Ukraine Crisis

Quoting Tzeentch

and that it somehow proves that NATO membership for Ukraine wasn't the driver behind this conflict

Because why then Russia would attack? Mere muscle flexing in one large military exercise would have done it. No need to attack Ukraine.

Quoting Tzeentch

And what I'm arguing is that what the other NATO countries thought about NATO membership for Ukraine is completely irrelevant,[quote="Tzeentch;774805"]
This answer shows how little understanding of NATO you have.

It's a defense pact between members states which all have to accept new members. It's not just a sock-puppet of the US President as you think it is. Just look at how many times the US has gone to war without NATO and how many times US Presidents have been angry about the whole organization. And we should remember that it's sister organizations CENTO and SEATO have already sidenotes on history pages.

[quote="Tzeentch;774805"]because the policy that the United States pursued made Ukraine a de facto member of NATO anyway, whether the other member states liked it or not.

Now you are totally making things up: the US doesn't make NATO members. The US can give assistance, military aid, train together and have all kinds of relations with one country, but that doesn't make it a "de facto" NATO member. Israel isn't a NATO member and so wasn't Afghanistan before turning again to an emirate.


Quoting Tzeentch

Coming back to my point, the Europeans do not play a role of significance in this conflict.

Do not play a role?

That's simply utter bullshit.

Let's start with the real committers to this war: Estonia and Latvia have committed to Ukraine military and financial aid equivalent of 1% of GDP. Basically the Baltic States and Poland are throwing as much as possible as they can +the kitchen sink to help Ukraine. Yes, they are small, but the European commitment comes to be huge by aggregate: when you add all of the things provided by various nations together, it becomes quite substantial.

Let's take for example tanks and armoured vehicles. The US has given 200 armoured vehicles and no tanks. Only Poland has given over 300 tanks and armoured vehicles to Ukraine. Czechia has given 153 tanks of which 90 have been upgraded by Netherlands and over hundred other armoured vehicles.

And then let's look at what Germany has given and has now promised to give:

107 border protection vehicles*
4 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
168 mobile heating systems*
20 rocket launchers 70mm on pick-up trucks with rockets*
15 armoured recovery vehicles*
13 tank transporter tractor Oshkosh M1070*
7 tracked and remote controlled infantry vehicles for support tasks*
143 Pick-ups*
216 generators
35 load-handling 8x8 wheeler trucks
26 reconnaissance drones*
36 ambulance vehicles*
36.400 wool blankets
12 heavy duty trailer trucks*
55 anti-drone sensors and jammers*
30 drone detection systems*
6 lift trucks*
Iris-T system and SLM missiles*
60,000 rounds ammunition 40mm*
18,500 projectiles 155mm
18 load-handling trucks 8x8
50 MRAP vehicles DINGO
3 bridge-laying tanks BEAVER*
10 unmanned surface vessels*
14,000 sleeping bags
Mi-24 spare parts*
ammunition for multiple rocket launchers MARS II
spare parts for heavy machine gun M2
20 frequency range extensions for anti-drone devices*
17 heavy and medium bridge systems*
5 multiple rocket launchers MARS II with ammunition
14 self-propelled howitzers Panzerhaubitze 2000 (joint project with the Netherlands)
200 tents
116.000 winter jackets, 80.000 winter trousers and 240.000 winter hats
100,000 first aid kits*
405,000 pre-packaged military Meals Ready
30 self-propelled GEPARD anti-aircraft including circa 6.000 rounds of ammunition*
67 fridges for medical material
counter battery radar system COBRA*
4,000 rounds practice ammunitions for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
54 M113 armored personnel carriers (systems of Denmark, upgrades financed by Germany)*
53,000 rounds ammunitions for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
20 laser target designators*
3,000 Panzerfaust 3 with 900 firing devices
14,900 anti-tank mines
500 Man Portable Air Defense Systems STINGER
2,700 Man Portable Air Defense Systems STRELA
22 million rounds of ammunition for fire arms
50 bunker buster missiles
130 machine gun MG3 with 500 spare barrels and breechblocks
100,000 hand grenades
5,300 explosive charges
100,000 m detonating cord and 100.000 detonators
350,000 detonators
10 anti-drone guns*
100 auto-injector devices
28,000 combat helmets
15 palettes military clothing
280 vehicles (trucks, minibuses, all-terrain vehicles)
6 palettes material for explosive ordnance disposal
125 binoculars
1,200 hospital beds
18 palettes medical material, 60 surgical lights
protective clothing, surgical masks
600 safety glasses
1 radio frequency system
3,000 field telephones with 5.000 cable reels and carrying straps
1 field hospital (joint project with Estonia)*
353 night vision goggles*
12 electronic anti-drone devices*
165 field glasses*
medical material (inter alia back packs, compression bandages)
38 laser range finders*
Diesel and gasoline (ongoing deliveries)*
10 tons AdBlue*
500 medical gauzes*
MiG-29 spare parts*
30 protected vehicles*
7,944 man-portable anti-tank weapons RGW 90 Matador*
6 mobile decontamination vehicles HEP 70 including decontamination material
10 HMMWV (8x ground radar capability, 2x jamming/anti drone capability)*
7 radio jammers*
8 mobile ground surveillance radars and thermal imaging cameras*
4 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
1 high frequency unit with equipment*
To be delivered:
2 air surveillance radars*
40 infantry fighting vehicles MARDER with ammunition (from Bundeswehr and * industry stocks)
air defence system PATRIOT with missiles
100,000 first aid kits*
114 reconnaissance drones*
17 mobile heating systems*
26 load-handling trucks 15t
2 Pick-up
18 wheeled self-propelled howitzers RCH 155*
90 drone detection systems*
2 hangar tents*
7 load-handling trucks 8x6*
7 self-propelled Gepard anti-aircraft systems*
7 tracked and remote controlled infantry vehicles for support tasks*
6 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
42 mine clearing tanks*
3 mobile, remote controlled and protected mine clearing systems*
5 mobile reconnaissance systems (on vehicles)
393 border protection vehicles*
1,020 projectiles 155mm*
156,000 rounds ammunition 40mm*
5 armoured engineer vehicles
3 heavy and medium bridge systems*
16 self-propelled howitzer Zuzana 2* (joint project with Denmark and Norway)
78 heavy duty trailer trucks*
3 air defence system IRIS-T SLM with missiles*
12 communications electronic scanner/jammer systems*
field hospital (role 2)*
20 frequency range extensions for anti-drone devices*
14 truck tractor trains and 14 semi-trailers*
2 tractors and 4 trailers*
10 protected vehicles*
vehicle decontamination system
5,032 man-portable anti-tank weapons
200 trucks*
13 bridge-laying tanks BEAVER*

In fact, the German military is now days so small, that it's surprising how much they have been able to give to Ukraine. (For example, Germany has 312 Leopard 2 tanks of which only 130 are operational. The older types Leopard 2A4 there are only 24. In 1989 they had over 5 000 tanks.)

This navel gazing and focusing just on the US is becoming ridiculous.

Quoting ssu

Because why then Russia would attack?

Quoting ssu

Now you are totally making things up: the US doesn't make NATO members.

Of course it does. That's why the US decided in 2008 that Ukraine would become part of NATO even though that was against the will of Germany at the time.

And notice that despite the protests from NATO members, the United States pushed ahead with it anyway, going so far as to support a coup d'etat in Ukraine in 2013.

At the end of the line, whether Ukraine got the official label of NATO member or not was completely irrelevant (and as such the opinions of the European member states were completely irrelevant) as long as the United States was there to guarantee its independence, NATO or no.

As it happened, Russia invaded before the United States was in a position to completely commit to a Ukrainian defense, which was probably why the Russians invaded then.

Quoting ssu

Israel isn't a NATO member

You're just missing the point. Clearly had Ukrainian ties with the United States threatened to become like those of Israel, we'd be in the exact same position, with Russia invading before such a defense pact could be sealed.

The only reason we keep talking about NATO membership is because that is the most obvious way Ukraine could get its security guaranteed by the United States. However, if Ukraine gets that guarantee on a bilateral basis it leads to the same outcome.

Again, the Europeans don't play a role of signifance here. They were never going to guarantee Ukrainian security, simply because they couldn't.

Quoting ssu

Basically the Baltic States and Poland are throwing as much as possible as they can +the kitchen sink to help Ukraine. Yes, they are small, but the European commitment comes to be huge by aggregate: when you add all of the things provided by various nations together, it becomes quite substantial.

Nice list. And where is Ukraine now? On a course to defeat.

Commitments, equipment, sanctions - it's all fine and good, but when the end result stays the same it was all for naught.

Had the United States not been involved in Ukraine, we wouldn't even be having this discussion and all of Ukraine would have been Russian now. (Except perhaps that this could have prevented the conflict, but that's a different discussion). That's why I say the European involvement does not play a role of significance, and the evidence for that is crystal clear.

Quoting ssu

1,200 hospital beds
18 palettes medical material, 60 surgical lights
protective clothing, surgical masks
600 safety glasses
1 field hospital (joint project with Estonia)*
field hospital (role 2)*
500 medical gauzes*
100,000 first aid kits*
67 fridges for medical material
medical material (inter alia back packs, compression bandages)
vehicle decontamination system
6 mobile decontamination vehicles HEP 70 including decontamination material

vs.

Quoting ssu

107 border protection vehicles*
4 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
168 mobile heating systems*
20 rocket launchers 70mm on pick-up trucks with rockets*
15 armoured recovery vehicles*
13 tank transporter tractor Oshkosh M1070*
7 tracked and remote controlled infantry vehicles for support tasks*
143 Pick-ups*
216 generators
35 load-handling 8x8 wheeler trucks
26 reconnaissance drones*
36 ambulance vehicles*
36.400 wool blankets
12 heavy duty trailer trucks*
55 anti-drone sensors and jammers*
30 drone detection systems*
6 lift trucks*
Iris-T system and SLM missiles*
60,000 rounds ammunition 40mm*
18,500 projectiles 155mm
18 load-handling trucks 8x8
50 MRAP vehicles DINGO
3 bridge-laying tanks BEAVER*
10 unmanned surface vessels*
14,000 sleeping bags
Mi-24 spare parts*
ammunition for multiple rocket launchers MARS II
spare parts for heavy machine gun M2
20 frequency range extensions for anti-drone devices*
17 heavy and medium bridge systems*
5 multiple rocket launchers MARS II with ammunition
14 self-propelled howitzers Panzerhaubitze 2000 (joint project with the Netherlands)
200 tents
116.000 winter jackets, 80.000 winter trousers and 240.000 winter hats
405,000 pre-packaged military Meals Ready
30 self-propelled GEPARD anti-aircraft including circa 6.000 rounds of ammunition*
counter battery radar system COBRA*
4,000 rounds practice ammunitions for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
54 M113 armored personnel carriers (systems of Denmark, upgrades financed by Germany)*
53,000 rounds ammunitions for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
20 laser target designators*
3,000 Panzerfaust 3 with 900 firing devices
14,900 anti-tank mines
500 Man Portable Air Defense Systems STINGER
2,700 Man Portable Air Defense Systems STRELA
22 million rounds of ammunition for fire arms
50 bunker buster missiles
130 machine gun MG3 with 500 spare barrels and breechblocks
100,000 hand grenades
5,300 explosive charges
100,000 m detonating cord and 100.000 detonators
350,000 detonators
10 anti-drone guns*
100 auto-injector devices
28,000 combat helmets
15 palettes military clothing
280 vehicles (trucks, minibuses, all-terrain vehicles)
6 palettes material for explosive ordnance disposal
125 binoculars
1 radio frequency system
3,000 field telephones with 5.000 cable reels and carrying straps
353 night vision goggles*
12 electronic anti-drone devices*
165 field glasses*
38 laser range finders*
Diesel and gasoline (ongoing deliveries)*
10 tons AdBlue*
500 medical gauzes*
MiG-29 spare parts*
30 protected vehicles*
7,944 man-portable anti-tank weapons RGW 90 Matador*
10 HMMWV (8x ground radar capability, 2x jamming/anti drone capability)*
7 radio jammers*
8 mobile ground surveillance radars and thermal imaging cameras*
4 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
1 high frequency unit with equipment*
To be delivered:
2 air surveillance radars*
40 infantry fighting vehicles MARDER with ammunition (from Bundeswehr and * industry stocks)
air defence system PATRIOT with missiles
114 reconnaissance drones*
17 mobile heating systems*
26 load-handling trucks 15t
2 Pick-up
18 wheeled self-propelled howitzers RCH 155*
90 drone detection systems*
2 hangar tents*
7 load-handling trucks 8x6*
7 self-propelled Gepard anti-aircraft systems*
7 tracked and remote controlled infantry vehicles for support tasks*
6 mobile and protected mine clearing systems*
42 mine clearing tanks*
3 mobile, remote controlled and protected mine clearing systems*
5 mobile reconnaissance systems (on vehicles)
393 border protection vehicles*
1,020 projectiles 155mm*
156,000 rounds ammunition 40mm*
5 armoured engineer vehicles
3 heavy and medium bridge systems*
16 self-propelled howitzer Zuzana 2* (joint project with Denmark and Norway)
78 heavy duty trailer trucks*
3 air defence system IRIS-T SLM with missiles*
12 communications electronic scanner/jammer systems*
20 frequency range extensions for anti-drone devices*
14 truck tractor trains and 14 semi-trailers*
2 tractors and 4 trailers*
10 protected vehicles*
5,032 man-portable anti-tank weapons
200 trucks*
13 bridge-laying tanks BEAVER*

:chin:

Quoting Tzeentch

Of course it does. That's why the US decided in 2008 that Ukraine would become part of NATO even though that was against the will of Germany at the time.

It cannot. If the members oppose what the US wants, then the US has to forget the organization and go to bilateral defense agreements. That happened with CENTO and SEATO, if surely the US did want the organizations to continue. You simply have false ideas about how international organizations work: their charter is important on how they operate. The US didn't decide anything in 2008. The promises of US Presidents hold until a new President changes them. And no process, like with Sweden and Finland, has even been started with Ukraine.

Quoting Tzeentch

You're just missing the point. Clearly had Ukrainian ties with the United States threatened to become like those of Israel, we'd be in the exact same position, with Russia invading before such a defense pact could be sealed.

No, you miss the point. If one can stop a defense pact only with the threat of war, then you only maek the threat. Period. You don't go to war. It's called logic, @Tzeentch.

However if you want to reconquer a country and be again a Great Power, what better way to hide your imperial aspirations than by accusing others and try to convince others that your only acting on purely defensive reasons. Some idiot will always fall for it.

Quoting Tzeentch

- it's all fine and good, but when the end result stays the same it was all for naught.

Just how can you be so sure?

Quoting Tzeentch

Nice list. And where is Ukraine now? On a course to defeat.

Oh, that you must in your knowledge about the future know.

Quoting ssu

It cannot. If the members oppose what the US wants, then the US has to forget the organization and go to bilateral defense agreements.

As I said:

Quoting Tzeentch

Ukraine manoeuvred itself into a grey area where it was both almost a NATO member and almost a US ally. In both cases, what mattered is that the United States would guarantee its independence and provide a credible deterrent against Russia.

___________________________________________________

Quoting ssu

The US didn't decide anything in 2008.

It decided, and I quote: "... that [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

Bucharest Summit Declaration

Quoting ssu

You simply have false ideas about how international organizations work

I think it's quite the opposite. You're grossly overstating the importance of countries who have no real power to speak of.

Quoting ssu

No, you miss the point. If one can stop a defense pact only with the threat of war, then you only maek the threat. Period. You don't go to war. It's called logic, Tzeentch.

I don't see any logic here.

Threats didn't work for Russia, so it used brute force.

Quoting ssu

However if you want to reconquer a country and be again a Great Power, what better way to hide your imperial aspirations than by accusing others and try to convince others that your only acting on purely defensive reasons.

A nice theory, but there's no evidence to support it - a point which Mearsheimer makes repeatedly.

Ironically, there's a lot more evidence to suggest that it is the United States who aggressively pursued incorporation of Ukraine into its sphere of influence, despite repeated warnings from Russia. So who is the fool, really?

Quoting Isaac

How can governments comply to their commitments?...
In other words, governments to gain moral legitimacy (whatever the ideology and regime are) are also morally compelled to pursue/secure power. — neomac

Why would governments need to use power to comply with their commitments? If government A and government B both have similar commitments it's not morally necessary for either government to have power over that territory in order to bring about it's moral objectives. Clearly either government will do the job.

How could a government govern if it does not have the means that allow it to govern?! Governing in compliance with some moral commitment still needs enabling means to govern. That's a rational constraint. Any government A,B,C,…,Z with exactly the same commitments or totally different commitments or half similar and half different needs means to govern people within a territory. The territory delimits the community and the resources within a government’s reach, the perimeter of its sovereignty.


Quoting Isaac

The idea that governments need to secure territory in order to carry out their moral commitments only applies if the alternative government (the one competing for the territory) doesn't share those commitments. If it does (or if it's even better), then it doesn't make any difference, the moral commitments will be met, just by a different government.

No, even if different governments share the same commitments they would still need to secure a territory. All Western, Ukrainian, Russian governments of all political regimes needed to secure their territory against invaders and/or separatist forces in their history. The territory is the geographic scope of governments’ governing activities so it's very much factored in the notion of governing activity. Congectures over what government is doing or can do better are still irrelevant at this point of the analysis.

Quoting Isaac

It's as if I make a committent to care for an elderly relative and then set about murdering any rival carers on the grounds that I need to see them off so that I can keep the commitment I made. It's an absurd argument.

I’m talking about political governments as we know them from history (city states, national states, empires): governments establish laws, impose taxes, have tribunals, law enforcement bodies, build infrastructures, hold their jurisdiction over a certain territory, etc. and they do it in a self-preserving way. They are political organisations that emerge as historical products from social dynamics within certain geographic coordinates and centralising certain public functions within those geographic coordinates. This is roughly what political governments are, with or without moral commitment. I’m just arguing that they can ALSO gain moral legitimacy wrt the people they rule over to the extent they are committed to support the moral standards of the people they rule over and exercise their governing functions accordingly.
Territorial disputes undermine governments’ resources (so their operative capacity and authority) if not their existence, with or without moral legitimacy. IN ADDITION to that they may threaten their moral legitimacy. For example, Ukrainians do not want to be governed by a pro-Russian regime, nor make territorial concessions. So if the Ukrainian government doesn’t commit itself to do what the Ukrainians want nor act accordingly, the Ukrainian government will lose also moral legitimacy in addition to see its sovereignty severely shrunk.
So the argument you take as a good analogy, not only looks absurd, but it’s very poor analogy. So poor that it’s even hard to improve. But I’ll give it a try anyway, here: X’s only job ever is to take care of client Y, but a rival carer Z wants to replace X in part or completely (so X may lose in part or completely his means of subsistence), and to that end Z is trying to convince Y accept him by forcefully entering in Y’s flat and repeatedly kicking in his stomach as hard as he can just in front of X. If X doesn’t intervene to defend Y, not only X may lose part or all of his revenue (were Z to succeed in his “special persuasive operation”) but X also betrays his deontological commitment as a care giver if there is one.

Quoting Isaac

Russia violated Ukrainian sovereignty. Ukraine is defending its sovereignty. And the West is helping Ukraine to secure its Western countries’ sovereignty (NOT Ukrainians’ sovereignty, that’s the Ukrainian government’s task!) against Russian strategic threats. — neomac

So? What's any of that got to do with the moral case? Why would anyone else care about Ukrainian sovereignty?

I’ve already answered both questions. I argued that “national security” can also be a government's moral imperative (this is true for all types of regime and ideologies). So if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are morally warranted.


Quoting Isaac

You are championing a theory of international relations which is incompatible with the kind of moral imperatives you think States should comply with. — neomac

If you can't understand the difference between how things are and how things ought to be then that explains a lot about your failure to engage with any moral arguments.

It isn't made so just by you saying it. If states can’t act or are rationally expected to not act based on moral oughts as the offensive realism theory you champion would claim, your claims about what states morally ought to do are doomed to be frustrated, not occasionally but systematically whenever they clash against state security concerns. So it’s precisely because, according to your own understanding of international relations, oughts can never inform political action in the international arena that your claims about what states morally ought do in the international arena are irrational. It’s like a farmer yelling at a cow: you morally ought to stop to eat grass over there because that’s not our field, and failing to do so it’s immoral! This would be a moral ought claim distinct from a fact, yet an absurd moral claim because addressed to a subject that can’t act or is rationally expected to not act according to moral claims. Now imagine the farmer objecting me like you did: "Dude, you do not understand the difference between facts and moral oughts that's why you can't engage with any moral arguments". Apparently you have a very poor understanding of your own conceptual framework.

Quoting neomac

How could a government govern if it does not have the means that allow it to govern?!

There's no moral requirement for any specific government to govern any specific peoples or land.

Quoting neomac

Governing in compliance with some moral commitment still needs enabling means to govern.

No it doesn't. Clearly some other government could bring about the same committent. If I'm committed to building the biggest sandcastle ever, I can easily step aside and let someone else finish the job. Building the biggest sandcastle doesn't require that I have the ability to build sandcastles, only that someone does. Likewise a government committed to a moral objective does not require that they have the means, only that someone does.

Quoting neomac

The territory delimits the community and the resources within a government’s reach, the perimeter of its sovereignty.

So? This clearly has no impact whatsoever on a government's ability to commit to programmes of any sort since borders are always changing. I listed above over 40 major internation changes in border in the last 30 years. In no case did the governments of those countries cease to be able to carry out their objectives in their remaining territory.

Quoting neomac

even if different governments share the same commitments they would still need to secure a territory.

Why?

Quoting neomac

All Western, Ukrainian, Russian governments of all political regimes needed to secure their territory against invaders and/or separatist forces in their history.

This is just bare assertion.

Quoting neomac

IN ADDITION to that they may threaten their moral legitimacy. For example, Ukrainians do not want to be governed by a pro-Russian regime, nor make territorial concessions. So if the Ukrainian government doesn’t commit itself to do what the Ukrainians want nor act accordingly, the Ukrainian government will lose also moral legitimacy in addition to see its sovereignty severely shrunk.

Nonsense. A government is not morally required to carry out all actions it's citizens request. Again, this just obvious nonsense if given even a moment's thought. If the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would still be immoral for the government to do so and it would still be a war crime. Things are not made right by voting for them and governments are not automatons devoid of moral responsibility.

Quoting neomac

I argued that “national security” can also be a government's moral imperative (this is true for all types of regime and ideologies).

No you didn't. You just said it.

Quoting neomac

if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are morally warranted.

Nonsense. A government has no moral right to the territory it governs. All border changes would thereby become immoral.

Quoting neomac

If states can’t act or are rationally expected to not act based on moral oughts as the offensive realism theory you champion would claim

Nothing about political realism says governments can't act differently. It's a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive one.

Quoting neomac

it’s precisely because, according to your own understanding of international relations, oughts can never inform political action in the international arena that your claims about what states morally ought do in the international arena are irrational.

It's not my claim... It's yours. Here...

Quoting neomac

I take national security to be the moral imperative of legitimate governments of sovereign states

Quoting jorndoe

Simple enough moral starting point: the invaders ought to go home (mercs included).

Reply to Isaac, check news, what do you think they've done and continue doing? Ain't going to keep repeating, but may add updates I suppose (spraying bombs, spreading destruction, letting their mercs run free, flattening towns, killing, shamming, re-enculturating, fear-mongering and calls for nationalism at home). Why do you think I posted the suggestion that they ought to leave anyway (affirming/denying omitted I noticed)? Actually, many draftees probably want to. Any "how" could follow any "ought".

Quoting Isaac

There are children, future children, millions affected outside of Ukraine...

And inside. A few already affected. Subsumption under Kremlin rule no good, wrong trajectory, what they don't want, but...repeating again. So, contrary to the UN, do you think it wrong that "the invaders ought to go home"? Had Ukraine just capitulated (or sought incorporation into Russia), the situation would be different. Probably more nervousness in Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia and elsewhere with the Kremlin expansion.[sup](Putin, Patrushev, Matviyenko)[/sup] You can be sure that (would-be) autocrats + others are taking notes.

With millions, are you referring to Ukrainian farm production + export impact + consequences elsewhere? (As an aside, Putin's Russia apparently managed to sneak stolen farm goods off to Syria.) Are you thinking of a (nuclear) world war three? Something else?

Anyway, getting too close to complicity in Putin's Russia subsuming Ukraine isn't really the best, be it persons or continents. By conscience at least, I'd rather flirt with complicity in standing up to the ruthless oppressive regressive autocratic untrustworthy land-grabber Kremlin. I guess, analogous to the Uyghur situation and the old Canadian Indian residential school system (children here too). Fringe style, supposing there was enough anti-resistance or laissez-faire type attitude in the 1930s-40s, would Berlinian Hitler-Jugend have subsumed scouts and schools in Europe? More victims to be sure.

Quoting Isaac

Why would anyone else care about Ukrainian sovereignty?

Because, like Sweden Finland others, they don't want to be under Putin's thumb? Might be...risky for vocal individuals to try it + report back. We might ask what the refugees want to go home to. Had Russia been on another trajectory, perhaps buzzing with transparency freedom whatever, then things might have been different. We've seen it.

Okie, enough repetition already. It's what these comments are, over and again. Any new aspects? Developments? (I can appreciate Reply to Tzeentch's suggestion for chessboard analysis, though lots of guesswork involved.)

[sub]And now to something completely different:
New Tesla Model To Include Undercarriage Thresher To Shred All Evidence Of Running Someone Over
[sup]— The Onion · Oct 24, 2022[/sup]
[/sub]

Quoting jorndoe

Ain't going to keep repeating

So you think that was the first suggestion that Russia ought to withdraw? 434 pages in and no one had mentioned it?

Quoting jorndoe

Why do you think I posted the suggestion that they ought to leave anyway

Virtue signalling.

Quoting jorndoe

Subsumption under Kremlin rule no good

As has been proven over and over Russian rule over Crimea produced a virtually identical record on human rights to Ukraine's rule over nearby Donbas. The record is unequivocal, there's little to no improvement under Ukrainian rule for average folk compared to Russian rule (and in case it needs clarifying, that means they're both awful, not that Russian rule is fine). Factor in the pecuniary loan and 'reconstruction' agreements of another year of war and there's zero reason to believe anyone's life will have improved sufficiently to justify a complaint letter, let alone a war.

Quoting jorndoe

do you think it wrong that "the invaders ought to go home"?

Frankly I don't care. They certainly ought to stop committing war crimes, but that's not the same thing as giving up territory.

I don't give a fuck who owns what. I care what they do with what they own.

Quoting jorndoe

With millions, are you referring to Ukrainian farm production + export impact + consequences elsewhere? (As an aside, Putin's Russia apparently managed to sneak stolen farm goods off to Syria.) Are you thinking of a (nuclear) world war three? Something else?

Yes. And more. Millions of people outside of Ukraine are affected by the continued fighting there. I can understand why the Ukrainian government might not take their needs much into account, but our governments ought to.

Quoting jorndoe

Because, like Sweden Finland others, they don't want to be under Putin's thumb?

I said 'anyone else'. Why do we care what Ukrainians happen to want. Do we care what Russians want? This idea that there's some moral value to what an arbitrary group of people happen to want is just nonsensical. That only institution that need concern itself with what Ukrainians want is the Ukrainian government, that being their duty in a democratic system.

Quoting jorndoe

Any new aspects? Developments?

I'm not a newspaper. You posted something. I presume you did so to garner feedback, which this is. Otherwise, why bother?

With a significant number of heavy tanks from the West now heading for Ukraine, including the Leopard tanks from Germany. Things just escalated! Much bigger booms coming or Russian bust?

https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/

90 seconds to midnight. The closest it's ever been. Posted by people who are not idiots by the way. This cannot be forgotten, regardless of who one "supports".

It can tend to fade into the background given immediate deaths, but, it's a real problem.

Quoting Manuel

90 seconds to midnight. The closest it's ever been. Posted by people who are not idiots by the way. This cannot be forgotten, regardless of who one "supports".

It can tend to fade into the background given immediate deaths, but, it's a real problem.

It's winter. We'll start back up in the spring.

Quoting Tzeentch

You're grossly overstating the importance of countries who have no real power to speak of.

When you are saying that Europeans do not play a role of significance in this conflict, US can solely decide what countries join or not NATO when it's charter say something else etc. I think there's no use to engage in a discussion where you have things so wrong.

And btw, you fail to give any reasons why you assume that " Ukrainian victory, obviously, which is going to involve NATO boots on the ground" even if asked several times, this discussion isn't really not worth wile.

Quoting Tzeentch

A nice theory, but there's no evidence to support it

No evidence...you are hilarious! Yeah, Don't mind taking into account what Putin says and the Russians have done earlier and are doing now, like annexing more parts of Ukraine to be part of Russia, just pick your quotes about NATO and insist there's nothing more to it.

Quoting Tzeentch

- a point which Mearsheimer makes repeatedly.

?

Mearsheimer argued earlier that Ukraine should have nuclear weapons, because otherwise Russia can attack it and thus it was a really bad decision to push Ukraine to give them to Russia.

And actual quote from Mearsheimer from November 17th 2022. Mearsheimer's response:

What we were talking about back in February was whether or not he was interested in conquering all of Ukraine, occupying it, and then integrating into a greater Russia. And I do not think he’s interested in doing that now. What he is interested in doing now that he was not interested in doing when we talked is integrating those four oblasts in the eastern part of Ukraine into Russia. I think there’s no question that his goals have escalated since the war started on February 24th, but not to the point where he’s interested in conquering all of Ukraine. But he is interested for sure in conquering a part of Ukraine and incorporating that part into Russia.

So your only "truth teller" that you have put on a pedestal is saying that Putin is interested conquering part of Ukraine and incorporationg that into Russia. Well, I would call conquering parts of another country and incorporating them to your own imperialism, but I guess that is semantics. That Russian jingoists has wanted Novorossiya to be part of Russia (and have that land corridor to the already annexed Crimea) has been something quite long known. Something that apparently came as a surprise to Mearsheimer.

Quoting ssu

When you are saying that Europeans do not play a role of significance in this conflict, US can solely decide what countries join or not NATO when it's charter say something else etc. I think there's no use to engage in a discussion where you have things so wrong.

You're just deliberately twisting my words at this point. The United States clearly decides what happens in NATO, and even if NATO member states stop NATO membership, nothing stops and nothing did stop the United States from turning Ukraine into a de facto NATO member, which it did. The Europeans had no say.

Quoting ssu

And btw, you fail to give any reasons why you assume that " Ukrainian victory, obviously, which is going to involve NATO boots on the ground" even if asked several times, this discussion isn't really not worth wile.

I gave you exactly the reason why I believe that, so stop making things up.


And as for Mearsheimer and his points regarding alledged "Russian imperialism", for which again there is no evidence whatsoever:

(time stamp 27:55 onward)



(time stamp 15:10 onward)




Note Mearsheimer has been making a consistent argument for over 7 years, and during all that time and before it, no evidence whatsoever exists of your theory about "Russian imperalism".

If you want to disagree with Mearsheimer and claim there is evidence for Russian imperial ambitions, then go ahead and post that evidence here.

Quoting ssu

So your only "truth teller" ...

A sad attempt at discrediting a well-respected scholar.

I'm not sure what to say about this. If you're not interested in the views of experts, wallow in your ignorance I guess?

Quoting Tzeentch

And as for Mearsheimer and his points regarding alledged "Russian imperialism", for which again there is no evidence whatsoever:

You really respond to what Mearsheimer said last November 2022 with a lecture that he has given in 2015 as a refutation? (The latter video isn't working)

Quoting Tzeentch

The United States clearly decides what happens in NATO, and even if NATO member states stop NATO membership, nothing stops and nothing did stop the United States from turning Ukraine into a de facto NATO member, which it did. The Europeans had no say.

Good that you finally acknowledge that NATO member states can stop NATO membership. (Just look at Sweden and Finland and the problems they have with Turkey and Hungary.)

Well, in a defense pact that relies on nuclear deterrence and mutual defense, membership is extremely important. Otherwise there is no deterrence, only what we have seen: sanctions and tapid arms shipments. You have to understand the difference. We wouldn't call it start of WW2 if in response of the German invasion of Poland, France and UK had responded with sanctions and arms shipments to Poland, not with war declarations. Alliance and warm words are two different things.

Hence talking about "de facto NATO membership" is wrong. Far better would be to talk about Ukraine as a "US/NATO proxy" as it cannot be refuted that Ukraine crippling Russia's military works well for those East European countries afraid of Russia. I know now how it felt for Swedes when Finland defended itself in the Winter War, because Ukraine is doing it for many East European countries.

Quoting Tzeentch

f you're not interested in the views of experts

You have one expert, I take experts in plural and understand that they can different opinions and even if they can have good points, not all of them have to be taken as lithurgy.

Quoting universeness

With a significant number of heavy tanks from the West now heading for Ukraine, including the Leopard tanks from Germany. Things just escalated! Much bigger booms coming or Russian bust?

I wouldn't actually call it significant number. And it will take months before they are on the battlefield.

Politicians want to meddle with the specifics, so they approve / disapprove what weapon systems are sent to Ukraine and what individual types are held. It's like the Johnson administration during the Vietnam war choosing some targets to bomb in North Vietnam and declaring others out of bounds assuming that for North Vietnam the war was some kind of diplomatic game of escalation (which was nonsense).

Basically with heavy tanks Ukrainian formations have the ability to make attacks and counterattacks. Of course there's more than just the tanks: there has to be enough artillery and rockets, enough other armoured vehicles and enough drones and a working battlefield intelligence and command and communication structure to have the ability to do maneuver warfare on the battlefield. One weapon system won't do it.

Russia has lost likely over 1600 tanks and Ukraine 400 tanks in the war. The US is contemplating to send 30 Abrams tanks, the UK 14 Challengers and Ukraine would be if it could get 100 Western tanks. That is basically enough for one armoured brigade and likely the tanks will be spread out and first used in the mobile reserve. It's not a game changer as the numbers are low. Ukraine likely would need three times more in order to take again the initiative in the war.

Leopard 2A4 and M1 Abrams

Quoting ssu

You really respond to what Mearsheimer said last November 2022 with a lecture that he has given in 2015 as a refutation? (The latter video isn't working)

Of course, because it proves your argument stems from a decade prior, and it didn't hold any water then, and it doesn't hold any water now.

The second video is called "The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war, a lecture by John J. Mearsheimer" and comes from 2022, in which the same arguments are once again debunked.

You see, Mearsheimer has been at this for over a decade. That's why I value his opinion.

Quoting ssu

Hence talking about "de facto NATO membership" is wrong. Far better would be to talk about Ukraine as a "US/NATO proxy"...

And you think calling Ukraine a US/NATO proxy would have eased the Russians' minds?

You've been claiming Ukrainian NATO membership was not the reason the Russians invaded. You think it would have mattered to the Russians whether Ukraine became NATO member or became, your own words, a US/NATO proxy? You don't think those two amount to basically the same thing in the minds of the Russians and perhaps in general?

My argument is that whichever one you choose, they're clearly a massive provocation towards Russia and that's what the United States has aggressively pursued for 15 years.

Quoting ssu

You have one expert, I take experts in plural ...

Here's Noam Chomsky, an intellectual of some caliber, making a comparable argument and highlighting the American role in the Ukrainian conflict:





We could play this game where you pretend the experts I base my views on aren't good enough for you, or that there aren't enough of them, but I'm under no illusion that this is nothing other than you not wanting to face the fact that there are other valid viewpoints than the one you've chosen.

Quoting Tzeentch

You've been claiming Ukrainian NATO membership was not the reason the Russians invaded.

NATO membership, yes, because NATO membership could be and was easily thwarted like Turkey's long standing EU application.

What your error is the idea that reason for the war is singular, NATO enlargement, and that the imperial aspirations are unimportant/fake. Unipolar reasoning for wars is typically incorrect. The obvious inability is to see that Russia a) wants parts of Ukraine and b) wants to dominate Ukraine. Yes, prevention of Ukraine slipping to the West is part of that domination. Controlling the "Near Abroad" isn't just about NATO membership, just ask the Moldovans. It all aligns perfectly well with the imperial aspirations. And the simple fact is that Russia has perpetually had a problem with it's borders.

And I've said years ago, far earlier than even this war started that in Russian military doctrine the number one outside threat was NATO enlargement. But when you can thwart that membership without a war, then you don't go to war just because of it. Russia achieved this well simply by waiting out the US in Central Asia. The US had bases all around Central Asia, the -stans, I think in Tajikistan even both Russia and US did had both military bases. And now the US is out.

Hence it isn't only because of NATO enlargement and to then argue that the war wouldn't have happened because NATO enlergement is incorrect. Pretext reasons could always be given. Russia could have easily gone to war let's say because stronger ties with Ukraine and EU. But of course an attacker disguises his aggression as a defensive measure.

Quoting ssu

NATO membership, yes, because NATO membership could be and was easily thwarted like Turkey's long standing EU application.

Easily thwarted? What makes you say that?

It's taken repeated "red line" warnings by Russia for nearly a decade, then a coup d'etat in 2013 and an invasion in 2014, and all those red flags still weren't not enough to thwart Ukraine's fast track to NATO membership that the United States pursued.

Ukraine's NATO membership wasn't "easily thwarted" - it took all-out war. Had these things not taken place, and had Russia simply accepted US ambitions to incorporate Ukraine, then it would have surely happened.

Quoting ssu

What your error is the idea that reason for the war is singular, NATO enlargement, ...

Putting words in my mouth.

NATO membership for Ukraine and Ukraine's incorporation into the American sphere of influence is the primary reason this conflict takes place.

I never said it was the only reason.

Quoting ssu

...and that the imperial aspirations are unimportant/fake.

I've said there is no evidence for it, and you have yet to present any.

Quoting Tzeentch

Easily thwarted? What makes you say that?

Did it happen? Even before the war.

No.

Quoting Tzeentch

I've said there is no evidence for it, and you have yet to present any.

Annexations of many parts of Ukraine are quite obvious evidence if this for all to see. You cannot refute it.

Quoting To Defend Civilization, Defeat Russia - The Atlantic

If Russia finally captures Ukraine by mass murder, torture, and nuclear threats, then everything the world has gained since the defeat of the Axis in 1945 and the end of the Cold War in 1991 will be in mortal peril. Putin will prove to himself and to every dictator on the planet that nothing has changed since Hitler, that lawless nations can achieve their aims by using force at will, by killing and raping innocent people and then literally grinding their ashes into the dirt. This is no longer about Russia’s neo-imperial dreams or Ukraine’s borders: This is a fight for the future of the international system and the safety of us all.

Quoting ssu

Annexations of many parts of Ukraine are quite obvious evidence if this for all to see.

In what world is that evidence for imperial ambitions?

The Kremlin has never been shy about their motivations - it's a matter of national security for them. Basically what you're doing is saying they're lying, and then taking your own statement as evidence.

Reply to Tzeentch

Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas, often through employing hard power (economic and military power), but also soft power (cultural and diplomatic power).

Reply to Wayfarer Yes.

We have to face the uncomfortable reality that we haven't progressed from the 20th or the 19th Century to something else.

Reply to ssu Still no shred of evidence.

gaining political and economic control of other areas, often through ... soft power (cultural and diplomatic power)

Then what fucking country isn't imperialist?

Reply to Wayfarer

Quoting To Defend Civilization, Defeat Russia - The Atlantic

the future of the international system

What "international system" do you take this to refer to? International Law (that the US has refused to ratify)? The authority of the UN (that he US has ignored whenever it feels like it)?

I'm intrigued as to what 'international system' you think was soundly in place through America's invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Kosovo and Libya. The support for Saudi Arabia and Israel... what 'international system' allows the starvation of millions of children, but it suddenly "in mortal peril" over a border war.

Quoting Isaac

Then what fucking country isn't imperialist?

A lot of countries don't want political and economic control of other states. They just want to sell stuff to them and have normal, working relations. Not meddle in their internal politics with the objective to control them.

But it's good that at least you noticed from the definition the part "Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition" that @Tzeentch isn't willing or capable to pick up.

These actions should be obvious and evident, even without going into what Putin actually says, which makes it even more clear what Putin's objectives are. Just to take one example:

June 9 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin paid tribute on Thursday to Tsar Peter the Great on the 350th anniversary of his birth, drawing a parallel between what he portrayed as their twin historic quests to win back Russian lands.

"Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. It would seem that he was at war with Sweden, he took something from them. He did not take anything from them, he returned (what was Russia's)," Putin said after a visiting an exhibition dedicated to the tsar.

In televised comments on day 106 of his war in Ukraine, he compared Peter's campaign with the task facing Russia today.

"Apparently, it also fell to us to return (what is Russia's) and strengthen (the country). And if we proceed from the fact that these basic values form the basis of our existence, we will certainly succeed in solving the tasks that we face."

Very directly said from the man himself.

Reply to ssu Why would it be impossible for a nation to seek to acquire territory in pursuit of a national security goal?

You keep making the leap to "imperialism", pretending that it is the only explanation when it clearly isn't. Why?

Quoting ssu

A lot of countries don't want political and economic control of other states.

Wishful thinking.

Quoting ssu

But it's good that at least you noticed from the definition the part "Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition" that Tzeentch isn't willing or capable to pick up.

No. The point was that your definition becomes pointless by being too inclusive. If Russia is 'imperialist' in your sense, then it's nothing to worry about. Most countries are. The US certainly is.

