A first cause is logically necessary
In thinking on causality, I have concluded that the nature of existence necessitates a "first cause". The definition and justification of this conclusion are written below. This may be a little abstract for some at first, so please ask questions if certain portions need some clarity. I welcome all criticism!
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows.
2. We can represent with the following labels.
Y: represents an existence that may or may not have prior causality.
X: represents an existent prior causality to Y.
Z: Represent an existence caused by Y.
Alpha: A Y existence that is identified as having no prior causality.
3. This leads us to 3 plausibilities.
a. There is always a X for every Y. (infinite prior causality).
b. The X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X (infinitely looped causality)
c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)
4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself. We could say, "The reversal of Z's causality logically lead up to this Alpha," But we cannot say "Z is the cause of why Alpha could, or could not exist." Plainly put, the rules concluded within a universe of causality cannot explain why an Alpha exists.
5. Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality.
6. If there exists an X which caused any infinite causality exists, then its not truly infinite causality, as it is something outside of the infinite causality chain. That X then becomes another Y with the same 3 plausibilities of prior causality. Therefore, the existence of a prior causality is actually an Alpha, or first cause.
7. Because there are no other plausibilties to how causality functions, the only only conclusion is that a causal chain will always lead to an Alpha, or first cause.
After much discussion, I am confident this holds. Here is a follow up if you want to discuss what this claim means. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows.
2. We can represent with the following labels.
Y: represents an existence that may or may not have prior causality.
X: represents an existent prior causality to Y.
Z: Represent an existence caused by Y.
Alpha: A Y existence that is identified as having no prior causality.
3. This leads us to 3 plausibilities.
a. There is always a X for every Y. (infinite prior causality).
b. The X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X (infinitely looped causality)
c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)
4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself. We could say, "The reversal of Z's causality logically lead up to this Alpha," But we cannot say "Z is the cause of why Alpha could, or could not exist." Plainly put, the rules concluded within a universe of causality cannot explain why an Alpha exists.
5. Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality.
6. If there exists an X which caused any infinite causality exists, then its not truly infinite causality, as it is something outside of the infinite causality chain. That X then becomes another Y with the same 3 plausibilities of prior causality. Therefore, the existence of a prior causality is actually an Alpha, or first cause.
7. Because there are no other plausibilties to how causality functions, the only only conclusion is that a causal chain will always lead to an Alpha, or first cause.
After much discussion, I am confident this holds. Here is a follow up if you want to discuss what this claim means. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1
Comments (1284)
:up:
The universe doesn't give a damn if it follows our logic or not.
Aw, don't do me like that 180 Proof. I usually love your wit and insight. Let me get you into the fun version of yourself.
So technically, no, a first number is not logically necessary. Considering we can have negative numbers, and the creation of numbers is a formula that can be applied without limitation, there is no "first" number.
First integer? Sure, that would be one. Of course, years later, 0 was invented, and that could be argued as the "first" integer. So would it be the first created integer, or the first integer in numeric order?
In otherwords, even though I considered your post silly, I addressed it seriously for fun. Do the same to my post please.
That's an interesting conclusion. If you read it and understood the premise, I would say it was clever. Feel free to explain why its clever within the confines of the OP, and I'll grant it.
I don't follow the logic of your discussion, but that doesn't matter, since I don't see why this is true.
Depends on how we think of cause. It's not impossible that the universe came into being for no reason or cause. Someone can say that makes no sense at all, but it could be the case for all we know.
I share the intuition that something must be the cause of the universe, but maybe there are no causes when we get to issues of this depth.
YQuoting 180 Proof
You're judging my post based on the title? Isn't that the same as reading the title of a news article, then commenting on it at the bottom of the forum? Come on, you're better than that. The title is just something to get people to click on it and read the post. Feel free to read the post, then let me know if my title was inappropriate.
Fair enough, I am presupposing some knowledge here.
Causality is the idea that a snapshot of existence is in the state that it is because of some prior state. Lets use a pool table for example. If I shoot a cue ball into the 8 ball, a certain amount of force is applied to the cue ball, which then transfers to the 8 ball, which then sinks in the right corner pocket.
If we shake this magic 8 ball for a minute, we discover that it moved because of the force applied from the cue ball. In other words, the 8 ball didn't just move itself without any internal or external force. It did not move "simply because it moved". A first cause would be if the 8 ball moved and there was no reason why it should have moved, internally, or externally.
Does that clarify causality? Do you have another take on it?
According to my OP, I conclude that it is logically necessary that the universe came into being for no reason or cause. Do I make a good case for it?
Quoting Philosophim
Maybe this is the case, maybe it's not. We have to "stop the buck" somewhere otherwise we go down an infinite chain of postulates. We don't know enough to say either is the case.
An argument could be made for both needing a first cause (or an uncaused cause) or not needing one, in the case the universe is actually infinite.
Yes, you understand this part then. What I am proposing are plausibilities. Its either "Infinitely Regressive", or "Finitely regressive". We don't know for sure which is real. So what I'm doing is saying, "Lets pretend one is real, what logical conclusions can we reach or not reach?"
Quoting Manuel
The argument that I'm making is that yes, the universe could be finitely or infinitely regressive, but that there logically can be no cause for why this should be. Many people say, "The universe could not have formed on its own," but my conclusion is, "The universe necessarily formed on its own".
No, sir, I also read your opening sentence:
Quoting Philosophim
Clearly it does not. This "concluded ... necessity" has long been refuted in both philosophy (logic) and physics (QG) which, like others on these fora, I've paraphrased
[quote=180 Proof]Re: the "kalam argument" fails ... https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/484423
Re: a physical interpretation ... https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/373602[/quote]
I know what causation means. I am familiar with pool tables. I don't think that's a good model for how the world, or causation, works. No need to go any further into it or send your discussion off on a tangent. I just wanted it to be clear that your assumption is not self-evident.
The best we can say is that the universe is all there is, unless the multiverse theory happens to be true, which is difficult to test at the moment.
If it is infinite however, it was never formed, it just is.
We have some evidence for a Big Bang, so maybe that happened and nothing occurred before that. In either case, I agree, I don't see why something other than the universe is needed, save the multiverse, which just pushes the question further away.
Sigh. For shame 180. I am not arguing the Kalem cosmological argument. It is irrelevant whether it is plank state or big bang. Why all the effort to not read and comment on the logic of the argument, instead of just reading and commenting on the logic of the argument? Enough straw men please?
Which if you feel that way, is fine. But why? You simply said, "I don't agree." and left it at that! I want other viewpoints other than my own. If you just say "No" and walk away, I'll never know if your view point is right.
No disagreement.
Quoting Manuel
Yes, I'm using the word "formed" but perhaps "incepted"? would be a better word? I originally wrote, "It just is" repeatedly in the lines, and while accurate, I felt I needed a word to encapsulate that phrase. So yes, that is the crux of the argument. If a universe is infinitely regressive, or finitely regressive, the reason for this is, "It just is." There can be no underlying reason for why the universe is. It simply is, no matter the type of origin we invent.
See Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason"
Quoting Philosophim
This is my counter to the OP's premises.
"The type of origin we invent" matters to the degree it is consistent with the best available observational data and measurements. Logic, as it were, is merely the syntax of any "origin we invent" and not metaphysically determinative as you apparently to believe.
Quoting Verdi
According to my argument, no. To disprove this, you either need to show a flaw in my logic, or show why it is logically necessary that the emergence of time must be preceded by time.
Quoting Artemis
That's a rather large topic that covers many points. You'll need to narrow down what specific points counter my reasons if we're to have a meaningful conversation. I have read it before, and I have a good understanding of the subject matter.
Quoting 180 Proof
Disappointing. You made a mistake in thinking it was a particular topic that it is not, and instead of bothering to read it and enter the conversation, you've doubled down on not reading it, and insisting its something that it is not. I expected better.
Time, irreversible motion, needs a starter kick to kickstart. As such, there had to exist time before, though this doesn't have to be an entropic time. Time is eternal by its nature. Now how can that come into existence? God knows.
Relax, it was just a book recommendation.
Besides the Principle of Sufficient Reason can only (without appeal to metaphysics, or more concretely ', physics) posit a prior cause.
I'm a little confused. A prior cause is X above. A first cause would have no prior cause, which I designate alpha.
I suppose I can lend my support to the OP, as best as I can that is.
1. Not everything is a cause. I once tried lifting a large rock and try as I might, the rock just wouldn't budge. Another time I pushed hard against a brick wall and then too the wall simply stood there without moving even an inch. Put differently, not everything has an effect or, more to the point, some things are not things that have effects.
Use a Venn diagram to get a clearer picture. Don't use the premise everything has a cause because that's a petitio principii.
Ergo,
2. It is possible some things are uncaused (Room enough for a first cause an uncaused cause)
Causal chains in the web of causation have dead ends - energy, as per thermodynamics, dissipates into unusable heat. Ergo, if science is correct, the universe should, at some point, come to a grinding halt - a car whose fuel guage reads empty slowly comes to a stop. Ergo, no causal loops possible.
Quoting Artemis
Not pertinent to the discussion. If you want to discuss book recommendations, I'm sure there's a post somewhere that would be happy to have you.
I'm just basing it off the PoSR. The PoSR can only stipulate an X, with only empirical observations entertaining an alpha, no?
It wasn't the intention. You gave me a counter to the Kalem argument as a counter to my argument, when my argument, wait for it...is a counter to the Kalem argument. I expect better of a long time forum goer as yourself to catch yourself on mistakes when pointed out, not double down.
However...I noticed you edited one of your earlier posts to include some actual substance. If we discuss this way, I don't care about the previous stuff. I just want a good conversation.
Quoting 180 Proof
Yes, I agree that the type of origin we invent must be consistent with the best available observational data and measurements. I note this in part 4 when describing an alpha. You can lead up the chain of causality to find the origin. The question is not about a specific origin like the big bang or plank space. It is the logical conclusion that there must be an origin of explanations that eventually arrives at the conclusion, "It just is".
The big bang, if it is the first cause, is. But even if we conceptualize the idea that there is infinite regression, the reason for why there is infinite regression does not have a prior cause, it simply is. Meaning that logically, there is something in our universe that has no prior reason for its existence. It simply is.
I thought you said you read it? :rofl:
Quoting Artemis
I thought you said it was just a book recommendation? Troll elsewhere Artemis.
There is no reason prior to observation, to believe that there is some prior causality to anything. It is the belief that there must be an X that drives us to look for that X. Hume called our belief in causality a "habit of the mind". While I disagree that we cannot eventually know causality upon study, the idea that there must be a prior causality is not a proven statement, but a belief. My conclusion here is that we can be logically certain that eventually there is something within the chain of causality that is not caused by anything prior.
But, ex nihilo arguments would seem to contradict a first cause argument. Or at least doesn't constitute a first cause, does it?
Mind stating which specific ex nihilo argument contradicts the points here? I just need more specifics, I am enjoying your points.
Something of the sort that something came out of nothing. Such as the existence of the universe, for example, according to some physicists.
Maybe you missed my most recent reply. Yes, I noted you linked the kalem argument and an argument about plank space. Neither of those arguments addressed the point I am making. Now, maybe they did. Feel free to point out specifically the parts of the argument that are countered by those arguments. If I am wrong, I will apologize without shame.
Further, one of your original posts I quoted you added some details to after. I caught the edit, and addressed them in my prior post. Again, no worry if we got off on the wrong foot or we misunderstood each other's intentions. All I want is a conversation from people who can examine the argument and provide good criticism for conversation.
Existence of the universe, existing universe. That's probably a term that would lead to less troubles than causes or reasons.
Yup. :up:
What that argument is doing is applying causality to "nothing". If I say, "Nothing caused this to exist," isn't it the same as saying, "This thing that exists has no prior cause?"
"Nothing" cannot cause something. That we logically know to be true. The argument shows that the only thing which must necessarily be, is that something within our universe has no reason for its existence, besides the fact of its existence. It has no prior cause for being. I note that this is logically necessary, because the only alternative that I can think of, "infinite regression" does not in fact have a prior reason as to why the universe should be infinitely regressive.
I think the opening for criticism here, is whether I am correct on that last part. What do you think? Can you point out a flaw there?
I would state at this point that this new possibility negates the necessarily so conclusion that there must have been a first cause.
That's just my take on the issue.
It would be nice to see that refutation by logic and physics. And to hear what you think the premise actually is. But if you cannot provide it, I have no choice but to think you either do not have that refutation by logic and physics, or you don't understand the premise. Later.
Hi Tim. Yes, this OP presupposed some information that absolutely should be defined.
Causality is the idea that a snapshot of existence is in the state that it is because of some prior state of existence. Lets use a pool table for example. If I shoot a cue ball into the 8 ball, a certain amount of force is applied to the cue ball, which then transfers to the 8 ball, which then sinks in the right corner pocket.
If we shake this magic 8 ball for a minute, we discover that it moved because of the force applied from the cue ball. In other words, the 8 ball didn't just move itself without any internal or external force. It did not move "simply because it moved". A first cause would be if the 8 ball moved and there was no reason why it should have moved, internally, or externally.
Does that clarify causality? Do you have another take on it?
A good conversation then. We'll have to go our own way with our own beliefs. I appreciate you taking the topic seriously. Have a good day!
For the reason I described - I thought my point was not central to your argument and I didn't want to send your discussion off on a tangent. Here are a few thoughts. I haven't written about this much, so this is not well developed argument:
The idea that causation is not a good way of thinking about how the word works is not a new one. Bertrand Russell wrote about it more than 100 years ago.
Sometimes it seems like all of philosophy comes back to the infinite regress argument. I've been surprised at some places it has shown up. People act as if it makes a difference, but it seems more of an aesthetic affectation than anything substantive. It seems like more trouble than it's worth.
The pool table is a metaphor often used to clarify the idea of causality. It represents a very simple closed system with no energy input from outside except for a single specific force applied at a specific point at a specific time. Nothing in the real world is that simple or that isolated.
In reality, if events are effects at all, they are caused by multiple, independent, long chains of events. Practically speaking, in almost any realistic real-world situation, those chains are impossible to chase back more than a step or two, it that.
Most of our understanding of the world is based on statistical effects. It's not the action of two balls on a pool table, it's the mass action of trillions of molecules in a tank. Pressure and temperature are not caused by molecular motion, they are defined by it.
I've run out of steam, but there's more I'm sure.
Could I get an example of a thing causing something to exist?
:roll: :confused:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/617855
Not a worry. We're here to discuss philosophy, and I'm interested to see other people's take.
Quoting T Clark
I agree 100%. I start by keeping things simple until people want to push it to the next level. In the same vein, there is nothing to necessitate there only be one first cause. There could have been many first causes. In theory, there could be first causes happening in the universe now that we're unaware of. But much like multiverse theory, its something we really can't test easily, if at all.
Sure, the usual example in philosophy is a cue ball hitting an 8 ball. The 8 ball exists in a new velocity state because the cue ball struck it with a certain amount of force. You could go plot the life of the entire ball up to its creation in the factory if you wanted.
Fine, this one time I'll go over your straw man arguments.
Your first link starts with,
"the premise [ ... ] everything has to have a cause to exist
— Varese
... is patently false. See Causa sui, etc ... follow links for further contexts."
So if you read the conclusion of the argument, you agree with me. A first cause is an "uncaused cause". It is existent without prior explanation. When I read the first sentence that agreed with my point, but you were implying it contradicted my point, I knew you hadn't read it.
Your second point in that same link was,
""3. An infinite regress ... is impossible"
False."
I never claim infinite regression is impossible. In fact, I assume its possible, and think about the consequences if it is true in the argument.
So again, your first link posits two points which agree with what I've stated in the argument. When you imply this counters my argument, what am I to think except for the fact that you didn't read it? If you were someone knew to philosophy, I would assume you simply didn't understand it. But combined with the initial troll in the beginning, I can only conclude you didn't read, and STILL haven't read it.
For your second post, the first two parts I have no disagreement with. Only your last part,
- Was there a first cause?
No.
disagrees with my end premise, but contains no explanation why there would be no first cause as defined in my argument. Just read the argument 180 proof. You clearly have the intelligence for it, and you might even agree with my conclusion.
Third possibility: "causation" is a concept of the mind, and does not have any application to things as they exist independently of it.
The classic Hume approach. I believe Hume is correct in our belief that consistent cause that will repeat in the future is something unknowable. Why should the rules of physics be the same tomorrow? That does not mean we cannot accurately find the rules of physics today through experimentation and scientific elimination. When we do have faith that causality will continue to work, our faith is fulfilled. It is the habit of belief that causality will be maintained that Hume rightly points out as an induction, but that does not deny that causality cannot be deduced.
Cause is generally measured through the application of distinct force over time. You can set the time scale to however back you wish. But what must be consistent is that a chain of force events occur that necessarily lead to the present time of the 8 ball. Clearly if some ne'er do well were to attempt to drop an 8 ball 3 stories up on my head, no court of law would question whether they attempted to use gravity to drop the 8 ball on my head. We can discuss the types of force involved, the scale of the forces involved, and scale of time involved, but no one denies that prior events cause the events of today.
And it is simply that cause that I am addressing. I do not think the argument stretches those limits, but perhaps you can point out where it does.
This is not a possibility, backed by the fact that you posted an argument on an online forum. Barring the fact that you were the cause of writing that argument, the internet and the computer you use could not work if cause was simply a concept of the mind, and not an independent reality.
Example of what? This sounds like a typical example of causality per se. My question is about what you mean causing something to exist.
Quoting Philosophim
Is there a new thing that exists when the 8 ball exists in a new velocity state?
Quoting Philosophim
Sure... would that be a new thing existing?
Now you impose your idea of causation into someone's mind. If the person addressed doesn't agree, your reality is wrong, and your idea of causality is just an idea then. Even if computers and the internet seem to conform to your idea. There can even be physics done without the use of time, without cause and effect, seeing the whole of existence as one instant happening, unstructured by cause and effect.
The internet and the computer I use are phenomena that are conditioned by the mental apparatus. Things in space and time have no independent existence outside of their appearance.
Yes, the 8 ball in a state of velocity is different from the 8 ball in a state of zero velocity. There is added heat to the ball through friction and the slight bend and reaction from the impact. The reason it is in the state of velocity at this particular shap shot is because a cue ball hit it one second ago. Depending on the scale of measurement, we could view the ball as merely an arrangement of atoms and elections. That is up to you. Create whatever scale you would like. I believe the argument isn't concerned with scale, though perhaps you can find a flaw in it if you do think there is a valid point here.
No, I'm not imposing anything. They made a claim. I pointed out a contradiction I saw with that claim. They are free to counter that point if they wish. We are here to think about things logically (as best we can, I fail too), so I am going to point out when I see a contradiction.
Lets say that physics can be done without cause an effect. That still does not counter my specific contradiction I pointed out to him. With even one instance of independent causality, it cannot be the case that causality is merely in the mind. The points I am making are about causality, and the logic we can conclude from it. If he cannot prove that causality does not exist, then my points still stand.
Your computer is a bunch of circuits and logic gates that only function because we know how they will respond once electricity is applied properly. If the gate is on, its true and lets electricity go to the next gate. If it is off, electricity is shunted to another gate. All of this necessitates that causality, independent of the human mind, exists. You believing that the computers circuitry does not exist when you aren't looking at it is not good enough for the chip manufacturers who ensure you received a working product.
I'm not clear how this is answering the question. Are you comparing the 8 ball before the cue ball hits it to the 8 ball after it hits it, or the 8 ball after the cue hits it to what would be the 8 ball were the cue ball not to hit it? And how does this relate to my question... what new thing was caused to exist?
Quoting Philosophim
This means nothing to me until you tell me what new thing was caused to exist.
Quoting Philosophim
You're a bit ahead of yourself here. I'm trying to figure out what you mean by causing something to exist, and you're having me pick scales for some reason or another.
Quoting Philosophim
Curious language... isn't this your argument? I would have thought you would be the authority on what was meant.
The presupposition of theory is that cause will continue into the future. That is the induction. That is what can never be truly known, because we cannot know until we step into the future and confirm it. Still, we take it on faith, and it has always been confirmed (so far).
Do you think the computer you are using doesn't use causality? I'm going to need a little more detail than the idea that some scientists in some things don't use causality anymore. As far as I know, every single thing manufactured and used in this world cannot be done without a fundamental understanding of causality. If you can grant me this much, then you should be armed to address the OP.
Disingenuious selective reading? You don't read my post, you post very selective readings, then when I read your selective readings and show they were straw men, you throw a pithy insult in an attempt to save face and run away?
Third parties ARE reading our posts, and you are setting a very poor example. I hope you're just having a bad day because you were incredibly disappointing.
What then do you see as one instance of independent causality, which is only an illusion on your part, as reality doesn't contain causation, as it's merely imparted on it by us, to make our way through space and time. Very usefull features, them cause and effect, but merely Illusions. As seen by the person you address. Is his view not corresponding to reality, because he made use of cause and effect himself?
It is my understanding of quantum mechanics, that matter and energy are continually being created and destroyed from nothing and to nothing in the quantum vacuum state.
My apologies if I've been confusing. The state of the cue ball in its new velocity is not the same as the cue ball without velocity. This is a "new" state caused by the cue ball's collision. Without the cue balls collision, or an equally placed force, the 8 ball would not be in its new state of velocity.
Verdi, when you press the key on your keyboard to type a message, does the message type? Doesn't the press of the physical key cause the letter to appear on you screen? Aren't you the one causing the message to be typed and sent to me? Or is that all in your mind?
When it gets compiled into very specific 1's and 0's sent over your line, read by a server that only responds very specifically to a set combination of 1's and 0's, is that not causality? If you can demonstrate that these instances are all in my mind, and do not exist independently of our observation, I will consider your proposal.
Would gravity be a force? Magnetism? The Higgs Mechanism?
Yes! You don't know how good it feels to finally speak with someone who is willing to take the conversation to its conclusion.
I realized it after I finished the proposal. After all, an uncaused cause does not necessarily have to remain existing. In fact, since an alpha would follow no rules for its being, it would seem that anything could form at equal likelihood. Why would a self-caused existence necessarily exist forever? If any period of time to exist is equally likely, as there would be no reason why it should or should not, by random chance most alphas would have a finite existence.
I've often wondered if that also means alphas would be "small". A self caused entity would be complete right? A complex "self-caused" entity would be several self caused entities that not only appeared in a specific order, but also would be able to interact in a way that remained stable. That's seems ridiculously unlikely. I've often wanted another person's take on this. What do you think?
I am not trying to put my own spin on force here. Yes. All of these are forces in physics.
I'm just trying to capture what you mean by causing something to exist. It sounds like it would be less confusing to just drop the exists part... at this point I'm not sure what the difference is between "cause things to exist" and just "cause things".
Yeah, but it's not that simple. If you want to talk about quantum mechanics and creation from nothing, they'll tell you the quantum vacuum isn't nothing. Anything that can cause something is, by definition, something.
If that would make things clearer, lets do that. Its about things being a state captured in time, another state captured later in time, and an explanation for why the state of the later is different form the former.
I got my degree in CS, I know how these things work...regardless, none of it necessitates that causality exists independently of the human mind. Rather, all it demonstrates is that our perception of computers always involves an element of causality.
There is the computer chip qua phenomena, which is conditioned by the pure sensible intuitions of space and time, and is understood through the application of concepts, one being causality; note that the computer chip qua phenomena is nothing when not considered in relation to them. Objects of perception are always in a relation to the mind, in that it is the mind that determines how the object is perceived.
The computer chip, as it exists independently of the human mind (qua noumena), is unknowable, i.e. it transcends the conditions of the possibility of experience.
Nothing ever is! The quantum vacuum is of course only a theory at this time. Many of its postulates are hypothetical. We know certain things are happening like particles popping in and out of existence, and this is an attempt to explain why.
But barring this, lets say it is real. What caused the quantum vacuum? And we're right back where we started. The existence of the quantum vacuum is irrelevant to the point made in the OP, because it is simply another Y.
This doesn't mean we should keep trying to look for prior to that which we discover causality, but logically, there will be a point that has no prior explanation for its existence. And if that is logically the case, what does that mean for the universe's existence? What potentials does that open up? Does this mean multiverse theory is not only plausible, but a logical certainty given enough time?
Let define what you mean by perception. When I think of perception, I think of the senses. Then there is interpretation of what those senses perceive. Finally, there is application. I cannot interpret a perception of sight if I am blind. Light within my eyes causes me to see, and my mind causes me to interpret that light a particular way. I can then analyze and think about how the light behaves, and how to use it.
But if I am blind, light still exists. My perception of it by sight is gone, but it is still around. This is evidenced by there being blind people in the world and light still exists. If you are going to go into solipsism, I decline as that goes too far out of the topic we are covering.
If you understand CS, then you understand causality. Unless there is a language barrier, I can't think of anything more plain to prove that causality exists apart from direct perception than that.
Not solipsism, transcendental idealism.
Quoting Philosophim
The objects that you describe cannot be described independently of a reference to the mind. They exist in space and time and are understood through the application of concepts like causality.
We do not experience causality! We experience phenomena, arranged in an order in space and time, and apply the concepts of cause-and-effect to these phenomena.
None of this entails that things only exist if they are perceived, or that there is nothing outside of our perceptions. But it does entail that the things that we perceive, as they are perceived, are nothing outside of this condition.
Yes, a certainty. Besides, if one universe can become, so then can another.
I was going to say "But then all of what we call 'reality' is just an 'observer's account.' But then you wrote:
Quoting tim wood
Quoting tim wood
I guess it's no surprise we agree n this.
Quoting tim wood
I like this too.
Different from the former as opposed to same as the former?
I'm convinced this is what happens. But there might exist views, realities, ways of looking, even opinions, which see all the causal happenings you (as I!) have in mind, are just illusionary qualities, like time can be illusionary. You might have the feeling that all this change and xausal, and timelike behavior we see around us is really out there (like I do!), but you can just as well ignore all that and claim that it's all a persistent and stubborn illusion, and that it's you who is having the illusion (though I'm not sure if you would have any reason to notify you then, because also that would be an illusion).
The problem here is you just keep saying an idea, but you're providing no evidence. Try to explain how a computer chip works without causality. If you can do it, I think you'll have something.
Yes! Isn't that neat? Opposed to multiverse theory being something we entertain for fun, it becomes something we can view as a logically likely reality.
I feel at this point you have something you want to say. Feel free to. Once I understand the larger point, I think we can get all of your questions out of the way at once.
If I understand you correctly Verdi, you take a more Eastern direction of philosophy. By the way, I do enjoy it, and feel it has its time and place. But this is more of a Western philosophy. I am not asking you to change your mind, just understand that I do not feel an Eastern style philosophy will fit in with what I'm doing here. If you want to entertain some Western style philosophy, just charitably entertain the idea that causality exists as stated, and see if my conclusions have merit, or if they are flawed.
But this was just exactly my point. Causality is applied in order to understand phenomena; it is not a phenomena itself. The operation of the computer chip is understood through the application of the principle of cause and effect. "Evidence" (empirical collections of data) is the wrong thing to ask for, since such a thing could not exist if it were not for causality itself.
What you need to demonstrate is that this causality has a reality in-itself, and is not just a function of the mind. Again, the computer chip as phenomena is understood through causality. But for what reason should we believe causality exists beyond this? You have simply taken it for granted that the conjunction of phenomena in successive time by rules has a valid application beyond these phenomena.
Honestly, no, I'm still trying to analyze this. I can still see what you possibly mean branching off in a few different directions, and I don't quite know which one you'll take. I reserve the right to make a point later, if I have one to make; but for now, I'm just trying to figure out where you're coming from.
The question I just asked is similar to a question a couple of posts ago. You're talking about an explanation for a "different" state. I'm trying to figure out if this is some counterfactual difference you're talking about, or just a change.
Honestly, you've lost me at this point. I've given a few clear examples of computers. I'm waiting for you to give me an example of how a computer works without causality. How did you post your reply to me without you being the cause of it? We are past generalities at this point, and are in the realm of specifics.
"Phenomena" is a dangerous word that is often thrown around without any real definition. Please explain what you specifically mean with phenomena as well. You should be able to explain your concept without using the word, and I will understand what you are intending to argue.
The First Cause ever writes the 'verses…
All the temporary complexities
From the Eterne must someday fade away,
Namely, our universe with its grandness
Dispersing its greatness into blandness.
In between, the Basis writes a story
That gets lived by the transients within,
As us and all the stars, moons, and planets—
In our book from the Babel Library.
…
When the universe ends—sparse photons left,
All splendor, life, and objects will have gone
The way that all temporaries must go,
To oblivion—oh, grand complexities!
Only the Eternal Basis remains
As potential for all possible books
In Everything’s Babel Repository
To author another universe’s story.
That's very fair. I've been on a computer chips kick in my posts, so I suppose I'll continue with them.
A transistor can either be on, or off. If it is on, the electricity will travel through the gate. When it is off, the electricity is cut off. Imagine that we have power constantly running to the transistor. Now imagine that the circuit is complete. We have electricity traveling that circuit. What caused electricity to travel the entirety of the circuit? At a particular scale we can say, "The gate was on". Or we could be more detailed and say, "And the electricity was on."
But lets say I look at the circuit one second later, and the electricity is still flowing through the circuit. Why is the circuit flowing? The answer is the same, but time has changed. The scale that I spoke about earlier is how much time you wish to pass, and what scale of change you want to attribute. I gave to the scale of the electricity and the gate, but perhaps someone could use the scale of human beings. I could say, "The reason the circuit if flowing is because I turned it on.
Why I think you should chime in with your own opinions right now is I can go incredibly detailed on this, and it could branch out into a topic of its own. If I go too detailed, I might confuse you. Finally, the whole point of causality is for the argument I made, and I don't want to go off on a major tangent.
Very nice. Was that of your own making or taken from somewhere?
It's the beginning and end of my longer poem about the First Cause being the quantum fields.
[b]Deriving the Narrative Uni-Versed Poem
Of Our Poetic Universe of the Cosmos[/b]
All the temporary complexities
From the Eterne must someday fade away,
Namely, our universe with its grandness
Dispersing its greatness into blandness.
In between, the Basis writes a story
That gets lived by the transients within,
As us and all the stars, moons, and planets—
In our book from the Babel Library.
What’s Fundamental has to be partless,
Permanent and e’er remain as itself;
Thus, it can only form temporaries
Upward as rearrangements of itself.
Change, change, change… constant change, as fast as it
Can happen, the speed of light being foremost
The speed of causality, over 13 billion years,
From the simple on up to the more complex.
[hide="Reveal"]The ‘vacuum’ has to e’er jitter and sing,
This base existent forced as something,
Given the nonexistence of a ‘Nothing’;
If it tries to be zero, it cannot.
At the indefinite quantum level,
Zero must be fuzzy, not definite;
So it can’t be zero, but has to be
As that which is ever up to something.
What’s continuous means a field, naught else,
That waves; ‘Stillness’ is impossible.
A field has a changing value everywhere,
For the ‘vacuum’ e’er has to fluctuate.
The fields overlap and can interact;
So, there is one overall field as All.
It’s the basis of all that is possible—
From another forced default, of motion.
From field points moving in their one degree
Quantum field waverings have to result
From their dragging e’er on one another.
Points are the bits that form letters’ strokes.
As sums of harmonic oscillators,
Fields can only form their elementaries
At stable quanta energy levels;
Other excitation levels don’t persist.
Since the quantum fields are everywhere,
The elementaries as kinks can move
To anyplace in the realms of the fields;
As in a rope, only the quanta move.
At each level of organization
Of temporaries in the universe
New capabilities become available,
And so they take on a life of their own
In addition to what gives rise to them.
The great needle plays, stitches, winds, and paves
As the strands of quantum fields’ webs of waves
That weave the warp, weft, and woof, uni-versed,
Into being’s fabric of Earth’s living braids.
Quantum fields are the fundamental strokes
Whose excitations at harmonics cloaks
The field quanta with stability
To persist and obtain mobility.
As letters of the Cosmic alphabet,
The elementary particles beget,
Combining to words to write the story
Of the stars, atoms, cells, and life’s glory.
This is the Poetic Universe.
The weave of the quantum fields as strokes writes
The letters of the elemental bytes—
The alphabet of the standard model,
Atoms then forming the stars’ words whose mights
Merge to form molecules, as the phrases,
On to proteins/cells, as verse sentences,
In to organisms ‘stanza paragraphs,
And to the poem stories of the species.
Of this concordance of literature,
We’re the Cosmos’ poetic adventure,
Sentient poems being unified-verses,
As both the contained and the container.
We are both essence and form, as poems versed,
Ever unveiling this life’s deeper thirsts,
As new riches, through strokes, letters, phonemes,
Words, phrases, and sentences—uni versed.
We have rhythm, reason, rhyme, meter, sense,
Metric, melody, and beauty’s true pense,
Revealed through life’s participation,
From the latent whence into us hence.
From quantum non-locality entanglement,
We know that information’s primary
Over distance, that objects don’t have to
Be near each other to have relation.
Everything connected to everything
Would seem to be a ‘perception’ as an
All-at-onceness, so a particle
Might ‘know’ something about what to do.
Informationally derived meanings
Unify in non-reductive gleanings,
In a relational reality,
Through the semantical life happenings.
This is a realm of happenings, not things,
For ‘things’ don’t remain the same on time’s wings.
What remains through time are processes—
Relations between different systems.
Syntactical information exchange,
Without breaking of the holistic range,
Reveals the epic whole of nature’s poetics,
Within her requisite of ongoing change.
So there’s form before gloried substance,
Relationality before the chance
Of material impressions rising,
Traced in our world from the gestalt’s dance.
All lives in the multi–dimensional spaces
Of basic superpositional traces
Of Possibility, as like the whirl’s
Probable clouds of distributed paces.
What remains unchanged over time are All’s
Properties that find expression, as laws,
Of the conservation of energy,
Momentum, and electric charge—unpaused.
…
A poem is a truth fleshed in living words,
Which by showing unapprehended proof
Lifts the veil to reveal hidden beauty:
It’s life’s image drawn in eternal truth.
A poem is both the thought and the presence,
An object born from one’s profoundest sense,
An image of diction, feeling, and rhythm;
It’s both the existence and the essence.
Poetry makes clear what’s just barely heard,
For it translates soul-language into words,
Whereas, music plays right on the heartstrings;
Merged, they create song; heart and soul converge.
Poems are renderings of the soul’s spirit,
The highest power of language and wit.
The reader then translates back to spirit;
If the soul responds, then a poem you’ve writ!
…
Oh, those imaginings of what can’t be!
Such as Nought, Stillness, and Permanence,
As well as Apart, Beginning, and End,
The Unfixed Will, Blame, Fame, and Theity.
…
When the universe ends—sparse photons left,
All splendor, life, and objects will have gone
The way that all temporaries must go,
To oblivion—oh, grand complexities!
