Confirming for someone else questioning why it seems you're not aware you have a headache (your example basically). That pain works differently than e...
However the whole point of PI is to show how different things matter to us in different ways, leading to the various ways they work. What matters to u...
Well if that's not just facetious, it demonstrates Witt's point that we want to strip away any context and take a sentence in isolation to have met th...
Good catch; that was a test to see if anyone was actually still reading--I only meant that in the sense of the recognition of pain; although Witt does...
I found that language; that's an intro Crary did for a book of essays I have that is just new authors saying different stuff--I'm not sure that wiki-a...
In what context would we say "I know I have a headache."? Maybe when you've made it aware to me that you have a headache, then, when I see you a littl...
Of course I don't know to what you are referring that you think is not necessary, but the way I read Witt he is necessarily, grammatically, claiming t...
No, what Witt is saying is that the way sensations/emotions/experience work, their grammar, is that they are not known, they are expressed, or not (su...
The fear of being empty, not unique, creates the idea there must be some "thing" beyond language which is mine, that I can know. Now it's not that the...
I can't help but think we've lost the thread here, because the point of PI is that the conclusion of the Tractatus was wrong. We can talk about all ki...
Just because "a community of Wittgenstein interpreters" disagree with what it means for traditional answers to skepticism, doesn't mean they can say t...
I appreciate all this effort. Well... maybe you just mean talking about Witt's attempt to imagine an experience that I would know but that no one else...
We've taken up the idea of beauty in an OP on whether there is an objective aspect of aesthetics. In that thread I presented Kant's description of our...
Witt only saw meaning as representational in the Tractatus; so he wrote the PI to figure out how and why he was locked into that way of thinking. It's...
If that is to say people have different interests in the work, I agree, though Heidegger would suggest setting that aside and letting the object appro...
Well thank you for that. I still don't understand the "therapy" label--I mean I barely get what it is actually supposed to mean, but I do see it as a ...
We don't learn how to employ tokens, or use words (I don't teach you all the things to say). There is our whole human life with pain, part of the esse...
I am not describing the periphery of Witt's investigation--just deeper into it, farther along. If we stop at the first idea we hear that we feel we un...
I'm not sure what I said that you took as "final" (what the implications are in saying that); as you point out in #23--Witt would say endless; that ou...
Not to maybe address your comment directly, but my point is that Witt is replacing the internal referent of the essence of a sensation with the ordina...
I'm not sure what version of the term token you are referring to; I take Witt to be showing us that a toothache (a sensation) works differently than j...
Bluntly, the desire to have something certain (the referent) blinds us to the actual workings of our personal, individual, secret, expressed/repressed...
Well, saying "language works differently in each case" is to say, poorly, that we have different concepts, like: thinking, promising, seeing, believin...
Well, yes, "public" as culturally, not something individual (special). But to understand how sensations are meaningful (the essence of them) is to und...
The picture of a word-referent clouds our ability to see that language works differently in each case (concept). Here, we are generalizing the case th...
Only here I'm trying to show that the point is not to replace the internal referent with an external one, as if the problem was just the assumption of...
The picture of a word and its object (referent) as the only way anything is meaningful is the exact thing which makes a "solution" impossible. Imagine...
And so if language cannot "refer" (directly as it were) to our--let's call it "personal"--experience, than we feel we must, as Kant did, cordon off th...
How an apology is meaningful is different than how fairness is meaningful. They have different criteria, they matter to us in different ways, we judge...
J.L. Austin is a great example of first starting with how things don't work. His work A Plea for Excuses is really an investigation into how action wo...
That is very interesting about Frege, thank you @"hanaH" (do you have a page # for the Blue Book cite?). I agree with your seeing Wittgenstein as reac...
Thinking, believing, understanding, pointing, excusing, deducing, etc., etc. All the various concepts and activities of our lives have different condi...
This was a dismissive, poor summary of Witt at one point, but not a real reading. You feel that the conditions and criteria of our expressions (their ...
Thank you @"Banno" for finding that lost Discussion of "essence" as expressed by Wittgenstein's grammar. That got zero traction when I posted it. I ca...
Well I don't want to sidetrack into Kant but what I meant was that our responsibility to the truth is not a matter of our choice, it is the structure ...
The denigration of anything but logic and right (or the good, or rules) is to make all other discussion or claim irrational, based on authority (force...
I didn’t mean to disagree, just to differentiate what I was discussing. Truth in this sense is more like a founding principal than a decision about wh...
A claim to the truth is made as if it were universal, as there is no reason it can't be (the other is in the same position with a rejection). I make i...
I agree that a broad education is important. It does bring up the issue again of avoiding a rote understanding of truth. I take this as the difference...
This is the story relativism tells. But you will notice it begins with the desire (demand) that truth meet a standard that does not include us, as mat...
If we consider that not every act is intentional (chosen), but nevertheless certain acts include being willing to answer for them (more than just "did...
Not a statement known or judged to be true or false, so, not a statement (is there any other); the idea of a declaration is more appropriate, announci...
This is again to want something's being "true" to be the reason why we claim it; truth here being a standard that moral claims can not meet because th...
Skipping over that we are not necessarily talking about a claim of how to act, my betterment (or dissolution) is part of my consideration in claiming ...
Yes, I'm saying Plato was wrong. The distinction between truth and rhetoric that he made was to hold knowledge to a certain standard, which involved e...
The idea of wanting something to be "truth-apt" is to have something to depend on, justify our acts, ensure agreement, etc. The sense of a statement t...
The claim of a moral principal and an aesthetic judgment are expressed in a similar structure, subject to the same acceptance or rejection, with the s...
Diamond proposes that a moral claim can be general, as universally claimed, but still with a context because it has a history, its possibilities of in...
I'm not discussing a moral theory. I mean implications here as like Wittgenstein's grammar. Not that we are considering the consequences in making a d...
I believe this was discussed at the meeting. Diamond's addition to this was I believe that this was not like an empirical assessment, nor that any dis...
Comments