You want 'imperialism' to mean something so much more sinister. Something more like Hitler, Elizabeth I, Alexander... But then you've not got any evidence to support such a claim, so you fall back on the weaker definition, only that has no teeth. We don't care that the US is imperialist in that weaker sense. So why should we care if Russia is?

Quoting Tzeentch

Why would it be impossible for a nation to seek to acquire territory in pursuit of a national security goal?

To seek to acquire territory in pursuit of a national security has been the modus operandi for Russia basically for all it's entire existence.

As Catherine the Great put it plainly and simply “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” Russian imperialism has always been viewed itself as a defensive posture simply because there is on geographic obstacle that would give a natural border for Russia...other than the goddam Pacific ocean. But that "defence" has meant colonizing other people and invading and annexing other countries. Which simply is imperialism, no way to say otherwise.

The error you seem to think is that somehow the Russian security goals and imperialism couldn't coexist. Yet basically they are part of each other. And that makes Russia so dangerous because it still is an Empire: Even just in the Russian Federation there are 35 regional semi-official languages and about 100 minority languages. There is something like 199 ethnic groups in the country. It's not actually something that you would call a clear nation state.

Reply to ssu It seems inevitable that the only ending to this war can be great disaster - either great disaster for Putin, or great disaster for the whole world. It's plain that he's not going to back down because any acknowledgment of defeat will cause his own collapse. He doesn't care how many die on either side, so he has to keep attempting to advance at all costs, like a shark who can't stop swimming forwards lest it drown. Hopefully the very worst-case scenario of actual nuclear war conducted by ICBM missiles will not be triggered, but I'm sure there is no easy ending.

Quoting Isaac

Wishful thinking.

There are many smaller countries who think so. Not every country is like the UK, Russia or the US.

Quoting Isaac

No. The point was that your definition becomes pointless by being too inclusive. If Russia is 'imperialist' in your sense, then it's nothing to worry about.

A country that just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors and annexed territories from them? Yeah, well, you'll be on there on your own peaceful island, not sharing a border with Putin.

Quoting Isaac

You want 'imperialism' to mean something so much more sinister.

Nonsense, likely you have imperialism either in the woke category of things like "racism" or likely as the nearly religious satanism as it's used by the Marxists. Russia is basically still an Empire, so it's really no wonder that it has imperial aspirations.

Quoting ssu

there is [no] geographic obstacle that would give a natural border for Russia...other than the goddam Pacific ocean.

Or neutral (double emphasis) border states - what Ukraine was and threatened to no longer be as a result of continued United States foreign policy.

Quoting ssu

The error you seem to think is that somehow the Russian security goals and imperialism couldn't coexist.

I never said was the case. I never even said that Russia wasn't imperialist. Rather, there is no evidence for it, so why would I believe it when there is a lot of evidence pointing towards the fact that Russia did indeed view the matter of Ukraine as a very serious security issue. In fact, there's 15 years of evidence to back that up.

Quoting ssu

Even just in the Russian Federation there are 35 regional semi-official languages and about 100 minority languages. There is something like 199 ethnic groups in the country. It's not actually something that you would call a clear nation state.

So? Is this a problem to you? Proof that Russia "must" be imperialist? I don't see where you're going with this.

For the sake of keeping things interesting:

Since the United States cannot have been surprised by the Russian invasion and also does not seem overly committed to a Ukrainian victory, I am entertaining the hypothesis that the United States intentionally sought to provoke long-lasting conflict between Europe and Russia.

Europe and Russia were cozying up to each other too much, while it is in America's best interest to keep the Heartland divided.

With China and Russia in an alliance that was futher strengthened by the American push for Ukrainian incorporation into NATO, the Eurasian continent was basically already 2/3's united. There was an actual threat of the Heartland uniting completely - with Europe becoming apathetic towards the United States and fairly neutral towards Russia and China, and with Russia and China being markedly anti-American.

The war in Ukraine attempts to establish Europe as a committed American ally, and a counterbalance against Russia in case a large-scale security competition breaks out between the United States and Russia and China.

Far-fetched? Sober big-picture thinking? You be the judge. ;)

Quoting Wayfarer

It seems inevitable that the only ending to this war can be great disaster - either great disaster for Putin, or great disaster for the whole world.

Or for Russia. Already as the Russian military is failing in Ukraine, it is having ripple effect in the Caucasus and in Central Asia with the former Soviet Republics. If everything goes bad, it can be extremely bad.

A good summary of why now only after two years since the last war tensions are again rising in Nagorno Karabakh:


And then there's Kazakhstan:

Quoting Tzeentch

Or neutral (double emphasis) border states - what Ukraine was and threatened to no longer be as a result of continued United States foreign policy.

Likely Moldova, which has a frozen conflict and Russian troops inside it or do you refer to my country in the past? Well, I think I know what that means.

Quoting Tzeentch

there is no evidence for it,

You really don't see the annexations of territory done through force as imperialism, really?

Quoting Tzeentch

I am entertaining the hypothesis that the United States intentionally sought to provoke long-lasting conflict between Europe and Russia.

You have to first tell just why, if this all was an American provocation, why did Putin be provoked? That fact is that Russia is meddling similarly in former Soviet republics that aren't coming to NATO. And being member of Russia's alliance, the CSTO, doesn't work like you would think in a defense pact. In fact the picture of what you have of NATO and the US would be far more appropriate to the relation of Russia and the CSTO.

Quoting ssu

You really don't see the annexations of territory done through force as imperialism, really?

Not without actual evidence, no. The fact remains that Ukraine is an important region for the Russians and they have made that clear over the course of fifteen years.

What you're asking me to believe is that the security concerns the Russians have voiced are part of a fifteen year long ruse.

Now that is far-fetched.

Quoting ssu

You have to first tell just why, if this all was an American provocation, why did Putin be provoked?

Because, unlike you apparently, I do believe the matter of Ukraine becoming part of the American sphere of influence represented a legitimate security concern to the Russians.

Quoting Isaac

How could a government govern if it does not have the means that allow it to govern?! — neomac

There’s no moral requirement for any specific government to govern any specific peoples or land.

If that’s an objection to the quotation, it doesn’t make much sense, because the quotation is not even talking about moral requirements. If that’s a moral claim you believe, is it supposed to be self-evident or do you have an argument for it? As far as I’m concerned governments of people and lands can be morally justified, of course. And that’s all I care arguing for (more on this below).


Quoting Isaac

Governing in compliance with some moral commitment still needs enabling means to govern. — neomac

No it doesn't. Clearly some other government could bring about the same committent. If I'm committed to building the biggest sandcastle ever, I can easily step aside and let someone else finish the job. Building the biggest sandcastle doesn't require that I have the ability to build sandcastles, only that someone does. Likewise a government committed to a moral objective does not require that they have the means, only that someone does.

That’s a random objection. The claim of mine you quoted is NEITHER stating a bi-univocal relation between governments and moral commitments, NOR logically implying such a bi-univocal relation, NOR suggesting it. In a Western democracy, several governmental administrations with different political leanings can succeed one another, and yet they all may be morally committed to same moral principles like respect/support for human rights and respect/support for democratic institutions, and then govern accordingly. To the extent they do that and the people they rule over morally care about it, they gain moral legitimacy. In Russia, the same territory was governed by an emperor, by a soviet regime, by a post-soviet regime. To the extent they supported shared moral views and ruled people were morally approved it, they gained moral legitimacy.
BTW nobody can easily step aside from commitments taken with people, if those people do not agree or there is a price to pay for that. So it depends on what there is at stake and the trust between involved parties (see my example of the care giver). What's more is that governments have their own social and historical reasons that pre-exist and support specific administrations with or without any specific commitments. Therefore as long as governments are the products of a society, no society changes local governments for foreign governments just because it's possible to do that or test if foreign governments can be better. If it happens this is typically through imposition by the foreign government.


Quoting Isaac

The territory delimits the community and the resources within a government’s reach, the perimeter of its sovereignty. — neomac

So? This clearly has no impact whatsoever on a government's ability to commit to programmes of any sort since borders are always changing. I listed above over 40 major internation changes in border in the last 30 years. In no case did the governments of those countries cease to be able to carry out their objectives in their remaining territory.

Right, so Putin could still govern Russia without grabbing Ukrainian land. So why is he doing it? Why isn’t Putin giving all Siberia to China, Putin will still be able to govern Russia without Siberia right? Why Putin needs to govern at all? He could let Biden govern Russia, what’s the problem with Putin? Since you can already guess all answers from the international relation theory you champion, namely Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”, I’m just getting to the conclusion: political governments are security maximisers over territorial resources wrt perceived threats, so much so that they may even need to project their power outside their land borders, and can do it offensively not just defensively. This is what history and geopolitical theories are teaching us. So the point is not the outlandish observation that government can still be able to govern if they suffer territorial resources losses (after all people can also live in prison or with a revenue below the poverty line, can’t they?), but what precisely history and geopolitics can tell us about states’ expected “securing” dispositions when facing security threats from rival states, their expected readiness to use coercive force to repel invasions and land grabbing, and the price to pay for failing that. BTW we may expect that even suffering land grabbing with little or no economic/logistic/demographic importance can likely trigger coercive responses from states if they perceive their authority threatened, and/or encouraging further land grabbing or invasions (as it likely happens for the smaller territories of the Sino-Indian border dispute).




Quoting Isaac

even if different governments share the same commitments they would still need to secure a territory. — neomac

Why?

All Western, Ukrainian, Russian governments of all political regimes needed to secure their territory against invaders and/or separatist forces in their history. — neomac

This is just bare assertion.

Yours is just bare assertion too. If your point is that you need examples backing up my claim, then check wikipedia. That’s basic history trivia which I can leave you waste your time on.




Quoting Isaac

Nonsense. A government is not morally required to carry out all actions it's citizens request. Again, this just obvious nonsense if given even a moment's thought. If the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would still be immoral for the government to do so and it would still be a war crime. Things are not made right by voting for them and governments are not automatons devoid of moral responsibility.

Your objection is evidently grounded on a huge misunderstanding of my claims:
First of all, I didn’t make anywhere the moral claim that “a government is morally required to carry out all actions it's citizens request”. I’m being descriptive in talking about moral behavior, and relativizing the notion of “moral standard” to communities. So with the expression “moral legitimacy” I’m descriptively referring to the possible situation in which the government is committed to support (by means of its governmental functions) the moral standard X shared by the community X within the territory under its control: e.g. say Putin is committed to protect the Russians from annihilation by Ukrainian nazis and Western satanists. This would let Putin gain moral legitimacy among ordinary Russians who believe that Ukrainian nazis and Western satanists are set out to annihilate Russians. And if all the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a Ukrainian hospital for those reasons, then it would be “morally legitimate” (it would be even if they didn’t vote at all: approving it might just be enough!).
Since the expression “morally legitimate” is ambiguous wrt its descriptive/normative usage, and despite all of my clarifications you can’t process my claims correctly, let’s put it this way: if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would be PERCEIVED as “morally legitimate” if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital for their own PERCEIVED legitimate moral reasons. “Perceived” means that related moral claims may be right or not, and this epistemic possibility is all I care to maintain at this point of my analysis. But notice that anybody sufficiently mentally sound and convinced that his moral claims are right may in parallel only conjecture that his moral claims are merely “perceived” (i.e. ultimately or likely wrong/unjustified). And precisely because those who are really convinced their moral claims to be right won’t change their belief or falter by simply conjecturing in parallel the possibility of being wrong/unjustified, the word “perceived” may be misleadingly suggesting lack of conviction, or readiness to re-examine moral claims, that’s why we may as well avoid using the word “perceived” in describing moral behavior. In any case, I’m here describing a moral behavior irrespectively of what anybody’s moral claims and convictions actually are (so I don’t even need to exclude the possibility that some may believe the moral duty of a government is to do all people voted for, including destroying hospitals).
Secondly, you offered a decontextualised hypothetical example (“if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would still be immoral for the government to do so”) to support your a-priori moral claim, without considering the possible contextual and a-posteriori reasons Russians may have had, to morally justify their decisions. Maybe they have been convinced by the Russian propaganda that the hospital was a cover for stocking biochemical weapons to annihilate Russians, or building a nuclear bomb in an underneath bunker that would certainly have escalated the situation to nuclear world war so bombing the hospital was the lesser evil. One could argue that the decision may still be moral, if moral evaluation is limited to intentions, or immoral if it comprises consequences but maybe excusable by ignorance. Or, else, maybe it wasn’t propaganda at all: some Ukrainian neonazi with the help of Zelensky as a cynical henchman of American evil financial/military/oil lobbies did really stock biochemical weapons in or build a nuclear bomb under that hospital. Would this still be a good moral reason to bomb the hospital at the risk of committing a war crime? Would this be nearly as bad as Americans nuclear bombing Japan (and yet they got away with it)? Or maybe: bombing a hospital was a retortion for terroristic bloody attacks Russians suffered in 10 of their hospitals, so their retorition is even subproportional wrt what they suffered from the Ukrainian nazis. Would this still make Russian bombing unquestionably immoral? You may say yes, others may say no. The point is that real moral cases can be trickier than your a-priori assessments of decontextualised examples suggest, and that people (honestly or dishonestly) disagree over moral standards, over how they apply moral standards in different often unexpected circumstances, over how they assess them in isolation or in comparison with past cases, etc. Refusal to acknowledge this intellectual predicament may lead to outright rejection of opposing views. While acknowledging this intellectual predicament may trigger more civilised discussions over moral reasons for the disagreements. But at the end of the day discussions do not necessarily lead to convergence, they may escalate into heated disputes and can persist even after long hostile arguing. They may split communities or create bitter rivalries, even in everyday life, nurturing resentment and intolerance, or worst, leading to civil wars. Or agreement can be reached at some point but without significant impact on society at large or where it matters, because maybe competing moral views are having greater significant impact on society at large or where it matters. And even the fact that shared convictions about what is morally right don’t have significant impact on society at large or where it matters, can trigger deeply felt personal disappointment and outrage (at worst, along with fear of discrimination, persecution, oppression). Why is that? Why can’t anybody (including Isaac) just blissfully enjoy having intellectually identified what is morally right to do in all circumstances, and contemplating the sheer logically possibility that everybody acts in accordance with it, even in the hypothetical case that nobody acts, has ever acted, or will ever act like this (including Isaac)? After all, as Isaac will sermonize, “oughts” are different from “facts” so who gives a shit if they never match? Or else why can’t anybody (including Isaac) having intellectually identified what is morally right to do in all circumstances, act in accordance with it INDIFFERENTLY from whatever other people’s actually do or believe? Or keep their outrage for themselves? Or live a misanthropic eremitical life if outrage is so intolerable? After all, if one single person on earth is acting according to what is morally right, why should anybody be outraged if there aren’t more people acting morally?
Maybe because moral claims concern also what other people’s do or believe, and/or because PROMOTING morality among people against “moral bankruptcy” (starting with showing moral outrage to protest against immoral people) is part of the morally right things to do. And failing to do that would be immoral. However, the problem is that if discussing, disputing, evangelising, confronting at grass-root level is not enough to promote collective morality or impact wherever it morally matters then, what to do? Maybe one smart thing to do is to get some support from those in power (e.g. asking Western governments to just sanction and diplomatically pressure Russia for aggressing Ukraine, right?), so unite with like-minded people to beg, plead with, pressure, sermonise, lobby governments to be supportive and take them morally accountable accordingly. In other words, there is a pattern that people with certain moral beliefs (you included) are drawn to follow by their own moral reasoning in interacting with governments that can lead to what I was referring to as “government moral legitimacy”.
So, despite the fact that you have such a hard time in processing the anthropological pattern I described and you yourself neatly follow, that anthropological pattern is very much real and related implications as well: 1. Even if moral ought claims and fact claims about society are distinct, still people (you included) may very much morally care if their claimed moral “oughts” actually inform social life de facto, but then considering chances of success may matter very much 2. The desirable moral impact one can have in informing society may be practically better achieved by having those in power (i.e. governments) morally accountable, therefore in condition of responding in compliance with moral standards shared by a ruled community. But then, power may very much matter to moral agents (whatever their moral claims are) when it’s instrumental to promote moral standards by increasing the chances of informing society, and it is therefore morally legitimised by those moral standards. The toughest part (for you to admit, if not even to understand) is that governmental power is essentially grounded on centralisation and capitalisation of scarce resources (arms, money, manpower, knowledge, etc.) which can be easier to be consumed than accumulated. So in order to keep relying on government power any competing moral community must pragmatically ensure that this power is not only consumed but also capitalised, that the ratio between capitalisation and consumption is positive and sustainable in the best interest of the moral community too. Governments will likely reciprocate the interest by finding more appealing those moral views and communities that can ensure them greater possibility of capitalising power (typical dynamics of security demand/supply). So moral communities already competing for incompatible moral standards or issues with rival moral communities, will additionally compete for the government support depending on their tolerance for capitalisation of power by governments, including all sorts of implied costs and risks (like possible abuses by cynical politicians and hijacking by powerful lobbies). On the other side, governments too suffer other forms of competition, on top of the competition between rulers and ruled: namely, the internal power competition for leadership (by leaders and lobbies) within a state government, and the power competition with other state governments. So governments too may compete for the moral communities' support depending on their tolerance for committing to moral communities (typical dynamics of moral legitimacy demand/supply), including all sorts of implied costs and risks for their power capitalisation and capacity of copying with security dilemmas. Conclusion: 1. one way or the other any moral community that morally cares to have a social impact is morally compelled to care for power capitalisation (not just consumption) to the extent it needs to rely on government power to morally promote shared moral views against competing moral views in a context of political power struggles and related security dilemmas. And even if we remove central governments from the equation, but moral communities still need to survive in accordance to their moral standards and in competition with rival moral communities, they will still need to directly engage in struggles for capitalisation of power and related “security dilemmas”, as forms of self-government 2. These are core logically interrelated claims that constitute my understanding of moral behavior. They are logically immune to the random objections you raised (failing to distinguish normative from factual, morally claiming to be right for governments do whatever voters demand). They are transversal to political, moral, ideological views, so by no means favour a-priori my own moral claims wrt rival moral views. They simply point to the fact that our moral claims don’t free float in a social space void of power struggles (between moral communities, governments, political leaders, social lobbies), on the contrary, their chance of informing social life very much depends on such power struggles in all their dimensions. And that’s logically compelling for all those moral views that morally care about informing social life, and therefore acknowledge the importance of increasing the chances of success. For those moral communities who don’t care, I’ll leave them to whatever fate the other moral communities will let them experience.

Quoting Isaac

I argued that “national security” can also be a government's moral imperative (this is true for all types of regime and ideologies). — neomac

No you didn't. You just said it.

No, dude, I argued it abundantly (way more than you ever did in supporting your claims and objections). Here is where I summarised the argument:
Quoting neomac

To understand my point one needs to get one step back. Moral rules like legal rules do not grant compliance by themselves. What’s worse is that differently from any legal system moral rules do not offer a procedure to resolve moral disputes , so a community can rely on central governments that are committed to promote a certain moral code within their sovereign territorial domain. How can governments comply to their commitments ? Through power (coercion, wealth, propaganda, etc.). Securing power within a sovereign territorial domain is how governments can both exist/function and accomplish their moral commitments wrt their people. Notice that these are transversal considerations wrt regime/ideology (communist, fascist, capitalist, theocratic, democratic, authoritarian, etc.).
In other words, governments to gain moral legitimacy (whatever the ideology and regime are) are also morally compelled to pursue/secure power.
And that’s also how the notion of “sovereignty” can ground legal/political relations among states also in moral terms.

Quoting Isaac

if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are morally warranted. — neomac

Nonsense. A government has no moral right to the territory it governs. All border changes would thereby become immoral.

Again I’m describing and not making moral claims. If it helps I could rephrase it as follows: “if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are ‘PERCEIVED’ to be morally warranted by the community that morally approves it.
Here another conceptual claim: governments’ moral rights to the territory are grounded on governments “moral legitimacy”. And a government may have as much moral right to the territory it governs as an individual has a moral right to his owned flat. The normative notion of “sovereignity” is designed to conceptualise such right. And it’s false to claim that all border changes would thereby become immoral. Indeed there might be moral/legal legitimate transfers of territorial rights (e.g. the independent states resulting from Soviet Union collapse), as much as there are moral/legal transfers of flat ownership.


Quoting Isaac

If states can’t act or are rationally expected to not act based on moral oughts as the offensive realism theory you champion would claim — neomac

Nothing about political realism says governments can't act differently. It's a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive one.

Sure miracles can happen. Nothing in the standard model of physics says miracles can’t happen.
Yet the standard model of physics is taken to be a descriptive theory of physical phenomena. Related laws of physics rule out as most unlikely those possibilities that contradict such laws.
So the geopolitical theory of “offensive realism” is taken to be a descriptive theory of international relations. Related behavioural patterns of States facing “security dilemmas” rule out as most unlikely those possibilities that contradict such patterns. So when moral views prescribe actions that contradict such patterns they are most likely not going to be followed. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory doesn’t predict that Western states will stop military support Ukraine if the Ukrainian casualties or the Yemeni casualties or the zillions of dying African children for famine is morally intolerable by some people. It predicts that even if the Ukrainian casualties or the Yemeni casualties or the zillions of dying African children for famine is morally intolerable by some people, this will most certainly NOT be prioritised over security concerns that led to Western military support of Ukrainian resistance.
At best, one might argue that Western policy is the result of a miscalculation of Western security concerns because Russia is a declining power, while China is a rising power so the West increased security threat which China might profit from, and the like. Therefore the West could have processed better its security (not moral) concerns. On the other side, that argument doesn’t sound very much as a description because it’s a personal assessment of threat perception and response (suggesting related prescriptions), so they shouldn’t be part of a descriptive theory of international relations, right? Or worst, that argument is surreptitiously trying to hide a falsification of Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” theory of international relations. Indeed, NATO enlargement could very much fit into the offensive realist pattern, if it wasn’t for the fact that “the West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations” [1] (in other words, certain States decide to support certain shared moral values, neglecting all relevant security concerns, contrary to the theory!)
Anyway, to recapitulate, a descriptive realist theory of international relations is not concerned with mere logical possibilities of states acting morally (as much as an empirical theory about human psychology is not concerned about the mere logical possibility of telepathy), instead it’s there to offer us empirical explanations and predictions on how states realistically behaved and most likely will behave, which in turn affects the chances for any moral standards to inform society. So that's why we may want to have reliable empirical theories in the first place, to inform our actions in a rational way and increase the chances for our actions so informed to succeed.
Conclusion: you are championing a theory of international relations that
1 - is predicting that Western governments will most certainly ignore any of your moral arguments/prescriptions in taking their decisions about security matters (Shit!)
2 - is totally irrelevant to morally justify what you claim Western states should do, and that makes perfect sense to you because of the logic distinction between “oughts” and “facts” (duh, right?), and absolutely nothing in that theory says that Western governments can’t act differently (but then why on earth are you championing it?! It’s like me saying: “I champion the Newtonian theory of gravity, but I’m gonna jump off that cliff anyway because nothing in that theory says I can’t fly!”)
3 - is totally relevant to question your opponents views of what Western states should do (ooooh, that’s why you are championing it!), because apparently you are mathematically certain that the already clumsy moves you just made to dodge the theory of international relations you yourself champion are some killer karate moves only you can master. Really impressive.

[1]
https://www.natur.cuni.cz/geografie/socialni-geografie-a-regionalni-rozvoj/studium/doktorske-studium/kolokvium/kolokvium-2013-2014-materialy/ukrajina-a-rusko-mearsheimer-souleimanov.pdf

Quoting Isaac

it’s precisely because, according to your own understanding of international relations, oughts can never inform political action in the international arena that your claims about what states morally ought do in the international arena are irrational. — neomac

It's not my claim... It's yours. Here...

I take national security to be the moral imperative of legitimate governments of sovereign states — Isaac[/quote]

I find your comment unintelligible, so until you rephrase it in English, I limit myself to add a few more clarifications to the two claims of mine you quoted.
Concerning the first quotation, as I previously argued, according to the theory of international relations you champion your moral prescriptions will most certainly never inform governments’ decisions about security matters. That’s what we should rationally expect by the theory. As far as I’m concerned, however, I do NOT champion Mearsheimer’s theory of international relations [1], nor his understanding of the interaction between moral and security concerns. That’s why I can argue for the possibility that moral oughts inform political action in the international arena in ways theoretically unavailable to you, and without believing in miracles as you need to do. Indeed, the second claim I made is precisely pointing at the solution of the riddle: only when national security concerns (and power capitalisation! [2]) are taken to be moral imperatives of governments, moral oughts can inform political actions while addressing “security dilemmas”. It’s very much realistically possible that governments act in support of shared moral views, if contextualised and a-posteriori moral reasoning can more “pragmatically” rely on governments’ in-built “security maximising” dispositions, instead of compulsively questioning them as your moral claims do in an a-priori, decontextualised, “idealistic” fashion. In other words, it can be moral for Ukrainians to keep fighting at the risk of sacrificing lives, and it can be moral for Westerners to support Ukrainians’ resistance if both are reasonably expected to effectively address security dilemmas favouring certain shared moral views (like the Ukrainian sovereignty and national identity, the Western countries’ sovereignty and democratic standards of life), despite all the other humanitarian emergencies the rest of the world is facing. Indeed I’m arguing for it and I morally support it (finally, these 2 are actual moral claims/commitments of mine!).

[1]

Quoting neomac

there are also non-pragmatic normative constraints (i.e. legal, moral) that one doesn’t need to ignore nor dismiss as Mearsheimer would do, like the ones related to the notion of “sovereignty”.

Quoting neomac

the goal is “national security” and not “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can”. And even if maximising national security would somehow equate “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can” under certain circumstances (like the ones prospected by Mearsheimer’s theory of International Relations that you champion) so be it.

[2]

“Capitalisation” and “power” and “capitalisation of power” must sound all “caca” expressions for exploitation of the working class to you, right?

Quoting ssu

A country that just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors and annexed territories from them? Yeah, well, you'll be on there on your own peaceful island, not sharing a border with Putin.

Are Canada worried? Is Mexico? America is the single most interventionist country in the world, by a long, long way. no-one talks about fear that it's going to invade Mexico. Why? Because people make even the most basic assessment of its interests (primarily oil). Russia wants gas export routes to be securely in it's sphere of influence. The US wants them in its own. Unless Latvia suddenly discovers a massive oil field, it's got nothing to worry about.

Quoting ssu

Nonsense, likely you have imperialism either in the woke category of things like "racism" or likely as the nearly religious satanism as it's used by the Marxists. Russia is basically still an Empire, so it's really no wonder that it has imperial aspirations.

Now it's back to the weaker definition. You can't get anywhere with this flip-flopping. Either 'imperialism' is a uniquely worrying trait (in which case you need evidence Russia has it - as opposed to most other countries), or it's a normal trait of many larger counties (in which case you need to explain why we need to be uniquely worried about Russia having it).

As to... "just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors"... are Israel imperialist? Is India, Pakistan, Bangladesh Myanmar, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Morocco, Spain, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey... All of whom have been involved in military clashes over border territory in the last two decades.

And if two countries in two decades is your evidence of rampant imperialism, then Finland must be quaking in its boots at the prospect of being invaded by Putin's tidal wave of imperial expansion...sometime in the next 160 years...

Quoting neomac

I’m describing and not making moral claims

Then your entire wall of text was a waste of time. If I want 'description' I'll consult an expert, not some bloke off the internet. If your ego is seriously so inflated that you think your armchair 'description' of how morality is manifest through society is better than any of the thousands of well-researched an informed papers, articles and books that have been written on the subject by sociologists, social psychologists and cognitive scientists, then I worry for you.

If I want a description, I'll consult an expert.

I'm asking for your moral view. the thing all of us are experts on, the thing for which there is no body of fact to draw on and so no expertise to be gained. What you think is right and why.

Quoting Isaac

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac

Then your entire wall of text was a waste of time. If I want 'description' I'll consult an expert, not some bloke off the internet.

Quoting Isaac

I'm asking for your moral view. the thing all of us are experts on, the thing for which there is no body of fact to draw on and so no expertise to be gained. What you think is right and why.

It wasn't a waste of time because my wall of text is very much part of the "why" i think military supporting Ukraine is morally right. What I described wasn't for the purpose of informing you about facts that require fact-checking and experts' advice. But for the purpose of illustrating to you the conceptual framework that makes intelligible any exchange on morality issues with you or others over Ukraine and any other political issues you may consider. It's essential part of my basic background knowledge (they are my "hinge propositions") and what was still missing in support of my moral claims about the Ukrainian war I argued for many times in our previous exchanges (so there was no point for me to rehash them). They are essential, because if we can't converge enough on conceptual frameworks, you simply do not make sense to me. So these very objections of yours are totally self-defeating. Not surprisingly though.

Quoting neomac

think military supporting Ukraine is morally right

Yet...

Quoting neomac

I’m describing and not making moral claims

Make up your mind.

Quoting Isaac

Are Canada worried? Is Mexico? America is the single most interventionist country in the world, by a long, long way.

If you would read correctly, it is about invading and annexing territories from neighbors. Hence when it comes to for example China, Vietnam can be worried about them (even if China hasn't called Vietnam an artificial country), but likely Portugal isn't worried so much about China. I think Mexico would mind if the US annexed let's say Baja California from them. And with US Presidents declaring Canada or Mexico to be artificial constructions.

Russia has treated similarly it's near abroad as the US does with Central America and the Caribbean. And now, as Russia is stuck in Ukraine, the regional policeman role isn't working anymore, as I referred with the videos from Nagorno-Karabakh and Kazakhstan.

Quoting Isaac

As to... "just has invaded in the past decades two of it's neighbors"... are Israel imperialist?

Classic case of a state annexing territory for defensive reasons. That still makes it so that Israelis have a map of their own while the other world accepts another map, which shows the discord. Even if Israel is a nation state and doesn't want to be multiethnic, it still has done things that are typical for imperialists. Right from it's inception.





Quoting Isaac

Is India, Pakistan, Bangladesh Myanmar, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Morocco, Spain, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey... All of whom have been involved in military clashes over border territory in the last two decades.

Needless to go over all the states as many have their own special cases. But for example Morocco is in the same category of annexing territories with Spanish Sahara. Imperialism isn't surely just limited to the Western countries.

And yes, I will stick to the definition of imperialism given, for example, in Merriam-Webster dictionary:

the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas

You can continue to argue that the definition is false/meaningless or whatever. I'll leave you to do that alone.

Quoting Isaac

think military supporting Ukraine is morally right — neomac


Yet...

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac


Make up your mind.

There is no contradiction between those extrapolated claims, because I made both moral claims (like "I actually support the military aid to Ukrainian resistance" and repeatedly argued for in our earliest exchanges even months ago [1]) and claims about how I conceptualise moral claims (i.e. "national security can be a moral imperative" and the like which again are nothing new in our exchanges [2]). And since you have hard time to process them separately, or you are playing dumb, I'll add clarifications which you ignore to re-loop over your clumsy random objections.
Clarifying our conceptual framework to deal with ambiguities and misunderstandings is a form of intellectual cooperation useful to better understand each other (which again is nothing new in our exchanges [3]), if you care to have a fruitful exchange. In addition we are in a philosophy forum so that's the right place to discuss them, as far as I'm concerned.


[1]
I’m reasoning on a step-by-step basis :

• First step:human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes
• Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes
• Third step: is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is.
• Fourth step: how likely is that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU) than by being within the sphere of influence of an anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights (see first step), if not now in the future? I say it’s more likely, based on historical evidence (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Is this enough evidence? If not why not?

[2]
Quoting neomac

No evidence, no 'proof'. — Isaac


No evidence, no 'proof' of what exactly? I was just exposing a conceptual framework.

The requests for 'proof only started when I objected to that position. — Isaac


That's false. Your objection started with: "How? I don't see the mechanism. Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty" (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746158)
To which I answered: "I didn't equate representation and sovereignty anywhere. I was talking about pre-condition for the implementation of state institutions that support human rights. State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory." (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746177)
So no, I didn't ask you for proofs in this case. On the contrary I exposed once again my conceptual framework. You might have objected that it's incoherent or with little explanatory power and consequently I would have asked you for proofs. But such a random objection like "representation is not the same thing as sovereignty" simply means you didn't understand what I was talking about. That’s all.

[3]
Quoting neomac

wanting a war to continue — Isaac


Then by your definition I'm not warmongering. I didn't want a war between Russia and Ukraine nor I want it to be continued. I was talking about my expectations about what the Ukrainians want not about what I want. BTW were the Russians warmongering when fighting back the Nazis out of their country in WW2?

Quoting neomac

No it isn't. I'm a member of the electorate in one of them, I hold them to account. It matters tremendously what I think they out to be concerned with. — Isaac


I wasn’t questioning the relevance of your moral standards to you nor the relevance of your political choices in a democracy. Again, I am questioning its relevance to establish what individuals, collectives or States are capable of. A part from that, people can surely have all the unrealistic expectations and set their moral standards arbitrarily high as they like, of course.

Since John Mearsheimer's opinions on the Ukraine war have been quoted here regularly, it seems some posters have gotten the impression that the perspectives that highlight the American role in causing the conflict in Ukraine are based solely on Mearsheimer's views.

This is of course false, and Mearsheimer is far from the only intellectual with these ideas. Noam Chomsky is another example, whose interviews have already been shared in this thread.

Another thinker that shares this point of view is Jeffery Sachs. His expertise is highly relevant as he was involved in the build-up of post-communist countries after the Cold War, and served as advisor to several Soviet/Russian and even Ukrainian presidents and (prime) ministers.




Several points made in this interview:

- Characterizes the conflict as being at its core about a clash between the United States and Russia.

- Integration of Russia into western economic systems failed primarily due to the United States demanding a subservient role from Russia, and when the latter refused such a role responded with antagonism.

- Western promises to halt NATO expansion eastward were hard promises, largely thrown to the wind when the neoconservatives took over American foreign policy in the early 90's. The neocons emphasized the preservation of complete United States dominance as unipolar hegemon.

Anyone that knows the archival record knows that it wasn't just a loose verbiage, but it was a decided policy of Germany and the United States to promise to Gorbachev: No NATO enlargement to the East - and not just East to the GDR. To the East.

Prominent scholars already warned of the dangers of neocon expansionism towards Russia in the mid to late '90s. George Kennan characterized it as the start of a new Cold War.

- The United States played a role in the successful effort to stage a coup d'etat in Ukraine in 2013-2014 to overthrow Yanukovyc. Sachs marks this event and the subsequent invasion of Crimea in February of 2014 as the start of the Ukraine war.

Reply to Tzeentch Jeffrey Sachs was well referred in the article given by Reply to Wayfarer. But Sachs naturally can have his US-oriented picture of it all (as can have Marjorie Taylor Green, etc). And have to say when it comes to the topic of global povetry, Jeffrey Sachs has a lot interesting to say, so he is a smart commenter.

Quoting Tzeentch

The United States played a role in the successful effort to stage a coup d'etat in Ukraine in 2013-2014 to overthrow Yanukovyc. Sachs marks this event and the subsequent invasion of Crimea in February of 2014 as the start of the Ukraine war.

Btw everybody puts the start of the war there with the annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk uprisings. February 24th last year was a dramatic escalation.

Yet even if US did play a role, I would disagree to call the Revolution of Dignity a "staged coup" starting with the Euromaidan protests. This wasn't some Operation Ajax, but naturally Russian propaganda portrays it to be so. That Yanukovych wasn't afterwards even accepted by the revolting Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which had been his core base, tells just how truly unpopular he was among Ukrainians. (Yanukovic heading Donetsk and Luhansk Republic etc. would obviously brought them legitimacy. Not like the people now: for example the ponzi-schemer that lead one of the "People's Republics".)

But of course, with the arrogant hubris of Westerners who see everything revolving around the US, actual domestic politics of foreign countries and their people don't matter, hence the finer details of the actual events are sidelined. But this has already been discussed earlier.

Quoting ssu

If you would read correctly, it is about invading and annexing territories from neighbors

So Britain wasn't imperialist?

Quoting ssu

I think Mexico would mind if the US annexed let's say Baja California from them. And with US Presidents declaring Canada or Mexico to be artificial constructions.

But Russia hasn't declared Finland to be an 'artificial creation'. You're losing the thread of the argument again. The article we're talking about paints Russia's attack as a problem for "civilization", not just for those countries Russia has declared 'artificial'. All countries.

So are we all worried about Israel? Are we all worried about Myanmar? Are we all worried about the US? Not just neighbours because the article doesn't say "Russia's neighbours who it thinks are artificial should be worried" the article is claiming that we all ought be worried about Russia's 'imperialist' war with Ukraine.

So did we all ought to be worried about Israel's imperialist war with Palestine?

Did we all ought to be worried about India's imperialist war with Pakistan?

If not, why not?

Quoting neomac

Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes

This step does not support your argument. To do so it would have to be possible for all countries to be like western countries, but if the human rights in western countries are bought at the expense of human rights in chattel countries, then it is not. You'd have to demonstrate not only that human rights are better in western countries, but that western countries do not worsen human rights elsewhere in achieving that state.

Quoting neomac

is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is.

Seriously? A bit of pro-western rhetoric is the gold-standard evidence of a desire to adopt western human rights values?

The human rights record of Ukraine is on record for all to see. You can't bluff your way out of it. Read the reports.

Quoting neomac

anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights

It does not have a poorer human rights record. Again, this is all on record. Read the reports.

Quoting neomac

the democracy index is telling

Democracy is not exhaustive of human rights, not even close. It's one of 30 articles. Usually the one chosen by neoliberals like you to excuse nations for trampling over the other 29.

Quoting neomac

Is this enough evidence? If not why not?

See above. What could possibly make you think that the satisfaction on one out of thirty articles of human rights would be all the evidence needed?

Come back to this argument when you have any evidence whatsoever that Ukraine's human rights record (in all aspects) is better than Russia's, that it has more than a cynical Machiavellian desire to take advantage of western money, and that western countries have an approach to human rights that could improve the welfare of all, not just a privileged few.

... Oh, and then you've got to show how the deaths of tens of thousands is the best, or even morally acceptable, way of achieving this vague goal of 'westernization'.

Quoting ssu

I would disagree to call the Revolution of Dignity a "staged coup" starting with the Euromaidan protests. This wasn't some Operation Ajax, but naturally Russian propaganda portrays it to be so.

When considering the diversity of participants, both previously organized and spontaneously self-organized, this comparison between the 'Orange' and 'Maidan' shows the idea that they were all fronts for foreign governments very difficult to imagine.

One vital component to how quickly and far the revolution spread was the repression of the protests by the authorities. That does not come up much amongst the promoters of coup narratives.

Quoting Paine

this comparison between the 'Orange' and 'Maidan' shows the idea that they were all fronts for foreign governments very difficult to imagine.

...by Dr Olga Onuch. Currently consulting for the Ukrainian government. This is what you consider an unbiased source?

Reply to Isaac
Do you have a source that rebuts her account of the participants?

Quoting Isaac

Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes — neomac

This step does not support your argument. To do so it would have to be possible for all countries to be like western countries, but if the human rights in western countries are bought at the expense of human rights in chattel countries, then it is not. You’d have to demonstrate not only that human rights are better in western countries, but that western countries do not worsen human rights elsewhere in achieving that state.

I don’t mind to review my past arguments once again (for the thousand time?), however it wasn’t the reason why I quoted them in the first place. The point was that I can argue for my moral claims only if there is sufficient understanding on how I conceptualise them because otherwise you will likely make outlandish objections. As the one you just made. The question “are human rights better implemented within Western countries?” is a question, not an argument, so you should address it as a question. And that question can be answered affirmatively or negatively independently from the possibility for all non-Western countries to be like western countries. Besides I do not need AT ALL to exclude that human rights in Western countries are bought at the expense of human rights in non-Western countries, maybe human rights institutions can emerge only as a result of zero-sum game (and if you had read my “entire wall of text”, you would have imagined why). So no, I do not have to demonstrate that “not only that human rights are better in western countries, but that western countries do not worsen human rights elsewhere in achieving that state” AT ALL.



Quoting Isaac

is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is. — neomac

Seriously? A bit of pro-western rhetoric is the gold-standard evidence of a desire to adopt western human rights values?
The human rights record of Ukraine is on record for all to see. You can't bluff your way out of it. Read the reports.

Again the question is “is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia?”, the answer can be affirmative or negative independently from your further clumsy objections. That’s why I was reasoning step-by-step to make you follow my line of reasoning to the end instead of jumping in all random directions as you did when you objected to it in the past, and as you are re-doing it now. So it's pretty symptomatic that you can't follow such a simple exercise.
Anyways, being pro-Western for Ukraine means at least what I exactly wrote: wanting to enter the Western sphere of influence through 2 organisations EU and NATO, and the readiness to suffer the consequences for this choice intolerable to the Russians corroborates it.
Said that, even though being pro-West doesn’t equate to the desire to adopt western human rights values, I don’t find that troubling at all, for 3 reasons:
1. The West imposes certain conditions that need to be satisfied before becoming an actual EU/NATO member, so nobody will accept Ukraine if it doesn’t comply enough to Western requirements. Its integration will require time before happening and even after to deeply reform the Ukrainian society (as for all post-Soviet republics).
2. This war proved that Ukrainians have great tolerance for sacrifices, so making the necessary institutional steps to satisfy Western conditions to membership should be a much more tolerable sacrifice.
3. Two potential problems in Ukraine, corruption and ultranationalism, persisted so far due to historical conflicts and ties with Russia: many Ukrainian ultranationalist (including Nazis) are essentially anti-Russian, Ukrainian corruption was abundantly nurtured by past pro-Russian regimes (Russia itself being a renowned example of “mafia state”). So if entering the Western sphere of influence means severing these ties and downgrading such historical tensions, the 2 problems may be more easy to deal with.
And if all that’s not enough to you (to me it is), a 4th reason will most certainly be: nothing in those reports says that Ukrainians can't act differently.


