does not exist is some sort of external guarantee to international agreements.
As you mention, the best that can be done is a UN resolution passed by all members of the security council (i.e. US and Russia agreeing to whatever it is).
This has no force of law, but simply increases the diplomatic cost of reneging on the agreement.
The argument that "Putin can't be trusted" as a basis to reject an otherwise good peace deal is simply an invalid argument. The trust in an international counter-party has little to do with reasons to enter an agreement or not. US and the Soviets never trusted each other, but entered into all sorts of agreements.
Indeed, the basic assumption of international relations is that countries don't just go ahead and trust each other, but the situation is more complicated than that.
Where do you get this idea? By what judgement you made this idea that Russia gave a "guarantee"?
The Ukrainians had made it impossible for Russia to supply over the Dniepr a huge force as it's dependence on rail lines made this totally obvious. Russia wasn't willing to sacrifice it's best troops. And of course Putin was no where to be found in the TV theatre where the commander in Ukraine and Shoigu discussed the withdrawal (which is typical Putin: he never gives the bad news).
It's interesting how many seem to be desperately hoping that Putin has many aces on his sleeves, that the Russian army isn't marching on to a defeat. As if the situation isn't so bleak to the Russian army. Yes, likely the West can snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by not supplying Ukraine and demanding a possibility for Putin to "save face".
The Soviet Union couldn't continue the arms race and actually did collapse partly because of it (even if Americans tend to overemphasize this). Soviet Union was spending twice the percentage of GDP than the US was and it was failing to keep up in the technological race. You are correct in that the two Superpowers never trusted each other, but agreements could be found simply when there wasn't any other sustainable option.
Prior to the midterm elections. Now the situation doesn't look so bad for the Democrats though.
By my own judgement. The way the Russians left Kherson is odd, so I sought a reasonable explanation.
The United States pressured Ukraine into showing willingness for negotiations. Russia left Kherson in a way that is not typical for two nations at war. Now Zelensky is talking about the end of the war.
I would not be surprised if the deal has already been struck.
Quoting ssu
Nothing stopped the Russians from reducing the force occupying Kherson, allowing it to be supplied while also imposing a cost on Ukraine for taking it. They chose not to, and that is not typical for two nations at war.
Quoting neomac
Ukraine stands nothing to gain from prolonged conflict with Russia, regardless of who controls the United States. It's losing, and it is going to lose more.That might be an unpopular opinion, but Ukraine's current position is the best it's ever going to be, and it will only deteriorate from here, regardless of whether the United States profit from continued conflict.
Russia probably wants out of this conflict sooner rather than later aswell. It's not making any more attempts at conquering more territory.
A good recipe for peace, wouldn't you say?
What is odd?
The reasonable explanation is that Russia cannot simply supply a force of tens of thousands of troops over the precarious few bridges (that Ukraine can hit) over the Dniepr on the western side of the river in Kherson. Russia lacks the logistical ability to move far away from the railway lines was well known even before the war started. They lack simply the logistics. Hence Ukraine has targeted supply dumps with the accurate HIMARS rockets and basically fought a similar conventional war that NATO planned to fight the Soviet war machine.
When you look at the rail lines in Ukraine, one immediately notices the only way is through Crimea by the now infamous bridge that was attacked.
The next possible Ukrainian offensive would be to circumvent the Dniepr altogether and launch an attack from the Donetsk region to the sea and cut the land bridge to Crimea and take Mariupol or Melitopol. In manpower Ukraine has the advantage, yet in artillery and arms Russia enjoys still the advantage. However that it articles it might have sustained losses of nearly 100 000 are breathtaking and show the urgent need to send the newly mobilized forces immediately (and prematurely) to the front). Of course such an attack would need huge combined arms maneuvering, which might be too much for the Ukrainians to do.
Quoting Tzeentch
Everything written or documented is against this.
There's only few bridges over the Dniepr and they are quite in reach of HIMARS rockets. You are simply wrong assuming Russian didn't have huge difficulties. In WW2 or even as late as in the Vietnam War a bridge as a target was very tricky. It isn't now with modern precision guided weapons.
And Ukraine has also by Russian sources used these precision guided weapons to destroy bridges:
"The odd" is that you don't give up ground for free when at war. Period.
You do if you think you can't hold it.
This would have never been done under regular war-time circumstances, which is why I suspect things have changed, likely deals have been made.
Nov 10, 2022
[tweet]https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1590762910758100992[/tweet]
Nov 12, 2022
[tweet]https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1591488080518975488[/tweet]
Nov 13, 2022
[tweet]https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1591753915867054081[/tweet]
Unlikely that the war will stop soon. The Russians were simply unable to hold Kherson and afraid of losing many men for nothing in that battle, so they ran away, leaving a lot of material behind. Nothing unusual here, except the fear of massive casualties is growing anong the Russian leadership, which is something new I think, perhaps because of the loss of thousands of mobilised men in the past few days in the eastern front and the ensuing scandals in the rear.
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
The Russians surely didn't give ground for free. They avoided a possible encirclement of their forces. There's nothing odd at that. Remember that the fighting at Kherson has gone since the summer in earnest. So holding the defensive line for months isn't "giving up ground for free".
Those forces are simply crucial for it because the Russian ground forces, which never were so large to begin with, and Russia has taken serious losses. Ukraine has more men now on the field than Russia basically. Russia had tried to create a small professional army and wasn't thinking mobilizing a far larger force, hence all the confusion in Putin's mobilization, which had to be ended because there simply weren't the resources.
Ukraine on the other hand had used the last eight years to fight this kind of war.
Russians need that artillery firepower, which itself needs a huge logistical tail. If those supply lines are cut, there's no firepower once the rounds you have next to the gun or rocket launcher have been fired.
Besides, notice how cautiously Ukrainian forces closed into Kherson, you didn't see columns of Ukrainian tanks rumbling into the city. Those would be a lucrative target for Russian artillery.
:up: :100:
What makes you think so?
US and Soviets had also deterrence means that Ukraine doesn't have though.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/15/7376378/
Russia is escalating this war however much it needs, and will continue to do so up until the point of nuclear war. There's no country in the West that is willing to go that far in their support of Ukraine.
However unjust it might be, Russia is going to get what it wants, and the only variable is how much of Ukraine will be destroyed in the process.
Does Russia want Kherson?
Maybe Kherson is not as high priority as land access to Crimea, yet it has its strategic importance (i.e. securing freshwater canals to Crimea).
Nevertheless there are demographic and economic reasons why giving up on those areas would hurt Ukraine badly:
@Tzeentch is unable to imagine a world where brutal dictators don't win.
Xi nixed the nuclear option.
Such a statement is meaningless, because Russia isn't seriously considering the use of nuclear weapons yet. If, after further escalation / mobilization by Russia NATO chooses to intervene with boots on the ground, nuclear weapons use will definitely be on the table, and what China thinks of it won't play a role anymore at that point.
Quoting Olivier5
I just don't look at the world with rose-tinted glasses where the "good guys" always win. That's not how the world works, and no amount of cheerleading and/or copium in this thread is going to change that.
Quoting China’s Xi warns Putin not to use nuclear arms in Ukraine · Stuart Lau · POLITICO · Nov 4, 2022
I'm guessing the Taiwan situation plays a role.
Quoting Li Keqiang
Quoting Olaf Scholz
Yaay :up:
Russia launches heavy air strikes across Ukraine as G20 leaders meet
[sup]— Wilhelmine Preussen; POLITICO; Nov 15, 2022[/sup]
On and on they go, bombing destroying ... Apparently, they're not expecting to pay repairs. I'd hold them to that, though. The latest conditions from the Ukrainians ( :up:, Nov 15, 2022) don't mention that, not directly anyway.
Of course you do. It's just that your rose-tinted glasses are Russian made, and so are your 'good guys'.
Accusations of partisanship is all you have left?
Got any more copium for us? :rofl:
It's a fact, not an accusation. Your interpretation of anything happening in Ukraine is systematically viewed through a pro-russian bias. So you are "wearing rose-tinted glasses" in the sense that you are interpreting data through a strong pro-Russian bias. That is why the battle for Kiev, seen by everyone else as a Russian defeat, is interpreted by you as a mere "message" sent by the Russian monarch to the Ukrainian government. This is why you must interpret the retreat from Kherson as the result if some sort of occult deal, rather than the Russians fleeing. And that is why you can write things as improbable as this:
Quoting Tzeentch
Let us reconvene in a month, and see how that particular prediction panned out. Although you can probably find a way to present any development as a loss for Ukraine.
I believe you're misdiagnosing the situation.
I don't know. I think the US and China are more economically integrated than the US and Russia were. There are good reasons on both sides for peaceful negotiations about Taiwan.
https://www.dw.com/en/russian-missiles-cross-into-nato-member-poland-report/a-63770954
shit hitting the fan?
Shit tried to hit the fan and missed. Gonna be interesting to see if Nato will use this to pressure Russia based on article 5.
Dejavu...
Do you remember:
The Russian lines haven't collapsed, Putin hasn't been overthrown. The Russian economy hasn't collapsed, etc. etc.
All the propaganda nonsense that has been repeated ad nauseum and never happened.
Your accusations of partisanship at my address is projection of the highest degree. You're parroting western propaganda, and wish to frame every happening as a defeat for Russia. That's why you're so defensive when someone voices a different opinion.
Sorry to give you a dose of reality every once in a while. Cozy delusions don't serve anyone.
You haven't the faintest idea of what I write about or think of this war.
?
Russia, or Putin and the five men or so who decided to escalate this to an all out war, didn't get what they wanted. That was basically shown in the first 24 hours of the attack: Ukrainians fought back, Zelensky didn't evacuate himself like the Afghan President.
Russia had to withdraw from the Kiev region, from Kharkivregion, from Kherson (which it reached basically in the first days of this campaign). When the Ukrainians hit the weakest point in the northeast of the front, Russian forces there were routed. This is not some propaganda, which you think it is. Russia is really facing huge problems.
Yet you think of the Russian Army as some kind of unstoppable Juggernaut that has simply so much arsenal and men to mobilize that only when "it gets it act together", the Ukrainians will be destroyed. Russia isn't the Soviet Union. Or then perhaps you assume Putin could just use nuclear weapons ...as if that would be the solution. Or then you assume everything is just Western propaganda. It isn't. Follow then the Russian side as they aren't either happy how the war is going.
The only thing Russia has a lot is it's famous artillery. Hence Russians can lob ordinary shells for a long time at the Ukrainians.
Ukraine has only 16 HIMARS -systems (in comparison: during the Gulf War US and UK had over 250 MLRS-systems, which packed a bigger punch than the HIMARS) for destroying the thousands of artillery pieces. Hence that isn't going to happen quickly.
Cool heads must prevail.
Quoting Manuel
I say just take the wretched bombs out already, aggressively, throughout, whether it takes lots or more or special or expensive tech or not.
They've been wreaking destruction for a long time and it's apparently spilling over.
It's not like shooting them down is going to kill anyone, at least that's very unlikely, rather the opposite.
Yep, keep heads cool, NATO shouldn't just retaliate.
It is relevant to any deal because the annexations make the terms of any compromise to be about how much territory Russia is willing to cede to Ukraine to stop the war. The present efforts by Ukraine to recover territory are, by the measure of Russian law, an invasion of the Federation, just as much as if that effort were directed toward Belgorod, Rostov-on-Don, or even Moscow. Any realistic negotiation will have to address this conflict between current Russian law and the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine.
Outside of that issue are the other oblasts the invasion has attempted to remodel. The Russians were unable to take Kiev or Odesa. The Ukrainian state was not accepted as a legitimate governance of any of the territory up to the western borders. Having gone this far resisting the Russians, it would be ridiculous for the Ukrainians to let this condition continue.
That is why any possible agreement has to start with recognizing a Ukraine that is something more than a tool of foreign powers. A place where Russia does not have the right to remodel the government to its liking.
Perhaps a cease fire is possible in the conditions you imagine. But if it would not resolve the conflict. It woulld not provide the foundation to unwind the sanctions or seek repatriation of deported people The offer, as you described it:
"We don't recognize your right to rule over Donbas, but we will withdraw our forces from there if you stop shelling us"
is so uncharacteristic of the way the Putin regime speaks that it is difficult for me to entertain the thought experiment.
Resources free for the grabbing and no Ukrainians in the way.
Would also give them a way to get away from it all.
How Putin prepared for sanctions with tonnes of African gold
[sup]— Tom Collins · The Telegraph · Mar 3, 2022[/sup]
Will Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Impact the Central African Republic?
[sup]— Nosmot Gbadamosi · Foreign Policy · Apr 6, 2022[/sup]
Analysis: The curious case of Russia in Central African Republic
[sup]— Bram Posthumus · Al Jazeera · May 20, 2022[/sup]
Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war effort in Ukraine
[sup]— CNN · Jul 29, 2022[/sup]
Leader of Central African Republic tells Putin he intends to attend Russia-Africa summit
[sup]— TASS · Nov 11, 2022[/sup]
Vladimir Putin Stashes Billions In Central Africa In Preparation To Flee Moscow In Case Of Emergency 'Evacuation' | Via MSN
[sup]— Haley Gunn · RadarOnline · Nov 15, 2022[/sup]
For that last article, it seems unlikely (to me) that Putin et al think they'd be left alone in Africa.
News and a bit of fake news? Don't know.
Makes for a cool story, though.
Retaliate against whom, anyway? There's an assumption these were fired by Russia but latest news is this is unlikely given the trajectory. We need to wait to understand what happened. If it wasn't the Russians though... that's going to complicate matters. But I'd rather not speculate at this point.
And cooler heads seem to have prevailed.
First, do you see thousands, if not tens of thousands, of stuck or captured Russian troops?
This was the scenario under discussion at the time. Ukraine had launched an offensive with this aim of taking Kherson by force and encircling Russian troops in and around Kherson.
That would have been "intensely embarrassing".
But that didn't happen. Russia left Kherson, which I have since described as "embarrassing" (compared to the "intensely embarrassing" worse scenario of being routed and encircled).
So yes, a sign of a "winning" army is that Ukraine's offensive operation succeeded. It did not. The goal of that operation was to take Kherson by force, which Ukrainian forces were unable to do (they did not launch their operation and "win").
Russian forces withdrawing from Kherson is embarrassing, but this was not Russian lines collapsing, being routed, thousands of troops surrounded and captured, break down of command and control and the whole operation in disarray, people demanding Putin's head for getting their boyz stuck in Kherson etc. (that was the scenario under discussion then, which is not the current scenario.)
What has occurred is not some catastrophe for Russia, but one step in a war of attrition. Ukraine has been attritting Russian held territory but at significant cost of men and material (at least people seem to agree on the point Ukrainian losses have been much higher in these recent offensives).
So, to evaluate the current stage of the war we'd need to know exact losses on each side, which we don't.
The second thing we'd need to know is the West's appetite to pour in more arms. This we also don't know.
Russia's plan was clearly to get to winter and see the effect of the gas situation, and Ukraine's plan was large scale brilliant operational success, routing the Russians and taking large amounts of territory with sustainable losses.
Both sides have accomplished some of their strategy. Ukraine has made advances and maybe losses are sustainable if the West replaces everything, while Russia has gotten to winter by simply withdrawing from weak points.
Yes, absolutely. All the more pertinent when set against this talk of 'requirements' which must apparently be in place for a negotiation to be possible. As far as I can see there are no requirements at all. As you say, a party might enter a negotiation for all sorts of reasons and a second party might agree to those terms (or merely appear to agree) for a completely different set of reasons.
There's literally nothing stopping two countries coming to any kind of agreement they each consider to be in their immediate best interest. The idea that some kind of ideological hurdle regarding the definition of statehood prevents a party from making an agreement is frankly silly.
But why would Russia need to negotiate to stop the war? It doesn't make any sense. If Russia could have staked a claim to those territories merely by negotiation, then it would have done so. IT has no leverage at all other than war, that's why it went to war. A negotiation is an exchange of promises, with each party feeling that their promises are worth the assurances they get in return.
So in your scenario, Ukraine are 'winning', Russia want to stop the war because they're 'losing'. So Russia's promise would be what? "We'll stop shelling you if you let us keep Donbas"? That's not going to work, because in your scenario, Russia were going to stop shelling Ukraine soon anyway. What are Russia going to offer in this scenario which might make Ukraine inclined to give up Donbas?
Alternatively, Russia are 'winning', they can now claim "We'll stop shelling you if you let us keep Donbas" and Ukraine might well accept that offer (maybe with a counter offer like "OK, but only if you pay for repair in Kiev"). But to make this offer, Russia don't need to say anything at all about Ukraine's legitimacy as a nation. It's irrelevant. The deal is about which government makes laws where and what each government is going to tell their armies to do.
Quoting Paine
It's ridiculous to save thousands of lives?
Quoting Paine
That doesn't follow at all. An agreement merely has to declare a promise not to attack said region. It doesn't have to say anything about its legitimate right to be there.
Shooting them down literally did kill someone (two someone's). That's the entire point.
You are just underlining my point that agreements are carried out in international relations not because of any sort of guarantee or legal system that would enforce those agreements, but because you think the other party's interest is to carry out the agreement, even without any or minimal trust.
For example, both the US and Soviet Union recognised it was not in their own self interest to have a nuclear war by accident, and that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on each side was creating this risk.
So, even without any trust, both sides were able to "trust enough" that the other party saw it was in their own interest to abide by various nuclear control and proliferation treatise.
To tip the balance of the "assumption scales" both sides allowed fly over inspections of their territory.
Quoting neomac
This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached. However, nothing kept each side in these agreements other than their own interest.
And this basic situation in international relations doesn't really change except in the direction of the more powerful party having zero consequences of breaking the agreement and the weaker party accepting the deal with zero belief the stronger party is forced somehow to abide by it, but because they have no other choice.
What matters is actual leverage in international relations.
For example, Japan had zero guarantee that the US wouldn't just arrest the emperor and execute him after accepting the conditional surrender, and largely Japan, being in the weak position at that point, had no choice. Nevertheless, executing the Emperor may create some endless Japanese insurgency, so even in totally losing the war the Japanese high command still had the leverage that their emperor (what they cared about in the surrender terms) was useful for an orderly transition, which presumably was in the US interest (seeing as the conflict with the Soviet Union is around the corner); which may seem like common sense now, but it is not some obvious thing as "holding the Emperor to account for Pearl Harbour and other war crimes" could be a good sell for the domestically, and you may calculate there will not be an insurgency (out with the old boss, in with the new, for the Japanese psychology). Point being, whatever the relative strength between parties in international agreements, there is no legal guarantee of any kind ever, but one must simply genuinely assume the other party intends to follow the agreement for their own reasons, has no choice, or then it is part of one's own intricate deceptive plan (as, likewise, neither the other party nor yourself need follow the agreement).
Now, if you have zero leverage then all you can do is make suggestions and argue what you want somehow also benefits the stronger party that has all the leverage.
If you do have leverage, then it would be this leverage that you'd be using to make clear it is in the best interest of the other party to follow the agreement.
But the idea that guarantees are needed to enter into an international agreement is just a high school level and completely ignorant understanding of international relations. There is never any guarantees. There's no guarantee anyone in normal life follows an agreement, only that there is a far stronger party that can be appealed to implementing or compensating the breach by force, aka. the state, but there is nothing that guarantees the state to intervene in your issue (due to not recognising an agreement it cares about, inefficiency, corruption or just not feeling like it).
Well Russia are saying it isn't them and Ukraine are saying it's a Russian conspiracy to even say it was Ukraine. So we're left with no good options.
If it was Russia (or people believe it was), then they've now attacked NATO, it's basically World War Three.
If it was Ukraine (but Ukraine deny it - rather than say "sorry, accident" - and continue to blame Russia), then Ukraine have deliberately fired into a NATO country to try and drag them into their war with Russia. Ukraine loses it's Golden Boy status and the arms supply, which was getting less and less secure in the long term dries up. Ukrainians have to fight an even longer, more drawn out war, or surrender.