Only the Eternal Basis remains
As potential for all possible books
In Everything’s Babel Repository
To author another universe’s story.[/hide]
PU has truly a Natural gift! He senses the universe better than most cosmologists or high-energy particle physicists!
Hume: There is no logical necessity in causality. No reason why if the first two times I hit a ball and it rolled away, at a particular speed and direction, the third time I repeat my action, the ball should faithfully replicate the behavior precisely as before.
The idea of cause, we can forget about first cause, as having to do with logical necessity is a category mistake - like saying red is loud!
I've read your Hartle–Hawking state as a background to "planck-scale event, therefore acausal" universe.
from here:
Unless I'm misquoting you, how does this oppose the first cause?
Hartle–Hawking state says nothing about lack of first cause except that BB didn't produce time and space.
It only assumes time and space was there before BB.
You said "planck-scale event, therefore acausal"
however:
Therefore no lack of first cause or mention of that.
First cause in BB is unknown because of "infinitely dense mass" as an explanation before plank epoch.
You mean quantum gravity could be the first cause? ex. inside or outside singularity.
At the singularity there was no mass yet. Only an extreme high spatial tension on the fluctuating field (which means, the virtual particle fields). The extreme high negative curvature (DE!) pushed that virtual stuff into real stuff, and fluctuating time got its entropy-based, irreversible direction. There was no infinitely dense mass as an explanation before the Planck epoch. There was only a Planck-sized fluctuation which took of inflationary when fluctuating time fluctuated above a threshold (and below).
Quoting 180 Proof
I see what you meant, sorry.
I ques by "planck scale" you are referring to singularity (it's micro size), initial point?
What I don't get though, in relation to BB planck scale must have converted to "macro" at some point because otherwise there shouldn't have been BB, but rather just stay at what it was, a singularity surrounded empty space and time.
I mean, explosion itself is a reaction which must be caused by something or there is no explosion.
Quoting Verdi
You're saying matter and energy come to be out of virtual particles and their tensions?
The virtual particle fields (only two, basically, but that's not so important now), concentrated not in a point but on a small Planck-sized spatial structure, are the cause of negative curvature, and this negative curvature pushes the particles into a real state, a bit like Hawing radiates from the event horizon of a black hole.
Look at the singularity as imposed on the negatively curved part of the structure in this video (ignore the positively curved part(:
Imagine the sizes Planckian.
Conclusion:
A sphere with a radius of 0, which has a curvature with infinity.
A point with infinite curvature is known as singularity.
This is possible to calculate toward singularity, but the opposite, that is to go out of 0 where curvature is infinite is impossible and unimaginable. It's like saying: infinity - 0.00...1 or abs(0, 0 + (+-inf))
That's why I don't believe in BB and "infinitely dense mass" because it doesn't make sense to me.
Thanks for the video though, very informative. :smile:
The concept of the infinite dense is problematic indeed. A classical view on spacetime with point particles in it is bound to get into trouble, be it in a black hole, be it in a big bang model. Empty space is not empty though, and particles not pointlike (like in string theory, which gives trouble and is just math, so another picture of a non-pointlike particle is needed, where all particles are able to sit on top of each other, like circles on a cilinder.
This can save the BB, in combination with virtual quantum fields, everywhere and always present. Why you don't like it?
What an absolutely fantastic skill! Well done, and thank you.
1. Time is fundamental and therefore causality is too and causality follows time.
2. Time is an emergent property and therefore causality is too and causality follows time. http://thescienceexplorer.com/universe/connection-between-dark-energy-and-time-was-discovered-physicists
3. Time is indistinguishable from causality and fundamental or time follows from causality. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_sets
4. Time is fundamental but causality isn't.
5. Causality is invariant from time. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/CausalInvariance.html
Considering the symmetry of physical laws you'd think moving forward or backward in time is entirely possible, which is just another way of breaking causality. The mathetmatics don't care as far as I understand Feynman's explanation of it (The Character of Physical Law). Randomness can result in a decrease of entropy as well, it's just very unlikely. I don't think we really understand at this time why that is; why we only observe "moving forward in time" and an overall increase in entropy.
I strongly agree with your point that asking what came before the planck-epoch becomes incoherent because there was no notion of time to refer to on the basis of the no-boundary theory and therefore non notion of causality in the classical sense. There are options open for causality at planck scales though, which aren't base don the classical notion. Not that I have an inkling how likely any of that is. Just interesting stuff I found when researching my short story earlier this year.
Not a worry. I'm thinking at this point that I did not write a clear enough idea in my desire to keep it within a certain size. That is on me, and no one else.
About Hume, Hume was talking about causality as an induction of belief about the future. In other words, there was no reason to believe the rules of causality (or really, rules of anything) would be the same tomorrow. However, that doesn't mean we cannot test the rules of today, and come to the conclusion that causality exists. Hume noted that our belief that the rules would be stable tomorrow could be nothing more than a belief. So far, that belief has held true. So can we know the future? Never.
So in the same vein, we can examine the distant past. Perhaps it is the case that billions of years ago, the rules of the universe functioned differently. Perhaps objects existed that were pure chaos and had no explanation for their being. While we can trace up what the past "should" be if the rules are the same, its really a matter of faith. Still, I think its a matter of faith we can cling to. Further, I can see no alternative to chaos and causality. Chaos is essentially a first cause, while causality is the expected response to external forces.
So, with the inductive belief that causality still existed back then, and as I have no other belief in my mind, I try to come to a logical conclusion with causality, and with a first cause, what must necessarily exist without prior causality.
Here you are. Rather than addressing general issues of causation, as others have done, I will go over the argument as it is presented.
Initially causation is treated as a temporally asymmetric relationship between facts or states of affairs (at least that's my fair reading of it). I will refer to this as "state causality" for short. Then an oddly titled premise 4 throws in a range of much less specific epistemological notions: reason, explanation, justification:
Quoting Philosophim
What should have been a simple tautology - a state of affairs defined as having no prior cause can have no prior cause - is suddenly expanded into a much more general epistemological thesis, and even a controversial metaphysical thesis of causa sui is thrown in.
Setting aside this oddity and summarizing the setup of the argument, three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive possibilities for the causal history of the world are presented:
A. An infinite causal regress of facts or states of affairs.
B. A causal loop.
C. A first uncaused cause.
The main argument is contained in this paragraph:
Quoting Philosophim
This attempts to rule out (A) and (B), leaving (C) as the only remaining possibility. But the argument equivocates between general notions of reasons and explanations and the more specific notion of state causality that was used in setting up the argument.
If we try to interpret "reason" in line with state causality, then the conclusion doesn't follow. The argument essentially says that since neither an infinite regress nor a causal loop admit a first cause, therefore a first cause must be the case.
If instead we interpret "reason" as justification, then the argument appears to say that neither of the propositions (A) nor (B) are self-justifying. But in fairness, the same is true of proposition (C). Presented with either of the three possibilities - infinite regress, circular causality or first cause - one can ask for reasons for why that is the case. @Philosophim attempts to smuggle some semblance of self-justification into premise (4), but that can't be left to stand without an argument. And besides, if it could be shown that (C) contains within itself a justification for itself, then no other argument would be needed.
Why not? Why can't I simply ask, "What caused the plank scale to exist?" Either something caused it to exist, or it exists simply because it does, without a prior explanation.
Isn't this the same argument the theists have been making about God for centuries? Considering plank space is only a theory at this point with many untested assertions, isn't this just a more detailed God argument?
If plank space is caused then there is a prior or underlying reason for its being. If plank space is uncaused, then there is no reason for its existence, besides the fact that it exists. And if something could be that has no prior causality, then logically, you can't conclude any reason why it exists. Meaning you cannot conclude that time did not exist prior to plank space either. It is the same reason why the Kalem cosmological argument fails.
Just because something cannot be caused in a classical mechanical view of causality does not mean there's no reason why it exists. The problem is you keep talking about time and causality surrounding circumstances that aren't subject to those notions. It's incoherent to consider questions about time and causality surrounding the planck epoch.
:up: :100: It's either #2 (e.g. Rovelli / Deutsch) or #4 (e.g. Smolin) make sense to me. However, I/we/they don't know enough yet to determine which makes more sense than the other.
If a thing has a reason for its existence, that means something caused it to exist. Explain to me how plank space isn't subject to causality, don't simply assert it as if it is true. I didn't buy it in the Kalem argument, and I don't buy it now. I'm asking a perfectly coherent question. Don't simply assert that its incoherent, show why its incoherent.
I have immense gratitude that someone finally took up the argument properly. You may be correct in 4. What I was trying to explain is the consequence of that tautology. While I believe it is a necessary point to explain, it may have been placed at the wrong point of the argument.
Quoting SophistiCat
I would reword it to this: "The argument essentially says that since neither an infinite regress nor a causal loop have a prior cause for existing, we can only conclude these are themselves first causes.
In other words, there is no prior state that necessitates there exist the state of an infinite regress, or a finite regress. If you try to, you simply introduce a prior cause, and we're in the same position again. As such, the only logical conclusion is that the universe must have a first cause. The consequences of this have been discussed in a few posts here. If the argument is satisfactory to you, feel free to add to these discussions. If not, feel free to continue to critique.
I'm still not sure you answered my question.
Quoting Philosophim
So let's go the other way. There's no electricity flowing out of the transistor. Can we ask what caused no electricity to flow out of the circuit? Can the answer be, "The gate was off" and/or "the electricity was off"?
How does plank space dodge spacetime? Are you saying it takes up no space? Then it is nothing, or God. I believe we both know arguments that have justified God this way are wrong. Why would it be any different here? Are you saying there is no time? Time is merely state change. Does the plank state never change? If it is outside of time, how can it interact with our universe in time? If it is outside of space, how can it interact with space?
Despite all of these questions, I also don't want to miss the point of the OP. If it does not have a prior explanation for its existence, then it is a first cause. In my mind, all you're stating at this point is that you believe this is the first cause, opposed to God, or even the big bang. This does not counter the argument I've made.
Yes, you've nailed it.
Quoting Philosophim
Like causality, spacetime is a classical concept (macro) that has no physical meaning at or shorter than a planck length (c10^-35 meters) or a planck interval (c10^-44 seconds) (nano).
A first cause has no prior cause. The point of the argument is that this is ultimately the universe will have a first cause origination. If you would like to show where the argument is incorrect, feel free.
Isn't measurement a way we measure space? It doesn't matter how small it is, what you are describing fits in space. You also dodged my point about time. Can its state change over time? Can it interact with space time? If so, its not out of space time. That fits the definition of something being in space time. If you can explain how it doesn't, please try.
So to me, it sounds like your notion of causality is similar that of "reason" in the Principle of Sufficient Reason, with the exception that I've yet to hear a commitment to sufficiency. I'd now like to explore sufficiency.
We have an atom that can, in a duration of time x, decay with 50% probability. Between times t0 and t1=t0+x, it did not decay. Between times t1 and t2=t1+x, it decayed. Let's call the time from t0 to t1 time span 1, and from t1 to t2 time span 2. Can we describe the cause of the decay in time span 2 as opposed to the lack of decay in time span 1? Can we say this cause in time span 2 is attributed to the properties contributing to 50% decay rate, and also that the cause of it not decaying in time span 1 is attributed to the properties contributing to 50% decay rate?
Lets remember what odds are first however. Odds are a predictive model we use when we are limited in knowing particular information. Lets use an easier model to digest, as odds work the same no matter the complexity. Take a deck of playing cards. I know there are 52 cards. I'm going to draw a card after shuffling, without looking at the cards. There is a 4 out of 52 chance that the card drawn is a jack. We know this, because we know what the cards are made of, and we know the rules of drawing the deck. Probability is based on the knowable parts, and the knowable outcomes. It is a way to predict when we cannot observer the mechanism that will lead to one of the knowable outcomes.
Does that mean the cards don't follow causality? Does that if we could see the deck as it was being shuffled, that the jack would magically appear on the top of the deck outside of the shuffling? No. If the deck could avoid causality, then our odds would be worthless. If that did not explain what you were asking, please try to rephrase the question with a deck of cards example.
The following points come to mind (in addition to a possible critique of causality itself):
1) It seems to me that if there can be such a thing as an uncaused cause, then there could be several such things. There is no apparent reason to limit the number of "uncaused causes" to 1, so there could be a large number of "first causes", if those are defined as "uncaused causes".
2) If the law of reaction is true, then whenever object A has an effect on object B, B also has an effect on A. Therefore, a "cause" is a two-way street, an interaction, so there can be no such thing as an uncaused cause (at least if the law of reaction is universally true).
The subject matter in this case makes clear you are correct, a first cause is logically necessary. The continuation of the subject matter also makes clear you are not correct, in that a first cause is logically impossible. Not sure why the discussion, if you’ve understood the argument pre-dating it, that says it better.
—————-
Quoting Philosophim
Check me on my reduction: the only necessary existence is something that exists, because it exists? If that’s correct, it’s merely Aristotle revisited: that which exists, exists necessarily. That doesn’t say that which exists necessarily doesn’t have a cause. To do so implies necessity is causality, a most serious categorical error.
Besides in the first....if that something is in our universe, how is it impossible the universe isn’t the necessity of its cause?
Besides in the second......the only thing that must necessarily be, is something that has no reason to be, is indulgently self-contradictory. The best one can say is, that which exists without at least a logical reason is utterly incomprehensible to us as humans, whose intellect is entirely predicated a priori on the principle of cause and effect.
Infinite regression wouldn’t have a reason for the universe being infinitely regressive? The universe, as a phenomenal existence, exists necessarily, as already established by the condition of something which is contained in it, thus eliminating infinitely causal regression for it, so who cares about the fact infinite regression has no prior reason for why it should be? Infinite regression itself has no priors at all, but the universe does, it being the effect of something, be what it may.
If there is something said to exist within the universe necessarily given from the fact of its reality, why not the universe itself? If that something’s cause isn’t infinitely regressive, why should the universe’s? The cause of the cause is not at issue; the subject here is a given real existence, whether a something, or a something known as “universe”.
————-
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
Why would it? A first cause is unconditioned, true enough, but the unconditioned necessarily presupposes the series of all possible conditions, which says nothing whatsoever about the idea of causality. All causes, as principles, have objects in their respective effects; causality, as mere idea and not in itself a principle, has no object. To claim causality has an object is reification of an abstraction in concerto, a logical no-no. That certain temperature or pressure is necessary to turn water into ice doesn’t clarify necessity. That jumping up is followed by falling down doesn’t clarify unity.
Anyway.....the same dance but to a different tune, is still the same dance. It just looks funny.
Of course there is not such thing as "uncaused cause", because otherwise scientists would already long time ago sing their victory over God.
The headlines would be all over the internet and local TV stations, common man.
The lowest point that scientists come to are virtual particles, their sudden and fast appearance and disappearance is known as "uncertain", which is far from uncaused cause.
Singularity breaks the laws of physics, it can be simulated only mathematically again into infinity therefore no result.
To break that infinity we would have to know the limits of whole universe, not just observable portion.
That song has been sung, I think.
I guess you're referring to string theory and multiverse, because that's the only one that attempts to "solve" infinity or unobservable universe, which are theories for which one can't even perform experiments, so very far from any proof.
If not then it must be a good joke unless they managed to prove Aristotle wrong.
Agree, scientists have already overcome and shown that cause-effect is a naïf-intuition that works well in our daily life but it breaks as you go macro or micro...
Can we common-mortals understand and comprehend this? NO. It requires strong and strict study on physics as well as "playing" a lot with new technologies that allow you to interact and exercise with the counter-intuitive micro quantum world.
This reality is only accessible to few people in the world. It is ineffable using current language and is only represented by formulas and mathematical language that "represent" those counter-intuitive laws.
And this ineffable reality is as real as it is the mobile phone and the TVs you have today in your homes. They work thanks to scientists understanding this counter intuitive reality.
Ah OK, I guess I'm uninformed then :worry:
But you the famous question right, what is truth?
Truth is a correct enough representation of reality, no?
Indeed. See "Three senses of the word ‘cause'" in Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics.
I can't make sense of this. You presented three alternative hypotheses - infinite regress, causal loop, first cause - each of which encompasses all states of the world at all times. It is trivial to conclude that none of these alternatives admits of a prior state, since that would require an additional, unaccounted state. Nothing interesting follows from this, nor is the first cause hypothesis any different from the other two in this regard.
I think the idea that you are reaching for is not first cause but brute fact. Each of the alternatives is a brute fact in this presentation, since there is no reason/explanation/justification for whichever one of them actually obtains (at least not in this context).
Not... exactly.
Quoting Philosophim
You tell me. I'm still asking you what your concept of causality is. It appears to me that you are indeed committing to sufficiency here though.
Quoting Philosophim
Hmmm... that might be interesting. Okay.
Let's imagine you and I are playing a card game; here is how it works.
We take turns. I always shuffle the deck (incidentally, I am not necessarily being fair; take that into account). After the shuffle, I deal three cards in front of you face down... left, right, and center. Then it's hands off for me; the rest is entirely on you.
Here's what you do. You pick any two of those cards... your choice. If the two cards are the same color (both black, both red), you win. If the two cards are different colors (black/red, red/black), you lose. I offer you two to one odds; you pay me $1 if I win (<- corrected), and I pay you $2 if you win. FYI, there are only ever two colors when you turn the cards over; each card is always either red, or black.
So here's the first question. Is this a fair game? Can you prove it? Can you work out the minimal probability that you'll win?
So here's a quick cheat sheet. Somehow, you lose 75% of the time. That's just a given. If you play 1000 times, you just plain lose around 750 times. Play 10000, and you just plain lose around 7500 times. Can you tell me how that works?
The game is not fair in that the chance on winning and losing is the same, if played fair. Well, they differ a bit as there are relative very few more different cards combinations. So the chance of getting two the same is slightly less. If 75 percent of the time one looses, then the play ain't fair, although you can always say that it's a coincidence. Paying 2$ and 1$ ain't fair, as the chances are the almost the same.
That's good. Even if we reason that there is no alternative to the Existent having to ever be, with no creation of it, it's still a brute fact with some understanding to why it has to be brute.
All of our local seeming causes and effects from what the Existent forms are really just the continuing one big effect of the Existent. For the convenience of calculations and localizing to an event of interest, we place artificial boundaries to bound our local notion of a cause and effect.
The Permanent Existent formed our temporary universe, and so it could form more universes.
That's correct. Eight isn't a large number, so let's list them. The possible arrangements are BBB, BBR, BRB, BRR, RBB, RBR, RRB, and RRR.
Quoting tim wood
That's also correct. But I think you're missing this:
Quoting InPitzotl
So there are 24 possibilities here, but that doesn't mean they're equally likely. I could be stacking the deck. So pretend you're me, maybe. How would you rig the odds? Well, in the BBB and RRR case, you're guaranteed to win... so maybe I just never give you those deals.
So let's say I do that. I'm only going to give you BBR, BRB, BRR, RBB, RBR, and RRB deals. Now how often do you win?
Quoting tim wood
It's not really that kind of puzzle. The whole point of this puzzle is that it looks fishy. It's more relevant that it looks fishy than that you solve it (it's also not new; though it's slightly in disguise here).
1. Nailed it. I find this exciting, and leads to new questions. Does this mean multiverse for example, is no longer a plausible theory, but almost logical certainty? A self explained existence does not need to exist forever. If any lifespan has an equal chance of forming, then wouldn't the universe be full of entities popping in and out of existence?
2. Almost correct. An uncaused cause has no prior reason for its existence. But what follows from its entering into existence would affect itself as well, yes. I would go so far to propose that a self explained entity could be completely indistinguishable from entities around it, besides the fact that its origin did not rely on anything else but its own existence. Proving an entity is self explained if it appeared and blended within a sea of existence that had already formed might prove impossible, as we might simply attribute the laws that are already around us on it, and merely assume things came before it, that in fact did not. I encourage you to let your imagination run wild here, its quite fun!
No, that's not what I'm saying. There is no necessary existence. It is simply that if we are to think about the end logic of causality, it is necessary that there must be a place in the chain that has no prior explanation for its existence.
Quoting Mww
I've heard things like this before, and I consider it wrong. If I can logically conclude that it must exist, then it must. At that point, I can start thinking about the logical consequences of such an existence. Knowing that such things must exist in the universe we inhabit may allow us to consider threads of thought we may have dismissed. Man has always tried to grasp the incomprehensible. At one time, the idea of space was outside of man's intellectual and physical capabilities. Theories spring to ideas which can then be tested. To me, this is an essence of philosophy. To reach for the things just out of our grasp, and see if we can actually reach it.
Quoting Mww
At this point I think you've strayed too far from the OP. The argument is that there essentially is the possibility of infinite regressive causality, or finite regressive causality. Yet the argument concludes that even when we propose an infinite regressive causality, it is impossible to escape that fact that if it is infinitely regressive in causality, that there can be no outside reason for this, but the fact of its own existence.
There are certain theories of math and philosophy that have succeeded by showing certain things are impossible, thus leaving us with a known alternative. That's essentially what the argument is doing.
According to my OP, it is actually the opposite that is true. It is impossible for there not to be an uncaused cause. Feel free to critique the OP and see if you can find a hole.
Feel free to attempt to show why cause and effect break down then. The idea that only a few people can comprehend this is, in my mind, an excuse for being unable to explain an idea in a way that fits with reality. Are you saying there are times in physics where a force can be applied and there is literally zero affect, both on the applying force, and receiving force? I would like to see that.
Sure, good example. What you're talking about is measurement of scale. I've written an old post that goes into a theory of knowledge and breaks down that very type of question. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge/p1 Suffice to say, its too complex for me to go over in this topic. So for my part, I am completely confident that cause and effect are more than convenient adoption of language, but real world applications that are expressed within expanding or contracting contexts. Again, I would love to speak on it more in depth, but I would derail my own thread!
Perhaps you can't think of anything interesting that follows from this, but I can. The idea that first cause entities are logically necessary is fascinating to me. This makes it more than a supposition, but a sound logical conclusion to follow. What does that entail for our universe? This leads to entirely knew philosophical threads that have this idea as a logical basis to start.
Quoting SophistiCat
That's likely just a semantic distinction then. If you want to call a first cause a "brute fact", that's fine. My question of course is why does that brute fact exist? In which case we can say, "It doesn't have anything prior that caused it to be, it just is." So I don't think we're in disagreement here.
No, I can't. That's because probability requires a certainty of certain facts for formulation. As soon as you said, "I might not be necessarily being fair," you remove the ability to make an accurate assessment of odds. Lets say for example you win 75% of the time, even though the odds if you were playing fair might be higher or lower. That doesn't mean that you were cheating.
There is a method in statistics called T-distribution. With this, we can calculate the likelihood of standard deviation. Further, I would have to play a large sample size of games to get a fair distribution. Even then, without knowing whether you are an honest player or not, I couldn't be sure the game was fair. It might be incredibly unlikely that I lose 75% of the time, but its not impossible.
The question is not in the cards or the game, but in the unknowable mind of yourself. When there is a variable that is completely unknowable, but can greatly affect the outcome, you cannot calculate accurate odds. At that point you have have to make your best guess as to whether it is fair or not, and live with that decision.
To the point though, does this help explain my viewpoint of causality?
Edit: I read the discussion between you and the others after posting this, so you can be sure this was my personal and honest view, and not influenced by the other conversations.
I think you're misreading the game. I can be unfair, but I can't change the game being played. All I can do is be maximally unfair but follow all of the rules.
Quoting Philosophim
You're trying too hard. We're not talking about "in a given run". We're talking about, I set up a casino, you come play, and I have a viable business model where your funds slowly drain into my casino.
Quoting Philosophim
And we're not talking about a puzzle you have to guess right at either. This is open ended. You can look up the answer. You can have other people do the work. I'll work it out myself, and you can use my workbook.
@tim wood gave an excellent crack at it here. I followed up with a few more details here. Picking up from there, assuming I cheat like I outlined in that post, all of the rest of the arrangements are symmetric... they're all of some form "PPM" where P is either red or black, in some permutation. In this arrangement you can pick either the first and second, the first and third, or the second and third cards; and you only win if you pick the first and second. So you win 1/3 of the time. This is where the puzzle gets fishy; in BBB or RRR arrangements, you win 100% of the time. In any other arrangement, you win 1/3 of the time. But when you actually play, you win 1/4 of the time. The 1/4 actuals seem a bit impossible to rig. But 1/4 is what we get.
The point of this game is that it is Bell's Theorem in disguise (as you requested; rephrased as a deck of cards example). The arrangements here are possible "riggings" that Terra Mater could make up; these are Hidden Variables. A meta-theory of how I might rig the game would be a Hidden Variable Theory. The analysis that the riggings only get down to your winning 1/3 of the time is a Bell Inequality. The 1/4 comes from quantum mechanics and agrees with experiment.
This brings me back to here:
Quoting Philosophim
...the puzzle stays open. Quantum mechanics would tell us the probabilities of this sort of match are 1/4. But classical probability can only bring us down to 1/3. Experiment appears to confirm quantum mechanics; that is, that Bell Inequalities are violated as per Bell's Theorem.
This isn't meant as a refutation against anything specific... but BT is definitely something that demands an explanation.
I gave you an example of an atom radioactively decaying. You followed up with a card analogy to make it easier. But atomic decay does not behave like cards. QM doesn't play by classical rules; it cheats.
Since you are trying to convey Bell's theory, lets go with that then. I see some problems with the thought experiment. But its not the thought experiment that is important, it what it is trying to convey.
I looked into it a bit, and was amused when I found that superdeterminism basically answers Belle's Theorem. Now I think I see what you were trying to get at by causality.
Yes, I am a super determinist. Once some type of existence is in play, it will act and react the same way identically each time. Except for one situation. An entity that is self explained being incepted.
To detail, imagine an electron spinning in accordance with the forces of the known universe. Yet for the briefest of seconds, a small entity, an alpha, pops into existence for 5 seconds. For that five seconds, it adds its influence within that universe. It doesn't do much of course. It just changes the flow of an electron for 5 seconds. But at that point, there is a record within the universe of something which altered the calculated outcome, and did something completely unpredictable. The cause and effect are all clear. The math is still the same. But the unknown and unpredictable was the alpha appearing for five seconds, then vanishing or dispersing, or perhaps traveling away from that particular electron and influences elsewhere.
All of that being said again, I am being consistent (I believe) with the OP I posted. Does this clear up what I mean by causality?
Are you sure?
Quoting Philosophim
That's not what superdeterminism means.
Superdeterminism means that Terra Mater is dealing the cards now, and on this particular deal she happens to deal BBR. So I have three options of two cards to pick, and if I pick at random, I would flip over the first two cards 1/3 of the time. But instead, just because the square of the cosine of 60 is 1/4, then Terra Mater mind controls me via my physical makeup to manipulate me into picking the second and third, or first and third, a sum total of an extra 1/12 of the time, such that my probability of picking the first two cards matches the square of the cosine of 60. This is the type of story you have to tell if you call yourself a superdeterminist.
Superdeterminism is kind of whacky. I'm agnostic on a lot of things; including a position on free will and a position on determinism... but it would take a lot to sell me on superdeterminism.
No:
Quoting InPitzotl
What I can possibly do to rig the game is analogous to a Hidden Variable Theory. The "real" goal here is to explain the 1/4 probability (the "win" thing is just to encourage working the classical probabilities).
Yes. Experimental results violate Bell Inequalities. (FYI, there are "outs" for HVT's, but they require giving up something like locality, realism, etc; some choose to do so).
Fair, I have no idea what I'm talking about then, and am not interested in getting further away from the OP at this point. To that end, do you have enough information now to understand how I view causality?
Quoting tim wood
Intentional or not, you are. How many seconds prior to the explosion should I consider? What scale of forces should I evaluate? Are we talking about the context of someone simply lighting the dynamite, or the subatomic forces aligned? How precise should it be? I suppose under the scale of everything the formulaic answer is, "All scales of force over X time units caused the dynamite to explode".
I don't see how this shows that causality does not exist.
Well, I have already said, the phenomena of a computer, as a phenomena, evidently follows the rules of causation. That is not the point I am disputing. I am disputing whether these causal rules also apply to the computer, as it exists independently of human thought.
Quoting Philosophim
Roughly, phenomena is that which is perceived, or more broadly, that which can conceivably be perceived, as opposed to that which cannot.
But, I think I can reduce and simplify the discussion further: what reason do you have to suggest that we perceive causality (and not just infer it, or apply it as a rule)? I think it will be easier to move forward with our discussion once we get past this point.
I really enjoyed your post (regardless of the position I would take on the issue at hand) due its thorough and substantive nature. With that being said, I do have to confess that I do not share your view as described in your initial post and, therefore, I would like to provide you with some of my thoughts pertaining to the matter at hand (which you can naturally do what you like with). Furthermore, I will try to be chronological (as best I can) with my remarks, but I apologize in advance if it seems a bit all over the place.
My first remark pertains to the very concept of “causality”, which I think can be reasonably inferred as your basis of your argument (although please correct me if I am wrong here). To be quite frank, I am very skeptical, to say the least, of any form of causation beyond physical (material) causation which, I would profess, is confined to space-time fabric. To say some effect was caused by some cause implies, I would argue, that (1) the cause came before the effect (no matter how minute or minuscule of a duration of time) and that (2) some form of matter was “converted”, so to speak, into something spatially different (whether directly perceived or abstractly inferred) than it previously was (which is then defined as the effect and investigated to determine the cause—which, in turn, is derived from the principle of sufficient reason). I would like to emphasize the implications of the two aforementioned properties of causality: without a spatial-temporal framework, causality is something that is (assuming there is a kind of causality separable from space-time) completely out of the scope of my perceptions and thoughts—thereby potentially unobtainable in my current biological state. All notions of causation, that I at least can fathom, has some sort of ties (no matter how subtle) to the two aforementioned properties (namely the spatial and temporal implications)--kind of like how I can’t actually, in a literal sense, fathom true nothingness (and I don’t mean that in a scientific sense of the term). Just like how to think of true nothingness one must necessarily tie it (no matter how subtle) to the closest imaginable absence of all things (such as empty space-time fabric), so it is with causation (I would argue). Now, before I continue, I would like to bring forth a common counter argument I hear, which I thought you may be interested to hear along with my ideas as they have been thus far portrayed: there is an argument out there (and I would confess I have found it to be relatively common of one) to consider there to be simultaneous causation—that is, the effect and the cause occur simultaneously. An example of such would be (as Immanual Kant put it) a ball sitting on a cushion: the cause simultaneously, in its very act, conceives the depression in the cushion. Another example is the act of sitting down simultaneously creates a lap. Now, I do have to say that I do not consider any of these to be actually simultaneous, but for the sake of providing counter examples (as the best I can), I ought to include them. Just to very briefly discuss why I don’t consider them simultaneous, I think that the reason causation can be, at times, perceived as simultaneous is simply because without measuring tools that have incredible amounts of precision (unlike our immediate senses) it seems as though the ball simultaneously caused the depression in the cushion; however, no matter how convincing it may seem to the naked eye, I would argue that more precise measuring tools enable us to conclude that the ball, no matter how incredibly quickly applied, requires a certain amount of time to effect the cushion and, thereby, create the depression. In terms of the lap example, I would argue that sitting down and “creating a lap” are two defined concepts that represent the same physical thing and, therefore, do not represent two different effects (in other words, saying “the process of sitting created a lap” is synonymous with saying “the process of sitting caused you to sit in a particular style we call a ‘lap’ in our language”--there is still one physical cause causing one physical effect). Now the reason I bring up all this skepticism pertaining to causation is that I view causal arguments for a first cause to be, simply put (and I am not trying to undermine your argument), the process of induction being utilized to infer something that is well beyond that which any given experience could reasonably supply to induction itself. In other words: to infer a first cause one must utilize induction, induction is an inference (and, thereby, reasoning) derived from experiences, any given experience is necessitated from a spatial-temporal framework, but yet the conclusion pertains to something beyond a spatial-temporal framework. I would say that this kind of logic is exactly how your #1 premise is derived and, quite frankly, I would argue this is the logical basis of your whole argument (as I would say it is an argument of causality).
My second remark pertains to your a-c options (or possible explanations) pertaining to the derivation of our world. You see, I am also not entirely convinced that those are the only three options. I would say there are five (if one is going to use logic and its metalogical principles, which I won’t elaborate here, but I would be skeptical of this too): eternal existence, self-manifestation (causa sui), infinite regression, infinite loop, and arbitrary stopping point. Firstly, I think you may have too hastily lumped all causes that are defined as “not having a prior cause” into your “first cause” (c), when, in fact, I think there are at least (at a minimum) two distinct sectors: eternal existence and self-manifestation (causa sui); I would be personally unwilling to say that these two concepts are synonymous or analogous to one another—although I would concede that they both fit under your “first cause” (c) definition. Without going to deep into it, I would just like to briefly highlight the major difference between the two: one simply is while the other caused itself. To elaborate a bit further, I shall quote you: . In light of the two aforementioned concepts (eternal existence and self-manifestation), I am not entirely certain as to if you are arguing for a “first cause” that created itself (which would constitute it being its own justification) or if it just is (which, I would argue, isn’t its own justification: it has no justification because, one method of argument would be that, it isn’t within the scope of the principle of sufficient reason). Secondly, I would like to point out that both forms of indefiniteness, as far as I could tell, in your 3 options (namely a and b) were references to actual infinities—contrary to potential infinities. A potential infinite is that which is infinite constrained within the boundaries of a finite (think of theoretically continually walking halfway towards a door, or getting smaller and smaller measurements within one meter on a ruler), which have been both mathematically and in practicality proven to be not only possible but true (as far as my knowledge goes). On the contrary, an actual infinite is that which is infinite and is not constrained within a finite, which (as far as I know) has not been proven to exist. The reason I am bringing this up is because of what you said here: Although I would concede that actual infinities have not been proven to exist, if they do exist, then they would not be subject to your criticism here: they would be just as out of bounds of the principle of sufficient reason as anyone could (at least) argue for any type of “first cause”. Furthermore, I would argue that your critique actually pertains to potential infinities: that a infinite within a finite must have, well, a finite cause—which makes sense. Again, I merely trying to point out that there may be a completely different “infinite” of which I don’t think you addressed (at least, at a minimum, adequately) in your initial post.