Quoting Isaac

anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights — neomac

It does not have a poorer human rights record. Again, this is all on record. Read the reports.

The claim that anti-West Russia does have poorer human rights record than most Western countries comes from reading the records (as already reported in our past exchanges).

Quoting Isaac

the democracy index is telling — neomac

Democracy is not exhaustive of human rights, not even close. It's one of 30 articles. Usually the one chosen by neoliberals like you to excuse nations for trampling over the other 29.

Indeed, that’s not the only evidence I reported. We are just looping all over it again:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK

Quoting Isaac

Is this enough evidence? If not why not? — neomac

See above. What could possibly make you think that the satisfaction on one out of thirty articles of human rights would be all the evidence needed?

Here is a summary for you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Russia

Quoting neomac

Here is a summary for you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Russia

John is taller than jack because John is 6 foot.

See any problem with that argument.

Christ! You didn't even put Ukraine on the fucking chart (which if you had, would have put them next to Russia).

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=UKR~RUS

It's like arguing with children.

Quoting Isaac

Here is a summary for you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Russia — neomac

John is taller than jack because John is 6 foot.
See any problem with that argument.

I gave you the chart:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK

The wikipedia article was to make you appreciate the remarkable breath of evidences one can find about the poor status of human rights in Russia (especially under Putin).

Quoting Isaac

Christ! You didn't even put Ukraine on the fucking chart (which if you had, would have put them next to Russia).
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=UKR~RUS
It's like arguing with children.

Why would I need to put Ukraine? I was comparing Russia with the West (including ex-Soviet republic joining the West) not Russia with Ukraine, for the obvious reason that I expect that the Western integration process of Ukraine will improve its human rights conditions as it did with other ex-Soviet republics (indeed it's one of the condition of EU membership https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership_en). That's exactly the line of reasoning that you can't even follow on a step-by-step basis.
But good you posted your chart, because it still neatly fits into my line of reasoning: Ukraine outside the Western influence, under Russian sphere of influence or in conflict with Russia, shows as poor human rights conditions as Russia wrt West (according to those charts). Not to mention that Ukrainian very poor human rights conditions may very well include the human rights violations of the pro-Russian Ukrainian regions [1] during the years of the conflict (including the tragedy of the Crimean Tatars). So the resulting border changes may also positively impact Ukrainian stats in terms of human rights.


[1]
[i]UN monitoring of abuses

At a press conference in Kyiv on 15 December 2014, UN Assistant Secretary-General for human rights Ivan Šimonovi? stated that the majority of human rights violations committed during the conflict were carried out by the separatists.[115] He also said, however, that this could not be used as an excuse by Ukrainian forces to commit human rights violations.

UN observers also registered multiple episodes of sexual abuse against locals, mainly women, at the border checkpoints run by both Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian armed groups. The presence of combatants in civil communities also brings up a danger of sexual violence against their population and increase the risk of rape and human trafficking.[116][117]

During 2014 and 2015 the UN Monitoring Mission documented multiple reports about people abducted by pro-Russian armed groups and Ukrainian military forces.[118][119] [/i]

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_situation_during_the_war_in_Donbas

Quoting Isaac

So you think that was the first [...]

Not relevant.

Quoting Isaac

Virtue signalling

Nope:

Quoting Jan 23, 2023

(spraying bombs, spreading destruction, letting their mercs run free, flattening towns, killing, shamming, re-enculturating, fear-mongering and calls for nationalism at home)
[...]
trajectory
[...]
ruthless oppressive regressive autocratic untrustworthy land-grabber
[...]
risky

Quoting Isaac

Crimea

You missed:

Quoting Jan 23, 2023

(spraying bombs, spreading destruction, letting their mercs run free, flattening towns, killing, shamming, re-enculturating, fear-mongering and calls for nationalism at home)
[...]
trajectory
[...]
ruthless oppressive regressive autocratic untrustworthy land-grabber
[...]
risky

Quoting Isaac

I'm not a newspaper

EU on government reshuffle: ‘We welcome Ukrainian authorities taking corruption allegations seriously’
[sup]— The Kyiv Independent · Jan 24, 2023[/sup]
Russia’s Longest Standing Human Rights Organization Dissolved by State Courts
[sup]— Tony Spitz · Veuer · Jan 26, 2023 (1m:14s)[/sup]

Mildly amusing despite the alternate interpretation:

German foreign office "sorry" for tweet taking a dig at Russia's African outreach with a leopard emoji
[sup]— CBS News · Jan 26, 2023[/sup]
Germany apologizes for leopard jibe that upset some Africans
[sup]— Gerald Imray · AP News · Jan 26, 2023[/sup]

Quoting neomac

I expect that the Western integration process of Ukraine will improve its human rights conditions as it did with other ex-Soviet republics (indeed it's one of the condition of EU membership https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership_en). That's exactly the line of reasoning that you can't even follow on a step-by-step basis.
But good you posted your chart, because it still neatly fits into my line of reasoning: Ukraine outside the Western influence, under Russian sphere of influence or in conflict with Russia, shows as poor human rights conditions as Russia wrt West.

So because western countries have better human rights records than Russia, it's morally legitimate to support Ukraine's fight over territory?

If Ukraine would then join the west's approach, and if the west's human rights are not simply bought at the expense of others, and if the utter destruction of Ukraine's economy and the flooding of its black markets with weapons aren't enough to tip it back over into nationalist extremism... then you might, just might, get an improvement in human rights.

And this slim chance is worth the deaths of tens of thousands?

Tell me. Those other ex-soviet countries which came under western influence, did we fight a proxy war with Russia over each of them? Or did economic development, local political action and covert support bring that about?

So in what way is fighting a long protracted proxy war with Russia necessary for this vague and speculative end goal of yours?

Quoting jorndoe

You missed:

What's Russia's conduct in war got to do with estimates about their relative management of peacetime conditions?

How do Ukraine's armed forces conduct invasions? We don't know. So comparing like-with-like is impossible. we can compare their management of contested regions and see they're about the same. so why would you avoid the evidence for which we do have comparative data and only seek to present the evidence for which we don't?

Quoting neomac

The wikipedia article was to make you appreciate the remarkable breath of evidences one can find about the poor status of human rights in Russia (especially under Putin).

If we were to do a side by side comparison of human rights violations in the 21st century of the United States and Russia, I'm not sure who would come out on top, but my bet would be on the Americans taking the cake.

We're all up in arms about supposed Russian torture of Ukrainian POWs (which if true is horrible and inexcusable, don't get me wrong), but have we already forgotten Guantanamo?

Reply to Tzeentch

Apparently @neomac is capable of comparing two entities only by looking at data on one of them. We don't yet know how...

Quoting Isaac

Apparently neomac is capable of comparing two entities only by looking at data on one of them

Where did I do that?

Quoting Tzeentch

If we were to do a side by side comparison of human rights violations in the 21st century of the United States and Russia, I'm not sure who would come out on top, but my bet would be on the Americans taking the cake.

Here all the stats you want:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK~GBR~USA~AUS~CAN~JPN~KOR
Ukraine is better than Russia, and the US is better than Ukraine and Russia. The rest of Western countries (including ex-Soviet republics) are much better than the US, Ukraine and Russia.


Quoting Tzeentch

We're all up in arms about supposed Russian torture of Ukrainian POWs (which if true is horrible and inexcusable, don't get me wrong), but have we already forgotten Guantanamo?

No we didn't. It simply doesn't abso-fucking-lutely have anything to do with the line of reasoning I was making (is Ukraine going to be like the US by joining EU/NATO?) and you two keep abso-fucking-lutely ignoring.

Quoting neomac

Here all the stats you want:

And you're using physical integrity rights as a proxy for human rights because...?

Quoting neomac

The rest of Western countries (including ex-Soviet republics) are much better than the US, Ukraine and Russia.

Here's your preferred statistics relevant to the actual argument.

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=HRV~BLR~IRQ~RUS~SAU~UKR~USA

1. Note Croatia, the most recent accession to the EU, whose record has gone down since joining.

2. Note Belarus, undoubtedly a Russian puppet state whose score is higher than the US.

3. Note Saudi Arabia, an ally of the US, performing identically to Russia.

4. Note Iraq, a famous beneficiary of the US's military help, at the bottom of the list below everyone.


Even with your own cherry-picked proxy for human rights (which are so much more than just democracy and government freedoms), your argument falls flat on its face.

Reply to neomac

Oh, and one last for you all

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=2009..latest&country=HRV~BLR~IRQ~RUS~SAU~UKR~USA

Which are the only two countries to have shown a net improvement in the last decade?

Russia and Belarus.

Reply to neomac

One more for fun. Since we've not touched on NATO.

Out of the longest running ex-soviet states in NATO... Lithuania.

Here's it's chart (again with your preferred metric), since joining...

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=2004..latest&country=~LTU

Bugger all progress.

Here's it's chart that it achieved all on its own first ...

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=earliest..2004&country=~LTU

Notice the difference? In 2004 Lithuania joined the EU and NATO. That move ended all progress in your chosen metric of human rights.

Reply to Isaac Note the steep decline of the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union, at which point it became unipolar hegemon. It seems power does indeed corrupt.

Quoting Isaac

So because western countries have better human rights records than Russia, it's morally legitimate to support Ukraine's fight over territory?

If Ukraine would then join the west's approach, and if the west's human rights are not simply bought at the expense of others (1), and if the utter destruction of Ukraine's economy and the flooding of its black markets with weapons aren't enough to tip it back over into nationalist extremism (2)… then you might, just might, get an improvement in human rights.

And this slim chance is worth the deaths of tens of thousands? (3)

Concerning claim (1), my reasoning is about the likely fate of human rights institutions in Ukraine once they join EU/NATO as other ex-Soviet republics did IN COMPARISON WITH the likely fate of human rights institutions in Ukraine under the influence of an anti-West Russia (e.g. as Belarus is). So unless you can bring actual arguments (what does it even literally mean “human rights are simply bought at the expense of others”? e.g. In what way the West is “buying” its human rights status out of say Iran’s, China’s, North Korea’s, Russia’s human rights?), evidences to support your bare conjecture, and argue for its pertinence wrt what I’m arguing, I don’t feel rationally compelled by it.
Concerning claim (2), again bare conjecture which still ignores the membership conditions of EU/NATO and Ukrainian motivations to join the West, as premised by my line of reasoning.
Concerning your moral question (3), first, I prefer to assess chances over actual pertinent evidences and arguments about their relevance, instead of rummaging biased conjectures as you do, but only when it goes against your opponents’ arguments (because you yourself don’t abso-fucking-lutely give a shit about chances when it’s matter to support your moral claims). Second, yes it’s arguably worth it as the lesser evil for Ukrainians and Westerners. But given the Western hesitancy to support Ukraine and the internal conflicts of national interests wrt this war my expectations about the evolution of this war change over time as much as my conviction about future consequences at the end of the war. So I too have my doubts. Obviously.


Quoting Isaac

Tell me. Those other ex-soviet countries which came under western influence, did we fight a proxy war with Russia over each of them? Or did economic development, local political action and covert support bring that about?

No to the first question. Yes to the second. Now you tell me: do you agree with that? If not, for what reason?

Quoting Isaac

So in what way is fighting a long protracted proxy war with Russia necessary for this vague and speculative end goal of yours?

The random charge of being “vague and speculative” is simply preposterous because I’m an avg dude (not en expert), we are reasoning under uncertainties of many relevant facts, and exchange in a philosophy forum from our armchair during leisure time. Didn’t we explicitly factor in all that in our claims many times already? Yet I care about the clarity/logic of my arguments and the evidences available to me to assess them (including the input from all sorts of news/stats/reports/experts of course). Since I take such arguments and evidence assessment to be affordable also by other avg dudes in a philosophy forum post format, I expect such avg dudes to reciprocate in intellectually honest and challenging ways. So in relative terms that charge is more apt to qualify roughly all your arguments and objections as I abundantly proved.
Besides the charge must be abso-fucking-lutely irrelevant especially to you: bare conjectures (nothing in any empirical theory excludes that things can’t go differently, right?) and “not enough imagination”-kind of objections are enough to you.
Finally, why on earth would I even care to answer such “vague and speculative” question of yours? In what sense, would this proxy war be “necessary” ? It you merely conjecture historical possibilities for Ukraine by comparison to the ex-Soviet republics, of course there is a counterfactual possibility that for Ukrainians things could have gone differently, the proxy war is “necessary” at all. Besides we should consider related choices by political strategic agents, so if those were free choices and free choice is understood as a non-necessary choice, then of course the proxy war is “necessary” at all. Still there are dramatic events, reasoning over them and choices by involved strategic players that led them step-by-step where we are. So I try to understand them as input for my arguments, whenever pertinent.

BTW, I forgot to mention the context where I extrapolated that line of reasoning from:
Quoting Isaac

As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there.

Quoting Isaac

What is the well-being of the people? — neomac
That's up to us to decide. Personally I think the notion of human rights is a good starting point.

That’s what inspired the first step of my line of reasoning, namely "human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes”, as a good starting point (not because I find it self-evident).


Quoting Isaac

And you're using physical integrity rights as a proxy for human rights because…?

Because physical integrity rights are covered by human rights, aren’t they? And I care to assess my claims against actual and pertinent evidences accessible to me. So if they support my claims, that’s good. Anyways you’ve got plenty of charts in that site. Here:

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~RUS
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~USA
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~UKR
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~POL
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~LTU
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~ROU
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~BGR
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~SVK
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~BLR

Anything else you want to randomly quibble about?

Quoting Isaac

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=HRV~BLR~IRQ~RUS~SAU~UKR~USA

1. Note Croatia, the most recent accession to the EU, whose record has gone down since joining.
2. Note Belarus, undoubtedly a Russian puppet state whose score is higher than the US.
3. Note Saudi Arabia, an ally of the US performing identically to Russia.
4. Note Iraq, a famous beneficiary of the US's military help, at the bottom of the list below everyone.

Even with your own cherry-picked proxy for human rights (which are so much more than just democracy and government freedoms), your argument falls flat on its face.

The charge of “cherry-picking” is random (as it was when you raised the same charge months ago, so re-looping again over the same stuff). You evidently don’t even understand what the charge of “cherry-picking” actually means.
My speculation concerns specifically the fate of Ukraine which wants to enter EU and NATO, so it makes perfect sense to make comparisons with other countries to the extent they share relevant similarities with Ukraine for that hypothesis (cherry-picking happens when part of the dataset falling within the scope of the hypothesis is ignored to support the hypothesis, defining the theoretical scope of the hypothesis is not cherry-picking at all!). Ukraine, ex-Soviet Republics, Belarus and Russia share part of recent history and many aspects of their social background again due to historical and geographic reasons. Due to these similarities it makes perfect sense to compare them more than including Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the US in the comparison, and delimit the scope of the hypothesis accordingly. Besides certain ex-Soviet republics joined EU/NATO, which is also what Ukraine wants. While Russia and Belarus didn’t. So we have a test for COMPARING their trends wrt question “what could happen to ex-Soviet countries joining EU/NATO instead of remaining under Russian sphere of influence in terms of human rights?”.
Getting back to your random objection: you can take the examples of US, Saudi Arabia and Iraq into the garbage. And leave them there forever and ever.
How about Croatia? Well it wasn’t an ex-Soviet Republic, it wasn’t even an ex-Warsaw pact member. So it’s the least similar in the group and we could throw Croatia into the garbage for ever and ever too. But I get that it’s an interesting case for comparison if the scope of the hypothesis was extended to ex-communist European countries. However the decline is not so sharp to significantly question the extended hypothesis either, so I don't mind if you play with it. Just don't forget to throw it in the garbage once you finished.

In any case, what you fail to understand is much deeper. There is no need for me to ignore deviant cases because I’m talking in terms of relative likelihood (and supporting evidences) wrt alternative hypotheses (like having Ukraine fall under Russian influence as Belarus). So not mathematical certainties. Besides I’m not assuming anywhere that the original hypothesis (nor even the extended one which I didn’t make) identifies the only relevant driving factor in the evolution of a country wrt human rights, because there may be other domestic or foreign factors that can get in the way.
Nor I’m assuming anywhere that a boost in human rights is the main motivating factor for countries to join EU/NATO: there are also economic/security benefits too, of course. For that reason I’m not even assuming that joining EU/NATO is necessarily a booster in human rights (indeed, the main booster looks national independence after the collapse of Soviet Union and ensuing reforms). Still the membership may be a relevant counterbalancing factor against potential declining trends due to domestic politics (like the EU for Orban’s Hungary).

BTW, I forgot to mention the context of our exchange in introducing that line of reasoning:
Quoting Isaac

As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there.

Quoting Isaac

What is the well-being of the people? — neomac
That's up to us to decide. Personally I think the notion of human rights is a good starting point.

That’s what inspired the first step of my line of reasoning, namely "human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes”, as a good starting point (not because I find it as a self-evident, or the only possible, or the best starting point).

Quoting Isaac

Here's it's chart that it achieved all on its own first ...

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=earliest..2004&country=~LTU

Notice the difference? In 2004 Lithuania joined the EU and NATO. That move ended all progress in your chosen metric of human rights.

Mind blowing, innit?

Reply to Paine :100: :up:

In all, both revolutions were something quite Ukrainian. Not something planned and controlled from other countries, even if these countries wanted to influence and likely did influence the outcomes.

That academic work btw that you referred to simply brings sanity to the whimsical anti-US propaganda spout on this thread to the real light:

Foreign NGOs and IGOs did indeed provide some small levels of support to several independent news groups, and SMOs in 2013, but this was clearly ad hoc and recipient actioned. Moreover, as was explained by one Kyiv based embassy worker, most foreign actors, be they diplomats or NGOs focused on elite actors and attempted to help broker a deal (author’s correspondence February 14, 2014, NYC). Ukrainian political insiders, have informally also complained about the lack of initial interest and then later mismanagement of the EuroMaidan crisis specifically by leaders of the EU (and EU member states) and the United States. Thus it is difficult to discern the real influence these actors had on the mobilization process.

It is possible, as I have argued elsewhere, that our focus on foreign actors oftentimes over-exaggerates not only their role in the mobilization process, but also their ability to influence actors and events.

And this latter I would agree, as Ukraine had elections (which changed the power structure) not only in 2014, but afterwards which change the political landscape a lot.

But some seem to go with Putin's delusional propaganda and think Ukraine is run by neonazis, which the US put into power years ago. I just hope it's simple ignorance about the actual history.

Quoting ssu

Not something planned and controlled from other countries, ...

You are aware of the tapped telephone conversations from 2014 in which US officials were literally discussing who was going to be in the new Ukrainian government?



If conversations were leaked about US officials deciding who was going to govern your country, would you consider that normal?


And before you latch onto claims that this was fake - the United States actually apologized for some of the things that were said in the leaked phone call.



Clearly the United States was deeply involved in this, and this was publicly acknowledged. So much for your anti-US 'propaganda' allegations, I suppose. These are straight facts.

Reply to ssu
The coup speculators point to associations to particular groups but do not cover the broad coalition of people who otherwise were not aligned with each other. If this was supposed be something like Operation Condor in Chile, how these very different agents were being leveraged simultaneously needs to be explained.

When Mearsheimer speaks of a coup, no effort is made to show how the revolution was managed as a project.

Quoting Paine

The coup speculators...

Here's a lovely little clip of Victory Nuland, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, at the end of 2013 as the Maidan revolution was in full swing, loudly proclaiming the United States spent more than 5 billion USD on Ukraine between 1991 and 2013. (timestamp: 7:27)





You're getting it straight from the horse's mouth.

These aren't "speculations". It was official US policy and they didn't even hide it!

Reply to Tzeentch
There is no secret about the pursuit of U.S. interests and their intention to support ties to the E.U.

This influx of support does not show that the revolution was engineered by outsiders.

Since the violence wielded by the Yanukovych regime was a decisive factor in the growth of the revolution, your planners would have had to have been behind that as well. Pretty crafty.

Quoting ssu

I just hope it's simple ignorance about the actual history.

So the BBC's diplomatic correspondent is likely to be ignorant about the actual history?

Quoting https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26079957

this transcript suggests that the US has very clear ideas about what the outcome should be and is striving to achieve these goals...Washington clearly has its own game-plan

And George Friedman, director of Stratfor, U.S. intelligence strategic advisory institute? Also likely to be ignorant about the actual history when he calls the euromaidan...

George Friedman, director of Stratfor:it truly was the most blatant coup in history.

Or the Guardian's associate editor...

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/30/russia-ukraine-war-kiev-conflict

... Basically, until it came time to rewrite history to conveniently fit the new narrative, the idea that the US were knee deep in this was commonplace.

Now, of course, it's time to dig up some Ukrainian government-sponsored academic and pretend that the idea of the US's involvement is ridiculous.

The trouble is, the internet exists and we can all see quite clearly what the view was at the time.

Quoting Paine

Since the violence wielded by the Yanukovych regime was a decisive factor in the growth of the revolution, your planners would have had to have been behind that as well. Pretty crafty.

That's not necessary at all.

You've already been given evidence of substantial US involvement.

Pretending that in order to be involved in the coup the US would've had to plan everything is dishonest to the extreme, especially since a few pages back you and Reply to ssu scarcely acknowledged the possibility of US involvement.

Quoting neomac

if they support my claims, that’s good

They don't. I've just demonstrated that. Croatia's human rights record declined on joining the EU.

Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Hungary made no progress at all.

But I see you have a new favourite metric. So here's Poland since joining the EU. Declined.

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=2004..latest&country=~POL

Estonia. Declined. Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria... None of these countries made any significant improvement in human rights since joining the EU and most worsened.

You argument is simply not supported by the evidence. Joining the EU is unlikely to improve human rights in Ukraine based on the unequivocal evidence that it has not done so for any other country.

Reply to Tzeentch
I acknowledge that U.S. was an influence in the country. If that involvement included taking part in a coup, that means they had worked with those who executed it. If the coup was the result of a plan, the revolution was engineered by the ones who plotted it. That would require leveraging a huge number of otherwise different people, including some in the Yanukovych regime. Showing how that happened requires a lot more explanation than saying a foreign power threw money around.

It seems that some modicum of the burden of proof here should be on those claiming the change was caused by the U.S. instead of developments in Ukrainian society in relation to Russian influence. How was that manipulation actually carried out?

Otherwise, the notion is as vague and binary as the theory on Color Revolutions developed by the Kremlin to explain popular movements as a tool of U.S. imperialism.

Quoting Paine

It seems that some modicum of the burden of proof here should be on those claiming the change was caused by the U.S. instead of developments in Ukrainian society in relation to Russian influence. How was that manipulation actually carried out?

And you don't think US officials putting together the new Kiev government in a tapped telephone conversation and $5 billion of "aid" goes a long way towards providing that proof?

Nothing to see here folks, just some US officials deciding who gets to be in charge in a country that just underwent a coup d'etat.

You expect people to believe that is coincidence? More importantly, you expect the Russians to believe that is coincidence? To assume the US is an innocent player in this?

Quoting Paine

Otherwise, the notion is as vague and binary as the theory on Color Revolutions developed by the Kremlin ...

Developed by the Kremlin? Are there still people who believe the United States doesn't actively pursue regime change in every place and in every way it possibly can?

How gulilble are you really?

The cases of the US staging coups are more than I care to count.

Quoting Paine

There is no secret about the pursuit of U.S. interests and their intention to support ties to the E.U.

This influx of support does not show that the revolution was engineered by outsiders.

Since the violence wielded by the Yanukovych regime was a decisive factor in the growth of the revolution, your planners would have had to have been behind that as well. Pretty crafty.

Exactly and well put.

What the people here obsessed with the US fail to understand that diplomats and foreign politicians trying to influence events simply isn't the same as foreign entities planning and staging a coup.

And naturally this idea totally forgets that for example the "Right Sector", the basis for all neonazi accusations, lost heavily in the 2014 elections and were out of the government (which that then has changed again when Zelenskyi and his party got into power):

Reply to Tzeentch
That phone call certainly demonstrated hubris and self-importance. It doesn't shed any light on how the revolution was manipulated.

Your alignment with the Kremlin view is noted. My problem with it is that it shrinks all efforts of people to change their civil society into pawns sliding on a board game.

Quoting Tzeentch

The cases of the US staging coups are more than I care to count.

Indeed. That is why I referred to a famous example to contrast the difference of conditions in Chile and Ukraine.

Quoting Paine

It seems that some modicum of the burden of proof here should be on those claiming the change was caused by the U.S

Why?

The US is the most powerful nation on earth. It's necessary to hold power to account otherwise it can just do whatever it likes.

So on what possible ground is it right to give the most powerful nation on earth the benefit of the doubt here?

If they did it, and we let them get away with it, then we've allowed power to dictate foreign governments to suit their needs.

If they didn't, and we assume they did, we hurt the feelings of the people who actually brought about the revolution.

Which is the more dangerous outcome to hedge against?

Quoting Tzeentch

?ssu scarcely acknowledged the possibility of US involvement.

Don't put words in my mouth. What I'm against is the reurgitation of Russian propaganda and to say that the US staged the Revolution of Dignity, not that it (the US) tried to influence Ukrainian actors (and those actors trying to get help from the US)when the protests were already under way, but that the US literally staged a coup.

I think we a had already this discussion 11 months ago. And then (and now) nothing else is given, but the Nuland tapes and articles from that time as "proof" of this conspiracy theory of a "US coup".

Quoting ssu

What I'm against is the reurgitation of Russian propaganda

...which is absurd.

Russia is opposed to the US. It's going to promote any story that reflects negatively on the US.

If you're going to repress all Russian propaganda you're effectively denying all opposition to the US, since all negative actions of the US will undoubtedly figure in Russian propaganda.

Quoting Isaac

Russia is opposed to the US. It's going to promote any story that reflects negatively on the US.

If you're going to repress all Russian propaganda you're effectively denying all opposition to the US, since all negative actions of the US will undoubtedly figure in Russian propaganda.

Facts aren't propaganda.

I think that Putin has mentioned himself for example PNAC, but you don't have to refer Putin on it, you can easily refer to this perfect example of US imperialism by the actual documents of the think tank and all the historical research done on it and the actions of it's members. Or just listen to the famous interviews that Wesley Clarke gave on the neocon adventurism (which he after dems got into power absolutely hates to be reminded of).

Quoting ssu

I think we a had already this discussion 11 months ago. And then (and now) nothing else is given, but the Nuland tapes and articles from that time as "proof" of this conspiracy theory of a "US coup".

"All I have" are US state officials confessing to funneling billions of USD to Ukraine, and being deeply involved in the construction of the post-coup government.

In what world would you ask "Is that all?" when this happens in a supposedly democratic country?

Whether you accept that the United States played a role in the coup is largely irrelevant, because this is more than enough proof of American meddling in Ukraine, which as many have argued is what sparked this conflict.

Quoting ssu

I think that Putin has mentioned himself for example PNAC, but you don't have to refer Putin on it

Right. Absolutely no one here has used Putin as a source of evidence on anything ever. So what the fuck are you on about?

Quoting Isaac

. Joining the EU is unlikely to improve human rights in Ukraine based on the unequivocal evidence that it has not done so for any other country.

But my hypothesis is not that joining EU improves human rights because: 1. when you roughly reached the top (the range is between 0-1) of course there is no much improving , at best you can preserve it 2. Those trends do not discriminate between driving factors (e.g. domestic vs foreign). Indeed EU/NATO membership could also contribute to inhibit/weaken adverse trends prior and after the membership was accepted e.g. through sanctions, monitoring and induced constitutional reforms etc.
As I explained several times but you keep playing dumb, I care comparing the likely trends concerning human rights institutions of ex-Soviet Republic between those which joined EU/NATO and those which didn't and remained under anti-West Russian influence. Why would I care about such comparison? For the obvious reason that Ukraine wants to join EU/NATO to escape from Russian sphere of influence. So it's relevant to understand what might happen to "human rights" institutions in the 2 cases. And since no trend in Russia/Belarus is close to reach any trend in ex-Soviet Republics that joined EU/NATO so far (EVEN WHEN IS DECLINING), my hypothesis is still very much plausible.

Quoting Isaac

But I see you have a new favourite metric.

What?! You were wining about the metric "physical integrity rights " (as you wined about the "democratic index" in the past). Then you wined about the examples I've selected. And now that I gave you the metrics you asked for, you are wining over trend variations [1] which aren't significant enough to challenge my hypothesis. Are you crazy?!

[1]
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=2004..latest&country=BLR~RUS~ROU~LVA~SVK~BGR~LTU~EST~POL

Nah, Reply to Isaac, no need to artificially limit an assessment/evaluation like so. And we take what we have when trying to better understand the attacker/imposer and defender, maybe what they want / don't want.
(Incidentally, Putin enrolling Ukraine into Russia would have been some achievement (resource-wise, politically, power-wise on the international stage, economically, popularity-wise at home, all that).)
Trajectories and trends matter too, like those mentioned above.

Posted prior in the thread? Others were. Anyway...

UN Human Rights reports dire human rights situation seven months after the start of the Russian Federation wide-scale armed attack on Ukraine
[sup]— Tanya Korol · UN Human Rights · Sep 27, 2022[/sup]
Olenivka prison massacre
[sup]— Wikipedia[/sup]

By the way, Holocaust Remembrance is today:

Putin blasts 'neo-Nazis' in Ukraine on Holocaust Remembrance Day
[sup]— AFP via Yahoo · Jan 27, 2023[/sup]

Quoting Tzeentch

It seems power does indeed corrupt

And elected officials like the Frump, Marjorie Taylor Greene, Lauren Boebert, Wendy Rogers, Ted Cruz, ..., look a bit like societal decline. Apparently, the Frump is now pushing the nuclear thing, suggesting that Biden sending nuclear weapons to Ukraine is next up.

Quoting Isaac

So on what possible ground is it right to give the most powerful nation on earth the benefit of the doubt here?

The skepticism expressed was not an attempt to give the U.S. a 'benefit of the doubt'. The U.S. has proven itself capable of doing many nefarious things. The worst of those can be related to accounts of how they were carried out by the people involved. Nothing like that has been presented as yet in regard to the unfolding of the revolution. My observations were given to underline how difficult such an operation would be under the circumstances.

Quoting Isaac

If they did it, and we let them get away with it, then we've allowed power to dictate foreign governments to suit their needs.

If they did it, they will get away with it if nothing more than suspicion is presented as evidence.

Quoting Isaac

If they didn't, and we assume they did, we hurt the feelings of the people who actually brought about the revolution.

I don't know what to make of this trivialization of Ukrainian experience right after you say: "we've allowed power to dictate foreign governments to suit their needs."

Quoting neomac

I care comparing the likely trends concerning human rights institutions of ex-Soviet Republic between those which joined EU/NATO and those which didn't and remained under anti-West Russian influence. Why would I care about such comparison? For the obvious reason that Ukraine wants to join EU/NATO to escape from Russian sphere of influence. So it's relevant to understand what might happen to "human rights" institutions in the 2 cases. And since no trend in Russia/Belarus is close to reach any trend in ex-Soviet Republics that joined EU/NATO so far (EVEN WHEN IS DECLINING), my hypothesis is still very much plausible.

And yet...

Quoting neomac

Those trends do not discriminate between driving factors (e.g. domestic vs foreign).

So you admit that you cannot possibly derive anything from them about Ukraine's likely trajectory by knowing only one such factor (sphere of influence).

Here's the charts you're using from the breakup of the USSR (beginning 1988, finalised 1991) to now. All countries including Russia registered a surge because having democratic elections scores very highly. Then very little happens. Russia declines, Belarus and Ukraine are turbulent but level, the others show virtually no change.

Depending on the nature of the democratic process installed, each country's score rose at the time democracy was established, then stagnated. This is largely to do with V-dem's heavy weighting of electoral procedures in its index (https://www.v-dem.net/data/).

Ukraine, however, already has democratic elections. Famously good ones (apparently) with Zelensky commanding the country's full mandate we're told.

So what improvements could you possibly anticipate, since electoral reform is petty much the only improvement that's consistent and even Russia achieved that with the break up of the USSR. I don't see any evidence of Ukraine's 'likely' path there.

What's more, at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes). It's whether a protracted land war is the best, or even acceptable means of achieving that, considering the enormous cost.

None of the countries you cite as examples have come out of long protracted land wars, nor have such significant far right nationalist sentiment, nor have such influential natural resource reserves, nor have Ukraine's position strategically for Russia... Nor a dozen other factors. The charts I selected show that there's nothing causal about entering a Western sphere of influence. Some countries improve (Lithuania, Estonia), others don't (Croatia, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq). so there's no reason at all to believe that it's the Western influence, and not internal factors that drive the changes.

Certainly not enough reason to justify supporting a devastating war on the back of.

Quoting jorndoe

we take what we have when trying to better understand the attacker/imposer and defender

What "we have" is the relative conduct in Crimea, which you're ignoring for some reason. We're trying to answer the question of what a Russian controlled region of Ukraine would be like and you want to start examining unrelated factors and ignore the example of a Russian controlled region of Ukraine.

Quoting Paine

The U.S. has proven itself capable of doing many nefarious things. The worst of those can be related to accounts of how they were carried out by the people involved. Nothing like that has been presented as yet in regard to the unfolding of the revolution. My observations were given to underline how difficult such an operation would be under the circumstances.

Yep. "always opposed to the previous war, never the current one". That way the war machine can just keep trundling on and everyone gets to pretend they're not supporters.

It's often decades after the event that we find out the sort of details you're using the lack of to exculpate the US. And this isn't a court of law, we're holding them to account, not bringing criminal charges. We don't need a smoking gun, we need the barest whiff of abuse of power.

Quoting Paine

If they did it, they will get away with it if nothing more than suspicion is presented as evidence.

Nonsense. Have you even read a newspaper? Governments have been brought down on the basis of nothing but hearsay. If the government didn't care whether we knew (but didn't have the evidence), they wouldn't put such enormous amounts of effort into controlling the narrative would they? Do you think Cambridge Analytica used the power of solid evidence-based arguments? Are we concerned about Russian troll farms because they might present bundles of court-ready evidence dockets? No we're concerned about their effect on public opinion.

If there's even the slightest sign that the US are repeating the same abuses of power that we know for a fact they've done before, then it matters that we kick up a hue and cry about it. It matters that they feel nervous. A government should be terrified of its people.

Right now they know can expect nothing but obsequious compliance from the likes of you so long as they don't slip up and release documentary evidence of the master plot in excruciating detail.

Quoting Paine

I don't know what to make of this trivialization of Ukrainian experience right after you say: "we've allowed power to dictate foreign governments to suit their needs."

Hopefully make of it exactly what it said. Hurt feelings are less important that holding power to account.

If the US government were involved, it's very important that they feel nervous (if not petrified) that their electorate will not stand for it.

If the US government were not involved, it is far less important (of virtually no consequence at all) that we properly congratulate the people who did actually do it. Hopefully they didn't do it for the praise.

Not that any of this is anything other than a smokescreen. after all, on this same thread, woven in amongst our conversation, you have @neomac literally arguing that Western influence is so instrumental in improving a country's human right record that it's worth fighting a bloody war for, and yet you've remained entirely silent about that.

No complaints about removal of agency when the argument supports the war.

Quoting Tzeentch

"All I have" are US state officials confessing to funneling billions of USD to Ukraine, and being deeply involved in the construction of the post-coup government.

And what you just said means that it wasn't a US staged coup. And the post-coup government lasted for few months until the elections in the same year where the extreme-right lost.

Quoting Tzeentch

In what world would you ask "Is that all?" when this happens in a supposedly democratic country?

Let's remember that the Revolution of Dignity started from a foreign trade policy issue, which inherently made the EU part of this.

Quoting Tzeentch

Whether you accept that the United States played a role in the coup is largely irrelevant, because this is more than enough proof of American meddling in Ukraine, which as many have argued is what sparked this conflict.

And your view is largely irrelevant, as people understand that this war started from the annexation of Crimea and the separatism in the Donbas area in 2014.

Quoting ssu

And your view is largely irrelevant, as people understand that this war started from the annexation of Crimea and the separatism in the Donbas area in 2014.

Ah, so people like Mearsheimer, Chomsky, Sachs, etc., what are they in your view? A bunch of dummies? Kremlin propagandists? Their views are irrelevant, because...? Because they don't conform to your world view, I imagine?

Quoting Tzeentch

Ah, so people like Mearsheimer, Chomsky,

Chomsky has stated that the "the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a major war crime, ranking alongside the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Hitler-Stalin invasion of Poland in September 1939, to take only two salient examples. It always makes sense to seek explanations, but there is no justification, no extenuation."

I have been following the events in Ukraine and this ongoing discussion with some combination of dismay/sorrow/despair. I understand (tho don't 100% agree) your position (which more or less aligns with Chomsky's) that the war could have been avoided by appeasing Russian concerns and that US support of Ukraine is prolonging the ongoing catastrophe.

I would gladly be wrong but I don't see any end in sight for the near term. I don't see either side gaining a military victory and the Russian strategy of destroying Ukraine's infrastructure (with the side effect of killing civilians) has had the opposite effect of hardening Ukraine's resolve to win.

I don't see any resolution until the two sides get sick & tired of killing each other - and this could go on for years

It would make me very happy to be wrong.

Reply to Tzeentch If you would actually follow what people like I write, you would have noticed that on some issues I agree with Mearsheimer, Sachs and even with Chomsky. And in some issue I hold a different view. But these change by the issue at hand and the differences between them and others are many times very subtle.

But perhaps you are the type who either puts someone on a pedestal and agrees everything what they say and damns them others the lowest hell and avoids everything they say as the plague. At least that I'm getting from you...

Quoting Isaac

Yep. "always opposed to the previous war, never the current one". That way the war machine can just keep trundling on and everyone gets to pretend they're not supporters.

I have actively protested against every war the U.S. has ventured upon since Vietnam. I wasn't sure about Vietnam because I was a kid holding a draft card.

Quoting Isaac

It's often decades after the event that we find out the sort of details you're using the lack of to exculpate the US

I am not trying to "exculpate the US." I am trying to introduce the perspective that things happen outside of it.
It is true that many details stay hidden for years. On the other hand, there are many cases where suspicious activities were reported and became the source of scandal.

Quoting Isaac

If there's even the slightest sign that the US are repeating the same abuses of power that we know for a fact they've done before, then it matters that we kick up a hue and cry about it.

Then you better get to work and find this sign. The political discourse in the U.S. is not going to recognize or smell a "barest whiff of abuse of power" without something to chew on.

Quoting Isaac

Hopefully make of it exactly what it said. Hurt feelings are less important that holding power to account.

If the revolution was a staged event, and can be shown to be so, this will undermine the authority of Ukraine as an independent nation. Compare the situation to when other regimes were created by foreign powers. From your extensive commentary, it is clear that you take this lack of legitimacy as a starting place rather than something that can be confirmed or denied by a consideration of facts.

Quoting Isaac

Right now they know can expect nothing but obsequious compliance from the likes of you so long as they don't slip up and release documentary evidence of the master plot in excruciating detail.

It is interesting to see how small you have made me.

Quoting Paine

I have actively protested against every war the U.S. has ventured upon since Vietnam.

You clearly haven't because you've not spoken a word of opposition against this one.

Quoting Paine

I am not trying to "exculpate the US." I am trying to introduce the perspective that things happen outside of it.

I can't see why. No-one is using the argument "nothing happens outside of the US" so there's no need for such a counter-perspective. Clearly some things happen under US puppetry, others don't. We're trying to establish which this is. Simply reminding us that some things happen outside of US influence doesn't help us decide whether this particular thing was one of those.

Quoting Paine

Then you better get to work and find this sign.

Already have. As I demonstrated, a large proportion, if the not the majority of political analysts at the time though this evidence was a sign of US orchestration. It's only now the narrative needs to change that people are pretending otherwise. I've already cited the BBC's chief political analyst at the time

Quoting https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26079957

this transcript suggests that the US has very clear ideas about what the outcome should be and is striving to achieve these goals...Washington clearly has its own game-plan

Here's another...https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/13/ukraine-us-war-russia-john-pilger

the US is threatening to take the world to war. With eastern Europe and the Balkans now military outposts of Nato, the last "buffer state" bordering Russia – Ukraine – is being torn apart by fascist forces unleashed by the US and the EU

As I said, the trouble with hastily trying to change the story is that we have the internet now.

Quoting Paine

If the revolution was a staged event, and can be shown to be so, this will undermine the authority of Ukraine as an independent nation.

I don't see how. High quality elections have taken place since then. What it proves is the US's meddling in the region. It puts the lie to the idea that the US are only involved because of the Ukrainian people's sovereignty. They don't give a fuck about sovereignty. They want US (or US friendly) control over the gas supply to Europe (among other boons) and are willing to do anything to get it - change regime, fight Russia, train neo-Nazis, flood the world's biggest black-market arms dealer with weapons, sabotage a pipeline...

Quoting Paine

It is interesting to see how small you have made me.

Any time you feel like actually holding power to account, feel free to show your mettle. Otherwise, yes, simply regurgitating the narrative of the most powerful nation on earth is pretty small. They really don't need any help.