If it was a third party, then terrorists have already got hold of some of the shitload of untraceable weapons now on the black market in Ukraine and are using them to provoke international conflict.
Either way...
The only thing to add to your analysis is that the US will choose the interpretation that fits their existing policy choice.
If they want to escalate with Russia they'll blame it squarely on Russia, claim they have the Radar proof, even if they have zero proof or even if they are sitting on proof it was Ukraine.
If they want to basically exit the war they'll blame it on Ukraine.
If they want to make the situation even more confusing for some reason, they'll blame it on terrorists.
If they want to keep the current situation, they'll just never blame anyone and it will stay "one of those things", maybe just say it was certainly an accident wherever the missiles came from.
What actually happened is of secondary importance in these sorts of small and ambiguous events, that can be spun in different directions and no one really knows for sure anything anyways (and if they do they can't prove it in a way that can't be denied).
Yes, this will be a litmus test for when the US plans to hang Ukraine out to dry like they did with Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan once they've milked the situation for all they think they can get out of it.
What's different this time is that I don't think anyone planned for the huge multiplier effect of social media. Governments and corporations only have to seed social media with the germ of idea now and it will, virtually free of charge, multiply and foment into two warring camps, one of which can then be declared 'misinformation', and voila - you have ready-made virtually fanatical support for whatever you wanted to do.
That's a weapon they've not had before.
Basically both sides are simply forced to make agreements. And this is with this war in Ukraine too.
Negotiations will be successful if both sides, Putin and the Ukrainians, have no option to continue the war or continuing would be a very bad decision. Hence very likely the war will continue.
Quoting Isaac
Again the typical anti-American view: Ukraine and the Ukrainians have no agency in this fight. After all, according to Isaac, why should Ukrainians even defend their country? Here's what I'm talking about. @Isaac's thinking is clearly showed in this quote from him months ago:
Quoting Isaac
Hence to Isaac, it doesn't matter at all to Ukraine and the Ukrainians if they are in control of their own country or under Putin's de-nazification program. All the killings, the forced evictions, the fake referendums and the Russification measures in the occupied territories are totally meaningless for Isaac. Because all that doesn't matter to Isaac. Perhaps it doesn't matter because it's not done by the Americans (and then it would matter a lot to Isaac). Yet it does matter to Ukrainians and hence Isaac's comments should be left to their own level.
LOL... It did succeed in recapturing Kherson. :-)
Was I talking about that? Or was I talking about what I literally stated: routing the Russians and encircling them in and around Kherson.
Ukraine launches an offensive: if they were simply better and stronger than the Russians, then that offensive would have worked without the Russians being able to hold any lines.
The current scenario of the Russians withdrawing I literally describe as "embarrassing", but obviously not as bad as losing on the field, positions overrun and thousands or tens of thousands of troops encircled.
The current situation is not a clear sign of Ukraine being able to beat the Russians in the field wherever and whenever they want and on a obvious path to "victory". War is far from over and far from having any obvious outcome.
No. No one is forced to make agreements.
Even if a party can't possibly win, even then sometimes a party will not surrender and the other party does what they want by force without any agreement at any point about it.
Quoting ssu
In no way true. There is always the option to keep fighting, even in a hopeless military situation (see: Nazi's sending children to fight) and just having all your positions overrun and your high command captured and / or run away.
Certainly parties enter agreements because they think it's a good idea, but no one's ever forced to. The whole idea of an agreement is what you are doing willingly and are not forced to do. When police arrest someone we don't call that an "agreement".
Parties enter agreements for all sorts of reasons, that the results are "guaranteed" in some sense of certainty is never one of them. If a company "guarantees" something, they may still go bankrupt and be unable to actually fulfil their promise, if you go get that promise insured ahead of time for this exact scenario, the insurer may go bankrupt or fight it in court and win.
This whole idea of only entering an agreement if the results are guaranteed is not how any agreement works, and as we increase in the power of the parties involved, is less and less remotely possible to try to approximate. Whenever we think an agreement is somewhat certain, it's only because there's a third far more powerful party (the state) that we think will act on our behalf (that the agreement is actually an agreement with the state to enforce it somehow, and not something the state doesn't care about such as an informal promise, unprovable promise, or a promise of love or anything else the state doesn't concern itself with); however, nothing actually guarantees the state will do so, it is purely an inference of the state doing so in the past for similar things, but even then any number of things can go wrong in our quest for legal restitution (you may not have the money for a lawsuit, your lawyer maybe incompetent, the judge maybe corrupt; and what "should happen" is not what actually happens).
You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue.
Quoting boethius
My impression is that you have no clue what you are talking about:
First, the deterrence means was not a pre-condition of the agreement but what the agreement was about (we both have too much deterrence to our mutual detriment).
However, the US and the Soviet Union could have entered into agreements that one or both pull out of the very next day; the situation would have then just stayed the same as before the agreement, no immediate negative consequences to a party violating, certainly nothing "forcing" them to stay in the agreement.
That Ukraine has no nuclear deterrence just means that it needs to consider the fact that Russia does.
If you feel it's "unfair" that stronger parties have more influence over events than weaker parties, I don't know what to say other than welcome to the real world.
If you're complaint is just that any deal Russia signs they can more easily break than Ukraine and that's "unfair" to Ukraine because they are the weaker party and less able to do anything about breaches to the agreement, then to make the situation "fair" you'd need a more powerful party than Russia to keep them to their word. Which is exactly what Ukraine is arguing in that the US would need to guarantee the agreement.
But, ok, the question then comes up of what would actually make the US enforce the agreement? Especially if doing so risks nuclear confrontation with Russia they have zero rational reason to risk that for the perceived benefit of Ukraine (risking nuclear war doesn't necessarily benefit Ukraine in any net-present-value calculation of any plausible metric of human welfare, but let's assume it does for the sake of argument).
Answer is nothing. Russia's promises can be empty and the US promise of "making Russia" do something can be equally empty.
What Ukraine is discovering is simply the reasoning behind why weaker states generally try to deal with stronger states diplomatically (accepting a worse negotiating position and accepting the stronger state can anyways more easily break whatever agreement is reached than themselves) rather than pick a fight with a stronger state on the basis of nationalist jingoism.
Ukraine's position now is basically "we'll start acting rationally if the world is changed to suit our irrational desires".
Yeah, looks that way.
You literally cite exactly what I describe:
Key words:
Quoting neomac
International agreements are all voluntary.
And so, a "guarantee" is likewise a voluntary thing ... and therefore not any sort of actual guarantee. These sorts of words in these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental. US can guarantee whatever it wants, doesn't mean it's going to do that.
Now, if your point is just that Ukraine would feel better if this sort of language is in the agreement and adding this language does place a bit of "prestige stakes" for the US, sure, but that hasn't been what's being discussed. The talk of guarantees has been some sort of actual guarantee, like US using nuclear weapons.
Quoting neomac
Because Russia knows:
A. It will be just feel good language and not the US nuking Russia if for some reason the agreement isn't kept.
B. Any economic leverage as a substitute consequence would require the West first scaling back the economic leverage its applied so far, which is basically a maximum of what it can reasonably do.
B. The West offering security guarantees means that they are at the negotiating table and a deal can be worked out with who actually matters in the situation, because, first it's NATO, not Ukraine, that is the more important party to the conflict (Ukraine being a complete military dependency at this point, just under a logo of alleged freedom), and, second, the following statement:
Quoting neomac
Is completely false, unless you're just repeating what I stated and what you claim to have issue with.
International law is not "law" (in the sense of law within states) and "legal framework" is not a "legal system" (in the sense of legal system within states). Same language maybe used, but referencing completely different things.
Actual law references the state's apparatus to enforce said law. "International law" references:
Quoting neomac
Or then a war if that doesn't happen and bygones can't be bygones about whatever the dispute is about.
If the party has zero intention to carry out the agreement, then it helps the deception to be all legal and shit.
Yes, they avoided total humiliation. Most importantly, they saved a lot of Russian and Ukrainian lives by deciding to withdraw from a position they were unable to hold. So they lived to fight another day, and Ukrainians could liberate Kherson at minimal cost.
I believe that the massive casualties among newly mobilized men incurred in the east over the past few weeks have taken a toll: all these wives protesting that their husbands are treated as cannon fodder and holding government to account can't be good politically... So it seems to me that the mobilisation reduced Russian appetite for wasteful death. That's a positive.
Then we agree, this is exactly what I describe: a "bad thing" but not some total disaster and strong signal Russia's military just can't compete with Ukrainian military and the current trajectory is towards total defeat in Ukraine.
Quoting Olivier5
In a war of attrition bad things are happening to both sides. There is no question bad things are happening to Russians; likewise, there is no question bad things are happening to Ukrainians.
In terms of projecting "who's winning" it's largely a question of how much badness each side can tolerate. Between the fog of war and disinformation and propaganda, unless a side start suffering clear "total humiliation", then it's just not really clear what the breaking point for each side is, and how close we are to each.
To say "Russia can't continue like this" is only meaningful if it comes with the argument "Ukraine can continue for longer" which is only meaningful if that comes with the argument "the West will cover the bill for however long that is".
The signal is there alright: they were forced to withdraw from what their lord Putin sees as Russian territory. That signal was well received in Ukraine, given all the celebrations, and it was also received in Russia, I would think, though less well given all the complaints and arguments. The Russians are losing ground, period. You are welcome to convince yourself otherwise, but it's a fact.
Better stop shooting down missiles and kamikaze drones then
The signal is not there.
Quoting Olivier5
At what cost?
I've pointed out the obvious now several times: what actually matters is whether these territory gains are sustainable for the Ukrainians or not? because if they are not sustainable then they are not the first steps of defeating the Russians but, rather, exhausting force capability which can be easily counter-productive and the territory simply re-lost in Russian offensives.
The meaningful question is that after these offensives by Ukraine are they in a stronger position or not?
Are the losses worth the gains?
The next meaningful question, would be even assuming Ukraine has increased their relative strength ... is that "strong enough" to achieve their objectives through force?
Or ...
Quoting New York Times
Which is another way of saying the losses aren't sustainable and so Ukraine should seek a diplomatic resolution to the war using the leverage they currently have (and, the implication being, won't get any better).
Again that's not what I claimed. I didn't talk about the content of the agreement. Read carefully: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue
Quoting boethius
If the West is involved in this war there is a reason and if they want to weigh in about this agreement at the expense of Russia, Russia must deal with it, even if Russia thinks it's "unfair" to them.
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
You are just reinforcing my impression that you have no clue what you are talking about. The Western involvement in the war in Ukraine is not for Ukraine, it's for the West. If a hegemonic power perceives a non-negligible threat to its hegemony, it will react accordingly. Russia is expressly framing this war as a struggle for the World Order at the expense of the Western/US hegemony. That's why Russia must now suffer the consequences.
Quoting boethius
What looks ornamental to me is your latest contributions to this thread. Money, law, language are based on voluntary accepted conventions. So what?
Quoting boethius
So what? State powers (and even criminal organizations) ground their power not just in brute force but also in consensus and reputation relative to their competitors and among competitors&allies for their own selfish interest!
Quoting boethius
Dude, it's not up to you to determine how these security guarantees are implemented. The security guarantees do not need to consist in the US swearing on their mother's head that they are going to nuclear bomb Putin's ass if he defects the agreement and act accordingly. It could simply require the forms and degree of military cooperation between Ukraine and its guarantors.
Quoting boethius
You are claiming that "these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental". I claim that this claim of yours show "completely ignorant understanding of international relations". International law has its use (addressing coordination issues) and can help in increasing transparency and trust. For that reason, rational political agents are engaging in it.
Quoting boethius
I'm talking about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law
So if you have a problem with the standard usage of the term "international law", I don't care.
Quoting boethius
Say the three wise monkeys... :-)
The precondition of any agreement is that the parties involved have some reason to pursue an agreement. Having nuclear weapons is not a "pre-condition" for entering that "kind of an agreement".
Lot's of non-nuclear powers have entered the same non-proliferation agreements ... without having nuclear weapons.
What you are saying is both meaningless and false.
The only "precondition" to negotiating any agreement is being able to communicate. Just declaring preconditions is just a way of saying you won't negotiate, or then because you think the other party will give you concessions for free for some reason.
Quoting neomac
This is what Russia wants: Negotiate with the West, the counter-party with the actual leverage (the weapons, the money, the economic sanctions).
Quoting neomac
Thanks for agreeing that Ukraine will not and cannot get any sort of guarantee from the US, or anyone else, in the "sense of certainty". I go on to describe that adding such language does create prestige states, that make matter or not.
Quoting neomac
Again, if Ukraine signs, their guarantors sign, and then the "guarantors" don't do what they guaranteed, or did it in a bad faith way that is not fit for purpose. Is this a guarantee?
There are two meanings to guarantee commonly used: certainty (I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow) and a promise that is in no way certain (satisfaction guaranteed!). Now, the talk of US nuking Russia or doing something else, if they don't abide by the agreement or reinvade or whatever, if meant as a guarantee in the second sense (a promise that maybe kept, maybe not, the word "guarantee" just being an expression of confidence by a party that could be trying to deceive you), I have no issue. However, if people want to be able to actually visualise how Ukraine could be certain the agreement would be followed, and what the guarantee is in this sense, then we definitely seem to agree that there is no such guarantee.
Now, if such wording is useful diplomatically and adds some prestige reasons as additional motivation for parties to ensure the agreement happens, sure, have at it, add the word guarantee and "guarantor" after every sentence.
Quoting neomac
No, I said the word "guarantee" is purely ornamental.
Saying "the parties will do A, B, C" is exactly the same as saying "the parties will guarantee A, B and C" except for the prestige points.
The agreement themselves are useful and meaningful (otherwise no one would ever make one), they are just not "guaranteed" in any sense of certainty (which you seem to agree with).
For example, the EU exists based on a giant pile of international agreements, premised on the idea of mutual benefit to the parties involved (that they want to be "in" and want to follow what's "agreed", overall), but, as the UK recently demonstrated, any party to these agreements can nope out of at anytime.
Quoting neomac
I explained how a "guarantee" (in the sense of some certainty Russia won't break the agreement) is impossible to implement, and such a reason is not, and never is, a reason to enter an international agreement (or any agreement for that matter).
You then say I don't know what I'm talking about and cite "international law" as a "voluntary" thing.
I say ... yeah, that's what it is, all these international agreements are voluntary, and likewise any agreement between Ukraine and Russian and anyone else. I point out your citation of international law as:
Quoting neomac
Is exactly what I'm describing to explain why "guarantee" in such agreements would be ornamental and not representing something actually certain.
I point our your explanation is the same as mine (Ukraine will never get any sort of guarantee from anyone, other than ornamental) ... and then you complain that I'm not using your definition of international law as entirely voluntary?
You agree that this situation is not anywhere close to being as bad as an actual military defeat in Kherson, positions overrun, lines routed, soldiers surrounded ... so how is the current situation a "strong signal" of military might?
Military might would be doing those things far more embarrassing to Putin. Or is your argument that Ukraine could have taken Kherson by force at anytime but not-doing-so was a 5-D chess move?
Because unless your saying not-taking-Kherson due to the Ukrainian offensives and just letting the Russians leave with all their soldiers, all the civilians that wanted to, and most of their equipment was a 5D Ukrainian chess move, the only signal we have is that Kherson was becoming more trouble than it was worth for Russia, in addition to avoiding the risk of the damn collapsing, so they left.
Maybe this allows Russia to consolidate forces and advance elsewhere. True, they no longer have this bridge head on the West of the Dnieper but they can invade from Bellarus anytime anyways.
And, just as continuously hitting the bridges across the Dnieper was a major problem for Russia, it stands to reason Russia can do the same to Ukraine in further fighting East of the Dnieper.
So, if Russia consolidates and launches their own successful offensives, the current embarrassment will quickly be forgotten and it was clearly a "smart move".
Likewise, if the Russian withdrawal from West of the Dnieper allows Ukraine to free up significant forces previously guarding any breakout operation there and continue sustainable territorial gains, then the Russian retreat was simply delaying the inevitable.
If you really think based on this withdrawal from Kherson we can deduce the "war is over" or the Ukrainians are clearly "winning", you simply live in wishful thinking land.
At the moment, the inference from the actual information available would be that neither side can currently make any decisive and sustained gains, so Russia is attempting to attrit the Ukrainian electricity grid and Western appetite to continue financing the war and deal with high energy prices.
That we're hearing all this talk of a "peace deal" and Zelensky focused on this subject, could be some 5-D move or then could be that it's clear to the West that Ukraine cannot "win", energy situation isn't good for them, and they want to wind down the war (whether Zelensky wants to or not, as he has no leverage with his "guarantors").
Agency entirely dependent on the weapons of others, isn't agency. And pointing out the influence the US has over this conflict is hardly anti-American, it's realistic.
Jeez. I'm glad I haven't been participating in this thread for a while. You guys are entrenched. It's like WWI all over again. Carry on!
Adhering to the "right" ideology, cheerleading for the "right" side, parroting the "right" narrative is all more important than acknowledging realities, even when the cost is prolonged war, human lives, etc.
That's why the more moderate voices in this thread are instantly met with hostility and branded as partisan, Russia sympathizers, etc. - because we do not adhere to the "right" narrative, and refuse to parrot its mantras.
The slightest hint of non-adherence is enough to invite hostility, because the cheerleaders realise how flimsy their views really are, and that they do not weather criticism very well.
There are those who are obviously emotionally invested in the idea of a powerful Russia, as a force of nature. Insinuations that it's just a kleptocratic regional power are taken as hostile language.
I think I understand that.
You're just proving my point here, buddy. :clap:
What point?
The Ukrainians forced the Russians to withdraw by cutting them from their supplies and by slowly grinding their defense lines. And they keep pushing; they won't stop at the river Dniepr.
In any case my point was simply to show that you have no intellectual honesty. A couple of months ago you said: Kherson is the litmus test for Ukraine's capacity to fight back Russia, and today you are saying something else altogether. You are a joke.
Nice self-criticism. Now do something about it.
I've never been hostile to anyone in this thread, but keep trying.
And yes, yours is exactly the behavior I am talking about.
If you're going to be man enough to dish it out, be prepared to receive.
What you perceive as an attack on your "partisanship" is simply me telling you a fact: that you have a pro-Russian bias, or preference, in this war. Facts do not attack anyone, so relax already.
"Careful reading of the passage is essential for proper understanding and answering correctly."
Let me make it even simpler for you: if Ukraine was to kick Russian forces out of its territory, would you be happy, or sad?
But be my guest. Wallow in ambiguity all you like, if you have something to hide to yourself.
Nothing in the quote you cited either latterly or formerly says anything about what may or may not matter to Ukrainians. I can't think why you'd imagine I even have an opinion on what matters to Ukrainians. I really don't give a fuck what matters to Ukrainians, why would I? I don't judge right and wrong by vote.
What I'm writing about is what I think is right based on my humanitarian principles. Which is all any of us can do in an ethical discussion. I don't think the Ukrainian government should be making decisions that cause more suffering, I couldn't care less if they have 'agency' or not.
Quoting ssu
The reason none of those matter is written in the fucking quote...
Quoting Isaac
...and no, the Ukrainian government doesn't get the right to commit more of it's people to death and misery just because it has 'agency'.
I think his position is pretty clear. He's saddened that Russia is struggling right now. *shrug*
I may have been inclined to disagree with this earlier, when it seemed there were two equally viable opinions and my main beef was that one of them was being branded pro-Putin without any justification. Now, however, as seems to be the way with these internet fads, it's starting to come unravelled and I think you're right. there's a desperate clinging to the narrative they felt they had some authority repeating (Washington-Post-and-New-York-Times-bestowed authority no less), but now even the likes of the those known warmongers are openly running articles about the risks of escalation, the need for diplomacy and the low chances of Ukraine winning back much more land.