I apologize for how long my reply is, but I have an inkling that you would rather have a too long response than one that is way too short. My final remark I will make pertains to your conclusion: I honestly don’t see how this follows. At best, I would say that your argument (as portrayed thus far) gets you to disproving a and b, but that doesn’t logically mean that c is automatically true. Now, I have heard counter arguments that it isn’t an appeal to ignorance fallacy if one has definitively proven that the options at hand are the only ones and, thereby, proving that process of elimination is a perfectly valid argument; however, with the consideration of what I have said henceforth, I do not see how one could possibly prove that a-c (or even if you were to accept my previously mentioned five possibilities) are literally the only options: I don’t think this situation is analogous to stating “the cat is either in the kitchen or it isn’t” which upon disproving one or the other would necessarily prove the contrary. Moreover, I think that scenarios like the previous cat statement are the only true scenarios where I would agree with proving one thing by disproving another. Another way I think about it is, to state that all options are truly exhaustive, one must necessarily know all the possibilites about the given subject: I certainly don’t think I could possibly ever reasonably determine that I know all the actual possibilities of how this world, as I know it, came about (in terms of derivation, however I could say it came about in terms of the big bang or evolution, but those aren’t absolute stopping points like a first cause).
Anyhow, in conclusion, I hope that this post found you well and hopefully I brought up some remarks that, although you may not agree with, sparks some sort of intellectual contemplation. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me.
Bob
I mentioned earlier to one of the posters that cause and effect are more than fiction, as evidenced by your ability to post a reply. If we did not have an understanding of cause and effect, your post would not be able to be converted into a particular set of 1's and 0's that are read, streamed over a line, interpreted and saved to a server, then retrieved by everyone else when we visit. All of this happens over time, and apart from our perception.
While you may not personally believe in cause and effect, I see no evidence for this to be the case. As to your explosion question, I felt I gave a pretty clear answer. You have to give a clear scope, and then the question can be answered. I gave you a formula for basically all scopes. The answer to your question is not a specific answer, it is all the answers. Give me a specific scope, and I will give you the specific answer for that scope, that does not contradict any of the other scopes.
A cause is separated by its effect by the application of an outside force. So in the case of a cue ball hitting the 8 ball, the cue balls transferred force moved the 8 ball. What caused the cue ball to veer in another direction withe less speed was the the 8 ball that it collided into and absorbed much of the cue ball's force.
Again, I feel I'm answering all of these questions. I am also not trying to convince you that causality exists. I'm assuming it exists. As I have the answers to your queries, I am satisfied that your points have not shown my assumptions to be wrong. If you cannot present a convincing argument that causality does not exist, then at that point the OP itself will need to be critiqued. One way you could convince me that causality does not exist as more than a convenient fiction is explain how you posted online without causality.
A good idea and a great gesture. Causality is not perceived, it is concluded. Try holding your breath. Try living without taking another breath. You will find it is impossible. A cause that allows you to live, is the air that you breath. With science, you can get more detailed. You can examine the different gasses and discover a certain range of oxygen mixed with other gasses is necessary for your life. One of the causes of your life is the air you breath.
If you don't eat, you run out of energy and die. What caused that person to die? They didn't eat. To deny cause and effect is to deny the very things that are causing you to remain alive. As such, cause and effect stands on some pretty solid ground. If you are going to turn that into shaky ground, you need some real world examples like how I can live without air or food. Until then, I see no convincing argument that can claim causality is something that merely exists in the mind.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, remember that I have not rejected the notion that causality is not applied to phenomena. The examples that you call "real world" are all subject to the conditions of space and time, i.e. they are phenomena. I cannot provide you with an example that violates this rule, because the requirement of doing so is not valid.
Most likely you will agree that things like color, taste and smell are subjective and do not belong to the thing in itself. I would like you to demonstrate why causality is different. To be sure, causality is inter-subjective, which grounds its objective validity. But independent of the human mind and its constraint of phenomena to space and time, is causality anything?
Quoting Bob Ross
Absolutely true. The OP is an argument of abducto ad absurdum. Meaning, I am not showing that a first cause is necessary by showing proof of a first cause, but instead showing that if we assume there is no first cause, there exists an absurdity, or contradiction. The argument shows that I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause, even when I propose an infinite regress.
That being said, it leaves it open to what we could explore that first causes would be. To me, this is the exciting part. If it is logically necessary that a first cause exist, would we see evidence of that in the universe? Is multiverse theory actually a statistical certainty, and not merely a fun theory? Is the nature of reality essentially infinite time and possibility?
If you believe my sense of causality to be the entire foundation of the argument, I agree. What I would put to you however, is does a first cause really function outside of space and time? Prior to its existence, yes. But once it exists, is it not part of space and time? One thing to also conclude from the argument is I am not stating there is only one first cause. If there is the possibility for one first cause, there is the possibility of several. Thus a first cause could appear while other existent things also exist. Perhaps yes, there is a first cause that could exist in a different plane of existence and time we cannot comprehend. But we're talking about our universe. First causes within our universe would necessarily have to be part of the space and time that results from them. That is because, as you noted, causality happens both ways. For space and time to come from a first cause, it must also be able to encounter space and time.
Quoting Bob Ross
Perfect. I have purposefully avoided the idea of eternal existence and self-manifestation because many will think I have an underlying theistic motive, and make the argument about what they believe I'm trying to say, versus just looking the argument for what it is. You are correct however. My only minor quibble would be self-causation, but that's technical and honestly irrelevant. I agree they all fit under the "first cause" definition.
Quoting Bob Ross
Here is where the technicality arises. If something creates another thing, even if it is itself, that created thing is caused by the original thing, the first cause. I feel this is more word play and I think can be simplified into the fact that it just is.
Quoting Bob Ross
I had to read this part a few times to make sure I understood. Please correct me if I'm wrong here. If you are implying that we could argue for any type of first cause, that is a conclusion of the argument. A first cause has no explanation for why it exists, therefore it is not constrained by prior rules as to why it should exist. That does not mean it wouldn't have rules after it formed, just no rules limiting it or requiring it to be a certain "thing".
The point of addressing actual infinities was to eliminate the only other option to the idea of finite regression. If we cannot have a situation that does not always boil down to a first cause, there must inevitably exist a first cause.
Quoting Bob Ross
You are all to right Bob!
Quoting Bob Ross
You are also correct. But they are the only known options we have. I cannot bring logic into that which we have no knowledge of. As such, I am left with what I do know. If there was another option that came into light in the future, then the argument would be invalid. However, within the confines of what we do know, does the argument make sense? I think I've made a decent case.
I appreciate again your well thought out answer and critques, it was a joy to read a fellow passionate thinker!
What I find intriguing is that there's a difference between acausality (no patterns) and amended causality (changing patterns). I think people, at least I do, conflate the two.
Allow me to explain.
Hume's problem of induction is ambiguous as regards these two (acausality vs. amended causality) because in both cases our predictions, based on how things were and are, fail. Is it because the world has become patternless (no laws/rules) or is it that it begins to adopt new patterns (a different set of rules/laws)? In the former, causality ceases to exist but in the latter, causality persists, only in a different form.
Against this backdrop, we could explore possibilities in re the so-called laws of nature e.g. in the case of the Big Bang (first cause), was gravity negative?
[math]F = -G\frac{m_1m_2}{r^2}[/math]
?
You like to think that, up to you. Do you understand quantum mechanics?
Check the "quantum causal loops", try to explain the entanglement with causal-effect approach, try to think on a cause-effect way when trying to understand quantum decoherence... .
I think in the microscopic quantum world things don't happen in a lineal cause-effect way.
Why is Schrödinger equation full of probabilistic functions? Do you think it is because we don't know enough so we replace a "deterministic" function by a probabilistic one?
I believe the world, what we call the reality is much more complex than the naïf-intuition of cause-effect.
I guess I'm not the only one, let s ask the physicists ;-)
No need for several universes. This very universe of ours appears made of things popping in and out of existence all the soddin' time. An non-determinist universe is a universe in constant creation.
I'm not physicists and I don't have the math tools to do it but it is easy to so the other way around, trying to break the cause-effect.
The cause-effect intuition (Hume was great explaining it) implies a cause of a cause in a infinity loop what is irrational in itself. That's it!
It works in certain situations (daily life scale) it doesn't in others (micro-quantum, macro-blackholes, etc)
We can ask if values beget distinctions or distinctions beget values. It is only of ‘value’ to ask not to answer.
To ask about a ‘first cause’ states that there is a first cause as ‘cause’ and ‘first’ are framed via temporal appreciation not via atemporal appreciation.
I cannot value one thing about another without two things. I can value myself above myself in terms of temporal difference (the me previously to the future me) but this is likely a trick as the ‘now’ is the accumulation of past/future me not distinct from it.
None of this likely helps the discussion though because it is meant as means of putting an end to it :)
The cat is either a live or dead until measured.
3rd possibility is uncertainty, which is the cause of virtual particles and current state of science.
Therefore first cause is logically necessary until measured otherwise. (that is until the box is opened)
I may not have understood the question then. Could you try to rephrase it to make it more clear?
Quoting tim wood
Are you asking what's in between the cause and effect? Time. What scale of time do you want to talk about? The only time when there is no cause and effect is if time is zero. Cause and effect are 4d measurement's essentially.
Quoting tim wood
Nope! Ha ha ha! We can of course believe all sorts of things, but that is not knowing all sorts of things. You really should go read my knowledge paper, I explore this idea in depth. To bring it to a simple real world example, when I press the space bar key on my keyboard, I expect a space between my words. Pressing the space bar causes the space to appear between the words. Am I wrong? Is that not a good example of cause and effect?
If not, what would you replace it with? It is incredibly easy to say, "I doubt everything," but its impractical, and if you read my paper, does not lead to knowledge. I have knowledge of cause and effect. I use it effectively and consistently in my daily life without fail. If its wrong, give me something that is just as, or more effective to try. But asking questions that cast doubt on something, just to doubt it, is something anyone can apply to any concept.
In general, yes I do.
Quoting Raul
Based on what evidence? We can believe and have opinions on all sorts of things. I'm not asking for personal beliefs or opinions. I'm asking someone to give me a hard fact that causality doesn't exist. Explain to me how you are able to press the keys on your keyboard to type words, and you expect those words to appear, and this can be understood without causality.
Quoting Raul
Yes, that is exactly that. The whole point of the experiment is when we don't observe the cat. The experiment continues without guesswork if we watch the cat the entire time. Quantum mechanics are understood because we understand rules that consistently work. Due to incredible difficulty of measuring and monitoring the quantum world, we are left with math that leads us to probabilities. But the math should not be confused as representing the quantum world as unpredictably random, but a predictable randomness based off of the knowledge we have, the the knowledge that we know we don't have.
Quoting Raul
No need. Any physicist will tell you cause and effect exists. I could ask any one of them, "What causes your keyboard to type words," and they will attempt to provide an explanation. But not one of them will say, "There is no cause, words just appear without explanation."
Also, we shouldn't need to ask a physicist if you have the answer yourself correct? If it is more than a belief, show it. If not, why should your belief matter to me? You could believe that unicorns control the world as well right? If you can't demonstrate that, is that a belief I should bother considering?
So here are some cool things to consider. If there are no rules as to what should be self-explained, then it seems like there are no limitations as to what could form self-explained. Well, within the limitations of definition. A complex object would arguably not be 1 self explained entity, but several forming at the exact time in a way that caused a stable identifiable existence apart from just the individual combinations. This would be exceedingly rare, and might pull in Cantor's cardinality to calculate the odds of such an event. Of course, perhaps that's irrelevant in a sea of infinite possibilities, but intuitively (for all that's worth) it would seem the case that over a set period of time, it would be more likely that there is a greater set of simple alphas that form independently, versus an increasingly smaller set of alphas that form with the correct way and timing into a more complex objct.
Yes, this does mean the universe would BOTH be deterministic, and non-deterministic. Once something forms, it is deterministic. But, the addition of an unpredictable alpha, even an incredibly tiny one for a few seconds, throws the forces off "just" slightly enough to never be 100% predictable. Here we have a solution to the deterministic problem that is logically consistent.
As for multiverse theory, it still might be a bunk theory, as we are attributing a possibility to an unknown. All we know is our notion of space. But what is there is a notion of space that can exist, but could never interact with our notion of space? I can't say its impossible (though in how we define space, maybe it is, another discussion) but it seems that if anything could form without prior explanation, why couldn't it?
I think this is incorrect. Hume was talking about predicting the future. Hume couldn't deny we could figure out cause and effect in the moment. His point was we could never be certain cause and effect would continue. Why should the rules and laws of physics remain constant tomorrow? Or even an hour from now. It is an inductive belief based on habit. And it may very well be the case that tomorrow, cause and effect stops working. All we are left with at that point is things that are essentially self-explained, and cannot be predicted or tell us its past.
That does not mean cause and effect is irrational, or incorrect. Look at the words you typed. What caused that? The question makes perfect sense to you. Try to answer that question without cause and effect in a way that is meaningful in reality. If you can do that, I will consider that cause and effect is not real.
Yes, an excellent point. We can only have faith that the rules of causality were the same billions of years ago as they are today. But perhaps they were not. Perhaps gravity is not a constant, but changes. But does that eliminate cause and effect itself? No. What it eliminates are our formulas of consistency being applied to the past.
Cause and effect are four dimensional measurements of the world. They are representatives of the world, just like words and math are. But, we can have inaccurate measurements, and accurate measurements. Is there a cause and effect behind you ability to type out words on the screen as a response? Of course there is, and it is accurate. The fact that cause and effect can be used inaccurately does not deny cause and effect.
Quoting I like sushi
I've never removed time. Time is simply the relation between two state changes. If things can change, there is time. If they cannot, there is no time. I am not claiming first causes are apart from time.
Quoting I like sushi
Well, I am valuing two things. A first cause leads to a second right?
Quoting I like sushi
No, trying to show that the discussion is along the wrong path is helpful. Analyzing whether are assumed premises are valid is incredibly important. But, I don't think you've succeeded in showing the premises of cause and effect aren't real. Try to explain to me how you can type words on your keyboard without cause and effect. Do that, and there might be a foothold here.
I was a physics major in college (albeit not a very good one). i can assure you that the expression "cause and effect" never came up in my 4 years of college.
Quoting Philosophim
We factually know that this is not true. Events at the atomic and sub-atomic level have no prior "cause". Events do follow certain statistical patterns, but each event is totally random with no prior "cause". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_foam
In the last 100 years our knowledge of the physical universe has grown exponentially and new discoveries are being made - we are likely just scratching the surface here. To think we can draw any sort of grand philosophical conclusions about the nature of reality is an act of hubris. We must be humble and acknowledge that we really don't know what's going on.
Doesn't your second paragraph refute your first one here?
Is that a 'value'? Why is it important what comes 'first' or if something does come 'first'? Do you apply more value to first or second and if so why do you do this?
Quoting Philosophim
Real in what way? Why does the value 'real' come into play here? Are claiming that cause and effect are real because you value them or because you value cause and effect or because you don't value them. I'm guessing you apply the term 'real' to them because you value them so when you say 'real' you mean of 'value'. The question is then 'value' how and due to what distinction?
Quoting Philosophim
I can show you. Here. I had no need whatsoever to type the words you said I wouldn't be able to stop myself from typing! :D
Seriously, that is part of what I'm getting at. You are reliant upon a certain means of communication to express ideas and can only, at best, vaguely adumbrate certain feels and senses about other vague feelings and senses. The problem is we're not exactly accurate and you did note that.
I can type without any real consideration towards what I am doing as a matter of 'cause and effect' so in that respect (as with walking and breathing) I do not take part in such activities due to being consciously attentive to the world as a 'causal stream' of happenings. I merely live and do for the vast majority of my actions and at certain alarms and triggers happen to draw my attention to or from one matter to another. I do not consider my general actions as being the 'cause leading to an effect' as I probably wouldn't get much done.
I'm aware of how physics models the world. Of course in that department there has been great discoveries and successes regarding cause and effect. The matter of 'time' is not something humans seem to have much of an idea about as it is part of us not apart from us ... or maybe we do have an atemporal element? Or maybe we're just caught up in the whole obsession of measuring and comparing x to y to see beyond it.
If we break down the cause and effect into the item you gave (typing) then I can just keep on dividing up any given act. For example I could say that the cause of me typing on a keyboard is my want to communicate, but then I could ask where this 'want' comes from. I could say my thoughts instigate my want, but what instigates my thoughts. Or I could move in another direction and ask what instigated that particular thought to type, or did I even think about typing or merely acted to the cause of reading your post? Where does this go? What direction do I take? Is this meaningful and if so, or not, how?
First cause makes no sense no more than 'cause and effect' makes sense out of specifically defined boundaries. Then we're back to value and distinction.
If the bridge is washed out, my path across it is impossible. That the path is impossible doesn’t leave me with a known alternate for getting across what the bridge allowed. I’m left with knowing I need one, but only to continue despite the loss of the bridge. But I could just turn back, in which case not only is there no given known alternative to the bridge, there isn’t even a need for one. Now, one could say retracing my steps is the known alternative to the impossibility of crossing over the bridge, but that is merely experience. I would have that exact same alternative knowledge even if the bridge hadn’t washed out.
If this is what the first cause logical necessity argument is showing.....is it really showing anything I didn’t already know?
————-
Quoting Philosophim
Granted already; there is a first cause logical necessity. But only in the case of a chain comprised of a regressive series. Doesn’t work that way for a progressive series. Next month cannot be explained without the priority of next week.
————
Quoting Philosophim
Again, I just don’t see how this says anything. The possibility of infinite regressive, and even infinite progressive, causality, is logically given. Do you mean there is no outside reason other than its being logical? What other reason could there be for that which is merely a logical proposition?
————
Quoting Philosophim
How can it be wrong, when it is you providing the reason, in the form of a logical conclusion? Technically though, mine has existence antecedent to the conclusion, hence logically sound, yours has existence post hoc ergo proper hoc conditioned by the conclusion, logically fallacious in that mere logic is insufficient causality for phenomenal existence. Yours would be true if you’d said, “...it must logically exist”. Or, “logically, it must exist”.
I am suddenly and inexplicably rich. The conclusion I reach that a rich uncle I never knew willed me his fortune, is sufficient reason for me being rich, but the rich uncle does not necessarily exist, nor is it necessary I was even a beneficiary. But there being no reason whatsoever for me being rich, is incomprehensible, whether I care about the reason or not. I simply cannot suddenly be rich (a change) without a reason (a cause), whether I conclude anything respecting it, or not.
———-
Quoting Philosophim
Yeah....I get that a lot. Don’t mind me none; point/counterpoint is the name of the game.
I wouldn't want to call a brute fact a "first cause," because it would be misleading. Take your trichotomy of possible brute facts, for example: infinite regress, causal loop or first cause. One of these, of course, is called "first cause," but as a fact about the causal structure of the world, it is not located anywhere in time, nor is it a cause in the usual sense (only in a loose sense that is synonymous with "explanation" or "reason").
As I said in my response to your OP, the entire argument, to the extent that I could make sense of it, hinges on an equivocation about the word "cause". Whatever meaning you prefer to use, if you use it consistently throughout, then it doesn't appear that you have managed to say much with your argument. My most generous interpretation of it is as an argument for the existence of brute causal fact(s), as opposed to the unrestricted principle of sufficient reason. But that is not novel, and could have been (and has been) stated much more clearly.
This is incorrect, you missed the important part on Hume.
Hume challenges us to consider what we can know of the constituent impressions of causation. All we can come up with is an experienced constant conjunction of cause and effect. He points out that we never have an impression of efficacy. Because of this, our notion of causal law seems to be a mere presentiment that the constant conjunction will continue to be constant, some certainty that this mysterious union will persist. Hume argues that we cannot conceive of any other connection between cause and effect, because there simply is no other impression to which our idea may be traced. This certitude is all that remains.
But this is Hume, and Hume didn't know quantum physics. I gave you several examples that, in a way, confirm Hume's argument and my argument that cause-effect is a naïf-intuition. Check those out and you will get the answer to your question.
Interesting topic! I have, however, quite a few questions/reservations on the whole thesis ...
Quoting Philosophim
Doesn't the second premise imply the first one? Wouldn't each event in a chain of events have a prior one that is its cause? But this is not important. What follows is!
Quoting Philosophim
I assume that by "unknown" it is meant that Y has a prior causality but it is unknown, and that unknown causality is represented by X, rather than it does not have a prior causality or that it is unknown whether it has a prior causality or not. The reasons I assume that first meaning are:
1) It is the most obvious, as it stands by itself.
2) Any of the other two cases would lead to a conflict or impossibility: that of X representing an inexistent causality.
Quoting Philosophim
OK, this doesn't add anything to the situation at this point, except the fact that Y has at least one "child".
Quoting Philosophim
I see a conflict here, since I have established that Y does have a prior causality, so Alpha cannot be an instance or existence of Y, since it has no prior causality!
So, it seems that things get stuck here. Is there a 4th interpretation for Y "having an unknown prior causality"? Because I showed that the other two meanings cannot apply because then the definition of X could not stand.
It would be good if we this impasse is cleared! :smile:
I'm not saying cause-effect does not exist. We humans have created the words cause and effect to describe something. What I'm saying is that they don't work to properly describe reality. It is like Newton vs Einstein. We cannot say Newton was wrong but was incomplete.
I'm arguing the same, cause-effect is not wrong. Those 2 words and their use work (Wittgenstein pragmatism) but are incomplete and wrong to describe reality.
You yourself accept the "randomness".... so here you go. Randomness breaks the cause-effect link.
Quoting Philosophim
Not really, they talk about action-reaction and anyway my point is that cause-and effect is not enough to describe reality. I give you more examples (besides quantum stuff), concepts like emergence in complex systems (what causes the liquidity of water?) that show you reality cannot be thought as cause effect.
Quoting Philosophim
If this question is for you relevant to this discussion I think you're too biased by using a language in wrong context. This then becomes a linguistic or phil of language issue (Wittgenstein, Recanati....)... you will keep going in circles if you keep working with this language created to understand our daily life not reality...
:up:
[b]On the One and Only Base Existence
Prolog[/b]
In this lost haunt on the Orion arm
Of the galaxy, safe from the core’s harm,
The philosophers meet in the forum,
As sleuth-hounds unweaving the Cosmic yarn.
We search for the Start of the Universe,
The End, the Before, the After, the Kinds,
The Measures, and All That Lies Between:
The Music of the Spheres’ Magnificat.
We follow every single avenue,
Whether it’s brightly lit or a dark alley,
Exploring one-ways, no-ways, and dead-ends,
Until cornered where the Truth is hiding.
Since we all became of this universe,
Should we not ask who we are, whence we came?
Insight clefts night’s skirt with its radiance—
The Theory of Everything shines through!
[hide="Reveal"]We are ever in touch with the unknown,
For that’s ever the reach of science shown.
Reality is grasped by focusing
On what interacts with what and the means.
There is a realm of happenings, not things,
For ‘things’ don’t remain the same on time’s wings.
What remains through time are processes—
Relations between different systems.
An Eternal Basis has to be so,
For a lack of anything cannot sow,
Forcing there to be something permanent,
As partless, from which the particles grow.
Consider quantum fields of waves atop
One another: waves are continuous,
And so qualify as Fundamental;
Quantized lumps are particles; they move.
Note that there is no other absolute:
Newton’s fixed space and time got Einstein’s boot;
Particle spigots making fields are mute;
Classic fields have no fundamental loot.
There’s a lightness to elemental being
Since any more would have to be of parts,
And thus go beyond the fundamental arts.
The vacuum puffs of energy are small.
On the Forced Defaults for the Only Existence
There can only be the one Existence,
Forced, with no option for it not to be,
Which is no mystery because a ‘Nil’
Cannot be, even as spacers within.
There is neither ‘Full’ nor ‘Null’,
But a lightness of being near ‘Zero’,
As that’s what the universe amounts to,
Nor ‘Nil’s kin as ‘Still’, since there’s constant change.
This must-be partless Existence Eterne
Can’t end, so it must remain as itself,
Transmuting into multiplicity
Of the temporary as ‘elementaries’.
Since The Eterne has to be, of not ‘null’,
‘Supernatural Magic’ isn’t required;
So, there’s only the natural as the base;
One degree of freedom is its forced default.
Motion is a must, or naught would happen;
It can’t have parts, so it’s continuous;
No end, it must e’er return to itself.
There can’t be anything else but it.
It is everywhere, with no gaps of ‘zilch’;
It waves, as is ubiquitous in nature,
Rearranging to the elementary
Particles at stable rungs of quanta.
Only quantum fields fit the criteria;
Particles as spigots failed to flow,
Newton’s ‘Space’ and ‘Time’ disappeared via
Einstein’s relativity special and general.
Quantum field points that must spring up and down
Form the field’s waves by dragging on others.
These sums of harmonic oscillations
Force the fixed quanta energy levels.
So the wave estimate proves to be right;
An electron/photon goes through both slits
Because it is a spread out field quantum.
Quantum jumps cannot be wave fractionals.
The universe is a large quantum field,
For the 25 quantum fields interact,
This containing the whole of physics.
There’s no ‘God’s’ eye view; anything happens.
The anything of the massive universe
Is a lot of needed extravagant junk,
For on Earth the right conditions obtained,
Our planet being where and what it has to be.
Cosmic and biological evolution were forced,
Stars collecting the elementaries,
Producing all the atomic elements
That went on toward molecules, cells, and more.
All this took 13.5 billion years,
Since, again, there were no hoodoo shortcuts.
Life and consciousness emerged, no ‘Mojo’—
Since long ago on Earth they were not there!
Our planet is very good at promoting life,
But it is much better at extinguishing it.
Of the billions upon billions of organic things,
99.99% are no longer around here living.
Of all extinctions, the Permian was the worst.
245 million years ago, for 95% of species perished,
Suddenly disappearing from the fossil recording.
Life had almost come to a total obliterationing.
“Hurray,” said the shrew; now I can evolve!
‘You’ were once a lucky shrew, darting all about,
But then attached to a favorable evolutionary line…
Every single one of your forbears on both sides
Being attractive enough to locate a loving mate,
And they fortunately had the good health to celebrate!
Our blind-fated path was the further paved
When disasters finished most of the species.
Far from a feature of Intelligent Design,
It opened up the space that was needed.
The Downfall of ‘Beyond’ and ‘Extra’
‘Magic’ has fallen by the wayside, it
As trancendence an intangible writ,
Unable to be distinct from matter,
Having to talk/walk the talk/walk of it.
An extra distinct realm isn’t needed,
As ‘intangible’, ‘ineffable’, etc.,
For it only begs the question—regress!—
And as separate couldn’t have effect.
The ‘immaterial’ and ‘nonphysical’
Haven’t shown anything at all to date,
Plus, all the more they’d have to be explained;
The ‘supernatural’ claim has to fail.
Five billion years ago there was no life
Or consciousness, and now they are both here,
Thus, they emerged, evolving during that time;
So, there’s no need for any ‘hyperphysical’.
Where’s the esoteric among atoms?
What inside their doings would be else wise?
Do molecules swirl into spooky states?
What their secret patterns hidden away?
The light atomic elements were prime,
And the stars made more, on up through iron,
And the rest were from collisions/novae;
So, what unknown secrets would they contain?
The ‘God’ idea has fallen from its throne;
Forever quantum fields’ excitations’
Elementary quanta roll on the fields
That are everywhere and remain intact.
Epilog
The quantum fields’ unity is the Whole,
Being ever, exhausting Reality,
Unbreakable and Unmakeable,
As partless and continuous monads.
All that emerges is still the fields at heart,
Though secondary and temporary,
Arising and at some time returning;
The quantum fields are indivisible.
Quantum fields are the fundamental strokes
Whose excitations at harmonics cloak
The quanta with the stability
To persist and thus obtain mobility.
The elementary particles beget,
As letters of the Cosmic alphabet,
And combine in words to write the story
Of the stars, atoms, cells, and life’s glory.
Why Something?
Quantum states melt via uncertainty,
And this means that no quantum property
Can e’er be zero—a precise amount,
And so it is that motion can ne’er cease.
The Something
The quantum field is the bridge between ‘Nil’
And basic matter, and can ne’er be still;
Thus the ‘vacuum’ is the quietest field—
The closest approach to ‘Nothing’ that can be.
No ‘Null’ nor Matter Full
‘Nothing’ had no chance to be the hero,
Plus QM scrubs the idea of zero
Out of the physical world of being;
‘Vacuum’ ne’er sleeps, but’s e’er up to something.
A Mere Blip
But for the small quantum uncertainty,
The Cosmos sums to naught, its lunch being free:
No net electric charge; a weightless brick;
Minus-potential = plus-kinetic.
The Impossibles
Oh, those imaginings of what can’t be!
Such as Nought, Stillness, and the Block’s decree,
As well as Apart, Beginning, and End,
The Unfixed Will, Blame, Fame, and Theity.[/hide]
A force collides with an object and causes it to move 1 meter per second upon impact. What caused the object to be in the state of velocity of 1 m/s?
Quoting EricH
I'm not sure what facts you're getting. Feel free to link to them. My understanding is there are plenty of forces at play like the weak, strong force, etc. An atom does not typically turn into a bomb unless certain causes happen correct? Something having odds or statistics does not eliminate cause and effect. Your cell phone works due to our understanding of quantum mechanics. If the quantum level was truly random, there would be no prediction or manipulation that we could do which would allow the precision communication of a cell phone. Finally, quantum foam as a theory does not destroy cause and effect.
I'll let Artemis address your last paragraph.
I'm just trying to speak in the terms you were using. I don't value anything more than another. Quoting I like sushi
Real means what exists. What is not real, does not exist. Can you demonstrate that cause and effect do not exist?
Quoting I like sushi
Did your fingers press the keys to type the words? Of course they did. Those fingers pressing the keys caused the words to appear on the screen. Its important that when obvious conclusions arrive in a discussion, we admit to them, even if we don't personally like them.
Quoting I like sushi
Yes, that is the scale of measurement. Cause and effect are a 4 dimensional measurement that analyzes states at one point in time, compares them to a previous point in time, and attempts to prove there is a necessary relation between it and the other states around it, that caused the current state to exist. We can use whatever time units we want, limit or expand the forces, etc. Its just like 2d measurement. I can measure length. But at what scale? Inches, cm, nanometers? What is the precision we desire, or is practical for predictive outcomes? You don't think because length measurement is a model, that there is no length right?
That's not really the same thing as the OP's points. Really, my best example of what the OP is trying to do, is the OP itself. But perhaps a better example is a light switch. If you turn it off, the light goes off. But if you turn it on, you expect it to light up. However, you find that when you turn it on, there's actually a circuit behind it that prevents it from turning on. You thought turning it on was an option, but its actually impossible. Therefore, the light switch can never turn the light on. Don't go crazy on the thought experiment. Its just to get you in a certain mindset. Use the OP if you find that mindset wrong.
Quoting Mww
Yes, agreed.
Fair question. If it turns out that all of causality is infinitely regressive, what caused it to be that way? If you introduce an X, or a prior explanation, then its not really infinitely regressive right? If we continue for an infinity of infinities, we still can only come to the conclusion, "it simply is, because that is how reality exists". There is no outside cause for why infinite regression would exist, its existence would be self explained, a first cause, an alpha.
Quoting Mww
True, but you're straying from the OP again. :P Lets try to keep the counter examples to the OP if possible. Btw, I enjoy your points, and think you are making excellent conversation. I'm just trying to steer it back tot he original point.
This is fair. "First cause" is simply a label for the underlying concept. And that concept is that every chain of causality must end. The end point logically, cannot have a prior explanation for its initial existence. It is called a "first cause" because that generally fits the narrative, and also communicates that once it is formed, it enters into causality. The only important note is that there is no prior causality. If you have a better word for this, I'm very open to it.
Quoting SophistiCat
I think pointing out that there must be something in our universe that does not have a prior explanation for its existence is a pretty big thing to say. If you're not interested, fair. But if you're not saying I'm wrong, I and others find that interesting. Since you seem to think there was a simpler way to prove this, feel free to show it.
No, and I thank you for pointing that out. I should detail that explicitly. Y is an object that we believe has an X, but we do not know if it does. That is why there is no contradiction. An alpha is a Y that is discovered to have no prior X.
If cause and effect cannot accurately represent reality, then they are unicorns that do not exist. Cause and effect is a 4D measurement of states over time, and discovering which forces caused those state changes over time. It describes reality with accurate enough precision, that we know it exists. How did you type the words to post your idea? What caused the words to appear on your computer screen? Are you saying there is no cause, nor effect?
I'm hearing a lot of, "They're just words that don't really work". But I'll need to see it demonstrated to me the situation of cause and effect that I just showed, is false. Show me an argument that clearly indicates there is no cause that allowed the effect, those letters that appear on the screen. If you can do it honestly, I will be impressed. Can you argue with the letters on your keyboard, showing why you did not cause those letters to appear on the screen?
Quoting Raul
How? How am I using it in the wrong context? It seems clear to me. There must be more than a claim, you have to give me a reason that backs that claim.
Quoting Raul
Action-reaction is another way of saying cause and effect. Reaction means a response to an action, an affect from a cause.
I read the whole thing. Again, very impressive!
That cannot be true. I value 'first' more as most people do. I am not saying it is logical just more a condition of culture I think.
The rest is just repetition of physics. Not interested. You can find plenty of discussion abut that on science forums with people who know what they are talking about.
Nothing you are saying looks or sounds like philosophy so I'm out. Have fun :)
Thank you for your commentary and further elaborative thoughts on my response post! I really appreciate you taking your time to address my remarks one-by-one. With that being said, I would like to respond to your response and, hopefully thereby, spark further conversation.
Firstly, I would like to confess an apology: I see now that you are making an argument of abducto ad absurdum—which, in your response, you cleared that up quite nicely. Further, I am glad that we can agree about how it can be problematic to use induction as a means of proof (with respect to this discussion topic)! However, I would have a couple issues with the use of abducto ad absurdum as well (in the context of this topic). Before I continue, let me quickly quote you:
Although (I would say) there is a lot to discuss in the above quote, I will start with your statement “The argument shows that I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause, even when I propose an infinite regress”. Now this may be me just being technical (and forgive me if that is the case), but your use of the term “deduce” leads me to believe that you are attempting, in your argument, to use deduction, on the contrary to induction, to derive (logically) a first cause. This may be a fundamental difference between you and I: I think deduction is actually less reliable than induction (with respect to the topic at hand) because it requires the use of a basic principle (or principles) that then can be “explored”, so to speak, to logically determine its consequences. For example, if I begin with the concept that a triangle has three sides, then I can logically deduce whether a given shape is a triangle or not (which is fine and dandy—solid proof). However, I don’t think the aforementioned example is analogous to the attempted derivation of the origin of the Universe—for what basic principle can one use in their process of deduction? In fact, I would argue, the use of deduction to derive thereof would necessarily require the use of some sort of axiom, which I think would defeat the whole purpose of the derivation in the first place. Now, again, I may be overthinking your use of “deduce”, but if I am correct thus far, then I would say it is a faulty line of logic (no offense). In other words, the derivation of the origin of the Universe is a bottom-to-top (or, more accurately, a subject-to-object) approach (induction or/and abduction) but never a top-to-bottom (object-to-subject) approach (deduction) because the overlying principle (which would have to be used in the process of deduction) would be the origin of the Universe. Anyways, on another note, I would like to push back a bit on your appeal to absurdity to prove a first cause: I do not see how a first cause, which would defy all laws and logic we have thus far (especially causality), is any less “absurd” than an actual infinite. To say something just infinitely regresses, or infinitely loops around, has just as little explanatory power (I would say) as saying it just is, or that it is its own cause in itself. Maybe we just don’t agree, but to put it another way, I think that refurbishing your statement “I simply cannot logically deduce a situation that does not have a first cause” to “I simply cannot logically induce (or abduce) a situation that does not have a cause” would suffice in demonstrating our differences on this topic (in an overly simplified sense).