Quoting ssu

But perhaps you are the type who either puts someone on a pedestal and agrees everything what they say and damns them others the lowest hell and avoids everything they say as the plague. At least that I'm getting from you...

Ah, right.

Your first accusation failed - accusing me of basing my views only on "truth teller" Mearsheimer - which I thoroughly debunked.

So now you have to find some new accusation to latch onto.

I'm not going to play this game with you.

Quoting universeness

With a significant number of heavy tanks from the West now heading for Ukraine, including the Leopard tanks from Germany. Things just escalated! Much bigger booms coming or Russian bust?

What's the time by the Doomsday clock?

Reply to Tzeentch Lol, How? And I've shown that a lot of experts don't agree with him on this issue.

Why not try to engaging on the actual issues and not "this is true, because John Mersheimer said so and he's an expert".

Quoting ssu

Why not try to engaging on the actual issues and not "this is true, because John Mersheimer said so and he's an expert".

No one here has argued that the provocation argument is true "because John Mersheimer said so and he's an expert". Not a single comment has been to that effect.

The invocation of people like Mersheimer has been entirely a means of rebutting your (and other's) feeble attempts to paint all opinion that disagrees with yours as uninformed Russian propaganda.

This latest reference to Mersheimer, for example, came after your incredibly insulting...

Quoting ssu

your view is largely irrelevant

Previous attempts to vilify anyone who disagrees with you...

Quoting ssu

some seem to go with Putin's delusional propaganda

Quoting ssu

simple ignorance

Quoting ssu

fail to understand

Quoting ssu

reurgitation of Russian propaganda

Quoting ssu

totally forgets

The problem is not other people failing to engage with the issues. The problem is your failure to do so. Your need to insult the intelligence of your interlocutors. The thought is that perhaps invoking experts might limit your supercilious sneering... Apparently not.

Reply to Isaac, what we have is a long thread (+ newspapers :smirk:) with observations, including and not limited to Crimea. Filtering most out in assessment and attempts to better understand the attacker/imposer and defender (like what they want / don't want), imposing the artificial restriction like so, suggests not really aiming to understand.

Quoting Isaac

Frankly I don't care. They certainly ought to stop committing war crimes, but that's not the same thing as giving up territory.

The defenders evidently aren't and war crimes (so far mostly) the attackers/imposers.

Reply to jorndoe The term "war crimes" is being thrown around a lot, and it is regarded as established fact that "war crimes" are being committed.

I am not so sure however. War crimes are specifically breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) which consists of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the so-called Additional Protocols. I think on a forum like this it's important to be factual and use accurate language.

Of the war crimes I've seen the Russian government / Russian armed forces accused of, the one that seems believable to me is the possible torture of POWs - likely as part of interrogations.

I've seen little indication that the Russian army is indiscriminately slaughtering civilians. While that would certainly be a breach of IHL, when civilian casualties happen that is not immediately a war crime. Cities and infrastructure can be legitimate military targets, and when civilians die as a result of attacks on such targets, that might still be legitimate under IHL as long as its fundamental principles, one of which being "proportionality", are adhered to.

I'm open to being convinced otherwise, but for that we first need to establish what precisely a war crime is. I've tried to do this on multiple occasions in this thread, but as of yet to no avail it seems.

Quoting jorndoe

The defenders evidently aren't and war crimes (so far mostly) the attackers/imposers.

The 'evidence' that the defenders aren't is little more than overt apologetics. Amnesty produced a report which made the mere mention of potential war crimes but was forced to retract by the rabid Twitterati.

But a 'who committed most war crimes' contest seems more than a little tasteless.

The point is that territory and the means of acquiring it are two different issues. Both Ukraine and Russia need to improve both their military discipline and their human rights record.

How much territory each have whilst doing so is utterly irrelevant.

War crimes in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

By the way, until now at least, Ukrainian areas have had better (international) coverage by teams of journalists/investigators, be it Kyiv, areas taken back by Ukraine, whatever.

Quoting Isaac

The 'evidence' that the defenders aren't is little more than overt apologetics.

They aren't in to give up the land. (Though I'd worry about the creation of haters.)

Quoting Isaac

But a 'who committed most war crimes' contest seems more than a little tasteless.

It's what you brought up.

Anyway, according to the UN, EU, the defender, most really, the invaders/imposer ought to leave. A fair amount already posted to that, and some from the invaders/imposer to the contrary.


On another note, would it be accurate to say that Iran is in a proxy war with Ukraine?
[sub](Sep 17, Oct 13, Nov 1, Nov 5, Nov 5, Nov 6, Nov 10, Nov 18, Nov 24, Nov 25, Nov 27, Nov 28, Dec 7, Dec 12, Jan 2, Jan 9, Jan 26)[/sub]

Quoting Isaac

If the revolution was a staged event, and can be shown to be so, this will undermine the authority of Ukraine as an independent nation.
— Paine

I don't see how. High quality elections have taken place since then. What it proves is the US's meddling in the region. It puts the lie to the idea that the US are only involved because of the Ukrainian people's sovereignty

The matter is not about the purity of U.S. intentions. It is about whether the revolution was a struggle between people in Ukraine that led to the present state of the nation or a trick to make people feel like that is happening.

I am heartened to see you recognize the elections afterwards as a hint of Ukrainian agency. It is an improvement upon your insisting that Ukrainians don't exist as a group acting on that basis.

Quoting Paine

I am heartened to see...

Exactly.

You care more about mollycoddling the current media darlings than you do about holding the most powerful nation on earth to account. I find that morally bankrupt, but if you're proud of it, there's little I can do about that.

[quote=“Isaac;776599”]So you admit that you cannot possibly derive anything from them about Ukraine's likely trajectory by knowing only one such factor (sphere of influence).
[/quote]

I disagree. Notice that the reasoning was focusing on “human rights” only (e.g. we didn’t talk other benefits: economic, security etc. which may also be very much relevant for well-being [1]). Accordingly, based on some related charts and despite the uncertainty (about the driving domestic/foreign factors) anybody can notice that:

• The collapse of the Soviet Union + ensuing independence is correlated with boost in human rights support to the top for many countries in eastern block and post-Soviet countries.
• After some of those countries joined EU/NATO, they managed to keep their positive trends relatively stable, and for those which experienced a noticeable decline (like Poland) still the trend doesn’t look as bad as it looks for other post-Soviet countries still under Russian influence

And since we know that Soviet Union (and Russia’s Putin) have shitty policies in terms of human rights and hegemonic ambitions, while the EU has conditional requirements (which may have been influential in the years prior to the entrance to the EU), policies to monitor and promote human rights [2] and pressuring means, we have good reasons to think that EU may have been a stabilising (if not a boosting) factor, while Russia may be a destabiliser and threat to human rights. So in relative terms, “human rights” may more likely benefit from joining EU/NATO than falling under Russian influence despite the uncertainties.

[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/648145/IPOL_BRI(2020)648145_EN.pdf
https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements_en

[2] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/peace-and-governance/human-rights_en


[quote=“Isaac;776599”]So what improvements could you possibly anticipate, since electoral reform is petty much the only improvement that's consistent and even Russia achieved that with the break up of the USSR. I don't see any evidence of Ukraine's 'likely' path there.
What's more, at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes).[/quote]

First, it’s good that you see electoral reform and democracy in post-Soviet Eastern European countries have improved human rights. Yet Putin doesn’t seem to like pro-West democratic governments in Ukraine despite the fact that since the XIX century Ukrainians are striving for having an independent nation and resisting Russification and Russian subjugation pursued by any Russian regime (Empire, Soviet Union, Putin). So, democracy may very much need securing and NATO expansion has so far secured certain East block countries against the perceived Russian threat (besides allowing states to keep low military budgets in the interest of civil economy/society). Even more so if Russia under Putin doesn’t seem to be very sensitive toward just sanctions and diplomacy (as proven during this war and before). Second, from those stats, one can notice that the trend of human rights protection in post-Soviet states has improved immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union in all countries yet in later years it declined too in some countries, even sharply (see Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan [1]). So it’s important to not discount other promoting factors (like EU membership) that might counterbalance potential declining trends (e.g. before and after the accession for Eastern block countries to the EU). Third, “if Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes)” (so also for the sake of human rights) how likely is that Russia will spare Ukraine from becoming Russian puppetry given all its strategic relevance (as the war is proving), wrt Ukraine joining EU/NATO? Even Kissinger changed his views about it: https://unherd.com/thepost/henry-kissinger-nato-membership-for-ukraine-is-appropriate/



[1]
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=1988..latest&uniformYAxis=0&country=MDA~TJK~TKM~UZB~BLR~RUS~ARM~KAZ~KGZ~GEO~UKR~AZE



[quote=“Isaac;776599”]It's whether a protracted land war is the best, or even acceptable means of achieving that, considering the enormous cost.[/quote]

Wars often have enormous costs. Yet no country will likely capitulate if it has the means to fight. First reason, readiness to surrender to a foreign force can be a very disturbing moral hazard because it encourages further abuses (especially by an authoritarian ruler that pursues hegemony) that may lead to subjugation and degradation of standards of life (also in terms of human rights). Ukrainians know very well that from history. Secondly both subjection and freedom may affect not only current but also future generations.
For the West is the same. Even if Russia doesn’t constitute yet an actual existential threat to the West as it is to Ukraine, there is no reason for the West to let Russia take Ukraine for free (and enjoy related strategic benefits plus full military assets for further expansions) just to find out later what existential threat Russia might become, because then it may well be too late. So Western support for Ukraine is not just for the present generations but also for the future ones. This includes a greater integration that might benefit both the West and Ukraine.
Besides, you keep talking about “enormous cost” without giving any moral criteria to understand the moral relevance of such “enormous cost”. For example: exactly how many Ukrainian casualties count as morally relevant “enormous cost”? If Ukrainian casualties were 0.000001% of the population would it be an “enormous cost” in moral terms? How about 0.00001%, or 0.0001%, or 0.001%, or 0.01%, or 0.1%? On what moral grounds you choose that number?

[quote=“Isaac;776599”]None of the countries you cite as examples have come out of long protracted land wars, nor have such significant far right nationalist sentiment, nor have such influential natural resource reserves, nor have Ukraine's position strategically for Russia... Nor a dozen other factors. The charts I selected show that there's nothing causal about entering a Western sphere of influence. Some countries improve (Lithuania, Estonia), others don't (Croatia, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq). so there's no reason at all to believe that it's the Western influence, and not internal factors that drive the changes.[/quote]

As already argued, I question the claim that there are no reasons to think that the West had an influence in terms of human rights as a driving factor. On the contrary, since the West is appealing for many good reasons we can understand why Eastern block people (including those who could care about human rights among other benefits) wanted to join EU/NATO after the collapse of Soviet Union instead of wanting to ally with Russia (now Georgia and Moldavia are also very much interested).
If the far right nationalist sentiment looks more significant in Ukraine, that’s because mainly nurtured by anti-Russians and philo-Russians tension. Otherwise it would likely be as intense as in other Eastern European countries given their more xenophobic culture wrt the Western European countries (https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/) which also suggests that foreign conditions may more likely trigger social reforms and government response supporting human rights than just domestic ones.

Quoting Isaac

you have neomac literally arguing that Western influence is so instrumental in improving a country's human right record that it's worth fighting a bloody war for,

Side comments to this otherwise misleading summary:

• "literally arguing that Western influence" yet the starting point of my views is not "Western influence" and "human right" was just a good starting point.
• "so instrumental" suggests a degree of conviction that I do not have, nor need to have. We are assessing likelihood under uncertainties.
• "it's worth" always in relative terms (like letting Russia subdue Ukraine and get away with it)

Quoting neomac

Besides, you keep talking about “enormous cost” without giving any moral criteria to understand the moral relevance of such “enormous cost”. For example: exactly how many Ukrainian casualties count as morally relevant “enormous cost”? If Ukrainian casualties were 0.000001% of the population would it be an “enormous cost” in moral terms? How about 0.00001%, or 0.0001%, or 0.001%, or 0.01%, or 0.1%? On what moral grounds you choose that number?

I would consider even a single person dying against their will to be an enormous cost that was unjustly imposed, on the moral ground that no person has the right to tell another to give their life against their will, under any circumstance.

Quoting Tzeentch

I would consider even a single person dying against their will to be an enormous cost that was unjustly imposed, on the moral ground that no person has the right to tell another to give their life against their will, under any circumstance.

Clear enough. Question: do you yourself ought to do anything to have people to abide by your principle?

Reply to neomac Engage in dialogue, perhaps? If you're asking me if I ought to force people to abide by my principles, then obviously the answer is no.

Reply to Tzeentch So you morally ought to do nothing to have people abide by your moral principle, except engage in dialogue perhaps. So I guess nobody else morally ought to do anything to have people abide by your moral principle, except engage in dialogue perhaps. Clear enough.
So imagine someone is bombing the neighborhood where your family and friends live (some die a horrible death, others are severely injured or maimed), they lost where to live and all basic services in the neighborhood, some even jobs if working in the neighborhood, does anybody (you included) morally ought to do anything about it?

Quoting neomac

The collapse of the Soviet Union + ensuing independence is correlated with boost in human rights support to the top for many countries in eastern block and post-Soviet countries.

Not derivable from the charts. As I said, V-dem bias their scoring heavily in favour of democratic representation which is only a small part of human rights. We can say with certainty that the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a strong increase in democratic representation (and associated freedoms). The rest of human rights are not addressed by your charts.

Quoting neomac

After some of those countries joined EU/NATO, they managed to keep their positive trends relatively stable, and for those which experienced a noticeable decline (like Poland) still the trend doesn’t look as bad as it looks for other post-Soviet countries still under Russian influence

Again, that's not what the charts show. The trend is similar in EU nations as it in Russio-sphere nations (in fact the trend is, on average, slightly more positive in Russio-sphere nations than it is in EU nations). The starting points in EU nations are often higher (explained by the weighting given to democratic representation).

Quoting neomac

we have good reasons to think that EU may have been a stabilising (if not a boosting) factor, while Russia may be a destabiliser and threat to human rights.

We have no such reason from the data you've provided. You've given no evidence that EU pressure, monitoring and requirements improve human rights as a whole. You've given no evidence that Russia is responsible for the low V-dem scores of the nations which chose not to join the EU. Basically you've come at this with a preconceived notion and squeezed the data into your theory.

What we actually have is...

1. Post Soviet break up, some nations chose to move toward joining the EU, for which they increased their systems of democratic representation which dramatically improved their V-dem scores. We don't have any data on why or how.

2. Other nations chose not to, so their V-dem scores remained low. We don't have any data on what influenced them to make this choice, certainly nothing showing that 'Russian influence' was the determining factor. That is entirely a fabrication of yours.

3. We have no data at all on comparisons between non-democracy related human rights such as freedom from slavery and the right to respect for family and private life.

4. We have no data at all on the impact of the post-soviet states on the human rights of other nations such as developing world trading partners.

Relating this to Ukraine. We have no reason (from the data you've given) to think that Ukraine defeating Russia would lead to a Lithuania-style improvement, or maintain the previous Ukraine-style levels. We don't know why Ukraine had such a low score and we've no evidence at all to suggest that might be related to Russia in a way which their defeat in a land war would prevent.

Quoting neomac

it’s good that you see electoral reform and democracy in post-Soviet Eastern European countries have improved human rights.

I've said no such thing. I've pointed out that V-dem scoring system weighs democracy highly.

Quoting neomac

since the XIX century Ukrainians are striving for having an independent nation and resisting Russification and Russian subjugation pursued by any Russian regime

Bollocks. There has been a civil war raging between those who want to remain in the Russian sphere of influence and those who don't. Your elaborations of data are bad enough. If you're going to just start making shit up we can't progress at all.

Quoting neomac

NATO expansion has so far secured certain East block countries against the perceived Russian threat

...and a single shred of evidence for this would be...?

Quoting neomac

it’s important to not discount other promoting factors (like EU membership) that might counterbalance potential declining trends

It is unequivocal from the data you yourself provided that the EU is no such promoting factor. Look at the data. The main net gains during the period after most states joined the EU were from Russia and Belarus. If anything, the data show the exact opposite, that being outside of the EU is a better influencer on human rights.

Quoting neomac

how likely is that Russia will spare Ukraine from becoming Russian puppetry given all its strategic relevance

That depends on the progress of the war. If the war goes very well and Russia lose quickly and completely, then that will secure Ukraine a free and intact future. If the war goes really badly and Russia make gains, that will actually increase the chances of Ukraine becoming a puppet state over say, simply ceding Crimea and Donbas right now. If the war drags on, then it will be the worse outcome of all since whether Russia win or lose will be irrelevant. Ukraine will be financially crippled and will be utterly under the control of either Russia or the IMF. In neither case will it be free to make its own choices.

Quoting neomac

there is no reason for the West to let Russia take Ukraine for free

Firstly, No one is talking about Russia taking Ukraine. That has never been a negotiating position of either power. The dispute is over the territory of Donbas and Crimea and the security thereof.

Secondly, there's ample reason. The longer the war drags on the more people die (or are put at risk of death) both Ukrainians and other affected groups such as those reliant on Ukrainian exports and those who care not be destroyed by nuclear holocaust.

No one has yet provided a shred of evidence showing that a Russian controlled Donbas/Crimea would be so much worse for the people of those territories as to justify the deaths of thousands (and risk to millions) of a continued war. All the evidence points to the fact that life for the people of those regions would be much the same either way (pretty bloody awful).

Quoting neomac

If Ukrainian casualties...

We're not talking (primarily) about Ukrainian casualties. We're talking about the risk of nuclear war, mass starvation, and future economic devastation. Ukrainian casualties are a drop in the ocean. More people died from Ukraine's appalling environmental pollution that died in the war so far (civilians). I don't see that over the front pages day after day.

Quoting neomac

So imagine someone is bombing the neighborhood where your family and friends live (some die a horrible death, others are severely injured or maimed), they lost where to live and all basic services in the neighborhood, some even jobs if working in the neighborhood, does anybody (you included) morally ought to do anything about it?

I don't think we necessarily have moral obligations to do things to other people, even if we think it is in their best interest.

But I would probably try to get them out of there, obviously.

Quoting Agent Smith

What's the time by the Doomsday clock?

I hope that some sneaky internal group of Russian dissenters, have 'knobbled' any such clock on the Russian side and have some plans to do something similar to whatever long term intentions Putin and his cronies have.

Quoting Tzeentch

I would consider even a single person dying against their will to be an enormous cost that was unjustly imposed, on the moral ground that no person has the right to tell another to give their life against their will, under any circumstance.

Isn't this more of an objection to most political/societal systems, except anarchy (maybe)?
Defenders don't really have much choice, as attackers do.

How do you imagine this playing out?

Wait for something to better regulate our interaction, say along the lines of 180 Proof's idea?
I suppose (theoretically) we might hope and wait for particular global change in the ethics of our neurotic, part-time rational homo sapiens (maybe even an evolutionary leap); yet that's quite high hopes, not quite realistic.

EDIT

Any one person is outnumbered by two with a different sentiment/attitude.
Individuals in a society could be ruled by organized thugs or a (transparent) democratic majority where all have a say.
Running with the least bad is rational enough, regardless of some personal sacrifices.

Quoting jorndoe

Isn't this more of an objection to most political/societal systems, except anarchy (maybe)?

Certainly. I am morally opposed to any system that is based on the use and threat of violence.

Reply to neomac

Interestingly, an article on some of 'benefits' of western control Ukrainians can look forward to...

https://jacobin.com/2023/01/ukraine-postwar-reconstruction-western-capital-blackrock-neoliberalism/

Ukraine is being sized up by neocolonial vultures from BlackRock to the EU for a carve-up after the war is over. On the menu is deregulation, privatization, and “tax efficiency” — measures that may have already begun.

Among the policy recommendations are a “decrease in government spending,” “tax system efficiency,” and “deregulation.”

Perhaps you could explain to me how "deregulation", the removal of what you call "conditional requirements", can have the effect you're claiming is likely?

All this bullshit fairy tale you're spinning about how EU rules are going to keep human rights up to scratch is counter to the documented reality that westernised post war Ukraine is planned to be a deregulated neo liberal nightmare.

Quoting Tzeentch

Certainly. I am morally opposed to any system that is based on the use and threat of violence.

Apart from mercenaries, sociopaths, dictators, ..., I'd think most share the sentiment.

What does that translate to, though, in real life, social life?

(I'm wary of thinking up idealized Utopias, would rather stick to ongoing realistic aspirations, but this ?? stuff isn't about me personally.)

Quoting Tzeentch

I would consider even a single person dying against their will to be an enormous cost that was unjustly imposed, on the moral ground that no person has the right to tell another to give their life against their will, under any circumstance.

Quoting Isaac

The collapse of the Soviet Union + ensuing independence is correlated with boost in human rights support to the top for many countries in eastern block and post-Soviet countries. — neomac


Not derivable from the charts. As I said, V-dem bias their scoring heavily in favour of democratic representation which is only a small part of human rights. We can say with certainty that the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a strong increase in democratic representation (and associated freedoms). The rest of human rights are not addressed by your charts.

Oh, you just went back to complaining about the metric.
The charts caption says “Based on the expert assessments and index by V-Dem. It captures the extent to which people are free from government torture, political killings, and forced labor, they have property rights, and enjoy the freedoms of movement, religion, expression, and association.” This is what they measured. If you have anything pertinent to the issue at hand and arguable better than those charts, show them to me. If you do not have them, I’ll keep reasoning over the evidence I have. You feel free to keep speculating over the evidence you do not have.




Quoting Isaac

After some of those countries joined EU/NATO, they managed to keep their positive trends relatively stable, and for those which experienced a noticeable decline (like Poland) still the trend doesn’t look as bad as it looks for other post-Soviet countries still under Russian influence — neomac


Again, that's not what the charts show. The trend is similar in EU nations as it in Russio-sphere nations (in fact the trend is, on average, slightly more positive in Russio-sphere nations than it is in EU nations).

What do you mean by “similar”? I don’t see very much relevant similarity wrt what I’m arguing.
Here some latest stats:

Post-Soviet republics (outside NATO/EU):
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=1988..latest&uniformYAxis=0&country=MDA~TJK~TKM~UZB~BLR~RUS~ARM~KAZ~KGZ~GEO~UKR~AZE
Only 3/12 are upper bound >= 0.9
Only 4/12 are upper bound >= 0.8
Only 5/9 are upper bound >= 0.7
Only 5/9 are upper bound >= 0.6

Post-Soviet republics and Eastern bloc (within EU/NATO)
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=2000..latest&uniformYAxis=0&country=LVA~LTU~EST~SVK~ROU~BGR~POL~CZE~HUN~HRV~SVN
Only 7/9 are upper bound >= 0.9
Only 9/9 are upper bound >= 0.8
Only 9/9 are upper bound >= 0.7
Only 9/9 are upper bound >= 0.6

Once again you fail to consider comparative likelihood, and comparison is not over variation but over desirable levels of human rights index. Also a turd can look similar to a chocolate muffin. Yet I guess it would still taste different enough in your mouth, innit? Would this change significantly enough if you removed the sugar-coat on top of the muffin and put it on the turd?



Quoting Isaac

We have no such reason from the data you've provided. You've given no evidence that EU pressure, monitoring and requirements improve human rights as a whole. You've given no evidence that Russia is responsible for the low V-dem scores of the nations which chose not to join the EU. Basically you've come at this with a preconceived notion and squeezed the data into your theory.

The data I provided shows some trends and allow us for some reasoning under uncertainty.
The good reasons are things like these:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/648145/IPOL_BRI(2020)648145_EN.pdf
https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements_en
https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/peace-and-governance/human-rights_en
Which must be again assessed comparatively. And the alternative here is to be Russian puppetry.
Quoting Isaac

at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes).

Quoting Isaac

What we actually have is...
Post Soviet break up, some nations chose to move toward joining the EU, for which they increased their systems of democratic representation which dramatically improved their V-dem scores. We don't have any data on why or how.
2. Other nations chose not to, so their V-dem scores remained low. We don't have any data on what influenced them to make this choice, certainly nothing showing that 'Russian influence' was the determining factor. That is entirely a fabrication of yours.
3. We have no data at all on comparisons between non-democracy related human rights such as freedom from slavery and the right to respect for family and private life.
4. We have no data at all on the impact of the post-soviet states on the human rights of other nations such as developing world trading partners.

Relating this to Ukraine. We have no reason (from the data you've given) to think that Ukraine defeating Russia would lead to a Lithuania-style improvement, or maintain the previous Ukraine-style levels. We don't know why Ukraine had such a low score and we've no evidence at all to suggest that might be related to Russia in a way which their defeat in a land war would prevent.

Of course we have reasons. Just we are reasoning under uncertainty as avg dudes by considering the available evidences (which will always be very limited, we are neither experts nor decision makers), make comparisons, guided by some reasonable assumptions like the EU/NATO policies, the degree of involvement of the West in Ukraine, the Ukrainian aspirations, geopolitical theories, history, etc. If you refuse playing this game, that’s fine with me. Believing that’s not worth playing it, that’s entirely your problem not mine. You didn’t offer any better alternative anyways to anything we have discussed so far. You just wish all and only Western rich people and politicians sell all they have and pay for Yemeni/African/Chinese/Indian/Russian kids starving and the UK healthcare system. And apparently the best strategy for you to make that happen is by holding them accountable through posts on a philosophy forum. How is it going so far? Don’t need evidences, use your imagination.



Quoting Isaac

since the XIX century Ukrainians are striving for having an independent nation and resisting Russification and Russian subjugation pursued by any Russian regime — neomac


Bollocks. There has been a civil war raging between those who want to remain in the Russian sphere of influence and those who don't. Your elaborations of data are bad enough. If you're going to just start making shit up we can't progress at all.

Which doesn’t contradict what I’m saying at all. Indeed the separatists fighting the civil war concerns Russified regions of course. If you are ignorant about Ukrainian history, it’s not my problem. I gave you the link to Timothy Snyder classes. Alternatively a wikipedia summary can come in handy too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russification_of_Ukraine
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-Tatarization_of_Crimea
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_nationalism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donbas
Ukrainians in the Donbas were greatly affected by the 1932–33 Holodomor famine and the Russification policy of Joseph Stalin. As most ethnic Ukrainians were rural peasant farmers, they bore the brunt of the famine.




Quoting Isaac

NATO expansion has so far secured certain East block countries against the perceived Russian threat — neomac


...and a single shred of evidence for this would be…?.

I gave it a while ago [1]




Quoting Isaac

it’s important to not discount other promoting factors (like EU membership) that might counterbalance potential declining trends — neomac


It is unequivocal from the data you yourself provided that the EU is no such promoting factor. Look at the data. The main net gains during the period after most states joined the EU were from Russia and Belarus. If anything, the data show the exact opposite, that being outside of the EU is a better influencer on human rights..

Irrelevant. Even if one can’t discriminate the impact of the EU/NATO from domestic factors from those charts (“absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence”), one can still clearly see that COMPARATIVELY those post-Soviet or eastern block countries which joined EU/NATO are in much better human rights conditions than those which didn’t. Besides we know that EU membership requires reviewing before and after the accession, pro-human rights policies, sanctioning mechanism and various other economic/security/social benefits which may motivate countries to stay in line. So if we do not fully know how effective or broad they are in promoting human rights (in comparative terms), still anybody who cares about human rights and is risk averse may still reasonably prefer to have them than nothing at all or the opposite of it.




Quoting Isaac

how likely is that Russia will spare Ukraine from becoming Russian puppetry given all its strategic relevance — neomac.

That depends on the progress of the war. If the war goes very well and Russia lose quickly and completely, then that will secure Ukraine a free and intact future. If the war goes really badly and Russia make gains, that will actually increase the chances of Ukraine becoming a puppet state over say, simply ceding Crimea and Donbas right now. If the war drags on, then it will be the worse outcome of all since whether Russia win or lose will be irrelevant. Ukraine will be financially crippled and will be utterly under the control of either Russia or the IMF. In neither case will it be free to make its own choices.

That’s not related to what I was arguing: EU/NATO influence vs Russia influence. If Ukraine didn’t join EU/NATO, it would have likely become a Russian puppet as Belarus due to its strategic importance and the evident intolerability for Russia to have a pro-West democratic government over there. So human rights conditions would have been likely as shitty as they are in Russia and Belarus.
There is no free meal you know? And IMF may still be the lesser evil than Russia.
In any case, my understanding is that Western international reputation is bound with the fate of Ukraine during and after this war. So if Ukraine can not be sold as a success story in some credible way for years to come Western reputation is screwed much more severely than what happened in Iraq or Afghanistan or Vietnam (put together).



Quoting Isaac

there is no reason for the West to let Russia take Ukraine for free — neomac


Firstly, No one is talking about Russia taking Ukraine. That has never been a negotiating position of either power. The dispute is over the territory of Donbas and Crimea and the security thereof.

Secondly, there's ample reason. The longer the war drags on the more people die (or are put at risk of death) both Ukrainians and other affected groups such as those reliant on Ukrainian exports and those who care not be destroyed by nuclear holocaust.

No one has yet provided a shred of evidence showing that a Russian controlled Donbas/Crimea would be so much worse for the people of those territories as to justify the deaths of thousands (and risk to millions) of a continued war. All the evidence points to the fact that life for the people of those regions would be much the same either way (pretty bloody awful).

Russia tried to attack Kyiv with the purpose of denazifying the Ukrainian regime. Since it failed, it had to redefine its military objectives and now it seems to focus on South-Eastern Ukrainian territories. But threats from Russia and for Russia are all still there. Even if you want to limit the scope of your argument, the choice for Ukraine between joining EU/NATO or remaining prey of Russia is still there. Therefore for the West and Ukraine the Russian threat needs to be reduced as much as possible (e.g. concerning Russian military capability to pursue conventional wars for further expansion or in support of China, also to give the West enough time to grow its military capacity bigger and more advanced than Russia’s ). That’s necessary for any negotiation to be perceived enough reliable (coz Putin’s word have absolutely zero value right?).
I don’t think the West/Ukraine are fighting this war to save the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas/Crimea, but to keep strategic territories and to save those who aren’t pro-Russian.



Quoting Isaac

If Ukrainian casualties... — neomac


We're not talking (primarily) about Ukrainian casualties. We're talking about the risk of nuclear war, mass starvation, and future economic devastation. Ukrainian casualties are a drop in the ocean. More people died from Ukraine's appalling environmental pollution that died in the war so far (civilians). I don't see that over the front pages day after day.

If you are claiming that pollution is a more serious problem than border disputes because it causes more deaths, that has nothing to do with the war. One can’t fix all problems at once and those that have priority concern the means of survival for competing geopolitical actors.
So, for example, the strategic relevance of “risk of nuclear war, mass starvation, and future economic devastation” can’t discount implied moral hazards which competitors can exploit (indeed less risk averse or bluffing competitors may easily turn perceived risks into emotional blackmailing strategies).


Quoting Isaac

https://jacobin.com/2023/01/ukraine-postwar-reconstruction-western-capital-blackrock-neoliberalism/

Ukraine is being sized up by neocolonial vultures from BlackRock to the EU for a carve-up after the war is over. On the menu is deregulation, privatization, and “tax efficiency” — measures that may have already begun.


Among the policy recommendations are a “decrease in government spending,” “tax system efficiency,” and “deregulation.”


Perhaps you could explain to me how "deregulation", the removal of what you call "conditional requirements", can have the effect you're claiming is likely?

All this bullshit fairy tale you're spinning about how EU rules are going to keep human rights up to scratch is counter to the documented reality that westernised post war Ukraine is planned to be a deregulated neo liberal nightmare.

"jacobin.com"? "deregulated neo liberal nightmare"? "documented reality"? show that to me, I wanna see the metrics of your unbiased source.




[1]
From:
[i]
THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
======================================================================= HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
[b] COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS [/b]?FIRST SESSION?__________?OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________?Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[/i]

Comments about the Russian “imperialist bent” were of the following kind:
[i]
Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

[…]

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.''

[…]

Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.

[…]

Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan- European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. [b] NATO has proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the beginning of the next century is also Russia [/b]. A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration [/b] does not see this as a legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
[b]Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to protect the democracies they have already established from external aggression. [/b]
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.

[…]


Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my own position. My position is not that we should accommodate Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, and even further, and considerably further, than the current proposal envisages.

[…]

The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite. They certainly speak with authority. [b]Moscow is opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as final[/b]. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.
[/i]

Comments about Ukraine were of the following kind :
[i]
If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of it.
[…]

My estimate here rests on the fact that including the Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th country, Ukraine, on the horizon.

[…]
The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.

[…]
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of political, economic and military maturity before they can become members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just ``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a collection of economic and political basket cases and both organizations would be unable to function effectively.
[…]
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
[…]
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.?[/i]

Apparently, some are making a buck off the war with computer games:

Battlefront: Black Sea

Ukraine Defender

Squad



And some are using games to spread fakes:

Trolls are using this life-like video game to spread misinformation about the Ukraine war

Can't trust alleged footage, though fake game video is often a bit too "perfect". At the moment anyway.

Quoting universeness

I hope that some sneaky internal group of Russian dissenters, have 'knobbled' any such clock on the Russian side and have some plans to do something similar to whatever long term intentions Putin and his cronies have.

As we can see whomsoever it was that, long time ago, claimed nuclear weapons are pointless, is right on the money. Nobody can use it. It's just there for show - a weapon that can't be used is useless, oui?

Quoting Isaac

You care more about mollycoddling the current media darlings than you do about holding the most powerful nation on earth to account. I find that morally bankrupt, but if you're proud of it, there's little I can do about that.

This list of my shortcomings does not get you closer to supporting your view that all appearances that Ukraine is acting in their own self-interest is a piece of agitprop. The U.S. has their bundle of interests. The Europeans have many different alignments and disagreements over their interests. You insist upon excluding Ukrainian interests as another factor driving events.

That fervor to exclude them is odd.

Reply to Paine

When I talk about US interests or European interests I'm talking about their governments, which, in turn, largely means the interests of their corporate lobbyists.

Yes, I'm sure the Ukrainian government has its interests and lobbyists too. They do, after all, consist of some of the wealthiest people in Ukraine.

What I've objected to is the notion that some unified group called 'Ukrainians' have a single view, and that, even if they did, that view should matter to US and European policy above than any other.

Quoting neomac

I’ll keep reasoning over the evidence I have

No, you're ignoring the evidence and continuing with your fairytale in spite of evidence to the contrary.

Your theory is that Western influence on Ukraine would improve human right compared to Russian influence.

You've given data showing that some ex-soviet countries improved their human rights record (according to one metric) after leaving the USSR, but others didn't. Those that did later joined the EU, some later joined NATO.

You've not shown that Western influence was responsible for this improvement, not even given any data at all regarding the cause.

You've not shown that Russian influence was responsible for the lack of improvement in Ukraine (and Belarus), not even provided any data at all on the matter.

What we do see, however, is data which opposes your theory.

1. During the last decade many countries in the EU have shown a decline in their human rights record, during the same period Russia and Belarus have registered an increase. You can't argue the EU are a protector of human rights when countries in them decline whilst countries outside of them improve.

2. Many other countries within 'western influence' like Saudi-Arabia, have seen their human rights record decline (from an already poor start). If there was a significant driver of human rights improvements in the ex-Soviet nations post 1999, western influence clearly wasn't it since it did not have a similar effect outside of those states and that time period.

3. The US (the chief 'western' influence in Ukraine) has a steeply declining human rights record and is currently below Belarus, a Russian puppet state.

To summarise.

• You cherry-pick a particular group of states at one very narrow period of history (ex-Soviet states post 1999 to early 2000s) and then extrapolate a general theory from those despite the fact that you've been shown other states and other time periods which contradict that theory.
• You infer reasons for those cherry-picked improvements which are not given in the data ('western' vs Russian influence), again despite being given data which shows the opposite - the Russian-influenced Belarus is now above the archetype of western influence, the US.
• You then ignore all other data, such as the fact that Ukraine's post-war policy is documented as being one of "deregulation", continuing instead with your fantasy that somehow western regulations are going to improve human rights. The fact that no state the US has aided militarily has actually improved. The fact that Ukraine's human rights record has not tracked Russia's (declining when Russia's improved)...

So no, you're not "reasoning over the evidence". You're regurgitating the message your newspapers are ramming down your throat and ignoring anything which contradicts it.

Reply to jorndoe What they have used quite a lot is Armed Assault -series (Arma 3). Typically been pro-Russian stuff. Even if IR-camera footage is blurry, anyone who has played the game can immediately notice the obvious signs of it.

Prague, 28th November 2022 – Developers from the independent Czech game development studio Bohemia Interactive would like to address the recent circulation of videos which were originally taken from their game Arma 3, and falsely used as footage from real-life conflicts, mainly from the current war in Ukraine. These user-made videos have the potential to go viral, and are massively shared by social media users; sometimes even by various mainstream media or official government institutions worldwide. The Arma 3 dev team would like to take this opportunity to point out how the general public can distinguish such in-game videos from real-world footage.

How to distinguish in-game videos from real-world footage (tips from the developers):

Very low resolution

Even dated smartphones have the ability to provide videos in HD quality. Fake videos are usually of much lower quality, and are intentionally pixelated and blurry to hide the fact that they’re taken from a video game.

Shaky camera

To add dramatic effect, these videos are often not captured in-game. Authors film a computer screen with the game running in low quality and with an exaggerated camera shake.
Often takes place in the dark / at night
The footage is often dark in order to hide the video game scene’s insufficient level of detail.

Mostly without sound

In-game sound effects are often distinguishable from reality.

Doesn't feature people in motion

While the game can simulate the movement of military vehicles relatively realistically, capturing natural looking humans in motion is still very difficult, even for the most modern of games.

Heads Up Display (HUD) elements visible

Sometimes the game’s user interfaces, such as weapon selection, ammunition counters, vehicle status, in-game messages, etc. are visible. These commonly appear at the edges or in the corners of the footage.

Unnatural particle effects

Even the most modern games have a problem with naturally depicting explosions, smoke, fire, and dust, as well as how they’re affected by environmental conditions. Look for oddly separated cloudlets in particular.

Unrealistic vehicles, uniforms, equipment

People with advanced military equipment knowledge can recognize the use of unrealistic military assets for a given conflict. For instance, in one widely spread fake video, the US air defense system C-RAM shoots down a US A-10 ground attack plane. Units can also display non-authentic insignias, camouflage, etc.

Lastly, we would like to ask the players and content creators of Arma 3 to use their game footage responsibly.

Quoting Isaac

No one here has argued that the provocation argument is true "because John Mersheimer said so and he's an expert". Not a single comment has been to that effect.

Wrong.

You yourself have admitted it. Just twelve days ago.

Quoting Isaac

You champion Mearsheimer's theory of International Relations as the best explanation of the events unfolding in Ukraine. You discount previous behavior by Russia as indicative of anything happening in this conflict.
— Paine

Yes. What's that got to do with the argument here?

:smile:

Reply to ssu

What?

Quoting Tzeentch

Certainly. I am morally opposed to any system that is based on the use and threat of violence.

Quoting jorndoe

Apart from mercenaries, sociopaths, dictators, ..., I'd think most share the sentiment.

You'd be surprised. Most people readily support systems based on violence without batting an eye. It's so normal to them. Nation states would be one such system. Politics and the laws through which they operate are based on (threats of) violence. Without violence, there would be no law.

Quoting jorndoe

What does that translate to, though, in real life, social life?

Refraining from the use of violence or threats thereof.

Quoting Isaac

No, you're ignoring the evidence and continuing with your fairytale in spite of evidence to the contrary.

Your theory is that Western influence on Ukraine would improve human right compared to Russian influence.

Not “improve” for the reasons I already explained.
Quoting neomac

my hypothesis is not that joining EU improves human rights because: 1. when you roughly reached the top (the range is between 0-1) of course there is no much improving , at best you can preserve it 2. Those trends do not discriminate between driving factors (e.g. domestic vs foreign). Indeed EU/NATO membership could also contribute to inhibit/weaken adverse trends prior and after the membership was accepted e.g. through sanctions, monitoring and induced constitutional reforms etc.

Quoting Isaac

You've given data showing that some ex-soviet countries improved their human rights record (according to one metric) after leaving the USSR, but others didn't. Those that did later joined the EU, some later joined NATO.

You've not shown that Western influence was responsible for this improvement, not even given any data at all regarding the cause.

Not exactly. First, I didn’t talk about “improvement”, you did. Secondly, also those post-Soviet republics which didn’t join EU/NATO experienced a boost in the earliest years according to those charts but then they didn’t keep the trend (until the top position) or degraded sharply. One might need to investigate domestic and foreign factors accounting for those trends (as I pointed out many times). Yet we have plausible reasons to suppose EU/NATO offered enough benefits to keep that trend relatively stable, even if we can not see that from those charts.


Quoting Isaac

You've not shown that Russian influence was responsible for the lack of improvement in Ukraine (and Belarus), not even provided any data at all on the matter.

I didn’t know such evidences were even needed (and I’m not certainly going to unload all the credible sources that anybody can easily consult on the internet in support of my claims, and that you are not going to read anyways or still consider biased because they do not into your echo chamber). Also because it’s very much obvious and implied in all discussions here. Yours included
Quoting Isaac

at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes).

Besides it’s preposterous to set standards for evidence-based reasoning for a philosophy forum exchange arbitrarily high. So unless you provide more unbiased and conclusive evidence for your claims than what you demand from me to offer for my claims, you are proving yourself to be intellectually dishonest. For a while now.


