creativesoul

Whose thread is it? Oh! Nah, we can keep it here. It's relevant.

So, I take it that you've no idea what it takes to attribute meaning? Thought and belief are not mental states on my view, by the way. Are you ready t...

I've offered nothing but. I'd be more than happy to unpack something I've already said should it seem like it implies such a linguistic framework. I c...

Well, you could say that. We've spent the last two thousand years failing to come to acceptable terms with our minds and how they work. Why not offer ...

What does that have to do with anything I've written here?

Don't be a dick. You won't like it.

I'm not at all understanding what reason there is for any one of us to believe that the terms "internal", "external", "physical", "non-physical" have ...

And here yet another obtuse question... :roll: Of course it is! That's exactly what the problem is... the criterion underwriting what counts as consci...

Is that what counts as an acceptable reply nowadays?

So the "it" in "what it's like to see red" is a conscious visual experience with red in it?

If we cannot somehow, someway, adequately explain what it's like(for our own selves) to see red, then we certainly have no business talking about - or...

As is The Flying Spaghetti Monster.

The ability to attribute meaning.

Pay attention . Here comes the death knell.

Hold on a minute. :brow:

Of course bats have conscious experiences. Of course dolphins have conscious experience as well. The "we don't" part is irrelevant. When we're reporti...

There's a conscious visual experience with a dog in it. And???

Ya think? Too bad the paper hinges upon it. Go back a few pages and re-read my critique. You cannot explain it because there is no it... Plain and sim...

Ok. Explain it then. What's it like to see red?

Nah. I'm more than willing to set things out for those willing to listen. Given the last few exchanges, including the refutation of "what it's like" t...

Then the notion of "qualia" is incoherent, and conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes. That's the position I'm arguing for/from....

:lol: Errr... ummm... ahhh... maybe something like what I've been doing?

There's a misunderstanding somewhere. I do not divide the world in a physical/mental sense, or a physical/non physical sense. Internal, external, that...

I was not objecting to that. I agree with that.

Sigh...

Looking for an answer to the questions posed... that's all.

A prima facie example of a problem created by language use. The above basically says that... The subjective essence of conscious experience equals and...

In order for that to be true, invention must not be a conscious experience and/or process.

Yep. That's where a major disagreement between you and I seems to be. We've discussed that at length in past, but as it pertains to conscious experien...

Sigh... If you believe that, then you clearly do not understand much of what I've said, and until I have reason to believe that you do, there's no rea...

Chalmers' "what it's like" rendering is an untenable and rather ill-informed approach. I've argued that at length on this very forum. There is no such...

What problem? Neurology is a discipline that tells us much about how conscious experience happens.

Throws the same thing at khaled... The same experience is not caused by the same brain... Thus, the variation cancels out. It tells us nothing except ...

Yes. Erring on the side of neither dispenses with the inherently inadequate dichotomies altogether. However, I'm hesitant if all experience has intern...

Non sequitur. That doesn't follow from anything I've said here. What are you talking about? I've not said anything at all about caring 'why' the compo...

Why do you say that emergentism is 'spooky'? Do you expect conscious experience to just pop into existence ex nihilo style? Does it still seem magical...

Loosely speaking, 'the connection' is the experience, on my view. It consists of both internal and external, physical and non physical, subjective and...

You implied that it was necessary(for some reason unbeknownst to me) that my position explain phenomenology. I mean, I certainly can, but a better exp...

Conscious experience of red cups is what was in need of explanation... not an explanation of an explanation.

What's that? Wonder if ducks and rabbits have such a thing? Seems to me that they do not. And yet, they most certainly have conscious experiences.

Is there a mantis shrimp being consulted?

The understatement of the century.

Ockham's razor applies.

That's not true either. It tells us much about the autonomous involuntary aspects of all conscious experience of red cups, including whether or not th...

And teach/learn from past mistakes... What I should have said was... What qualia?

Those colors and pains are absent from ALL explanations.

The ability to attribute meaning.

But it does, for it contradicts this... The connection is one of existential dependency and elemental constituency. Without biological machinery there...

Well, that's one way to take it.