Secondly, I love your enthusiasm and curiosity about the implications of a first cause! Although I am still not convinced that it is the case, given the idea, I also would have a vast array of questions.
I am a bit confused with respect to both of these statements. I bet you can already guess my question pertaining to your first sentence (in the quote): are you open to the idea that the multiverse, if it is true, also has a sufficient cause? That it has a “first cause”, so to speak? Now, coupled with your second sentence (in the quote), I am now questioning whether you are arguing for a first cause that all things (and “thing” defined in the most ambiguous and generic sense possible) are derived therefrom, or are you merely attempting to prove that the Universe itself had a first cause (of which its first cause would also have a first cause—i.e. the multiverse example)? If the latter is the case, then I would wonder where and why you would draw the line? When is the “first cause” of something necessarily the very first cause of all other “things”? When you say that reality may be “infinite time and possibility”, are you asking if it may be infinite chain of causation? I reckon you aren’t, but then I would be curious as to how “infinite time and possibility” would be derived anywhere but from some sort of actual infinite?
Thirdly, I would like to address your remarks pertaining to the relationship between the first cause and space/time fabric:
Before I address the above quote, I would like to, first and foremost, to agree with you that I also think that your argument (as presented hitherto) is open to the idea of multiple first causes, which leads me to believe (given that you agree with me on that) that I may have originally misunderstood your argument: you seem to be arguing for a first cause of the Universe, but not necessarily elaborating on whether those causes were caused or not (which is an entirely different discussion, but, although I won’t elaborate here, I think they are intertwined—as they both bring forth heavy implications for the other). Again, correct me if I am wrong here. Now back to the quote: I am a bit confused because you seem to be asserting that a first cause must necessarily be “part of space and time that results from them”, which seems contradictory to causation. You see, the cause cannot be the effect (nor part of the effect). That would mean that an effect, or at least a part of an effect, could possibly be its own cause—which I don’t think is consistent with humanities knowledge of causation as we currently know it. In other words, the cause of space/time fabric must reside outside of space/time—otherwise, if there is a part of the cause that resides therein, then that part logically would not be part of the cause (paradoxically): it would be part of the effect. If one were to argue that part of the cause is the effect, then one is also arguing that part of the effect caused itself (which is, at a bare minimum, a partial self-manifestation). I also, thus far, haven’t brought up the fact that quantum physics (although I am no expert by any means) reveals to us that our “traditional” intuitions of causation do not work at the quantum level (which I am still exploring the literature on that as we speak). However, I think that may be for another conversation.
For the sake of making this less wordy, I am going to start quickly addressing your comments with less structure (I fear I am not being concise enough):
To be honest, I am not sure what the difference would be between self-causation and self-manifestation: is it that the latter may require a will of some kind? If so, then I am perfectly happy using the term self-causation instead! That would make sense to me why you would prefer not to label it that way and, quite frankly, I think it to be a very relevant critique: thank you for bringing that up!
This may be me being to technical again, but I think this sentence is a contradiction. On one hand, you say “something creates If something creates another thing, even if it is itself, that created thing is caused by the original thing, the first cause. thing”, but then you say “even if it is itself”: the former, I would say, is a perfect representation of causation (as the term another thing can not refer to the original thing), whereas the latter is not. I cannot think of a single example of where an effect caused itself (traditionally speaking, although I would be willing to explore the implications of quantum physics). If that were the case, namely that effects could be there own causes, then there would be no semantic difference between the term “cause” and “effect”: I would argue there would be no meaningful distinction.
I think I slightly misunderstood your argument and, therefore, I apologize. But I am still a bit confused because an actual infinite would also not be “constrained by prior rules as to why it should exist” just as much, I would argue, as saying there is a first cause that either just is or is self-caused. That is what I meant by “they would be just as out of bounds of the principle of sufficient reason as anyone could (at least) argue for any type of “first cause””: namely that defining a cause as being self-caused, for instance, breaks the chain of the principle of sufficient reason (that everything has a sufficient reason for its existence) by exhausting that principle inward on itself (i.e. what’s its cause? Oh! It is its own cause! But what’s the cause of its own cause? Oh! It is the cause of that too! Etc...)--just like, on the other hand, an actual infinite would exhaust the principle of sufficient reason outward of itself (i.e. what’s its cause? Oh! That is its cause! What’s the cause of that? Oh! That is the cause of its cause! Etc..). You see, they both break the principle of sufficient reason (and I personally think this is one out of many reasons why our logic and reason is not reliable pertaining to anything beyond space/time, or anything postulated to be the cause of space/time but yet part of it in some way). I am saying this because I was under the impression that you were arguing against the idea of an infinite regression, but I would say that an actual infinite regression is just as valid, so to speak, on contrary to a potential infinite regression, as the idea of a first cause which is self-caused.
Forgive me, but I am not entirely sure (in light of what I previously stated) how you eliminated actual infinities? I thought, and correct me if I am wrong, that you were arguing that an infinite regression would logically require a reason for why it infinitely regresses: but that’s only true, definitions wise, for potential infinities. By definition, an actual infinite is, in its own definition, necessitated to be truly infinite (there is nothing outside of it), just like how, by definition, a self-caused first cause, in its own definition, necessitates that it is truly its own cause (there is nothing beyond it). I am finding it hard to see how you concluded that one is invalid while inferring the other is perfectly valid.
Fair enough! And you have absolute made a decent case (if not more than that)! However, I don’t think that we can say that there is definitively a first cause given how little we understand the topic: it isn’t analogous, I would argue, to the study of cells, for instance, where we have ample knowledge on the topic. Sure, we could discover something entirely new about cells that rocks our previous understand at its core, but we have plenty of positive evidence for our claims, whereas you seem to be arguing by process of elimination (abducto ad absurdum), which is purely negative evidence. I find this problematic because negative evidence only tells me logically what can’t be, but rarely ever what can be (which requires positive evidence—with the exception of statements that are truly limited in scope, like whether the cat is or is not in the kitchen).
Hopefully my responses find you well and are at least somewhat substantive.
Bob
What is the prior cause that causes these sub-atomic particles to pop into existence? Answer that question and you'll get the Nobel Prize for Physics.
This would only stand up if you proved that such an X actually exists. This is a condition you set up which is not shown or proven to be true.
It all starts on a more precise understanding of the Self, how the Self comes to mind and how we create categories and concepts. Happy to talk this in a Tertulia if you join us to Discord's Philosophy Bookclub.
This is such an old and commonly discussed topic that I am at a loss as to what to recommend. See Agrippan (Munchhausen) trilemma, principle of sufficient reason, metaphysical grounding.
Sure:
You said: Quoting EricH
So, events at the quantum level work in ways that we really don't understand or know how to explain, and the "solution" is to throw out literally everything we do know and can explain about everything else in our personal and scientific experience, namely cause and effect.
...and you say this is "factual knowledge."
But then you also say that we're barely scraping the surface of what we could know about the universe and how it works and we need to "be humble and acknowledge that we really don't know what's going on."
Seems to me that humility would apply to scientists too, and that instead of claiming some "factual knowledge" about something we don't actually have an explanation for and which defies everything else we do know how to explain... we could and should very simply say "as far as we can tell at this moment in time."
But you have established that "X represents an existent prior causality to Y". So, if we know that X exists, how can we not know that Y has an X?
The contradiction is well and alive! :smile:
I am sure you have something else in mind but maybe you have not described it clearly or correctly ...
Whatever is the case, I believe that the issue, as it is described, is too complicated and does not offer
for a comfortable analysis or discussion. It cannot be followed easily or walked through with confident steps (sound arguments). Moreover, the object of the topic, that is, what is to be proven, namely that "A first cause is logically necessary", is lost in the road, i.e. it cannot .
If I were to describe such a subject , would try to do is as simple as possible, with every premise (step) as [b]clear and definite as possible, i.e. leaving as much less room for ambiguity as possible, and it would follow something like the following scheme. (This is a "classical" style. There are also other ones.)
1. I will try to prove that {object}
2. Assumptions
2a. Assumption #1
2b. Assumption #2
...
3. Logic/arguments
3a. If both #1 and #2 are true, then {conclusion #1)
3b. If #1 is true but not #2, then {conclusion #2)
...
4. Final conclusion that proves the object
Then the whole thesis could be evaluated by someone else, who can agree or disagree at any point. If he disagrees at any point, then of course he should not continue. If, on the other hand, one reaches at the final point (4) and agrees also with that, that will mean that he complete agrees with the thesis.
Yeah, well, you know. I want to know stuff. That first causes are logically necessary tells me not a damn thing about stuff. I’m aware of some theories that prove impossibilities, but whatever isn’t, doesn’t tell me what is. The bridge...an empirical circumstance the complete knowledge of which is immediately available to me....attempts to falsify your claim that demonstrations of impossibilities necessarily gives alternative knowledge, which the bridge-path impossibility apparently does not provide.
Quoting Philosophim
No, it isn’t, you’re correct. The OP uses universals, re: X,Y,Z, Alpha....forms of things. Could be any damn thing. And if any thing, then all things. If there is one exception to the rule conditioned by universals, that rule fails. It follows that if there is no alternative knowledge given from a particular bridge wash-out, the demonstration of alternative knowledge from impossibilities in general, fails.
Thing is....there’s no possibility of demonstrating a failure in pure logic predicated on universals alone, all particulars in succession must be substituted to falsify the proposition/theory, which effectively reduces the logical necessity for first causes to a worthless tautology.
Quoting Philosophim
And I say it isn’t. Well...ok, it is a pretty big thing to say, but it is just as empty as it is big. Be nice to prove the assertion, with the same justice as the bridge disproves alternative knowledge given from impossibilities.
“...Because, however, the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering whole, of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this (...) that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly misapplied....”
Hence, the bridge. Well-grounded information obtained independent of logic.
——————
Quoting Philosophim
We do, of course. Turns out, we as the cause of this, is as big a thing to point out, as pointing out that our universe must have something that does not have a prior explanation. And just as empty.
“...Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever....”
With respect to this topic, formal conditions of the understanding means only that for any thing in existence, a cause of it is logically necessary, and in the continuation of that, we understand the logic of a first cause of that thing, and by association, all things.
With respect to logic itself, its illusion means only that whatever truth is taken from logic alone cannot be taken as proofs in the world of things.
But never fear: I am “prating” as much as the next guy, insofar as attempts at refutation of a claim is just as much an attempt to extend the range of knowledge, as the affirmation of it.
————
Quoting Philosophim
Right.
The nonsense of “an infinity of infinities” aside, if we continue the series of causes without concluding to a first cause, whether infinitely or merely indefinitely, all we’ve done is determined a series of causes. We are not justified in saying “that is just how reality is” because there may very well be exceptions to the rule we have not reached, in which case, we really didn’t know just how reality is at all. Remember the logic of illusion? There it is, right there. Eliminate the illusion by saying that is how we are, rather than that is how reality is.
Actually, parsimony suggests, and experience makes explicit, the indefinite extension of causes a posteriori is highly unlikely, and the infinite extension of causes a posteriori is impossible, which makes affirmative empirical judgements with respect to things contained by such causal extensions, categorically false.
————
Quoting Philosophim
I never wandered from it. I support the logical necessity of first causes; followed by a great big fat gigantic....so what? Even if true, we can do nothing with it, it makes no difference in The Grand Scheme of Things, and as an intellectual exercise, ended as soon as it began. Anyone with a modicum of metaphysical prowess already knew all about it, and no one else cares.
Still fun to play with, though, so...thanks for that.
There you go again making the same basic mistake. You just can't seem to get over the cause/explanation equivocation. Assuming that the world regresses infinitely into the past, if there is an explanation for that, that explanation doesn't in any way negate the premise. Nor does the absence of an explanation.
Causation is a time-bound concept such that causes always precede their effect in time. Thus there can be no cause of time. It follows that there can be no cause of the universe; it is equivalent to asking for the cause of causation.
Is it? Do you agree that a cause must precede its effect? If so, what meaning do you give to a cause of time? Something preceding time seems to make no sense to me. One speaks of 'outside' or 'beyond' time and space in a hand-waving loose way, but I think cause is rather too definite for your 'why' to substitute without scientific complaints. A cause of time and space, necessarily outside time and space, is not the same kind of cause that science wots of.
Let's not multiply conceptual muddles without necessity. This is an old trope, on par with 0.9... =/= 1, but has nothing to do with the OP.
Your physics is a little out of date. You need more PBS Spacetime.
Quoting SophistiCat
One can do lots of things by way of speculative talk especially if one can retreat when pressed to 'loose' or 'metaphorical' or 'metaphysical'. Nevertheless, an 'account' has to add up, and the time before time does not compute.
So does humanity as a whole have a mother?
I wouldn't say illogical, at least doesn't derive a contradiction.
Counterintuitive perhaps?
There'd be no sufficient reason that 0 was reached at one particular moment, and not some other moment, any other moment.
Yet, with a definite earliest time, we similarly appear to run into such a violation, in that there'd be no sufficient reason for the universe being 14 billion years old, and not some other age, any other age.
Maybe the counterintuitive "edge-free", not infinite universe is the more intuitive after all?
Weird. :meh:
At least we might admit that we don't know, and will just have to let the universe tell its own story (evidence).
[sub]• Surprise: the Big Bang isn’t the beginning of the universe anymore by Ethan Siegel (Oct 20, 2021)
• The problem with the Big Bang theory by Don Lincoln (Nov 4, 2021)
[/sub]
If the past is infinite then the present is the end of an infinite period of time, but an infinite period of time has no end.
I much appreciate the discussion Bob. Do not worry about being concise!
Quoting Bob Ross
I understand. I wrote another paper here which examines knowledge using basic principles. I've used that basis of knowledge for years now in my own life and philosophy, but of course you would not know that! It is here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge if you are interested in reading it after this conversation is over. I can't seem to get anyone to have a good discussion with over it, and it bothers me that I haven't had anyone to properly discuss a theory which is a potential solution to the problem of induction.
But back to the topic, to your definition of induction, I will agree that that the argument is inductive. I am assuming a consistency in laws, and assuming things that may or may not exist. Where I think the deduction comes from is if these inductions were to be true, what would logically have to follow. But you are 100% correct in the fact this is is something we cannot actively prove or confirm through evidence. There are a few theories in math that also work this way. They make claims about number patterns that in theory should be logically true, but cannot be confirmed due to the fact there are infinite numbers. I think this is a fundamental of philosophy. Science seeks to put our theories to the test, while philosophy tries to narrow the field of ideas to those that have the most logical reasons to test, or try to answer logically situations that, at that moment of human history, cannot be tested by science.
Quoting Bob Ross
You are correct. Both are outside of the ability to confirm though experience. They are the conclusions of what we know today. Causality exists. So causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely. Of course, maybe there's a third option we haven't thought of. But among the two options of absurdity, we find that even an infinite regression end up having to be self-explained.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, I am not denying that an infinite regression is possible, but the fact that there exists an infinite regression, is self caused.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, there is nothing in the argument that implies only one first cause would exist, or can exist. If a first cause has no prior explanation for its existence, there is no rule constraining or pushing a first cause to exist. Meaning there is no reason multiple first causes could, or could not happen. Further, there is no reason a first cause has to continue to exist once it is formed. What does necessarily have to happen however, is if it forms among other existences in space and time, it must be part of space and time. Further, it can cause, and be effected by other matter that share the properties of space and time. So while a first cause has no prior cause for its inception, once it enters reality it can interact with, it can be acted upon and vice versa.
And this leads back to the issue I had with the technicality of "A self cause creating itself". Once a self cause is existent, anything that it causes is now a secondary cause from the primary formation. This has lead me to wonder at a few things. And here, this is recently considered territory for me, and I am curious what you think. If it is the case that more than one first cause can form, why would we not see more? But thinking about it, I believe first causes by their nature or the base constitute parts of existence. Complex objects are really a combination of smaller objects. A complex object cannot be self-explained, but is explained by its interaction with other objects.
That being the case, a self-explained entity would seem to be indivisible. Anything at the scale of our general observations is divisible. Now, that is not to say more than one self-explained entity could form in such away with another self-explained entity as to create a more complex object. But when you consider the odds of a self-explained entity appearing alone, versus the odds of it appearing in perfect tandom with another self-explained entity, it seems like it would be smaller and smaller odds that a self-explained entity appeared at once as an ever more complex object, like a person, or a planet. It doesn't mean that primary entities couldn't combine later once formed, but that may also take time and incredible luck and timing for them to be intertwined in such a way as to create a long term stable complex object.
But that's just some extra thought for now. Your grasp of the situation I think is rather tight, and you have a keen mind for this. Continue to ask questions as you see fit!
Yes. I have a theory of that, but that will have to wait for another time.
Let me clarify the point. I am saying "if" there exists an X. If there does not, then the infinite regress's cause for existence, is the fact that it exists. There can be no prior reason for its existence, but itself. The only way this cannot be is if an X exists for that infinite regress. And if that is the case, we repeat the process ad nauseum, still arriving at the same conclusion of the OP.
Certainly Raul. Fantastic contribution here and discussion. Thank you.
Hm, I don't think those conclude the same thing that has been concluded here. But, I appreciate your input to the conversation.
No, I am saying that we don't know. Perhaps there is an X for a Y, or perhaps there is not. If there does not exist for a particular Y, then that Y is an alpha. Basically a Y without a X. I suppose I don't change Y to something else when we know there is an X for that Y, which I could see causing confusion. If I said a Y that we knew had an X was called a "why", would that help? :D
So then a Y may or may not have an X.
An Alpha is a Y that does not have an X.
A Why is a Y that does have an X. (Why? Because X. I can put a little levity here right?)
With that in mind, see if you can continue the rest of the argument. Part of asking for feedback from the forums is so it could be rewritten and amended better to be clearer. So your feedback is welcome!
No start, in this case.
But the argument is usually phrased as "cannot be completed", except it can, it just takes an infinity.
Of course, if you presuppose otherwise, then you won't get anywhere.
It's not a (purely) logical thing, unless you include things like the principle of sufficient reason.
[sub]• James Harrington
• Craig Skinner
[/sub]
Its not science, its philosophy. Philosophy helps us come to logical conclusions apart from application, so we can let our mind wander to possibilities that perhaps could one day be applied. For example, if it is the case that first causes are logically necessary, we can also conclude that there is no need for there to be only one, and that one could happen at any moment. This leads to questions about why the universe isn't loaded with them. Check the last paragraph of my reply to Bob Ross to see some of the things of consequence I've been thinking of.
Quoting Mww
Perhaps you think tautologies are useless, but they can help narrow questions of scope. The debate between infinite regression and finite regression has existed for quite some time. This give a definite answer to the idea of a first cause. The conclusion of a long debate in philosophy can be useful, and opens up further ideas as I've already mentioned.
Quoting Mww
Of course. You have to take your idea and apply it to reality to determine its real. You can logically predict things about reality, test them, and find them to be true however no? Scientists predicted the big bang purely through logical consequences. Does that mean its proven? Of course not. Does that mean its interesting and makes us think on further possibilities? Absolutely. The quest for philosophy is to find the limits of logical consequences with ideas. If we can apply and test them, they become science. I am not doing science, but creating an idea that is logically sound. While I may fail at science, do I fail at philosophy here?
Quoting Mww
No disagreement here. But we can only conclude logic with what we know today correct? Your assertion can be applied to every single bit of knowledge mankind has ever gleaned from the world. It doesn't mean I've done anything wrong here. :)Quoting Mww
I have had fun thinking about it as well. Perhaps you may have fun thinking of the next stage that I started with Bob Ross. Its been a great conversation regardless.
Feel free to better explain how I am making this equivocation then. I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm just not seeing where you are coming from.
I see. So "X: represents an existent prior causality to Y" is an hypothetical element. So, we don't know whether Y exists or not and we don't know whether X exists or not. OK, there's no conflict in this, but also there's no ground where I can stand on. And maybe the same holds for Z and Alpha ... In short, everything is possible!
This for me is walking on thin ice ... Even worse, walking on the air; I get dizzy! :grin:
What I can do though is to try in my own way to prove or disprove your thesis: A first cause is logically necessary, which anyway, as I already told you, I find it quite interesting ...
Anyway, thank you a lot for your willingness to clarify things!
I'm glad you're enjoying the challenge! If I've given you something to think and wonder on, whether it ends up holding true or false in the end, it is one of the greatest compliments I could receive. Feel free to keep asking for clarification where needed, and keep challenging it as your thoughts arise.
We don’t know there is a first cause, yet we conclude logically there must be one. What we know today is that, in our experience, every change has a cause. So it is the case that what we know from limited experience contradicts what we logically conclude regardless of experience.
Quoting Philosophim
Define “fail”. There’s nothing patently new, no paradigm shift; there’s nothing supported by experience; there’s nothing to which a complementary negation doesn’t equally fit, so while there may be no logical failure, per se, there is just as little evidentiary success. If the only condition humans seek more than happiness is knowledge, and this purely logical exercise grants none, then yes, it fails.
Fortunate for us, methinks, that human reason by its own nature wanders hither and yon in epistemic wastelands, and at the same time by its own nature, curtails itself from becoming lost in them. It remains only a wish such rational camaraderie obtains in the same subject.
I don't think that's quite correct. What I did was take cause up to its logical conclusion. There are only two alternatives. If one is logically eliminated from actually being possible, only the other remains. Now where the theory could fail is if some third alternative arrives. Of course, I also think that's impossible. Its like saying the number 3 could exist in binary. If we include a 3, its not really binary anymore.
So I've proven with the information we have, that a first cause is necessary. And in that, I think that's new. Its not a "maybe", its a "logical certainty". The question of applicability and needing evidence is only in what form it would take.
Quoting Mww
Unless of course you can negate the argument. Currently its what I'm waiting for to hear from people. Because if people don't, then philosophically, this debate and any debate about finite vs infinite regression is concluded.
I don't think we learn through observation that every change has a cause. We assume it. It's the Law if Explanation per Schopenhauer, and a way out of the OPs conundrum is to note that cause and effect are bound together, two sides of one coin. The problem is coming from analysis, or dismantling the clock.
Quoting Philosophim
To the best of our knowledge this statement is false. I believe that the rest of what I said still applies.
Now if Philosophim had said "I believe that we will eventually find etc etc"? That would be fine (or at least it would be on firmer logical grounding). But that would not be a definitive proof, because the argument would start off with an unprovable axiom.
And this where faith comes in - to believe in the a god or gods or the supernatural requires a leap of faith. I have known many people of varying religious beliefs and I have seen first hand how their religious beliefs help them in their daily lives - and as long as they do not try to impose their religious beliefs on me that's fine.
But for some people faith is not sufficient - they require some sort of absolute irrefutable evidence or definitive proof. I believe these attempts are doomed to failure - you cannot use logic to prove something illogical.
But maybe I'm wrong - and that would be very cool. But prime mover or first cause arguments lack the necessary rigor for many reasons beside the one I mentioned.
Yes, you did. That conclusion being there is a necessary first cause. Which is the same as, if a first cause is necessary, there absolutely must be one.
Quoting Philosophim
The two alternatives here being necessity and possibility? The logical necessity for a first cause automatically and immediately eliminates its possibility. Problem is, necessity and possibility are not proper complements, they are properly speaking, different and separate modalities. Necessity and contingency, on the other hand, are directly complementary. That which is necessary cannot be merely possible, but that which is possible is not therefore necessary. That which is necessary, on the other hand, can never be contingent, and that which is contingent can never be necessary.
This makes a difference because to say a thing is necessary automatically eliminates its possibility, but it is not equally true to say that which is necessary automatically eliminates its being contingent. To be a first cause presupposes it is not itself an effect, but presupposition doesn’t serve to eliminate it from being one. Experience validates that for ever effect a cause is necessary, and that cause itself always contingent on it being itself an effect of something antecedent to it. It follows that if the validation given by experience is continued in kind into the infinite range of effects contingent on causes, it is logically impossible for there to be a cause that is not itself an effect.
Your argument for first causes is negated, and your philosophy fails, insofar as one logical determination is offset by another with equal justice.
TA-DAAAAA!!!
Or not. Six of one, half dozen of the other.
True enough, but not quite what I said. We don’t observe every change, but the changes we observe all have causes.
I agree that the changes you observe all have causes, I just think that's apriori knowledge.
If we actually knew the causes of all the changes we see, science would be completed, right?
Indeed. Thank you. This doesn't happen often to me!
Oh absolutely. Good point. What the changes are, how they manifest, is knowledge a posteriori.
Plato Enlightened.
:up:
Lets clarify what necessity and possibility are.
Logical necessity is a logical conclusion that cannot be contradicted within the system. For example, if you define yourself as "the thing that thinks about what I am". You then say, "Either I exist, or I do not exist." Then if you think about what you are, it is logically necessary that "you" exist because you have eliminated the possibility of "you" not existing. You can expand the definition of "you", but then its a new system that has new considerations.
We could expand the scope of what "you" are into the realm of possibility. For example, you could say, "I like cherries, I like ice cream, I will probably like cherry ice cream." This is not logically necessary, but logically possible. Cherry ice cream exists, therefore you might like it. The flaw in the argument of possibility is the idea that liking cherries or ice cream has any bearing on whether you'll like cherry ice cream as many times a combination of foods we do not like creates a taste we do like.
As you can see, the OP is not an argument about logical possibility, but logical necessity.
Quoting Mww
I never claimed first causes are outside of cause and effect once they exist. The opposite in fact. While I stated an alpha is an entity that does not have an X, I did NOT state that an alpha could not have an X. The implicit (which perhaps should have been made explicit) understanding is that an alpha can, or cannot have a Z. And as we know, cause and effect are measuring tools of perspective. That which we are measuring to have been caused, is effected. This can of course turn around. Just as we can say the cue ball caused the 8 ball to move, we can state that the 8 balls acceptance of the force transfer from the cue ball, caused the cue ball to slow down substantially.
The only hard rule for an alpha, is that its initial existence for being has no X. I find it logically necessary that at least one alpha must exist in any chain of causality. If this clarifies the idea, do you agree that the argument fits the criteria for logical necessity?
I fail to see this. Mind using this to demonstrate how this dismantles the OP? Anything can be claimed, but for it to matter, it must be logically shown.
Please demonstrate how this is false. I can go around saying a lot of things are false, but it must be shown to be false, not merely believed to be false.
Quoting EricH
This argument has nothing to do with faith or God. I often find theists and anti-theists become completely unreasonable when they suspect an argument is going for or against their personal belief. Please eliminate that inclination, and take the argument for what it is.
No, this is not knowledge at all. That is belief. For it to be knowledge, you must demonstrate that all changes you observe have causes. It is a strong and very useful belief, but it is not knowledge.
I already gave you the link. Here it is again. Sub atomic particles pop into existence with no prior "cause".
There are also many, many other quantum effects which also have no preceding cause - the decay of radioactive atoms, e.g.
To the best of our knowledge there is no causality at the quantum level. People much smarter than you & I have proposed theoretical frameworks that preserve causality, but to date these frameworks have all been dis-proven by experiments.
So just to repeat, to the best of our current knowledge there are measurable physical events in the real world that have no prior cause. These events do occur with statistical regularity - modern technology is based on this. But each individual event is causeless.
Yes, this defies our common sense notion of how the world behaves. If you're curious and want to learn more, here's a good starting point: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty/
There's a third option: first mover agnosticism. Nothing in this thread has yet convinced me to be for or against the idea of a first mover... or rather, everything has convinced me of both infinite causal regression and the impossibility thereof.
Quoting EricH
I'm a total layperson, but have long been interested in someone explaining the quantum stuff adequately. This link doesn't really explain to me how "quantum foam," or the idea that space/time is non-linear, would negate the idea of cause and effect?
Quoting EricH
Here Stanford seems to be discussing the notion that we can't measure momentum and location at the same time, right? Again, that doesn't seem to me to have any effect on the notion of cause and effect and I can't find any reference to it in the SEP entry.
I'm not overly concerned with mattering. You need the answer to come from the dismantled clock. It's not there.
It's Kantian knowledge.
X: represents an existent prior causality to Y.
Alpha: A Y existence that is identified as having no prior causality.
Quoting Philosophim
Something with unknown prior causality is that which has no existent prior causality, and for any causal chain, there is at least one of those things identified as such.
Nahhhh.......you couldn’t pay me enough to agree with that, if I’m being honest. The same thing cannot both have an unknown cause and no cause at all.
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Quoting Philosophim
And with that little tidbit of philosophical wonderment.....I’m out. I recognize a dead horse when I see one. Sorry.
There is a difference between not knowing if there is a cause, versus knowing there is not a cause. At one time atoms were thought to be the smallest indivisible objects in the universe. This was not knowledge, but belief. If we learn from history, we should avoid doing that again here.
Quoting EricH
I am not concerned with preserving causality, when I have yet to have anyone show me its broken.
Quoting EricH
Statistical regularity can only occur because there is an underlying rule which produces said effects. Just ask yourself, what causes this statistical regularity? Perhaps it is self-explained, but perhaps it isn't. Its a Y, but we do not know if that Y has an X, or an Alpha.
Arguably, even if we discovered an entity which was self-explained, we might not be able to actually prove it. There would always be the question of whether there was something prior to it. Further, a self-explained entity joins causality once formed. We could use that causality to move backwards and predict that some event caused the alpha, when in reality, we are only predicting that there must have been some prior force to generate its existence.
That is why this argument is important. It may be impossible to ascertain by evidence if something is self-explained or caused by something prior. Perhaps some alphas would fit into a provable context, but I could see just as many not. With a logical certainty that alphas must exist, perhaps it can help us ascertain reality better when we arrive at situations that appear to occur without prior cause.
I have not stated that there could not be a chain of infinite causal regression. All I've stated is there can be no prior reason as to why there exists a chain of infinite causal regression. Meaning the cause for why there is a chain of infinite causal regression is the fact that it exists, and nothing else. So far, I have not seen any one provide a valid counter argument to this claim.
Then your point will not matter.
Quoting frank
This sentence is nonsense. If you want your point to matter and make sense, use your example and point out where the OP is wrong.
A priori knowledge is that which is independent from experience. You cannot conclude that everything must have a prior explanation for it being based upon experience, because you have not experienced every prior cause to every prior thing. Not that there aren't flaws with Kant's theory of knowledge, nor am I using Kant's model, but you haven't accurately ascribed what a priori knowledge is.
I was not merely referring to your posts alone. When I talk about the thread, I'm referring to its entirety.
I'm not claiming a thing can have both an unknown cause and no cause at all. That which has an unknown cause is a Y. That which has no prior cause, is an alpha. Someone else had this same confusion earlier. I told them if it makes it easier, a Y that is proved to have an X could be called a "why" (Because of X). A Y is merely a state that has the question of whether there is an X or not. No X, alpha. Has X, why. Does that make it more clear?
Quoting Mww
I clearly pointed out why it is not a priori knowledge. If you cannot refute it, my point stands. And if you wish to leave it that way, that is fine.
Understood.
I already explained several times, including in the remainder of the post that you quoted. I don't feel like spending more of my time on this.
Quoting SophistiCat
When you stated premise, I assumed you spoke about the OP. Our previous conversations seemed to lean to the idea that you found the solution uninteresting, but sound. So if the premise of the OP is not negated, I assumed you had no issue.
Quoting SophistiCat
Is this what you were talking about? Yes, this is part of cause and effect. Cause and effect are ways to measure the reason why a state changes from one to another over time. The cause is the reason for the effect. There is not a false equivocation here, and entirely intended in the argument. If this had presented a problem to the argument, I did not feel you pointed this out properly.
Not what you said. Y has a cause, even if the cause is unknown.
Quoting Philosophim
Therefore no alpha can be a Y, but you also said an alpha is a Y but a Y with no cause. But a Y has an cause. You’re making a valiant effort in having your cake and eat it too, and THAT’S what I ain’t buyin’.
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Quoting Philosophim
It is true left out the pure/impure subdivisions, but I didn’t need such accuracy to know what he meant, because the topic ultimately reduces to the principle of cause and effect, which in and of itself, because it is a only a mode of human cognition, has nothing to do with experience. Experience is certainly required for its objective validity, but not for its constructions a priori, re: Hume’s mistake.
Anyway....in passing.
As I stated before, you were the second person to interpret that the wrong way. That tells me I need to revise this section to be more clear. The way I clarified it in my last post was the way it was always originally intended. Of course it would be silly for me to say something has no cause, but also has a cause. The "unknown" cause was meant to mean, "You do not know whether Y has a cause."
Which is fully on me for not thinking the sentence through. I can see how you would think "unknown cause" means there is definitely a prior cause that we don't yet know about, so no worry. Now that you understand the way its intended to be read, you can see the contradiction never existed.
Quoting Mww
I am also under no obligation to follow Kant's definitions of knowledge. I do not agree that you can know about cause and effect apart from experience. The idea boils down to whether there is a state prior to another that caused that secondary state to be. This is something that exists in reality, external to our construction of it. All you have to do is type a reply on your keyboard, press "Post Comment" and you will have caused the effect of responding to my message. Our language that we use to describe cause and effect can only exist because the world exists with cause and effect independent of our realization of it.
It has been demonstrated that causality does not happen at the atomic & sub-atomic level. What is the prior event that causes a radioactive atom to decay? What is the prior event that causes a particle anti-particle pair to materialize out of nowhere? To the best of everyone's knowledge there are no prior events that cause these things to happen.
Quoting Philosophim
Can we absolutely rule out with absolute 100% confidence that there is some unknown / unobservable hidden cause behind quantum mechanics, behind the uncertainty principle? No one is saying that. But you are the one making the assertion that that there must be a cause for everything - therefore the burden of proof is on you. If you could develop a theoretical framework to account for this observed lack of prior causes - and develop an experiment that would demonstrate this? Your name would go down in history! I encourage you to do this. Go Philosophim!
But even beyond that - and here is a question I'm really curious about. I'm fascinated by this behavior. Why is this so important to you that there must be a first cause?
That is an interesting topic! And perhaps one I'll make after this dies down. There are a few claims that could be made that I think are interesting.
1. There is no reason for an alpha to to last any period of time. It could exist from X to infinite seconds before not existing anymore.