The faddists become ever more desperate and start citing each other's tweets, having run out of any expert opinion at all, those all having jumped the sinking ship, having a little more foresight.
In a year's time they'll be back to Ukraine stories about growing Nazism, corruption and black market arms dealing, US stories about rampant militarism and lobbying powers, and they'll pretend they never thought otherwise, but they leave behind trails of people still vomiting up the previous stock narrative who aren't as fleet of opinion as the modern media.
None of the Russophiles want to come out and say it. I'm not sure why.
Yes. Since Poland are already talking of invoking Article 4, it's obvious to anyone not caught up in their naive Hollywood version of how wars go that a few missiles getting trough to Ukraine causes less death and destruction than shooting them down would if doing so triggers a NATO-Russia conflict.
So yes, Ukraine ought to be very very careful indeed with these weapons and may have to make some very difficult strategic decisions about the safety of their use.
One such very important strategic decision, for example, would be to not immediately claim it's a Russian conspiracy to even talk about the possibility that the missile came from Ukraine.
Russia:
Rest of the world:
(generally along the lines of...) "We'll see after the investigation, our condolences to Poland"
Ukraine:
It's not a good look for a country desperately trying to convince the world that it doesn't engage in the same level of knee-jerk instant-denial propaganda that Russia does.
They still have decisions to make, that's what agents do.
Putin's decisions, on the other hand, are kind of a prerequisite here, "influence" being invasion bombing annexations re-culturation whatever, it's not like others can just choose for those things to not go on.
As it stands, the US is definitely also an influence, and NATO, the EU, China (yaay), ...
I guess what's been seen here and there, is that these things have been used as a springboard for haters, US-haters especially, and that's when they blame the US for all, the invasion bombing annexations re-culturation whatever (the constellations?), a diversion often enough playing right into Putin's hands (and their propaganda) by the way. :down: The US ain't the center of the world.
Meanwhile ...
Power outages in Moldova after Russian strikes in Ukraine
[sup]— Cristian Jardan, Stephen McGrath · AP News · Nov 15, 2022[/sup]
Just cutting "successful" Russian bombing in half would help, taking out 92 of 100 better, ...
Cite a single commentator either here or in media who blames the US for all
They say hypocrisy is the homage of vice to virtue.
Just so delusional.
If parts of reality just don't happen to be "good" for Ukraine, pointing that out isn't being pro-Russian, it's just understanding reality.
I think @Tzeentch has said it best:
Quoting Tzeentch
But to give an example of this, Zelenskyites would definitely take issue with my sentence:
Quoting boethius
But this is just reality, simply what weaker states do.
For example, Finland has received praise upon praise for killing Russians in the Winter war.
However, not only did they "lose" the war, lose 20% of territory and need to pay reparations to the Soviet Union, but following exactly the common sense proscription for dealing with a more powerful neighbour was criticised by the West for decades! Literally named being nice and currying favour with the Soviet Union for the sake of not being invaded (again) after Finland and then expanded it to the entire concept.
Quoting Finlandization
Notice what no one named Finland after was fanatical uncompromising war, refusing to meet with the "war criminal" Stalin, etc.
Why? Because that didn't happen, and both before, during and after the war Finland tried to make common sense diplomatic decisions to avoid conflict taking into account the Soviet Union being more powerful than them.
[sup]— TASS · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
Suspected drone hits oil depot in Russia's Oryol, officials say
[sup]— Reuters · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
Hmm... Another stray? Or not.
Elsewhere ...
The Ukraine war in maps | Russia launches largest missile attack of the conflict against key infrastructure
[sup]— Javier Galán, Mariano Zafra · EL PAÍS · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
:fire:
What's the point of your post?
Why not post news snippets to news snippet aggregators on reddit or wherever?
If it ever becomes relevant to the discussion, you can then just link to your aggregated news snippets about it.
That is entirely correct, but not at issue. My point was rather that if parts of reality just don't happen to be "good" for Russia, pretending against all evidence that they are "good" for Russia is being pro-Russian,
What evidence?
You've resorted to citing yourselves now. Barely a shred of 'evidence' has been presented over the last dozen pages at least, just uninformed opinion.
Cite some of this 'evidence'.
The Russian retreat from Kherson.
And how's that evidence opposing @boethius's position?
The one you're arguing against, of course. The one you're suggesting 'all evidence' is against. The one which support of, against all this evidence, makes one pro-Russia.
Yep. So how is...
Quoting Olivier5
...evidence that Russia was forced to retreat from Kherson, as opposed to @Tzeentch's theory that they left in preparation for a peace deal?
You're citing the mere fact that they retreated, you've provided no evidence at all of why.
He's literally just called for a start to world war three on a whim
[tweet]https://twitter.com/anders_aslund/status/1592616431291535360[/tweet]
Fucking twat.
I cannot imagine that Russia would give up Kherson freely, and loudly announce it, since it goes against any principle of two nations being at war.
You have a tendency in misinterpret my posts, and falsely give them a "pro-Russian" twist, so you can then discredit them on the basis of being "pro-Russian" - everything to avoid having to deal with the logic of the argument.
They didn't. They were forced to give it up.
That's an easy one: there's no evidence of any peace deal, and the Russian general admitted on TV that they couldn't supply the troops on the right bank of the Dniepr and thus had to withdraw. So as far as the evidence goes, the retreat of Kherson was NOT the result of a secret peace deal but the result of months of fighting.
You said "all evidence" pointed toward some theory the opposite of which would require one to be pro-Russian to believe it. Lack of evidence either way is not "all evidence".
Quoting Olivier5
Yes. You missed the bit where the theory included Russian collusion.
Are we starting again?
What evidence do you have which proves the reasons for the Russian retreat are solely the strength of the Ukrainian advance, and could not be influenced by back door negotiations?
Yes, yes. The logistical situation and all that - the common military response would be to reduce the amount of troops occupying Kherson to a managable level without announcement, leaving only tripwire forces and artillery scouts, etc. to make the enemy guess and pay with indirect fires should they advance - urban areas are perfect for that.
Giving up ground for free with loud announcement is not a typical military action, regardless of what position these troops found themselves in, which is why it is likely the town was abandoned under loud announcement for other reasons - a deal potentially, which is given some credit due to Zelensky talking about "the end of the war" shortly after the retreat from Kherson, even though there's no reason to assume that the retreat from Kherson in any way signaled a retreat from the occupied territories.
I hope you'll agree that a complete collapse of the Russian lines is not in the cards any time soon, so why would he be saying this, if there wasn't some deal made?
Quoting Olivier5
Indulge us - what do you think I'm saying? :lol:
The theories don't interest me. Your attitude toward them does.
You're trying to deny a theory by presenting evidence to support an alternate one. It's obviously incoherent (unless the two theories are mutually exclusive), but this tactic has become more and more popular on social media lately.
I'll wait for @Tzeentch to correct me.
It's just far fetched that the Russians would divest themselves of their assets prior to official negotiations.
Quoting Tzeentch
I don't know.
Perhaps giving up Kherson, the potential springboard for future offensive operations towards Odessa, was a prerequisite to starting those negotiations.
Quoting frank
Well, then we have ourselves a mystery, and all I'm doing is trying to make sense of it, while accounting for those things that seem to make little sense.
I have nothing to correct, and your representation of my view is fair.
Good, glad I wasn't misrepresenting you too badly. Then @Olivier5's position becomes all the more bizarre. Your view is apparently rendered implausible merely by the existence of an alternative theory. Weird.
Well, you are not saying that the reasons for the Russian retreat are partly the strength of the Ukrainian advance, but could also be influenced by back door negotiations. Your stance is less half-assed than that. It is that the Russian decision to leave is primarily the result of a peace deal secretly in the making.
Lot's of non-nuclear powers have entered the same non-proliferation agreements ... without having nuclear weapons.
What you are saying is both meaningless and false.
The only "precondition" to negotiating any agreement is being able to communicate. Just declaring preconditions is just a way of saying you won't negotiate, or then because you think the other party will give you concessions for free for some reason.
[/quote]
Dude, for the third time, you are mistaken about what I claim. I didn’t write anywhere that nuclear weapons is a “precondition of any agreement”. Means of deterrence available to the US and the Soviet Union (i.e. the nuclear arsenal) during the Cold War were factors rationally taken into as incentives toward solving conflicts through relatively balanced agreements. Since Ukraine can not count on equivalent deterrence means, then Ukraine can not rationally pursue with Russia the kind of agreements that the US could rationally pursue with the Soviet Union. Yet the US/NATO may have a strong rational incentive to weigh in and back up Ukraine at the expense of Russia as long as Russia is perceived as a threat to the West. And by this way some “security guarantees” may be implemented e.g. to replace NATO membership.
Quoting boethius
Russia as a declared challenger of the Western-led world order wants to negotiate with the West in position of strength. US/NATO as the challenged power has a strong rational interest to the exact opposite.
Quoting boethius
Who is talking of “security guarantees” in terms of certainty? You didn’t quote anybody.
Quoting boethius
I don’t know who are the people you are referring to. We will see what security guarantees are going to be negotiated/implemented, if needed. From an international relation perspective, I find simply myopic to downplay the fact that States (like Russia and Ukraine) are seeking “security guarantees” just because such “guarantees” are not certain.
Quoting boethius
In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena.
You've got Zelensky negotiating from a position of power.
You literally stated nuclear weapons were the precondition for the US and Soviet Union entering various non-proliferation agreements:
Quoting neomac
Which was your example: "Ukraine doesn't have!" nuclear weapons.
But obviously even in your example nuclear weapons aren't a "pre-condition" (your exact words), because plenty of other non-nuclear states entered the same nuclear non-proliferation treatise.
It's late here, so I'll get to the rest of your comments tomorrow, but ... maybe spend that time to read your own words.
You literally state "this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue".
What was the "pre-condition"? "taking into account the deterrence means they both had".
Which is obviously contradicted by other non-nuclear states doing the same thing, so obviously nuclear weapons isn't a pre-condition for "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue", as other actors pursued the same agreements without having nuclear weapons.
Therefore, in the words of my sweet, innocent legal colleagues: Quod erat demonstrandum!
Who would be setting the terms has not been made clear in the proposal. If it is in line with the view that Ukraine is merely a proxy for foreign powers, Zelensky will have little to do with the actual deal. If the Ukrainian government does have some agency, despite their reliance upon foreign support, the deal would probably be something worked out between them as an approach to the Russians.
Whatever influence the Ukrainians may have in a conclusion of hostilities, they will need the foreign powers to see that the Russians honor their side of it. The removal of sanctions will probably be based upon demonstrations of good faith.
The idea the Russians conceded territory for the sake of a bargaining position certainly does not fit with any notion of Ukrainian agency. The missile attacks upon civilian targets immediately after the retreat solidify the Ukrainian commitment to further war.
Fierce offensives by the Russians are underway. Something more than some of them being saved from destruction is needed to signal a willingness to negotiate.
Right, and I took the case of the US and the Soviet Union both as a way to illustrate this general point, and to compare it to the hypothetical case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia.
Quoting boethius
You got it all wrong for the forth time despite all the clarifications I already provided to you!
Now I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).
I claimed that available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations. In the particular case of the US and Soviet Union joining the NPT (and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), they were factoring in the deterrence means available to them (i.e. nuclear weapons).
I also claimed that since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).
good luck with that!
What do you mean?
That Zelensky is making demands to start negotiations?
I don't see why that would be anything strange. As many as theorized, there's a good possibility Russia has reached its strategic goals (land access to Crimea) and if that is the case, they are likely looking to end the conflict sooner rather than later. Giving up Kherson may very well be the price.
Giving up the land bridge and Dombass would be more likely to work.
So you think the Soviet Union would have gone fine on with unlimited weapons armament during the Cold War. One fifth going to defense spending wouldn't be enough? No. And on the other hand the West, which just was putting 5% into defense spending, it wouldn't have been detrimental to brush off any kind of talk of arms reductions and spending on other issues? Usually leadership of a country is rational, at least about it's popularity and survival.
Quoting boethius
Not only you had a leadership that wanted Gotterdämmerung for Germany and Germans, but also because the Nazi government had no option. Remember Yalta. There was (luckily) the ability for separate peace for Finland, but that option wasn't open for Germany. Something that is a very good choice: if the allies would have stopped at the borders of Germany, it's likely that the Nazi regime would have survived and Germans wouldn't be such pacifists as they are now.
Quoting boethius
I think that we are just arguing about just when a country needs to do a decision and when not to. I would just emphasize that a country that has started a war has gone to the extreme and doesn't back out of it's decisions for minor inconveniences.
I disagree. Your attitude is Western hubris in short (assuming that Ukrainians wouldn't fight if it wasn't for the West). I think the Ukrainians would fight even if they didn't have the backing of the West. Or in such numbers.
First of all, Ukraine didn't collapse, it fought back. For Putin to succeed, he would have needed the Ukrainians to be as passive as the Czechs were in 1968. They were not. Hence the less than 240 000 or so invading force of Russia simply couldn't take out all of Ukraine and hold it. Likely the fighting would be going around Kiev, perhaps also Kharkov would have fallen and Ukraine wouldn't have made the gains as it did now. Ukrainians wouldn't be holding the initiative as now, that's for sure.
Weapons don't mean anything if there isn't the will to use them. And Ukraine still had a lot of weapons for an European country.
We surely have seen that.
And hence as you cannot comprehend them, your views aren't much worth of discussion. Just gaze at your own navel.
They might have fought and Ukraine would've been Russian in the first week. You seem to forget western support was there well before the war started.
(Btw, thanks for the Leopard 2 tanks and the MLRS systems you sold us.)
Interesting... Do facts interest you at all?
Or he just genuinely believes that the missile that crashed in Poland was not fired by Ukraine. It's not like the evidence is out there for everyone to see.
By forced I really mean forced, and not "have really good reasons".
I think the Germans had really good reasons to agree to a surrender anytime before sending literal children to go fight in the front lines, but precisely since they weren't forced to surrender until Berlin was overrun.
Which was exactly my point, you can just not agree to things even if the alternatives are worse.
Quoting ssu
Are you really arguing the Nazi's government had no other choice than to send children to fight in the front lines?
Obviously they could have surrendered when the war was clearly lost and the outcome of occupation unavoidable. That's not what they want, but when you can't stop your enemy that's what happens.
Quoting ssu
I'm not even sure what we're arguing about.
The others were arguing there are valid preconditions for negotiating (such as "trusting Putin" or NATO will "guarantee" the agreement ahead of time, or Putin must no longer be president of Russia, or Russia pulls all forces out of Ukraine etc.).
Of course, nothing stops a party from throwing down preconditions as a negotiating tactic, but it's absurd to say that is some actual barrier of some kind. Obviously you can always negotiate without preconditions and this is the vast majority of negotiations. Lawyers even have an expression "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed!" and variations on that.
This whole preconditions thing is that whenever Zelensky doesn't want to negotiate, instead of saying he could but he won't, he says there's some reason he can't negotiate or then simply won't negotiate until such-and-such. People can defend such things as "good diplomacy" or that Ukraine will "win" so don't need talks and can just troll the media or whatever, but the disagreement here is people defending these arguments at face value; that there really is reasonable preconditions required for peace talks.
You can always ask for conditions to be met, either as a good faith gesture or then as a way to not-talk, but it's absurd to say you really can't talk due to this or that, unless there's some sort of actual practical barrier; which is obviously almost never the case between states.
Talks of course may not succeed but clearly parties to a dispute can talk if they want and see if there's enough common ground to work out a deal.
The alternative to talks is more warfare. If you don't need a deal, but can get what you want by force, then you don't need talks.
But the contradiction Zelenskyites get into is when they argue Ukraine wants a peace deal but refuses to talk, and not-talking is justified even if they really do want a peace deal.
The only position that coheres with wanting a peace deal is wanting to talk and try to work out a peace deal. The only position that coheres with refusing to talk is not wanting a peace deal that can only be achieved through talks, and therefore more war (which can be a reasonable decision if you believe you will get what you want at the end of more fighting).
Inventing some obstacles to talks, that is obviously not there, is just bad faith and ridiculous to anyone familiar with talking.
https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-military-victory-unlikely-soon-top-us-general-says/6837655.html
What general point?
Having nuclear deterrence was not a "pre-condition" to entering non proliferation treatise, as countries with zero nuclear deterrence (including Ukraine) enter the same agreements.
There are lot's of reasons to sign a treaty with another country, but that they are somehow guaranteed to follow the treaty is not one of them.
Presumably an agreement is good for both parties (otherwise why would both parties agree to it?) and the reason to believe the counter party will follow the agreement is whatever reasons for them to be in the agreement in the first place are really there and persisting (at least long enough for it to be worth it for your own goals; for example the non-aggression pact between the Nazi's and the Soviet Union).
However, there is simply no system of "guaranteeing" any party will actually follow any agreement.
Quoting neomac
Please read.
There are two meanings to guarantee: certainty or then purely ornamental expression of confidence that is in no way certain.
If I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow or that we cannot time travel to stop the Ukraine war from happening, I truly believe that is certain and am using guarantee to express certainty. If I say I guarantee you'll have a great time at my party, that is obviously not certain and the word is purely ornamental; the meaning of the phrase "you'll have a great time at my party" doesn't really change if I add guarantee to it or not.
Likewise, if a company promises you something and doesn't deliver, you could sue them. Again, there would be little difference in such promises and their litigation with or without the word guarantee. The argument "aha! I said I would do it in the contract but I didn't guarantee it!" isn't a good legal argument. Words that emphasise but don't change meaning are ornamental in linguistics. Ornaments can still have consequences. For instance, if I say my promise is a "super duper, mega, no doubts, fantastico guarantee" and then don't deliver, judge will for sure not reward me for adding all these arguments to a promise, the basic legal decision would be about what the promise was and if I delivered it and what the liability is in the context. For embellishing my promise a judge may see it suitable to embellish the damages, but the decision would be about what was the promise, that I "super promised" doesn't really matter to the legal decision as such (did I promise, or didn't I, did I deliver or didn't I, was there good reasons for that, or not); a promise is a promise is a promise; adding "I guarantee it" to a promise doesn't change it's ontological or epistemological status.
In relations between states there is the additional problem that there are no judges that decide anything. Everything is "voluntary". So, in such a context, adding "guarantee" is even more ornamental than in private dealings, as you cannot even go to a judge and complain that this asshat not only promised and didn't deliver, but was an arrogant reckless idiot and claimed to be certain about it (so even more reason to not take mitigatory steps).
As I've described, the reason to assume other parties would follow the deal is not some legalistic reasoning that simply doesn't apply in a non-legal context, that the US "guarantees" something.
One maybe more or less confident a deal will be followed, but the evaluation has little to do with any legal wording or obligations (which simply don't exist in international relations).
The fact is that the US and Poland have both said conflicting things within their own nations so there's nothing conclusive at all about this. However, if it was Russia's, then Zelensky knows that it won't lead to an Article 5 consequence, because it's most likely a misfire, but still serious, which would result in an Article 4 event.
Such an outcome would drastically put pressure on Russia and could very well be a pressure point that leads to actual progress with Russia scaling down and retreating. Russia's answer to anyone who tells them to scale back and retreat has so far been a blunt "no" and there's nothing the world can do about it, but if they were responsible for an attack on a Nato nation, Nato could pressure Russia but "play the good guy" and say they won't escalate this if they don't need to, as long as Russia starts complying.
Such a thing could actually lead to real constructive peace talks since so far the problem with anyone suggesting peace talks, to this date, has been that they ignore the fact that Russia's "demands" in such peace talks have been "a total surrender of Ukraine".
It's irrational to think that this is a black-and-white scenario and that if some Russian just took a piss on the wrong side of the Polish border it would lead to Article 5. Maybe the ones thinking Nato is a movie villain warmongering organization believe this but it's not how things are.
Here: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.
Quoting boethius
If you think that's what I claimed. You are twice wrong (and for the fifth time!) as I explained here:
I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).
