creativesoul

One cannot adhere to both, an eliminative materialist, and a sense datum theorist account of perception.

Feigned interest is rather unbecoming. Re read our exchanges, or better yet, click my avatar, click my comments and read for yourself how I use the wo...

:lol: That's the missing presupposition. As I said, it didn't follow. The above is just plain false or there is no such things as constituents of any ...

What is below does not follow from what is above. .

Measuring is an interesting act to consider here. If all constituents of experience exist only in the head and never distal objects, then what exactly...

Yup. Yup. That's yet another place in reasoning where the indirect position goes wrong. All experience is experience, of that we can be certain. It do...

Red cups are necessary elemental constituents of seeing red cups. The red cup has a reflective outer layer. The color we talk about is not inherent to...

That's what I'm saying; earlier pointing at the need to unpack the phrase. He didn't listen.

I'll leave you to think about it.

No. In the sense that an apple pie is part of a dinner party.

I think Searle may agree with that sentiment.

Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects.

To be expected from another option.

If impressing one's own face into a custard pie does not count as directly perceiving the pie, then nothing will and one's framework falls apart if it...

I strongly suspect you and I have different opinions on what the issue is.

See what happens when one irrelevant comment is made? It becomes the focus. Easy to avoid the difficulty that way, I suppose. :brow:

Sigh... Yeah, other options should be that way, ought they not? You asked for other options, and yet complain when they avoid the rabbit holes. Have f...

If the cow is in the field, then it is not in the brain. If we see the cow, then we see things that are not in the brain. The cow is one of the things...

The "phenomenal" approach presupposes a difference between reality and appearances thereof. So, that's of no help here. What scientific account of ocu...

Right, for you, according to the framework you're employing, that's the important part, but science has nothing to say specifically about the notion o...

I personally would reject 3, for it overstates the case. Some, not all. I do not see how scientific evidence refutes 2. The emphasized part needs unpa...

You may be interested in listening to Searle's lectures on philosophy of mind. It's an entire course available for free on youtube. He has an interest...

Crossposted. I'll address the quote soon.

There's more to it than whether or not distal objects are constituents of experience. But, as you imply, either that is the case or it is not the case...

I meant better options for rejecting naive realism than just indirect realism(indirect perception) of the kind you're arguing for/from. There are more...

I think that that is a bewitchment of the mind by virtue of language use. It also shows the limitation of logic. Validity alone does not warrant belie...

I think that there are better options...

Interesting. Dennett is an eliminative materialist. The Churchlands are as well, I think. In "From Bacteria to Bach and Back" and "Kinds of Minds he e...

So, shapes, colors, smells, and sounds are in your brain?

Qualia?

No, it's not. False analogy. Red herring as well. Portraits are not equivalent to seeing cows(which is one kind of visual experience). If "the cow I s...

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

Do you see something that is not a constituent of your experience?

Is the field in your brain?

Blather. Where is the cow you see?

The most salient - but sorely neglected - point made thus far.

You keep saying that but refuse to directly address the inevitable consequence thereof. If distal objects exist outside the brain, and experience exis...

It's odd to me that people using a computer to argue a very nuanced philosophical position, can be led to believe that the computer is not a necessary...

Or that experience is not the sort of thing that has a location.

I'm not speaking for Luke. He's far more eloquent and concise than I. That said... That question presupposes the brain is somehow severed from the cre...

:sweat:

What does our biological machinery do then, if not directly connect us to the world? Sometimes the causal chain is longer than others, but it is a dir...

Yup. There's the performative contradiction Janus pointed at earlier.

Well, you're right about one thing, we can see both, but not in the way you're claiming. I've mentioned before about hallucinations and that they are ...

If colours are the end result of a biological process that is existentially dependent upon the surface layers of distal objects as well as a creature ...

Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both. Distal objects are not mental phenomena. On second thought, hallucination...

Agreed, but false analogy with regard to what I'm arguing. That fits with what you're arguing about all perception, and what I'm arguing only regardin...

That distal objects are constituents in veridical perception and illusion, but not hallucinations. Yup. Go back through my posts here, and it ought be...

Veridical perception, hallucination, and illusions. You claim they share the same constituents, and the difference is in their causes. Can you set out...