Quoting Isaac

2. Many other countries within 'western influence' like Saudi-Arabia, have seen their human rights record decline (from an already poor start). If there was a significant driver of human rights improvements in the ex-Soviet nations post 1999, western influence clearly wasn't it since it did not have a similar effect outside of those states and that time period.

3. The US (the chief 'western' influence in Ukraine) has a steeply declining human rights record and is currently below Belarus, a Russian puppet state.[/quote]

This is a total equivocation of the notion “Western influence”. The case of Ukraine is completely different from the case of Saudi-Arabia. To say the least, for Ukraine there is a meaningful discussion over its EU/NATO membership as there was for other post-Soviet countries in its neighbourhood (until their actual integration). And nowhere I claimed that Western influence has the same effects in every case. Western interests (vs competitor interests) in the region and domestic conditions must be taken into account.
Concerning Ukraine, the situation is particular because of the bitter conflict between anti-Russians and pro-Russians, and the ensuing effects of forced Russification: from the national government control to the pro-Russian Ukrainian regions (including the tragedy of the Crimean Tatars). Besides, according to your eagle eye for positive variations, the US influence may have improved the situation in Ukraine:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=2014..latest&country=UKR~RUS


Quoting Isaac

What we do see, however, is data which opposes your theory.

Quoting Isaac

You cherry-pick a particular group of states at one very narrow period of history (ex-Soviet states post 1999 to early 2000s) and then extrapolate a general theory from those despite the fact that you've been shown other states and other time periods which contradict that theory.
You infer reasons for those cherry-picked improvements which are not given in the data ('western' vs Russian influence), again despite being given data which shows the opposite - the Russian-influenced Belarus is now above the archetype of western influence, the US.

You simply misunderstood my claims (your cherry-picking charge is grounded on your strawman fallacy). And keep playing dumb as if nobody can notice it.

Quoting Isaac

You then ignore all other data, such as the fact that Ukraine's post-war policy is documented as being one of “deregulation"

Economic deregulation may be needed, for example if the local economic regulations are meant to let local corrupt oligarchs win easily. There is nothing in the notion of “economic deregulation” that makes it incompatible with regulations promoting human-rights. Again it all depends on how deregulation is going to be implemented. BTW I don’t need AT ALL to ignore all side-effects and failures of Western induced policies in post-Soviet countries (like Russia). Yet they didn’t fail everywhere (see Poland). Besides, as I understand the stakes of the current war, lots of already compromised Western reputation (instrumental to its power struggle as for any other competing power) hinges on the fate of Ukraine, so the West can’t reasonably let it be just another failure story in Western and international perception.

Reply to neomac

I see. So Ukraine may or may not "improve", it's plausible the EU might help but the evidence isn't in the charts, but it's "obvious" so there's no need for you to actually show any... and we don't need evidence anyway because we're just a philosophy forum... and Ukraine is "different" from any of the places where western influence hasn't worked (but oddly the same as the ones where it might have), but again, no need to actually specify how because.... hey, who needs all this 'evidence'... and 'deregulation' is the means by which regulations are sometimes enforced....

But somehow this is all enough evidence to justify full-throated support for a devastating war which many experts think risks full nuclear exchange...

Yeah, I think we're done here.

Quoting neomac

Secondly, also those post-Soviet republics which didn’t join EU/NATO experienced a boost according to those charts in the earliest years but then they didn’t keep the trend or degraded sharply. One might need to investigate domestic and foreign factors accounting for those trends (as I pointed out many times). Yet we have plausible reasons to suppose EU/NATO offered enough benefits to keep that trend relatively stable, even if we can not see that from those charts.

Both for joining EU and NATO having problems with human rights is an issue. And the emphasis in is joining, because then you do have (and did have) very much focus on the situation and members countries could use (and actually did use) those indicators as reasons why not to give membership. In EU membership talks human rights has been the obvious unsolved problem with Turkey's membership, but also in NATO membership in the environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union created.

As the The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe notes about NATO:

The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (PL 103-447) provided a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about NATO enlargement, consistent with U.S. interests in ensuring stability in Europe. The law lists a variety of criteria, such as respect for democratic principles and human rights enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, against which to evaluate the suitability of prospective candidates for NATO membership. The Act stipulates that participants in the PfP should be invited to become full NATO members if they... remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens.... Under section 203, a program of assistance was established to provide designated emerging democracies with the tools necessary to facilitate their transition to full NATO membership.

The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (PL 104-208) included an unqualified statement that the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights are integral aspects of genuine security. The law also makes clear that the human rights records of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe interested in joining NATO should be evaluated in light of the obligations and commitments of these countries under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.

But after gaining membership, you can have populists coming into power who don't give a damn to human rights or see them just a way for the West to control their country's sovereignty. Hence you have the problems like the EU is having with Hungary and Orban. And of course Turkey under Erdogan has become a somewhat problematic member of NATO.

Reply to ssu

And correlation is not causation.

Nothing in that establishes that those countries made those changes because of western influence, or were accepted into the western sphere because of an internal desire to make those changes.

Likewise with Ukraine and Belarus, it is not established if their failure to adopt western political systems was a result of being in the Russian sphere of influence, of whether they sought the Russian sphere of influence because of a lack of interest in such policies.

It's so funny to read the same people who've been bleating on about the evils of removing Ukrainian 'agency' all of a sudden fine with laying all the progress former Soviet states have made at the hands of the great 'western influence'.

Where's their agency now? Lithuania are great because Europe/NATO made then so. Ukraine are shit because Russia made them that way.

Suddenly lost all their agency have they?

Quoting Isaac

Nothing in that establishes that those countries made those changes because of western influence, or were accepted into the western sphere because of an internal desire to make those changes.

Again nonsense from you. I think there was an evident and obvious desire to make changes from the Soviet system. Even if you think it was so much better.

Hence these countries left Marxism-Leninism and Soviet socialism. Except those who stayed in the Russian sphere of influence (Belarus, Transnistria etc...), where usually the reforms, if any, brought into power oligarchs close to the leader into power.

In fact Ukraine was more prosperous per capita than Poland, which now is far richer than either Ukraine or Belarus. So it's no wonder that it has been Ukraine that has had the uprisings against how politics has gone in the country and that Ukrainians do want to join the West and the EU:



The simply undeniable fact is that those countries who have joined EU and the West have prospered and those who have been "independent" but de facto under the Russia sphere of influence have had it quite bad.

Quoting Agent Smith

we can see whomsoever it was that, long time ago, claimed nuclear weapons are pointless, is right on the money. Nobody can use it. It's just there for show - a weapon that can't be used is useless, oui?

There is always the unpredictable MADman. Mutually assured destruction might not worry a crazy theist like Putin, if he thinks he is fulfilling his gods will. To me, Putin could have had a starring role in Dr Strangelove.

Quoting Agent Smith

As we can see whomsoever it was that, long time ago, claimed nuclear weapons are pointless, is right on the money. Nobody can use it. It's just there for show - a weapon that can't be used is useless, oui?

Except that "Rogue states", those that are deemed to be one by the West, that do have actual nuclear weapons aren't attacked by the US and it's allies. Not at least in the way that would call for a retaliatory nuclear strike. (For example Iran has attacked US bases with conventional artillery missiles under the Trump administration.) Hence nuclear deterrence works.

I think if Russia wouldn't have nuclear weapons, NATO would have intervened with a no-fly-zone. At least in Western Ukraine out of the range of Russian SAM systems located in Russia.

Nuclear weapons actually work perfectly well in their role of deterrence... even if the threat of "pre-emptive attacks" because of faulty alarms given by machines have sometimes put as to the brink of nuclear disaster and nobody has noticed.

And notice how people will adapt: once they are used again, then that's the reality we live in. Period.

Quoting Isaac

I see. So Ukraine may or may not “improve”, it's plausible the EU might help but the evidence isn't in the charts, but it's “obvious” so there's no need for you to actually show any… and we don't need evidence anyway because we're just a philosophy forum... and Ukraine is "different" from any of the places where western influence hasn't worked (but oddly the same as the ones where it might have), but again, no need to actually specify how because.... hey, who needs all this 'evidence'... and 'deregulation' is the means by which regulations are sometimes enforced....

But somehow this is all enough evidence to justify full-throated support for a devastating war which many experts think risks full nuclear exchange...

Yeah, I think we're done here.

As usual, you need to caricature my views to score a point:
1 - The word “improve” is misleading, but since your objection revolved around it, you need to keep framing my views accordingly
2 - I said nowhere that is “obvious” from those charts. I was the first one to acknowledge that does charts did not discriminate between driving factors. So, given that we were uncertain about some relevant facts, I simply said it’s reasonable to make some assumptions. And to support the plausibility of those assumptions I also provided evidences.
3 - What needs to be shown depends on what it is actually claimed (not what you think the interlocutor has claimed) which concerns both what can be verified and inferred from the available evidence.
4 - I didn’t say anywhere “we don't need evidence anyway because we're just a philosophy forum”. Just that one can not set evidence-based reasoning standards arbitrarily high for a forum post. Even more so if you yourself are not up to standards you demand from others. For example: prove from unbiased sources that regulations are always correlated to improvements of human rights. That’s exactly how dumb your counter-arguments look to me.
5 - My claim wasn’t generic about “Western influence” nor made without considering “how” this needs to be specified wrt to other countries: e.g. Ukraine is different from Saudi-Arabia wrt joining EU/NATO as neighbouring countries with shared history did. And EU/NATO accession requirements imply policies and strategic concerns which hold for Ukraine too as they hold for its neighbouring post-Soviet countries (which joined EU/NATO).
6 - Deregulation and privatisation happened also in Poland (as suggested by Jeffrey Sachs according to his infamous “shock therapy”), and are still considered by many as the major drivers of Poland economic boost:
[I]Advising in post-communist economies
Sachs has worked as an economic adviser to governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. A practice trained macroeconomist, he advised a number of national governments in the transition from Marxism–Leninism or developmentalism to market economies.[citation needed]
In 1989, Sachs advised Poland's anticommunist Solidarity movement and the government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He wrote a comprehensive plan for the transition from central planning to a market economy which became incorporated into Poland's reform program led by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Sachs was the main architect of Poland's debt reduction operation. Sachs and IMF economist David Lipton advised the rapid conversion of all property and assets from public to private ownership. Closure of many uncompetitive factories ensued.[24] In Poland, Sachs was firmly on the side of rapid transition to capitalism. At first, he proposed American-style corporate structures, with professional managers answering to many shareholders and a large economic role for stock markets. That did not bode well with the Polish authorities, but he then proposed that large blocks of the shares of privatized companies be placed in the hands of private banks.[25] As a result, there were some economic shortages and inflation, but prices in Poland eventually stabilized.[26][third-party source needed] The government of Poland awarded Sachs with one of its highest honors in 1999, the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit.[27] He also received an honorary doctorate from the Kraków University of Economics.[17]
Sachs's ideas and methods of transition from central planning were adopted throughout the transition economies. He advised Slovenia in 1991 and Estonia in 1992 on the introduction of new stable and convertible currencies. Based on Poland's success, he was invited first by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and then by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the transition to a market economy. He served as adviser to Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and Finance Minister Boris Federov during 1991–1993 on macroeconomic policies.[citation needed] Sachs' methods for stabilising economies became known as shock therapy and were similar to successful approaches used in Germany after the two world wars.[23] When Russia fell into poverty after adopting his market-based shock therapy in the early 1990's,[28] some Western media called him a cold-hearted neo-liberal.[29][30][/I]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Sachs

BTW the author Tyler Cowen you cited a while ago to question the myth of the Marshall plan is talking about pro-market policies like privatisation and deregulation as major factors of European economic recovery
[I]U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic poilicies

Policy makers and aid proponents should no longer view the Marshall Plan as an unqualified success. At best, its effects on postwar Europe were -mixed, while its impact on the American economy was negative. The basic problem with foreign aid is that economic growth is not a creature of central planning and direction. Growth is the result of individual initiative and enterprise within a sound legal and economic framework. Government can only supply the framework. Anything more will result in the well-known problems of central or socialist planning: the impossibility of rational economic calculation, the creation of perverse incentives, and the stifling of entrepreneurial initiative, among others. Foreign aid programs always will be plagued by such problems.

In most cases, and certainly in the case of the Marshall Plan, the government-to-government character of foreign aid encourages statism and central planning, not free enterprise. The best way to promote free markets in other countries is to allow their businesses to trade with the U.S. without government interference. This freedom of trade includes not only exporting and importing, but also lending, borrowing, and labor emigration and immigration. [/I]
https://www.ccoyne.com/files/Marshall_Plan.pdf]/
So the problem is not “deregulation” per se but how it is implemented and fits other major driving factors.




Quoting Isaac

And correlation is not causation.

Nothing in that establishes that those countries made those changes because of western influence, or were accepted into the western sphere because of an internal desire to make those changes.

Quoting Isaac

Suddenly lost all their agency have they?

You are conceptually confused. I didn’t talk about causation which is a notion that can be particularly misleading in human affairs since human affairs involve agency (and that’s not the first time we have been discussing about it). I’m fine with correlations and arguable reasons for agents to process those correlations for decision making or explaining those correlations.
BTW human agency is also matter of responding to incentives and the fact that incentives do not lead to the desirable effect right away is not a sufficient counter-argument to those incentives. For example: even economic sanctions to Russia and military aid to Ukraine are not proving effective in convincing Putin to stop the war, yet we didn’t stop sanctioning Russia nor military aid to Ukraine, why is that? Because for example people can be stubborn in the pursuit of some goals as long as they can afford it, until they can’t of course. Since nobody can be certain that competing rational/irrational agents stop misbehaving out sweet-talking, one can just raise the costs of misbehaving until the misbehavior wears out its resources. And Putin will make the reciprocal reasoning. (One could also cursorily mention that even scientific theories have some resiliency against adverse evidences, and this phenomenon is the object of much debate about epistemologists like Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend)

Quoting ssu

Again nonsense from you. I think...

Views opposed to what you "think" are not thereby nonsense. It's called disagreeing.

Quoting ssu

But after gaining membership, you can have populists coming into power who don't give a damn to human rights or see them just a way for the West to control their country's sovereignty. Hence you have the problems like the EU is having with Hungary and Orban. And of course Turkey under Erdogan has become a somewhat problematic member of NATO.

I agree. Focusing on the EU, while there is lots of literature out there about the problematic interplay of domestic factors and foreign factors showing the limits of EU pre-accession conditionality in shaping post-Soviet EU members’ “Europeanisation” (as the Visegrad group has shown), yet there are also the effects of EU integration after post-accession which help explain the relative stability of democratic trends in other cases (https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gpop/files/why_no_backsliding.pdf). To which one can now add the Russian threat which is breaking the Visegrad group (https://en.uj.edu.pl/en_GB/news/-/journal_content/56_INSTANCE_SxA5QO0R5BDs/81541894/150377650) and may turn in favour of a greater EU integration (e.g. in the domain of security and foreign affairs) but also European re-democratization (https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/10/13/democratic-backsliding-in-the-ukraine-conflict-and-renewed-prospects-of-re-democratization-in-europe/).

In a recent interview with Jeffrey Sachs, he calls United States foreign policy a major threat to peace, and ascribes significant responsibility to the United States in provoking this conflict.

Obviously, he doesn't spare Russian or Ukrainian foreign policy either, but that kind of goes without saying. The important thing here is that the United States' role in this conflict is highlighted - an important aspect of this conflict which is completely voided by the mainstream media.

Note also a common theme among people who speak out against the narrative - they have to do so via independent platforms, because the establishment media simply will not allow them to talk.

We see this for Sachs, Mearsheimer, Chomsky, and a myriad of others whose messages are being purposely suppressed.

Not allowing people to speak is censorship, and omitting truth is propaganda. I hope people realize this is taking place in what were formerly known as civilized societies.

Quoting Tzeentch

Not allowing people to speak is censorship, and omitting truth is propaganda. I hope people realize this is taking place in what were formerly known as civilized societies.

By far the most important issue here.

We are censoring debate among experts.

Not idiots on Twitter, not Russian trolls, not paid lobbyists...experts in their field.

The day we decide government-prefered narratives are more important than expertise we might as well go back to the dark age.

Quoting ssu

As the The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe notes about NATO:

The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (PL 103-447) provided a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about NATO enlargement, consistent with U.S. interests in ensuring stability in Europe. The law lists a variety of criteria, such as respect for democratic principles and human rights enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, against which to evaluate the suitability of prospective candidates for NATO membership.

Speaking of the Helsinki Final Act (Helsinki Accords), a few weeks ago the Russian government banned the Moscow Helsinki Group - one of the oldest human rights organizations in the world. It was started in the Soviet Union (which was a signatory of the Accords) as a watch-group to report on the compliance with the accords in the Soviet Union. Later, similar watch-groups were started in other parts of the USSR and in other countries. The US Helsinki Watch group, started a few years after the MHG, is now called Human Rights Watch. Naturally, the MHG was severely persecuted, but after the dissolution of the Soviet Union it operated relatively freely. Well, not any more.

Reply to Tzeentch Reply to Isaac Well, there are some degrees I guess...

outlawed (punishable by law)
loosely illegalized (can/will always find something?)
censored out
suppressed (like by independent publishers/media)
propagandized against
commonly scoffed at

Would it be worthwhile differentiating? (intentionally omitted "shoot on sight!")
I wouldn't say Chomsky "and a myriad of others" are being gagged. Besides, Chomsky ain't so easy to keep down. :)

Reply to SophistiCat

Putin's Russia has been regressing ?

:/

Quoting Jan 26, 2023

Russia’s Longest Standing Human Rights Organization Dissolved by State Courts
[sup]— Tony Spitz · Veuer · Jan 26, 2023 (1m:14s)[/sup]

An off-the-books mercenary army is gaining power in Putin’s Russia
[sup]— Zachary B Wolf · CNN · Jan 30, 2023[/sup]
Inside the battle for Bakhmut, where Ukraine's tech-savvy troops say Russia treats men like meat
[sup]— Debora Patta, Steve Berriman, Tucker Reals · CBS News · Jan 31, 2023[/sup]

Let's see what comments if any this can generate:

— Mearsheimer (paraphrased): Everyone should have known that Putin would have Russia attack Ukraine

— Others: Ukraine's defense and political dealings with the West ain't up to Putin to decide, and, besides, Ukrainian NATO membership wouldn't doom Russia to destruction [sup](Feb24, Mar18, Apr26, May7, Jun10, Oct27)[/sup], let alone a Russia without Crimea

— Cynic: Bah, it's all just rhetoric, entitlement, propaganda, manipulation by everyone

Grabbing Crimea (2014) apparently was a surprise. Invading (2022) wasn't entirely a surprise [sup](2015, 2015, 2022)[/sup].

Quoting jorndoe

Would it be worthwhile differentiating? (intentionally omitted "shoot on sight!")
I wouldn't say Chomsky "and a myriad of others" are being gagged.

That's not the point. The moment society places a higher premium on adherence to government-sanctioned narratives than it does on actual qualification we've lost.

It's not about degree, it's about the existence and active promotion (as we see enthusiastically here) of a notion that there's something instantly suspicious about people who speak out against the government.

Governments need to be held to account. They need to be frightened of their populace. Having three quarters of their populace actively doing their own propaganda for them by casting suspicion on dissent is beyond scary.

Quoting jorndoe

Would it be worthwhile differentiating? (intentionally omitted "shoot on sight!")

In my opinion, no.

It's great for the individual speaker that their tongues are no longer being physically cut out, being thrown in jail, etc., but the intentions behind the action and the net result for the public are the same.

Quoting jorndoe

— Mearsheimer (paraphrased): Everyone should have known that Putin would have Russia attack Ukraine

— Others: Ukraine's defense and political dealings with the West ain't up to Putin to decide, and, besides, Ukrainian NATO membership wouldn't doom Russia to destruction (Feb24, Mar18, Apr26, May7, Jun10, Oct27), let alone a Russia without Crimea

— Cynic: Bah, it's all just rhetoric, entitlement, propaganda, manipulation by everyone

Mearsheimer's statement is clearly true. Not only have the Russians warned the West about Ukraine for over 15 years, the American establishment itself recognizes the incredible importance of Ukraine to Russia, and in its own continued bid for global dominance.

Influential political scientist and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has underlined how Ukraine is part of a global pivot area along the lines of Mackinder's Heartland-theory.

I've tried to draw attention to this earlier in this thread, but it was predictably ignored in favor of propaganda regurgitation and surface-level analysis.

Here's what Zbigniew had to say about the role of Eurasia in American geopolitical strategy:

For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia... America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained.

About 75% of the world's people live in Eurasia, and most of the world's physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for three-fourths of the world's energy resources.

- Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (1997). p.30 - 31.


He argued principally that American dominance of Eurasia relied on control over pivot areas. Ukraine is a geopolitical pivot area, and such an area Zbigniew defines as follows:

Geopolitical pivots are the states whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players.

[...]

Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran play the role of critically important geopolitical pivots, though both Turkey and Iran are to some extent -- within their more limited capabilities -- also geostrategically active.

- Ibid. p. 41 - 42.

Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for
imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south.

- Ibid. p. 46.

Given the growing consensus regarding the desirability of admitting the nations
of Central Europe into both the EU and NATO, the practical meaning of this question focuses attention on the future status of the Baltic republics and perhaps also that of Ukraine.

- Ibid, p. 50 - 51.


On page 101 Brzezinski states that the US bid for NATO enlargement came too late in 1996, and should have come earlier, in 1993, when Russia was at its most powerless point. That's two years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, after which the United States and Germany made solemn promises to Gorbachev not to expand NATO. Cynical, eh?

Further, Brzezinski underlines Russia's geostrategic vulnerability after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is important, because Russia has continually marked the matter of Ukraine as a security threat to them.

In brief, Russia, until recently the forger of a great territorial empire and the leader of an ideological bloc of satellite states extending into the very heart of Europe and at one point to the South China Sea, had become a troubled national state, without easy geographic access to the outside world and potentially vulnerable to debilitating conflicts with its neighbors on its western, southern, and eastern flanks. Only the uninhabitable and inaccessible northern spaces, almost permanently frozen, seemed geopolitically secure.

- Ibid. p. 96.


In his conclusion, Brzezinski writes the following:

How the United States both manipulates and accommodates the principal geostrategic players on the Eurasian chessboard and how it manages Eurasia's key geopolitical pivots will be critical to the longevity and stability of America's global primacy.

- Ibid. p. 194 - 195.

It follows that political and economic support for the key newly independent states is an integral part of a broader strategy for Eurasia. The consolidation of a sovereign Ukraine, which in the meantime redefines itself as a Central European state and engages in closer integration with Central Europe, is a critically important component of such a policy,

- Ibid. p. 203.


Anyone who understands the above paragraphs, understands.

The rest are just patzers.

Quoting Tzeentch

Anyone who understands the above paragraphs, understands.

Brzezinski is definitely one of the most influential experts to understand US geopolitical strategy (far more than Mearsheimer, Chomsky and Sachs are not even geopolitical analysts). Good you cited him. I was already discussing Brzezinski 3 months ago:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/750556

Reply to jorndoe

You might be interested in an article by Harvard's Stephen Walt, professor of international relations describing with surprising accuracy much of the bullshit that goes on in this thread...

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/29/the-perpetually-irrational-ukraine-debate/

What I find especially striking is how liberal interventionists, unrepentant neoconservatives, and a handful of progressives who are all-in for Ukraine seem to have no doubts whatsoever about the origins of the conflict or the proper course of action to follow today. For them, Russian President Vladimir Putin is solely and totally responsible for the war, and the only mistakes others may have made in the past was to be too nice to Russia and too willing to buy its oil and gas. The only outcome they are willing to entertain is a complete Ukrainian victory, ideally accompanied by regime change in Moscow, the imposition of reparations to finance Ukrainian reconstruction, and war crimes trials for Putin and his associates. Convinced that anything less than this happy result will reward aggression, undermine deterrence, and place the current world order in jeopardy, their mantra is: “Whatever it takes for as long as it takes.”

Sound familiar?

This same group has also been extraordinarily critical of those who believe responsibility for the war is not confined to Russia’s president and who think these war aims might be desirable in the abstract but are unlikely to be achieved at an acceptable cost and risk. If you have the temerity to suggest that NATO enlargement (and the policies related to it) helped pave the road to war, if you believe the most likely outcome is a negotiated settlement and that getting there sooner rather than later would be desirable, and if you favor supporting Ukraine but think this goal should be weighed against other interests, you’re almost certain to be denounced as a pro-Putin stooge, an appeaser, an isolationist, or worse.

Mmm... I wonder if we could possibly find examples of such approaches anywhere nearby...

He concludes...

If the world is forced to choose the lesser evil from a set of bad choices, a more civil and less accusatory discourse would make it easier for policymakers to consider a wider range of alternatives as well as make it more likely that Ukraine and the coalition that is presently supporting it make the right call.

But hey, fuck it, it's far more important to score brownie points with the Twitterati by reminding everyone how much we agree that Putin is bad...

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64455121

I expect what will happen ultimately is Ukraine will give up territory in return for NATO membership.

Reply to Baden
To join NATO a country needs to meet the following standards:

• a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;
• the fair treatment of minority populations;
• a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
• the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and
• a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of membership. This would include acceptance at the time that they join of all the principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members.

A functioning democratic political system presupposed a lack of corruption. On the other hand, Turkey is also a member, so, who knows.

Reply to Benkei

Standards have never been much of an obstacle where politics is concerned. What's needed is a "solution" that both sides can find something to love and hate about.

Reply to Baden A mutual defence pact with a country that doesn't have the necessary checks and balances to ensure it doesn't elect a dictator or abuse minorities doesn't go down well. While everybody is celebrating Zelenskyi, let's not forget the horrible corrupt shithole Ukraine was before the war. I doubt corruption will lessen when institutions and infrastructure are bombarded back to the stone age.

Reply to Benkei What the US strategy for incorporation of Ukraine into NATO has been so far, is to make Ukraine a de facto US/NATO ally (something they nearly achieved).

After that it's a matter of waiting until the time is right for further steps. Unless Russia invades in the mean time, of course.

As it happened, Russia invaded before the Ukrainian capacity to defend itself was such that the United States would commit to its defense fully, and that is unlikely to have been a coincidence.

Reply to Benkei

I can agree with that and still hold to my prediction. Give it six months.

Reply to Baden I want the Netherlands out of that pact anyways.

Reply to Tzeentch Sufficiently likely. Another reason I want the Netherlands out of that pact.

Quoting Benkei

A mutual defence pact with a country that doesn't have the necessary checks and balances to ensure it doesn't elect a dictator or abuse minorities doesn't go down well.

Yes, I think there are serious questions over America's membership...

... Oh, you were talking about Ukraine...

My understanding: Ukraine must be part of the West security system (inside or outside NATO may have pros/cons for Russia too!). Russia gave the West the justification on a golden plate. Ukraine (which is far more reliable then Turkey in containing Russia in that area) will be important later on, as soon as the military clash between the US and China materializes. To keep Russia out of it.

Reply to Baden
https://unherd.com/thepost/henry-kissinger-nato-membership-for-ukraine-is-appropriate/

Quoting neomac

My understanding

Rand corporation's expert opinion on the benefits and costs of continued war involvement for the US ...

https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html

(I've summarized their tables for ease of posting it as a quote).

Moderately significant benefits
•Fewer Ukrainians would be living under Russian occupation. The United States has a humanitarian interest in exposing fewer Ukrainians to Russian occupation.

Less significant benefits
•Ukraine could become more economically viable and less dependent on external assistance. Areas under Russian control as of December 2022 are unlikely to prove hugely economically significant.
• Ukrainian control of more of its sovereign land may reinforce the territorial integrity norm.

Highly significant costs
• Enabling greater Ukrainian territorial control increases the risk of a long war.
• There is a higher risk of Russian nuclear weapons use or a NATO-Russia war if Ukraine pushes past the February 24, 2022, line of control. Avoiding these two forms of escalation is the paramount U.S. priority.

Moderately significant costs
• Ukraine would have a greater need for external economic and military support during and after the war.
• More Ukrainian civilians would die, be displaced, or endure hardships stemming from the war.
• There would be continued upward pressure on energy and food prices, causing loss of life and suffering globally.
• Global economic growth would slow.
• The United States would be less able to focus on other global priorities.
• An ongoing freeze in U.S.-Russia relations would pose challenges to other U.S. priorities.

Less significant costs
• There is a possibility of Russian territorial gains. Russia is not likely to make significant territorial gains
• Russian dependence on China could increase. Russia will be more dependent on China than it was before the war regardless of its duration.

...but, you know, I'm sure your guesses are good too...

Reply to Isaac

Sure and as you know, I agree with the sources you post, they tend to be the same ones I use.

However, it must be pointed out, that in areas of international affairs, you can find an "expert" defending any conceivable view, often quite horrible ones.

This isn't physics in that respect: for every Mearsheimer or Chomsky, you get a dozen state fanatics, with decent credentials too.

Of course, you would do well to point out that the level of the sources you cite are of much higher regard and respect than others. But than can be easily dismissed.

Reply to Manuel

Absolutely. Part of what I've been trying to show here is that it's ideology, not facts which drive our beliefs. We seek out the theories (experts etc) which support those beliefs, myself included.

I believe that power should be held to account, so I seek out narratives which do that.

I've been trying to enquire about the ideology motivating those who want to exculpate the US, but thus far there's been nothing but a pretense that their positions are nothing but cold rational assessment of the facts.

That doesn't get us anywhere since none of us are qualified to comment on the accuracy of those facts. We can only discuss ideology.

Getting past the notion that one view is based on 'facts' and the other on 'misinformation' is a project which 439 pages in has yet to get anywhere.

Reply to Isaac

I was skimming a book the other day, Being Wrong by Kathryn Schulz, in which she says something to the effect of (I don't have it with me at this very moment):

"So how does it feel to be wrong? It feels like being right."

And as you say, that applies to us too, no doubt.

What I don't think should be in question at all is what you say: trying to take the discourse into a place in which we can have an effect (in principle) on policy, and that means our own countries, not a foreign one.

But this truism, is questioned as being doubtful.

At least those Russians who protested the war and who are now in jail understood that much. And they seem to have had been covered favorably. Oh well.

Quoting Isaac

...but, you know, I'm sure your guesses are good too...

You are confused (as usual). I'm not trying to sell my guesses more than what they are. In any case, the problem is not the lack of support from the experts (as Manuel clarified). The point is that my speculation concerns what the West is actually looking for in Ukraine, however this war ends, in terms of geopolitical endgames. Your analysis concerns costs/benefits suggesting what the US should do (avoid a protracted war) and which doesn't contemplate at all in what ways Ukraine is instrumental to the Western security system.
The question that you systematically fail to address in realistic terms is how on earth the US administration AND deep state (including the other Western administrations with their deep states) could possibly engage in such a war if the entire universe of experts you consulted have repeatedly for years suggested otherwise. Your only possible answers in the end are that either they are a corrupt evil cabala of alien-nazi-vampires or it's just a bunch of brainless wild monkeys. And multiply this for all world issues you think humanity morally ought to address. Since ever.

Quoting Isaac

That doesn't get us anywhere since none of us are qualified to comment on the accuracy of those facts. We can only discuss ideology.

What does "ideology" mean to you? Explain that to me. What is there to discuss when we can only discuss ideology?

Quoting neomac

My understanding: Ukraine must be part of the West security system (inside or outside NATO may have pros/cons for Russia too!). Russia gave the West the justification on a golden plate. Ukraine (which is far more reliable then Turkey in containing Russia in that area) will be important later on, as soon as the military clash between the US and China materializes. To keep Russia out of it.

What I don't understand is that you seem aware of the probable realist motives behind the United States' actions - Ukraine being a bulwark to contain the Russians in a future great power conflict, etc. - and at the same time seem to believe that those same realist motives aren't going to see Ukraine and possibly all of Europe served up as the sacrificial pawns when that great power conflict breaks loose.

Ukraine is going to be, no, already is, on the frontline of that conflict. You, probably rightly so, foresee more conflict in our future.

When and how exactly is this decision to join NATO going to pay off?

Under these assumptions, wouldn't the smart course of action be to tell Uncle Sam to fight his own battles? That's certainly the course of action I would have proposed from the European point of view.

Reply to neomac I mean I could go on. Given the fact that this future great power conflict is likely going to take place between the United States and China, in the Pacific Ocean, on the other side of the world, what is the point of stirring up a conflict needlessly in Europe?

Now, my theory is that they didn't aim to keep Russia out (they wouldn't be able to), but to drag the Europeans in.

I've been trying to keep up with everything in Ukraine but I will admit I haven't really read a lot of the recent posts in this thread so I apologize if I'm posting something someone else already covered.

I just wanted to point out a recent news article on CNN:

Fighting Wagner is like a ‘zombie movie’ says Ukrainian soldier
https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/01/europe/ukraine-soldiers-fighting-wagner-intl-cmd/index.html

In the article a Ukrainian soldiers mention the following "During a recent battle, soldiers say they were surrounded by Wagner attackers 'climbing above the corpses of their friends' to overrun Ukrainian positions".

While reading it it reminded me about a World War II story about German surrounded on all sides and being attacked by waves of Russian soldiers who would often attack in what was described as in in total disregard for the loses that they would suffer, nor would the Russians attacking would have much regard for their own lives. I will have to admit that when I read about it, it was a comic book I picked up when I was a teenager or in my early twenties:

Witches' Cauldron: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket
https://www.amazon.com/Witches-Cauldron-Cherkassy-Heritage-Collection/dp/B086WPF716

Here is a wiki link about the battle if anyone is interested in it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Korsun%E2%80%93Cherkassy

I guess what I'm trying to say is that while reading the comic I thought to myself how horrible it must have been to be on either side because it was almost literally "Hell on Earth" as the title of the comic book describes. The only thing that eased my mind while reading it was that it happened during World War II and I assumed that it was highly unlikely that any modern country would try to fight a war in the same manner again.

Unfortunately, it sounds likely in some of the worse places in the war in Ukraine, the same thing is happening all over again. :(

Quoting Tzeentch

Now, my theory is that they didn't aim to keep Russia out (they wouldn't be able to), but to drag the Europeans in.

Of course, I don't exclude that possibility either. My point is that Ukraine may play a key role in the Western security system for future challenges, even after this war ends. Ukraine may offer plausible triggers to bend the NATO defensive alliance logic into an offensive operation, if needed. For the same reason, having Ukraine outside NATO has its risks for Russia too because it may keep re-militarised Europeans outside a direct confrontation (not military aid though) but it may also lead to some n-lateral military pact with Ukraine that is less "defensive".


Quoting Tzeentch

Ukraine and possibly all of Europe served up as the sacrificial pawns when that great power conflict breaks loose.

I do not see any soft way to come out of this game. So either Europeans learn to be and act as a great power (a bit late for that) or they must suffer the great power initiative. Peace-talking (even when successful!) is not a way to disengage from this dangerous game nor to avoid to be sacrificed, because great powers will always have the upper-hand in power dynamics and the less powerful will always pay the greater costs (wrt the benefits). In other words, si vis pacem, para bellum.

Putin says military must stop Ukrainian shelling of Russian regions
[sup]— Mark Trevelyan, Alexandra Hudson · Reuters · Feb 1, 2023[/sup]

Quoting Putin

Many people found themselves in a difficult situation, lost their homes, were forced to move to relatives or to temporary places of residence, faced interruptions in the supply of water, heat, and electricity.

(well then ... no, not The Onion)


Reply to dclements, yeah, CBS reported it as well.

Quoting Jan 31, 2023

An off-the-books mercenary army is gaining power in Putin’s Russia
[sup]— Zachary B Wolf · CNN · Jan 30, 2023[/sup]
Inside the battle for Bakhmut, where Ukraine's tech-savvy troops say Russia treats men like meat
[sup]— Debora Patta, Steve Berriman, Tucker Reals · CBS News · Jan 31, 2023[/sup]

By "tech-savvy" they're referring to monitoring, recording, drones, ...
Apparently a good lot of the "zombies" are questionable hires by the mercenary groups.
Aren't there some human rights principles/edicts being blatantly violated here...?

Quoting Manuel

What I don't think should be in question at all is what you say: trying to take the discourse into a place in which we can have an effect (in principle) on policy, and that means our own countries, not a foreign one.

But this truism, is questioned as being doubtful.

Yes, I think there's an aspect, as Stephen Walt says, of managed guilt avoidance. People love an enemy who is completely removed from any aspect they themselves may have any control over (and so obligation to do/have done something about). Putin makes a great bogeyman - no voting required, very few purchases linked directly to Russia, no benefits to give up...basically people can rail to their heart's content and no-one gets to come back and say "well what are you doing about it?" That's very attractive, we don't often have the opportunity to do that.

Another of those sorts of reports:

Ukraine: Russia sending civilians through landmine fields to find safe routes
[sup]— Jerusalem Post, Reuters · Feb 1, 2023[/sup]

Would Belarus then be complicit in crimes / human rights violations?
Don't know if Belarus would allow independent investigators, but probably not monitors.

Reply to jorndoe

Another of those posts.

There's two parts to this story...

1. A reputable Human rights group with a long and respected history accuses Ukraine of abusing human rights in it's landmine use.

2. One of Ukraine's war propaganda arms reports that Russians are using civilians to navigate these minefields.

In a sane world, which of these elements would receive most air, and which would be treated with some degree of suspicion during a bitter war?

In contrast, which do we have being promoted on social media here?

Quoting neomac

My point is that Ukraine may play a key role in the Western security system for future challenges, ...

Ok, but I have trouble reconciling this with page-long discussions about human rights, when you are now giving very straight-forward realist explanations for why Ukraine in NATO is useful to 'the West', which I think means primarily the United States. (And I don't disagree with those explanations. I think it makes good sense for the United States to instrumentalize any willing nation for its own goals.)

Being instrumentalized as a useful asset in great power competition in which, by the way, Ukraine is sitting in the front row, can hardly be considered beneficial to Ukraine though or am I missing something?

Certainly if past nations who found themselves in such a position are anything to go by, Ukraine is in big, big trouble for the foreseeable future.

Quoting neomac

Ukraine may offer plausible triggers to bend the NATO defensive alliance logic into an offensive operation, if needed. For the same reason, having Ukraine outside NATO has its risks for Russia too because it may keep re-militarised Europeans outside a direct confrontation (not military aid though) but it may also lead to some n-lateral military pact with Ukraine that is less than "defensive".

I honestly don't think any European nation fantasizes about invading Russia. They have no offensive capabilities to speak of.

The type of threats the Russians fear are probably more focused on economic and (geo)political strangulation - the type that a hostile Ukraine could have facilitated by cutting off Russia's access to the Black Sea.

Quoting neomac

I do not see any soft way to come out from this game. So either Europeans learn to be and act as a great power (a bit late for that) or they must suffer the great power initiative.

I don't believe the Russians had much incentive to pick a fight in Ukraine (let alone the rest of Europe) before the United States threatened to incorporate it. Even now the regions it occupies relate directly to their primary strategic interest - Crimea.

With Ukraine being neutral, Russia didn't have to fear the loss of Crimea. It was a stable situation.

If any tangible threat did exist, perhaps the proper reaction of the Europeans should have been to dust off their militaries instead of endlessly suckling on Uncle Sam's teet.

So yes, I agree nations must be prepared for conflict, especially in times like these. I don't agree the path the Europeans have chosen is in any way conducive to their own security.

Quoting Tzeentch

I think it makes good sense for the United States to instrumentalize any willing nation for its own goals.

Obviously as a general principle this is true to the point of being a truism, but if you look at the analysis I presented from Rand, it's not even clear that this war is in the US's interests (as a geopolitical unit). It seems more likely that it is very specific key sectors in America, and Europe, whose interests are served by a protracted Ukrainian war - namely arms manufacturing, reconstruction, finance, and gas/energy companies. The rest of the US seems just as prone to the economic downturn and shift to China that the war seems likely to bring, and all are at the same risk from escalation.

I don't think it's true to say that Ukraine are being 'rationally' used as a pawn of the US government. If there's a rational self-interest explanation, it would be that they are being 'rationally' used as a pawn of major industrial investment holders with the US government being merely a tool.

After all, all that lobbying money and share buybacks are not offered out of charity.

Quoting Isaac

Obviously as a general principle this is true to the point of being a truism, ...

Just thought I'd drop it here because for whatever reason it still seems controversial to suggest that nations, including the United States, are primarily self-interested.

Quoting Isaac

... it's not even clear that this war is in the US's interests (as a geopolitical unit). It seems more likely that it is very specific key sectors in America, and Europe, whose interests are served by a protracted Ukrainian war - namely arms manufacturing, reconstruction, finance, and gas/energy companies. The rest of the US seems just as prone to the economic downturn and shift to China that the war seems likely to bring, and all are at the same risk from escalation.

I agree the military-industrial complex and other corporate interests could have serious influence, however for the United States to go to war with a nuclear-armed former great power while the conflict of the 21st century is looming on the other side of the world in East Asia, demands further explanation.

Quoting Isaac

I don't think it's true to say that Ukraine are being 'rationally' used as a pawn of the US government. If there's a rational self-interest explanation, it would be that they are being 'rationally' used as a pawn of major industrial investment holders with the US government being merely a tool.

After all, all that lobbying money and share buybacks are not offered out of charity.

I see your rationale, and I see the argument for the military-industrial complex benefitting of this war, however I struggle to see what economic prospects Ukraine will bring as it is being thoroughly wrecked.

Even if Ukraine wins an unlikely victory, Russia's significant strategic interests in the region will ensure it is the center of conflict for the foreseeable future and beyond.