Quoting boethius
You forgot there are two meanings? Are you reading yourself? And neither Russia nor Ukraine would look for the kind of system of "guaranteeing" that you are imagining, of course. They are looking for the "security guarantees" that can be implemented.
Quoting boethius
Please read.
[i]In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena[/i].
Calling such "security guarantees" "ornamental" is a way to dismiss them which is unjustified from an international relations perspective (even if they are not certain). Your disquisition about the semantics of "guarantee" is irrelevant and embarrassingly clouding your reasoning about basic concepts of international relations. Suck it up and move on.
If Zelensky believes in good faith that the missile was sent by Russia, then he is not following a political line in saying so. He is just saying what he believes is the case.
Not everything Ukrainian is necessarily sinister, you know?
The probability of Kherson being liberated so soon was not very high either. The morale and readiness level of Russian troops is unknown but probably very low, and for all we know, the whole Russian war effort could crumble tomorrow. So I agree a quick ending is unlikely, but not impossible.
Obviously it's not a "necessary condition" (which would obviously be false statement as that would mean it would literally not be possible to sign such an agreement). Necessary conditions would be things like "existing" as some deal making entity, and also "able to communicate" in order to engage in said deal making.
However, the fact that non-nuclear states both can for pretty clear rational reasons (of making the world as a whole a safer place and being unable to compete in the nuclear game anyways) and actually do engage in non-nuclear proliferation treatise, often the exact same ones as the nuclear powers, is pretty clear indication that your idea of a "rational requirement" is also obviously false.
Which, again, is what you state:
Quoting neomac
Now, the meaning of this paragraph is clear, that you are arguing US and Soviet Union could enter these agreements somehow due to having nuclear weapons, a "pre-condition" (rational requirement if you want to change goal posts there), and you even specify "Ukraine doesn't have" ... what don't they have? The pre-condition, therefore Ukraine should not enter the same sorts of agreements.
Which links up with the fundamental issue under discussion, which is the level of certainty Zelensky should (or even can) have for signing a peace agreement. Zelensky has been demanding certainty (which is certainly rational to want) but phrasing things in absolute terms like "pre-condition" (you use this term because Zelensky uses this term), but obviously eventual certainty, guarantees, etc. are not preconditions to negotiate.
Of course, parties have reasons to agree or not.
If all you're saying is nuclear powers had reasons to signup to nuclear non-proliferation, and non-nuclear states had other reasons, obviously. Likewise, both the US and Soviet Union and other states would have their own evaluation of their confident other parties will follow those agreements, maybe try to find out about it to do something (such as the network of sensors and radiation testing to detect non-treaty nuclear tests) ... maybe try to break the agreements themselves.
All you're doing now is moving the goal posts from defending Zelensky's statements of "preconditions" (which simply don't exist, as you yourself note they are obviously not "necessary", which precondition would usually literally mean in that if a precondition wasn't necessary then obviously it's not a precondition) to removing all meaning from your original argument so as just to say "parties have their own reasons to agree to something", which is pretty common feature of agreeing to something.
There can be lot's of reasons to agree to something; one such reason is that you will lose the war anyways so there's no point continuing to fight, there's literally zero confidence the agreement will be followed but ... continued fighting no longer serves a purpose. In other words, the "rational requirement" of confidence a party will actually respect an agreement, can literally be zero but still rational to agree to.
For the sixth time, the general principle is the following: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.
I'm not relating states attitude toward agreements and negotiations to one specific type of deterrence.
What is rational is to reliably relate available means wrt desired goals. Any rational agent will take into consideration available means to sanction agreement defection. For example, for countries without nuclear bombs it could be to military ally with those compliant which have them and apply economic/diplomatic sanctions to the rogue countries.
Quoting boethius
I'm responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.
Quoting boethius
It isn't absolute, for 2 reasons: first it's not a necessary condition, and secondly, it's conditional on the rationality of the agent. Concerning Zelensky perspective I clarified my point: since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).
You didn't even quote who is understanding "security guarantees" in terms of certainty. So everything you said about it sounds like a strawman argument which you are idly looping over.
Looking forward to explaining all that to you for the 7th time, dude.
As you must know, some posters are more interested in spreading confusion and misunderstanding than in understanding anything.
That's in no way a "pre-conditon" in the sense Zelensky uses it, or the sense you clearly were using it.
Saying parties take information into account to make decisions ... is obvious.
The subject was if "preconditions" were reasonable, an example of a precondition mentioned by Zelensky and Zelenskyites here was "trusting Putin", I pointed out that's not a precondition to enter an agreement, parties (even states) that don't trust each other enter into agreements.
Your rebuttal to this was that US and Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and "Ukraine does not have!" (Exclamation mark!) That this was a "precondition" in your words. So clearly some condition that made it reasonable of US and Soviet Union that Ukraine doesn't have so doesn't make it reasonable ... otherwise you would have stated "well, of course it's a precondition for the US and Soviet Union, a condition Ukraine doesn't have, but of course Ukraine could enter those same agreements without the precondition I'm talking about, especially because Ukraine itself signed some of the same treatise vis-a-vis nuclear weapons" but by then maybe you'd perhaps even realise "hmm, I'm either not making any sense whatsoever or saying nothing at all, certainly not rebutting Boethius' point".
Now, you've moved the goal posts to from the nuclear weapons being a "precondition" to the nuclear weapons being a "rational requirement" to now just "taking into account".
Obviously "rational agents" take into account what other agents can and cannot do.
You are saying absolutely nothing other than people make decisions based on the information they have, sometimes rationally according to your standard of rationality you're invoking.
So, where is the debate on this topic: obviously the "precondition" of Zelensky isn't some actual precondition that would prevent him from talking or agreeing to something, and if it's a "rational requirement" that would depend on a lot of things (such as if he can just go ahead and "defeat" the Russians or not, if the Russians can defeat him, if fighting for time or a better negotiation position later is worth the lives lost or not, if the Russian economy will collapse and Putin is ousted from power one way or another; in brief everything we've been discussing this entire thread).
Obviously decisions would be based on evaluating the situation and what one believes about the future, what people believe about intentions of people involved, trust and so on.
What Zelensky has been trying to argue is there is some basic short circuits around all that sober consideration of the circumstances that justifies his decision to have an uncompromising diplomatic position that would result in extended warfare into potentially the far future requiring Western support.
Now, we may see why Zelensky would want simple arguments that would justify his position to not compromise so his backers don't get angry with him. The subject under discussion is whether those simplistic arguments to basically not enter any discussion that may actually reach a compromise by invoking "preconditions" (such as won't talk to Putin, or US guarantees, or Russian forces must withdraw entirely, or won't offer any territorial concessions etc.) are "actual preconditions", as Zelensky presents them, or are just a way of saying he's not going to compromise and has no justification for not compromising, he's willing for another 100 000 of his citizen's lives "thrown into the abyss" (as apparently pentagon officers put it) simply to not compromise and perhaps not accomplish anything further militarily as perhaps everything they could reasonably accomplish militarily they have already done so (as another pentagon officer has apparently noted).
But, if there is some version of "precondition" that's not some vacuous tautology and is in some way connected to the subject matter (Zelensky's clear meaning and functional use of the term as justifying his decisions), then present an argument.
However, rebutting my point and then later explaining you literally have said nothing of substance whatsoever in relation to my point, just reminding us that decisions are in fact based on information the people making decisions have, or then at least "rational agents" base their decisions on what they know, you have literally said absolutely nothing.
Quote Zelensky. And then comment. Besides I didn't claim anywhere that I would use the word "pre-condition" the way Zelensky does.
Quoting boethius
Saying that nothing is certain in this life... is obvious.
Quoting boethius
Security guarantees (or equivalent).
Quoting boethius
As if you knew what "tautology" means
Quoting boethius
Never made such a claim. On the other side you are trying to sell us that international relations is matter of "certain" or "ornamental". That is substantive steamy bullshit. Period.
I think the forum should nominate prizes for pseudo intellectual bullshit, and I nominate this phase.
Quoting neomac
First, your idea that the US and Soviet Union entered non-proliferation agreements based on the idea they could deter the other from not breaking them with their nuclear weapons, is simply false. US and Soviet Union could sign a non-proliferation treaty one day, break it the next day, and the situation would just return to what it was before, neither would rationally (nor did in practice) consider nuking the other simply for breaking a treaty. They would nuke the other if they genuinely believed they were being or about to be nuked.
So, maybe think it through and see your delusion here about how the world works. Why would they nuke each other for breaking a treaty that was intended to lower the chances of nuking each other? Ok, treaty didn't work, situation returns to higher odds of nuking each other.
The US did not "use its deterrence" as a basis to believe the the Soviet Union would abide by the treaty. At no point did either party sign thinking the other would stick to the agreement or be nuked. The nuclear weapons, and their mutual fear of them, was what the negotiation was about (the common ground, common risk, they both wanted to lower), but not itself a way of "dealing" with the other party.
Read some history or maybe just think through the implications of what your saying.
As for seeking NATO deterrence because Ukraine does not have deterrence, this is certainly a rational desire, but it is not a rational diplomatic goal because NATO will never provide it.
There is no reason for NATO to nuke Russia if there is a peace agreement and Russia violates it vis-a-vis Ukraine. If Russia re-invades we'd just be back to where we are currently, there is no circumstances, and certainly no wording of any treaty, that would be some rational basis for NATO to nuke Russia for violating it.
Now, by all means, change your goal posts again to just "for Ukraine to agree, they'd need to be somewhat confident the agreement is better than the alternatives, and somewhat confident Russia would follow it due to a bunch of reasons".
Never made such a claim. Quote where I did.
Quoting boethius
Besides, since when conceivable possibilities constitute evidence to falsify factual claims? Here: The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. It was recognized that the Cold War deterrent relationship between just the United States and the Soviet Union was fragile. Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, escalation in tensions, and nuclear conflict (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons)
First, as a general principle, this is not a "precondition" or "rational requirement" as a state may surrender simply because they are losing.
Second, Ukraine will receive zero meaningful security guarantees in any peace deal with Russia, other than the ornamental meaning of "trust us bro".
Whatever Russia promises to do, and does not do, obviously nothing stops them, and there is no meaningful leverage NATO would have anyways that would actually stop them short of nuclear weapons, which obviously they won't be "deterring" Russia with concerning Ukraine.
We can be pretty sure of this because NATO has already applied maximum pressure of sanctions and arms supplies and this hasn't "deterred" Russia from their course of acton, so presumably if Russia invaded again then the reasonable bet is we'd (at best for Ukraine) just be back in this same situation; West angry about it, sanctions up the wazoo, providing arms ... and that's it.
Whatever US promises to do and doesn't do, there would unlikely be any consequences at all.
But whatever the consequences for breaking the agreement, they would not be "much" as some sort of contractual result.
The consequence for Russia of reinvading Ukraine would be war and likely sanctions and international pressure, perhaps from their own partners if it's a second time around of this mess for no reason.
This would be the reason to expect Russia to abide by a peace agreement, to avoid the negative consequences of war they have also experienced.
However, being nuked by the USA would not be a reason.
If there's a peace deal and then later war resumes, the reasonable expectation is that the parties to the agreement will do in the future whatever their policy is then in the future anyways.
For example, let's say in the future Europe's and US economy is really hurting, monetary crisis, real domestic problems, in addition to potential war with China invading Taiwan any moment, all sorts of messes all around the world, and they simply don't have the capacity for this same kind of conflict, pour in billions and billions ("carte blanch"), then what we would expect is that their policy then would be "sorry Ukraine, but you're on your own this time" regardless of what is written on any piece of paper.
If the policy in the future is not to intervene for reasons, then the answer about the agreement will be "yeah, well", as we saw about the Crimea annexation in 2014.
Why wasn't the word "assurance" meaningful? Well, it was just ornamental for and a stand in for "trust us bro". Why does a promise not matter because the word "assurance" instead of "guarantor" used to embellish it?
Because nothing actually legal is going on and the promises don't need to be kept, regardless of what words you use.
Who said anything about comprehending them? I said I don't care what matters to them, not that I don't comprehend them.
And in either case, explain why that makes my views not worth discussing? Why are only views relating to what matters to Ukrainians worthy of discussion?
I've quoted it back to you several times:
Quoting neomac
Read your own words.
"this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" and you even note "Ukraine doesn’t have!".
The meaning could not be more clear that it was rational for the US and the Soviet Union to "rationally pursue" these non-proliferation agreements, despite not trusting each other, because they both had nuclear weapons ... and ... "Ukraine doesn’t have!"
It cannot be clearer that your implication is that it would not be rational for Ukraine to enter the same agreements without nuclear weapons.
An argument that is clearly false, especially as Ukraine and many other non-nuclear states pursued and signed up to the very same agreements.
Since, you moved the goalpost from "pre-condition" (the word you use) to "rational requirement" to "taking into account".
Yes, obviously all parties took into account the nuclear weapons other parties had or didn't have in negotiating and agreeing to non-proliferation treatise.
If you're really saying now that what you really meant was that the US took into account the Soviet Unions nuclear weapons, vice-versa, and non-nuclear states did the same, everyone took into account stuff, it's just a farcical level of bad faith.
Yes. There's simply no good way for Zelensky to come out of this (though I'm interested in how the media will spin it).
Quoting Olivier5
Don't be absurd. World leaders ought not simply announce any matters they happen to believe like fucking children with no filter. His words could have brought NATO into a war with Russia on false premises. That's negligence on a criminal level.
That's not what I claimed.
Quoting boethius
I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.
Quoting boethius
I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.
Quoting boethius
It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and it didn't finish to pay. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism.
Quoting boethius
I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.
Quoting boethius
More claims and conjectures and ornamental blablabla.
I argue these points at some length, literally cite the claims I'm rebutting that you just continuously deny ever making.
Quoting neomac
Do you see Russia stopping the war of their own accord?
No. So, obviously the cost of their adventurism is a cost they are willing to pay.
So, what would be the reason to assume they are not willing to pay the same cost in the future?
Not really any. So, "rationally" it would be nice to have some better reason, such as the US nuking Russia on behalf of Ukraine and being deterred that way. The only problem is there's no rational reason for the US to sign up to that, much less actually do when called upon.
Which is the core fallacy of Zelenskyites: that whatever is good for Zelensky to be true (at least according to him) we should also believe is true, or at least nevertheless support whatever he wants and is trying to get in saying whatever we agree isn't true.
A nice connection to the missile issue. Is Zelensky talking out of his ass? Zelenskyites: Sure, maybe. But that's just all rational decision making that we should support and encourage escalation, if that's what Zelensky wants, it's just clever to use the missile issue to try to escalate. You see, he "believes it" so it's ok to say what you believe even if you have no evidence for it.
Bollocks. Poland have done zero investigation beyond simply looking at the parts (which, since both Russia and Ukraine overlap in armaments, tells you nothing), and the US have investigated (albeit unfinished) with the single most well-informed intelligence network the world has ever known. to suggest that somehow the facts are still 'up in the air' is ridiculous fawning.
Oh, and...
Quoting https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/poland-president-missile-strike-probably-ukrainian-stray
But of course you have to immediately spin it to some pro-Ukrainian stance.
Quoting Christoffer
Anders Aslund immediately took to Twitter and Urged the President to "Bomb Russia" on the basis of exactly that article.
Quoting Christoffer
I've not read this. What source are you getting that from?
I know that you scare easily, but this is ridiculous even by your chicken little standards. NATO does not take its orders from Zelensky. Beside, it's not yet certain that Zelensky is wrong on the origin of the missile.
You keep quoting only the claim that triggered your misunderstanding without taking into account all my clarifications. But you misunderstood that quote: "taking into account the deterrence means they both had" is the "precondition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ). So "precondition" refers to a rational requirement for the US and Soviet Union to take into account their deterrence means while pursuing their agreements (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ).
Quoting boethius
I clarified what I could infer from my claim about Ukraine (not having nuclear bombs): since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like)
So you must have understood from that too that I couldn't mean what you keep attributing to me like a fool.
Quoting boethius
You understand words the way you like without double check, then you iterate on a huge strawman argument built out of this misunderstanding, and despite all the clarifications I've given to you. And you wanna get away with it? Are you crazy, dude?!
NATO are required to respond by treaty to any threat made to a member country. If there is doubt as to the origin of the missile, NATO will be some degree more inclined than otherwise to respond as if it were Russia. He negligently increased the risk of NATO concluding it was more likely Russia and responding accordingly. It's nothing to do with 'giving orders', it's to do with brazenly lying about some facts which are really important to get correct.
But of course, all your bleating about the importance of 'facts' goes out the window the moment it goes against your mainstream narrative.
What evidence? I thought the origin of the missile was shrouded in mystery.
Weird. They don't know who fired it, but they know why.
What I describe is not conjecture, but a potential scenario that makes clear the ornamental nature of any "guarantees" to any peace deal concerning Ukraine.
I am not "conjecturing" that this scenario will come to pass, but developing such scenarios is how decisions are made. Ukraine's concern about "security guarantees" comes from asking "what if Russia reinvades later anyways".
For the word "guarantee" to be more than an ornament would mean that the US et. al. would fulfil whatever it is they promised to do, or make sure Russia doesn't do, even if it's no longer their policy to do.
For example, if it's policy to want to pour arms into Ukraine if Russia re-invades for the same reasons they did the first time or then entirely new reasons, then they don't really need an agreement. NATO wasn't bound by treaty to pour arms into Ukraine in February, they did so because they wanted to.
Now, imagine things change and NATO no longer wants to pour arms into Ukraine.
Would the agreement itself compel them to act (such as supply arms again) just in order to keep a promise, even if it's in total contradiction to their national interests and policies at this future time?
If the answer is ... yeah, no, they'd just "look out for number 1" as they always do, then all this talk of "guarantee" is an ornamental sense, adds nothing to whatever the promise the guarantee is attached to, just embellishes the promise, which may have some consequences as far as embellishments (they maybe really very sorry for breaking a guarantee, truly regret it, rather than simply be just sorry and regret it, breaking a promise that was not also guaranteed).
They may have some excuse, like " 'assurance' means absolutely nothing", which would be likely the case if there's a peace deal as the wording will be such that nothing was really promised anyways, for the simple reason that the US doesn't need to. Or, if they really are breaking a promise but they just can't fulfil it (consistent with their policies at this future time) then they may just say that it's unfortunate but they can't afford to try to rescue Ukraine again ... or, they just say nothing and do nothing.
The reason to believe Russia won't just re-invade is exactly as you describe: it's costly.
Of course, they were willing to take this risk and pay this cost once, so that's not really a "guarantee" just the reasons they don't invade is that it's costly, and the reasons they do reinvade is ... it's costly but they're willing to pay the cost.
The whole point of fighting a more powerful state is to demonstrate that there's a high cost to the use of force, to then negotiate a resolution using that leverage that, sure, Ukraine maybe entirely destroyed by the end of a war, but it's still a big cost and hassle to Russia too.
This is what Finland did with the Soviet Union, demonstrate war isn't easy and then negotiate a compromise ... but somehow Finland is only a model on killing Russians and not their diplomatic efforts that they carried out consistently, continuously, reasonably and earnestly in parallel to the fighting.
Who?
It is simply utter bollocks to say they knew it was an accident but didn't know where it came from. The facts are that they learned where it most likely came from first, and prior to that considered several theories involving hostile intent.
...but I think we've established how little the actual facts of the case have any influence on your propaganda.
You have an interesting idea of "good faith" which is actually to the total opposite. What Zelensky believes is irrelevant; he needs to have reason to believe it.
One of the tests of "good faith" is that the action has to be reasonable. You cannot maintain that acting, or urging others to act, on beliefs that are not grounded in facts is reasonable. Facts which you maintained were not available. I can honestly believe we'll be struck by a meteor tomorrow and urge everyone to go out and get drunk but I wouldn't be acting in good faith, since claiming such a thing without any evidence is unreasonable.