2. There is no reason to believe there is only one alpha.
3. Alphas would seem to be incredibly small. Anything that can be divided or seen as parts is not an alpha, but a complex object. Now it is possible that two alphas could form or collide at the exact combination needed to make a new object. Considering the odds, it would seem like a ridiculously low chance that anything complex would form.
I think these are the most interesting. Do you think I'm off in my musings here?
I think you misunderstood the OP. The OP concludes that there must exist things which have no prior explanation for their existence. If there is nothing prior to the sub-atomic level, then it is an alpha that I've been showing must exist. Do one more review on the OP and you'll see you are agreeing with me if you claim this to be true.
All I am saying is that you do not know if what you are describing is actually an alpha, or if we have not simply discovered what the prior cause is yet.
Quoting EricH
To answer a simple philosophical question. Is there infinite regression or finite regression. It turns out its a false dichotomy. I find solving puzzles like this fascinating! I have some follow up thoughts on what it means if there alpha's are logically necessary in the post above. Feel free to chime in your thoughts.
It is true the cause of an effect cannot be known absent experience. Still, it remains that no singular object of perception, in and of itself, can inform as to its cause, nor that it even had one. That relation is what we think as appended to objects, which makes explicit the relation itself resides in reason, not in experience.
Quoting Philosophim
If that is the case, you’ve created a false dichotomy. In its fullest extent, if independent of our realization, we wouldn’t have the language at all, and, in its simplest extent, if we merely realize it, whether it exists in the world becomes irrelevant.
Food for thought.....all respectful and friendly like.....of suspicious standing is he who brings billiard balls and acorns to a metaphysics arena.
Immediate edit:
HA!!! We both used false dichotomy almost at the same time. Scary!!!
Perception combined with proper science can however. What caused the words that you wanted to type appear on your screen? Are you saying there was no cause? Computer science would say otherwise, that there are clear inputs that cause that output to appear on your screen. It can be easy for us to get lost in the abstract, and forget the very things we use daily. Open a door. Now shut the door. What caused the door to open? What caused the door to close? Can you honestly say there was no cause? Of course not.
To clarify once again, we can look for cause and effect, and not find any, be inaccurate in our assessment, but also be accurate in our assessment. Accurate cause and effect is testable and repeatable, because it accurately describes reality. That is why it is not a false dichotomy. Though fist bump for jinx on using false dichotomy!
Yeah....about that. What caused the words? And PLLL—EEEEEZZZEEE...don’t say my fingers caused the words. Finite causal regression writ large.
And a logical iteration for your sacred alpha.
Thank me later.
I think you would benefit from doing some reading about causation (and disabusing yourself of the notion that there is only one kind and everyone agrees on what it is), explanation, grounding. When you have all these mixed up as you do, you end up with the kind of muddle that you have in your OP.
Your fingers. :D
Am I wrong? Simple things are often all that are needed to prove a point. Demonstrate to me that your fingers were not one X in the chain that caused those words to appear on the screen, and then you'll have something to stand on. For the purposes of my OP, I merely need an X, or a prior existence that causes the Y we're analyzing. To show that the OP is wrong, you have to show that X doesn't exist for anything. If I can show even one X, then the point stands.
Also, alphas are not sacred. If you think this is about religion, it is not. If anything, this argument is likely an incredibly harsh counter against religion. But I find when people start worrying about where the argument is going, versus worrying about the argument itself, they make lot of mistakes in reasoning.
Yes, as close to zero as the simplest that is possible.
It has energy and so it can't be still, else naught would have further come forth.
It has only itself, so it can only rearrange to make forms.
Random action, since no design could have been imparted? Or some default for the simplest?
How much of it would there be?
It is continuous if there is a lot of it, again due to no spacers of 'Nothing' unable to be in it.
It is ever there because 'Nothing' cannot be and so there is no alternative to its being?
I am not going to go into the entire literary history of philosophy of causation for a forum post to a general audience. I am using the general understanding of cause and effect with precision given as needed. If people have asked for clarification on what cause and effect means for the OP, I have given it with clear examples and evidence. If they countered these, examples they could give me definitive evidence showing it is flawed.
If you have done all of that reading and can see the flaws in the examples, feel free to point them out. Confidence that the OP is wrong does not logically prove it. So far those challengers have abandoned the argument after I've made a counter point. Which is fine. Many people get frustrated when they realize they cannot counter a particular point, and revert to insults, talking down, and ignoring that counter point in their follow up posts. The good ones love the challenge, and make great conversation. Sometimes, they win, and I admit to it. Those are the real philosophers and thinkers that make my heart race, set my mind alight, and force me to things I've never thought of before.
I already have something to stand on, and I don’t care about one X. I want to determine a possible alpha. That said, fingers cause the keys to be struck, but do not on that account alone, cause the words. A damn axe can strike keys, as can a feather.
How many clues do you need, to see where this inevitably leads?
Maybe. It might also just be inert floating amongst other things. I would assume that some came into existence with momentum however, as otherwise we wouldn't have our current universe.
Quoting PoeticUniverse
Once a thing forms into existence, it could very well follow rules and patterns. In this, it might not be random. I think only true randomness can happen when there is no prior cause, or when an alpha appears. Once its appeared, we could try to figure out how it functions.
Quoting PoeticUniverse
Great question. This is again, completely random. That means it means they could appear anywhere between just above 0% frequency, to just below 100% frequency. Calculating this would be difficult in the fact that you mentioned, which is what are comparing the frequency of this by? Space? Nothingness? Simply our universe? I don't think we can do that. So in the end I'm not sure we can calculate the frequency that something which is truly random could appear.
Well, the argument does. If you're trying to say causality doesn't really exist, but I can post even one instance that it does, then my point stands.
Quoting Mww
Right. But they're part of the causal chain correct? Did you smash your keys with an ax, or a feather, or your fingers? It doesn't really matter. The proof is in the fact that those words would not have appeared on the screen without some cause. Isn't that a perfectly reasonable thing to logically grant?
Quoting Mww
I don't see where this inevitably leads at all. Please point out where this leads to, and also point out why this counters the OP.
Just checking by what you mean by spontaneously. If you mean "By some numeric random chance", you are correct. We can't put numbers or predictions of a things appearance that has no prior cause.
I think I mean 'spontaneously' as instead of the First Cause having always been—as a true Fundamental that never gets made or appears, being unmakeable and unbreakable due to having no parts. I favor the latter case as mandatory because the alternate of 'Nothing' is not the case nor could 'Nothing' even have being or even be meant as an opposite option.
Logically, why could there not be "nothing"? Doesn't nothing exist now? The fact that something can appear while nothing remains around it is not far fetched at all, considering we have many things that exist with mostly nothing around it.
But to your point, I am also not denying such a fundamental could also be an existent alpha. That is perfectly possible, but so would an alpha appearing for five seconds, then disappearing without a trace.
Because 'it' has no properties. 'Nothing' is as nonexistence; 'it' isn't there; 'it' has no what, etc.
Quoting Philosophim
No, it appears from the successful QFT that all is field. The quantum 'vacuum' is the best candidate for the First Cause, its energetic points having a value at every point, which is all that's meant by a field. Its behavior matches the math model based on harmonic oscillators. The elementaries come forth directly as the quanta of field excitations, as field arrangements, not as any new substance different from field. So, here we have something to go on to confirm the philosophy of the one First Cause that cannot not be.
There ain't no nothing no way nohow!
It very well could be the alpha. But, there are a few things to understand about QFT. First, its tenants are not proven yet. It is very much theory, and a theory based on math. Second, a "field" is a mathmatical representation, much like a wave. But a wave in water is still composed of molecules, and emptyness between those molecules. For fields, we have electron fields. Yet they are still composed of individual electrons, and "nothingness" between them.
I have no doubt at a larger scale, it functions like a field. But, this does not mean its proven that there is nothing more granular if you examine that field at a closer level.
Then they would be adjacent, without anything in-between, with 'Nothing' still not there as existent. Electron virtual particles are the fractional excitations that didn't reach a quantum of energy. They and the field at rest that yet ever moves still fill it all up completely as field, as ever. There's no existent of 'emptiness' as a nonexistent something; Parmenides came up with this shock.
Quoting Philosophim
I wouldn't think there's anything more basic than a field point. Fields are the ultimate lightweights from which the lightweight elementaries are the rather stable energy quanta. Yet, everything leaks and so our universe is temporary, although long lasting, but the Permanent ever remains.
QFT is the most successful and firm theory in the history of science, from which we build all kinds of devices. Good to follow up on the actual universe. Other supposed Absolutes from now ancient science have fallen by the wayside, such as Absolute Time and Absolute Space, along with the elementaries themselves being Fundamental and making fields. Quantum fields are all that's left to consider.
I still don't understand how 'Nothing' could be something. At any rate, a lack of anything isn't the case. There is, though, a curious near zero sum of the universe, but for the quantum fluctuations, and it could be that the potential energy of gravity matches and even feeds the kinetic energy of stuff but that is a physical process and not 'Nothing' doing anything either.
All interesting points. I don't see why anything you said isn't a possibility. Fantastic conversation, and I loved the poems!
Before I address your most recent reply, I wanted to apologize for a such a late response! With that out of the way, I will now begin my remarks.
I must also confess that I am very much appreciated our conversation as well! I enjoy civil philosophical dialogue, whereas I find (too often than I would hope) most people simply insulting each other (typically in more complex diction and prose) and I am not too fond of it.
That sounds like a splendid read! I will definitely read them and get back to you on my thoughts (if you would like, of course). For now, I will respond in light of my ignorance on your papers (and, therefore, forgive me if my ignorance shows).
Although, again, I haven’t read your work, if it is as you describe, then it will, indeed, be an enjoyable read (to say the least).
I think a proper response will require me to address this after I read your work(s), but I will still briefly address these two sentences. With respect to the first sentence, I would like to ask: what laws are you referring to? Newtonian laws? With respect to the second sentence, I now understand what you were meaning by deduction and, therefore, I was mistaken. You seem to be inducing a basic principle from which to deduce, which makes perfect sense (however I don’t quite agree with doing so, but that will have to wait until after I read your works).
I genuinely would like to know to what theories are you referring? Are you simply referring to the idea that we assume any number will “behave”, so to speak, like any other (i.e. addition will operate the same on 1 as it will with any colossal number I can think of)? Or are you referring to imaginary numbers, which are speculative? Or are you referring to a particular theory you would wish to enlighten me on? Or, and this will be my last conjecture, are you referring to infinite series summations (and such)?
I agree: it is important to work with what we have; however, I think that, in terms of causality and its dependency on time/space fabric, there are ways in which the faculties of reason can be stretched too thin--thereby causing one to be convinced it is intuitive or logical, but in reality it is what I would call lowercase “logic” being extended to what I call uppercase “Logic”. “logic” is that which our faculties of reason utilize all the time and, in many senses, is perfectly valid and useful. However, this “logic” (I think) has its limits and I would say (briefly) that the extension of causality beyond space/time fabric is “logic” being extended to “Logic” (upper case logic). “Logic” is simply defined in terms of what it is not: “logic”; Just like how true nothingness is defined as what it is not: something. Just like how I deem it impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I would also (for the same reasons) deem it impossible to truly know “Logic”. In other words, I find causality arguments (and I am not trying to overly generalize your argument) to be an extension stretched too thin. To sum this section up, I will would say that, although you are totally right in utilizing the knowledge that we do know, I would say your statement “causality must either continue indefinitely, or definitely” to be, as you admit in the following sentence, to be only a given certainty in terms of what is closest to our lives (metaphorically and literally speaking). For example, to say that something is a circle or is not a circle is typically considered a pretty exhaustive proposition (and reasonably so). And we could (and arguably would) extend this principle (that a thing is either a circle or not a circle) to all the depths of the universe (assuming we don’t find contrary evidence). However, I would say that our certainty on this principle, in this case the principle of non-contradiction, no matter how ingrained into our reasoning or closely intertwined within our lives, is inversely proportional to how far away a thing is, metaphorically as well as literally, to our lives. In all academic honesty, I am not very certain that I have any true justification for thinking that the law of non-contradiction persists in the farthest away concepts to me (such as the quantum realm, where superpositioning is technically possible). However, I would still advocate to use it (as you said) because it is the best thing that we’ve got for navigating our lives (but I would advocate its use within bounds, and that boundary is something I am still contemplating). Furthermore, and most importantly, the extension of this principle, which is already on fragile grounds when extended into the quantum realm, to that which is beyond our basic understand of all things (namely space/time fabric) greatly increases my skepticism and uncertainty on the issue at hand. So much, in fact, that I am hesitant to grant the idea that it is even useful to derive any concepts from any sort of greatly extended forms of induction (at least, ontologically speaking).
I think that I am now starting to grasp (slowly more and more) your argument: there must be an initial cause, or causes, for any given thing and that cause (or those causes) could be a combination of any type of thing that is self-explained (which, thereby, includes actual infinities). If that is the case (and, as always, correct me if I am wrong here), then I find that your argument is tailored more towards semantics: any term that is defined in a way that fundamentally has no cause is fair game. The problem I have with this (or confusion at the least) is that you seem to be advocating to the logical, via the principle of sufficient reason, derivation of causation back to a first cause (or causes) but yet then decide that it (or they—not necessarily in an agency sense of the term, but merely plurality) are outside of the scope of the principle of sufficient reason. In other words, it seems as you are using the principle of sufficient reason to derive a thing of which is excluded from that very principle. To say that it is self-explanatory, in my opinion, also, by your line of causal logic, invokes a particular infinite regression—namely that one would still be required to give a sufficient reason for why it is self-explained. This is why I think that it either becomes a semantic dead end or an infinite regression of “this is self-explained, what is the sufficient reason for its self-explanation, it is self-explained by its own self-explanation, what is the sufficient reason for that, etc”--which this leads our conversation back to your previous statement of how it boils down to indefinite or definite (which, in turn, leads us back to my previous remarks about certainty and the extension of “logic” past its limits). Now, this is exactly why I consider explanations to fundamentally collapse on themselves (which I call explanatory-collapsibility) and, therefore, I take a very different approach to epistemology (but I won’t get into that now, it will have to wait until after I read your works).
That is totally fair! However, I would then (and correct me if I am wrong) presume that you are semantically deriving this concept of a first cause—as this idea (in the above quote) is purely (I would argue) semantics (and I am not trying to undermine your position). Fundamentally, as I take it, you are defining this first cause to be, well, the first cause! Which means, as you said, that the term ‘self-cause’ doesn’t really make any sense anymore (but that’s only, I would say, if one already pre-defines it to be so!). If we weren’t to define it in a way where the term ‘self-caused first cause’, semantically speaking, is a contradictio in adjecto (i.e. a square circle), then I think we would be logically inclined, by the lines of your causal argument, to provide a sufficient justification, at the very least, for why the first cause was a first cause. In other words, why was first cause A a first cause and not the first cause B? Why were both B and A not secondary causes of first cause C? We could logically, but only in terms of semantics, conclude that B and A are not secondary causes of C because, by definition, first causes cannot be such. However, as hopefully I am demonstrating, there is still a level of explanation that I don’t think you are entirely addressing. But yet again I could just be misunderstanding you, so correct me if I am wrong!
I believe I am following what you are saying, but I am still a tad bit confused: if complex objects are merely constructed of smaller objects, then wouldn’t that be their explanations? Why (and how) would the interaction explain the Complex objects? My hand, mereologically speaking, does not exist, but, rather, is a construction of smaller parts: I take it that this is what you are referring to by “complex objects” (but correct me if I am wrong). The explanation of my hand is (I would say) the smaller parts. But here’s where it gets complicated (really quickly): those smaller parts are actually made of smaller ones, so, in a sense, the smaller parts of my hand are actually complex objects compared to its smaller parts (and so on and so forth!). Hence, I would argue, we end up with explanatory-collapsibility. I would say that we arbitrarily, within a relative scope, defining my hand to exist with respect to its smaller parts (objects), but I can also shift the scope to be of my cells to its smaller parts (objects) and the cells would now become the complex object. As far as I can tell, if one zooms in or out (so to speak), the explanations begin to cave in on themselves (providing little explanatory power the closer or farther away one goes). But yet within a relative scope they can be powerful explanations!
Not to reiterate, but, again, what is the sufficient reason for a self-explained entity (first cause) to be indivisible (other than the fact that semantically speaking it is pre-defined as such)? Again, I may simply be misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how that doesn’t require a reason.
This is all of my thoughts for now! I really appreciate your posts and I hope that this was at least somewhat useful. I will definitely take a look at your epistemological works!
Bob
It is not so much flawed as inadequate. Your persistent examples of billiard balls are the sort one might use to explain what "cause" and "effect" mean to a four-year-old.
-"I have concluded that the nature of existence necessitates a "first cause"."
-First of all you should use abstract concepts to philosophize because you are making judgments irrelevant to the actual phenomenon in question.
Now you first need to define this nature of existence in order to argue about it.
Lastly I don't know if anyone can demonstrate non existence (nothingness). Based on our current epistemology we can not verify "nothing" as a possible......."state?". Nothing is the absence of all states.
From a scientific perspective our observations of quantum fluctuations point to a cosmic substrate(cosmos) that could easily always exist.
What we label "first cause" are just random fluctuations in this cosmic energetic field that force a local change of state resulting to the emergence of temporal and spatial properties. This change we call the existence of a universe.
-"5. Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality."
- First of all causality doesn't exist. Its an abstract concept we as observers use to identify the order between interactions among entities and forces. Causality is a real phenomenon enabled by the EXISTENCE of those entities and forces.
Secondly "why" questions are useless when we deal with a fact of natural.There aren't any answers for "why" teleological questions about nature.
Why previously aroused electrons "create" new particles out of thin air?.....Becausssse....This is how nature works at its fundamental scale. This is what energy does.....produces work. Work causes things.
I considered this on pg 4. Really exist? Not like billiard balls and acorns, no, the concept abstracted from principles does not really exist. The principles themselves don’t really exist either. But post-post moderns these days like to recklessly pretend the term stands for a real thing, so.....ehhhh, I understand what they mean by it even while it grates on my supersensitive metaphysical nerves.
With respect to this dialectic, no, I’m not trying to say causality doesn’t exist.
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Quoting Philosophim
As a premise or condition, sure. The argument cares more about its conclusion, “that a causal chain will always lead to an Alpha, or first cause”, which presupposes all the X’s. They are necessarily given as links in a causal chain, so not much reason to care about one of them.
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Quoting Philosophim
I considered this on pg 8. It is reasonable to logically grant, but it is an empty proof, in that the proof of empirical conditions is not served by merely logical conclusions. Such proofs begin with them, not end. Of course there’s some cause. Big deal. What is it?
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Quoting Philosophim
You wouldn’t. Your inferences are inductive, starting at the bottom with an effect (a word on a screen) and ending at the top with the 3c plausible: some alpha such that there is a time when there is nothing prior to the cause of the word. Somewhere in that chain the empirical mechanisms....physical causality.... necessarily become exhausted. THAT’S what you haven’t yet seen, apparently.
Quoting Philosophim
Not counter. Satisfy. By finite regressive causality. Like I said. You claim a time and place for an alpha but not the when or the what; I can show an alpha plus the when and the what. But we both know you’re bound to reject my argumentum ad verecundiam, hence the aforementioned dead horse.
Not a worry! It isn't as if we are typing a few paragraphs. A quality analysis is worth the wait!
Quoting Bob Ross
By laws, I do not mean any specific law. I mean a consistency in the way existence works. One potential argument against cause and effect, is that we cannot prove that cause and effect will work tomorrow, or that they worked before recorded history. We can assume, but its not provable. That being said, if there is an argument against this, I have a counter point ready. Before getting into the messy details, I try to set things up in a way that gives a clear picture of where I'm going first. So feel free to dig further if you wish.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, you have it. I believe it is a reasonable induction, but it is without question an induction. In short, I find it impossible to function without induction. The only thing we can do is figure out which inductions are more reasonable than others. The paper ends up declaring that. Regardless, if you do find it an unreasonable induction, I would ask a more reasonable alternative be provided. Doubt for its own sake doesn't lead anywhere.
Quoting Bob Ross
I am referring to mathematical induction. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction#:~:text=A%20proof%20by%20induction%20consists,case%20n%20%3D%20k%20%2B%201.
Basically think proving formulas. If A is true, and B is true, C will always be true. But we will never be able to actively prove C is true by experience, because we cannot possibly test all C's in existence. C is logically necessary, but is ultimately an induction based on the idea that the truth of A and B will always hold no matter the situation.
Quoting Bob Ross
Absolutely correct. And I understand your point about taking logic too far. :) If you can point out where I do, please do. I am interested in getting to the truth of the matter, and only other people can point out my blind spots.
Quoting Bob Ross
While it may be impossible to truly conceive of true nothingness, I find the opposite to also be true. I cannot truly conceive of an absence of nothingness. In every thing that we know of, there is space between things. Every time we drill down, we find a piece that makes up another piece, but there is clearly space between them. Is that space also filled with other smaller things? Is space truly all one thing that touches everything else with no room for anything else to fit?
I only mention this to bring back to the idea of doubting an induction, but replacing it with a more reasonable one. I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other. To this, I feel the OP holds up in both scenarios. In the case where nothingness can exist, we have the instance of a self-explained entity forming. But in the case where there is no space, we have the question, "What caused existence to be without any space between it?" It does not escape the chain of causality question, and ends in the same answer as the OP.
Quoting Bob Ross
I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct. Something cannot cause itself, because then we are left right back to the question, "What caused it to cause itself?" So I find ascribing self-cause results in a contradiction, so should not be used.
Quoting Bob Ross
I hope I addressed it. If not, please point it out!
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct. That is why I believe complex objects cannot be defined as alphas. A complex object could be composed of alphas, but once a complex object exists, the cause of its existence is its constituent parts. So it could be that any mixture of alphas and Y's with X's could have mixed together to make a complex component. The key is that an alpha really is no different from any other existence (in our universe) beyond the fact that its inception had no prior cause. Now it could be the case that a bunch of alphas incept in such a way that they form a complex object. The reason for the objects formation is the combination of those alphas. But the reason those alphas incepted in the formation of a complex object, has no prior cause. The complex object is not an alpha itself. This is I think the only way that the proposal stays logical and consistent.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, you get it! The problem you are proposing is the exact problem of the OP. And according to the conclusion of the OP, there must be a point in which the chain of causality ends. What the OP cannot answer, is what that specifically is.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your questions are all fair. It would be because if an self-explained entity was divisible, the reason for its existence would be the combination of those divisible parts. This is the complex object being addressed again. A complex object may be composed of many alphas, but a complex object itself cannot be an alpha, because its existence is caused by the alphas (and possibly non-alphas) that make it up.
Absolutely fantastic questions that have helped me shape the points on the edge of my mind into something more concrete. Thank you again, and continue to follow up as needed.
An inadequate argument is a flawed argument. I was a teacher for five years. If you can take a complex concept and break it down so that even a four year old can understand, it is one of the greatest accomplishments you can do. Thank you. Now that I know you understand the point fully, I expect that if you find a flaw, it will be simple to point out. If you cannot, then I'll know that it wasn't because you didn't understand it, but that you were unable to counter it. I await to see if you are able to do so.
Certainly. Cause and effect are measures of states over time based on interactive forces. A very simple and real world example is when you press you keys on the keyboard to type a response. The keys on the keyboard do not press themselves, you do. When we see your message on the screen, we can know the prior state of you pressing the keys caused that to be.
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
If you don't believe it exists, simply explain to me how it is that you did not cause the message that you typed. Of course, you'll have to type that out to prove it, so that's pretty much out. Still, give it a try if you think you can. What is a phenomenon in your mind? I find its a word that needs a hard definition to be useful in a conversation.
Quoting Nickolasgaspar
So, a cause and an effect?
Of course they exist. We're talking about them right now. Further, when they are applied to reality, reality does not contradict their application. So not only do these concepts exist, when we use them, reality does not contradict their use. Just like math right? 1 exists as a concept. When we apply it to reality, it turns out reality does not contradict its use. Now you can apply math improperly, that's true. That doesn't deny its existence either. It only denies its misapplication. What you can't do is deny that cause and effect exist at this point. What you could do, is make an argument showing that I'm misapplying it. That may be the case, but I need a good argument for that to be true.
Quoting Mww
So at some point there is a part in the chain that has no prior cause? That's what I've been describing in the OP this entire time. That's not a counter, that fits the conclusion of the argument.
Quoting Mww
I do not claim any time, place, when or what an alpha is incepted. All I am claiming is that at least one alpha must exist along the chain of causality. In fact, it concludes from the argument that it is possible that there would be more than one alpha, and that they could appear anytime. There could be many alphas and many chains of causality in existence that stay separate, or intertwine. It is not about the nature of any specific chain. It is a logical conclusion about the chains themselves.
Quoting Mww
Formulas are often not provable by application, but by logic. I can conclude that there is no end to the placeholder of a number. 10, 100, 1,000 etc. But it can never be empirically proved. Do you want to deny the idea that there are an infinite amount of numbers based on the fact it cannot be empirically proved. If you do not, then you are accepting a proof based purely on logical consequence. That is the form of my argument. If you accept one proof of logical consequence, then I see no logical reason you would not accept my proof of logical consequence. Unfamiliarity with the logical proof, or displeasure at the idea is not a valid reason.
Finally, this is not an argument from authority. We have the terms in front of us. We can challenge the logic of the terms, and the logic of their application. Feel free to continue to try.
-"Certainly. Cause and effect are measures of states over time based on interactive forces. A very simple and real world example is when you press you keys on the keyboard to type a response. The keys on the keyboard do not press themselves, you do. When we see your message on the screen, we can know the prior state of you pressing the keys caused that to be."
-Ok sure, but you defined causality , not the nature of existence.
My question was directed to your initial statement: " I have concluded that the nature of existence necessitates a "first cause"." So what is that "nature" of existence that necessitates a first cause?
i.e.The alternative energetic state(of matter) of the cosmic substrate. (If yes,I would agree with you on that)
-"If you don't believe it exists, simply explain to me how it is that you did not cause the message that you typed. Of course, you'll have to type that out to prove it, so that's pretty much out."
-No no, I think you didn't got my point. I was referring to the difference between "existing" and "real". Existence is for entities while "real" is for abstract concepts that describe emergent phenomena.
Of course my fingers will need to "work" in order to cause the typing of my message.
The concept of typing will be the cause...but "typing" doesn't exist on itself. The same is true for Existence (universe). Existence(Universe)...needs to be caused from something that already exists or is real.
In the case of the universe (everything that exists) we can agree(or not) that there is an underlying causal mechanism responsible for shifting the state of energy find in the cosmic substrate(Quantum fluctuations). I don't distinguish between Cosmos and Universe I only refer to a different state.
-" What is a phenomenon in your mind? I find its a word that needs a hard definition to be useful in a conversation."
- Well I had my own definition but I decided to use a common one so that I can make my point better.
"1.a fact or situation that is observed to exist OR happen, especially one whose cause or explanation is in question."
So this random definition also distinguishes between something existing or "happening"(real) in general.
-"So, a cause and an effect? "
-No, my point was that in an energetic cosmic substrate....causes are always available and they result to effects/phenomena.(if we are able to observe them).
We are not in disagreement , I just want to know what is your position on the nature of existence.
But you didn't explain a complex concept - you gave the sort of use example that would help four-year-olds connect the words "cause" and "effect" with something of which they already have some intuitive grasp. You didn't actually explain anything. Not only is this inadequate to a philosophical discussion of causality, but your repeated appeal to these simplistic examples is patronizing and insulting.
Whatever we can talk about, exists? Something like this, you mean:
Quoting Philosophim
Yikes.
I'm not seeing any refutations here, which means despite your personal feelings, means the point stands. Your personal feelings or unbacked accusations do not matter in philosophy. Only points, counter points, and logic. If you are unable to counter my points, we both know they stand.
Of course the idea exists. The idea of a unicorn exists. But can we discover a unicorn in reality apart from the idea? No. The idea of cause and effect exists as an idea. I clearly demonstrated it is real and well applied to reality as well from the keyboard example.
Are we at the point in the argument when you have nothing further to add or refute, so you start taking my phrases out of context and saying things like, "Yikes"? Will it be you start ignoring the points and start demeaning my intelligence? I've seen these patterns in argumentation many times, which are face saving techniques. You've been one of the better people discussing, and I don't want to see you devolve into that. There is nothing wrong with stating you cannot counter my points, but you just don't like it. I would have a lot more respect for you, and it would leave our conversation on a high note, not a low note.
I think Philosophim's mistake is haphazardly assigning logical necessity, without question, to the "first cause", identified as Y. A better way of calling it is the given. Geometry considers this an acceptable starting point -- such as given the presence of Alpha Y, therefore X.
But then it begs the question, do we need to have justification for the given or are we not required to provide justification for the given? Apparently no. This is simply saying, we work with what we have. Then the second question is, is there a point to our effort of building up the logical argument? Yes. Because the given is the variable one. We do not put much importance in the why of the given. What's important to us is we get to organize our thoughts, in a logical way, if the given is thrown at us.
I wish someone would open a thread about The Given. And give it a good whipping of exposition.
I'm not sure you understood the OP, which is perfectly fine. The first cause is not Y. Y is when we look at a state and wonder, "Does this have a prior cause for its current being?" That would be the X, which comes before Y. A first cause would be an alpha. An alpha happens when we examine a Y, and conclude there can be no X. I use the term alpha because "A" is used also as a word, and I wanted the nice representation that it is the first letter of the alphabet with nothing prior. What I conclude is that an alpha must logically exist.
Given that, re-read the OP one more time. Does the conclusion make sense, or do you see a flaw somewhere?
Have a think about Has physics ever been deterministic?
Determinism is opposed to randomness. Those are the two properties of physical causation. Physics has never proved things can happen without a cause in the universe for the very reason that science is undermined if and when things happen without laws within the framework of our perceptions
Oh oh. Now you went and done it. You hinted he may have made a mistake. To which, of course, invites the response that you, rather, may have not understood.
I just don’t get how a thesis of a lousy couple hundred words, that’s been around in its various iterations for millennia, and argued to death, can be misunderstood, but apparently half of us, have.
Guess we weren’t as smart as we thought we were.
...a thesis that has been both falsified and shown to be unnecessary.
What do you mean? The whole assumption of science is that laws work by causality. Virtual particles come from somewhere for example. We just don't know where from
Nuh. Science doesn't assume that. That's just you.
Quoting Gregory
Ah, you agree with Einstein.
But it ain't so. And that's all a matter of historical record.
:blush:
Quoting Philosophim
No it doesn't need to logically exist. That's what I'm saying. You call it a given.
Quoting Philosophim
Your assumption cannot be your conclusion. This is a fallacy. Therefore, I disagree.
Randomness occurs causally
Then the relation between a cause and its effect comes adrift, and any cause can be attributed to any effect. That is, the usefulness of the notion of cause and effect comes to an end.
One puts a kettle on a fire, and it does not heat up.
There is, as per Hume, no contradiction in this; the description is coherent; we know what has been said.
Russel, On the notion of Cause
He's got a point.
If one posits a multi verse in order to explain life's unlikely rise then why not a multi verse to explain virtual particles? We have to understand the world as rational. Gravitational astronomy talks about gravity all the time because causation is the language of science. Randomness doesn't mean "without a cause" but instead "not perfectly predictable", and something " coming out of" nothing means nothing because nothing doesn't refer to anything except perhaps to spacetime itself
I'm not assuming physics is deterministic though. I even mention several times that the physics of today might not have been the physics of thousands of years ago. Its because its not important to the argument. This is about barebones causality. Some state occurs because of a prior state correct? Either some prior state causes a current state, or nothing causes the current state but the fact that it simply is. While a few have stated this might be erroneous, no one has shown how it is erroneous.
Banno, I know you've been on these boards for a while and have a keen mind. I've been using a fairly basic example. Did the message that you typed simply display itself without any prior cause, or was there some chain of events that happened to make them appear? This is not claiming that it must have been a chain of events in any one particular way, only that there had to be a chain of events.
To counter it, you must type a message to display. But if you type a message to display, you are part of the chain of causality that lead to the event of your answer displayed. Can you explain the fact you can type a message and have it display on the boards and yet claim cause and effect is erroneous?
Apparently. A few people in this discussion have gotten the argument after discussion and clarification. Straw men attacks, or attacks on my character, are not counters to it. You stopped addressing the arguments and counter points, and have devolved your character. You can do better than that.
What? How? That's the conclusion of the argument. I do not say anywhere in the initial set up that an alpha necessarily exists. I am setting the stage to show what the idea of an entity without prior cause would entail. No where in the premises am I stating that an alpha is a given. A given is something that does not need to be logically proven. I am logically pointing out that if the given premises are true, the conclusion is true.
If you look at the threads, everyone here gets that the argument is sound and valid. The only way to attack it, is to attack one of the initial premises by showing it is false. Check out Banno's critique. What I have been defending this entire time isn't the argument, because everyone knows its sound. I've been defending the idea of cause and effect. So far, I have not heard one valid argument against the existence of cause and effect. Check the example I gave Banno. That is how you can attack the argument.
Quoting Caldwell
Of course that would be a fallacy. The argument does not do that. Read it again please.
I am trying not to interfere in your discussion with Banno, but I thought it would be useful to point this out for others. True randomness has no prior cause. A coin flip is not truly random. We say its random because the ability to measure it exactly is outside of our capability. Physics does not vanish on a coin flip, only our ability to measure it. If there is any confirmed limitation on randomness, then there is a cause for that. Which means, its not truly random. I hope this helps others understand the argument better.
Firstly, I would concur that it is, indeed, impractical to completely disband from induction. However, I don’t really agree with what you stated thereafter. It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. For example, if all of the options are absurd, and we hypothetically could not think of an alternative that isn’t absurd, I would not advocate to utilize the least absurd of them all (which I think ties directly to your argument being a self-proclaimed argumentum ad absurdium). On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). I do no think that someone needs to provide a reasonable alternative in order for an unreasonably derived inductive argument to be disbanded: one simply needs to prove that it is unreasonable (I would say). Now that’s not to say that one shouldn’t attempt to provide a better alternative, but picking the least unreasonable option (as opposed to simply recognizing our ignorance on the topic) isn’t something I would advocate for. Moreover, to your remark about doubt being useless without it being coupled with a better alternative, I take de omnibus dubitandum est (all things must be doubted) to heart. Although gathering reasonable alternatives to unreasonable positions is essential, the removal of unreasonable positions is vital even in the absence of an alternative option (and, I would argue, the best means of doing so it by skepticism, which, in turn, requires doubt). Now, with that being said, I understand that a posteriori knowledge is induction at work and we typically assume they are correct (in the manner you are describing—in that there isn’t a more meaningful alternative to them), but I think there is a distinction to be made from what I call immediate forms of knowledge (for all intents and purposes let’s just say it is synonymous with a posteriori) and mediate forms of knowledge (which would encompass a priori knowledge as an example thereof). To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. Anyways, I can’t expect you to know what I mean by “immediate” and “mediate” (although I would reckon you get a basic idea), it is relevant to the above quote and so, naturally, I felt obligated to at least slightly address it. If you would like to know more, feel free to ask questions about it!