Earlier in this thread I've tried to offer a geopolitical explanation for the United States' actions:

Since the United States cannot have been surprised by the Russian invasion and also does not seem overly committed to a Ukrainian victory, I am entertaining the hypothesis that the United States intentionally sought to provoke long-lasting conflict between Europe and Russia.

Europe and Russia were cozying up to each other too much, while it is in America's best interest to keep the Heartland divided.

With China and Russia in an alliance that was futher strengthened by the American push for Ukrainian incorporation into NATO, the Eurasian continent was basically already 2/3's united. There was an actual threat of the Heartland uniting completely - with Europe becoming apathetic towards the United States and fairly neutral towards Russia and China, and with Russia and China being markedly anti-American.

The war in Ukraine attempts to establish Europe as a committed American ally, and a counterbalance against Russia in case a large-scale security competition breaks out between the United States and Russia and China.

Far-fetched? Sober big-picture thinking? You be the judge.

The central "oddities" that I am trying to reconcile here are:
1. The United States knew its actions could result in a serious conflict with the Russians.
2. The United States does not seem fully committed to Ukrainian victory (so why provoke conflict?).
3. Given the current geopolitical situation with the threat of war between China and US allies in the Pacific, it couldn't have been the United States' intention to commit to a war in Eastern Europe for a long time.

So at the base I guess we agree that it's hard to see how the United States' interests are served by this war, but I'm not sure if something of this magnitude can be explained by corporate interests. I think it is simply too significant for that.

Quoting Tzeentch

Ok, but I have trouble reconciling this with page-long discussions about human rights, when you are now giving very straight-forward realist explanations for why Ukraine in NATO is useful to 'the West', which I think means primarily the United States.

My recent discussion about human rights was just reviewing a narrowly scoped argument of mine inspired by Isaac’s claims [1].

Anyways, the shortest and most general answer I can give you about reconciling clashing views (human rights and realist geopolitics) is the following:
1. Policies promoting human rights (as any alternative policy agenda like the extermination of jews, or the working class liberation from capitalist exploitation, or Islamist sharia) require power. And since power is grounded on scarce resources this will trigger struggles over capitalising those resources among competitors. That’s how any government promoting human rights (competing with those promoting others political agenda) is realistically drawn willingly or unwillingly into a power race (including propaganda wars, economic wars, military wars, you name it).
2. Power is constrained by geographic factors so in international relations it makes sense to relativise (de facto and or normatively) political goals and decision making as a function of territorial sovereignity. This in turn will imply that any other interstate relation will be instrumental to empowering/securing sovereignty and determined by power relations. But that doesn’t exclude convergence and cooperation among states at all (indeed, that’s why there are alliances and partnerships).
3. Geopolitical strategies can involve long-term goals covering decades and generations to come, and always relative to competitors. So the power race is constrained by timing factors: any players is incentivised to be pro-active and facilitate/exploit other players failures/slowness/lack of reactivity as opportunity windows to take bolder steps. In other words, any understanding of geopolitical endgames limited to short term goals and irrespective of what competitors might do next is geopolitical myopic (and most certainly unreliable to support rational expectations about geopolitical players).
4. For a minimal moral justification one can simply argue in terms of the lesser evil (wrt costs and risks): so as long as the great power game is de facto framed as a conflict between US-led coalitions and Russia (and/or China) where the European security is jeopardised in so many ways that Europeans can’t autonomously or effectively address, then European governments are forced to pick a side (with costs and risks included). What’s the lesser evil even for empowering/securing human rights policies?

These are the background assumptions of my reasoning.

Quoting Tzeentch

I honestly don't think any European nation fantasizes about invading Russia. They have no offensive capabilities to speak of.

The type of threats the Russians fear are probably more focused on economic and (geo)political strangulation - the type that a hostile Ukraine could have facilitated by cutting off Russia's access to the Black Sea.

I agree and my comment was focusing on the possible contribution of Ukraine. As I said if Ukraine is integrated to the West security system through NATO or through n-lateral security agreement which includes the US, so not demilitarised de facto, Ukraine will always constitute a threat for Russia's access to the Black Sea, its ports might be bombed and military operations can attack Russian Western front, especially the annexed territories if they remain to Russia (in other words the US can play in Ukraine the same game Russia is now playing in Belarus against Ukraine). One way or the other pretexts can be found, if needed. So this might be a possible deterrent for Russia to engage in the eastern front.


Quoting Tzeentch

I don't believe the Russians had much incentive to pick a fight in Ukraine (let alone the rest of Europe) before the United States threatened to incorporate it. Even now the regions it occupies relate directly to their primary strategic interest - Crimea.

Even if Crimea is the core in Russian geostrategic calculations, its annexation wouldn’t guarantee its security as it would if Ukraine was under Russian control (or at least, demilitarised). So the threat for Russia may still be serious enough to work as a deterrent.


Quoting Tzeentch

I don't agree the path the Europeans have chosen is in any way conducive to their own security.

First, the Europeans are realising how delegating their own security to the US can be costly and risky as they never could before. And that Russia and China are on the path of engaging the US in a nasty power struggle. Understanding the dangers is a necessary step to better address them.
Second, Europeans can profit from the weakening of Russian military capacity, the lessons gained through this war, and the time gained to re-group and re-arm as well as they can.
That’s in some way conducive to Europeans’ own security. In the hindsight it may look suboptimal. In the hindsight.


[1]
Quoting Isaac

As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there.

Quoting Isaac

What is the well-being of the people? — neomac

That's up to us to decide. Personally I think the notion of human rights is a good starting point.

Quoting neomac

So this might be a possible deterrent for Russia to engage in the eastern front.

I think it will have the exact opposite effect.

By inserting itself between Russia and one of its core strategic interests, the United States has guaranteed a permanent state of conflict (hot or cold) for as long as that situation persists.

Quoting neomac

Even if Crimea is the core in Russian geostrategic calculations, its annexation wouldn’t guarantee its security as it would if Ukraine was under Russian control (or at least, demilitarised). So the threat for Russia may still be serious enough to work as a deterrent.

Holding a nation's core strategic interests hostage will not work as a deterrent. It will ensure conflict permanently looms over the region, just like with Taiwan.

Quoting neomac

First, the Europeans are realising how delegating their own security to the US can be costly and risky as they never could before...

There seems to be little awareness within the European leadership that they and the United States have played a prominent role in provoking this conflict. The US is playing them for fools, because they largely are.

They've been given the illusion of importance and agency, but current US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland's words probably describe the United States' position vis-à-vis Europe the best: "F*CK the EU!"

It would be great if the Europeans started to realise this, but I see nothing of the sort.

Quoting neomac

Second, Europeans can profit from the weakening of Russian military capacity, ...

As we speak, Russia is massively expanding its military capacity.

Looking at Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine with 190,000 troops, what was there to fear, really? The Russian military was small and clearly not made for warfare against NATO.

We've given the Russians clear incentive to expand and modernize its military, even more so if it loses control over Crimea.

Ironically, how can we conclude anything other than the fact that Europe and Russia were quite de-militarized prior to this conflict breaking loose? And wasn't that something we should have fostered?

Europe profits (and has been profiting) from normal relations between Russia and the rest of Europe. But, as I have eluded to before, I don't think normal relations between Russia and Europe is what the Americans need in the coming great power struggle. It likes a divided Heartland.

Quoting Tzeentch

I struggle to see what economic prospects Ukraine will bring as it is being thoroughly wrecked.

Even if Ukraine wins an unlikely victory, Russia's significant strategic interests in the region will ensure it is the center of conflict for the foreseeable future and beyond.

Blackrock have already made a deal with the Ukrainian government for the reconstruction deal. I'm no economist so I couldn't say what the relative benefits are, but Blackrock are not in the habit of making deals they're not going to profit from.

And.. guess who was advising the US government on Russian and Ukrainian economic affairs prior to this war? Yep. Blackrock.

I think it's one of the basic tenets of modern capitalism. There simply isn't an ever-increasing demand, so to make an ever-increasing profit companies need to generate demand. Planned obsolescence, addiction, fear,...and trashing whole cities in manufactured wars...

Quoting Tzeentch

I'm not sure if something of this magnitude can be explained by corporate interests. I think it is simply too significant for that.

Possibly. I get the scepticism, but even as individual companies many corporations have working turnovers higher than most countries. As an industry... the arms industry put together (with their shared interest in perpetuating war) has a lobbying power in the US larger than most of Europe can muster. Plus it's multinational, so the same interests are lobbying the governments of both the US and Europe, tying up media narratives through advertising revenue control...

Personally, I find it far easier to see how a multinational corporation has the power and will to push an agenda like this than I do most governments.

Quoting neomac

any government promoting human rights (competing with those promoting others political agenda) is realistically drawn willingly or unwillingly into a power race

Exactly why I spent so much time demonstrating that your assumption that the US are following a different agenda to Russia in terms of basic human rights is completely unfounded. It may have different methods (elections plus narrative control), but the outcomes are the same - power concentrated into the hands of a smaller number of wealthy individuals.

Quoting neomac

that doesn’t exclude convergence and cooperation among states at all (indeed, that’s why there are alliances and partnerships

Exactly. So none of your theory, even if true, has any bearing on the debate about the US's involvement in this conflict. It may gain this 'power' you claim it needs by beating Russia militarily, but it may also gain it by clever diplomacy, territorial deals, persuasion, economic offerings, power-sharing...

Reply to Isaac

Yes. It's easy to pick out one person and blame all the evils on the world on that person. And sure enough, he is a despicable thug. But what makes anyone think that removing him - if that could somehow be made possible - would not guarantee someone worse to rise to power, because that's never seen before.

Reply to Manuel

Yeah, history is not on the side of the cheerleaders for this war.

Barely a single US foreign intervention has ever worked, since WWII whenever the US has tried to intervene in foreign wars/disputes. Virtually all failed.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128158746000381

The way in which it is the opposition to US involvement that is made to sound unreasonable, is truly astounding.

Whether it's a nationalist resurgence in an economically crippled Ukraine, or a deterioration of the region into warring sub-factions... The lesson from history is abundantly clear. It will not be a shining beacon of democratic enlightenment.

Quoting Isaac

any government promoting human rights (competing with those promoting others political agenda) is realistically drawn willingly or unwillingly into a power race — neomac

Exactly why I spent so much time demonstrating that your assumption that the US are following a different agenda to Russia in terms of basic human rights is completely unfounded. It may have different methods (elections plus narrative control), but the outcomes are the same - power concentrated into the hands of a smaller number of wealthy individuals.

First, I didn't even understand what assumption you are attributing to me. Since you have a poor understanding of what I write better to avoid rephrasing. Quote me, it's much easier and fair.
Second, my claim suggests the opposite of your conclusion: even if power was concentrated into the hands of a smaller number of wealthy individuals, this may still serve human rights promotion.


Quoting Isaac

that doesn’t exclude convergence and cooperation among states at all (indeed, that’s why there are alliances and partnerships — neomac

Exactly. So none of your theory, even if true, has any bearing on the debate about the US's involvement in this conflict. It may gain this 'power' you claim it needs by beating Russia militarily, but it may also gain it by clever diplomacy, territorial deals, persuasion, economic offerings, power-sharing...

It has bearing to the extent that we are talking about geopolitical agents, so it makes sense to discuss our assumptions about what's their expected behavior and aims in given circumstances e.g. to understand why the US might spend hundreds of billions in military expenditure instead of fighting famine and diseases around the world. And to remind us that possibilities are not free floating in a vacuum of geopolitical constraining factors and historical legacies, that affect threat and trust perception: Russia had 30 years to become more pro-West through diplomacy, persuasion (G8), economic offerings (energetic cooperation between Europe and Russian) , power-sharing (in Syria and war against Islamist terrorism) but then Putin preferred to become more anti-US (profiting from the complacency of the pro-Russia attitude of the West, right?), pushing anti-West populist narrative in the West, and directly challenge the US leadership. On these premises, better to look for a diplomatic solution always in position of power.

Quoting Tzeentch

So this might be a possible deterrent for Russia to engage in the eastern front. — neomac

I think it will have the exact opposite effect.

By inserting itself between Russia and one of its core strategic interests, the United States has guaranteed a permanent state of conflict (hot or cold) for as long as that situation persists.

Any deterrence can also have the opposite effect. Anybody trapped in a security dilemma can likely see defensive measures of its opponents as offensive provocations. That’s e.g. how you get the nuclear race. The point is that the US is military engaged in Russia’s neighbourhood not the other way around. And the permanent state of conflict is useful to decouple Russia from Europe with little military investment wrt Russia. The benefit for Europeans, it’s the time to prepare for worse. And let’s hope that’s enough.


Quoting Tzeentch

Even if Crimea is the core in Russian geostrategic calculations, its annexation wouldn’t guarantee its security as it would if Ukraine was under Russian control (or at least, demilitarised). So the threat for Russia may still be serious enough to work as a deterrent. — neomac

Holding a nation's core strategic interests hostage will not work as a deterrent. It will ensure conflict permanently looms over the region, just like with Taiwan.

Deterrence on the Western from means that a costly retaliatory measure might ensue. And that is what Russian rational strategists need to take into account and possibly discourage any hostile move. The threat of an attack from Ukraine against Russia on the West front, say in the Black Sea, will oblige Russia to invest part of its military capacity in protecting that region, as it happens now for Ukraine under the threat of an attack from Belarus.
For any move it’s possible to imagine a counter move. But all moves have costs, so for the US investing resources to pressure competitors’ to pay greater and rapidly growing costs and re-aligning allies is still a good strategic move.



Quoting Tzeentch

First, the Europeans are realising how delegating their own security to the US can be costly and risky as they never could before... — neomac

There seems to be little awareness within the European leadership that they and the United States have played a prominent role in provoking this conflict. The US is playing them for fools, because they largely are.

They've been given the illusion of importance and agency, but current US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland's words probably describe the United States' position vis-à-vis Europe the best: "F*CK the EU!"

It would be great if the Europeans started to realise this, but I see nothing of the sort.

I don’t see it that way. “Provocation” sounds weird in competitive games (even more so if one champions Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”). It’s like calling “provocation” a first pawn exchange on a chessboard by a player against an opponent. That’s the game they are supposed to play.
Besides “provocation” is in the eye of the receiver so it’s easy to represent one’s action in terms of reactions to some actual or perceived “provocation”. Also the US reacted to European provocations (who were flirting with American authoritarian competitors: Russia and China, “NATO is braindead”) and Russian provocations (Russia under Putin was set out to re-establish its great power role at the expense of the US plus “I and my Chinese boyfriend want a new world order”, and messing in America and America’s backyard, namely Europe, with infowar and lobbying) while both were enjoying the benefits of the globalisation promoted by the US (so without considering the US security concerns).
In talking about “provocation” Russia is just claiming some right that it can’t prove to have (and which within Mearsheimer’s offensive realism shouldn’t even make sense!), it’s an indirect threat to the US or the West, and it’s trying to make a genocidal mafia state look as a victim, if not a martyr. Ridiculous.


Quoting Tzeentch

Ironically, how can we conclude anything other than the fact that Europe and Russia were quite de-militarized prior to this conflict breaking loose? And wasn't that something we should have fostered?

Russia de-militarised prior to this conflict breaking loose?
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1203160/military-expenditure-russia/
“Peace talking” is always derailing your reasoning outside the power game “rules” you are trying to understand. In the opposite direction goes the ancient piece of wisdom: si vis pacem, para bellum

Reply to Isaac

I think that the thought behind this is that the end justifies the means, so that who cares if a "hypocrite" state (and all powerful states are similar in this respect) arms Ukraine, the important thing is to beat this evil monster who knows not how to reason and so forth.

What I find quite confusing, which I heard said several times - and I don't know if it's been mentioned here, haven't kept up on the details, though have seen some of your replies, which, to my light have been excellent - is that if we somehow let Russia win, then, quite literally it is said "I don't want to live under a dictator."

Same "logic" with China.

If you failed to see a connection between these conclusions, then I will be more comfortably in knowing I am not a completely crazy person.

Reply to SophistiCat The country is going back to it's old ways rapidly. In celebration of the 1943 victory in Stalingrad, Volgograd was named again Stalingrad, at least for the festivities, and brand new busts of Stalin are made. Quite in line with banning human rights watch groups, that were accepted by the Soviet Union.

Quoting neomac

I don’t see it that way. “Provocation” sounds weird in competitive games (even more dumb if one champions Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”).

I don't think the EU's behavior can be explained through the lens of offensive realism.

I don't personally subscribe to any one way of viewing international politics, and it should be noted Mearsheimer often states that he believes his theories aren't right 100% of the time either.

Quoting neomac

Russia de-militarised prior to this conflict breaking loose?
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1203160/military-expenditure-russia/

Numbers mean little without context, and the context is that the Russia invaded Ukraine with 190,000 troops at the start of the invasion. For a gigantic country like Russia that is a very tiny force. With it they struggled to conquer and occupy even a few regions of Ukraine. It didn't come close to being a threat to NATO. They could double that, and it still wouldn't be.

Prior to this conflict most European armies were in shambles (for the most part they still are) and Russia was maintaining a small army relative to its size, and compared for example to the size of the armies of the Soviet Union.

Quoting neomac

“Peace talking” is always derailing your reasoning outside the power game “rules” you are trying to understand.

Hard to see what you mean by this.

Countries don't prefer to be at war. They prefer to be at peace. War is simply an inevitable consequence of the power structure states find themselves in.

When the status quo is resilient peace, there's no rational reason for states to disrupt that status quo simply because "those are the rules of the game".

Quoting Tzeentch

For a gigantic country like Russia that is very tiny. With it they struggled conquering and occupying only a few regions of Ukraine. It didn't come close to being a threat to NATO. They could double that, and it still wouldn't be.

Do notice that all armed forces combined Russia the size is very large. But the forces are deliberately cut into different services as one singular entity wouldn't pose a threat to Putin. Hence the National Guard (the old MVD) is roughly the same size as the Russian Ground forces. Add to this the Wagner group, which has no legal base in Russia (hence Putin can do away with it, if he would want to do that) and can do basically whatever (for example hire foreigners and prison inmates and shoot them, if they try to escape the war).

A powerful centralized Russian Army would be very beneficial in fighting a war, but would be a potential threat to Putin. Domestic politics comes always first.

Quoting Tzeentch

I don't personally subscribe to any one way of viewing international politics, and it should be noted Mearsheimer often states that he believes his theories aren't right 100% of the time either.

Yet you cited Mearsheimer (along with Sachs and Chomsky) to support the idea that the US has provoked this war, didn’t you? And you did that to imply what exactly?
Whatever Russia claims to be “provocation” doesn’t mean that Russia had a right to invade Ukraine in international law terms.
Nor it can possibly mean that the US (or the West in general) should put Russia security concerns above or at the same level of the US (or the West in general) security concerns, if you want to talk about geopolitical strategy.
Nor it can possibly mean that different political administrations are morally bound to follow the same path/commitments toward third countries that previous administrations followed without considering geopolitical strategy (and third countries’ administrations!).
So what else does it mean exactly? Can you spell it out?



Quoting Tzeentch

Russia de-militarised prior to this conflict breaking loose?
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1203160/military-expenditure-russia/ — neomac


Numbers mean little without context, and the context is that the Russian military consisted of 190,000 troops at the start of the invasion. For a gigantic country like Russia that is very tiny. With it they struggled conquering and occupying only a few regions of Ukraine. It didn't come close to being a threat to NATO. They could double that, and it still wouldn't be.

Prior to this conflict most European armies were in shambles (for the most part they still are) and Russia was maintaining a small army relative to its size, and compared for example to the size of the armies of the Soviet Union.

Then I don’t see enough context in there either. What counts for geopolitical considerations is Russian military capacity, not just what is mobilised in specific military operations and invested in military budget. Then its military offensive capacity (not only defensive) which needs to be compared to the defensive/offensive military capacity of any target country (e.g. post-Soviet Republics). Then its hegemonic ambitions wrt hegemonic competitors (like the US) and allies (like China).
Concerning the logic of your argument, if the EU is more demilitarised than Russia, then EU is more military vulnerable to Russia. Besides nobody is reasonably going to invade Russia as a whole, which would practically imply inheriting all the security issues Russia has for occupying such a vast territory (comprising lots of wastelands).


Quoting Tzeentch

“Peace talking” is always derailing your reasoning outside the power game “rules” you are trying to understand. — neomac

Hard to see what you mean by this.

Countries don't prefer to be at war. They prefer to be at peace. War is simply an inevitable consequence of the power structure states find themselves in.

When the status quo is resilient peace, there's no rational reason for states to disrupt that status quo simply because "those are the rules of the game”.

Hard to see what you mean by this as well. The “rules of the game” are just patterns of behavior that geopolitical agents show in dealing with security dilemmas that power structures and struggles “inevitably” pose. And that’s a fundamental premise to discuss the rationals for ensuring a otherwise mostly uncertain “resilient” peace. “Uncertain” precisely because indeed there are scarce resources, competing interests over those resources and no rules granting successful cooperation (not to mention equal distribution of related costs/benefits & risks/opportunities).

Quoting neomac

Yet you cited Mearsheimer (along with Sachs and Chomsky) to support the idea that the US has provoked this war, didn’t you? And you did that to imply what exactly?
Whatever Russia claims to be “provocation” doesn’t mean that Russia had a right to invade Ukraine in international law terms.
Nor it can possibly mean that the US (or the West in general) should put Russia security concerns above or at the same level of the US (or the West in general) security concerns, if you want to talk about geopolitical strategy.
Nor it can possibly mean that different political administrations are morally bound to follow the same path/commitments toward third countries that previous administrations followed without considering geopolitical strategy (and third countries’ administrations!).
So what else does it mean exactly?

Oh wow. You completely missed the ball on that one if that's what you believe my arguments implied.

Quoting neomac

Can you spell it out?

I already did, in painstaking detail, multiple times over, and I can't be bothered to do so again. You can go back and read them yourself.

Quoting neomac

Concerning the logic of your argument, if the EU is more demilitarised than Russia, then EU is more military vulnerable to Russia.

Except that the EU has a military ally, the United States, which has the most powerful military in the world by a mile and a half. So no, Europe wasn't vulnerable, which is why they left their militaries to collect dust for decades.

Quoting Tzeentch

I already did, in painstaking detail, multiple times over, and I can't be bothered to do so again. You can go back and read them yourself.

If that below [1] is the piece you are referring to, then ok, I missed it and I would basically agree. But then I totally disagree with your following comment.

[quote="Tzeentch;778359”]Except that the EU has a military ally, the United States, which has the most powerful military in the world by a mile and a half. So no, Europe wasn't vulnerable, which is why they left their militaries to collect dust for decades.[/quote]


That’s begging the question though. If you want to discuss the US reasons to engage in such a war, you can’t simply take the US military alliance to the EU for granted. War is often too heavy/costly endeavour on national and international level, and plenty of imponderable factors that even military/intelligence experts can't foresee until shit hits the fan. So one can reasonably expect geopolitical agents to avoid war not only for an understandable desire for peace, or avoiding wasting resources, but also because they might not want to discover how awfully wrong things can go. And the worst scenario for everybody is when war concerns major nuclear powers. Isn’t it? Besides the US is also plagued by deep domestic political conflicts, pressured by the rise of China, suffering from additional economic/technological competition from the EU (while enjoying the NATO shield and the benefits of the Pax Americana), suffering a growing anti-americanism from the Rest to the West. Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia? Why would the US preserve the globalisation if that benefits more its adversaries and its allies, and making them more defiant? For the sake of Europe? Because "those are the rules of the game”? Indeed, the US military presence in Europe has been declining for 30 years (which doesn’t fit well into the NATO expansion narrative). Besides the US solicited the EU to increase their military budget for a long time. Actually, since the Obama administration they have become very much vocal about it. Trump wanted to pull out the US from NATO. And Sarkozy declared NATO braindead.
So yes, Europe is vulnerable to Russia if Europe doesn’t give a shit about the US security concerns or plays against them.

[1]
Quoting Tzeentch

Earlier in this thread I've tried to offer a geopolitical explanation for the United States' actions:

Since the United States cannot have been surprised by the Russian invasion and also does not seem overly committed to a Ukrainian victory, I am entertaining the hypothesis that the United States intentionally sought to provoke long-lasting conflict between Europe and Russia.

Europe and Russia were cozying up to each other too much, while it is in America's best interest to keep the Heartland divided.

With China and Russia in an alliance that was futher strengthened by the American push for Ukrainian incorporation into NATO, the Eurasian continent was basically already 2/3's united. There was an actual threat of the Heartland uniting completely - with Europe becoming apathetic towards the United States and fairly neutral towards Russia and China, and with Russia and China being markedly anti-American.

The war in Ukraine attempts to establish Europe as a committed American ally, and a counterbalance against Russia in case a large-scale security competition breaks out between the United States and Russia and China.

Far-fetched? Sober big-picture thinking? You be the judge.

Quoting neomac

Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia?

Because Europe is home to a number of immensely powerful nations which are, united or seperately, essentially destined to play a big role in global affairs (most notably France and Germany).

Since WWII, the United States has controlled Europe through soft power. It bought influence for the cost of paying the lion's share of Europe's defense bill.

Such control over a large portion of the Heartland is extremely important to United States hegemony, at least if we are to follow Mackinder's and Brzezinski's ideas.

If the United States doesn't control Europe, it will either be controlled by another great power or possibly even turn into its own great power, which will inevitably find itself in conflict with the United States at one point or another.

Quoting neomac

Indeed, the US military presence in Europe has been declining for 30 years (which doesn’t fit well into the NATO expansion narrative).

That's no surprise. After the Cold War up until now there was virtually no military threat from Russia, so numbers of troops decreased while NATO was turned into an instrument to expand US influence through soft power.

Quoting neomac

Trump wanted to pull out the US from NATO. And Sarkozy declared NATO braindead.

Those are words, not actions.

Quoting Tzeentch

Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia? — neomac


Because Europe is home to a number of immensely powerful nations which are, united or seperately, essentially destined to play a big role in global affairs (most notably France and Germany).

Since WWII, the United States has controlled Europe through soft power. It bought influence for the cost of paying the lion's share of Europe's defense bill.

Such control over a large portion of the Heartland is extremely important to United States hegemony, at least if we are to follow Mackinder's and Brzezinski's ideas.

If the United States doesn't control Europe, it will either be controlled by another great power or possibly even turn into its own great power, which will inevitably find itself in conflict with the United States at one point or another.

If it wasn’t for the fact that:
1 - Europe is still far from turning into its own great power: existing military deficiencies and “strategic cacophony” inside Europe (also between France and Germany too) remain an obstacle to reach strategic autonomy
2 - EU with its large market (which included East Europe) is not Germany (nor Germany and France)
3 - The new developing economies (in South Asia, South America and Africa) are expected to become more relevant in next decades while EU is becoming less and less competitive
4 - Russia is supposed to be a mafia state and declining power so whatever they will be able to achieve by stretching further West their hegemony won’t be an evident challenge to the US military and economy
5 - The greatest challenge to American hegemony comes from China so the Americans might think to take Russia on their side to fight against China.
Not to mention that Germany became the peaceful economic power it has become, thanks to 30 years US-backed support for EU project, NATO and globalisation. And since world-wide power projection has its monstrous costs, everybody must pay for it. Even more so if they largely benefit from it for decades. Most certainly not play against it.
So no, at the moment, it’s not evident that the US must intervene or engage more than it does in Ukraine if Russia actually tried to military expand westward just because Europe has “powerful nations”. The US could handle this this during Cold War when Russians had also half Germany.


Quoting Tzeentch

Indeed, the US military presence in Europe has been declining for 30 years (which doesn’t fit well into the NATO expansion narrative). — neomac


That's no surprise. After the Cold War up until now there was virtually no military threat from Russia, so numbers of troops decreased while NATO was turned into an instrument to expand US influence through soft power.

If there was virtually no military threat from Russia why the NATO expansion then? And why would Putin worry about NATO expansion if it’s just American soft-power and American military presence was declining? Those countries that tried to invade Russia in its recent history (Germany and France) were pretty complacent toward Russian security concerns. So why was Russia so worried?
Besides under Putin Russian military budget increased significantly, power consolidation in domestic affairs and over rebel peripheries turned authoritarian, nationalist, and aggressive (see war in Chechnya and Georgia), Russian military projection overseas increased (in the Mediterranean Sea, Middle East and Africa), governmental cyberwarfare activities and “soft power” (by lobbying populist and anti-American info-war) in the West increased as well, anti-American rhetoric became more hostile up until calling for a new world order in partnership with China, and last but not least Russia (not the US) was the one with border disputes, Russian minorities scattered in neighbouring countries, a lost hegemonic influence to recover, and post-Soviet Russian political/economic/intellectual elites with revanchist dreams.


Quoting Tzeentch

Trump wanted to pull out the US from NATO. And Sarkozy declared NATO braindead. — neomac

Those are words, not actions.

Even Putin’s concerns for NATO enlargement in Ukraine were just words until they weren’t. The debate over transatlantic relations in the US has become bitter for a while now. Besides Putin (after the annexation in Crimea and still at war in Donbas) didn’t seem too much worried about the US until Trump was there, right? And until the military special operations French and Germans didn’t seem much compelled by the US soft-power to change their attitude toward Russia, and they still look reluctant about it (e.g. Sarkozy was still talking about Russian security guarantees just a few months ago).


I think it’s more intellectual honest to understand geopolitical agents’ security dilemmas for what they are. So misrepresenting them by removing implied uncertainties and risks, it’s myopic not only toward administrations’ internal tensions and ambiguities in international relations, but also toward administrations’ resolutions and consistency as expressions of their agency.

Quoting neomac

1 - Europe is still far from turning into its own great power: existing military deficiencies and “strategic cacophony” inside Europe (also between France and Germany too) remain an obstacle to reach strategic autonomy
2 - EU with its large market (which included East Europe) is not Germany (nor Germany and France)
3 - The new developing economies (in South Asia, South America and Africa) are expected to become more relevant in next decades while EU is becoming less and less competitive
4 - Russia is supposed to be a mafia state and declining power so whatever they will be able to achieve by stretching further West their hegemony won’t be an evident challenge to the US military and economy
5 - The greatest challenge to American hegemony comes from China so the Americans might think to take Russia on their side to fight against China.

All fair points, yet I don't think many would argue Europe isn't still very important to the United States,

Quoting neomac

So no, at the moment, it’s not evident that the US must intervene or engage more than it does in Ukraine...

I don't know where you get the idea that I implied as much. If anything I believe the Europeans should stop backing the war in Ukraine and encourage the Americans to leave as fast as possible.

Quoting neomac

If there was virtually no military threat from Russia why the NATO expansion then?

Because NATO became a tool to expand US influence through soft power, and there was plenty of historical grievance to build it on.

Quoting neomac

Putin (after the annexation in Crimea and still at war in Donbas) didn’t seem too much worried about the US until Trump was there, right?

US presidents have very little influence over foreign policy, so I don't think Trump's presidency made any difference in the Russian's view of the situation at all.

If anything Trump probably eased their minds at least for a little while, since he was all about his America First policy and a commitment to stopping "forever wars" across thousands of miles of ocean, etc. Of course, Trump used some bombastic words but such rhetoric isn't aimed at or taken seriously by world leaders. That was aimed at the US population towards which he wanted to seem like the "strongman".

Quoting neomac

And why would Putin worry about NATO expansion if it’s just American soft-power and American military presence was declining?

That should be obvious. When powerful nations are close to each other, conflict is bound to arise. And the United States' sphere of influence was inching ever closer to Russia. Powerful nations care greatly about what the other powerful nations are doing in their backyard.

And you underestimate the power of soft power if you think it cannot pose a serious threat to other countries. The American empire is largely based on soft power, though it never shied away from hard power either.

Quoting neomac

Besides under Putin Russian military budget increased significantly, power consolidation in domestic affairs and over rebel peripheries turned authoritarian, nationalist, and aggressive (see war in Chechnya and Georgia), Russian military projection overseas increased (in the Mediterranean Sea, Middle East and Africa), governmental cyberwarfare activities and “soft power” (by lobbying populist and anti-American info-war) in the West increased as well, ...

Yes. Great powers, even a small one like Russia, are often busy serving their interests militarily all over the globe. That's nothing new or special.

Whatever military build-up took place was nowhere near significant enough to pose any threat to Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union it was only normal to expect some raise in military expenditure at some point, for a country as big as Russia with long borders and many potential flashpoints.

It is dwarfed by the actual military build-up we are seeing today, encouraged in part by the West's own actions.

Quoting neomac

Even Putin’s concerns for NATO enlargement were just words until they weren’t.

Russia acted the part as well. Concentrating troops and exercising near the border, letters of ultimatum, etc. and lets not forget they put forward a consistent message over the course of 15 years.

But when Trump says he wants to pull out of NATO, and the rest of America panics and starts yelling they have to secure their overseas alliances, such rhetoric has zero credibility. Only if it becomes consistent policy over several presidencies might it start to be seen as actually representing the geopolitical vision of the US foreign policy establishment.

Quoting neomac

And until the military special operations French and Germans didn’t seem much compelled by the US soft-power to change their attitude toward Russia, ...

Well yes, that may have been exactly the point.

The European leaders seem pretty naive and self-interested, but there are plenty of people smart enough to not assume the United States' benign intentions, so that reluctance will probably stay.

There is ultimately a limit to what United States influence can achieve, but there are historical examples aplenty of the United States leading countries willingly down the path of their own destruction.

Belarus leader says he has been asked to seal a non-aggression pact with Ukraine
[sup]— Andrew Osborn, Mark Trevelyan · Reuters · Jan 24, 2023[/sup]

Quoting Lukashenko

They are asking us not to go to war with Ukraine in any circumstances, not to move our troops there. They are proposing we conclude a non-aggression pact.

Quoting Rudnik

For the past ten months, [Belarus/Lukashenko] has permitted Russia to base troops in Belarus and launch airstrikes from the country against Ukrainian targets.

Quoting Peskov

No, I cannot comment on this right now. I do not have any information.

Quoting Nikolenko

Russia is trying in every possible way to draw Belarus directly into the war. Ukraine warns Minsk against any possible further aggressive plans, we confirm the absence of any aggressive intentions towards Belarus on our part.

Seems unlikely, and might not mean a whole lot anyway. Any takers?

Quoting jorndoe

Seems unlikely,

It's hard to make sense of it.

It basically signals that the Ukrainians fear an offensive from the north, while the chance of such an agreement being signed seems very low.

Perhaps it's a way to test whether the Belarussians are planning to get involved in the war. Declining would imply yes, agreeing would imply no. Though even if they weren't planning to get involved they would probably still decline for the sake of ambiguity.

Maybe the goal of the action is the signal itself; to feign weakness.

Or maybe the goal is simply to confuse.

Quoting Tzeentch

So no, at the moment, it’s not evident that the US must intervene or engage more than it does in Ukraine... — neomac

I don't know where you get the idea that I implied as much. If anything I believe the Europeans should stop backing the war in Ukraine and encourage the Americans to leave as fast as possible.

Why did you chop my quotation like this? My claim wasn’t about the war in Ukraine, it just drew a parallel with it. To clarify once again my point, I asked you "Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia?" and your answer was roughly that the US needs to control Europe and its “immense powerful nations” from becoming its own great power or fall under the control of another foreign power. Even if that’s true in general, a Russian aggression against the EU might not necessarily need to worry the US and compel its prompt reaction just for that reason. In concrete scenarios, the nature, magnitude, timing of the US intervention may greatly vary as a function of the nature, magnitude and timing of the Russia aggression (scenarios are countless), and as a function of the American priorities (imagine that Russia is attacking in the European front when China is attacking in the Asian front), so the American intervention may in the end frustrate expectations as it does in Ukraine at least to those who would welcome greater and quicker support (that’s the parallel I was making). Even more so if certain US administrations are playing with their credibility as reliable partners (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/22/trump-says-he-threatened-not-defend-nato-russia/), emboldening Russia to take greater initiative against Europe (Russia is not even short on pretexts see the case of Serbia). Not to mention that Russia can both inflict great damage on EU territories (independently from land grabbing) and always threat escalation to nuclear strikes. In conclusion, the EU can’t just blindly rely on the US support in the risky case that Russia turns military hostile for revanchist reasons, and the US is troubled by other pressing domestic and foreign challenges.


Quoting Tzeentch

If there was virtually no military threat from Russia why the NATO expansion then? — neomac

Because NATO became a tool to expand US influence through soft power, and there was plenty of historical grievance to build it on.

I find your reasoning pretty confused. To me “historical grievance” means that Eastern block countries and especially post-Soviet countries were reasonably fearing Russian revanchism (https://www.politico.eu/article/western-europe-listen-to-the-baltic-countries-that-know-russia-best-ukraine-poland/) for a full package of reasons: border disputes, Russian minorities, Russian ultranationalist surge, and historical imperialist trends. Indeed, this “historical grievance” was a deep-rooted reason behind NATO expansion as I pointed out elsewhere [1]. This makes sense also wrt what you were claiming before: if the US cares about long-term control over Europe against rival powers, then of course it’s prudent to expand control against potential threats from Russia. “Potential threat” doesn’t mean “actual threat”, but it doesn’t mean no threat either. It has to do with long-term expectations and for such threats you don’t want to wait to find out if it was worth to prepare for it, because it might be too late. Unless you can turn a blind eye on it for convenience, or for otherwise feeling just remotely concerned, of course.
In 1993 (so no Putin and no NATO enlargement, apart from the consensual case of East Germany), even Mearsheimer famously suggested Ukraine to keep Russian nuclear weapons precisely for that reason: [I]My argument for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent assumes that Russian-Ukrainian relations are likely to deteriorate in the future. If trouble were not in the offing, Ukraine would not need a nuclear arsenal. The safest strategy is to make Ukraine a responsible nuclear power before serious trouble starts between them, and not have to attempt this in the middle of a Russian-Ukrainian crisis[/I]
Source: https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf
(While via the Budapest Memorandum the Russophobic US helped Russia get back its nuclear weapons from Ukraine, which kept about 1/3 of the former Soviet nuclear weapons, go figure!)



Quoting Tzeentch

Putin (after the annexation in Crimea and still at war in Donbas) didn’t seem too much worried about the US until Trump was there, right? — neomac

US presidents have very little influence over foreign policy, so I don't think Trump's presidency made any difference in the Russian's view of the situation at all.
If anything Trump probably eased their minds at least for a little while, since he was all about his America First policy and a commitment to stopping "forever wars" across thousands of miles of ocean, etc. Of course, Trump used some bombastic words but such rhetoric isn't aimed at or taken seriously by world leaders. That was aimed at the US population towards which he wanted to seem like the "strongman".

Quoting Tzeentch

Even Putin’s concerns for NATO enlargement were just words until they weren’t. — neomac

Russia acted the part as well. Concentrating troops and exercising near the border, letters of ultimatum, etc. and lets not forget they put forward a consistent message over the course of 15 years.

But when Trump says he wants to pull out of NATO, and the rest of America panics and starts yelling they have to secure their overseas alliances, such rhetoric has zero credibility. Only if it becomes consistent policy over several presidencies might it start to be seen as actually representing the geopolitical vision of the US foreign policy establishment.

A part from the fact that you start underplaying the influence of US presidents over foreign policy, and then you highlight the influence of Trump’s policy on American foreign affairs, the main problem is that your claims don’t stand factual scrutiny. It’s true that American foreign policies is not determined exclusively by presidential administrations: Congress (sided by the the Pentagon) thanks to its institutional powers can set or stabilise major trends in foreign politics. Yet presidential administrations, even in non-emergency times, have significant powers concerning military operations, international agreements, and trade among others (e.g. signing the Budapest Memorandum). If American presidents weren’t influential, it wouldn’t make sense for foreign administrations to favour one over the other, or to try to interfere with their political elections, or to set their foreign activities’s timing accordingly.
Trump’s case was even more worrisome given his penchant for destabilising American institutions from the inside, his complicity with Putin and his polarising withdrawals from various international agreements:
https://www.trtworld.com/americas/trump-s-top-five-withdrawals-from-international-agreements-18543
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/31/politics/us-mike-pompeo-inf-withdrawal/index.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-germany-military-roettgen-idUSKCN24U2BJ
Indeed, the European leaders were seriously worried about Trump and needed reassurance: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/28/thanks-to-trump-germany-says-it-cant-rely-on-america-what-does-that-mean/
The “bombastic words” by Trump were taken so seriously by the Congress representatives themselves to the point that:
[I]Such concerns led the House of Representatives in January 2019, to pass the NATO Support Act (H.R. 676), confirming Congress' support for NATO and prohibiting Trump from potentially withdrawing from NATO. On December 11, 2019, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee passed a bill to be put in front of Congress which would require congressional approval for American withdrawal from NATO[/I]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO




Quoting Tzeentch

And why would Putin worry about NATO expansion if it’s just American soft-power and American military presence was declining? — neomac

That should be obvious. When powerful nations are close to each other, conflict is bound to arise. And the United States' sphere of influence was inching ever closer to Russia. Powerful nations care greatly about what the other powerful nations are doing in their backyard.
And you underestimate the power of soft power if you think it cannot pose a serious threat to other countries. The American empire is largely based on soft power, though it never shied away from hard power either.