Zelensky's willingness to make these claims without knowledge, or more likey with knowledge to the contrary, is a reminder that our interests do not align 100% with that of Ukraine. The most charitable interpretation is that he wants to secure arms deliveries for the foreseeable future in light of Biden's mention of "ally fatigue" beginning of this month but that requires him to be stupid enough not to realise the possible consequences. But he did realise because he expressly referred to an escalation when he said: :
So he doesn't know (according to you) but he's totally fine with calling for an escalation of a war with a nuclear super power right here in Europe without knowing whose missile it was. That's not reasonable and considering the very serious potential consequences, is a textbook example of "bad faith" as it in no way, shape or form takes into consideration the safety of people currently not involved in this war.
How strangely your mind works.
A nuclear war would destroy every single Ukranian, European and likely the majority of the world's population.
I can understand and sympathize with the situation his country is in, it's not nice to have fellow citizens dying from missile barrages. But to suggest without evidence that Russia attacked Poland is one of the most dangerous acts in recent history.
I think they are aware that if things don't close soon in this war, Russian reservists will enter and basically wreck everything they want. It's probably won't be too long before something like this happens. This crazy act was probably meant to stop that.
It would be nice to negotiate before massive bloodshed happens with the reservists coming in.
I'm not spinning anything. I'm describing what the scenario would be if it was Russian. But you can't even accept speculation based on a possible conclusion out of the investigation. Or even what it would have been if it had been Russian.
Your constant straw-manning and intentional misinterpretation of other's posts in order to spin it in your direction in this thread makes you a dishonest interlocutor, I'm not engaging with your dishonest posts and inability to understand what the fuck others are writing. Spin away into a corner somewhere.
Btw, irrespective of who fired the missile, you get an article 4 event if invoked.
Quoting Christoffer
I've read "Russian missiles, we don't know who did it" and read several people clamoring the Russians did it, including the Ukrainian president and several US news outlets, on Wednesday and that changed to "Russian missiles, fired by Ukraine" according to NATO and the USA when I opened my browser this morning. Seems pretty conclusive to me and I can't for the life of me think of a good reason for NATO/USA to claimy it wasn't a Russian fired missile when it actually was and to do so before the investigation has been finished unless they have very high confidence levels to make such statements.
So, at this point in time, I'm going with "Ukraine accidentaly hit Poland while defending against a Russian barrage" as the most rational position.
How does a Russian misfire into Poland lead to nuclear war? It's engaging Article 4, not 5 and would most likely lead to higher political pressure on Russia because such an event would clearly give Nato political ammunition they didn't have before and a clear reason for higher-ups in Russia to de-escalate. Zelensky knows this and might have tried to take advantage of the situation.
They all know the MAD consequence, that's not an outcome of a misfire. If Russia deliberately fired into a Nato nation, that would be another thing, but that's not what happened even if Russia was responsible for this.
What I wrote was a speculation on the outcome if it was Russian. Zelensky wants a no-fly zone over Ukraine, he knows a full-blown Article 5 intervention would be too much for the world to handle and that no one wants to initiate that. But if he could push Nato, out of the situation that Russia misfires into Nato nations, then a no-fly zone could become a reality based on that fact and Nato could deal with the diplomacy towards Russia in a way where they initiate a no-fly zone without concluding it all to be a direct war with Russia, but instead in order to defend against irrational misfires. It would be diplomatic ammunition to pressure Russia in ways they couldn't have done before.
Yes, we know that now that Russia was not deliberately aiming at Poland.
That's not what Zelensky and people in his cabinet said at the time these missiles hit Polish territory.
I think it should be obvious that some kind of official investigation should occur before reaching conclusions based on the relevant facts, due to the stakes involved. They did not wait to announce who did what to whom.
This incidentally led to several politicians both in the US and Europe to start claiming that it was time to get in the war. Luckily Biden waited for the Polish intel, which concluded this was not a deliberate attack, contrary to Zelensky's statements.
If you were in his situation, asking for a no-fly zone and more help to defend his people and push back the Russians, what would you have done? Especially since right-wing nationalists around the world keep hinting of leaving Ukraine in the dust by stopping aid.
Are you saying that Zelensky should put the world on his shoulders and be the perfect leader for everyone around the world while backward politicians around the world keep hinting of turning their backs on him. I wouldn't, I would probably do whatever I could to try and defend Ukraine and push for the aid that is required.
It's insane what people demand of him in the situation he's in from behind the safety of our own nations.
It's not an easy situation, that much is true.
But what should be clear to him, is that getting direct NATO involvement would signify the end of Ukraine and of Europe. This is not secret information.
I'd like to believe that I would wait for the facts, knowing the consequences of my statements. But I'm not him.
And you, of course, interpret that as "initiate Article 5 and bomb Russia to hell".
In no way is what he said directly pushing for a direct world war with Russia. Why wouldn't "action is needed" also mean a no-fly zone that he has been asking for since the beginning of the war? Or more serious pressure from Nato towards Russia than just sending weapons.
How is my interpretation and speculation in any shape or form less true than what you suggest?
Direct Nato involvement is not a single event. It can also mean other structures of pressure on Russia than some final nuclear war. It's this type of black-and-white assessment of the situation, disregarding any kind of more serious diplomacy against Russia as an outcome.
The most likely outcome, out of this specific situation, that Nato can deal against Russia would be to pressure them that they will initiate a no-fly zone to block possible rogue missiles going into Nato nations. That would be a kind of soft no-fly zone that doesn't become a full confrontal war and it would have legitimacy within the context of what has happened here. Within that diplomacy, they would have the foundational reasoning against Russia for such a no-fly zone that isn't a full-blown Article 5 movement.
But people seem to argue about both Russia and Nato as being just people with their finger over the red button. That's the depth some of these discussions seems to have.
And how would they decide what missiles count as rouge or not? There is very little margin of error here.
If the margin were as big as you imply, such actions would have already been considered and probably implemented, given how long the war has been going on.
If a no-fly zone were initiated, or a "soft" one, that would basically mean Nato shoots down the missiles shot into Ukraine. If that happened without the context of this event, it would be considered a direct oppositional act by Nato against Russia, but if it's within a context of diplomatic pressure against Russia that "this is the only way Nato can assure Russia that they will not escalate into war but instead protect themselves from Russian misfires". It's an escalation, sure, but not a direct war and it would set a specific context around why it's initiated as a direct pressure point toward Russia to stop sending in missiles.
A Russian misfire is a serious blow to Russia, not anyone else. There's little diplomatic ammunition that Russia can gain out of this situation as Nato has always been clear about its focus on defense. Russia's claims that Nato is trying to be on the offense against Russia has no merits and is proven by Nato not involving itself in battles, but if Russia misfires into a Nato nation they could argue that they need to defend themselves against such events and Russia has little to argue against that.
As I said, I don't think that's a reasonable interpretation at all.
As I said, they have probably considered and dismissed this option. Every time any type of No-Fly Zone has been proposed, it has been immediately rejected. Why? Because this would force Russia to go nuclear.
It's direct interference in war. NATO members know that, even Stoltenberg agrees that a no-fly zone would lead to World War III. They would be best positioned to know what would happen in this case, so I don't think your proposals are realistic.
Quoting Christoffer
Sure. This is true.
He's the leader of a nation and the commander in chief of an army. He's not a five year old having a go at 'My First Country'. We can, and should, expect exactly the level of diplomacy and restraint being suggested. Not taking an ambiguous and dangerous option which could potentially put thousands more lives at risk is basic.
If he doesn't want to have his decisions held to account by those who might be affected by them then he's in the wrong job.
They were obviously trying to take Kiev, and we now know that Putin was trying to stamp out the Ukrainian identity in Kherson. Putin is without a doubt, the scum of the earth. He's a turd on top of a mountain of slimy poop. He's... well, I'm sure you agree. He sucks.
NASAMS air defense system have 100% success rate in Ukraine- Pentagon chief
[sup]— Reuters · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
Pentagon chief: NASAMS intercept all Russian missiles in Ukraine
[sup]— The Kyiv Independent · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
U.S. NASAMS Having 100% Success Rate in Stopping Russian Missiles: Pentagon
[sup]— Newsweek · Nov 17, 2022[/sup]
:up:
Quoting jorndoe
Quoting Isaac
Can't tell if trolling or not. Choosing between downing incoming bombs and letting them fall isn't much of a choice. (NASAMS can help, too. :up:) Could always try to calculate (expected) numerical differences I guess; there is a fair amount of data to go by:
The Ukraine war in maps | Russia launches largest missile attack of the conflict against key infrastructure
[sup]— Javier Galán, Mariano Zafra · EL PAÍS · Nov 16, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Manuel
They wouldn't be forced to start nuking. Besides, if they did, then that'd likely end up worse for Russia(ns) anyway. They'd still have decisions to make.
Looks like Zelenskyy blundered horribly. And is getting a lot of attention for that. (Had to happen sooner or later? No re-election for Mr Zelenskyy (perhaps). If NATO is going to retaliate, I'd suggest starting with the east Kherson oblast. :grin:)
Well if that is true - as some people here are gambling on, which is what it is, - then tell me, why hasn't NATO decided to implement such a no-fly zone?
Surely, you must figure, they are aware that Russia won't use nuclear weapons, because they aren't forced to do so. So, what prevents it? After all, send a large NATO coalition to carpet bomb the Russian military, then the war would be over.
NATO can surely do that much.
Of course it's a choice. It's exactly the choice military commanders make almost continuously during military operations - military objectives vs the risk of collateral damage.
Even the legal frameworks acknowledge the notion, let alone the ethical ones. Being attacked isn't an excuse to just do whatever you want by way of defense.
Clearly in this case, the decision to launch the defensive missile was sound, but if continued misses run a risk of extension or escalation then yes, those are exactly the sorts of collateral damage command are ethically, and in many cases legally, obliged to take into consideration when determining a course of defensive action.
It's not just 'throw everything at them and hang the consequences'...despite the ever more shrill cries from social media for world war three to get started already.
Not really, no. I go by the usual meaning, which implies a lack of lies and dissimulation, but does not imply that only reasonable statements are in good faith. The word 'faith' is not synonym of the word 'reason'. It's more an antonym in fact. Sometimes it is rational to lie. but one cannot lie in good faith.
Quoting Benkei
That would be true, and obvious, even if and when Zelensky argues in good faith. In fact, each and every country at play has its own interest. They just happen to coincide momentarily, in each camp (Russia and Belarus on one side, Ukraine and 'the West' on the other).
Tomorrow, it may be that the interests of Belarus and Russia do not align anymore. Or it could be that, say, Italy leaves the pro-Ukraine coalition. Not saying it will happen but it's perfectly possible
Quoting Benkei
He is only calling for 'action'. That's vague enough. It could be anything. An increase in weapon delivery would qualify.
There are (most likely) two possibilities here: either 1 the Russian flew this missile, or 2 the Ukrainians did it. ( excluding other hypotheses a bit hastily perhaps but open to rebuttals)
If 1, then the US intell got it wrong, something which we haven't been used to during this war but it has happened before, and Zelensky is right, and right about opining so. He would be in his role. You can't expect the Ukrainian president to act otherwise, if indeed the Russians did send this missile and Zelensky have some reason to believe it (his own intell).
If 2, then either 2.1 Zelensky knows it and therefore he acts in bad faith in saying Ukraine didn't do it, or 2.2 Zelensky does not know it, and/or believes otherwise. He is still in good faith and in his role then.
The term "good faith" has a specific meaning quite devoid from "faith". It's a legal term of art which nowadays is also used in common language. Your use of it is incorrect, the absence of lies and dissimulation (great word btw) are not enough. It is generally assumed an effective translation of the Latin bona fides, which is about reliability and trust between two parties in their dealings towards each other. If you cannot reasonably rely on your statements to be correct (because you're just guessing) and if you're not taking into consideration the interests of the other, you are not acting in good faith.
I already mentioned to Christoffer that in the context of that small speech it's quite clear what he means.
Someone died and made you the final interpreter of anything Zelenskian?
That is correct. There is that dimension. However, I wouldn't say that my trust in Zelensky has been shattered. Would you?
Funny. You seem to have quite a complex grasp of the concept here...
Quoting Olivier5
...
Even by your new measure, it is wildly irresponsible for a leader to publicly declare a culprit, on no other ground than that he has some kind of 'gut feeling' it was them.
Shall we have a look at the furores kicked up when people suggested America blew up the gas pipeline? What about the backlash you yourself take part in at the mere mention of US involvement in Maidan? The slightest suggestion of a back door negotiation recently brought a scathing rebuke.
Apparently now you've had a sudden change of heart, and any old reckon counts as suitable for high stakes international discussion.
We don't know what he knows, though. Beside, I think one could be forgiving of a certain rashness in judgment, under the circumstances.
What furores? Haven't seen that. Last time I checked, we don't know who did it. Isn't it irresponsible to publicly declare a culprit, on no other ground than some kind of 'gut feeling'?
I'm entitled to my opinions and to not seeing them branded as some sinister backslash. If you can't argue your case, just shut it up. Don't whine about 'backlashes'. You are as toxic a poster as any.
I am just pointing out how such an explanation for the Russians' flight from Kherson is not based on facts, and likely biased. Call me intolerant.
Whatever. I get you're not a native English speaker and the finer points of the translation are lost in you. Why don't you find a French translation and share it here?
action (n.)
mid-14c., from Old French action (12c.) "action; lawsuit, case," from Latin actionem (nominative actio) "a putting in motion; a performing, a doing; public acts, official conduct; lawsuit, legal action" (source also of Spanish accion, Italian azione)
It's not quite clear at all. It could be actions to put much harsher pressure on Russia, it could mean actions to rally military defense lines at the borders, it could mean actions to, as I said, initiate a no-fly zone and be more active in the defense of Ukraine rather than just sending weapons. It could merely mean that the world needs to take more action to prevent Russia from continuously killing civilians.
The way you handle discussions like these, pointing out that something is "obvious" when it clearly isn't obvious, other than supporting your own argument, makes it impossible to have a discussion with you. You demand that your interpretation is the valid one and then everyone around you should comply based on that interpretation because then you can win that argument... wake me up when you're a more honest interlocutor.
A bit drastic. :)
I'm guessing NATO/whoever aren't doing much because of unpredictability, risk, that stuff.
A no-fly zone still wouldn't force Putin to start nuking, though.
Quoting comment · Nov 17, 2022
On another note, we don't really know all that much about what goes on in Russia. Whatever shows up may give hints.
Russia's economy has finally fallen into recession, 8 months after it invaded Ukraine
[sup]— Huileng Tan · Business Insider · Nov 17, 2022[/sup]
Putin reforms Russia’s Human Rights Council and puts commander in charge of military operations in Ukraine
[sup]— Daniel Stewart · News360 · Nov 17, 2022[/sup]
Effects of sanctions?
[sup]— EDA · Nov 15, 2022[/sup]
The EU isn't sufficiently organized in this respect. Maybe some day? NATO it is, until then, I guess.
How in the world is what I wrote an ad hominem? I described the reasons why it's impossible to discuss with someone who requires their own interpretation to be accepted before they can accept any counter-arguments from their interlocutor. That's not an ad hominem, that's pointing at the problem of your reasoning, and your answer to that is to shout "ad hominem".
...and then the irony of you trying to prove why your interpretation is correct by prompting that those non-native English speakers you argue with would "clearly understand" in the way you do if they had only understood the English language better. Almost kind of racist in a way of an Ad Hominem now is it?
Can some other mod please enlighten me on why Benkei is still a mod on this forum? It's like a judge who's breaking the law and when being called out doing so he just continues with even more of it and the justice system just keeps him protected within the system.
You were criticising his method of argument and suggesting he's a dishonest interlocutor, which is ad hom, because you were attacking him personally rather than his argument.
(As per the basic definition:
Ad hominem means “against the man,” and this type of fallacy is sometimes called name calling or the personal attack fallacy. This type of fallacy occurs when someone attacks the person instead of attacking his or her argument.)
https://www.google.com/search?q=ad+hominem&oq=ad+hominem&aqs=chrome..69i57.2566j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
That's not to say you broke any rules. But he's right on that point.
Quoting Christoffer
His retort wasn't racist in any way (he's a non-native speaker himself far as I know and being a non-native speaker isn't a race anyhow).
Quoting Christoffer
If you think Benkei broke a rule, PM me with details of the rule he broke. I don't see any rules being broken by anyone here, certainly not racism or anything remotely of the sort. Finally, please use PMs or the Feedback category for complaints in future. Thanks.
I think this is standard game theory, if I remember correctly, but the details could be off.
The standard interpretation would be that he now has no other options, because Russia clearly cannot go toe to toe with NATO. So, they can either get destroyed by NATO completely, or strike back as soon as a no fly-zone is implemented.
Again, this would be direct involvement. Yeah, theoretically, one could say, there's a very, very, very small chance Russia would simply allow for a No-Fly Zone to be implemented, which would render whatever war aims they have null, which would be a massive embarrassment to Russia - something great powers do not tolerate at these levels.
But it *could* happen. Sure, and China could send troops to help Russia out. It could happen.
That's not the rational being used for the reaction on the missile attacks in Poland.
Note that Zelensky is not a native speaker either, so arguably Chris and I understand him better than any of you natives.
I'm not getting involved in that. Maybe his claim is ridiculous or not. Maybe you and Chris understand Zelensky better or not. I'm just commenting on the complaint. Carry on.
Ok, what was his argument? To be an ad hominem there has to be an argument that I didn't adress? That his interpretation is more valid based on "just knowing English better", that's not what I call an argument.
Quoting Baden
If the same tactic was used against an English-speaking Pakistani man, pointing out that he is wrong just because he doesn't understand English when he clearly does so, and that being the foundation for the argument put forth. Essentially providing a speculative interpretation and telling the Pakistani man that if he interprets it in any other way, he's just bad at English ... would it be racist then? Or considered to be that?
Because as far as I can see, attacking someone's ability in English, when they clearly are proficient, only based on the idea that they're not native English speakers as the whole foundation for dismissing their writing... seems like there's a racist component in it?
These are not further complaints, just trying to clarify how you interpreted what I wrote.
Sounds like:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirming_the_consequent
"Affirming the consequent, sometimes called converse error, fallacy of the converse, or confusion of necessity and sufficiency, is a formal fallacy of taking a true conditional statement (e.g., "If the lamp were broken, then the room would be dark"), and invalidly inferring its converse ("The room is dark, so the lamp is broken"), even though that statement may not be true. This arises when a consequent ("the room would be dark") has other possible antecedents (for example, "the lamp is in working order, but is switched off" or "there is no lamp in the room")."
The consequent here "pointing out someone is wrong because they're a non-native speaker" has more than the one antecedent given in your example. i.e. A racist could make that comment and a non-racist could make it too.
Yeah, maybe Zelensky just misspoke? According to the logic, a non-native English speaker is not reliable enough in using the language for a conclusive point, meaning Zelensky could have meant basically anything. If understanding English leads to wild misinterpretations, then just imagine trying to formulate a rock solid conclusive message in a language you don't even speak natively :scream:
It kinda shows how ridiculous such a thing is to use as a counter-argument, which is my point.
Sounds logical, ok :up:
...however, doesn't the act make the racist, rather than the racist making an act?
Funny enough, even as a native speaker I had to edit that because I somewhat misphrased it the first time. There you go, ain't none of us perfect!
The reason for the act makes the racist in this case. There are lots of acts like that.
The article isn't quite so dramatic, though.
Maybe mostly for Russians (in Russia) to check.
The Russian Empire Must Die
[sup]— Anne Applebaum · The Atlantic · Nov 14, 2022[/sup]
Not trying to argue against it, but I'm curious about where this leads even if it's a slight derail in here...