To a certain extent, I agree with you: we do have to utilize induction to, for example, assume that the future will resemble the past. However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. This would be, I think, my biggest quarrel with such a line of thinking, one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. In fact, I would argue that causality (in terms of everything I could possibly conceive) cannot exist sans space/time fabric. The only way I can (in my own head) reconcile this with your OP is that the self-explained first cause must be space/time fabric (or potentially what caused it). But then I think we would be asserting that the PSR stops at space/time fabric: I don’t think we are warranted in saying that space/time (or potentially what caused it) is exempt from requiring a sufficient reason. And even if we were to produce an actual infinite of sufficient explanations, we would be lacking the sufficient explanation for that actual infinite (but, as we’ve previously discussed, we could arbitrarily circumvent this issue if we semantically define an actual infinite to be its own explanation—or requiring no further explanation). I think that this is exactly why I think that no matter how one derives the physical world, one is always going to be left with an absurdity (aka: explanatory-collapsibility).
I think that my main issue, with respect to inductive extensions, in your OP is as follows. I think that your OP is inclined to disband any notion of the use of causal induction beyond space/time fabric (due to causality having no basis sans space/time), and, therefore, you would have to establish the self-explained first cause as either space/time itself or entangled with space/time (somehow). If it is space/time, then I would ask for a sufficient reason (not cause) for why space/time came about, so to speak, as a self-explained first cause. Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! But then I would ask for a sufficient reason as to why we ought to semantically define it as so in the first place: I don’t find it evident why I should (I would argue, arbitrarily) stop issuing the principle of sufficient reason on any kind of seemingly first cause out of nothing (or self-explained in some other manner). On the other hand, if the self-explained first cause is somehow entangled with space/time fabric, then anything part of this first cause that is sans space/time would be irrelevant to your OP (because, again, I would argue that any notion of our causality sans space/time is an over-extension of induction with respect to causality), and, therefore, the only relevant parts would be that which is mixed in with space/time fabric. This would imply, to me, that any part of the first cause that is mixed in with space/time is simply just apart of space/time’s causality and, therefore, there is no actual distinction (that I can think of) between the first cause and space/time itself. In other words, I would ask you: what is the sufficient reason for space/time fabric? If any notion of causality (which only exists within a spatial and temporal framework) is utilized in the sufficient reason, then I would argue that you are over-extending induction (although I could be wrong of course!). Hopefully that made at least a bit of sense.
If space was made up of smaller things, then those things would be space. Unless you are referring to something metaphysically explaining the physical space, which I don't see how we would have any pertinent knowledge on that.
I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it.
I apologize: now that I understand your argument better the idea that physical causality may be broken at the quantum level has no effect on your argument. So I would agree with you here.
This is exactly what I meant by a “semantic distinction”. You seem to be defining it in a way where it, by definition, doesn’t require the PSR anymore, which I don’t think is justified.
You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion.
I would ask: does PSR not apply to that conclusion? Besides semantically defining it to not require PSR, shouldn’t we have to provide a sufficient reason for why causality has to end? And how does causality exist beyond space/time?
I see where you are coming from on this, but I would (in an effort to provide some exposition on my confusion) ask: what is the sufficient reason for it being indivisible? To say that a self-explained entity cannot be divisible because those smaller parts would be, logically, the self-explained entity instead, would seem to me to be simply (and solely) a semantical distinction. We could then say that this thing A is not a self-explained entity because it is made up of B and C. But B and C also aren’t self-explained because they are made up of D and E. We could do this infinitely. Then we could postulate that the very reason for why everything is seemingly infinitely not a self-explained cause must be the self-explained first cause. But then, I would say, why stop there? Why not postulate that the explanation for the actual infinite regression is actually made up of smaller explanations, and those made up of smaller, and so on ad infitum. So now we are attempting to explain an actual infinite regression that has an actual infinite regression of explanations for it. As you can probably see, we could keep elevating, so to speak, to the next necessary explanation above each infinite regression forever (and thereby never logically deriving a self-explained first cause). Now this isn’t to say that your OP isn’t true, but just that we could (theoretically) create an infinite amount of infinite explanations of infinite explanations of infinite explanations, etc. This demonstrates, to me, the absurdity of the argument (no offense meant).
Hopefully that all made sense. I think that we are more similar than I originally realized: what you would deem a self-explained first cause, I deem an explanatory-collapse. It seems as though this is your origin of things, mine fundamentally (due to the explanatory-collapsibility) cannot be derived therefrom.
As always, I hope this finds you well!
Bob
That is a choice, and one I respect. I believe there is no "correct" answer when this problem occurs, and should be left up to the individual.
Quoting Bob Ross
I have situations like that well. For example, if prior to the moon landing someone said, "The moon is made of green cheese, or blueberries, no alternatives", I would definitely suspend judgement until we arrived at the moon. Such inductions do not use tested reality as any basis. But, when we are living life, and questions about what the life means come up, I find I have to pick something. For example, morality. Lots of people have different inductions as to what they believe morality is. Some people choose to dispense with all of them, stating we cannot know. But some choose to pick one. In the second situation, I am the personality type that is the later. But in no way is the former personality type incorrect or inferior. I believe that is part of human variety, and essentially a way of humanity rolling the dice on different inductions to hedge our bets. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
Fantastic point, and I am in agreement. I believe I understand the general meaning you wanted to convey with mediate and immediate. Because I do not know all the subtleties behind the definitions, let me list out the concepts that were pertinent from them.
If I understand correctly, there are conclusions from experience, and conclusions from our minds. Ideally, we want conclusions from experience and conclusions from our minds to match up. But in the heirarchy, conclusion of experience are more reasonable to pursue then conclusions of the mind which are contradicted by experience.
The difference in the OP is that there is a situation in which we cannot discover by experience, because arguably we may never be able to confirm an alpha through experimentation. If we did posit an existence as an alpha, one could always state, "Perhaps we do not have the tools at this time to discover the prior cause." Even further, since an alpha has its own effects it creates once it has been incepted, we could simply work backwards and reasonably conclude that there must have been something prior, despite the reality it just formed in a particular state.
For myself, when left with a situation that cannot be confirmed through experience, I like to cobble together logic of the mind that is confirmed by experience, and see where that takes us. Perhaps I could "logically" conclude the moon is made of green cheese, despite no experience that would lead to this conclusion. This would be an irrational induction that I would throw away like yourself.
But, I know that causality is both confirmed by experience, and the mind. I can take that, and predict a logical conclusion. Is this logical conclusion's final steps purely from the mind? Absolutely. But do they have an underlying basis that is based on conclusions of experience and the mind? Absolutely. As such, I take this as the most reasonable induction to use when faced with a situation that may never be able to be confirmed by experience.
Quoting Bob Ross
To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.
Quoting Bob Ross
True. But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration. In my case, I have an experience of space and time. If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time. If you disagree with this, I see nothing wrong with that. But on the flip side, I don't think you could state there is anything wrong with what I am doing either.
Quoting Bob Ross
That is the conclusion of the OP. What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully. The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct? And an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience, just like the conclusion of the OP. As such, the POSR is a conclusion of the mind alone. Yet, if taken to its end, we find the POSR breaks down. My conclusion does not break down. Therefore, if we have two conflicting inductions that can only be created within the mind, if one logically breaks down when fully examined, while the other does not, I am going to take the conclusion that does not logically break down.
To sum it up, the POSR states that everything has a reason, cause, or ground. But if we take it to its logical conclusion, we realize that does not mean that the reason, cause, or ground, is always due to something prior to that state of existence. Even if we envision the idea of an infinite regress, we still come to some conclusion that has no prior reason for its existence, besides that fact that it is. To preserve the POSR, we must add an addendum. "One reason for a things existence that has no prior cause, is the fact that it exists."
The OP points out the only logical conclusion that can be made while still preserving the POSR. To deny that there must be at least one alpha, points out a flaw in the POSR that cannot be answered, and it is refuted. Quoting Bob Ross
True. But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.
Quoting Bob Ross
And you have done a magnificent job of questioning and providing alternatives to think on. I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR. I look forward to your response!
And 11 pages of myself pointing out why these proposals of scientific illiteracy are incorrect. Feel free to take a stab at it yourself Benkei.
A person who only insults an intellect then runs away from a request to viably back that insult. I suppose you think everything you believe is right, and never argue with yourself.
Take the present moment; it does not arrive because it is already here, nor does it leave because it is still the present moment. Our sense of time comes from measuring the changes that we notice, from now to whatever duration we like. Now is always the zero point in time, since it is always now. Now may be thought of as the end of a tape measure.
Certainly. What caused reality to be that way? If you answer, "Something else", then I'm going to ask the same question. If you answer, "It simply is", then you have provided a first cause. My statement is that it is logically necessary that a first cause will happen in the chain of cause and effect. Am I wrong?
No. You defaulted on your explanation. Specifically, I gave this example:
Quoting InPitzotl
And I met this request:
Quoting Philosophim
...by giving you an example "card trick", which is a rephrasing of Bell's Theorem.
The problem with BT, for you, is that it refutes the idea that there is a causal story that would explain why the atom decayed in time span 2 as opposed to not decaying in time span 1. In particular, this is refuted:
Quoting Philosophim
Quantum mechanics gives probabilistic predictions (such as, in the card trick example, that the probability of a match is 1/4) that cannot be accounted for with simple lack of information (classical probability theory mathematically constraints the probability to at least 1/3).
HVT's are still strictly allowed, but only if you give up certain "sane assumptions". But that is not what is being presented in this thread; rather, in this thread you're arguing that something is logically necessary. If there is a logical way in which it is violated (e.g., make these sane assumptions), then you don't have logical necessity. You started running for such a thing (a silly choice at that; superdeterminism), but this was the wrong approach to support your argument.
Your argument therefore has a hole in it. You need to explain how your argument addresses the notion that there can be states which are not fully explained by priors (at least with "classical" stories; but those are the types we tend to deal with when discussing causality; e.g., cards, billiard balls). This was the question asked of you with atomic decay.
Maybe you can call such decay "alphas", but it would be weird. Surely it would have to at least be some particular radioactive atom before it can decay; so it's at least partially caused by a prior. But that doesn't explain decay versus non-decay, which cannot be explained as caused by a prior.
There was no cause. If something has always been, then it was not caused to be. The idea that there MUST be a beginning seems logical but not necessarily true.
A person whom believes in God, when asked whom created God, might answer “God has always been” which is the same thing as saying the universe has always been, only difference is a middle man is used to create it all.
Yes, but there may be true randomness and it would still remain casual. Hume didn't prove that there is no causes. All he seemed to prove is that that we don't know where the cause can be. But he was, imo, disconnected from reality and it took Kant and all of phenomenology to correct him
I'm glad you came back InPitzotl! I knew you were going somewhere with BT, but I needed to learn where so I could figure out how this applied to the argument.
First, Bell's Theorem does not violate causality. Bell's Theorem lent credence to a theory that the idea of locality did not apply to entangled electrons. The experiment for BT demonstrates causality is alive and well. We don't have to use any math to understand it.
The observation was that if you entangled two electrons, then separated them at a distance, you could predict the spin of another electron with a certain accuracy by spinning the other electron, even at a large distance. The question was, "What causes this to happen?" There is an effect, and one cause was proposed. Assuming that locality was true, one proposal was to place an unknown variable within consideration. I'm no advanced physicist, but I don't have to understand the equation completely. I only have to understand one thing, this was an attempt to provide a cause for a consistent, and repeatable observed effect.
Now that particular proposal for a cause failed. But why it failed is when the experiment was repeated, the outcome which was expected with the introduction of the third variable did not occur. So we know (If Bell's Theorem holds) that the cause of the effect was not a third variable. Bell's conclusion then is that locality does not apply to entangled electrons. So what causes the electrons to respond over large distances? The cause that is proposed is that it is a non-local influence.
Action at a distance is not new in physics. Newton proposed that gravity violated locality as well. His idea was that everything in the universe, no matter the distance, was always exerting gravitational forces on one another. Action at a distance is the cause for the effect.
Of course you can ask, "Well why can action at a distance occur?" You are back in the OP once again. Either there is a prior cause for this, or it simply happens without prior cause, and is evidenced by its own existence.
Proposing a cause to an effect, and having that proposed cause fail as an explanation for that effect, does not show that cause and effect does not exist. That's like saying, "Because a unicorn cannot be used as a cause for why it rains, we can conclude that rain destroys our notion of cause and effect".
Quoting InPitzotl
As we can tell, my argument doesn't have a hole in this by your point. The conclusion points out it is logically necessary that such alphas must exist along the chain of causality.
Then you agree with the OP.
No. True randomness has no prior cause. The result of that randomness will be causal, but the production of the random result is completely unpredictable and without cause. Anything which has prior causality is not truly random, but caused by something else.
Quoting Gregory
For me, Hume's true genius was in realizing that our belief that cause and effect will be repeated in the future, or occurred in the distant past before humanity was around to observe, was an induction, and not a knowable fact. We take it on a matter of faith, and so far, it has held up. I cannot for the life of me refute Hume on this.
I would contend that a determined motion can cause a random effect
While I have my own opinions on this, your viewpoint does not negate cause and effect, so to avoid going on a tangetnt, its fine if you hold it for the purposes of the OP. If you believe this somehow violates cause and effect, please show me why with a real world example, and I will address it.
Since there was no first cause, a first cause is not necessary, so I disagree that a first cause is logically necessary.
Why has existence always existed? What caused it to be that way?
I believe in caused and effect and am surprised that others reject it. A determined action can result in spirals that are random whose effects would then be determined. If cause and effect don't apply, then anything can pop into existence without reason and anything can happen. There is something about our reasoning we have to correct if Hume bothers us. You know when you type that your fingers are not controlled by Mars. How we know might be hard to pinpoint but we have to resists irrationality at all costs. You control your fingers, a car while moving controls the wheels, and all the rest is obvious. Philosophy itself can turn bad
This is why I love philosophy! There are two main ways of looking at existence, it was either created or it was always there. If it was created, then where did the creator come from? If it was always there, why and how could it have been always there? The answers to these questions are just points of view, not facts by any means. Without any proof, I choose to believe that existence has always existed, but I don’t know how or why.
That's kind of a narrative on Bell's Theorem. BT demonstrates that there can be no classical sufficient explanations of QM given certain "sane assumptions". Locality is simply a particular such sane assumption.
Quoting Philosophim
There's a prediction before the observation though. BT is based on the concept of Bell Inequalities, which are based on ordinary probability theory. Bell showed that QM makes predictions of probability that violate Bell Inequalities. That is the interesting thing here.
Quoting Philosophim
Okay...
Quoting Philosophim
...this is too restricted. Bell's Theorem is an argument against Hidden Variable Theories under certain assumptions (locality, realism, etc).
Quoting Philosophim
I blatantly disagree. If you don't understand the math, you have no clue what I'm talking about. It's not that hard, so here it is again.
Assuming there's some classical fact of the matter as to what the cards are before you turn them over, then there are only 8 possible arrangements of said cards: BBB, BBR, BRB, BRR, RBB, RBR, RRB, or RRR. If you turn over two of the cards in each of these arrangements, the probability they would match are respectively 1, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, and 1. Given any possible scenario where there would be some classical fact of the matter as to what the cards are before you turn them over, the probability you get a match must be at least 1/3. QM predicts this probability to be 1/4. Experiment demonstrates that the probability is in fact 1/4. Therefore, there is no classical fact of the matter as to what the cards are before you flip them over.
Quoting Philosophim
Sure.
Quoting Philosophim
But you do have to understand the problem; else you cannot comment on it.
Quoting Philosophim
Okay, sure.
Quoting Philosophim
But you're arguing for logical necessity, so you cannot add assumptions. If therefore you are to propose something, to meet your burden, you must derive your proposition. So if you want to propose the underlined thing, you need to show it's logically necessary. Failing that, you failed to demonstrate your argument is logically necessary.
But I'm not asking about electrons responding over large distances anyway. I'm asking about an atom decaying in a particular time span of duration x, after having not decayed in a previous time span of duration x.
What I'm asking about is how you account for a state that cannot be fully accounted for from priors. I can logically entertain theories of physics that have such states. If your analysis holds under such theories, it should describe them. If it does not hold, you should explain why it's logically impossible to hold such theories; otherwise, you did not demonstrate logical necessity.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, this is not meeting your burden. I can logically entertain local theories. Apply the same criteria as above.
Incidentally I'm still trying to boil down your concept of causality, but it's specifically a question about states that are not completely explained by their priors (i.e.., it could have been another way given the same priors).
Causation is eternal. It never began.
Yes, although I would phrase it as that there has to be a Base Existent as a Single Simple Permanent Eternal Existent with no beginning as the basis of all the temporaries come forth because 'Nothing' cannot be in place of it as an alternative, or have given birth to it, that is, the Base Existent is mandatory, having. no option not to be, with no opposite state having being.
Indeed there is something, which is the same as saying that a lack of anything could not be the case; so, the something that we have about us had to have a basis, which basis as the Base Existent could not have an infinite regress beneath it nor have come from the impossible 'Nothing',not able to become from parts that would be more fundamental than it, and so there we have identified the Base Existent as having to be so.
The Base Existent must then be partless and continuous, and thus the simplest state, unmakeable and unbreakable, and thus eternal, as Permanent, it only means of forming temporaries being rearrangements of itself that must occur because it could not have been still or else it just would have sat there, inert and unable to form anything.
So, our universe is temporary, and the Permanent Existent has to be there before our universe, still here now during our universe, and still there after the universe and all its temporaries have gone away.
The simple partlesss, continuous, energetic quantum vacuum with its overall quantum field matches the criteria above, it giving rise to all of physics, which works beyond our wildest dreams.
Time, space, distance, speed, direction, size, are all relative, and the play of the one eternal infinite substance.
Yes, and as an aside Rovelli uses this 'relativeness' as trying to show relationism…
Quoting Miller
It writes the story of our universe on the bookshelf of the Library of Babel as well as all the books.
I understand your joy of philosophy! You may hold that without debate. What I'm asking is can your view point avoid what the OP is stating? If its always existed, then there is no prior reason for its existence. Thus the reason things have always existed is the fact of its existence. That's the first cause. I'm stating that no matter what we can envision in a chain of causality, it will always logically end up to end at a first cause.
But that doesn't negate cause and effect. That's the only thing that matters right now. I'm not here to argue whether BT is correct or not. I'm here to see if BT negates cause and effect. A prediction before an observation does not.
Quoting InPitzotl
Stating that hidden variables cannot exist as the cause of an effect is not a refutation of cause and effect.
Quoting InPitzotl
I have all I need to know for the purposes of this argument. I'm not interested in debating BT. I'm interested in knowing whether it violates cause and effect. A science experiment that had odds one way under assumptions, but found the odds to be different means the assumptions were wrong. That's not complicated, nor does it violate C&E. If results of your experiment result in different odds then you were expecting, then that means you lack a full understanding of the causes underlying the reality of the experiment. You predicted causes would result in the effect of a particular odds. When they do not, you need to re-evaluate that the effect you predicted was wrong. That means something is wrong with what you think is causing the effect.
That resulted in removing the cause of locality.
Quoting InPitzotl
I'm not arguing for logical necessity that any one cause and effect must be true. I'm arguing that in any chain of causality, it is logically necessary that it results in a first cause.
Quoting InPitzotl
I think you might have forgotten the original argument. (Its been a while, no worry!) The first statement of the above quote is the conclusion of the OP. It is logically necessary that first causes exist. A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence. If you posit that there are known entities that have no prior explanation for your existence, you're not countering the OP, you are affirming its logical necessity with its existence in reality.
What I would question though is whether your theory really is a first cause. it is not any one theory in particular, it is any theory that assumes it has found a first cause. Proving a first cause an be extremely difficult to do. First, there is the question of whether you've found a first cause, or whether we don't have the tools or understanding yet to observe or understand a prior cause that we don't know about yet.
Second, when a first cause incepts into reality, everything that follows from it is within causality. Meaning after its here, everything after is part of cause and effect. Thus, we could develop rules up to its cause and effect chain, and conclude there must be something prior. For example, an alpha could appear spinning in place at 3 rotations a second. We could establish the rules of this alpha, then predict something must have set it into motion. Of course, it just appeared that way, but our rules would imply there is something prior that set it into motion.
While a first cause is logically necessary, I cannot honestly say that even if we found it, proving it is a first cause would be easy, or even possible.
See a few posts up above. I'm thinking of putting this mention in the OP because I've seen it a few times now.
But that's not what I assume at all Banno. The first very first statement is:
Banno, does a first cause have a cause? Of course not.
Quoting Philosophim
Would it help if I reshaped it to say:
Either everything has a prior cause for existence, or there are things that have no prior cause for existence. A thing which has no prior cause for existence will be a "first cause". It is called a first cause, because it is within existence, and part of causality. But as for why it exists in particular is not because of some prior cause, but by the fact of its existence.
People are continuing to straw man the argument and see something that isn't there. The only thing I think could have been said against it is, "There is no cause to anything," which of course you agree is bunk. If I can show that even one cause exists, the proposition stands within reason.
:up:
I understand what you are saying and it does make logical sense. However, something which has always been, in one form or another, does not have a beginning. Without a beginning, there would not be a first cause, only a continuously changing cause.
Take your own personal physical form for example, at what point could you say that you came into being? Was it at birth, or conception and what about when you were a separate sperm and egg cell living in two separate bodies? You were always here in potential, otherwise you would not be here now, it’s just that your previous forms were different from your current form. They say our universe was born with a Big Bang some 13.7 billion years ago, but I see that as a local event in an infinite universe. There could be other Big Bangs so distant from us that the light won’t reach us for another 10 billion years.
Replace x with universe and we have a first cause argument. Call this first cause w. It's obvious that w too underwent a transformation from possible to actual. Hence, another cause is necessary that effected this. Reiterate this line of reasoning ad infinitum, ad nauseum and we're quickly face to face with another thorn in our side viz. infinity. The problem has doubled and we're nowhere near a solution.
However, just as one poster remarked a long time ago on the old forum, paraphrasing, "I'm not in the least bit bothered by whether God had a creator or not; all I want to prove is that this universe had one!" Case closed!
We've been over this Philosophim; it was in the previous post again. That's not what our interchanges are about. I'm asking you about your concept of cause and effect.
Quoting Philosophim
That's not the issue. The issue isn't whether BT is correct or not; the issue is what BT is. It is that your description of atomic decay conflated QM probability with classical probability games (you started to lecture me about what probability was about; remember?)
This leaves your initial response in default. You owe me a description of this.
Quoting Philosophim
It's not meant to be, but buddy, we've just been over this. You are biting off of the apple of logical necessity. You don't seem to grasp what burden this demands of you. You're burden is "I'm necessarily not wrong", not "I'm not necessarily wrong". If I were trying to refute you, I need not demonstrate something correct; it suffices to simply demonstrate something is logically possible.
BT isn't presented for you to debate; it's presented for you to understand the question and why you defaulted on it. You owe me an explanation.
Quoting Philosophim
Okay, but that still does not answer the question. Does the atomic decay in time span 2 as opposed to the lack of atomic decay in time span 1 have an explanation for its existence?
In order for that atom to decay, there must be a prior... the atom must exist. At the same time, there is no explanation for why it decayed versus did not decay; any explanation given for why it decayed in time span 2 would have to describe why it didn't decay in time span 1. And according to BT, there really isn't a "fact of the matter", at least classically, at least under some "sane assumptions", that would explain the decay in span 2 (and I'm actually agnostic on those sane assumptions; but you're biting off logical necessity, so you had better be consistent with any set of sane assumptions).
So which is it? Is this atomic decay an alpha, or part of a chain of causes? It doesn't appear to me to be either; it partially requires a prior, but partially has no explanation. But this is your concept. So you explain it to me.
Of course. But that can be said about anything, and isn't an argument. The entirety of physics could be wrong. We could all be brains in vats. Doubting something because you can think, "Of course our logic could be wrong," doesn't make the logic wrong.
"First cause" does not designate a beginning, it designates the first state of causality chain. If it is the case that everything has always existed, the reason for that, is evidenced by the fact that it has always existed. There is no prior reason why something has always existed correct?
That's what the OP does. I examine the idea of a universe with infinite regress, and finite regress. In examining the idea of an infinite regress of causality, I find it cannot escape the question of, "Why is there an infinite regress of causality opposed to a finite regression of causality?" The answer is, "It simply is". Thus, even an infinite regress of explanations still has a first cause for its existence.
Also, this is not a theist argument. It seems to be making people think the argument is trying to argue something that it is not. If anything, this is a hard counter to theistic arguments.
To be fair, we proceeded to have a discussion and I think we reached a kind of agreement. Which I'm forgetting now. :sweat:
Of course, the scientific method itself is fundamentally a methodology which doesn't necessarily have metaphysical implications. ie. Science openly admits its status as provisional and approximate. Science is consistent with material reductionism, but it doesn't imply it......
Ok, I see what you're asking now. Lets address your reasoning.
Quoting InPitzotl
You are incorrect here. BT does not posit that there is no explanation. It posits that one explanation cannot be addition of a hidden variable. But that's it. It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.
Here are a few links to back my claims:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#Controversy_and_common_misunderstandings
From this link here is a deeper link about Bells Take on his own theorem.
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#The_EPR_argument_for_pre-existing_values
I will quote a few points of the article for guidance.
"Whatever the historical explanation for the misunderstanding might be, it turns out that the general understanding within the physics community regarding Bell's theorem was that it established the impossibility of "hidden variables" (or, for those a little better informed, of "local hidden variables") and the role of the EPR argument (i.e., the fact that the non-locality problem arises anyway if we regard quantum theory as complete) was missed entirely. Moreover, many authors took Bell's theorem to be a proof that, with regard to the EPR argument, Einstein was wrong and Bohr was right. While it is indeed true that Bell's theorem shows that Einstein was wrong, in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."
"Already at the time Bell wrote this, there was a tendency for critics to miss the crucial role of the EPR argument here. The conclusion is not just that some special class of local theories (namely, those which explain the measurement outcomes in terms of pre-existing values) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory (which is what follows from Bell's inequality theorem alone), but that local theories as such (whether deterministic or not, whether positing hidden variables or not, etc.) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory. This confusion has persisted in more recent decades, so perhaps it is worth emphasizing the point by (again) quoting from Bell's pointed footnote from the same 1980 paper quoted just above: "My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "
And what is the EPR?
"In a celebrated 1935 paper11, however, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen pointed out that, in situations involving specially-prepared pairs of particles, this orthodox principle conflicted with locality. Unfortunately, the role of locality in the discussion is often misunderstood — or missed entirely. One thus often hears that the EPR paper is essentially just an expression of (in particular) Einstein's philosophical discontent with quantum theory. This is quite wrong: what the paper actually contains is an argument showing that, if non-local influences are forbidden, and if certain quantum theoretical predictions are correct, then the measurements (whose outcomes are correlated) must be revealing pre-existing values. It is on this basis — in particular, on the assumption of locality — that EPR claimed to have established the "incompleteness" of orthodox quantum theory (which denies the existence of any such pre-existing values)."
To sum this all up, the EPR assumed locality and hidden variables. BT pointed out that locality and hidden variables were not compatible in regards to quantum entanglement and spins. To bring the relevant quotes out of the above quotes:
" in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."
and:
""My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "
So again, BT is not claiming that cause and effect is destroyed, or that there aren't potentially other variables we don't know about. His claim was to show that locality could not work while there were hidden variables. This is not the destruction of cause and effect, or spooky science with out comes that have no possible explanation.
Ha ha! All good!
Metaphysical is such a broad term, I don't use it. If you mean science is a model that attempts to propose solutions that are not contradicted by reality, I'm all for it. Same with logic. If reality contradicts logic, then its not really logic right?
For the third time in a row, I'm reminding you that you are not meeting the burden of logical necessity. BT is logically consistent with the premise that there is no explanation.
Quoting Philosophim
No it doesn't.
Quoting Philosophim
(Edited, after having enough time to quickly scan your source a bit more): There are local theories of MWI that do not violate BT. These theories would give up realism; they would e.g. in our card trick predict the probability as 1/4. Since there's at least one local theory consistent with BT, it cannot be said that BT replaces locality with action at a distance. It certainly doesn't in the BT-consistent local MWI, where no such replacement exists.
This is actually mentioned in your source; in fact, there's an entire section on it specifically: "Many-worlds and relational interpretations of quantum theory". I'm not sure why you're trying to engage with this, seeing as how twice you said you didn't want to debate this.
Quoting Philosophim
You still didn't answer the question I asked you.
Being counter intuitive does not mean they aren't logical.
If my premises are all correct, I am meeting the burden of logical necessity. Either everything has a prior explanation, or there are things that do not have a prior explanation. The second is logically proven at the conclusion of the argument. If BT allows that there are things that have no prior explanation, then that is consistent with the OP, and its conclusions.
Quoting InPitzotl
Yes it does. If you are not going to explain why it doesn't, I'm not going to continue explaining why it does.
Quoting InPitzotl
I quoted a reference to Bell himself, because that is the theory you cited. If you have a different version of the theory you would like to propose, feel free. But I am not incorrect of my assessment of Bell's original theory.
To point out about countering realism, another citation from the links:
One currently popular account of Bell's theorem has it showing that "local realism" is incompatible with the quantum predictions, so that one has to choose between abandoning locality or abandoning realism. Those who talk about "local realism" rarely explain what they mean by "realism". (Is "realism" related to "hidden variables" of some sort? What exactly is meant by "hidden variables"? Is "realism" related to determinism?) And when they do, it often becomes clear that the "realism" under consideration isn't among the actual assumptions of Bell's theorem, so that abandoning that kind of realism isn't a viable strategy for saving locality.
Finally, if it appears that I am, incorrect in my assessment of Bell's Theorem, you don't think Bell's original theory doesn't apply anymore. So either way, Bell's original theory is not a viable critique against the OP.
First of all, I would like to thank you for such a splendid, thought-provoking conversation! Moreover, I also think that we are narrowing down to the roots of the OP.
Upon further reflection, I have realized something that I believe to be of great importance that I overlooked this whole time and, quite frankly, I think is the source of a lot of the confusion in the other responses to your OP (or at least the ones I briefly read over). You see, I’ve noticed a general pattern amongst the other responses (although I do not mean to overgeneralize their counter arguments), namely that they were all addressing the issues with the use of causality in the argument (whether that be a counter-argument directed towards causality and effect being the two sides of the same coin, quantum physics producing seemingly truly random effects, or that causality is strictly a priori). To be honest with you, I think that some of these counter-arguments were perfectly valid, yet didn’t pose any threat to the true essence of your OP. The only reason I am able to state that previous sentence without contradiction is because there is a fundamental distinction (that I overlooked this whole time) between causality and explanation. First and foremost, causality (cause and effect) are two sides of the same coin: we semantically (and intuitively) label event, A, a cause if it seemed to be in direct correlation to event, B (with chronological precedence); However, event A is actually an effect, not a true cause, that was “caused” by a previous event, C, that produced A which, in turn, produced B (both A and B are effects). You could do this infinitely. For example, after initiating a chain of dominoes (one falling by the previous domino’s fall), we intuitively consider the “cause” of any particular domino falling as the previous domino—but actually, in fact, the whole chain of dominoes are simply effects sparked by, for instance, me flicking the first domino. So in a sense, the first domino is not only the “first cause”, but actually the “only cause”: this is also wrong. As you already can probably anticipate, if I “zoom out further”, so to speak, I would realize that the first domino was an effect of me flicking it and, therefore, is not a cause either. Doing this ad infitum demonstrates that we have no examples of any actual causes: just effects which we label a “cause” within a relative scope to bring meaning to the world around us (i.e. the first domino, with the scope of dominoes, is the cause of the chain of dominoes falling, but not in an absolute sense). This directly entails that we have no experiences of any sort of true cause, which means we have no reasonable grounds to induce anything (as induction requires experiences). I think a lot of people were quarreling with you on this (although I may be mistaken) and I think that it is perfectly valid, but let me repeat: it poses no threat to the true essence of your OP. As you are already well aware, even if it is an infinite chain of effects with no causes, we are still stuck in the same dilemma that your OP addresses: the actual infinite of effects would be the self-explained “first cause”. Now here’s the issue I would like to propose to you that would resolve this conflict (even in the case of the quantum arguments): your OP is directed NOT at causation, but explanation. In other words, you can’t logically utilize causation to induce a “first cause” (because you have no experiences of a “cause”, just a chain of effects and induction requires experiences as we previously discussed—therefore your “first cause” would be the only example of a cause we would have), but you can logically (in terms of your argument) induce a “first explanation”. You see, explanations are not restricted to causation whatsoever! Sure, we can’t actually, in an absolute sense, determine that this particular domino caused all the others to fall, but we do know that each event (each effect in the continuum of effects) has a sufficient reason (yay we are back at the PSR!). That leads me to my other point: PSR doesn’t require causation nor does it directly utilize it! Rather, it uses explanations. This is why I think, and agree with you, that pointing out that particular aspects of the quantum realm have no causes doesn’t affect your OP because you aren’t arguing (I would say) for a “first cause”, you are arguing for a “first explanation”. Therefore, the “first explanation” would be those quantum aspects that have no previous causes—notice that you would no longer be claiming that those quantum aspects are a cause, but rather, an explanation that is its own explanation. In other words, I think that your reliance on causation (although useful in an everyday sense) manifests most of the counter arguments I have read and the refurbishing of “first cause” to “first explanation” would suffice in resolving this conflict.
Last thing I will state about the previous statements is that, I think that the refurbishing of your OP into an explanatory (rather than causal) argument accurately shifts (thereby strengthening) your argument into what I would consider the true essence of it: PSR, left to its own, causes absurdities which you attempt to resolve by means of claiming that somewhere along the line of explanations (not necessarily causes) there must be a “first explanation”, which is, therefore, outside of the scope, so to speak, of PSR.
Now what I have stated hitherto doesn’t address our conversation too much because I was inadvertently thinking of your argument in terms of explanation and not causation (although I just realized that I was conflating the two terms). So now I will start addressing some of your points directed towards me, but I wanted to propose that refurbishment of your OP: its obviously up to you whether you refurbish it or not (just food for thought).