What did you just write?! You are the one randomly qualifying “Nato expansion” in terms of “soft-power” not me. And after downplaying its deterrent value by calling it “soft power”, you need to re-affirm it’s threatening nature in terms of hard power to make sense of Russian reaction. In other words, you just demystified your own mystification.
As far I’m concerned, NATO is essentially a military defensive alliance so an expression of coercive power, against potential military threats. NATO is not like having McDonald’s and IKEAs (used to be present also in Russia), nor like joining the EU. NATO specifically concerns military security, so “hard-power”, not “soft-power”. I’m also the one claiming that any defensive measure can be taken as potential threat by competitors trapped in security dilemmas. So if me it’s easy to acknowledge that Russian national security concerns and demand for NATO access denial to Ukraine look persuasive, other considerations discounted.



Quoting Tzeentch

Yes. Great powers, even a small one like Russia, are often busy serving their interests militarily all over the globe. That's nothing new or special.

Whatever military build-up took place was nowhere near significant enough to pose any threat to Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union it was only normal to expect some raise in military expenditure at some point, for a country as big as Russia with long borders and many potential flashpoints.

It is dwarfed by the actual military build-up we are seeing today, encouraged in part by the West's own actions.

You make no sense to me. On one side you claim: [i]“when powerful nations are close to each other, conflict is bound to arise. And the United States' sphere of influence was inching ever closer to Russia. Powerful nations care greatly about what the other powerful nations are doing in their backyard”[/I]. So it’s all about Russian threat perception , that you seem to find definitively justified being Russia a powerful nation, even though NATO is defensive alliance, Russia is 3rd rank country by military capability with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, Germany/France were against Ukraine within NATO (and cozying up to Russia), Russia had already annexed Crimea easy-peasy and whatever military support Ukraine got prior to the war wasn’t significant enough to pose any threat to Russia.
On the other side, when it’s time to assess the Russian threat from Western perspective, Russia is all of a sudden a small great power, nothing new or special, just busy serving their interests militarily all over the globe (but apparently not its borders despite all pretexts for territorial disputes and Russian minorities to protect) whose military build-up posed no threat to Europe (in other words, very powerful nation but not so very powerful nation after all, and let’s bother us over the fact that we are talking about the 3rd rank country by military capability with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, very much active in the Mediterranean Sea & North Africa, Middle East, East Europe and Baltic sea, so all around Europe!) and whose nasty political/economic leverage in the West wasn’t used to mess with America’s backyard at all.



Quoting Tzeentch

And until the military special operations French and Germans didn’t seem much compelled by the US soft-power to change their attitude toward Russia, ... — neomac

Well yes, that may have been exactly the point.

The European leaders seem pretty naive and self-interested, but there are plenty of people smart enough to not assume the United States' benign intentions, so that reluctance will probably stay.

There is ultimately a limit to what United States influence can achieve, but there are historical examples aplenty of the United States leading countries willingly down the path of their own destruction.

Oh so now the US doesn’t want to control Europe (hosting “immensely powerful nations”) because Mackinder/Brzezinski say so, it wants to lead it down the path of its own destruction?!
BTW you most certainly seem one of those people smart enough to not assume United States' benign intentions, right? What can you tell me then about Putin’s benign intentions toward the satanist Europe ? Does his murdering, raping, deporting, torturing, wrecking the life of their own people (oh he’s very much peremptory about this! Ukrainians and Russians are one people! Don’t even dare question him, he could tzar bomb your ass!) give you any idea about it by any chance?


What you are so surreptitiously yet so clumsily trying to do is to support the idea that the West had no reason to fear Russia, and Russia had all reasons to fear the West. And then put all the blame on malign-intentioned US for artificially pulling all the triggers of this war at the expense of Europe (coz they are immensely powerful nations, so powerful that the war in Ukraine by a small great powerful nation could destroy them) and Russia (which is such a cute small great powerful nation that doesn’t bother anybody, just busy serving samovar tea & babushka cookies all over the globe). And you’d count yourself among the “smart people” for thinking all that by yourself, right?



[1]
Quoting neomac

From:
[i]
THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
======================================================================= HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
[b] COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS [/b]?FIRST SESSION?__________?OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________?Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[/i]

Comments about the Russian “imperialist bent” were of the following kind:
[i]
Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

[…]

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.''

[…]

Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.

[…]

Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan- European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the beginning of the next century is also Russia . A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration [/b] does not see this as a legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to protect the democracies they have already established from external aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.

[…]


Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my own position. My position is not that we should accommodate Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, and even further, and considerably further, than the current proposal envisages.

[…]

The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite. They certainly speak with authority. [b]Moscow is opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as final[/b]. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.
[/i]

Comments about Ukraine were of the following kind :
[i]
If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of it.
[…]

My estimate here rests on the fact that including the Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th country, Ukraine, on the horizon.

[…]
The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.

[…]
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of political, economic and military maturity before they can become members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just ``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a collection of economic and political basket cases and both organizations would be unable to function effectively.
[…]
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
[…]
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.?[/i]

Quoting neomac

To clarify once again my point, I asked you "Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia?" and your answer was roughly that the US needs to control Europe and its “immense powerful nations” from becoming its own great power or fall under the control of another foreign power.

I tried to give you an explanation for why the United States is worried about controlling Europe, which it evidently is.

If your argument is "they shouldn't be", then that's something you'll have to discuss with the policy makers in Washington, I suppose.

Quoting neomac

I find your reasoning pretty confused.

My point was that NATO was a tool to expand US influence, not whether the Europeans' feelings of historical grievance and/or fear were justified.

Your confusion would probably lessen if you paid more attention to what I write, and less to what you believe I am implying.

Quoting neomac

A part from the fact that you start underplaying the influence of US presidents over foreign policy, ...

Yes. Let there be no doubt about my position on this: US presidents don't have much influence over foreign policy at all. Many tried. Obama for example, who famously failed and admitted this in his exit interview. Trump also.

The neoconservative lobby, aka "the Blob" is probably the most powerful entity in US politics.

Quoting neomac

The “bombastic words” by Trump were taken so seriously by the Congress representatives themselves to the point that:
Such concerns led the House of Representatives in January 2019, to pass the NATO Support Act (H.R. 676), confirming Congress' support for NATO and prohibiting Trump from potentially withdrawing from NATO. On December 11, 2019, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee passed a bill to be put in front of Congress which would require congressional approval for American withdrawal from NATO
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO

You're making my point for me. Trump (might have) wanted to leave NATO. The establishment ensured he couldn't. Who is in power here? Not Trump.

Quoting neomac

What did you just write?!

NATO has a clear soft power element in terms of the relation between the US and it's allies. I don't see what's controversial or hard to understand about that. It's pretty obvious.

Quoting neomac

You make no sense to me. On one side you claim: “when powerful nations are close to each other, conflict is bound to arise. And the United States' sphere of influence was inching ever closer to Russia. Powerful nations care greatly about what the other powerful nations are doing in their backyard”. So it’s all about Russian threat perception , that you seem to find definitively justified being Russia a powerful nation, even though NATO is defensive alliance, Russia is 3rd rank country by military capability with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, Germany/France were against Ukraine within NATO (and cozying up to Russia), Russia had already annexed Crimea easy-peasy and whatever military support Ukraine got prior to the war wasn’t significant enough to pose any threat to Russia.
On the other side, when it’s time to assess the Russian threat from Western perspective, Russia is all of a sudden a small great power, nothing new or special, just busy serving their interests militarily all over the globe (but apparently not its borders despite all pretexts for territorial disputes and Russian minorities to protect) whose military build-up posed no threat to Europe (in other words, very powerful nation but not so very powerful nation after all, and let’s bother us over the fact that we are talking about the 3rd rank country by military capability with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, very much active in the Mediterranean Sea & North Africa, Middle East, East Europe and Baltic sea, so all around Europe!) and whose nasty political/economic leverage in the West wasn’t used to mess with America’s backyard at all.

Yes. Russia was not a threat to NATO at any point between 1989 up until now. Clearly that doesn't mean it wasn't still a powerful nation. Just not in relation to US/NATO.

Quoting neomac

Oh so now the US doesn’t want to control Europe (hosting “immensely powerful nations”) because Mackinder/Brzezinski say so, it wants to lead it down the path of its own destruction?!

You're just putting words in my mouth.

I guess I'll have to state the obvious; the US wants to control Europe. And in its desire to control, the US frequently destroys nations. Vietnam, the entire Middle-East, etc.

Ukraine is going to be the next addition to that list, I'm afraid.

Quoting neomac

What you are so surreptitiously yet so clumsily trying to do is to support the idea that the West had no reason to fear Russia, and Russia had all reasons to fear the West.

I'd probably put it in slightly more nuanced terms, but that's indeed the part of the point I have been making for a while now, and unapologetically so.


Your posts seem to degenerate into walls of text worth of ravings. Can you try to make your points in a straightforward fashion? And try doing so without putting words in my mouth or assuming that I am implying all sorts of things which I am not.

Quoting Tzeentch

The neoconservative lobby, aka "the Blob" is probably the most powerful entity in US politics.

Neocons were actually a tiny cabal, that just got power during younger Bush. You have more longer schools of foreign policy than that, starting from Wilsonianism, the Jeffersonian school, the on-and-off "isolationism" of the US.

Quoting Tzeentch

To clarify once again my point, I asked you "Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia?" and your answer was roughly that the US needs to control Europe and its “immense powerful nations” from becoming its own great power or fall under the control of another foreign power. — neomac

I tried to give you an explanation for why the United States is worried about controlling Europe, which it evidently is.
If your argument is "they shouldn't be", then that's something you'll have to discuss with the policy makers in Washington, I suppose.

I summarised my argument for you, so no need for you to suggest any other answer: “In conclusion, the EU can’t just blindly rely on the US support in the risky case that Russia turns military hostile for revanchist reasons, and the US is troubled by other pressing domestic and foreign challenges.”
Evidently you lost track of our previous exchange. In short:
- I claimed “if the EU is more demilitarised than Russia, then EU is more military vulnerable to Russia”.
- You countered “Except that the EU has a military ally, the United States, which has the most powerful military in the world by a mile and a half. So no, Europe wasn't vulnerable”
- I replied “If you want to discuss the US reasons to engage in such a war, you can’t simply take the US military alliance to the EU for granted” and in relation to that I asked “Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia?”
- You rebutted “If the United States doesn't control Europe, it will either be controlled by another great power or possibly even turn into its own great power, which will inevitably find itself in conflict with the United States at one point or another”
- And I commented that, although true in general, that doesn’t exclude the possibility that the US intervention against a potential Russian aggression might be frustratingly less or less reliable than expected (arguably as in the Ukrainian case), so the European vulnerability wrt Russia is not automatically gone just because the United States are their most powerful ally independently from the circumstances.

Quoting Tzeentch

My point was that NATO was a tool to expand US influence, not whether the Europeans' feelings of historical grievance and/or fear were justified.
Your confusion would probably lessen if you paid more attention to what I write, and less to what you believe I am implying.

I find “NATO was a tool to expand US influence” trivial, but you didn’t limit yourself to make such trivial point. You were talking about “soft-power” and “plenty of historical grievance to build it on”. NATO is not expression of soft-power (so why would you call it soft-power? [1]) and “historical grievance” was treated just as pretext, not on its own merit as you did with the Russian grievance (why this difference in treatment?). The way you conceptualise and argue things may be rife of understated implications which you later confirmed anyways [2].


Quoting Tzeentch

A part from the fact that you start underplaying the influence of US presidents over foreign policy, ... — neomac

Yes. Let there be no doubt about my position on this: US presidents don't have much influence over foreign policy at all. Many tried. Obama for example, who famously failed and admitted this in his exit interview. Trump also. The neoconservative lobby, aka "the Blob" is probably the most powerful entity in US politics.

Quoting Tzeentch

The “bombastic words” by Trump were taken so seriously by the Congress representatives themselves to the point that:
Such concerns led the House of Representatives in January 2019, to pass the NATO Support Act (H.R. 676), confirming Congress' support for NATO and prohibiting Trump from potentially withdrawing from NATO. On December 11, 2019, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee passed a bill to be put in front of Congress which would require congressional approval for American withdrawal from NATO
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO — neomac

You're making my point for me. Trump (might have) wanted to leave NATO. The establishment ensured he couldn't. Who is in power here? Not Trump.

As I said American foreign policy making is institutionally divided between Congress and presidents, in non-emergency times. So it’s false that presidents don’t have much influence over foreign policy at all (like all the agreements Trump withdrew from and the Budapest memorandum being an example of Clinton’s administration policy that returned 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia). Besides if the Congress didn’t intervene Trump could have tried to withdraw the US from NATO so his weren’t perceived just as “bombastic words” which no political leader should have taken seriously (Trump could have also acknowledged Crimea annexation by Russia: https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-doesnt-rule-out-recognizing-russian-annexation-ukraine-crimean-peninsula/29328403.html). Finally, if American presidents have no influence in foreign policies, there would be no reason for Putin to favour/lobby for Trump more than Biden, or aggress Ukraine during Biden’s administration instead of Trump’s, etc. Indeed, presidents have decision powers over military deployments and intelligence activities, sanctions, and control executive international agreements that may be of tremendous importance for competitors.
The Blob, the military-industrial complex, etc. are more useful for polemical than analytical elaboration of the American foreign policy. And the logic of power doesn’t depend on any ideology, not even on “liberal hegemony”, but the other way around, that’s why militarisation and overstretch are recurrent phenomena in all hegemonic great powers independently from their ideology.
So no I’m not making your point at all.


Quoting Tzeentch

What did you just write?! — neomac
NATO has a clear soft power element in terms of the relation between the US and it's allies. I don't see what's controversial or hard to understand about that. It's pretty obvious.

Because the point of NATO is to military defend a country against aggressors. Military defence is a coercive response and readiness for that task. That is the element that can make the Russian security threat perception plausible, not the fact that NATO members serve each other tea and cookies.


Quoting Tzeentch

Yes. Russia was not a threat to NATO at any point between 1989 up until now. Clearly that doesn't mean it wasn't still a powerful nation. Just not in relation to US/NATO.

What’s your argument? A comparison of US military capacity and Russian military capacity is enough to make your point?
Something like: IF AND ONLY IF X is more military capable than Y (like the US vs Russia) and X is interfering in Y’s “backyard” (like the US in Ukraine as Russia’s backyard), then X is a threat to Y ?




[1] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/transatlantic-division-of-labor-nato-hard-power-and-eu-soft-power/


[2]
Quoting Tzeentch

What you are so surreptitiously yet so clumsily trying to do is to support the idea that the West had no reason to fear Russia, and Russia had all reasons to fear the West. — neomac


I'd probably put it in slightly more nuanced terms, but that's indeed the part of the point I have been making for a while now, and unapologetically so.

Quoting neomac

NATO is not expression of soft-power

Quoting neomac

Because the point of NATO is to military defend a country against aggressors.

United States controls Europe through NATO. That is to say, it controls Europe through (in this case) political means not dependent on coercion.

The nature of soft power is the lack of a coercive element.

Your point seems to be that a military alliance cannot have a soft power dimension. I don't see any reason why that would be the case, and I think NATO is a clear example to the contrary.

No one forced the Europeans to neglect their militaries, with the end result of making them completely dependent on the United States for their defense, and thus greatly increasing United States influence. The Europeans did that completely voluntarily.

What a beautiful example of soft power at work.

Quoting neomac

“historical grievance” was treated just as pretext

That's an assumption on your part.

In my mind there's no question that ex-Soviet republics joined NATO in large part because of their history with the Soviet Union, and that the United States made use of that fact to expand NATO beyond what could be rationally explained by a foreign (Russian) threat.

Quoting neomac

What’s your argument? A comparison of US military capacity and Russian military capacity is enough to make your point?

Essentially, yes. What would you like me to compare instead? GDP? Think it'll paint a different picture?

Quoting Tzeentch

US presidents don't have much influence over foreign policy at all.

This is nonsense. Did you live in America during the Bush years? Do you think there would have been an Iraq war with a President Gore? Congress has been ceding war-making powers to the executive for the last 70 years. The presidency in the U.S. is becoming more and more like a dictatorship.

Think: How many wars has the U.S. been in since WW2? How many Declarations of War from Congress have there been since WW2?

Quoting RogueAI

This is nonsense.

About as much nonsense as using a hypothetical as evidence...

"I think things would have been different under Gore; that proves things would have been different under Gore"

Your argument is literally that it is "nonsense" to have an opinion that's different to yours.

Reply to RogueAI There are plenty of scholars who make the argument, and I find it quite compelling.

Foreign policy and geopolitical strategy are things that may take years, even decades, to unfold. It makes no sense to leave such things to the political squabblings of camp red and blue. Moreover, US foreign policy over the decades does not give that impression, and tends to be cohesive over long periods of time.

The power of the various lobbies also is well-documented, and you can research that yourself.

Reply to Tzeentch Do you think there would have been an Iraq war with a President Gore?

Reply to RogueAI In one way or another, probably so.

Reply to Tzeentch Are you an American?

Reply to RogueAI No.

Reply to Tzeentch If foreign policy isn't affected by presidents, and Congress has shown over the decades to want less and less to do with it, who do you think is setting policy in the U.S.?

Reply to RogueAI The foreign policy establishment. Do you live in America?

Quoting RogueAI

Do you think there would have been an Iraq war with a President Gore?

Do you think there would have been a President Gore?

No. He never stood a chance.

So in what way was the foreign policy set by the president?

Even if we ignore lobbying, the order of events is;

1. Presidential candidates declare what their foreign policy will be.
2. They get voted in and can then enact it.

It is not;

1. Presidential candidates start with a blank slate.
2. They get voted in and then decide what their foreign policy will be.

Quoting Tzeentch

The foreign policy establishment. Do you live in America?

Since 1975. What do you mean by "the foreign policy establishment"? Do you mean think tanks? People like Kissinger? McNamara? Cheney?

Reply to RogueAI That's a huge topic, which I am not going to go into detail on because A) I don't believe you're genuinely interested in what I have to say (I'm not an American, after all), and B) it would derail the thread.

Go do your own research.

Here's a place you could start:

Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment

Reply to Tzeentch Grand strategy is not the same as foreign policy. Foreign policy is how a nation pursues it's strategic goals. For example, while Clinton and Bush no doubt both believed in America's place as a superpower, they disagreed on which policies would effectively keep America in the driver's seat- Clinton favored a containment strategy of Iraq, Bush favored invasion. Had Gore won, we would have continued the policy of containing Iraq.

If you're saying that all Presidents agree on certain strategic goals, that is true. But it's also trivial. The two parties very much disagree on the particulars. Obama didn't send Ukraine weapons. Trump did. Biden sided with Ukraine. Trump called Putin a genius. Our foreign policy toward Ukraine would be much different under Trump.

Reply to RogueAI

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/who-influences-us-foreign-policy/BDBD39237BF2EA6F86836FEB2F87F8B7

The results of cross-sectional and time-lagged analyses suggest that U.S. foreign policy is most heavily and consistently influenced by internationally oriented business leaders, followed by experts (who, however, may themselves be influenced by business). Labor appears to have significant but smaller impacts. The general public seems to have considerably less effect, except under particular conditions. These results generally hold over several different analytical models (including two-observation time series) and different clusters of issues (economic, military, and diplomatic)

Just do a little research.

Despite USA's larger military budget, Toti opines:

Who is the sleeping giant now?
[sup]— William Toti · The Hill · Feb 7, 2023[/sup]

Something odd about the US... Medicine and some kinds of services are more expensive in the US than most others. Also came up in the 2016 election run. An effect of capitalism or something? Plain supply and demand?

Quoting jorndoe

Despite USA's larger military budget, Toti opines:

... as we risk another high-end war in the Pacific

So the concern is that as the US deliberately provokes another war, it is simultaneously under-prepared for one, and the solution is not "then don't provoke another fucking war", it is "best get prepared then"?

As to your question. A smaller number of high innovation products is more profitable for the arms companies. Same is true of medicine. The companies can profit from 'innovation' almost 100%, whereas, when it comes to sheer number of actual tangible items, they have to (begrudgingly) share at least some of that profit with the raw material suppliers and labourers who manufacture it.

So there's an incentive to promote the higher end 'innovative' solutions. Add to that the most powerful lobbying groups the world has ever seen, and unsurprisingly government and establishment procurement tends to also favour these high-innovation, low-material/labour solutions.

Of course, they don't always work because $20 million spent on R&D has a much lower rate of return than $5 million spent on R&D for some crappy product and $15 million spent on lobbying to get the government to buy it anyway.

Quoting Tzeentch

United States controls Europe through NATO. That is to say, it controls Europe through (in this case) political means not dependent on coercion.

The nature of soft power is the lack of a coercive element.

Then your terminology is misleading:
[I]Hard power encompasses a wide range of coercive policies, such as coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions, military action, and the forming of military alliances for deterrence and mutual defense.[/I]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_power
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/transatlantic-division-of-labor-nato-hard-power-and-eu-soft-power

And I still suspect that the rhetorically purpose of such misleading usage was to convey the impression that the actual motivation behind NATO expansion is not the fear from a threatening Russia, but the fun of being part of the Western club.

Quoting Tzeentch

What’s your argument? A comparison of US military capacity and Russian military capacity is enough to make your point? — neomac

Essentially, yes. What would you like me to compare instead? GDP? Think it'll paint a different picture?

There are many factors that shape threat perception in geopolitical agents "military capacity" being one of the most important, but not the only one (and notice that in the case of Russia things are complicated by the fact that Russia is not only the 3rd rank country by military capability but also the country with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, relevant to the defensive/offensive military capacity balance, and that it’s military/offensive capacity can sum up with the Chinese one in case of a anti-American alliance). Military capacity is important because it contributes to shape “security dilemmas” but in this respect, also aggressive intentions count (signalling strategies and ideological convergence may help in mitigating the issue), so geopolitical agents are prone to detect and anticipate potential threats based on other geopolitical agents’ past/current behavior and their dispositions/opportunities for alliance and conflict.
Reactions may be defensive or offensive (pre-emptive): especially, hegemonic powers may certainly not wait for threatening competitors to be strong enough to attack, before reacting against them. As I wrote elsewhere, geopolitical strategies can involve long-term goals covering decades and generations to come (so timing is important too). Any response implies risks, because of uncertainties induced by mistrust, complexity/timing of coordination and unpredictable events (like a pandemic).
Now let’s talk about “threat perception” for the post-ColdWar American hegemonic power (which, not surprisingly, is perfectly in line with “offensive realist” views [1]):
[I]”Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”[/I] (source: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html)
Pretty diabolical, isn’t it?! Yet in the last 30 years, Europe got richer and less committed (in terms of security/economy) toward the US, and at the same time Russia and China got much richer (also related avg standard of life improved), more militarised and assertive abroad, in the hope of extending their sphere of influence at the expense of the US. Europeans, Russia and China abundantly exploited the institutions and free-market (the soft-power!) supported by the Pax Americana after the end of Cold-War era. And anti-Americanism (along with American decline calls) grew stronger too. What could possibly go wrong given those “security” premises held by the hegemonic power?

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”.


[1]
[i]My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.[/i]

https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

Quoting neomac

Then your terminology is misleading:
Hard power encompasses a wide range of coercive policies, such as coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions, military action, and the forming of military alliances for deterrence and mutual defense.

After the Cold War, NATO became something different from a military alliance that pursued deterrence and mutual defense, since there was no enemy to defend against.

What happened after the Cold War is that the Americans collected their prize.

It became a different name for the European part of the American sphere of influence, and a soft power tool to control Europe, even if it's original nature was a hard power deterrent towards Russia.

That change in character is well-documented and part of the reason why NATO went through several identity crises post-Cold War.

This isn't misleading language, this is simply understanding the purpose of NATO post-Cold War from the American perspective.

Quoting neomac

There are many factors that shape threat perception in geopolitical agents military capacity being one of the most important, but not the only one (and notice that in the case of Russia things are complicated by the fact that Russia is not only the 3rd rank country by military capability but also the country with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, relevant to the defensive/offensive military capacity balance, and that it’s military/offensive capacity can sum up with the Chinese one in case of a anti-American alliance). Military capacity is important because it concurs to shape “security dilemmas” but for that also aggressive intentions count (signalling strategies and ideological convergence may help in mitigating the issue), so geopolitical agents are prone to detect and anticipate potential threats based on other geopolitical agents’ past/current behavior and their dispositions/opportunities for alliance and conflict.
Reactions may be defensive or offensive (pre-emptive): especially, hegemonic powers may certainly not wait for threatening competitors to be strong enough to attack, before reacting against them. As I wrote elsewhere, geopolitical strategies can involve long-term goals covering decades and generations to come (so timing is important too). Any response implies risks, because of uncertainties induced by mistrust, complexity/timing of coordination and unpredictable events (like a pandemic).
Now let’s talk about “threat perception” for the American hegemonic power (which, not surprisingly, is perfectly in line with “offensive realist” views [1]):
”Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (source: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html)
Pretty diabolical, isn’t it?! Yet in the last 30 years, Europe got richer and less committed (in terms of security/economy) toward the US, and at the same time Russia and China got much richer (also related avg standard of life improved), more militarised and assertive abroad, in the hope of extending their sphere of influence at the expense of the US. Europeans, Russia and China abundantly exploited the institutions and free-market (the soft-power!) supported by the Pax Americana after the end of Cold-War era. While anti-Americanism grew stronger. What could possibly go wrong given those “security” premises by the hegemonic power?

Right, so it was never about actual threat perception. It was about pre-emptively protecting U.S. hegemony. That's basically what I've been saying all along.

Quoting neomac

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”.

Ask the people of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lybia, and all the other nations the United States invaded and cast into the fires (a long list it be) what they thought of that "Pax Americana". :vomit:

Seymour Hersh just posted a blow-by-blow account of How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline, going into details of secret meetings and CIA reports, communications between governments, and precise descriptions of military operations.

All of it "according to a source with direct knowledge of the operational planning."

(Sorry for posting on topic!)

Reply to SophistiCat how likely is it that it's actually true?

So...Nord Stream bombing, Biden...Flight MH17, Putin...they are telling each other's secrets...

Never mind...the White House is denying it. Who can you believe?

What would be most surprising here would be that Biden had the balls...

Reply to Banno Well, I have no opinion on whether it's true or not but seems grounds for investigation by Germany and other EU members. With "allies" like that, we don't need enemies, so it's essential to either rule it out or to confirm it. I'm afraid though that even confirmation won't lead to a reevaluation of our intelligence and military relationship with the US.

Reply to Mark Nyquist Yes, this MH17 twist is interesting. We had an extensive report in November 2015 published that was performed by the Dutch government (Raad van Onderzoek). Putin wasn't mentioned. We convicted in absentia three Russians. Putin wasn't mentioned in court either. Now a little over 7 years later he's considered guilty of it because he likely decided to provide the separatists with air support. While this is most likely true, that doesn't result in him ordering shooting down a civilian plane. We hebde to wait for this new report but in the face of it, it looks politically convenient and tenuous at best.

The conclusion of the original report was that all parties involved underestimated the danger of flying over the region, which was regularly barred for commercial flights due to military action by the Ukrainian air force against the separatists.

Quoting Mark Nyquist

Jewish so maybe a Jewish agenda.

Seriously! What the fuck does 'maybe a Jewish agenda' mean in this context? In what sense could you possibly justify a 'Jewish' agenda toward bombing a gas pipeline?

Quoting Mark Nyquist

Anyone know much about this Seymour Hersh beyond Wikipedia?

He seems to have a solid record of uncovering U.S. atrocity, being noted for his investigations into the M? Lai massacre, Watergate and Abu Ghraib, to name a few.

Supposedly he was put on the NSA watchlist for this.


Reply to Benkei The story does sound believable (the U.S. role in the bombing was already widely speculated) and for a journalist of Hersh's caliber I cannot imagine him implicating high-profile people by name if he was just making things up.


On a somewhat related topic, the West's role in the war in Ukraine seems very impopular in Israel. We've recently had Israeli former PM Naftali Bennett stating in an interview that a truce was on the table very early on in the conflict (with major concessions from both Russia and Ukraine), but this was sabotaged by the West.

Recently there was also a Turkish news agency that reported casualty figures of the Ukrainian war which it supposedly had based on a report by the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad. These figures were very different from what is commonly accepted in the West, but the veracity of this news article was also very questionable.


There's a chance people are just making things up. There's also a chance the "accidental" leaking of unwelcome information is an act of quiet disapproval.

Quoting Benkei

how likely is it that it's actually true?

Let's just say that Seymour Hersh's "investigation," based entirely on a single anonymous source, doesn't move my opinion one way or another. It might as well be some random conspiracy nut (which is what Seymour Hersh has become in his dotage). But it will be amusing to watch how all the anti-American "skeptics" will jump on this juicy piece.

Quoting Banno

What woudl be mist surprising here would be that Biden had the balls...

Yeah, basically that's why I rank the US-did-it theory low. It's not just Biden though: I don't see why anyone in his place would take such a huge risk for a minor (proportionally) financial gain. Only an actor as desperate and impoverished as North Korea might have done something like this just to earn a bit of extra cash.

Besides, it doesn't even make sense from the money angle. Russia had several pipelines to Europe, which were operating well below capacity. The pipeline through Belarus had been shut down earlier that year. Nord Stream 2 was never operated. Nord Stream 1 was being shut down intermittently throughout the year, and then Russia closed it off indefinitely, not long before the explosions. The explosions took out three out of four Nord Stream lines, leaving one intact (notably, it was one of the Nord Stream 2 lines). If both Russia and Europe were willing, gas could have been flowing at the same rate or higher. The explosions as such didn't change the calculus in US's favor.

Reply to SophistiCat Are we just going to ignore that this happened then?



In what world is the U.S. not the primary suspect after such a statement has been made?

Reply to SophistiCat

Ha!

Here's you talking about a piece with uncorroborated sources supportive of the US...

Quoting SophistiCat

(Given that most of her sources are anonymous and there is little independent confirmation for any of this, you can only trust her integrity. But she has written for respected media outlets before independent media was completely shut down in Russia.)

Here's you talking about equally respected, award-winning journalists using uncorroborated sources critical of the US...

Quoting SophistiCat

It might as well be some random conspiracy nut (which is what Seymour Hersh has become in his dotage). But it will be amusing to watch how all the anti-American "skeptics" will jump on this juicy piece.

I'd struggle to find a clearer example of ideological bias.

Support the US with anonymous sources - you're a respected journalist.

Criticise the US with anonymous sources - You're a conspiracy theorist.

Quoting Tzeentch

In what world is the U.S. not the primary suspect after such a statement has been made?

Yeah.

Is the US capable of such an operation? Undoubtedly, yes.

Have the US carried out such operations before? Undoubtedly, yes.

Would the US benefit from such an operation? From their own admission, yes.

It's amazing the world we now live in where suggesting the US has done something it's capable of, benefits from, and has done before becomes a 'conspiracy theory'.

On a different topic, Ukraine's frontline is starting to look severely compromised, with pockets closing around Vuhledar, Bakhmut and Krasna Hora, and several cities being at risk of ending up in a similar situation, like Bilohorivka, Avdiivka and the urban area south of Bakhmut.

There are also rumours of a Russian offensive being expected within the month.

Under these circumstances I expect a serious simplification of the Ukrainian lines in the coming week, because this situation seems to be unmanagable. If large portions of defenders are cut off from supply lines this might turn into a disaster, because I am not getting the impression the Ukrainian forces can afford to lose many more troops.

It also makes me wonder why the Ukrainians haven't started a tactical withdrawal yet. It seems to me that the longer they wait, the harder it will be.

Now let's hear from random conspiracy nuts!

Quoting SophistiCat

Now let's hear from random conspiracy nuts!

Just calling everyone you disagree with a 'conspiracy nut' is not a response you'd want to advertise. It's embarrassing.

Reply to Isaac I was not familiar with Hersh or his writing until it came up here. So Hersh might have a history of being anti US military so just asking others what his political orientation might be.

Can we notice any kind of trend here?

Seymour Hersh - multi-award-winning journalist, famous for breaking the CIA internal spying stories, the Abu Graib stories.. Now, apparently a conspiracy nut.

Glen Greenwald - another award-winning investigative journalist, famous for breaking the Snowden story... Now apparently also a conspiracy nut.

Robert Shreer - won eight awards for outstanding journalism. Now also a conspiracy nut.

Chris Hedges - received the Amnesty International Global Award for Human Rights Journalism in 2002. Now also apparently a conspiracy nut.

Paul Thacker - received the 2021 British Journalism Award for Specialist Journalism for a series of articles in The BMJ investigating undisclosed financial interests among medical experts advising the US and UK governments on vaccines. Dismissed by Facebook as 'misinformation'.

Jeffrey Sachs - named one of the 100 Most Influential People in the World by Time. He was also named one of the "500 Most Influential People in the Field of Foreign Policy" by the World Affairs Councils of America. Adviser to the UN. Winner of too many awards to list here. Now apparently a conspiracy nut too.

It's surprising the number of journalists and commentators who suddenly become 'conspiracy theorists' despite award-winning respected careers, almost immediately after criticising mainstream pro-US narratives... There must be some kind of epidemic, poor things.

Reply to Isaac

Forget it, the gig is up - too many superb sources being called ideologues or whatever. And what, they think the New York Times or whatever establishment media (who never see a war they don't salivate for) are more trustworthy?

Not worth it, it isn't serious.

Reply to Mark Nyquist Why get personal instead of answering his question?

Reply to Isaac It's essentially a replay of the covid pandemic.

This is the denial phase. The phase is prior to the last one, quiet shame.

It makes you wonder how many this circus has to be repeated before people wisen up.

Reply to Manuel

And that list isn't even exhaustive. I could have added another dozen at least - good, well respected journalists, experts, political commentators...

It's such a lazy, anti-intellectual trope to just lob these labels at dissent. I thought we'd done with that after McCarthy, but here it is again, this time promoted by liberals as much as anyone.

Quoting Tzeentch

It's essentially a replay of the covid pandemic.

Yep, I slipped Paul Thacker into my list there too. I could have added Pete Doshi, John Ioannidis,... Some of the most respected minds in public health research and journalism victim to the crackdown on dissent.

I think much of what we see happening over Ukraine discourse comes out of Covid-era policies.

Quoting Tzeentch

This is the denial phase. The phase is prior to the last one, quiet shame.

Some shame at least would be something. I suppose restitution is too much to ask.

Reply to Mark Nyquist Hersh was once a respected journalist - Pulitzer winner and all that. But he went off the rails a while ago. His wiki page mentions some of that, and you can find more info if you look for it. This type of explosive "investigation" based on a single anonymous source (who may or may not exist, for all we know) has become his modus operandi.

Of course, none of it matters to the useful idiots who will swallow any yarn if it's too good not to be true.

Quoting SophistiCat

Of course, none of it matters to the useful idiots who will swallow any yarn if it's too good not to be true.

For example the yarn that anyone critical of US foreign policy has "gone off the rails".

Of perhaps it would be easier to simply list all the hard hitting investigative journalists strongly opposed to US foreign policy who are still treated with respect...

There's... um...

Quoting SophistiCat

This type of explosive "investigation" based on a single anonymous source (who may or may not exist, for all we know) has become his modus operandi.

Yeah, imagine investigative journalists being allowed to use a single anonymous source to break open an explosive story...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/watergate-50th-anniversary/?clsrd

Where would that leave the poor government?

Reply to Mark Nyquist

If you want some background on Seymour Hersh that isn't just @SophistiCat's apologist smearing, there's a good summary in the London Review of Books when his biography came out.

Here... https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v40/n18/jackson-lears/i-figured-what-the-heck

Without his indefatigable reporting, we would know even less than we do about the crimes committed by the US national security state over the last fifty years. While most of his peers in the press have been faithfully transcribing what are effectively official lies, Hersh has repeatedly challenged them, revealing scandalous government conduct that would otherwise have been kept secret

...but of course, now he's officially a conspiracy nut we have to pretend that he's suffered some kind of weird mental breakdown coincident with all the other prizewinning journalists who've recently had similar mental issues...

Reply to Isaac
The week it happened, I was thinking the US did it.

Quoting SophistiCat

I don't see why anyone in his place would take such a huge risk for a minor (proportionally) financial gain.

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year.

Quoting Tzeentch

After the Cold War, NATO became something different from a military alliance that pursued deterrence and mutual defense, since there was no enemy to defend against. What happened after the Cold War is that the Americans collected their prize. It became a different name for the European part of the American sphere of influence, and a soft power tool to control Europe, even if it's original nature was a hard power deterrent towards Russia. That change in character is well-documented and part of the reason why NATO went through several identity crises post-Cold War. This isn't misleading language, this is simply understanding the purpose of NATO post-Cold War from the American perspective.

The repurposing of NATO post-Cold War from the American perspective doesn’t exclude the fact that Russia, along with Germany (especially after the reunion), were still perceived as potential threats by other Western and Eastern European countries. The fear of nationalist revanchism in Europe (at the origin of 2 bloody world wars) remerged after the Cold War (as in the case of Yugoslavia). This is also to say that it’s not just that US wanted to extend its sphere of influence (say for economic reasons), but for keeping safe and stable a dangerously unstable Europe by their own request too.



Quoting Tzeentch

Right, so it was never about actual threat perception. It was about pre-emptively protecting U.S. hegemony. That's basically what I've been saying all along.

You are clearly playing dumb. First you were talking about threats in terms of deltas in “military capability”, but that’s a very poor understanding of what constitute “threat perception” for geopolitical agents. Indeed, what was the military capacity of Ukraine wrt Russia prior to this war?! Secondly, if threat perception were elicited only by an actual military buildup on the border and/or ultimatum, it would be useless, because then it might be already too late to prepare a response. Take the case of Ukraine, even its joining NATO defensive alliance wasn’t an actual threat to Russia. Even more so if such event wasn’t imminent at all. And most certainly so if Germany/France were stubbornly against it. And yet Putin perceived such possibility as an intolerable threat and decided to react preventively as timely as he could.


Quoting Tzeentch

Ask the people of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lybia, and all the other nations the United States invaded and cast into the fires (a long list it be) what they thought of that "Pax Americana". :vomit:

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland.

Quoting neomac

This is also to say that it’s not just that US wanted to extend its sphere of influence (say for economic reasons), but for keeping safe and stable a dangerously unstable Europe by their own request too.

There was no "dangerously unstable Europe" after the Cold War. First off, Yugoslavia hardly represents all of Europe. Second, the U.S. played a major role in destabilizing Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia insisted on neutrality instead of joining the U.S. bloc.

Quoting neomac

You are clearly playing dumb.

You are clearly clutching at straws.

Quoting neomac

First you were talking about threats in terms of deltas in “military capability”, ...

And when asked for a metric that you would find more acceptable you presented nothing.

Quoting neomac

Indeed, what was the military capacity of Ukraine wrt Russia prior to this war?!

Ukraine is not NATO.

What you're doing is using the present situation to retroactively justify NATO expansion in a period that was marked by cooperation, not hostility, between the West and Russia.

When after 2008 it was becoming clear Ukraine might be the stage for a new geopolitcal rivalry, Ukraine was right to fear a Russian invasion.

But who started that conflict? NATO, at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, and through its continued efforts to make good on the promises that it made back then.

So any notions that NATO did what it did in response to a Russian threat is utter nonsense.

Quoting neomac

Take the case of Ukraine, even its joining NATO defensive alliance wasn’t an actual threat to Russia.

I'm not sure what to make of the fact you're still referring to NATO as a defensive alliance. I don't know if you've been paying attention, but NATO has invaded several countries post-Cold War, and left ruin in its wake.

Today it is not a defensive alliance by any stretch.

Quoting neomac

Even more so if such event wasn’t imminent at all. And most certainly so if Germany/France were stubbornly against it.

There's no point in regurgitating points that have already been discussed at length.

NATO membership for Ukraine mattered because of the role the United States would take in its security. The situation that developed in Ukraine is that the US took that role without NATO membership, causing de facto the same situation. NATO membership, and thus the German and French opinions, became of secondary importance, if of any importance at all.

Quoting neomac

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland.

Then don't come with bullshit like this:

Quoting neomac

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”.

Quoting Benkei

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year.

I don't believe it's a huge risk, either.

Previous US interventions on foreign assets have included drone strikes, overt threats, seizure, and actual invasion of sovereign territory. None of which so much as dented their hegemony. The barest shred of plausible deniability is all that's required. Much, much worse has been done with impunity in the past.

But more to the point, either Russia are a threat which oughtn't be provoked or they're not. Either both the suspicion of sabotage and anti-Russian intervention in Ukraine are a huge risk, or neither is. I can't see the argument for one being huge and the other not. It's not like Putin is a gentleman who'll only be offended by legitimate grievances. So it's about his capacity to retaliate in both cases.

With Ukraine it's "Biden needn't worry about provoking Russia, they'll never dare attack NATO".

With the pipeline it's "Biden would never provoke Russia, it's too risky"

Some more serious analysis...

Reply to Isaac Hilarious, sad and scary at the same time.

Quoting Tzeentch

There was no "dangerously unstable Europe" after the Cold War. First off, Yugoslavia hardly represents all of Europe. Second, the U.S. played a major role in destabilizing Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia insisted on neutrality instead of joining the U.S. bloc.