Can a person act as a racist, even without having a clear racist inner reasoning? Racism is easy to spot after the fact when pointed out, but don't plenty of people exist today who do racist acts, who can be considered racists by others but don't consider themselves to be it, or identify with any purely racist ideologies? For example, the parents in the movie "Get Out" aren't technically racists, but they surely are by their acts and by their way of reasoning around race. Systemic racism is all about how racism is within the system, and how people act and become racists without even knowing it themselves.
So doesn't intention or reason mean nothing if the act itself is the core thing that defines a racist? How do we know which is which within a certain case if the person conducting the act might not even remotely believe they are racist?
So if someone punches you in the face because they don't like your race, that's a racist act. If they punch you in the face just because you are really annoying them, it's not. In this case, that is the relevant analogy.
A punch in the face is however a "neutral act". But a person can also be annoyed by someone's race, ability to understand language, or presumption of lower intelligence based on stereotypes without knowing it themselves, claiming "I just got so annoyed by him, that's why I punched him". Is that not racism as well? In a way that's basically what drives most cops killing innocent black people in the US. They act upon racial stereotypes as the driving force behind their acts.
People can get annoyed by others just for them being a certain race, speaking a certain way, or presumably not being as fluent in a certain language, but letting that, knowingly or unknowingly, drive to a certain action against that person or group, should be considered racism, no?
Quoting Christoffer
Yes.
Quoting Christoffer
No.
Again, there's no necessary connection between being annoyed at someone for speaking a certain way or not being fluent in a certain language and racism. Can't you think of a million non-racist examples of someone being annoyed at someone's speech?
For example, it seems unlikely that an attack on the occupiers would go ahead and level Melitopol, despite Russian troop concentrations. Too many civilians, maybe too much infrastructure or whatever.
Also seems unlikely that anyone would be marching on Moscow (or flying). A good many things would precede anything like that.
But maybe you're right.
Quoting Skeletor
I had in mind more how NATO would get directly involved - if they ever did. They've said that it wouldn't be a good idea to go nuke for nuke - in the case in which Russia uses one in Ukraine. They said they would use conventional weaponry to destroy the Russian army, which NATO can do, without too much trouble. Of course, I'd think if such a thing were to happen, they would probably avoid killing too many civilians.
I think that Russia's reservist army might be put to use in December - January at the latest. Here, we don't know how far they'd go. As you say, I don't think they would flatten Kiev. But it won't be pretty.
Point is, NATO was correct in reacting how it did in Poland. Even though complete certainty isn't available in the empirical world, the odds of going to war with a nuclear power is still one of the worst possible gambles in all of international relations.
:smile:
Hi Benk.
Some are more perfect than others though, like our boy @Benkei here. He understands Zelensky more perfectly than anybody else, and if you disagree with him, he might perfectly delete your post. He's the perfect putinista.
We should all speak French, it would be much easier, and more precise. :-)
Pending that, native English speakers should make an effort and try to understand airport English, which is what the rest of us speak, including Zelensky.
Pending that, them natives could decide that philosophy is inherently British, and therefore non native speakers are not allowed on TPF.
Or perhaps they could just talk among themselves, the english-speaking elite, and let the rest of us unwashed masses talk to one another. That would actually be useful: it would allow us to filter out all that anglosaxon 'analytical' noise about Mary in her room with the red p-zombies.
Hasn't seemed a barrier previously to you waxing lyrical about Putin's intentions, Biden's intentions, Macron, Draghi... Since when have you once considered the need to not surmise what a political or scientific figure might know a barrier to commenting on their likely intent? Is there a reason Zelensky gets special treatment here?
Quoting Olivier5
What circumstances? He's not on the front line. He's jetting around the world meeting leaders in plush hotels. As I said before, if he's not prepared to have his decisions held to account he's in the wrong job. We don't excuse global sabre-rattling because he had a bad day. He's a big boy, I'm sure he can handle a few internet posts criticising his behaviour.
Quoting Olivier5
That's the point. This is exactly the line trotted out against, for example, Jeffry Sachs when he declared it was clear that the US did it. The standards are not being applied consistently, which is an indicator of bias. Bias in favour of what is already the world's most powerful nation is very dangerous. Power need to be held to account.
Quoting Olivier5
I'm pointing out that your opinions are naive, boot-licking, ill-informed and dangerous. I never said you weren't entitled to them. The point is that you're applying double standards - a clear sign of bias. When Zelensky expresses an 'honest feeling' that Russia conspired to cause this event, you say it's OK to hold serious discussions on that level. When people talk about their feeling that the US orchestrated the Euromaidan coup, you imply they ought not because it's not something that's been proven beyond doubt.
Quoting Olivier5
Neither is Zelensky's claim that it was not a Ukrainian missile and that it's a Russian conspiracy. If it's OK for him to make such claims publicly. and we ought not criticise, then why is it not OK for us to make claims about back door negotiations, with as little evidence? One rule fro pro-mainstream opinions, another for those opposed.
You realise the mainstream opinion has quite enough support already, right? It's backed by the most powerful nation the world has ever known and the largest, richest and most powerful corporations that have ever been. You can afford to ease up a bit, put your feet up, I don't think the US corporate hegemony are on the ropes just yet.
I was trying to be charitable by assuming there was a language issue, especially since you got the meaning of good faith wrong already, but we can go with "knowingly maintaining a wrong interpretation".
This is what he said. He qualified it as a "strike" on NATO territory knowing full well the article 5 obligations (it has no added meaning otherwise, as he could have left it at "Poland"), qualified it as a "significant escalation", raises the spectre of the Baltic States and Poland being subject to Russian terror going further than a missile strike and then his call to action in that context isn't "have an investigation" or "keep sending arms". He's not asking them to answer another party's escalation with "keep doing the same" because he already got that, so that doesn't qualify as "action". So yes the context is quite clear. But happy to have that discussion based on a French translation source.
It's also funny how we then have this scripted propaganda when he realises he fucked up:
"We shouldn't jump to conclusions after I did exactly that."
He went further on Twitter, saying...
That's one hell of a no-fly zone!
You 're reading too much into this. Maybe you need to open a dictionary and read the entry for "action", rather than try and impose your skewed interpretation.
This seems to be the most likely scenario. And that Zelensky had a stupid gaffe that he is now backtracking.
And one should note, this wasn't the first time thanks to the war flying objects came out of Ukrainian airspace. It was the first time that somebody unfortunately got killed. Had the missile landed just few hundred meters somewhere else, it might not even had broke the global news media threshold.
It seems unlikely that a stray modern air defense missile hits something it wasn't supposed to and also kills two people, across the border of a neutral country no less. Unlikely in terms of statistical probability, but also due to the fact that the S-300 system makes missiles self-destruct when they miss their targets.
It's not impossible, but also not a conclusion I would accept without serious evidence.
You haven't actually done that. That's what you dream of doing perhaps, in this fantasy world of yours where you are a hero. What you have done here, consistently and on countless topics, is to confuse yourself while attempting to confuse others.
I had also been thinking about the odds on this. Poland is also in the opposite direction.
Of course, Russia has hit targets close the Polish border, so the setup isn't difficult to believe (of an AA missile chasing something towards the Polish border), but the odds of both AA missiles malfunctioning in addition to killing people rather than landing in some random field, is pretty low.
If it was done intentionally, sending two missiles would make sense if the story one has in mind is one was Russian and the other was chasing it. You'd want to do this for the plausible deniability that the Russian missile was missed by radar and so of course there's only the radar signature of the AA missile.
Two missiles is a liability if the US then insists neither came from Russia, as two not only malfunctioning at the same time but coming down in the same location and killing 2 people, creates this head scratching odds questions. Much easier to say one in a fluke than two. There's an old saying in Tennessee—I know it's in Texas, probably in Tennessee—that says, 'Fool me once, shame on...shame on you. Fool me—you can't get fooled again.'
If it's a rational plan, you'd have to bet US actually wants to escalate to go with the plausible deniability story that no one can prove the second missile wasn't Russian.
If you have no reason to believe that, then it's just a desperate plan with significant risks.
Missiles have been flying all over the place for over three quarters of a year, none of them falling in Poland, and shortly after Zelensky is warned of "ally fatigue" by the US ... "collective security" is directly attacked.
There is certainly motive and opportunity in any rational consideration of the evidence we have so far.
Also important is that the notion it was a Russian missile came from an unnamed "senior U.S. intelligence official" who AP are still refusing to name despite the fact they they were obviously fed false information.
The question is why the US would deliberately feed false intelligence to the press, then later deny the veracity of that information.
A split over strategy, perhaps?
Answer your own question, please. What is your interpretation of what Zelensky meant by his 'action is needed'?
An unnamed diplomat from a NATO country has just told the Financial Times...
Definitely also a curious aspect of the case.
However, even it was a US intelligence official it may have been a legitimate leak of someone who legitimately didn't actually know. Also, it could have been just leaking what Poland then claimed that it was a "Russian produced missile", maybe AP even got the same info but left out "produced" for click bait effect.
In any event, doesn't need to have been any deliberate decision by the US administration. If it was a genuine surprise then some confusion is reasonable to go along with that on the US side. Intelligence agents may also have their own agendas, biases and sense of a lack of accountability anyways, opportunity to stoke tensions because why not. Has been known to happen.
That could well explain why they're now refusing to reveal their source.
Their own editorial guidelines state that an anonymous source can only be used if the information is sound and a clear byline to that effect is in place. They adhered to neither in this case, so the theory that AP played this up themselves seems plausible.
Could also be that Poland was gearing up for a big splash with "Russian missile!", and AP got the information when that was the actual plan.
Perhaps at the time Poland thought they could walk that back to "Russian produced" later, but then got cold feat when they realised that would make them look stupid, they have no idea how the US (not to mention Russia) would react to that, so better just stick to common sense justifiable statements navigating an event that could potentially lead to nuclear war between two super powers.
Poland's statements definitely look like they were originally written to say "Russian missile" but then someone added "produced" when they actually sat down and asked themselves if jumping out with "Aha! never said owned and operated by Russia!" later, was a good situation to be in.
I never denied making the claim you literally cite (quote where I did). I continuously denied that you literally understood my quotes and I still do ("taking into account the deterrence means they both had" is the "precondition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ). So "precondition" refers to a rational requirement for the US and Soviet Union to take into account their deterrence means while pursuing their agreements (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ).).
Again I'm responsible for what I write not for what you understand.
Quoting boethius
So what? There are three reasons your question is failing to take into account:
1. We are in the middle of the war so we don’t see the end of the war nor the full consequences of such war. The Soviet–Afghan War lasted 10 years, could anyone see the end of it and the following collapse of the Soviet Union while they were in the middle of it back then? No, because they didn’t happen yet.
2. Russia was complaining about NATO enlargement since the 90s, did Russia see NATO enlargement stopping for that reason? NATO/US can be as determined as Russia to pursue their goals in Ukraine at the expense of Russia. And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit.
3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West.
Quoting boethius
But will it is not all that matters, what also and primarily counts is the actual material and human resources one country has to achieve its geopolitical goals.
Quoting boethius
Quoting boethius
You keep generically mentioning people without quoting them: who are the Zelenskyites ? Can you quote them? Given the twisted way you literally processed my claims I prefer check their claims by myself. And if you can not quote them nor prove that they claim what you are attributing to them, your argument looks like a strawman.
Quoting boethius
Since you can perfectly understand that there are implied and increasing non-negligible costs, especially when it’s matter of sunk costs and its psychological effects (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost#Fallacy_effect), talking about actual willingness or hypothetical willingness in conjectured scenarios doesn't suffice to reason about this matter. And for that reason I’m not sure that Russia could rationally want to aggress Ukraine again.
But assuming that Russia wants or could want to do that (rationally or irrationally), then the West must damage Russian resources to pursue that goal as long as possible and with most enduring consequences as possible, if they rationally believe that Russia constitutes a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West and as long as they have means to do that.
Quoting boethius
If "ornamental" is meant to suggest that it's irrational for Ukraine to look for “security guarantees” (or NATO membership for that matter) and claiming otherwise shows "completely ignorant understanding of international relations" because an avg dude like you can conjecture random scenarios where these “security guarantees” aren’t effectively pursued or deterring enough, then that's bullshit. As I said:
Quoting neomac
Any possible military success in that direction is conditional on the military support the West provides to Ukraine. And I'm not sure the West will continue as Ukrainians may hope.
Hope springs eternal, but the support they got so far has been quite significant. Biden is evidently interested in checking Putin and their support will likely endure the current row. Europeans may opt out, some of them (Hungary) are nit even in the coalition.
If there's one positive thing in this Poland missile debate, it's the demonstration that NATO is perfectly capable of avoiding escalation into WW3, even when Mr Zelensky is having a bad day. Poland reacted with measure, and so did the US.
You then make clear "that Ukraine doesn't have!"
It cannot be clearer that you are claiming the US and Soviet Union can make deals without trusting each other because of the nuclear weapons.
Saying "nuclear weapons" is a precondition to a deal about nuclear weapons, is a tautology. Obviously non-nuclear powers take into account the nuclear weapons of nuclear powers in making deals about nuclear weapons, as well. What else would you do? How do even propose a deal about nuclear weapons that does not take into account the nuclear weapons people do or do not have.
So either you're saying nothing at all, just that people have the idea of nuclear weapons in their head in making deals about nuclear weapons, or then you're saying something meaningful that would have been meaningfully connected to the point you are responding to: that actually having the nuclear weapons is "pre-condition" to making a deal about said nuclear weapons, as a substitute to the trust that gave rise to this discussion. A meaningful argument, just obviously wrong.
Quoting neomac
Again, reading comprehension.
We agree that the major reason for Russia to not reinvade is the cost of the war. For, if they could get Ukraine for free at no cost of inconvenience, I think we'd both agree they would do that.
So, the reason to not-invade Ukraine last February would be the cost of the conflict (sanctions, fighting and so on).
If there is a peace deal, the situation will be the same. The reason to enter a peace deal would be a bet that from Russia's perspective the cost of another war would outweigh the benefits and therefore they would not reinvade.
If we agree on this point, then we agree that this is in no war a guarantee.
If we also agree the US is not going to nuke Russia if they invade again (or at least not due to anything written on any piece of paper with the word "Ukraine" on it), then there is just no guarantees available. You can call something a guarantee; you can write down "the US will see to it that this deal is respected, that's a Uncle Sam guarantee!" but it's not a guarantee in any sense more than ornamentation added to the agreement for PR purposes. Wording and PR does have some consequence, it's not meaningless, just the US is not about nuke anyone simply due to PR optics of not-nuking them. They'll nuke Russia if they genuinely believe Russia is going to nuke them now or after some series of events they come to believe are inevitable. The decision to nuke Russia or not will have anything to do with any promises to Ukraine; I guarantee you that in the certainty sense of guarantee.
Now, you're whole list:
Quoting neomac
Has nothing to do with my point. My point is simply that obviously Russia is willing to pay the cost of war with Ukraine under certain circumstances (such as circumstances that literally exist right now ... if they weren't willing, then they'd be withdrawing right now and the war would be over). Therefore, you could never reasonably assume such circumstances would not reemerge in the future regardless of any peace deal today. If there's no third party to keep Russia to its promise to not reinvade in the context of a peace deal (even ignoring the problem of why we'd believe such a third party would actually act), then there is simply nothing that can be remotely described as a guarantee of not being reinvaded available to Ukraine.
We may empathise why they would want such a guarantee in a peace deal, but it's simply not available. Therefore, if they want a peace deal, insisting on a guarantee in any meaningful sense (non-ornamental sense) is an irrational demand in negotiation, even more so an irrational precondition to negotiate in the first place.
What you list above has nothing to do with my basic observation that Russia is obviously willing to pay the cost of a war with Ukraine, has just happened and so may happen again. None of the third parties will be able to change this basic fact in any scribbling on paper process of whatever you want.
Of course, the alternative to a peace deal is more war, and in such a choice, as you say, maybe continued war is good for the West to "to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power".
However, if this damage is indeed significant, then it would be reason to assume that Russia would not restart a war that was so damaging. But, even if this is good for the West, is it good for Ukraine to be in a war forever with Russia and never make peace?
Quoting neomac
Agreements are about future scenarios and contingencies. If Ukraine is demanding "guarantees" ... guarantees for what? Obviously not being invaded again. That's the scenario being negotiated.
If the US is promising something, and for that guarantee to be meaningful, then that means asking the question of "would the US do this thing even if it otherwise wouldn't want to?". A promise is only meaningful if it actually compels you to fulfil your promise in circumstances you don't want to anymore.
Now, the answer to the question "Would the US intervene again in Ukraine even if it really doesn't want to, for whatever reasons, just because it promised Ukraine as much?"
The answer is: No, it won't.
It will just forget about the agreement under such circumstances, but more likely just negotiate the agreement in such a way as to not really promise anything anyways (because it can, as it has the leverage vis-a-vis Ukraine, so there's simply no reason to make potentially unfulfilled promises anyways).
Therefore, the reason for Ukraine to believe Russia would not invade is not any promise by the US, but simply the cost to Russia of another war being higher than the benefits. If the current war really was premised on the idea that it would be over in 3 days, and has been a disaster ever since, then obviously Ukraine has demonstrated it takes more than 3 days to conquer, so Ukraine can sleep easy with that fact being clear.
Can the agreement commit US to actions that further increase the cost of another war beyond simply fighting with the Ukrainians? Obviously yes, just I honestly don't see any interventions the US would reasonably do in a second war they aren't already doing (again, actions under which Russia is currently willing to wage war). More important to the subject matter, even if the US made such commitments, if the question is asked if anything holds the US to their word about those commitments (promises by the US are a meaningful guarantee), the answer is obviously no.
So, to summarise, not only is "guarantees" not a reasonable precondition to negotiate in the first place, but there is no guarantee that Ukraine can actually secure in any meaningful sense. Placing the word "guarantee" or "guarantors" on the agreement would have very slight PR differences on how any events would actually play out (such as a "super sorry bro" rather than a mere "sorry bro").
Of course, if you want to argue that more war is good for the West and good for Ukraine, then you need not justify Zelensky's unreasonable conditions (to talk peace), but just defend the actual decision of wanting more war and ignore Zelensky' bullshit or then justify it as clever trolling of his partners, the media and social media. It's not like the Western media is able to rationally critique anything he says, so he could literally say anything.
However, this configuration of Zelensky dictating what's true and false to the Western media is one of invitation and not power. What the CIA gives with its right hand, it can take with its left.
Zelensky's credibility can be placed at any moment at any level the US administration wants, without Zelensky having any say whatsoever in the matter.
US administration wants the world to doubt what Zelensky knew or didn't know, intentions behind his statements, about any missiles hitting Poland, paint him as a dangerous fool, done. US administration wants Zelensky to talk peace even if he doesn't want to because there is no peaceful end to the war compatible with the survival of his political career, and controlling billions of dollars of free money with zero accountability and zero "collect taxes and pay debts" requirements nor any governance services quality expectations by anyone ... or opposition media ... or opposition parties ... and win oscars for the performance ... is a pretty nice life style, literally a 2 day operation to have Zelensky start talking peace rather than "we will defeat the Russians".
An attack can be called "ad hominem" and yet not be fallacious in the specific sense of: "A makes a claim x, B asserts that A holds a property that is unwelcome, and hence B concludes that argument x is wrong" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem). As far as I've understood from the recent exchange between the two, @Christoffer didn't conclude nor suggest that @Benkei's understanding about Zelensky's claims was wrong out of Benkei's dishonest way of arguing. He simply argued that Benkei's understanding of Zelensky's claims wasn't obvious (It could be actions to put much harsher pressure on Russia, it could mean actions to rally military defense lines at the borders, it could mean actions to, as I said, initiate a no-fly zone and be more active in the defense of Ukraine rather than just sending weapons. It could merely mean that the world needs to take more action to prevent Russia from continuously killing civilians.) and then he additionally argued that Benkei's way of arguing was dishonest (The way you handle discussions like these, pointing out that something is "obvious" when it clearly isn't obvious, other than supporting your own argument, makes it impossible to have a discussion with you. You demand that your interpretation is the valid one and then everyone around you should comply based on that interpretation because then you can win that argument... wake me up when you're a more honest interlocutor. ).