That isn’t quite what I meant, although I would agree with your statement. I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. In other words, any n run through the function P(n), is a number within space/time fabric. To use causation to assert, for instance, that any given location some 5000 billion light years away is operating under the concept of causation (that we would expect causation to occur there as well) is induction extended beyond experience (which I agree with you on that), but what I was trying to say is that anticipating (via induction) causality 5000 billion light years away is analogous to mathematical induction. However, mathematical induction is dis-analogous to causation past space/time fabric: it would be, on the contrary, analogous to considering “numbers” in a P(n) function that exist sans space/time. I would consider both extensions of P(n) and causality past space/time fabric to be over-extensions of induction for the aforementioned reasons. However, with that said, I think that a “first explanation” would not be affected by my critique here because explanations (PSR) could possibly exist sans space/time (potentially).
Yes, this is my whole point! To say it is “outside of space and time” is to make a contradictio in adjectio! The question itself is flawed, because “outside” linguistically refers to a spatial framework! Same goes for asking “what came before space and time”, as “before” linguistically refers to a temporal framework! That is why I would posit a very well known refurbishment to the question: “what is sans space and time?”. Now I still have problems with it (as I don’t think one can completely linguistically detach from space and time), but the use of sans is much better!
I am not quite following what you mean by this. The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time.
I agree. As I previously stated above: causality is really just a bunch of effects (or randomness in terms of quantum mechanics)(and it simply doesn’t make sense sans space and time). I think you are fundamentally arguing (and correct if I am wrong) for a “first explanation” (in terms of a solution to the problem of the derivation of PSR, not necessarily causation).
I would agree (mostly). PSR does have a glaring flaw (two actually: it’s infinite derivation makes no sense and it doesn’t require of itself a sufficient reason—it is an axiomatic metaphysical principle). I would say it can be true in a relative sense, but not true in an absolute sense (because, for me, explanations collapse when extended into an absolute sense). PSR is meaningful (and I think you would agree with me on this) in a relative sense but completely useless in an absolute sense. The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. I think it makes equally as little sense to say that PSR can be fixed, so to speak, by allowing an explanation, somewhere down the line, to explain itself (that isn’t really PSR, although you are more than in your own rights to redefine it that way if you so choose). Although, yes, your definition of PSR is correct, there is no explanatory power (and thereby no true reasons derived therefrom) by saying something explained itself.
Although I don’t entirely understand why you think there’s “nothing” between things (and I would be genuinely interested as to know why), but I do agree with you in the sense that people aren’t giving your OP enough credit: but I think that is partially (nay, primarily) due to the use of causation in your OP instead of explanation (which I think you could easily swap the terminology out and your argument—as I understood it—wouldn’t change, it would only eliminate a lot of the confusion). Anyways, I am curious as to what you think of my refurbishment proposal (hopefully I explained it adequately enough).
To be honest with you, in hind-sight, I think that I understood it better than the rest simply because I have unintentionally thinking in terms of explanations and not distinguishing it from causation. That’s why I think your argument is much stronger in terms of explanation and not causation.
To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation (and I look forward to your response)! I think that our fundamental difference is that I consider the derivation of explanations (aka PSR) to be an explanatory-collapse regardless of which derived concept one derives it back to (but you definitely go me thinking about first explanations for sure!).
Bob
That's not your stated premise. This is your stated premise:
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
Sorry, you still don't get the question.
217Pb will decay in about 20 seconds to 217Bi. For said 217Bi to be made, you need a prior of 217Pb. But 217Bi may or may not result from 217Pb in any given 20 second life span.
So a decay product 217Bi does have a prior (217Pb, which will also emit a Beta particle). So it can be explained as having a prior cause (217Pb). And also, it does not have an explanation ("why did the 217Pb decay into 217Bi during this 20 second span and not the one before it?" has no answer).
So the question I ask you, yet again, is which is it? Is 217Bi an alpha? Or a result of a causal chain?
You keep saying this doesn't disprove causality, but that's not the question. I want to know what causality even means here. You suddenly jump from causality to explanations, and I have to admit, that change in wording is the very first thing I notice. Are you talking about first causes, or explainability? From the OP it sure sounds like you're talking about first causes. But if you want to talk about explainability, how do your premises then handle partial explainability?
Maybe part of the problem is that you are imagining that I'm arguing 217Bi is a first cause, and you're saying, aha! I have those things in my theory. Let me dissuade you of that notion. Your proposal is that things are either first causes or parts of causal chains. I propose that 217Bi is both a first cause and part of a causal chain (whatever that means; it's just a dialectic position). So why am I wrong? That is what I'm asking you when I ask you which it is.
Quoting Philosophim
Excuse me? You just quoted me explaining why it doesn't. Incidentally, see also the edit.
Quoting Philosophim
But you didn't understand it.
So read it from your own source:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#Many-worlds_and_relational_interpretations_of_quantum_theory
MWI admits a local explanation that does not violate BT; your source explains why. Note that I'm specifically invoking a local interpretation of MWI, and your source specifically has a section on that very thing.
You absolutely nailed the "reassessment". So why have I been using causality and not explanations? Because I run into another problem. What is an explanation? You understand what an explanation is clearly, but how do I define it? How do I put it into a definition that everyone can agree with? If I claim something is an explanation, then it seems like I'm really talking about "knowledge". And at that point, this becomes an exploration into epistemology that few would accept.
Despite people trying to reject cause and effect, and despite their counterpoints not actually challenging the OP, but missing the mark (as you clearly noted), cause and effect are something fairly stable that people can understand, that is essentially an explanation. Why is this thing the way it is? Because of these things being the way they are. Why does this effect occur? Because this cause occurs.
Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.
My label of a "first explanation" as a "first cause", is not inaccurate. It is simply a more complex translation than I would like, because it serves the purpose of being simple to understand, difficult to counter, and stable. A first explanation is the first in a chain of explanations. A first cause is the first in a chain of causes. That which has no prior explanation for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality. That which has no prior cause for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality.
If I had a better means of language that could preserve what was needed for the argument, and not diverge into the tempest of epistemology, I would. But you are right. It is not ideal, and perhaps it would have been better to use the term "explanation", then explain what an explanation is through cause and effect. So thank you, your point is well taken!
Quoting Bob Ross
While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.
Quoting Bob Ross
True. This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does. Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)
I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning. That being said, refinement is NOT my best quality as a philosopher. If the argument would be served using other syntax, you again may be correct. Feel free to use such terms until we run into a place where there is more than semantic difference.
Quoting Bob Ross
Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole. I can understand how you think it is arbitrary, but that is where the conclusion in the OP comes in. If I cannot comprehend of a situation where there is no first explanation, (understanding this can be backed in an underlying manner by cause and effect) is it unreasonable to conclude the alternative, that there must inevitably be a first explanation?
Like we have both concluded, neither can be confirmed by experience. So we are arguing between two inductions. To liken the argument to something more common, let us propose someone states the reason why it rains is a magical unicorn. Since it cannot be confirmed by experience, we must think about it logically. The problem is, no one has seen any evidence of a magical unicorn, and within the proposal, there is still the question of what caused the magical unicorn to be. It doesn't really answer the ultimate question, and there is no evidence it exists. Would it be more logical to drop the unicorn entirely, even though the rain remains unexplained, or to keep it? In exploring reality, it may be that a unicorn in fact DOES exist. But that still doesn't answer the question of what caused the unicorn, and I still think most of us feel it is unreasonable to believe in the unicorn when we lack evidence that it exists.
Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn? This is where a hierarchy of induction is needed. At this point, I am inclined to state the proposal of there being no first cause is the unicorn. But because we have no meaningful way to conclude which inductions are stronger than others, I have no means to back this opinion, besides opinion. This is where the knowledge paper I wrote comes in. In it, I break down a hierarchy of inductions as the end. Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.
To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well. It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!
Quoting Bob Ross
Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!
Yes, and a cause is an explanation for an effect. Bob Ross and I had a fantastic discussion on this. In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.
Quoting InPitzotl
We don't know. Remember, I'm not claiming the existence of any one alpha. All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. To know that specifically, we have to prove it. Lets assume that BT is correct as a theory. As I noted earlier, BT does not claim that there cannot be any explanation for its results. This is very different from stating, "We don't yet have an explanation for its results". I've also mentioned how difficult it is to confirm that we have actually found an alpha. You can't just find something you don't understand, throw your hands in the air and say it has to be an alpha. That's no better than ascribing God as the cause for rain.
Alright, so we are citing a popular off branch of BT. But is BT provable epistemically? No. Its just a theory that could be cool, as there's no evidence that multi-verse theory exists. Now what IS interesting, is if my theory is true, multiverse theory has another leg to stand on, as there doesn't seem to be a reason why a multiverse couldn't happen, opposed to it just being guess work.
So I think the confusion you have with the OP is you think its trying to posit a specific first cause. It is not, and I even claim its ridiculously difficult to do so, and for some alphas, might be impossible. The point is that even though we haven't discovered or realized alphas, at least one must exist following the chain of prior causality.
To mention again, Bob Ross and I came to a satisfactory conclusion. I would give it a read if you want to understand the theory and the conclusions I agreed with him on.
Okay, then causes are not logically necessary.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm not quite sure I have to read it... it seems apparent to me.
Quoting Philosophim
The question isn't about the number of alphas, it's about whether or not this particular thing is one.
Quoting Philosophim
For the fourth time, you are (or at least were) claiming that it is logically necessary that there be at least one. That's vastly different than claiming that it is merely necessary. The former has a burden the latter lacks.
Quoting Philosophim
But for re-emphasis, regarding the claim that it is logically necessary, BT demonstrates how it is logically possible that there cannot be any explanation for the results. If it's logically possible X is false, it cannot be logically necessary X is true.
Quoting Philosophim
You mean MWI? It's not just MWI being referred to; it's a local interpretation of MWI. But again for re-emphasis, your question is misguided. Local interpretations of MWI need not be proven to challenge logical necessity; it suffices that local interpretations of MWI are logically possible. If it is logically possible X is false, it cannot be logically necessary X is true. (Not that I understand how challenging local interpretations helps you).
Let me back up. To me, "logically possible" means that if you assume something to be true, you do not get a contradiction. "Logically necessary" means that if you assume something to be false, you do get a contradiction (e.g., it contradicts the argument for it being logically necessary). Logical possibility doesn't mean something is the case; it could be wrong, but still be logically consistent. So you don't need to test if something is true to demonstrate it's logically possible.
Quoting Philosophim
Why would you think that? I don't understand how you get from my asking you a question about whether a 217Bi atom (as a decay product of 217Pb) is or isn't an alpha to my confusing you as saying there's only one specific alpha. Apparently that's where you got the impression, but I cannot see how you drew that connection.
The premises of the OP are not logically necessary. It is the conclusion that is logically necessary if the premises are true. It is either the case that there are things that have no prior cause for their existence, or things that have prior cause for their existence. This is an assumption. If you can show that the assumption is incorrect, then the conclusion is not logically necessary.
If you can provide an alternative, that there is something which does not have a prior cause, and is something which has no prior cause for its existence, then the assumption is false. The BT argument only applies to the first premise, not the conclusion. I do not see you presenting a viably third option with the BT argument as I've noted prior.
Quoting InPitzotl
Well of course it does to you, otherwise we wouldn't be going back and forth. But Bob really nailed the essence of the argument, and I think you'll really get to understand the conclusion. I feel like I've been explaining the OP to you for a while, and either you don't quite understand it, or I don't quite understand your criticism. Maybe you're right, but I'm just not seeing it. Its not that I'm stubborn, I clearly say Bob nailed it. If you read it, you might see another view point, and tie it into your own argument so that I might see it better.
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting InPitzotl
Ok. If we look at the conclusion of the OP, it fits logical necessity under your definition. If I assume everything has a prior cause for its existence, I run into a contradiction. If infinite regress exists, what caused there to be infinite regressive causality in existence? You can't say, "Something else", because the question continues. It only ends with, "It must not have a prior cause for its existence."
This is why I also keep saying BT does not contradict the conclusion. If there is something in BT that is discovered to have no prior reason for its existence, we have the logical necessity becoming a reality. Here we have the existence of something which has no prior cause for its existence, an alpha.
Quoting InPitzotl
Again, this does not counter my conclusion.
Quoting InPitzotl
What I'm saying is I don't see any evidence of it being something which has no prior explanation for its being. That has nothing to do with the OP. If you believe the rate of decay we have calculated from an atom has no prior cause, you agree with my OP. I'm not here to decide whether BT theories are correct, or make any assertions as to what specifically is confirmed in existence as an alpha. That is out of the wheelhouse of the discussion. I'm here to show the conclusion to the OP is correct.
Hmmm...
1. ¬?P
Quoting Philosophim
Hmmm...
2. ( P ? ?(P?C))??C
That doesn't work. ( P ? ?(P?C))?C works, and ( ?P ? ?(P?C))??C works, but not ( P ? ?(P?C))??C.
Imagine it this way. Let's say "a world" is a day. Let's say, it's necessarily true that IF it rains on some day, THEN the ground will wet that day:
?(P?C)
(P is "it rains", C is "ground is wet"; "a day" is our model of "a world").
So it rained last Wednesday. We can then say that the ground was wet last Wednesday:
( P ? ?(P?C))?C
...but we cannot say that because it rained last Wednesday, and ?(P?C), that the ground is necessarily wet:
( P ? ?(P?C))??C
...it doesn't have to be, for example, wet today just because it rained last Wednesday.
Now if it rained every day (it necessarily rains), then the ground would be necessarily wet:
( ?P ? ?(P?C))??C
...but it doesn't follow that the ground is necessarily wet just because on some day it rained and it's wet.
Quoting Philosophim
Nope.
Quoting Philosophim
Not really.
Quoting Philosophim
The sequence S1={0.5, 0.25, 0.125, 0.0625, ...} is infinitely decreasing. But the entire sequence has a prior... 0. Also -1, -2, and so on. By contrast, the sequence S2={-1, -2, -3, -4, ...} is also infinitely decreasing. But this sequence has no prior. Both of these are logically possible. This might make your head asplode, but it's not something you can derive falsum from using logical operations.
Just because you can ask your question doesn't mean it need have an answer; or that if it has no answer there must be a contradiction. Questions can be the problem too. Here:
Quoting Philosophim
Actually, I can. Infinitely regressing sets can have priors; S1 does for example.
Quoting Philosophim
Also possible; see S2. Infinitely regressing sets can have no priors. In this case, your question is basically asking what's smaller than the smallest negative number, which is a question that has a problem since there is no such thing as the smallest negative number.
Quoting Philosophim
BT isn't supposed to "contradict the conclusion". You're trying to argue that on every day, the ground is wet. BT is analogously a demonstration that maybe on some days the ground is dry. For your argument to hold, you basically have to show it can't possibly ever be dry. If I can see how it might possibly ever be dry, you haven't shown it can't possibly ever be dry.
Quoting Philosophim
Let's assume that the ground is dry one single day, maybe in the far future. Now let's run through your argument... did you rule out my assumption? Can your argument derive falsum from my assumption that one single day in the far future it's dry? If not, you haven't demonstrated this assumption is a contradiction. And if you haven't done that, you haven't shown your conclusion is logically necessary.
I am back after some pondering on the subject ...
First, we must select a "world", a "universe" to work on the premise "A first cause is logically necessary": the physical universe (nature) or the non-physical universe (a "personal" universe existing in our minds), Yes, the second one is usually neglected, but it exists; it's another kind of "universe" : E.g. a thought can produce another thought, a logical statement can produce another one, etc. All these are non-physical, since they exist in our minds. But since this second universe needs be well and clearly define before working on it, and this is not something easy, I will restrict the application of the premise on the physical universe, the material world. For now, at least.
So, let's start by assuming that (something cannot be the cause of itself. (This might be argued, but I can't see how!) So, there must exist a cause for that thing to occur, to exist. This, apparently can go back to infinity, right? So, the question is "Can such an infinity of cause and effect relationships exist?" If yes, the premise is of course refuted and we don't have to speak about it anymore!
But anyway, the impossibility of such an infinity is more logical, isn't it? So let's accept this.
Now, if the infinity of cause and effect is impossible, there must be a "first cause" from which all starts, right? However, since we said that nothing can be the cause of itself in the physical universe, that cause must necessarily be non-physical, right? A non-physical entity that is not itself created, but which always existed and is the first cause of everything --physical and non-physical. Right? This leads us to concepts like God, Supreme Being, Universal Consciousness, etc. I believe that it does not matter how we name it, since one way or another we don't --and most probably, we cannot-- know how it works! :smile:
This is as far as I can personally reason on the subject. So, I will look for and present excerpts on the subject from standard references and known philosophers of the past.
1) "First cause, in philosophy, the self-created being (i.e., God) to which every chain of causes must ultimately go back.
(https://www.britannica.com/topic/first-cause)
2) "First Cause is term introduced by Aristotle and used in philosophy and theology. Aristotle noted that things in nature are caused and that these causes in nature exist in a chain, stretching backward."
"There must be a First Cause because such causal chains cannot be infinite in length."
"Aristotle referred to the First Cause also as the "Prime Mover" that is a deity of "pure form" without any potentiality"
(https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/First_Cause)
3) "The 'first cause argument' is an argument for the existence of God associated with St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)."
"The first cause argument is based around cause and effect. The idea is that everything that exists has something that caused it, there is nothing in our world that came from nothing."
"Aquinas argued that our world works in the same way. Someone or something must have caused the world to exist. The cause is God, the effect is the world."
"Aquinas stated that this cause (which is outside our world) is the first cause - that is, the one that started everything."
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zv2fgwx/revision/2)
I see your dilemma now, and, therefore, exactly why you are utilizing causality instead of explanation. Although I think that utilizing it in terms of explanations would "open more doors", so to speak, in your OP, I understand that it may introduce a new level of (possibly) unnecessary complexity and, so, I respect you decision to refrain from semantic refurbishment.
I apologize, I think I misunderstood what you were previously saying. As I understand it now, you seem to be pointing out (quite correctly) that potential infinities may not truly exist (and actual infinities). There is a limit to how many numbers I can fathom within my time constrained lifetime and, therefore, I can't possibly verify that all numbers (within no bounds) actually work for P(n) (and some may not even represent actual quantities in the universe). Even if I continually mentally incremented a number (any number, no matter how big) for my entire life, non-stop, from here onward, I would, nevertheless, never be able to verify them all. With respect to that I agree with you! However, I think there is a fundamental difference between utilizing a P(n) function that is induced to work for an actual or potential infinite, and attempting to utilize it beyond space and time. For example, for me, all that mathematical induction means (in terms of meaningfulness for the subject) is that any number I can fathom in my lifetime is reasonably induced to work in P(n) . But, more importantly, I would never attempt to (somehow) extend it past space and time and infer that some quantity (let's just say X) that exists (somehow) beyond space/time will give reliable results when past through P(n). In other words, any use of P(n) (although technically it could be relating to numbers that don't have any true quantifiable existences in reality) is a use of P(n) specifically tailored for this space/time rabric that I wouldn't say can be reasonably extended past thereof. Anyways, I think you understand what I am trying to say so I will leave it at that.
I understand your point here, but think this is exactly why using the term "explanation", contrary to "causation", helps your argument, because I don't think explanation in terms of causation can occur "outside" of space and time. However, I do understand what you mean by "outside", I think that we both don't know what that truly means in terms of the context of "outside of space and time" and I think that is my main point here--that, I would say, neither of us can truly separate our thinking beyond space/time in terms of causation (and that's why I would argue that there is no meaningful usage of "cause" and "effect" "outside" of space and time). But, again, I see where you are coming from and I get that our terminology is quite limited with respect to your OP.
I think this exposes exactly my issue with your OP, which is that your OP seems to require the use of causality beyond space and time to make its case, but yet then it concedes that any causality past space/time is meaningless to discuss (which I would agree with). You see, I could then argue that space/time is eternal (although I'm not actually trying to argue that), which I would say your OP would be the claim that the fact that it is eternal is the "first cause". But the fact that it is eternal is not a cause (I agree with you that this is epistemological in nature), it is beyond causation (because it is beyond space/time, it is metaphysical in a sense--this fact doesn't "cause" any "effect", it, by definition, explains itself): it is an explanation completely beyond causation (and, therefore, I would argue that, even though it is a complicated topic, explanation and causation are not synonymous). Now, as you pointed out, the explanation could end up being Causation (note the captial C), which would be meaningless for us to discuss because that Causation would be "outside" of our causation (which is restrained to space/time). You see, if you agree with me in that, for all intents and purposes, Causation doesn't exist (in terms that we can't discuss it), then your causal argument gets cut off at space/time, but your explanatory argument proceeds just fine! In other words, although I get where you are coming from on this, there seems (to me) to be a necessary distinction between explanations and causations. The fact that an actual infinite goes on forever is not explained by that very fact being its own cause but, rather, it lies in the fact that, somehow, it, by definition, explains the necessity of it continuing on forever (which could be a result of Causation or something entirely else, but necessarily not causation).
I agree with you here: it is semantics and that's why I don't quarrel with people over the usages because, quite frankly, we both are talking about the same thing. However, I think that the fact that we can't truly discuss these matters properly, which (I would say) is directly due to the fact that we can't separate from certain fundamental aspects of our existence, is incredibly telling that we may (but not necessarily are) over-extending our logic into Logic. Personally, the fact that we can't quite accurately pose the question makes me wonder what authority we truly have to ask it in the first place! That's why I do my best to try to conceive of a proper way of semantically putting it, because, in this case, I don't see how I can truly answer the question if I can't even truly verify whether my question is valid or not.
That makes sense, I recant my previous statement that you are abandoning it! As you noted thereafter, I do still think it is an arbitrary fix.
Although I understand what you are portraying here, I am going to have to disagree with you here in favor of your own OP! You see, your OP is quite strong in the sense of your question here, because to take the position that there can be no first explanation (and, therefore, that the contrary is the unicorn) is to concede the OP! This is because it is paradoxical: the fact that there is not first explanation is, in itself, the first explanation. I think this is exactly why I would argue our logic breaks down (which leads me to describe it as explanatory-collapsibility). You see, there is another option here: although the framework in which we live our lives compells us to make this distinction (that either there is no first explanation or there is one) it doesn't apply if we were to claim that our framework doesn't persist to the level at which we are posing the distinction! I think that whatever kind of framework may exist past space and time is most definitely some sort of framwork completely separate from our own and that is my explanation for why all of these questions we could posit (that seem like binary questions) will inevitably collapse on themselves! In other words, to take the position that there is no first explanation, inevitably collapses into the position that there is one. And to take the position that there is a first explanation, is to presume that there is a possibility that there isn't one, which collapses on itself because, again, if there isn't one then it will, in turn, collapse again into the position that there is a first explanation and, you guessed it, that collapses yet again into the idea that there is an alterative (this infinitely collapses, but, wait, we could then extend your OP to pose that these infinite collapses is the first explanation--which I think you see where I am going with this).
I 100% agree. However, I respect your efforts to keep it comprehensible (by using terms pertaining to causation).
I think you did a marvelous job at arguing your position! I also think that your OP has much merit!
I agree! However, (although I may be mistaken here), I am starting to think that you may be misunderstanding I position slightly (as in very slightly): if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. Therefore, I think it isn't useful to attempt to uncover some logical reasoning behind it (in terms of causal derivation) but, rather, I would argue that whatever overlying metaphysics necessitates our representations is, in part, completely unobtainable by human reason. If I could reasonably (without producing an explanatory-collapse) extend causal derivation beyond space/time, then I would, at the very least, accept it as just as valid as mathematical induction, but I don't think it is possible to do so. Hopefully that made sense.
Your responses were more than adequate! I hope I am not reiterating myself on some of my points I am making in this post, but i still think they are relevant to the discussion. You are also a fantastic philosopher!
Bob
So, there is a “first cause” (not necessarily unique) for an F, but that first cause has no set position in an infinite span of past time and is only completely reliable in a limiting sense. (this has nothing to do with a “point in time at negative infinity” that set theorists might consider)
If anyone is interested, I will briefly sketch out this scenario. Otherwise, ignore and continue with philosophical conversations.
A = !?X -> Y
An alpha is when there does not exist some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.
C = ?X -> Y
A cause is where there exists some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.
Onto the premises!
Q (For Question) = Y -> (A or C)
(I'm going to use "or" and "and" because I don't want to copy and paste the symbols repeatedly. :D)
The first premise is the question. For a state of existence, there exists a first cause, or a prior cause for its existence.
Y -> (!?X -> Y) OR (?X -> Y)
Translates to
Y -> (!?X or ?X) -> Y
Translates to
Y <-> (!?X or ?X)
All Y's lead to some prior explanation, or lead to no prior explanation. There is some prior explanation lead to Y, or there is not some prior explanation that leads to Y.
Lets start with our second premise:
For all Q's about Y states, the answer is a cause.
(Translating C)
(?(Q) = ?Y <-> ?(?X))
Now lets see what we can conclude.
?Y= (?Y <-> ?(?X))
First, this is a state, which then has a question. This is looking awkward, so lets change it to a set.
?Q( y ? Y <-> x ? X )
For the set of all Q's, there exists some prior cause. But, because the set it itself a Y, we have a situation in which there is something outside of a set, that should be in the set.
y = ?Q( y ? Y <-> x ? Q )
So what if we said that the set of all Y's also includes the set itself? Because if there exists a y outside of the set, then there exists an x outside of the set. This would be called a Universal set. However, Russel's paradox shows this is impossible. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_set#Russell's_paradox So we can't do that.
But if that is the case, then all this leaves us with a Y outside the set of all Y's. Which means there is a question outside of the set. But if there is a question outside of the set, then our set is contradicted.
But if we instead state:
A = ?Q( y ? Y <-> (x ? Q or (!x ? Q))
There does not exist any Q's outside of the set with an answer that does not lead to a contradiction. If the answer is A, then there is no Y or X outside of the set that leads to Russel's paradox.
Feel free to check my logic, I'm pretty rusty on it, and not sure if this is the best representation. Great discussion so far!
Agreed.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Not quite. Physical or non-physical, that would be a prior cause. If you posit a non-physical cause, its still a cause right? Which means the same question applies to it. What caused the non-physical state which caused the physical state?
The real answer is, "There is no prior cause." Meaning nothing created it, and it is not the cause of itself. It simply exists, because it does. So if a non-physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being. If a physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being.
The problem with positing a God as "The" solution, is it doesn't logically follow. A God does not escape the problem of the first cause, nor offers a solution. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior reason for its existence, and no rules or limitations of why it should, or should not exist. Meaning the first cause could be the big bang, or particles just entering into existence at any time. Is a God also probable? Yes. But that's only one out of an incredible number of other options.
To prove one or many first causes is a monumental task that might be impossible. If anything, we would need to work our way backwards through causality and hope we arrive at conclusive proof at a start. If a person is going to prove a God is a first cause, they will need to do it separately from the conclusion that there is a first cause. The necessity of a first cause does not necessitate that a first cause be God.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, even though you or I may personally agree with the OP to an extent, without a better framework of epistemology, it collapses into a messy paradox. Like you stated about logic being extended to Logic, I feel the OP extends to the limit of what we can know by today's standards, and finds itself in a strange situation when we are faced with the limits of the unknown.
At this point, I would be repeating myself if I mentioned anymore. What a fantastically thorough examination! If you are interested in continuing a discussion of epistemology, here is the link I spoke about earlier. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge I do not intend this to pressure you, it is only if you enjoyed the conversation, and would like more like this on another topic. It is one of my older works, and it is broken into four parts of about 20 pages total, so I understand if that is a bit much to take on. If you do read it, I recommend reading it all at once however. In the past people stop after the first part, and ask questions that are all answered in the later parts. The payoff for it is I can viably establish not only an epistemology that crosses cultures and contexts, but contains a means of establishing a hierarchy of inductions, something that I think the study of epistemology lacks.
And if it doesn't interest you, not a worry at all. I am grateful for the great conversation here, and hope to see you again in other conversations on the boards!
I believe what you are talking about are limits like in calculus? Or are you talking about the limits of precision? For example, .1 becomes .11, becomes .111, etc?
2. Only nothing has no cause.
Ergo,
3. The first cause is nothing.
4. Nothing can't cause anything
Ergo,
5. The notion of a first cause makes zero sense.
Can you prove that nothing has no cause though?
Nothing isn't anything. It cannot be caused, or uncaused. It is the absence of both cause and effect. Nothingness is outside of causality. The only thing that can be uncaused, is something that exists.
:chin:
Was the use of "it" the source of confusion? Nothingness cannot be caused or uncaused, because nothingness is not a thing. If its not an effect, it cannot be caused correct?
Caused and uncaused exhausts all possibilities.
Is this Buddhism?
Does it though?
A common mistake with causality is to attribute singular causes in a causal line. We might think of it like I hit a cue ball, and that strikes a 7 ball causing it to go along a certain path, which then hits the 3 ball causing it to go along a certain path, each collision also affecting the colliding ball. So the question "why is the 3 ball going this way" is traced to the 7 ball collision, and "why did the 7 ball go that way" to the cue stick. I imagine something like this is going on in the thought process here.
But this isn't really how causal chains work. Events can and often do have multiple causes. My car started because I turned the key... and, because it had gas in it... and, because the battery was charged... and, because the spark plug worked, etc. This atom is moving this way because it bounced off of that atom... and, because it has this charge and there is this particular field on it... and, because it's weakly tugged this way by space time due to a gravitational field... etc. Basically, all sorts of fields around the atom affect its movements, and those fields are a reflection of a large number of things around it. So causal chains don't really trace back along lines, but rather along branches.
And that's where the possibilities diverge. We can have an event partially have a cause and partially be uncaused. So there's your other possibility.
Non sequitur!
A non sequitur is something that does not follow.
Quoting TheMadFool
I have presented another possibility (partially caused, partially uncaused). It therefore does follow that you haven't exhausted all possibilities.
Is nothing partially caused and partially uncaused?
There's nothing in nothing to be caused wholly or partially.
What, this one?:
Quoting TheMadFool
No... that argument makes no sense anyway. It doesn't even allow for the uncaused possibility, much less the partially caused and uncaused. Furthermore, it kind of concludes the notion of a first cause it itself introduced (the one "only nothing" can be) does not make sense, making the entire argument a bit moot.
But it does matter to the thing I quoted, which claims to exhaust possibilities when the possibilities were not in fact exhausted.
I'm not sure what point you're trying to establish. You're arguing first causes don't make sense because nothingness is the only thing that cannot be caused; then you're saying something about caused and uncaused exhausting possibilities, and now you're saying partially caused and partially uncaused things don't matter. Weird.
How about you taking the question I asked about the 217Pb atom that, during a particular 20 second time span (span 1), remains a 217Pb atom, and in another 20 second time span (span 2), decays into a 217Bi atom. Regarding this, the question is whether the 217Bi atom is caused or uncaused. It certainly had a prior; the 217Pb atom, which has a property that it has a half life of 20 seconds. But there's no explanation for why this atom would decay in span 2 versus span 1, so we can't fully account for the cause of 217Bi. I'm not sure where your "nothing" would be in this example, unless you want to reify it to explain the decay during span 2, but said reification isn't interesting.
I agree 100% with causal chains, but I'm not sure how something can have some causes, but then also not have causes. If something is uncaused with in a chain that intersects with another causal chain, that's fine. But if there is something uncaused at the top of one of the chains, nothing caused that uncaused thing to be.
Quoting TheMadFool
Premise 1 can't be denied.
The sticking point is 2. I'll dial down the rhetoric and offer a more realistic argument:
1. The first cause is uncaused.
2. Nothing has no cause
Ergo,
3. The first cause could be nothing
Is this version of my argument more reasonable?
If it is, please give me an example of something as opposed to nothing that's uncaused. Oh, wait! That's precisely the problem we started off with. And, to top it all off the assumption was if it's something then it has a cause. The infinite regress that this entails being the thorn in our side and hence, a first cause. However, this leads to a contradiction: all things have a cause AND some things have no causes (first cause).
To avoid this contradiction, a way out of this quagmire, is to say that the first cause = nothing (no infinite regress & no contradiction).
See?
Perhaps the first cause simply has different properties than subsequent cause and effects? For example, we include 0 in the number line, even though 0 is the only number to not have a multiplicative inverse. Maybe the first cause willed itself into existence, and we didn't, because were just the first cause in it's subsequent actions(not to say that the first cause is God).
Except there could be multiple first causes.
Quoting TheMadFool
I see a problem with it:
Quoting TheMadFool
"Nothing" is being reified here. Think of "south" as a prior on a globe. There are a lot of points on the globe, and they have points south of them, but there's a special place on the globe which has no points south of it: the South Pole. Yet that is itself a point. You are saying something silly, like there's a south to the South Pole that has no points on it. The way you phrase it is, nothing has no south to it. Either way, you're reifying. There's no such thing as a "nothing-place" that is south of the South Pole.
There's a second mistake being made here as well. To point that out, let's consider proof by contradictions generically. You start with some set of premises P={P1,P2,...}. From there you proceed with an argument that arrives at a contradiction: P??. But from this, you only get to conclude that at least one of your premises is false.
Quoting TheMadFool
...that would be a premise. The premise can be wrong; after all, you have a proof by contradiction and this is one of your premises.
Quoting TheMadFool
...and that's just introducing a reification.
It's not really a contradiction that a cardinal direction cannot infinitely regress (a cone with its point being a north pole has an infinite regression of south points), but the globe itself doesn't infinitely regress southward. But we need not hold the premise that there is such a thing as a place with no points that is south of a South Pole just to maintain that all points have a point south of them. We could simply reject the notion that all points have a point south of them (i.e., the South Pole has no point south of it).
If nothing is being reified and seeing that it's true that nothing is uncaused, the problem then lies in the first cause argument - it necessitates a reification of nothing.
Plus, you seem to be implying nothing is just a concept. Are you sure?
Nothing can't be caused for there's nothing to cause.
The first cause can't be caused.
Both the first cause and nothing are uncaused.
However, the first cause is a cause but nothing is not a cause.
In terms of a prior cause, the first cause and anothing are identical but in terms of a post effect, they're not the same, the first cause has an effect but nothing can have none.
Ergo, hence, therefore, thus, there's something nothingish about the first cause.
Nothing is uncaused like unicorns are uncaused. But unicorns being uncaused have nothing to do with anything; they're uncaused because they don't exist.
Quoting TheMadFool
It has nothing to do with "the first cause argument". Unicorns are uncaused therefore the first cause argument reifies nothing?
Quoting TheMadFool
How many nothings are there?
Quoting TheMadFool
Likewise, nothing can't cause for there's nothing to cause.
Quoting TheMadFool
So? Both the south pole and the color red don't have points south of them; the south pole because it's the southernmost point, the color red vacuously because it's nonsense to say something is south of it.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, they aren't identical. They're like the south pole and the color red here. I can make sense of the south pole having no points south of it. I can't make sense of the color red being south of the south pole; it's just nonsense.
I am sorry, TheMadFool, but I cannot accept The Chewbacca Defense as a valid way to derive what exists or not.
What that?
I quoted you! You're also obviously reacting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chewbacca_defense
I'm simplifying. The sun, [math]1.989 \times 10^{30}[/math] kg in physics, last I checked, can be treated as a point mass.