You keep dodging my objections. Notice I never claimed, nor implied, nor suggested that NATO expansion wasn’t in the interest of the US, or to extend its sphere of influence, or that the US didn’t take initiatives, nor that Yugoslavia represents all of Europe.
The point I’m making is that fears of European instabilities due to historical legacies from 2 WWs and the Cold War (from ethnic nationalisms like in Yugoslavia to imperialistic ambitions like from Germany and Russia), were shaping the risk perception of European countries and the US. That’s why Western European (like France and the UK) and East European (like Poland and the Baltic states) welcomed NATO presence. That’s how you get a British lord, H.L. Ismay, the NATO’s first Secretary General, claim that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” or a debate on NATO enlargement by the American committee on Foreign Relations talking about Russian imperialism.
And the reason why I’m making this point is that you need to divert your attention from these facts to build a narrative in which Russia and the US are the only relevant actors, the US is always the most aggressive, and Russia is just victim of the latter.
But that’s a myopic caricature of what actually happened. Russia and the US were absolutely not the only actors that shaped the evolution of NATO. And all other actors involved, including the US, were driven also by very much serious historical fears. Sphere of influence build on fears (of military clashes) and/or opportunities (economic partnership). And the Americans weren’t perceived always as aggressive and exploitative. Both the US and Europe had their interests to favour the American sphere of influence compared to available alternatives.



Quoting Tzeentch

And when asked for a metric that you would find more acceptable you presented nothing.

I presented an argument to explain why your approach is flawed. And if that’s not enough you can read plenty of geopolitical theories (also within a realist tradition like Walt’s “balance of threat theory” or Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”) that would explain what’s wrong with your single metric. On my side, I’m not committed to any specific theory. I limit myself to take the patterns these theories individuate just as patterns of reasoning over security dilemmas more or less plausible depending on the given circumstances, and more or less empirically supported.


Quoting Tzeentch

Ukraine is not NATO.

When after 2008 it was becoming clear Ukraine might be the stage for a new geopolitcal rivalry, Ukraine was right to fear a Russian invasion.

Quoting Tzeentch

But who started that conflict? NATO, at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, and through its continued efforts to make good on the promises that it made back then.

So any notions that NATO did what it did in response to a Russian threat is utter nonsense.

First, you are contradicting your previous argument. If deltas in “military capacity” is enough to identify "real" threats, then the "real" threat for Ukraine was there even before 2008 (most certainly after Ukraine returned 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia in 1994).
Second, since now you are reasoning in terms of “threat perception”, then again your claim is very much questionable. The Budapest Memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) was proof that Ukraine had legitimate worries from Russia not only for historical reasons but also for the case of Crimea, which became a contested region practically immediately after Ukraine declared its independence.
Third, since the deltas in “military capacity” most certainly increased after the Budapest Memorandum, and the security assurances weren’t binding, the problem was still there (as Mearsheimer’s explicitly suggested) so Ukrainian NATO membership (along with other Baltic states) became more appealing to Ukrainians. Even more so after Putin started an increasingly authoritarian and nationalist internal consolidation of power against rebel peripheries concerning territorial disputes prior to 2008.
But, once again, you rely on your own outlandish “threat perception” assessments indifferent to how all directly affected actors and circumstances actually shaped geopolitical events, because you need to support the narrative that basically the US started aggressing Russia for no other reason than its [I]hubris[/I].

Quoting Tzeentch

I'm not sure what to make of the fact you're still referring to NATO as a defensive alliance. I don't know if you've been paying attention, but NATO has invaded several countries post-Cold War, and left ruin in its wake.

Today it is not a defensive alliance by any stretch.

“Collective defence and Article 5” is a binding commitment. There is no equivalent for offensive operations. This suggests that all other military activities allegedly going beyond the commitments of NATO by NATO members may be based on other international relation reasons (e.g. including the UN charter) and still express the cohesion of the West toward perceived threats (e.g. by those authoritarian countries vetoing UN agreements in line with the UN charter).

Quoting Tzeentch

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland. — neomac

Then don't come with bullshit like this:

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”. — neomac

I get that “then” suggests an inference. “Bullshit” suggests something you find objectionable.
Yet, there is absolutely no contradiction between those claims I made. On the contrary, they support each other! So I find your brachylogy utterly unintelligible.

Quoting neomac

The point I’m making is that fears of European instabilities due to historical legacies from 2 WWs and the Cold War (from ethnic nationalisms like in Yugoslavia to imperialistic ambitions like from Germany and Russia), were shaping the risk perception of European countries and the US. That’s why Western European (like France and the UK) and East European (like Poland and the Baltic states) welcomed NATO presence. That’s how you get a British lord, H.L. Ismay, the NATO’s first Secretary General, claim that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” or a debate on NATO enlargement by the American committee on Foreign Relations talking about Russian imperialism.

My argument is that none of this 50-year old argumentation is particularly relevant after the Cold War. It's a completely different situation. There is no threat of European infighting. The Germans didn't need to be "kept down", the Soviet Union no longer existed and the Americans had no military reason to stay in Europe (but of course they had a geopolitical reason to want to be "in"). Russia is severely weakened, the United States is the undisputed hegemon.

There was no threat of war in Europe after the Cold War. You're just making it up.

Quoting neomac

I presented an argument to explain why your approach is flawed.

You did none of the sort. You avoided giving me a metric, probably because you're fully aware that they all point towards the same thing - that Russia was weak after the Cold War, and not a threat to NATO.

Quoting neomac

First, you are contradicting your previous argument. If deltas in “military capacity” is enough to identify "real" threats, then the "real" threat for Ukraine was there even before 2008 (most certainly after Ukraine returned 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia in 1994).

I never argued as much. I gave Russia's military capacity in relation to the West as a measure to support the idea that Russia did not pose a threat after the Cold War.

Quoting neomac

Second, since now you are reasoning in terms of “threat perception”, then again your claim is very much questionable. The Budapest Memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) was proof that Ukraine had legitimate worries from Russia not only for historical reasons but also for the case of Crimea, which became a contested region practically immediately after Ukraine declared its independence.

How can you interpret this in any other way than a solid commitment to peace and cooperation?

Note that the United States and the United Kingdom also signed this treaty, vowing to respect the sovereignty of its signatories.

Quoting neomac

... because you need to support the narrative that basically the US started aggressing Russia for no other reason than its hubris.

Yes, and there are plenty of experts that make this point for me. Mearsheimer explicitly makes the point that the U.S. pushed NATO expansion all the way into Ukraine because it felt Russia was weak and it could get away with it.




Quoting neomac

“Collective defence and Article 5” is a binding commitment. There is no equivalent for offensive operations.

Nice words on a piece of paper mean nothing when NATO goes around the world invading countries wherever it pleases. To make the argument that NATO is a defensive alliance in view of its appaling record of expansion and aggression after the Cold War is just detached.

Quoting Tzeentch

My argument is that none of this 50-year old argumentation is particularly relevant after the Cold War. It's a completely different situation. There is no threat of European infighting. The Germans didn't need to be "kept down", the Soviet Union no longer existed and the Americans had no military reason to stay in Europe (but of course they had a geopolitical reason to want to be "in"). Russia is severely weakened, the United States is the undisputed hegemon.

There was no threat of war in Europe after the Cold War. You're just making it up.

See how you are dodging again: there was no "threat" (which you who are not a geopolitical agent measure on a single metric) or there was no "perceived threat" in Europe after the Cold War (which contradicts your claim that NATO expansion was based on "plenty of historical grievance to build it on.")?


Quoting Tzeentch

You did none of the sort. You avoided giving me a metric, probably because you're fully aware that they all point towards the same thing - that Russia was weak after the Cold War, and not a threat to NATO.

Of course I did [1]. And I re-iterated on analogous points over several posts in my past exchanges.
Besides there is no geopolitical theory I'm aware of that uses such single metric to assess threat perception by geopolitical agents (not even Walt's or Mearsheimer's). Not surprisingly NATO enlargements as expression of the US hegemony fits very well Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory ("states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals").

Quoting Tzeentch

How can you interpret this in any other way than a solid commitment to peace and cooperation?

Note that the United States and the United Kingdom also signed this treaty, vowing to respect the sovereignty of its signatories.

That Russia violated by invading Ukraine which is why the United States and the UK felt compelled to react. And let's not forget the returning of 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia with the support of the very much "aggressive" and "Russophobic" US/UK.

Quoting Tzeentch

Yes, and there are plenty of experts that make this point for me. Mearsheimer explicitly makes the point that the U.S. pushed NATO expansion all the way into Ukraine because it felt Russia was weak and it could get away with it.

I know about Mearsheimer's views. But I'm not impressed by them for several reasons: it contradicts Mearsheimer's own "offensive realism" assumptions (which is even more unmitigated if alliance commitments shouldn't be taken seriously just because they are written on paper). Secondly, it questions the explanatory power of Mearsheimer's theory (I won't reiterate on my old arguments about this, you can find precious inputs also from Robert Jervis "Liberalism, the Blob, and American Foreign Policy: Evidence and Methodology"). Thirdly, Mearsheimer's completely bypasses the historical arguments I made which owe also to Brzezinski's insights (Brzezinski wasn't just a armchair academic like Mearsheimer, but someone who contributed to shape American foreign policy after post-Cold War), and which Mearsheimer didn't question (he too predicted the tensions between Ukraine and Russia would likely increase).

[i]Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If, as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO impact Russian interests?
Dr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well.[/I]
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm



[1]
Quoting neomac

[i]What’s your argument? A comparison of US military capacity and Russian military capacity is enough to make your point? — neomac
Essentially, yes. What would you like me to compare instead? GDP? Think it'll paint a different picture?[/i]

There are many factors that shape threat perception in geopolitical agents "military capacity" being one of the most important, but not the only one (and notice that in the case of Russia things are complicated by the fact that Russia is not only the 3rd rank country by military capability but also the country with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, relevant to the defensive/offensive military capacity balance, and that it’s military/offensive capacity can sum up with the Chinese one in case of a anti-American alliance). Military capacity is important because it contributes to shape “security dilemmas” but in this respect, also aggressive intentions count (signalling strategies and ideological convergence may help in mitigating the issue), so geopolitical agents are prone to detect and anticipate potential threats based on other geopolitical agents’ past/current behavior and their dispositions/opportunities for alliance and conflict.
Reactions may be defensive or offensive (pre-emptive): especially, hegemonic powers may certainly not wait for threatening competitors to be strong enough to attack, before reacting against them. As I wrote elsewhere, geopolitical strategies can involve long-term goals covering decades and generations to come (so timing is important too). Any response implies risks, because of uncertainties induced by mistrust, complexity/timing of coordination and unpredictable events (like a pandemic).
Now let’s talk about “threat perception” for the post-ColdWar American hegemonic power (which, not surprisingly, is perfectly in line with “offensive realist” views [1]):
[I]”Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”[/I] (source: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html)
Pretty diabolical, isn’t it?! Yet in the last 30 years, Europe got richer and less committed (in terms of security/economy) toward the US, and at the same time Russia and China got much richer (also related avg standard of life improved), more militarised and assertive abroad, in the hope of extending their sphere of influence at the expense of the US. Europeans, Russia and China abundantly exploited the institutions and free-market (the soft-power!) supported by the Pax Americana after the end of Cold-War era. And anti-Americanism (along with American decline calls) grew stronger too. What could possibly go wrong given those “security” premises held by the hegemonic power?

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”.


[1]
[i]My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.[/i]

https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

Quoting SophistiCat

I don't see why anyone in his place would take such a huge risk for a minor (proportionally) financial gain.

Quoting Benkei

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year.

Sure, but that is a hypothetical that has little to do with reality, so I am not sure how this is an objection to what I said.

1. Europe was already on course to wean itself from Russian gas long before the explosions.
2. Most of the extra purchases necessitated by the shift were not going to the US, for obvious economic and logistical reasons.
3. As I was just saying, before the explosions, only two of the Nord Stream lines were ever in operation, and the explosions left one line intact (one of the Nord Stream 2 lines, which Russia lobbied for and US opposed). The supply was not constrained by this action, because European pipelines were already underutilized, and Nord Stream was not operating at all.

So the hypothetical motivation for the US would not be money, and such an action would not be taken just to earn a bit of extra cash, anyway. It would have to be a political decision. One possible motivation could be to burn the bridges to prevent backsliding, but the timing seems odd, seeing as Europeans were moving away from Russian gas full-steam.

Quoting neomac

Not surprisingly NATO enlargements as expression of the US hegemony fits very well Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory ("states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals").

Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top. The United States, for which any semblance of independence is a "threat", resistance is aggression, etc. case and point: Yugoslavia, Lybia, Russia, China, etc.

This is further supported by the fact NATO enlargement received a great deal of criticism over the years, precisely because there was no Russian threat - in the end, NATO enlargement turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Quoting neomac

That Russia violated by invading Ukraine which is why the United States and the UK felt compelled to react.

Yes, and that happened under entirely different circumstances. This conflict was initiated by the U.S. when it sought to change Ukrainian neutrality, which was obviously a prerequisite for a robust peace.


Further, Brzezinski is a terrible source to quote in favor of your position, since he basically laid out how U.S. domination of the globe works and how to maintain it, and it fits perfectly into the picture of U.S. hubris.

Reply to SophistiCat

Sure.

Now apply exactly the same level of exculpatory analysis to the theory that Russia did it.

1. Europe was already on course to wean itself from Russian gas long before the explosions.
2. None of the extra purchases necessitated by the shift were not going to Russia, for obvious economic and logistical reasons.
3. Only two of the Nord Stream lines were ever in operation, and the explosions left one line intact (one of the Nord Stream 2 lines, which Russia lobbied for and US opposed). The supply was not constrained by this action, because European pipelines were already underutilized, and Nord Stream was not operating at all.

Plus...

4. It's Russia's fucking pipeline and they could have just turned off the supply.
5. Less stable supplies through the Baltic actually favour Ukraine - that being the whole point of the crisis between Germany and the US over the pipeline in the first place.
6. Putin has, unlike Biden, never threatened to "end" the pipeline by unspecified means.

But somehow the exact same analysis doesn't seem to stir the same sycophantic bootlicking when directed against America's competition.

Yes, Isaac, who needs Hersh when you have the logic of your item #4.

Reply to Mark Nyquist

Sure, but the important thing here is to remember this is not about us trying to work out who sabotaged the pipeline. We're just not in a position to do that. We have a miniscule portion of the evidence available and are all woefully inexpert regarding the geopolitical analysis required to assess motive here.

The point is entirely about opposing this new fad of trying to present all opposition to US foreign policy as deranged conspiracy theory.

If we can no longer hold power to account we're screwed.

I don't care if there's only a tangential scrap of evidence that the US did it. I will still amplify that narrative above any that exculpate the US so that the government remain as terrified of their populace as possible. They should feel as though they're walking on thin glass, not a red carpet.

Quoting Benkei

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year.

It's basically Gulf States like Qatar and a myriad of providers have replaced Russia.

The problem with US gas (and oil) is that the production hasn't the infrastructure yet to be exported to Europe. Also they have had regulatory obstacles. So a country like Qatar is the real winner of embargoes.

Quoting Tzeentch

Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top.

I think for the East European countries and the Baltic States wanting to join NATO had the membership everything to do with the threat of Russia. Which now also Sweden and Finland have seen, thanks to February 24th 2022.

Typical for those obsessed about the US: forgetting totally the motivation and agenda of the European countries themselves.

What I see is the people in power play a zero sum game but they need to control the means of production of their own populations or base. So if we are the producers we should hold our governments to account to not exploit their populations unnecessarily. Seems like a lot of bungled wars on the US side in recent history.

Also we should be aware that weaponized central banking can be a driver in leading to wars.

Reply to ssu

Reuters:This means that the United States will remain the primary supplier of LNG to Europe for at least 2023. This will likely generate even greater revenue for U.S exporters after a record 2022, which totaled $35 billion through September, compared to $8.3 billion over the same period in 2021, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data shows.

Quoting ssu

[s]forgetting[/s] disagreeing totally [about] the motivation and agenda of the European countries themselves.

Fixed that for you.

Reply to ssu

So can you explain for us why the US pushed to the point of diplomatic crisis against Nordstream2, if they had so little to gain?

A bit of fun? A sudden passion for the well-being of Qatar?

Reply to Benkei Well, it has changed. Eu statistics from 2020:

In 2020, almost three quarters of the extra-EU crude oil imports came from Russia (29 %), the United States (9 %), Norway (8 %), Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom (both 7 %) as well as Kazakhstan and Nigeria (both 6 %). A similar analysis shows that over three quarters of the EU's imports of natural gas came from Russia (43 %), Norway (21 %), Algeria (8 %) and Qatar (5 %), while more than half of solid fossil fuel (mostly coal) imports originated from Russia (54 %), followed by the United States (16 %) and Australia (14 %).

So finally they've gotten those terminals built.

Quoting Isaac

forgetting disagreeing totally [about] the motivation and agenda of the European countries themselves.
— ssu

Fixed that for you.

Yeah sure, you know better what Finns and Swedes think. :roll:

Quoting Isaac

So can you explain for us why the US pushed to the point of diplomatic crisis against Nordstream2, if they had so little to gain?

Yes, it was Trump that was against this.

Of course in your logic you forget what and why that changed, just like why Sweden left it's foreign policy stance that had been the same since Napoleons times.

With no February 24th, Nordstream lines would be open and Sweden and Finland not trying to join NATO.

Quoting ssu

Yeah sure, you know better what Finns and Swedes think. :roll:

No. Do you need me to get the diagrams out again?

1 + 1 is 2 definitionally, so people who think it's 3 are wrong.

The earth can be empirically shown to be spherical by methods performatively agreed upon by everyone. People who think it's flat are wrong.

Physical laws of electromagnetism are agreed on by virtually all experts in the field. People who disagree are wrong.

The internal motives and beliefs of the entire population of Sweden and Finland is neither empirically demonstrable, nor agreed upon by all experts in the field. People who have a different opinion to you are not wrong. They disagree.

Quoting ssu

Of course in your logic you forget what and why that changed, just like why Sweden left it's foreign policy stance that had been the same since Napoleons times.

Go on. "Some time has elapsed therefore everything's changed" is not much of an argument.

Now this is interesting. WoPo article says that Ukraine’s rocket campaign reliant on U.S. precision targeting, officials say. What's more, while Ukrainians identify and select their targets for precision rocket strikes on their own, their NATO partners basically have a veto power.

Quoting SophistiCat

What's more, while Ukrainians identify and select their targets for precision rocket strikes on their own, their NATO partners basically have a veto power.

So NATO is monitoring their targeting systems and won't allow them to strike the Russian interior?

@SophistiCat @ssu https://www.welt.de/regionales/mecklenburg-vorpommern/article243596071/Frank-Keine-Belege-fuer-russische-Sabotage-an-Pipelines.html

Peter Frank is one of German's highest ranking prosecutors. And he's no friend of Russia as he's also the guy that communicated they found 100s of pieces of evidence of war crimes by Russia in Ukraine and called for their prosecution.

Of course, no evidence yet doesn't mean there isn't any but I think, once again, we really don't know who's done it and we need to wait it out. I do think the hypothesis the US did it needs to be considered and investigated. If they didn't do it and give full cooperation then disculpatory evidence should be relatively easy to find.

Another theory, but one further down the likelihood road, is that it was corporate sabotage. Certainly players that could pay for it but who would they hire?

Quoting Benkei

Of course, no evidence yet doesn't mean there isn't any but I think, once again, we really don't know who's done it and we need to wait it out. I do think the hypothesis the US did it needs to be considered and investigated. If they didn't do it and give full cooperation then disculpatory evidence should be relatively easy to find.

As obviously things are kept out of public, it naturally begs the question who did it? Hence the US is totally one candidate in this.

Wouldn't actually be anything new for the US. During the Cold War Sweden got humiliated after a Russian sub moving on the surface got stuck on a rock on Swedish waters very close to their main naval base. Afterwards the Swedes were eagerly hunting for submarines (and mini-submarines) on their waters. Later it seems that at least some of these incidents were done by NATO submarines and if so, as the incidents were blamed on the Soviet Union, it was quite a successful covert operation. See here.

(A humiliating incident for both Sweden and the Soviet Union during the Cold War:)


The reason why would Russia blow up it's own gas pipeline is beyond me. Hence I think that the US behind this is totally possible. Luckily the US is system is so prone to leaks at least in the historical perspective, decades from now as people write their memoirs, is that we'll know this in future history books.

Quoting Isaac

The internal motives and beliefs of the entire population of Sweden and Finland is neither empirically demonstrable, nor agreed upon by all experts in the field.

But the reasons, arguments and agenda of the politicians and the military are.

And simply sidelining them here is simply wrong. It's you who is counting 1+1=1, when you argue that everything evolves around the US and the security issues of European countries don't matter in the equation when they have applied to NATO.

Quoting ssu

And simply sidelining them here is simply wrong. It's you who is counting 1+1=1, when you argue that everything evolves around the US and the security issues of European countries don't matter in the equation when they have applied to NATO.

My position is clear.

The U.S. and Russia, and to a lesser extent Ukraine are the big players in this conflict, and all the other countries involved (primarily in NATO) play no role of significance. That's not to say they play no role at all, but their influence isn't big enough to warrant paying much attention to.

Maybe you should provide some argumentation why you believe that approach is wrong. Why these smaller countries are worth paying attention to.

Your point seems to be we cannot sideline their agendas and interests. My question would be, why not?

Quoting Tzeentch

Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top.

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case. You would also contradict yourself, in claiming otherwise.
The best you can argue is that Russia wasn’t a direct threat to the US as it was for the Baltic States or Ukraine because it’s very much unlikely that Russia was prepared or determined to aggress the US after the collapse of Soviet Union. However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share). One may wonder why is the US so jealous, though? Realist views like Mearsheimer’s are not concerned with moral assessments but with how security dilemmas by geopolitical agents are expected to be addressed. And what are “offensive realism” expectations about how the US (or any possible geopolitical actor at its place) would act wrt Russia (or any other possible geopolitical competitor at its place)? Here is the answer [1]. Indeed there are evidences in support of the fact that American decision makers would reason like that [2]. So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts.
One can still wonder at individual level or state level: if that’s the typical hegemonic behaviour and the alternative to the US is China or Russia, which one is more convenient for remaining non-hegemonic states to bandwagon with?

Quoting Tzeentch

This is further supported by the fact NATO enlargement received a great deal of criticism over the years, precisely because there was no Russian threat - in the end, NATO enlargement turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The criticisms were out of fear of Russian reaction in case of NATO enlargement. But why would a superpower like the US fear Russia for NATO enlargement? Russia is no threat to the US right? And why would Russia react to NATO enlargement to the point of threatening European security? NATO enlargement wasn’t an invasion of Russian territory, was it? Maybe it’s because NATO was interfering with the Russian sphere of influence (euphemistically called “Russia’s backyard”)? Why should the US (or neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter) care for Russia to have a sphere of influence at their expense exactly? Does Russia have a moral or legal right to have a sphere of influence? Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so?


Quoting Tzeentch

This conflict was initiated by the U.S. when it sought to change Ukrainian neutrality, which was obviously a prerequisite for a robust peace.

Or maybe the “conflict was initiated” by Russia when it sought to forcefully preserve the “alleged” Ukrainian neutrality?
BTW, neutrality could be an obvious precondition for robust peace as much as for repressing independents movements (Chechnya), military engaging over territorial disputes (Georgia), puppetization (Belarus) and economic exploitation/depression (the whole of Russia federation, except major Russian urban areas like Moscow and St. Petersbourg) and Russification (Ukraine). What if Ukraine didn’t want any of that?


Quoting Tzeentch

Further, Brzezinski is a terrible source to quote in favor of your position, since he basically laid out how U.S. domination of the globe works and how to maintain it, and it fits perfectly into the picture of U.S. hubris.

On the contrary, it’s precisely because Brzezinski contributed to the decision process that led America to NATO expansion, that is absolutely worth to have a good grasp of his reasoning over American security dilemmas. On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic who most certainly didn’t benefit from the informational network, the internal understanding, and related responsibilities in foreign policy decision making as Brzezinski (not surprisingly, Brzezinski analysis are richer in terms of Russian political, social, historical insights than Mearsheimer’s).
For the notion “hubris” holds the same I said for “jealousy”. They are polemical notions which do not improve our understanding of geopolitical agents’ behaviour. At best, they can appease some avg dude’s sense of moral entitlement which anonymously, on the internet, is very cheap and verges on virtue signalling, right?



[1]
[i]To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics.
First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them.
Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other.
Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions.
[…]
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other.
[…]
Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it.[/i]

(Source: https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931)


[I]”Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”[/I]

(source: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html)

Quoting ssu

the reasons, arguments and agenda of the politicians and the military are.

No, they very clearly aren't. The arguments and agenda of the politicians and the military are empirically demonstrable. The reasons are private and a matter on which you and I may equally speculate.

Quoting neomac

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case.

And what evidence would that be? The Budapest Memorandum?

Quoting neomac

However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share).

Certainly. This is a philosophy forum after all, and realism is one lens through which I might view current events - not the only one.

Quoting neomac

So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts.

Indeed. Which is why I've been making the argument that that is the core of why things in Ukraine happened the way they did.

Quoting neomac

The criticisms were out of fear of Russian reaction in case of NATO enlargement. But why would a superpower like the US fear Russia for NATO enlargement? Russia is no threat to the US right?

That answer should be obvious: just because the U.S. is/was the hegemon, does not mean they can force anyone to do their bidding, or enter war with anyone they like and come out the victor. That much should be painfully evident from the failings in the Middle-East.

As I said earlier, to the U.S. independence is a threat, resistance is aggression.

We can use such hubristical notions to understand U.S. behavior, but to consider them rational would be an entirely different subject. Moreover, we see now how U.S. hegemony is slowly crumbling as a result of this hubris, so even the realist may start to question the nature of these actions.

Quoting neomac

Maybe it’s because NATO was interfering with the Russian sphere of influence (euphemistically called “Russia’s backyard”)?

Let's be frank. Russia accepted most of NATO's enlargement. Ukraine was simply a bridge too far. That has more to do with the way Russia views Ukraine with regards to its vital interests, and less with its sphere of influence, though it would stand to reason Russia would prefer to have Ukraine in its sphere of influence for this reason.

For such a position as yours to make sense, you would have to provide some evidence that Russia viewed the ex-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe as part of its ("rightful") sphere of influence. I don't think you'll find much of the sort.

Quoting neomac

Why should the US (or neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter) care for Russia to have a sphere of influence at their expense exactly?

I don't think "sphere of influence" is the right description, as I said earlier, but it's in U.S. interest to understand the vital interests of other big players on the global stage, to avoid getting into conflicts it cannot or is not willing to win. That's what we see now, and in my view it is bringing the end of U.S. hegemony one step closer since it now has to juggle its attention between Europe and South-East Asia.

Quoting neomac

Does Russia have a moral or legal right to have a sphere of influence?

Neither of those (moral or legal) are particularly useful lenses to view the current situation through. International law is entirely ignored, and Russia is not a moral actor.

From a perspective of how nations can best coexist peacefully and war can be avoided, it is of vital importance that countries' security concerns are taken into consideration.

Quoting neomac

Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so?

It certainly would have been convenient for the Ukrainians had Russian security concerns been taken more seriously. If they had been, many would not have lost their lives and homes.

Quoting neomac

Or maybe the “conflict was initiated” by Russia when it sought to forcefully preserve the “alleged” Ukrainian neutrality?

I view this conflict as having started in 2008, with war becoming extremely likely after the U.S. backed coup, and practically unavoidable after the 2014 invasion of Crimea.

Quoting neomac

What if Ukraine didn’t want any of that?

What the Russians demanded was Ukrainian neutrality, not puppetization or Russification.

If they were willing to have their country wrecked as a consequence of not wanting to meet the Russian concerns in any way, fair enough.

If having their country wrecked was unexpected, I think their political elite should have thought a little harder about their actions.

Quoting neomac

At best, they can appease some avg dude’s sense of moral entitlement which on the internet is very cheap and verges on virtue signalling, right?

I think you're letting a little personal animosity bleed into your realism yourself. :nerd:

Quoting neomac

On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic...

Said what I assume is also "some avg dude on the internet"?

A bit of self-awareness would suit you well, I think.

Quoting Benkei

Of course, no evidence yet doesn't mean there isn't any but I think, once again, we really don't know who's done it and we need to wait it out.

I agree, and I never said otherwise. There are arguments in favor of the Russia-did-it theory (e.g. this), and I could buy some of them, but not with real money.

One thing though that makes it easier to buy the Russia theory is that the risk threshold is much lower for Russia than for any other plausible actor. They have little to lose, since their relationships with Europe are at their lowest point since the Bolshevik revolution. Worse comes to worst, they will just deny everything, like they always do, not caring at all whether they are believed.

Quoting frank

So NATO is monitoring their targeting systems and won't allow them to strike the Russian interior?

I doubt it. They know full well that Americans would not agree to that. And those systems don't have the range to strike deep in the interior anyway. More likely the Americans are second-guessing the Ukrainians, trying to conserve their expensive munitions.

Quoting SophistiCat

One thing though that makes it easier to buy the Russia theory is that the risk threshold is much lower for Russia than for any other plausible actor

So...

Quoting SophistiCat

They have little to lose, since their relationships with Europe are at their lowest point since the [s]Bolshevik revolution[/s] cold war.

Quoting https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/06/trump-has-irrevocably-changed-american-relations-with-europe-and-biden-probably-can-t-fix-it-pub-81739

European diplomats privately admit transatlantic relations are at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, including during the 2003 Iraq War

And..

Quoting SophistiCat

they will just deny everything, like they always do, not caring at all whether they are believed.

Quoting https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/pitfalls-us-covert-operations#

the scope and the scale of such operations have been enormous

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093

Quoting SophistiCat

doubt it. They know full well that Americans would not agree to that. And those systems don't have the range to strike deep in the interior anyway. More likely the Americans are second-guessing the Ukrainians, trying to conserve their expensive munitions.

I figured the Ukrainians are consulting with American strategists though. The run toward Kharkiv was supposedly a strategy the US military has used before.

Quoting Tzeentch

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case. — neomac

And what evidence would that be? The Budapest Memorandum?

The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence.
Some more input also in the article: https://www.politico.eu/article/western-europe-listen-to-the-baltic-countries-that-know-russia-best-ukraine-poland/.
You yourself were talking of "plenty of historical grievance to build it on”, did you already forget?
And I could go on discussing about the rise of the Russian far-right nationalist (even nazi) movements before and during Putin (see “managed nationalism”) etc.

Quoting Tzeentch

However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share). — neomac

Certainly. This is a philosophy forum after all, and realism is one lens through which I might view current events - not the only one.

So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts. — neomac

Indeed. Which is why I've been making the argument that that is the core of why things in Ukraine happened the way they did.

That’s also why you are trapped in a cognitive dissonance, because you seem to hold realist expectations in geopolitics that systematically frustrate your idealistic moral standards or your relatable desire for peace.


Quoting Tzeentch

Let's be frank. Russia accepted most of NATO's enlargement. Ukraine was simply a bridge too far. That has more to do with the way Russia views Ukraine with regards to its vital interests, and less with its sphere of influence, though it would stand to reason Russia would prefer to have Ukraine in its sphere of influence for this reason.

First, that Ukraine was “a bridge too far” wasn’t always so obvious as you seem to believe. Here is an interview with Sergej Lavrov by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt (02.01.2005):
[I] Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on [/I]
(Source: https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html)
Although that conciliatory response by Lavrov was questioned by Putin himself, especially in the case of Ukraine, a few months later: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x88b9ii
Second, what would be the difference between vital interests and sphere of influence in the case of Ukraine? I see the latter as a desirable condition to ensure the former. And even if one wants to consider the worst scenario for Russia, namely Russia losing the port of Sevastopol (but I wouldn’t exclude a possible compromise convenient to Russia), Russia could still keep its access to the Mediterranean through the Port of Novorossiysk.


Quoting Tzeentch

For such a position as yours to make sense, you would have to provide some evidence that Russia viewed the ex-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe as part of its ("rightful") sphere of influence. I don't think you'll find much of the sort.

The evidence I need is what I already provided. Threat perception is in the eye of the perciever (as NATO enlargement for Russia). Surely one can question how reasonable they are but historical legacies can sediment in blood and bones for generations. Besides it’s also up to Russia’s signalling good intentions by acts and words, especially if aware that the ex-Soviet Republics might have been particularly suspicious about any innuendo to Russian hegemonic pride and historical revisionism. Unfortunately Russia (especially under Putin) didn’t send the right signals most of the time. E.g. Russia has almost always complained about NATO enlargement (aside from East Germany), Putin has vowed to protect the rights of Russian minorities (like in Ukraine and Georgia, and the problem is that there are Russian minorities also in all ex-Soviet Republics, including Baltic states and Moldova), Putin questioned the legitimacy of modern Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism (BTW Putin complaining about Ukrainian nazism is not new, even against the Baltic states he raised the same accusations https://www.dw.com/en/putin-accuses-europe-of-ignoring-nazism-in-the-baltics/a-2817872).

Quoting Tzeentch

Neither of those (moral or legal) are particularly useful lenses to view the current situation through. International law is entirely ignored, and Russia is not a moral actor

.

What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor?

Quoting Tzeentch

From a perspective of how nations can best coexist peacefully and war can be avoided, it is of vital importance that countries' security concerns are taken into consideration

.

I see at least 2 issues: 1. How can democratic countries best deal with security concerns of non-democratic countries, especially if driven by hegemonic ambitions (imagine a Nazi regime, Isis, Soviet Union, etc.)? Appeasement might be a very risky game 2. Your idea would sound more plausible if every geopolitical agent had a full understanding about the security concerns of its peers, yet any defensive move can be perceived as hostile (NATO enlargement was defensive for the ex-Soviet Republic but perceived as hostile by Russia, but also Russian perceiving NATO enlargement as hostile was perceived as hostile by ex-Soviet Republic, etc.).


Quoting Tzeentch

Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so? — neomac

It certainly would have been convenient for the Ukrainians had Russian security concerns been taken more seriously. If they had been, many would not have lost their lives and homes.

Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands (which for Ukraine means losing its independence to the historical most dangerous country/people to the Ukrainians, let’s not forget that to Ukrainians Hitler’s Germany wasn’t perceived as dangerous as Soviet Union). And the West should have played along, which Germany and France could have done and likely kept doing so until Russia invaded Ukraine.



Quoting Tzeentch

I view this conflict as having started in 2008, with war becoming extremely likely after the U.S. backed coup

.

Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links?



Quoting Tzeentch

What the Russians demanded was Ukrainian neutrality, not puppetization or Russification.
If they were willing to have their country wrecked as a consequence of not wanting to meet the Russian concerns in any way, fair enough.

It’s a bit naive to think that Russia would have explicitly demanded the puppetization or Russification of Ukraine in these terms (e.g. “denazification” is Putin’s ersatz for puppetization and Russification). There are implied risks though. Ukrainians seem willing to sacrifice and resist now to be free later.
Just imagine how shitty must feel to be under the Russians to them.

I think you're letting a little personal animosity bleed into your realism yourself.

Sir, it’s just that I’m more pugnacious when I suspect intellectual dishonesty. Said that, “homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto”.


Quoting Tzeentch

On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic... — neomac

Said what I assume is also "some avg dude on the internet"?
A bit of self-awareness would suit you well, I think.

And correctly said so, because that’s a fact. Check on wikipedia. Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic.

Concerning my “bit of self-awareness”, is the following enough?

Quoting neomac

I’m an avg dude (not en expert), we are reasoning under uncertainties of many relevant facts, and exchange in a philosophy forum from our armchair during leisure time. Didn’t we explicitly factor in all that in our claims many times already? Yet I care about the clarity/logic of my arguments and the evidences available to me to assess them (including the input from all sorts of news/stats/reports/experts of course). Since I take such arguments and evidence assessment to be affordable also by other avg dudes in a philosophy forum post format, I expect such avg dudes to reciprocate in intellectually honest and challenging ways

Quoting neomac

as an avg dude, I’m far from assuming to know better or enough how to play the game to “propose” or “recommend” anything to anybody about geopolitical issues, or to have any significant impact on this war directly or indirectly through my posts here

Quoting neomac

nobody and certainly not avg dudes like me and you can figure out a reliable plan to grant an optimal military victory

Quoting neomac

As an avg dude, I would rely more on geopolitical speculation and historical analogies for guidance.

Quoting SophistiCat

I agree, and I never said otherwise. There are arguments in favor of the Russia-did-it theory (e.g. this), and I could buy some of them, but not with real money.

Oh good, didn't mean to suggest you did. Interesting article. With regard to his Nord Stream speculation, I think the first is bullshit. If things normalise, the West isn't weaned of Russian gas: it will buy whatever is cheapest and if that's Russian gas, we will buy Russian gas.

The second point, though, is indeed a good argument to suspect the Russians.

Personally, I don't think the Russians are sophisticated enough to not have any evidence pointing their way after 3 months of research.

Quoting neomac

The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence.

A-ha.

So NATO enlargement was all about Ukraine, then?

Interesting theory.


Quoting neomac

That’s also why you are trapped in a cognitive dissonance, because you seem to hold realist expectations in geopolitics that systematically frustrate your idealistic moral standards or your relatable desire for peace.

Has the time already come for psychoanalzying?

Realism is the lens through which I understand the why and how. A moral framework is what I use to judge how I feel about that.


Quoting neomac

First, that Ukraine was “a bridge too far” wasn’t always so obvious as you seem to believe. Here is an interview with Sergej Lavrov by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt (02.01.2005):
Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on
(Source: https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html)
Although that conciliatory response by Lavrov was questioned by Putin himself, especially in the case of Ukraine, a few months later: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x88b9ii

During this period the Russians were committed to playing nice with the West.

Since there wasn't any indication that NATO or the EU were making serious attempts at incorporating Ukraine or that such a thing was even feasible, why would they have answered any different?

It seems to me they went to great lengths not to give the impression of being aggressive, even when it touched on vital security concerns. Even when it finally did become a real worry to them, they gave warnings for 15 years.

Quoting neomac

Second, what would be the difference between vital interests and sphere of influence in the case of Ukraine? I see the letter as a desirable condition to ensure the former.

Russian vital interests were protected with a neutral Ukraine. There'd be little to gain and much to lose for them to change that status quo, so incorporating it into their sphere of influence would not have been desirable at all.


Quoting neomac

... Russia could still keep its access to the Mediterranean through the Port of Novorossiysk.

Crimea is about more than just access to the Mediterranean. It's about control over the Black Sea, the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov (highly important in connecting the Russian heartland to trade), Odessa, etc.


Quoting neomac

Besides it’s also up to Russia’s signalling good intentions by acts and words, [...] Unfortunately Russia (especially under Putin) didn’t send the right signals most of the time.

Prior to 2008, there was a clear commitment from Russia to maintain good relations with the West, and the West was mostly receptive to that.

It is when the U.S. realized Russia was not going to subjugate itself to the U.S. that it started to pursue its policies in Ukraine.

I see no evidence for real security competition between the West and Russia prior to 2008. If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West.


Quoting neomac

What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor?

Individuals are moral actors.


Quoting neomac

I see at least 2 issues: 1. How can democratic countries best deal with security concerns of non-democratic countries, especially if driven by hegemonic ambitions (imagine a nazi regime, isis, soviet union, etc.)? Appeasement might be a very risky game 2. Your idea would sound more plausible if every geopolitical agent had a full understanding about the security concerns of its peers, yet any defensive move can be perceived as hostile (NATO enlargement was defensive for the ex-Soviet Republic but perceived as hostile by Russia, but also Russian perceiving NATO enlargement as hostile was perceived as hostile by ex-Soviet Republic, etc.).

Fair points, and the nature of the security dilemma does not need elaboration.

I shared my perspective in response to your question whether nations have a moral right to a sphere of influence. My perspective presupposes peaceful coexistence is (or "should be") the goal of nations. Sadly, many nations and certainly the U.S. are not driven by that goal. They are driven by hegemonic ambitions like the ones you consider risky to appease.


Quoting neomac

Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands...

That's presupposing that Ukraine sought to join NATO for security reasons. It also sought to join the EU, and join the "western world" at large - the U.S. sphere of influence. There were plenty of other benefits that could have guided their decisions.

What was stubbornly ignored were 15 years worth of the Russians voicing their security concerns. A recipe for disaster, anyone could have told you 15 years ago, and that is what we got.

What I'm explicitly suggesting is that whoever drove Ukraine to try and join NATO was either A) extremely foolish, or B) not acting in pursuit of Ukrainian interests. (I'm still entertaining the hypothesis that this whole ordeal is largely U.S.-orchestrated).


Quoting neomac

Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links?

I'm referring to the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, during which it was decided that:

"... [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

NATO officially reaffirmed its commitment to this promise on several occasions between 2008 and 2014.


Quoting neomac

It’s a bit naive to think that Russia would have explicitly demanded the puppetization or Russification of Ukraine in these terms (e.g. “denazification” is Putin’s ersatz for puppetization and Russification).

If you believe puppetization or Russification was Russia's goal you must provide some evidence.

I can go along with the idea that Russia, like any nation state, acts in its self-interest. I do not go along with the idea that Russia can only do so by acting in hostile ways, and therefore must always have sinister intentions even if we can't see them.


Quoting neomac

Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic.

I think it's crazy that you would dismiss academics in such a way, but whoever you base your views on is your business.

If practical knowledge is required in order not to be considered by you a "armchair academic" then why are you referring to someone whose practical experience is nearly half a century old?

Anyway.

Have you ever considered the difference between the words of an "armchair academic" and a politician?


Quoting neomac

it’s just that I’m more pugnacious when I suspect intellectual dishonesty.

Quoting neomac

Concerning my “bit of self-awareness”, is the following enough?

If you are so quick to suspect intellectual dishonesty when someone disagrees with you, defer to phoney psychoanalysis and believe everybody here to only be "avg dudes", it begs the question what you are doing here.