And therefore claiming or suggesting that Christoffer committed a fallacious argument ad hominem is questionable. While one can more easily argue that Benkei's claim "I get you're not a native English speaker and the finer points of the translation are lost in you" is a fallacious ad hominem attack, because he seemed to conclude that a correct understanding of Zelensky's claims (like his) depends on somebody being a native English speaker. But that doesn't logically nor empirically follow at all.
But it is obvious.
Fist Zelensky Larps as a NATO member claiming an "attack on collective security", as if Ukraine is part of some collective.
This is the key phrase, claiming NATO is under attack.
Second he says "action must be taken", which is perfectly clear what that means in the context.
It's like me yelling "The building is on fire! Action must be taken!" (having no evidence of this), and when my actions cause damages, even lives by causing a panic, claiming that "aha! I didn't say what 'actions,' I could have meant just the situation should be investigated, my statement that was based on nothing verified, and there's no cause for alarm; it's not like I said there's a fire and people should panic or act based on that belief! Where do I say that!?!?!?!."
The only other interpretation available than Zelensky claiming Russia is attacking NATO and therefore NATO must respond with some militarily escalation of one form or another, would be that Zelensky is claiming an attack on collective security by Ukraine on NATO, because Zelensky ordered an attack on Poland that took Polish lives and, generally speaking, Ukrainian actions and reckless subterfuge is a menace to NATO and European welfare since 2014. But, I seriously doubt Zelensky meant an attack on collective security by Ukraine.
If his meaning was Russia, then everyone would understand he means Russia attacked NATO and therefore NATO must respond, at least somehow. If Zelensky does not want peace (requiring compromise and breaking all his extreme exaggerated promises of victory to the Ukrainian people and accepting a deal worse than what was on the table first week of the war), then his best option is escalation ... but he doesn't control the weapons so he can't escalate himself, he needs NATO to escalate.
... resulting from a single stray missile fired by one of their allies.
Yes, I'm glad the alliance has met the bare minimum threshold of not starting world war three on the basis of a single incident which their own intelligence shows to be a missile form their own ally. Yesterday they also didn't start the apocalypse because Putin looked at them funny. Well done them.
The response to this single incident included an appeal to "bomb Russia" from the highly influential Atlantic Council, plus mentions of Article 5, and "defending every inch of NATO territory" from the warmongers in the US and other NATO states.
That you find this reassuring is seriously worrying.
Glad I could worry you a little more than you normally are.
And what holds for US and Soviet Union doesn't necessarily hold for other countries not possessing such weapons, like Ukraine.
Quoting boethius
I never said such a thing. "Precondition" was referred not to nuclear weapons but to taking into account means of deterrence available to geopolitical subjects concerned about security. The US and Soviet Union possess nuclear weapons so they will take that into account. Nuclear weapons are something "that Ukraine doesn't have!" therefore it's rational for them to find an alternative (e.g. whatever kind of economic-military alliance with the West that could help them hedge the risks coming from Russia). That and only that is what you must have inferred from my claim as I repeatedly clarified.
Now for the tenth (?) and last time. I'm not interested in feeding your personal guinness record of intellectual failures.
Quoting boethius
Same with respect to what? If sunk costs are of significant magnitude for Russia or more consistent for Russia than for its rivals then the situation is not at all the same in some relevant sense.
Besides Russia couldn't know at the beginning of this war what would have costed to them this war. Worse than this, it seems to have badly miscalculated a lot of things (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-miscalculations). And once one is trapped inside a sunk cost fallacy, it's really hard to stop it.
Quoting boethius
The irony.
Quoting boethius
"Again, reading comprehension".
Quoting boethius
I totally agree with you if and only if you totally agree with me that is perfectly and pragmatically rational for Ukraine to look for "security guarantees" or equivalent to hedge against the risk of Russian adventurism at Ukrainian expenses.
Quoting boethius
You are pointlessly obsessing over nuclear bombs. Russia is claimed to see an existential threat in having Ukraine and Georgia within NATO, this was no actual nuclear threat (because they didn't have such weapons, and the membership wasn't imminent) nor - as you could argue - guarantee in the sense of certainty that Russia would be nuked after Ukraine joined NATO or after invading Ukraine following the Urkainian NATO membership. How do you interpret this behavior if international relations are just an ornament and nothing certain?
BTW, for the third time, who on earth is taking security guarantees in the certainty sense? Can you quote him?
Quoting boethius
Your point looks ornamental, once you take into account my points. Again, who on earth is reasonably assuming such circumstances would not reemerge in the future regardless of any peace deal today? Do you have actual quotes to provide or it's all a strawman argument you are looping over?
Quoting boethius
After some more blablabla you finally converge to my conclusion. So I can spare myself commenting the rest of your blablabla.
I wasn't arguing to support Christoff's understanding of Zelensky (I find Zelensky's attitude toward the missile incident questionable). I was arguing against the claim that Christoff committed a fallacious attack ad hominem.
Your exact word was "pre-condition".
Pre-condition for what? A deal concerning nuclear weapons. What's the precondition again? Having nuclear weapons, in your rebuttal to my point that the United States and Soviet Union were able to come to agreements despite not trusting each other (that "trust", such as "trusting Putin", is not a precondition to international agreements and treatise and so on).
You simply are unable to read and understand your own words.
Now you've moved the goal posts from "pre-condition" to "rational requirement" to "taking into consideration" all the way to "what holds for some parties may not hold for all parties", which is in no way an analogue for "pre-condition".
Maybe just admit you made a completely ignorant argument because in your own mind it sounded good the idea that US and Soviet Union, having nuclear weapons, don't need to trust each other due to their deterrence of actually having nuclear weapons (even underlining that "Ukraine doesn't have!" said nuclear weapons, so the pre-condition doesn't "hold" for them) and, at the time, you were completely oblivious to the easy and obvious contradiction to such an argument being other non-nuclear states entered the same agreements, so obviously it's not a pre-condition to have nuclear weapons to agree about nuclear weapons.
Quoting neomac
It's rational to want to shit gold (in a rectally safe way and not a "careful what you wish for way"). It's rational for Zelensky to want to be king of the world. So, if by "look for" you mean "desire", sure, it's rational to desire a lot of things that won't happen, even knowing they cannot possibly happen.
If by look for you mean some actual objective ... and you are now placing "security guarantees" in quotations to emphasise the ornamental meaning of the phrase in the context we're discussing, then yes, we do agree. But all you're saying is that Ukraine (if it wanted to get a peace deal) should seek as good a deal as it can get, which is obviously true.
The basic point of international relations I have been trying to instruct you about, is that a good international deal if by "good" we mean is actually followed and implemented, is one in which the parties involved carry out their promises because they remain actions they would want to do anyways in the circumstances that follow. All an international relations agreement accomplishes in practice is coordination between willing participants and very slight resolutions of catch 22's where each party would do the actions in questions (such as reduce their weapons stockpiles for their own reasons) but only if the other party was doing so as well (solution, a system of fly over's and other inspections to see the other party is doing what they promised, in which case we'll do what we promised).
Vis-a-vis a peace deal in Ukraine, the primary factor of believing Russia would not simply reinvade is because one believes Russia would not want to, an entirely reasonable belief if one does in fact believe this war was a disaster for Russia and was premised on a total victor in 3 days. If one believed they had this current scenario in mind in launching the invasion (perhaps not as their preferred scenario, but possible and accepted), and were willing to pay the cost to achieve what they have so far, then it stands to reason they may pay a similar cost to accomplish as much in the future.
To believe the US would supply arms again in such a future invasion, again, is to assume they see that, again, as a positive cost-benefit to themselves.
All sorts of things could be in a deal that (if people kept their word) may increase or decrease the cost to Russia of another war, but none of these would be in any sense a "guarantee", except in the ornamental sense of "trust us bro" and not in a sense of certainty nor some legal sense of a court holding a party to their promise (embellishing the legal consequences to compensate the arrogance of someone who "guarantees" and doesn't deliver).
However, the biggest problem to a peace deal at the moment is that Zelensky has made a completely uncompromising position for himself, to justify further fighting at all costs, and that compromising would immediately result in the problem (for Zelensky) that it's a worse compromise than what was available before (in any deal we can imagine the Russians accepting). Of course, the West may have accomplished what it wanted in dragging out the war and damaging Russia as you point out they are want to do, but Zelensky also has constituents not only in Western parliaments but also in Ukraine who may not see the logic for them in such a resolution to the conflict.
Sure, but this defence still requires Zelensky's words as somehow unclear.
And, if we were only talking about "action must be taken", that's ambiguous enough, but the context is incredibly clear, specifically the word "attack" is incredibly clear without alternative meaning.
There's no system of goal post shell game that can be played to turn the meaning of "attack" into "maybe it was an accident, no biggey, nothing to see here" nor "actually, we should probably investigate where the missiles came from".
There's really no other meanings available.
Now, if despite Zelensky's meaning being perfectly clear, you nevertheless see no ad hominem, I do not really care about the ad hominem in itself, wasn't directed at me and I wouldn't care if it was, but the meaning of Zelensky's words claiming Russia has directly attacked NATO does seem to me relevant to discussion.
Now, I would agree Zelensky's words wouldn't cause NATO to do anything anyways, but it is important information about Zelensky's character or if he's in control of his own forces. In Zelensky demanding the data, what is clear is that neither Zelensky nor anyone under his command has any data that indicates any Russian missile they were chasing.
Maybe Zelensky believed his own commanders "in good faith" without asking for the evidence before accusing Russia of having killed two Polish citizens (because he follows the maverick shoot from the hip play book of the league of extraordinary statesmen), but, even if this was true, the commanders in turn have no evidence for their claim.
Now you may "understand" the lying, "given the circumstances", as @Olivier5 would defend, but that is an extremely naive understanding of the circumstances.
Even if the West would never cause a stir about such lying in public, no one appreciates being lied to and that may have serious consequences, perhaps accelerating the "ally fatigue" Zelensky has already been warned about.
Even a liar only wants us to believe their lies but does not like being lied to in turn. "We're all the fucking scum of the earth" is not a team building argument.
Here I claim it again: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue
The problem is not the word "precondition" but the syntactic ambiguity of "this" which you took as referring to "deterrence means" instead of "taking into account the deterrence means they both had ". This looks to me now the likely trigger of your misunderstanding. Anyways you are wrong.
Quoting boethius
I see you understand the word "rationality" as arbitrarily as you understand the word "precondition". Still waiting for you to quote who believed in security guaranties in the sense of certainty. Try harder.
Quoting boethius
Like "pre-condition" I guess. BTW "clear" in the sense that is obvious to you or in the sense that we should really care about?
Quoting boethius
You are getting closer to the same conclusion. But since you keep insisting on talking in terms "ornamental" then I'll ask you again: Russia is claimed to see an existential threat in having Ukraine and Georgia within NATO, this was no actual nuclear threat (because they didn't have such weapons, and the membership wasn't imminent) nor - as you could argue - guarantee in the sense of certainty that Russia would be nuked after Ukraine joined NATO or after invading Ukraine following the Urkainian NATO membership. How do you interpret this behavior if international relations are just an ornament and nothing certain?
October–November 2022 nationwide missile strikes on Ukraine
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]
They might've run low on kamikaze drones.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17
[sup]— Hird, Bailey, Klepanchuk, Kagan · Critical Threats · Nov 17, 2022[/sup]
The bombings are "cheap" in a way. Go set up gear, push buttons, go for lunch, check the news, repeat. Defense is more tedious. Take'm down aggressively. (Whether that'd frustrate/amuse the Kremlin or not.) On another note, maybe someone implemented the drone swarm concept and is good to do a run?
Putin’s generals preparing for more Ukrainian ‘breakthroughs’, says UK
[sup]— Rachael Burford · Evening Standard · Nov 18, 2022[/sup]
Digging in. Land grab. (Or attempted anyway.)
[sup]? Source[/sup]
That's simply not your original claim, and if it is it means nothing.
Notice the tautological nature of your new claim, which is, seeing as you agree having nuclear weapons isn't a precondition to any agreement about nuclear weapons in anyway, that people just basically take into account information in making decisions. True for pretty much any decisions.
Ukraine doesn't deterrence means ... but also took that into account in negotiating accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
There's actually a long list of countries without nuclear weapons that have agreed by accession or ratification to the NPT, that you can consult at treaties.unoda.org.
So, countries having nuclear weapons is a precondition for these other non-nuclear states taking into account the deterrence means of themselves and other parties etc. etc. etc. in order to decide to agree.
All that's saying is the existence of nuclear weapons, or then their conception, is a precondition to an agreement about nuclear weapons, and people thinking it's a good idea to agree to the treaty (for whatever reason) is a precondition for actually agreeing. I.e. the tautology that if someone agrees to something ... they at least thought they had good enough reasons to do so at the time, why else would they agree. Certainly it's tautological for the "rational agents" you like to sprinkle here and there in these little exchanges.
By definition a rational agent does not do something they are entirely convinced a terrible idea in every way and in no way serves any of their purposes. Obviously. And that's all your saying: US and Soviet Union thought the NTP was a good idea ... as did all the other states that agreed to it who didn't have nuclear weapons.
You're attempt to water down your original claim, clearly trying to rebut my claim that trusting Putin was in no way a precondition to a deal with Putin, is just really boring at this point.
However, it's instructive because it's a good example for anyone following of how the "that's not what I really meant" defence works in terms of mental gymnastics the practitioner can engage in and likely genuinely believe on some level.
I'm sure Zelensky genuinely believes his meaning was not to try to escalate military confrontation between NATO and Russia without any evidence but was all entirely reasonable at the time and still is even if we have to stretch the imagination to the point of being stupid.
Quoting neomac
Shitting gold is not an arbitrary. Gold is worth a lot of money, it's rational to want money according to every economics text book I've ever read, therefore it's rational to want to shit gold if that were possible and safe. Arbitrary would be that I'm just as willing to defend "it's rational to want to be eaten alive by scorpions", which I'm not. I do not think it's rational to want to be eaten alive by scorpions; seems completely irrational.
The point of this example is that stating its rational for Zelensky to want something, such as security guarantees, is not the same as stating it's a rational expectation or even possible for Zelensky to get.
We can agree that it's a rational desire on Zelensky's part, without agreeing he has any way to meaningfully get what he wants nor agreeing that anyone can even offer what he wants. Even if Biden were to swear up and down on his own son's coke, Biden may not be there in 2 years and the next US president not only care nothing for whatever Biden promised by even actively hostile to Zelensky's interests.
Your phrase "look for" is, true to form, ambiguous. It's of course rational to be on the lookout for the satisfaction of desires, even if one does not expect them. If I desire magic to actually exist (despite zero evidence) I may rationally defend being on the "look out" for ferries that have magic dust, of a coke or similar kind.
Where we can start to seriously question my rationality is if I start to put resources into attracting these ferries that I have no reason to believe exist, just would very much like the coke ferries to be an actual thing.
Likewise, if I start to make decisions, spending resources, taking risks, leading thousands of my fellow citizens to their deaths, in my quest to uncover the true magic of ferries, having zero evidence they actually exist, then, the rationality of my behaviour is, at best, highly circumspect and people may come to question my decision making process.
So, if there is no "security guarantee" that can feasibly be made for Zelensky, he may rationally rather that not be the case, but to act based on the expectation of something that cannot be offered would then fall in the irrational category.
It's only rational to make a precondition that cannot be satisfied by any party an obstacle as another way to simply say "no, I refuse to negotiate, more war please" and otherwise irrational preconditions simply a way of trolling people.
That is the issue at hand; the actual debate that is relevant to the discussion and the situation in Ukraine and Zelensky's negoitation position.
Now, if you concede the central point of contention that there is no guarantee available other than ornamentation to an agreement no one expect to be followed a week after it's signed, if circumstances emerge that render the agreement no longer in the interests of the key parties to follow, then certainly there are better and worse deals and Zelensky would want to be as confident as he can Russia won't just reinvade (or then act in his rational self interest and just be concerned about his own immediate political future and wealth, maybe take a bribe to sell Ukraine out to maximise his profits of this whole enterprise; maybe crack open an econ-101 book and look out for number 1 like a boss), but there is zero way for anyone to meaningfully guarantee they'll do what they promise or Russia will do what it promises in such a deal.
The reasons to take the deal are:
1. The alternative is losing on the battlefield and the worse conditions being imposed by force without any further leverage to negotiate conditions.
2. One genuinely believes the parties involved will follow the deal anyways, even without any guarantees (that do not and cannot exist), and that circumstances will stay that way, at least long enough that it serves your own purposes in making the deal.
3. One has no intention to follow the deal oneself, it's all part of a 5D military-diplomatic maverick statesmen move to buy time, track down the coke ferries once and for all, fly off to never-never land, track down the lost boyz and do an insane amount of coke.
4. One has been bribed to sell out ones own country for the next best thing next to magic: the fucking money.
Yes, precondition is also a pretty clear meaning, just like attack.
If you say A is a precondition for B, the meaning is not-A isn't compatible with B ... it was a precondition so it should definitely be there for there to be B.
Saying A is a precondition for B but likewise not-A is also a precondition for B, that's the exact opposite of the meaning of precondition.
Lookup precondition in a search engine results in literally:
Quoting search engine search for precondition
Notice the strong words like "must" ... and absence of words like "optional" or "nice to have, but not like, an actual precondition".
... Notice the example the search engine produces from Oxford Languages ... "a precondition for peace".
Quote whatever you think was my original claim so I can claim it again and then you explain its meaning to me, dude.
Quoting boethius
Sure like a rational requirement, like the rules of logic, that's why the word precondition was appropriate for me to use. In other words, the problem is not the word "precondition" but probably the syntactic ambiguity of "this" which you took as referring to "deterrence means" instead of "taking into account the deterrence means they both had ". This might have triggered your misunderstanding. Anyways it remains a misunderstanding.
Quoting boethius
But I didn’t make anywhere the claim that “people just basically take into account information in making decisions”, indeed you are incapable of quoting any such claim. It's like me attributing to you the claim: "basically nothing is certain in life", which is another obvious truth.
My point was and is that available deterrence means must be taken into account by rational agents in the geopolitical arena for both war time and peace time, since security concerns are of paramount importance in geopolitics. From that follows that it’s rational for Ukraine to look for affordable deterrence means alternative to the nuclear weapons (as long as it doesn’t have it) to hedge against the risks of Russian expansionism: e.g. NATO membership and “security guarantees”. The likelihood of this happening depends on the West of course as much as the support Ukraine gets right now against the Russian aggression and prior to such an aggression, independently from the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member yet. But as long as the West perceives Russia as a non-negligible threat and has the means to counter it, Ukraine can rationally exploit such condition (as it has managed to do so far) to have the West stick around at the expense of Russian expansionism during war time and peace time e.g. through NATO membership or “security guarantees”.
What’s catastrophic in your dialectic strategy is that after realising you have badly misunderstood my claims, you are trying to make them ultimately appear at the same time as obviously true (by calling them “tautological”) and most likely false (by calling them “ornamental”).
Unfortunately for you what I claimed is very much consequential and in line with standard understanding of international relations as applied to Ukraine:
Rasmussen characterized the proposed security pact as part of a long-term answer to the West’s long-standing challenge with Russia, rather than as an act of charity to Ukraine, as Washington tries to pivot more resources to geopolitical competition with China. “If we get this right, the security guarantees to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem, because it is in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks.”
Volker said the best way to secure Ukraine over the long term was to focus on the country’s eventual accession into NATO, rather than working out an interim option. “It’s good to have this [Kyiv Security Compact] as an alternative that people can chew on,” said Volker, who also served as U.S. special envoy to Ukraine. “But when you start stacking it against actual NATO membership, and you start considering this as a possibility at a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better.”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/10/ukraine-nato-accession-kyiv-security-compact-rasmussen/
Since you keep dodging my questions, here they are again:
Until you answer them appropriately, I’ll keep considering your claims for what they look, a monumental straw man argument because grounded on the caricatural assumption that security guarantees is wrongly associated with certainty instead of being rightly associated with hedging against uncertainty.
