Michael

Do these mean different things? 1. The object is green 2. The object looks green

Yes, but that "what we in our scale see as cars" depends on us (and our sense organs) and is an essential component. The notion that a car is reducibl...

Carrying on from this, the argument is something like: If ordinary macroscopic objects are fully mind-independent then ontological reductionism is cor...

And introduces new (bigger?) problems, like why did the conveyor belt come back with six dots rather than three? And why/how do things cease to exist ...

In my scenario here, both groups use the same word to refer to the direction of the Earth's gravitational centre. But what one group sees when standin...

I don't understand this. There is a difference between something continuing to exist and something ceasing to exist and then coming back into existenc...

Say we have a conveyor belt, and situated in the middle is a device that prints a dot on the conveyor belt at regular intervals. We watch it print thr...

There is no "right way up". There's just the way things seem to you and seem to me, determined entirely by how our bodies respond to stimulation. For ...

Here's a relevant paper I've referenced before.

It's "distorted" in the sense that objects appear to be coloured (in the sense argued by primitivist realists like Keith Allen), even though they aren...

It defines terms like: And the science shows that this isn't the case. Consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain, so conscious experience doesn't ...

It's what direct realism always was, e.g. going back to Aristotle. Direct realists believed in things like A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour/primitivis...

Pointing out the grammar doesn't address the epistemological problem of perception, which is the problem that direct and indirect realists are trying ...

As I said in my previous comment, you're reading too much into the phrase "distorts reality". That we naively assume that colours and smells and taste...

The philosopher would be wrong. The scientist knows best. They're the ones actually studying how the world and perception works. The reason is that ph...

And when we both watch Biden's inauguration on TV (and in different rooms), we're both seeing the same thing; Biden's inauguration. And Biden's inaugu...

That lemons smell like lemons is a vacuous claim that has no bearing on the arguments made by direct and indirect realists. Then you're welcome to pre...

They don't. Relative to each other, they see things upside down.

Imagine an organism with a peculiar sex difference; the males' eyes and the females' eyes are, relative to the other, upside down such that what the m...

You can if you turn your mobile to landscape.

One of these must be true: 1. The science of perception is correct and suggests that perception distorts reality 2. The science of perception is corre...

No, I'm making it explicit what "lemons smell like lemons" means, and explaining that this does not address the arguments made by either direct or ind...

What does this even mean?

Nobody is perplexed by this. It’s the vacuous claim that lemons cause me to experience what lemons cause me to experience. It has no bearing on anythi...

You said that we smell things as they are, which under any reasonable reading is to say that smells are properties of those objects that we are then a...

If perception does not distort reality then the empirical evidence would show us that perception does not distort reality. The empirical evidence does...

Direct realists recognize the difference between phenomenal experience and external world objects. So why do they still claim that perception of exter...

In the context of this debate, what is required for an experience to be direct? In the context of this debate, is direct experience of an external wor...

So things have a smell even if nothing has a nose? I disagree. There's no such thing as smelling something as it is. It is just the case that some obj...

You said that a direct experience is unmediated. You seemed to be suggesting that if there is some third physical thing in the causal chain between th...

So an experience of an external world object is direct if and only if the atoms that constitute that object are physically touching the atoms in my br...

This seems like an anti-realist view?

I don’t think that’s right. Particular wavelengths cause most humans in normal lighting conditions to see blue, and so as a matter of convention we mi...

Also there’s the photo of the dress that some see as black and blue and others as white and gold. Any “information” in the experience is influenced by...

Well, the first step is to explain what it means to experience something directly and what it means to experience something indirectly. Can "direct" a...

I was just trying to paraphrase the Wikipedia article.

It is according to some interpretations of quantum mechanics, e.g. Copenhagen, Von Neumann, and Many-worlds. I believe this entails local hidden varia...

I think this depends on whether or not something like objective-collapse theory is correct. If it's not then there's no "size limit" to a superpositio...

This is Wigner's friend. Wigner observes John. John measures a particle spin but doesn't tell Wigner the result. From Wigner's perspective, is John in...

I answered it. Neither p nor q make sense. @"TonesInDeepFreeze" has explained to you in depth that the sentence "A is a member of B in C" is meaningle...

I was being lazy because this discussion has gone on long enough. Should have been: S = {S, …} and S = {x1, x2, …} where no xn = S

Russell’s paradox: Assumption: S is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Option 1: S = {} S is not a member of itself. But, as per ...

Your p and q make no sense in set theory. Only 3a is meaningful in set theory (although as already mentioned, the “in B” part of the sentence is vacuo...

When a set is a member of another set it is still a set with members of its own. Given this: A = {A} B = {A, 1} One of these must be true: 1. In B, A ...

You said that L is a member of itself "in L" but not a member of itself "in LL". So you're saying that L "in L" has one more member (itself) than L "i...

Here's some JavaScript code to demonstrate: // Lists const l = {} // Add Lists to itself l.l = l // Lists that list themselves const ll = {} // Add Li...

What is the difference between asking if L lists itself and asking if L is a member of itself? If L is a member of itself "in L" but not a member of i...

Let's consider these four lists: Months January February March April May June July August September October November December Planets Mercury Venus Ea...

You're half right.

Saying that John smells smoke doesn't explain what it means for John to smell smoke. And yet I see and talk about Joe Biden without ever being anywher...