litewave

Remember, I am just questioning the claim that we intentionally choose to forget our original identity. How many near-death experiencers made this cla...

I was talking about the suppression of our memory of our original loving nature. Supposedly we were once able to live with that awareness just fine, s...

Even if I couldn't ultimately be harmed why would I choose to go through hell without not much to learn from it?

I am questioning the wisdom of suppressing our memory to the point of having horrible experiences with not much meaningful benefit. Sure, you can lear...

But we don't have much choice about suppressing our memory when we fall asleep. It just happens as we fall asleep. Maybe it is similar with the suppre...

So the suppression of memory would not be an intentional choice but rather a weakness. Makes more sense to me, especially when the suppression of memo...

What would one want to learn or achieve from the experience of being murdered?

Learning from experiences might be a good reason to undergo them. But why would a loving being want to experience what it's like to, say, murder someo...

It seems that suppressing our memory of our loving nature has resulted in a lot of horrible experiences. Why would we want that?

But what would be the point in intentionally suppressing our memories of who we are or where we came from?

According to esoteric traditions like Gnosticism, Hermeticism or Neoplatonism our loss of memory of who we are or of where we come from is basically a...

Sure, for all practical purposes it is still the same apple. But strictly speaking, by taking the apple out of the apple pie something has changed in ...

Every two objects have some identical properties and some different properties; in this sense they are both same and different but never identical (me...

One could argue that once the parts cease being the parts of a particular whole, they are no longer the same objects they used to be; they stopped exi...

A whole is not identical to any of its parts. A whole and its part are two different objects. A whole is a collection of its parts. If by 'essence' yo...

Ok, that's a common intuitive view although upon reflection I fail to see why a particular possible world should be more real than others, or what it ...

Was Wittgenstein a modal realist like David Lewis, that is, did he believe that all possible worlds are just as real as the actual one and the actual ...

Well, it just says that the actual world is represented by a designated point in logical space. But why is this point designated?

I see that Wittgenstein regards only one possible world as actual. Does he also explain what makes a possible world actual?

Sure, but I meant indescribable in principle. The description of a thing's relations to other things could be regarded as a partial description of the...

"Indescribable" means "non-relational", because every description of something is a presentation of this something in relations to other somethings ("...

I agree that process metaphysics can be subsumed in substance metaphysics by treating spacetime as a persistent/timeless substance and events as parts...

Some philosophers identify "states of affairs" with facts. Others (I presume Wittgenstein among them) seem to treat "states of affairs" as properties ...

I agree with Schopenhauer that our supposedly free acts are ultimately determined by factors that determine our desires, needs and intentions, and we ...

Representation is a part of the mind. Representation is conscious.

Yes, inconsistent facts don't exist.

I recently had an argument in another thread about ontological relevance of paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistent logic admits contradictory objects - ...

I don't require more than non-contradiction for existence. (But it is not as simple as it may seem, because since there can be no inconsistency in rea...

But the objects (hypothetical or whatever) are not relations, at least not all of them. That's why I'm saying that in addition to relations there must...

Well, there is a difference between being conscious of premises and being conscious of their implications. The former consciousness seems relatively g...

Not sure I understand this. A thing that is not extended in time is a different thing than a thing that is extended in time and that consists of thing...

Yes, it is what the thing is in itself, rather than its relations to other things. If you can coherently describe what it means that a whole "emerges"...

Why would it be a problem? If there are two things with certain properties then there are certain relations between those things based on those proper...

Unless the objects you have named "Slitheytoves", "brillig" etc. are inconsistently defined they exist. They exist in the most general sense of "exist...

So what are the if-then facts about? About "hypothetical" objects rather than about "objectively-existent" objects? If so, what is the difference betw...

The problem is that only relations are describable, but if there are relations then there must also be objects between which those relations are. Thos...

There is a metaphysical view called Russellian monism according to which physics and mathematics only describe relations (including causal relations) ...

Well, since the two photons have no measurable differentiating property at the end of the experiment, not even a different position in physical space,...

That's right. But there is also no possible situation where disjunction introduction is valid and invalid. Your contradiction referred to that situati...

Depends on what you mean by "physical". Is "imaginary momentum" that a particle has in quantum tunneling "physical"? It cannot be measured, even in pr...

This contradiction is referring to a purported situation where disjunction introduction is a valid rule of inference and not a valid rule of inference...

I am not sure if you understood me. I was saying that the differentiating property of the two photons is their position in the abstract structure of t...

Example? My understanding is that propositions are meanings of strings of words (if the string of words has a subject-predicate structure). In other w...

When I am making a reference to the property of blackness then the referent is the property of blackness, no? A contradiction has an identity as a sen...

And in so doing I am also referring to the property of blackness. The property of blackness is the referent (meaning) of the word "black". An object i...

Ok, I'll look into it.

Properties are objects too - they are something that is identical to itself and different from other objects. I see no reason why words could not refe...

But without identity there is not really an object. I don't know what it would mean that an object has no identity or what it would mean that the law ...

In theory - and also in reality if the theory is correct - there are two photons throughout the experiment, not one photon. They are numerically diffe...

So there is a language in which an object can have and not have the same property? The Wiki quote just says that the referent of the word "Mary" is Ma...