Disinformation in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]
Steven Seagal joined the war? Can't lose then. Unless Chuck Norris...
"The Ghost of Kyiv" seems more standard, if you will. The elusive legendary superhero.
Then there are the weapons with blood magick and the Satanic seals. Scary stuff.
The fake fact-checks are a bit more inventive.
:smile:
Sorry 'can't contribute much to this thread. I'm just here for moral support to you guys.
Putin's Covert Conscription Will Flood 'Overburdened' Russian Forces: ISW
[sup]— Brendan Cole · Newsweek · Nov 19, 2022[/sup]
... Putin's team is moving to war on. From the looks of it, either their losses are higher than what they report, or they have further war plans of sorts. Expansion? Maybe they just aim to flood whatever occupied regions with Russians in uniforms? Starting to look like Putin's Russia is becoming an increased threat to others, which would be bad news.
Meanwhile, ? crap in North Korea. :/
I think it's pretty obvious that their casualties and overall losses have been substantial. If the US military is estimating about 100 000 casualties (meaning killed and wounded), that is a huge amount. The verified equipment losses are very large. Hence the mobilization has been a stop gap measure.
As Russia doesn't have a large organized system for mobilization and training (because at peace time the training is done in the units now deployed to Ukraine), they likely have to limit the taking in of reservists. The mobilization had simply to be stopped to do the conscription. After the conscripts are possible to be put forward to the units, then the mobilization can continue. I think Putin has understood that something obviously ending up in a mess (as there isn't the organization and the manpower to do it properly), it's better not to make a huge deal about it.
Quoting boethius
As if?
The UN? OSCE? WTO?
Or is it that artificial countries run by neonazis aren't part of a collective? :smirk:
The idea of one incident then leading to another and then leading to WW3 is the typical unreasonable scaremongering of some. But it's quite natural that saying the obvious, that things do tend to go like this, is basically politically incorrect at least to the nuclear armageddon fearing crowd. Yet nuclear deterrence works: it's pretty hard to go up the escalatory stairs. Sides show obvious restraint.
The fact is that all the potential global clashing points are like this: North Korea vs US and South Korea, Iran vs US, China vs Taiwan and of course, Russia vs US/NATO, all show the obvious restraint when things do escalate.
Let's take an example,
The below pictures are of artillery engagement between North and South Korea. In it several artillery units from both sides engaged in an artillery duel lasting for about an hour which resulted in South Korea having two soldiers killed and 19 wounded, two civilians killed and three wounded and perhaps some North Korean soldiers killed and wounded (South Korea estimates 30-40 North Korean casualties).
And this happened in 2010.
So does anybody remember the great panic in the Korean Peninsula twelve years ago?
No. Even at the time there was no media panic. The out-of-the-blue engagement just raised eyebrowse.
There wasn't any continuation, neither side escalated the fighting. The event wasn't in anybodies interest to escalate. The Bombardment of Yeonpyeong is a forgotten detail in the Korean crisis.
Another example is when during the Trump administration Iran retaliated the assassination of a high level military leader with artillery missile attack on US bases in Iraq. The US didn't respond.
Hence if in this war there would be an escalation: a missile on a logistical base or something, the likely response would be a limited similar response designed specifically to be basically a tit for tat. If by some reason Russian and NATO jets would engage each other, it would be limit to the aircraft at hand, likely in the air at that time.
How the above potential events would lead to all-out nuclear war is beyond me. And beyond any credible reasoning from the nuclear scare mongers, but their motivation is just to alarm people.
I have little doubts you're actually in such a self-delusion, perhaps on some level vaguely remembering your original point and thinking it was a good one, but now completely within an emotional state that you believe you're rewriting your memories of this conversation is a "good trick" and you deserve a medal or something.
It's extremely boring, but I will entertain it further as my primary purpose on this forum is to develop methods against bad faith debate. Just boringly repeating your delusions is a common bad faith debate tactic, so let continue.
To cite the point under consideration again:
Quoting neomac
Now, unless you're now claiming to have zero reading comprehensions skills, of your own words or anyone else's, at this point in the debate the word "precondition" had been the focus of discussion for several pages with a clear meaning; Zelensky uses the word and everyone in the discussion was using the word in exactly the same way, exactly how the dictionary describes it.
So, if you want to say now that you didn't read any of that, just happened to drop into the discussion completely randomly to say absolutely nothing, and just "accidentally" used the word precondition but in an unusual and meaningless way without any intention to reference anything in the debate you were joining, yes, zero reading comprehension would be one explanation. But, in that case you're unlikely to be able to comprehend your lack of reading comprehension through reading. It's also unlikely as you've been engaged in this discussion for a while, and clearly know the bare minimum of "what words mean" in order to take part.
The issue under discussion is "precondition" for negotiation (such as "trusting Putin" or "security guarantees" etc.). You are clearly a partisan to Zelensky jumping in to defend his claims to require preconditions to be met to negotiate, contradicting my claims to the contrary.
Your point is clear, Zelensky's preconditions can make sense even if the deals between the US and Soviet Union are a counter example (on the issue of trust), because there is a difference between them and Ukraine. They have Nuclear Weapons "but Ukraine doesn’t have!"
Which is a meaningful argument. Would make sense (if it was true) as a rebuttal to my claim, that there is a critical difference in the counter example and the situation at hand, supporting Zelensky's insistance on "precondition".
Now, you've moved the goal posts from "pre-condition" all the way to a tautology that in a deal about nuclear weapons the US and the Soviet Union took into account nuclear weapons (the idea, who has them, etc.) just like every other state, nuclear power or not, would do exactly the same, and actually having nuclear weapons was obviously not a precondition to agreeing to the deals that the US, Soviet Union and most non-nuclear states also agree to.
If you didn't think you were making a meaningful point, you'd make it clear that non-nuclear states of course "rationally pursue" the same kinds of deals and "not-having" nuclear weapons is a precondition for doing so (in the way you are using term), and that your use of "pre-condition" means absolutely nothing as the contrary to the precondition in question may result in the exact same actions, which is not what a precondition is (how it's described in the dictionary, how Zelensky uses it, how we were using it in this discussion about Zelensky's use of the term, until you retroactively invented a completely unusual and bizarre meaning that is obviously a lie, and boils down to the the tautology of a "a factor under consideration").
But, anyone who is actually a fan of reading comprehension can clearly see that the structure and meaning of your original claim was that having nuclear weapons was a precondition to enter agreements with untrusted parties and, therefore, it's not "rational to pursue" doing the same if you don't have nuclear weapons.
The intended purpose of your statement is to defend Zelensky's various preconditions as "rational to pursue" given Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons. An argument you continue to make, clearly arguing Zelensky understandably is going to want guarantees in any deal and taking issue with my claim that any "guarantee" will be purely ornamental (perhaps a nice ornament to have, but ornament non the less).
The original meaning is clear and it clearly serves an important function in your overall position that security guarantees are a "rational" precondition for Zelensky to seek out in any peace deal; whereas the US and the Soviet Union didn't require such guarantees in their various peace making dealings because they already had nuclear weapons.
Your original rebuttal to my claim makes perfect sense to support your position and serves a clear roll in the argumentation structure you've developed.
The problem you've encountered is that your position is false: nuclear weapons are not a precondition to enter agreements about nuclear weapons and, more importantly, security guarantees do not exist and cannot be invented to satisfy Zelensky's desire for guarantees (even if we can easily agree he'd want them if they could and do exist and provided to him in any agreement and, even better, as a precondition to even start discussing an agreement; just as we can rationally want a lot of things that don't exist or can't happen or then so unlikely to not-happen that it is functionally the same as can't happen; impossible desires that are actually completely critical to decision making, as often we do not know what is possible or not and to check the feasibility of something, that we'd want it if it were possible, is generally a "precondition" to going and checking, otherwise why would we care? The exception being when we desire it not to be true, as it would present a risk to us, but we go check the feasibility to evaluate our risk mitigation; but this is really the exact same thing that our desire is something not-be-true even it maybe or actually is true, and we are still desiring "A" despite its impossibility, just A is best described as a "not-B" and A is impossible because B is actually true).
The reason to believe the peace deal will work is if one believes things in the real world do and will continue to motivate all the key parties to follow the deal, and will have little to do with what the deal actually says (because, as you've pointed out yourself, international law is "voluntary based" system). The wording of the deal maybe necessary to coordinate willing participants, and some plans are better than others, but what the wording of the deal will not accomplish is keep any party to their word if they decide it's better not to (such as the US, EU, Ukraine, Russia).
Now, the boring response to explaining the obvious to you again will be "Yes! both nuclear and non-nuclear states rationally pursued the exact same agreements, but I was actually talking about counter-factual agreements that didn't happen but could happen that maybe nuclear states might pursue only because they have nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states wouldn't pursue because they don't have nuclear weapons, we can imagine the difference in nuclear status resulting in difference of diplomatic outcomes! The 'pre-condition' I pointed out, although not an actual pre-condition, could nevertheless be a condition that can be different and lead to different decision making outcomes."
Aka: "people take information into account in making decisions, and different configurations of information can lead to different decisions, even under the same rational framework; I have discovered, after hundreds of pages of discussing diplomacy and warmaking, a basic description of the decision making process: people have information and make decisions, and the information, like if you have nuclear weapons or not, is taken into account in making decisions. Do I get a philosophy medal now?"
If also want to change the meaning of words around to make boring discussion, be my guest.
"Collective" is a strong word in political analysis, and Zelensky is clearly using it in exactly that very strong way of a collective strong enough to act in common military defence. "Collective security is under attack" is Zelensky's words.
Of course, he certainly would like to be part of the collective he's talking about, but isn't, and obviously you know that. Zelensky know's that too, so the next best thing would be being able to tell NATO what do do, which he tries in his statement.
But, even saying the obvious:
The UN is not a collective and doesn't define itself like that:
Quoting UN about page
Certainly capable of collective action, but through this process of gathering together, discussing common problems and finding solutions.
The OSCE literally describes itself as a forum:
Quoting OSCE
And the WTO is quite clearly about trading and not any sort of collective action.
Quoting WTO
Your examples are far from describing themselves as "collectives", much less any kind of collective that has mutual security and it would make sense to say "attack on collective security".
Of course, you can always join the game of bait-and-switch the meaning of words in order to say nothing and try to bore other participants out of participation. Does the UN involve a "collection" of nations, yes, is that collection a "collective" connoting a pretty strong political bond, far beyond a forum of dialogue, and presumed collective action? No.
Again, Oxford languages as the first result in searching "define:collective"
Quoting Search engine search for Define Collective
So you would agree that Russia could employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine "out-of-the-blue" with zero fear of any US response.
... And you'd even make the stronger claim that our media wouldn't even be all too worked up about it, no worries, certainly no reason to panic, just raise some eyebrows at best?
Quoting boethius
Well, NATO is about "collective defence" (that's the phrase they use).
I think, though, Zelenskyy also wanted to put forth that Putin's Russia poses a threat to others, and to unify efforts (Didzis Nestro and others have also aired unease). After all, Putin and compadres have been talking about dire threats to Russia for a while (it's Putin against a couple or so continents), to the point of justification to wage war.
It's that kind of wretched environment. Threats take stage, regardless of technical semantics of "collective". :/
Quoting ... maybe ...
‘Tyranny and turmoil’ in Russian invasion, US defense secretary says
[sup]— Rob Gillies · AP · Military Times · Nov 20, 2022[/sup]
Quoting Murray Brewster · CBC News · Nov 19, 2022
That's why I have no pity for your intellectual misery.
Quoting boethius
A sequel of nonsense one after the other:
- I'm claiming that you keep misunderstanding my claim (and I did it even in that quotation!).
- I also explained to you what triggered your wrong understanding of my claim.
- I said nowhere that I used the word precondition as Zelensky.
- You didn't even quote Zelensky's claims where he used the word precondition.
- The rest of your comment follows from your reiterated wrong assumptions, so more of the same intellectual misery, good for the trash bin.
Quoting boethius
Unfortunately for you what I claimed is very much consequential wrt what I argued since the beginning (and you misunderstood) and in line with standard understanding of international relations as applied to Ukraine:
Rasmussen characterized the proposed security pact as part of a long-term answer to the West’s long-standing challenge with Russia, rather than as an act of charity to Ukraine, as Washington tries to pivot more resources to geopolitical competition with China. “If we get this right, the security guarantees to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem, because it is in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks.”
Volker said the best way to secure Ukraine over the long term was to focus on the country’s eventual accession into NATO, rather than working out an interim option. “It’s good to have this [Kyiv Security Compact] as an alternative that people can chew on,” said Volker, who also served as U.S. special envoy to Ukraine. “But when you start stacking it against actual NATO membership, and you start considering this as a possibility at a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better.”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/10/ukraine-nato-accession-kyiv-security-compact-rasmussen/
Since you keep dodging my questions, here they are again:
Until you answer them appropriately, I’ll keep considering your claims for what they look, a monumental straw man argument because grounded on the caricatural assumption that security guarantees is wrongly associated with certainty instead of being rightly associated with hedging against uncertainty.
P.S.
I re-claim all I wrote, word by word:
[i]This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached[/i].
— boethius
Quoting neomac
Of course not!
I'm implying that if there is an unfortunate accident, let's say Russian aircraft shoots down a NATO aircraft of vice versa, things won't automatically escalate.
This isn't 1914 or 1939. Nobody is looking for a general war.
Of course, what you are saying is what Medvedev said earlier: that the US / NATO wouldn't do anything if Russia used nukes in Ukraine. Naturally to that kind of public statement, US and NATO had to reply in some way.
And of course, backchannels are open and used now.
The thread is discussing Zelensky and his preconditions for dozens of pages. I write my views about it, which you then respond to in a way perfectly consistent with the discussion so far as well as what precondition means in the discussion so far and also in the dictionary.
Only after your point is wrong do you go on an endless "axchually" diatribe explaining how you use the word differently to make an empty point.
It's the most boring, bad faith, cowardly way to debate: retroactively dilute the meanings of words to most the goal posts of your claim to something so trivial and tautological it is not wrong ... but also just dumb if that was actually your original point and you're not lying about it now.
But you seem to take yourself for a clever chap, and it's far more clever to lie than to just be an idiot.
For your new story about the word to make any make sense at all, you're asking us to believe you were simply not following the discussion and just-so-happened to use the word in a different sense to make an empty point about how people generally make decisions (taking into account the situation; in this case who has nuclear weapons and who doesn't, although of course having nuclear weapons isn't an actual precondition for anything we've talking about as people without nuclear weapons do the same things).
Quoting neomac
Do you even understand what you are reading?
This is a proposal exactly in the understanding of international relations I've described: whatever the US does, now or in the future, is because it's in the US interest and no Ukraine. There's no charity towards Ukraine now nor in the future.
So first of all, what's the corollary to his idea? Well, if his theory turns out to be wrong for whatever reason, then the US would cease supporting Ukraine, and look out for number 1 as it always does.
You can also see clearly the ornamental nature of guarantee. For, if it stopped being in the US interest to carry out this plan, maybe the dust settles and Russia offers a good deal to keep Ukraine out of NATO and to cease arming it, the basic premise of the entire proposal is the US is going to do that: the only way for Ukraine to benefit from interaction with the US is if Ukraine's interest aligns with the US' interest and here's an idea for that in the long term. Consequence? If this alignment of interest were to break down for any reason, Ukraine would not be able to rely on these "guarantees" and would discover that the word guarantee in this context is purely ornamental.
"If we get this right, the security arrangements to start and are in no way guaranteed down the line to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem," is the exact same meaning as "guaranteed" in the context. Diplomats and political analysts like calling them guarantees, as it seems nicer.
As for the theory itself ... it's just really stupid.
Even according the author, you could only finalise this plan at "a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better".
But if Russia has accepted to live within its own borders after a long and bloody war and eventual "defeat", in some sense that doesn't involve actual defeat in Ukraine v Russia, then Ukraine can be slipped into NATO as Russia will be so weak as to be unable to oppose it.
However, if Russia has accepted to live within its own border ... why would it be "in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks."
Why would a nation that has accepted to live within its own borders attack anyone?
But, I'm sure you have some new boring diatribe explaining how this proposal is self contradictory and stupid ... if words mean what they they say in the dictionary!!! But they obviously don't ever!!!
We agree here. If we are only considering Zelensky lying to us; I think what matters is the intention. Zelensky's intention is clearly to escalate tensions between nuclear powers in a way that he certainly has in mind may go all the way to nuclear war; either as a desirable thing or then just a risk he's willing to take.
An act of criminal defamation and fraud with intended damages.
Certainly Zelensky is so delusional as to think his words matter outside what is convenient to his backers, but I don't think we should minimise the intended consequences of his actions.
What you describe, if true, simply puts into sharp relief the extent of Zelensky's delusions, which we should take into consideration in our analysis that Ukraine is lead by an out of control maniac willing to cause extreme damages on false pretences and lying to us.
You're right, we should be very worried about what damages he can practically achieve out-of-the-blue given his unstable and delusional mental state, thinking two polish citizens killed by a missile could be anything more than raising a few eyebrows even if it was Russia. Now that he's discovered this particular plan doesn't work, and no one cares what he has to say about it, we should be worried about what reckless and damaging options are within his grasp.
Yes, go ahead and read your own words:
Quoting neomac
"pre-condition for the kind of agreements" and "but Ukraine doesn’t have!"
You are making a "pre-condition" difference between Ukraine and the US and Soviet Union. Why you use the word "pre-condition". You are simply so ignorant of international relations that you were simply unaware that non-nuclear powers, including Ukraine, "rationally pursued" in your pseudo-intellectual-bullshit way of speaking, the same agreements, so obviously having nuclear weapons was not a precondition for pursuing these kinds of agreements (the reality is in direct contradiction to your claim).
Any "rational agent" that was actually aware they were not describing a precondition related to the result of negotiating an agreement, would then obviously clarify that: followed by an actual meaningful point; such as: "Of course, the agreements between the US and Soviet Union weren't of a kind that having nuclear weapons was a precondition, but here's an example of such an agreement that a nuclear power would rationally pursue but a non-nuclear power like Ukraine wouldn't rationally pursue--since if I don't even have one example for my hypothetical ... I'd look pretty foolish ... almost, but not as quite as foolish as changing my position to basically describe how decisions are made generally speaking: pursuing something you want for some reason and also considering the situation and what you know about it."
You'd say "of course Ukraine and many other nations don't have nuclear weapons and pursued the same agreements, but 'thinking about it' is what I mean is a preconditon to agreeing; both the US, the Soviet Union and everyone else thought about nuclear weapons, wherever they are, before agreeing to the same kind of agreements; there's no meaningful difference I am pointing to."
But that's obviously not your point, your point is obviously that the US and the Soviet Union could enter some kinds of agreements contingent on actually having nuclear weapons and it would be irrational if they didn't have nuclear weapons, making it a precondition which is why you literally say precondition, and non-nuclear powers would therefore not pursue those kinds of agreements as they lack the precondition to pursue those kinds of agreements as rational agents, at least as they exist in your head.
As that's exactly what you say. You even emphasise this difference with an exclamation mark: "but Ukraine doesn’t have!" If what Ukraine didn't have made no difference (to the kinds of agreements it could rational pursue), you would have said "but Ukraine doesn’t have! but of course that doesn't matter for these kinds of agreements we're talking about!!"
No. Apparently it's...
Quoting ssu
The sophistic art of the historicist...
When events from the past don't match your preferred theory say "ah, but things are different now".
When events in the past do match your pet theory say "see, the way things happened in the past shows us how they will happen today, nothing is different"
Voilà. One completely self-immunised theory.