litewave

Every thing is "something it is like" because every thing has some properties and that's what it's like. A more precise definition of consciousness in...

Yeah but it seems kind of arbitrary what consciousness is. We may agree that consciousness consists of qualities without agreeing which qualities. It'...

I am not saying that base materials have qualia. I am saying that base materials have qualities. Whether these qualities are qualia is a matter of def...

Every object has a quality - a piece of unstructured stuff. The qualia of consciousness are qualities too, but that doesn't mean that all qualities ar...

My point is that atoms have not just states but qualities - pieces of unstructured stuff. And the qualia of consciousness are pieces of unstructured s...

I am saying that atoms have qualities. Are they the same qualities as we find in our consciousness? Probably not. Whether the atoms are conscious depe...

The parts may lack consciousness as we know it (sensations of pain, redness, sweetness, etc.) but they don't lack qualities. Every thing in itself is ...

Consciousness seems to consist of qualia - pieces of qualitative, unstructured stuff. Such pieces of stuff seem to be part of any traditional metaphys...

I wouldn't say obscure or irrelevant, but one should do also other things in life than analytic philosophy, in order to be healthy and enjoy life.

It sounds like putting emphasis on sensory perception rather than on thinking, or on holistic consciousness rather than analytic.

Well, in pure set theory a and b are sets too, because it's sets all the way down. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_theory#Ontology

a and b are sets too? I already talked about that here:

Chairs are collections too.

I was responding to your post in which you used the phrase "reified metaphysical entities". I understood them simply as real entities. It seems that w...

Yes. I interact with collections of objects all the time.

I have always treated sets as real metaphysical entities. So if properties were sets, then properties would be real too. If properties are not sets, I...

That sets are objects in the ontology of set theory.

Yes, because my attempt to treat the set and the property as one and the same object seems to have failed.

I have not studied model theory.

But in set theory, sets do add to ontology. And in pure set theory all elements of a set are sets too.

I wanted to say that the set is the common property of its elements.

Why would there be a problem in counting a set as a different thing to its elements?

A set is pure if all of its members are sets, all members of its members are sets, and so on. For example, the set containing only the empty set is a ...

Depends on what you mean by individual. There are obviously two elements in this set: a, b. By the way, in pure set theory these two elements are alwa...

So the set is another object, in addition to its elements.

Alas, I have broken the vows in the course of this thread. Although it was not really nominalism about properties; I still regarded them as real separ...

Enter the prompt "Is a set identical to its elements?" in ChatGPT, Claude or Gemini. They will all give you the answer No.

Right. There is a difference between "element" ("member") and "subset". Outside of set theory they may be both conflated with the concept of "part" bu...

I see what you wrote early on: But I still don't think that a set is identical to its elements because a single object cannot be identical to multiple...

It seems that we have found genuinely different yet coextensive properties (like the property of redness and the property of being an instance of redn...

I would classify objects as concrete and abstract as you have indicated. The weirdness part would fall under abstract.

It depends on what we mean by "abstract" and "concrete". It is often said that concrete objects are located in space or in spacetime. Then a collectio...

I'm not sure what you mean by "abstract" or "abstraction" here. Is the phone a concrete or an abstract object? Is it a collection of other objects or ...

Come on, objects that are included in a set satisfy certain criteria (have certain properties) but the set is a collection of those objects.

"Being an instance of redness" seems to be a property of all instances of redness, yet it seems to be a different property than redness itself. Both p...

A set is a collection of objects. An average person surely knows what a collection is. Not so surely a universal.

She has never seen a universal though. But she has seen collections (sets), so she may know more about collections than about universals.

She also doesn't know about the general property of redness, which probably cannot even be visualized. She only knows particular instances of redness.

Or if not identify, then at least associate a set and a property like this: set S = set of all elements that have property P This is an intensional de...

Still, a set (collection) is also treated as a single object in set theory that exists as a single element in other sets. And I don't regard sets as "...

Hm yes, the problem will be in the property of being red, which I equated with these two properties. It seems ok to equate being red with having the p...

This way:

These two properties have exactly the same instances and if I got it right, they are one and the same property, just described differently.

My reply above was a groaner, wasn't it. Perhaps the property of "being in set X" could be interpreted as a property of the set membership relation bu...

If only the actual world exists, then a property has instances only in the actual world, and the property is still a set of its instances (but the ins...

On further thought, I find this confusing too. The property of "being in set X" may seem to be the property of members of set X, but perhaps it is act...

The point of my OP is that the set actually is the property. That may not be obvious.

By being an element of the set, thus having what all the other elements of the set have.

It sounds weird if when you think of the set you think of all the red things. It makes you think that the peony somehow has all the red things, which ...

Well, in predicate logic you have individuals that have/satisfy a property/predicate. I propose that the property is the set of these individuals.