:lol:
Just kiddin'. You're right! Happy? :smile:
Yes, I think this is undeniable.
Unicorns are caused - they are by our brains/minds depending on your philosophy.
Quoting InPitzotl
As uncaused, nothing is a candidate for the title of a first cause with respect to being uncaused. If that's reification then the notion of a first cause is such that nothing has to be reified.
Quoting InPitzotl
I don't understand the question.
Quoting InPitzotl
Yup!
The rest of your post doesn't make sense.
P. S. I'm not expecting a reply.
:smile:
Here's a mathematical analogue of a causation chain involving an esoteric kind of dynamical system that most math people would disown (but I have enjoyed them): Assume that each causality step is described as a function of the previous step, starting with a first cause [math]\alpha =f(\delta )[/math] taking a state point [math]\delta [/math] to a state point [math]\alpha [/math].
We go back n-time steps into the past and begin the chain there, [math]{{z}_{1,n}}={{f}_{n}}(\alpha )[/math]
Assume the observed present result is [math]\beta [/math]. For each value n there arises an observed present value that differs from [math]\beta[/math], but the discrepancies grow less and less the further back we start the causal chain.
[math]{{z}_{1,n}}={{f}_{n}}(\alpha )[/math]
[math]{{z}_{2,n}}={{f}_{n-1}}({{f}_{n}}(\alpha ))={{f}_{n-1}}\circ {{f}_{n}}(\alpha )={{f}_{n-1}}({{z}_{1,n}})[/math]
[math]{{z}_{3,n}}={{f}_{n-2}}\circ {{f}_{n-1}}\circ {{f}_{n}}(\alpha )={{f}_{n-2}}({{z}_{2,n}})[/math]
[math]{{z}_{n,n}}={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(\alpha )={{f}_{1}}({{z}_{n-1,n}})[/math]
So that [math]\underset{n\to \infty }{\mathop{\lim }}\,{{z}_{n,n}}=\beta [/math]. We have a first cause but no first time.
This example has lots of holes.
Big Deal! :cool:
First, I am talking about the "first cause", not any "prior cause". Then, I assumed that there cannot be a physical thing that is cause of itself, which you have just accepted. Therefore, it must be non-physical. It doesn't have to be "God". I said "God, Supreme Being, Universal Consciousness, etc.". Its nature is not important here.
Physical and non-physical cannot be put in the same "basket". That's why I have excluded cause-and-effect chains regarding non-physical things (e.g. thoughts, ideas, etc.), otherwise the discussion becomes too difficult to handle. We must first establish the "first cause" iof the physical universe. We could then maybe talk also about non-physical, virtual, etc. universes ...
Confusing the concept with the thing? "What caused my car to start" my brains/minds depending on my philosophy?
Quoting TheMadFool
Apparently not... it can't cause:
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting TheMadFool
Presumably there's at least one, if it's a first cause.
Quoting TheMadFool
I'm just using your argument to derive the impossibility of a South Pole like you're using it to derive the impossibility of a first cause.
Possibly but then thoughts aren't caused by your logic and that, somehow, doesn't seem to be correct unless you believe in free will; an interesting topic no doubt but I'm sure you don't wanna go there.
Quoting InPitzotl
Yup! We're on the same page.
Quoting InPitzotl
:ok: Are you saying that there could be more than 1 first [s]causes[/s] cause? Care to share why exactly? A team of gods? :chin: It seems a bit too extravagant; it's more than some of us can handle.
This got me thinking. Do the number of causes diminish as we go backwards in time? Does it have to? It would if causation is like a nuclear chain reaction. How would we measure the number of events taking place at any one time? What about the Big Bang?
Quoting InPitzotl
:ok: Sorry but to be honest, it didn't do anything for me.
If there can be one, why can't there be more than one?
Quoting TheMadFool
Must a first cause be a god?
Quoting TheMadFool
If you can handle one first cause, what's the problem with handling any arbitrary number? Is there some rule you're applying where you'll "allow" one first cause "but no more"? Why should the universe care about such a rule?
Why not indeed! There can be many first causes! Kinda defeats the purpose though.
Quoting InPitzotl
That's the general assumption. I have no bone to pick with anyone on the issue but, the way the world is, I think too many cooks spoiled the broth. Whatever happened to two heads are better than one?
Quoting InPitzotl
I dunno! Occam's razor?
Quoting InPitzotl
A first cause by nature cannot have a prior cause for its existence, which means there are no rules. You cannot say, "There can only be one," or, "It must be God", because then I would ask you, "What causes this?" Since nothing can cause a first cause, you cannot claim there "must" be a first cause with particular rules by looking at something prior.
Now, if we worked back up the chain of causation, we might find there are some necessary rules, or even discover some first causes (though it would be extremely difficult, and impossible in some cases).
I want everyone to understand, this argument is not about God. If you think it is, I think you're missing the real picture.
Should I sell all my worldly possessions, donate the money to charity,and live a life of poverty and service?
Should I separate from my spouse and spend all my money on fast women & booze?
Should I become a philanthropist and try to help starving people in Africa? (That one would be hard seeing as my capital reserves do not qualify me for philanthropist status.)
Etc?
I started a thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12164/why-there-is-something-and-further-extensions
Not at all. Why would it?
This still does not negate that "caused and uncaused exhausts all possibilities".
Please consider this:
1. An event is caused.
2. It is partially caused by another event and partially uncaused by some other event still.
3. The other part of the causes of the event are other causes and other parts of the uncaused whole are other uncausing events.
4. Therefore the event has been in its totality caused and uncaused (by distinct and discretely separate events or causes) and there is nothing in its post-caused behaviour therefore that is not caused and not uncaused.
I don't know what "uncaused by some other event" means.
Quoting god must be atheist
2 and 3 refer to events that are... uncausing the event? An uncaused whole? Uncausing events?
Quoting god must be atheist
I can't reach this conclusion, because I cannot make sense of an event uncausing another event. It sounds like gibberish to me. What does it mean for an event to uncause another event? 1 makes sense. I have no idea what 2 and 3 are. Can you illustrate what you mean by an example?
Quoting InPitzotl
I was just repeating what I gleaned from your earlier posts in conversation with others.
Quoting InPitzotl
I have no clue what an uncausing is in relation to causality. But you used it, and I thought YOU knew what you were saying. Now you say that my saying "uncaused" has no meaning.
I can live with that. This is a nice example of uncaused reasoning caused by uncaused ununderstanding.
I did no such thing. I mentioned a partially caused, partially uncaused event. I mentioned that causality isn't linear, but branches. But I didn't mention any "event uncausing another event" nonsense; that notion came entirely from you.
Quoting InPitzotl
Yes. But let's break that conjunction apart. "Have a cause" is on the left; so there's an event that "has a cause"... that cause we could call an event, so this would be an event (the cause) causing an event (the effect). But on the right side of the conjunction, there's just "partially be uncaused". It's a "god must be atheist" invention that "be uncaused" means there's an event that is the uncauser, and that's kind of ridiculous. But that's the direction you took it.
Quoting god must be atheist
So let's go back to starting my car as an example. I put the key in the ignition and turn it, and the car starts up. Wonderful! But that's not the whole story. The car doesn't always start up when I turn the key. Turning the key is critical, but not sufficient. So we can say that turning the key causes it to start, but it's not the complete explanation. This is a partial cause. In this case, there are reasons why the car might not start if I turn the key... among those are: there's not enough gas to start, there isn't enough battery to crank it, and the spark plug is too gunked up to fire properly. For discussion purposes let's pretend this is complete. Then if we meet all of these prerequisites and the key is turned, the car will always start; collectively all of the causes are sufficient.
By contrast, we can have things such as the 217Pb atom I keep mentioning here, that during a particular 20 second period (span 1) does not decay, but during another (span 2) decays into a 217Bi atom. If we explore the cause of the existence of the 217Bi atom, that has an explanation; there's a prior 217Pb atom... and 217Pb's are known to decay into 217Bi's with a half life of about 20 seconds. So we can call this a cause. But it is not a sufficient cause, as proven by span 1. Not all 217Pb's decay into 217Bi's in a 20 second time span; about 50% of them do. But there need be no set of causes that collectively are sufficient to explain this decay; there need be no answer to the question of why the atom decayed in span 2 as opposed to not decaying in span 1.
This isn't a situation of some other "event" "uncausing" the decay, whatever (if anything) that might mean. It's a situation of there being no other event that causally explains it. It's a situation where there are causal priors, but collectively they are insufficient to explain the event (i.e., were all causes present, the event would not always happen).
By saying that you did no such thing, you meant that you did not know what you were saying? You are negating your own action, but since I used two of your actions, and you did not reference which specific one we must apply your negation to, we are at liberty to apply it to either. Precision is lacking.
I am yanking your chain, of course, I am only joking. But you need to clear up your text, please, I think, you are at best ambiguous at most times, and at others, incomprehensible. Not your fault, your thoughts are most likely clear, but it's a special skill to write philosophy. You can't lead your audience astray, because then they will turn on you and bite you.
Even after several explanations I can't comprehend what you mean by uncausing. I let it be, please don't worry about it. You've given it your best shot, and I still stayed stupid and ignorant in comprehending it. I am a lost cause as far as uncausation is concerned, so please don't take it on your self to explain it yet a third time.
I cry foul.
You didn't understand what I was saying. But instead of asking a question, you presumed to pretend you did understand, and tied me to some nonsense having nothing to do with what I said. When I corrected you, you started blaming me for not understanding. I'm being unclear. I'm being ambiguous. I'm being incomprehensible. The problem is, you could have chosen to just ask questions; I did that of Philosophim throughout this thread.
I don't buy your narrative that it's my fault you didn't understand. It looks to me like you're just posturing:
Quoting god must be atheist
"Uncaused" means "not caused"; as in an event happens, and there isn't a cause for it. There is no such thing as "uncausing"... the act of not causing an event.
Quoting god must be atheist
Okay, but it's okay to not understand something. I gave you an example of what I was talking about, and there's no "uncausing" happening there. There is no event "uncausing" another event there. There's just a part that has no cause; since it has no cause, we call it "uncaused". So don't pin your "uncausing" on me.
So do I. You can't deny you wrote this:
Quoting InPitzotl
So explain what you mean by that, with special emphasis on the "be uncaused".
I did not want to continue this because it is tiresome to argue with you. But if you insist we go on, and you challenge me, I will not bend or break. Only under the weight of reason do I bend or break. But your statements have not shown anything but a bunch of self-contradictory claims.
In the following excerpt you set out to explain uncausing. But you did not. It was an entirely wasted effort. You put out words and you expect to be understood even when you say essentially nothing.
Quoting InPitzotl
This above was supposed to explain your position on "uncausing". Yet it did not. You can't do that to your audience.
You have used "uncausing" and "uncaused" prolifically before the discussion between you and me. You now deny that it means anything. That's another thing you can't do in normal discussion, let alone in a discussion where reason is trump.
The religious first cause is too complex to be Fundamental, plus it also leads to a regress of the lesser having to ever come from the greater if they continue that template.
There is a Mandatory Permanent Continuous Simplest Non-Composite Fundamental Existent, X, as all there is, because it has no alternative or opposite to its being, for ‘Nonexistence’ can’t even be meant as something, much less be productive.
Why does X have to produce the temporary forms?
X cannot be still or naught would have become as the temporaries, thus, X is not still and so X is energetic and X ever moves.
How does X produce the temporary forms?
X has only itself available to constitute the temporary forms and so these have to be formed via arrangements of itself that can have some persistence as elementary units that have mobility.
What mobility?
X is everywhere and so the elementary units can travel about.
Why elementary?
X is the ultimate lightweight and so the first temporary forms as the elementaries must also be lightweights. The elementary units may then combine or interact to form composite elements, and we know the rest of that story from Science.
But how do we know the first part of the story from Science, as confirmation of the philosophical logic?
X would be the quanta vacuum with its overall quantum field as partless and continuous, as the simplest, mandatory, permanent existent.
A field is merely what has a value at every point, they having to fluctuate, given that there cannot be stillness. The points must tug on one another and so the field at large wavers, this wave nature leading to the necessity of the quantum aspect of stable excitation levels happening.
A model that proves to be correct in representing a field is one that has sums of the harmonic oscillations of the field points. The rather persistent elementaries occur at the stable rungs of energy excitation quanta and they are those quanta.
Wanna-be ‘elementaries’ that do not reach the right excitation level are the still real virtuals that come and go very quickly. We know these from the Casmir effect.
This fails as a gotcha. I'm not denying I wrote that. What I'm denying is that it contains your unique brand of confusion about this:
Quoting god must be atheist
You are the first person I have ever heard of to suggest that "uncaused" requires an "uncauser" that is "uncausing" the events. To the rest of us, all "uncaused" means is that there isn't an antecedent cause.
Quoting god must be atheist
Wrong. I have used "uncaused" before the discussion between you and me, but I've never used "uncausing". I've searched all 15 pages of this thread, and the first usage of the term "uncausing" (by anyone) was in this post. This uncausing idea is unique to you.
Quoting god must be atheist
Apparently not. You're chasing windmills, Don Quixote.
Quoting god must be atheist
s/be uncaused/partially be uncaused/:
Quoting InPitzotl
In the normal English speaking world, "uncaused" means "have no antecedent cause". A partial cause is something that brings about an effect, but is not sufficient to bring about an effect; that is, sometimes the effect occurs given the partial cause, and sometimes it doesn't. The insufficiency could be accounted for by other causes, such as in the car example. But it's not necessary that there be other causes; in the case that there are no other causes sufficient to explain the event (i.e., if given any set of causes, sometimes the event occurs, and sometimes it doesn't), then the event is partially uncaused (i.e., there's some aspect which cannot be explained by an antecedent cause).
I've drawn you a picture to help:
[hide="Reveal"]
The correct answer here is C. There's no contradiction in saying C is the correct answer. Given C is the correct answer, we only have one more question to address... is there some other cause that we could shove into the quiz, to disambiguate this? Something to where we can answer if A or B happens? If you think there is, you're introducing an unproven premise (equivalent to presuming determinism). If there isn't, that's what it means for whatever does happen to be partially uncaused.
Quoting god must be atheist
Nope. There's no such thing as uncausing; that thing you introduced in this post. What I explained there was what I meant by partially being uncaused; that thing I actually did talk about here:
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting god must be atheist
There has never been a change in my position. I have never discussed uncausing. I never mentioned an event uncausing another event.
I mentioned an event partially being uncaused. And I gave that atom example a long, long time before you arrived. But you're not talking about anything in this example; you're instead trying your damndest to pin me to this uncauser thing you invented.
Quoting god must be atheist
Building straw men and playing gotcha is not reasoning. If we were having a real meaningful discussion, you would address what I actually did talk about. Let's try that. Tell me why, in the picture, C isn't the correct answer; or why there has to be something that tells you whether A is going to happen in 20 seconds or B is going to happen in 20 seconds. If you can do that, you've addressed what I actually talked about. Barring that, you're just chasing windmills.
Please forgive a possibly insulting question - are you a native English speaker? If not, then your confusion is understandable and I would be glad to help you. Otherwise
Quoting god must be atheist
I double checked. @InPitzotl never used the word "uncausing".
You're right, "uncausing" was not used by InPitzotl. I stand corrected.
But in his explanation to me what he meant by "uncaused" he did not explain it. Sorry.
I took offence actually when you questioned my proficiency in English. If you can't tell who speaks and writes English correctly, then maybe the problem is not with my English.
Yes. I can expect another barrage of condescending explanation from you telling me the difference between "proficiency in English", "correct English" and "understanding nuances in English". I expect you wish to tell me that "proficiency in English" is a typical word used for gradations of English knowledge in non-native speakers of English. Please do and then I'll never speak to you again.
I don't know why people stoop so low on this site and resort to insult others here by pre-judging the others' abilities and ranking them low in a type of skill in which they certainly do not lack.
Let me be condescending now to you for a second, pointing out some peculiarities of the English language that may have passed you by. Not in order to insult you, but just to make you see how it feels.
InPotzli wrote,
We can have an event partially have a cause and partially be uncaused.
Normally, "be uncaused" to me means, not being the object of a causational effect. It can be semantically exchanged to "not be caused".
An event is affected by one or more causes. Let's say we call the resulting common drive of all these causes "a cause" just to stay consistent with InProtzli's claim. We can sum then all events that do not cause the event at hand a singular non-causing force, consisting of many unrelated events. How can that be only partially not effecting? If it starts to affect the event, then the affecting cause that is new and no longer in the set of unaffecting events, and is now the part of the set of events that cause the event, i.e. have an effect on the event. The sum of all events and forces and causes that do not act at all on an object to bring about an event of the object, can't be called, in their entirety, "partly unaffecting".
----------
For the other part: you accused me, and rightfully found me guilty of using "uncausing" as a quote by InPortzli. What you considered a mistake was that I had taken the liberty and I EXTRAPOLATED the lingual use of "be uncaused". "Be uncaused" is in the passive mode of the verb. All passive modes can be put into a direct mode, by changing the object noun with the subject noun. "The racket hit the ball" is the direct mode, "the ball was hit by the racket" is the passive mode. In the former, the racket is the subject of the sentence, the ball is the object. In the second example. the ball is the subject, and the predicate is using the passive mode.
I don't know if you mistook my using "uncausing" as an error in grammar, which would be, in your mind imagined, used by me as fully interchangable with "uncaused". You were probably vaguely thinking of "I am interesting in buying this car" in which sentence used by many immigrants they mix up the past participle with the present participle. I am sorry, but if this is what indicated to you that I was incapable in English, then you in fact insulted me.
When I used "uncausing" I used it in the form of present continuous indicative performed by the subject of the sentence, which subject has no effect on the event at hand. "Many events are uncausing the event at hand (i.e. have no effect on it), while some other events are causing the event at hand to happen."
Quoting EricH
No offense was given.
...two posts later:
Quoting god must be atheist
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/when-un-isnt-negative
https://www.wordreference.com/definition/un-
https://www.vocabulary.com/articles/wordroutes/the-un-believable-un-verb/
Here is the key passage:
. . .the prefix "un" means "not" when used with adjectives & adverbs. But when used with verbs, the prefix "un" expresses "a reversal of some action or state, or removal, deprivation, release, etc.
So you can be be untying your shoelaces, since they were tied at some point in time in the past. Ditto for unlocking, unplugging, etc, etc, etc. I can think of many funny usages - Are you un-urinating?
So anyway, under standard usage the verb "uncausing" clearly means to reverse the action of some other cause or causes.
iQuoting god must be atheist
I give you kudos for creativity & erudition on this one, never heard that one before. Talk about obscure. I googled the expression "present continuous indicative" and got exactly 40 hits.
I understand what you are saying. But that does not negate or undo or reverse the standard usage of the prefix.
If you are erring, then unerring is not undoing the erring. If you cause something, then uncausing is not undoing the causing. It is, instead,
The whole thing is a huge red unherring.
Your argument ought to have been that uncausing is not accepted by the English language. It is not found in any dictionary. (I've checked them all.) It is a neologism by me.
What I really resented was your insinuation of my not speaking, understanding and reading-writing in English at the native speaker's level. Well, you are no language pathologist, either.
As @InPitzotl has pointed out, your interpretation is incorrect. I'll try one more time, then I give up.
Quoting god must be atheist
And the reason for this is that by attaching the prefix "un" to the verb "caused" you're creating an oxymorom. It makes no sense based on the clear standard usage of the prefix "un" with verbs - for which I gave you more than ample documentation - namely that it involves a reversal of the verb - not simply a passive "not doing that verb". Are you un-urinating right now?
Quoting god must be atheist
Are you saying that every event in U "un-caused" event A? If yes, then, umm, OK - but that is a very strange way of putting it and you will have to cut the rest of us some slack that we didn't get your creative definition. But it would be so much more understandable to simply say that no event in U caused event A.
Quoting god must be atheist
You're still on that? I apologized in advance of making that statement - and by your own admission you invented a new word.
This is not simple. At all. And not because of the thought's complexity -- you are explaining it in its chronological development, while a SIMPLE explanation of how an uncausation (?Is this a word? I don't want to start another argument, for crying out loud) can be partial is what I wish to see.
That's all I need. Someone said, something to the effect, "Caused and uncaused exhausts all possibilities." To which InPotzl replied: "We can have an event partially have a cause and partially be uncaused."
This is what you could explain to me. Not that uncausing is not a word. That's fine, you win there. But please explain how something can be partially uncaused. (Not a verb, but an adjective.)
The simpler the explanation, the better. No references. Just the straight goods. No A's and T's and X's. Just real life examples. Exactly what InPotzl actually meant.
Thanks.
There, you could do me a service and to InPontl too, if you explained that how a causation can be undone (uncaused) partially. Since you so eloquently explained that the un prefix is not a negation, but a reapplication of an action in reverse.
That's not what InPotzl and I are saying - and furthermore that sentence makes no sense. I'm sorry, but I don't have the time / energy to continue this discussion.
Be a man and defend what you stand for, by explaining in terms that can be understood, what the dickens you and InPotzl actually meant. Your withdrawal means you can't explain. Because what InPotzl said is nonsense.
Okay. You're the immigrant.
But I think we need a tad bit more explanation than that.
Quoting god must be atheist
Wrong... those are completely different... let's talk about the immigrant:
Quoting god must be atheist
Wrong:
I am interesting in buying the car.
Right:
I am interested in buying the car.
But why?:
The car is what does the interesting (active voice):
The car interests the immigrant.
We flip this with passive voice:
The immigrant is interested in the car.
And that's why interested works above when interesting doesn't. The immigrant is the object of "to interest"; so we need passive voice. The past form of a verb is used to convey passive tense both directly and in participles.
X causes Y. X is the cause; Y is the effect.
X is doing the causing of Y.
But:
Y is caused by X.
Y is caused.
"Partly caused" means being Y-like, not X-like. Y is partly caused because there's an X that causes Y. "Partly uncaused" means there's a Y-like role for which there's no X. For example, "There's nothing you can add in your box along with the 217Pb atom to make it decay into a 217Bi in the next 20 seconds."
Quoting god must be atheist
The "gmba's the immigrant" theory works much better than the "everyone's fault but gmba" theory here:
Quoting god must be atheist
Partly uncaused is talking about Y's that have some aspect that cannot be explained by an X that makes them exist (cf the OP). That's what I said, that's what EricH said, and that's even what you said (at least, it's what you said when you were talking about cars interesting immigrants). So that explains why all three of us are correct. Your misphrasing of this as if it had to do with partly not causing had to do with your poor mastery of English; and there is exactly the -ing versus the -ed forms that you whined about regarding the immigrant showing up right there in your confusion.
What about causa sui? The PSR remains intact.
Consciousness=charge.
Virtual charge= Virtual Consciousness
Virtual charges=negative curvature
Negative curvature=Causing power
Thus...Consciousness (virtual not to be confused with not real; potentially real) is first cause.
Mind describing what you personally mean by causa sui? A wikipedia article doesn't flesh out what you intended by it,
Can you clarify this? I don't know what a reversible clock is, or what you mean by a singularity.
You have to prove that nothing causes consciousness. That's a very tall order. Proving that any one thing is self-explained has an incredibly high burden of proof, and arguably may be impossible. I will flesh this out more if needed. First, try to show that consciousness is uncaused. We'll discuss more in depth after.
None of this makes sense. Flesh out what your words mean please.
Suppose the infinite regress is a causation sequence that, going back toward an origin, is of the form 1/2^n. You never reach the origin, but the chain exists. Just babble :roll:
Read the OP. I would ask, "Why is the causation 1/2^n power? The answer is, "Something else" in which case you would need to provide that, or "There is no prior reason," In which case we have our first cause.
If proving something like this seems impossible, then what makes you ask for a proof? :smile:
All I'm saying is that it's hard track the causality of the universe back to the point of singularity, since that's far removed from our times. Perhaps we would learn something about the first cause of the universe if we examine the first cause of the mind, because we can witness the lifespan of mind unlike the lifespan of the universe.
OK. At the present time we have a result of causation from an event having taken place 1/2 a year ago. At that time a previous event caused that result, the previous event having taken place 1/4 of a year prior to that event. Keep going back in time in this manner and you never reach an origin for this causation sequence, although the causation sequence started no further back in time than one year ago.
Silly nonsense.
That didn't really answer the question. What caused it to be that way?
That's a prediction, not the question of prior causation.
Quoting Raymond
How does this apply to the OP?
Got mixep up in threads! There was another one about the reality of time. A first cause for the big bang is the perfect clock, which the singularity constitutes. If the circumstances are right then entropic time comes to be. Entropic time has cause and effect. The perfect clock has no inherent cause or effect. It is time without direction. If all matter in our universe has accelerated away to infinity it causes the perfect clock, the perfect time, to become entropic, unidirectional. So, there is an infinite sequence of bangs. Each bang starts from the time symmetric singularity and is caused by the end of a previous one at infinity. Oops, wrong thread...
Ah, you are the OP. Okay then. All of matter is charged. Charge is said to be the cause of force, acceleration, interaction, energy. It's my conviction that charge is the base for consciousness, even though the base charges, inside the base matter fields, of which I think two massless ones are present in the universe, are truly rudimentary. At the singularity, there was only virtual charge, electric and color. There were no cause and effect yet, though the virtual process constituted time with no visible direction. This process constituted a perfect clock without an entropic time, an entropic process, to measure. The charges had a "longing" to take off in entropic time, to become irreversible processes, with cause and effect. But. The circumstances were not right. This state helt hands with a negative curvature in space. Time was not curved as there was no direction in time yet. When the universe preceding it found it's end at infinity (in an extra dimension in space), the negative curvature reached max value, and the charges caused the birth of entropic time.
What first cause are you looking for?
It's not babble unless some reputable thinkers are also doing it. I recall reading a Wikipedia article that says the same thing. It's essentially Zeno's famous paradox but what's the [math]\frac{1}{2^n}[/math] doing? Is it marking off durations for causes to take effect?
I see. That's just an invention of your mind though. Regardless, that doesn't negate the OP. What caused the charge? What caused the singularity? If you say, "Nothing" then it is self-explained as I conclude in the OP.
Quoting Raymond
None, that's not the focus. Its just noting it is logical that a first cause must exist. See Bob's discussion for details.
God(s) aused the universe. Who else? But in the realm of causal relations, the first cause of each new big bang is a causeless state, which is not the state at t=0 because that doesn’t exist. That's what I mean by the perfect clock state. That's not my invention but a state that truly existed. There wasn't cause and effect as this process had no direction in time. It doesn’t make sense to speak of time in the entropic sense. There was the perfect clock state only, which turned into the imaginary time coordinate. During the perfect clock state there were no irreversible it could quantify. Time was empty so to speak. So the state of the universe that came from the singularity was the inverse state of the singularity itself. During the singularity the was only the perfect clocktime with no entropic time yet. In the universe there is entropic time only with only imaginary clock time (coordinate time, it).
So time doesn’t go back to 0 but to Panck time, as this was the time period of the perfect clock.
Can we prove this? Why couldn't the big bang just happen? After all, if God is the first cause, why couldn't something else be?
Quoting Raymond
That would be the definition of a first cause, which would not negate the OP. I'm not stating whether that is, or is not the first cause, but I am saying there must be one.
If you go back in time you can't go back to t=0. What caused time to begin? God is the easy answer. That's no physical answer. If he created a singularity, how could time start from t=0. How could processes get a first kick if there wasn't any prior time? The first mover problem. Even God couldn't for then he would be a part of the universe. And because time stands still in a classical singularity, he could not give a first kick.
If a big bang is happening time after time, every time from s fresh state behind the bang preceding it, how can there be a first cause?
Ah,yes. I misunderstood. Even if infinite spatiotemporally, it has to come from somewhere? It all just is there?
Yes. The end result to all causality, according to the OP, is there must come a time when there is no prior explanation or cause. It exists, simply because it does.
Quoting Raymond
Why caused the big bang to happen infinitely, and not just once, twice, or any other number? And if you have an answer, what caused that? And if you have an infinite number of answers, why caused there to be an infinite number of answers, instead of just one, two, or any other number? Eventually, "It just is."
I think there are two kinds of causes. Well, three actually. The first cause is what caused the whole shebang to exist in the first place. You can say it simply all is, but that's not satisfying somehow. You can invent whatever physical mechanism but still the question remains, "why this mechanism?". I think I know the mechanism of the universe, but I have no clue where all of it actually came from. God seems the only option. How else can it just be, even if eternal? You could ask the same of gods but at least they give it some...eeehh...well...sense?
In my cosmic succession model, every new big bang is caused by the right circumstances around a state without entropic time but with a literal clock time. This perfect clock state contained the seed for entropic time and as such cannot cause entropic time by temporal cause and effect.as contained in that time (cause and effect asymmetrical in time. Directed entropic time was caused, in a big bang, by a preceding universe that accelerated away to infinity. Like our universe will cause a new big bang behind us. So a timeless state (entropic time, that is), can give birth to one with time. But only if particles are not point-like, and if some other conditions are fulfilled.
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
You seem to be using a two different definitions of 'existence', one that applies to objects (things that are contained by space and time), and the other 'everything that is real'.
For example of the first one, suppose I have 7 small coins and a couple larger ones, and I arrange the little ones into an arc and put the bigger ones above. The coins now form a crude smiley pattern.
I have, in a way, 'caused' the existence of the smiley despite the fact that all I did was change the arrangement of the already-existing coins, and designate the latter arrangement as meeting the requirements of 'a smiley' whereas the prior arrangement did not.
But that definition of 'existence' is applicable only to objects, that is, some state of affairs contained by space and time (and is thus a relation with that space and time), which is a state that is in a certain required condition at such and such location for such and such duration. It is a category error to apply that sort of definition to 'all of reality' which isn't contained, but rather is the container.
To say that there is a first cause is probably no more than to say time (a dimension of the structure that is the universe) is bounded. Bounded time is not new. It occurs in white holes, and black holes, all without contradiction. It does imply a sort of 'initial state' at the boundary if it is bounded like that, but only if the boundary in that edge is considered 'before' the others, which isn't necessarily true. There are unbounded cyclic models, but these for the most part predict different observations than those we measure, and have been effectively falsified.
True only in classical physics. An easy example is the decay of an atom, which occurs uncaused. That Y has no X, and as such there is precedent for an 'alpha' as you call it.
No, they don't, but no rules are violated either. The usual rules don't apply where the rules are singular, which they are say at the big bang.
Quoting Philosophim
This is the second category, not the same thing as 'why the smiley is'.
Quoting PhilosophimThat's like saying the first moment in time is now, or that space begins here on Earth. OK, I don't buy that time isn't bounded in the past direction. It certainly seems meaningless beyond the big bang singularity, even though there are hypothesis that discuss the physics beyond it. Whatever's beyond it, it isn't measured in 3 spatial dimensions of meters and a single dimension of time measured in seconds and such.
As an aside, can you answer a question: What is a distinguishing characteristic of a unicorn? I mean, one legend has it that it blows rainbows out of its butt, but I don't think that one is universally agreed upon.
If something applies to "everything that is real," then it also applies to any of its subsets like objects. So I don't think I'm using two definitions here.
Quoting noAxioms
I'm not trying to assert any one specific first cause. All I'm asserting is that if you follow the logic of causality, it necessarily results that there must be a first cause. Quoting noAxioms
I think you misunderstand, if there is no cause for the decay of an atom, than that decay is the "alpha", or the first cause. It has no prior explanation for why it decays, it simply is. This is not a deistic argument. If that is getting in the way of you understanding the argument, please be rid of that notion. I am only using "alpha" in the sense of "first letter".
That being the case, there are explanations for why atoms decay. Not that that is particularly important either. The question is whether I've shown that it necessarily must be the case that there is at least one first cause in the chain of causality.
Quoting noAxioms
No, it literally means the fact that the first integer is 1. :) Don't read too much into it.
Quoting noAxioms
That's fine, but that's not what the OP is addressing. I'm not addressing what you believe is a first cause. I'm addressing that logically, there must be a first cause.
Quoting noAxioms
Big question that's more about epistemology. I have an entire other thread where I cover that. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge
In short, if we're talking my personal definition of a unicorn, it can be anything. If we're talking about a societally agreed upon term for a unicorn, I would say the essential property that most people agree on is that its a horse with a horn on its head, and followed slightly less with "magical".
Right. So the existence of an alpha isn't a problem. There is a time before the decay event, but there isn't a time before say the emission of material from a white hole, so time can be bounded.
I'm agreeing with you about the alpha thing, just not about the universe (the container) having been caused or created. I'm not sure where your opinion lies on that account.
But there is an integer before it, by any standard (not just counting) ordering of the integers. It's still only a semi-applicable example (180 came up with it I think) since the set of integers is unbounded and time isn't necessarily unbounded.
A lot of them apparently, since there are plenty of sets of events, none of which share a common cause, at least not one in our spacetime.
It wasn't really a question about your knowledge of the subject. It was a question about the unicorns.
Close enough. I mostly agree: Horse-like, but not actually a horse. The horn was what I was after.
Perhaps we'll come back to that, but for the time, it appears that pursuit of the unicorn thing goes in a different direction than where you're obviously trying to confine this topic. It's your topic, so I don't want to derail it with ontological illustrations.
I get that four-dimensional existence can only manifest from existing causality, but there’s nothing to suggest that causality has a temporal location - ie. that there MUST BE a ‘first cause’.
If you follow the logic of qualitative geometry, a two-dimensional shape can only manifest in relation to a three-dimensional aspect. Therefore, a four-dimensional existence can only manifest in relation to a five-dimensional aspect.
Causality is potential. To refer to it as a ‘first cause’ and state that it ‘must be’ is logically inaccurate.
Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state.
Quoting Possibility
And why is that? What is the cause for this?
This makes the presumption that there is a current state.
Please clarify. Are you implying there is no "now"? Do you not exist at this time? We clearly exist currently don't we? If we observe something currently, then that state is current as well correct?
Still potential.
Quoting Philosophim
Did you see how your language shifted? Now you’re referring to cause as a principle, which is structurally different to an agent.
My language didn't shift. Are you saying there is no cause for why it is, thus an alpha, or are you stating there is a cause for why this is?
That question also presumes it.
I can think of no empirical test that falsifies the alternative, so no, it isn't clear.
That statement also assumes (begs) it.
Quoting Philosophim
There's where the implication comes in (bold above). The assumption has the 3D universe contained in time: The universe wasn't there at some time in the past, and at some point in time, the alpha event 'happened', and thereafter the universe was there. It makes for a larger container that contains the universe (itself a container of space, but not a container of time).
Physics suggests (doesn't prove) that the universe is 4D spacetime, and is not something contained in time, but rather something that contains it. In that view, time is a dimension and not a preferred moment that flows. The big bang isn't something that 'happened'. It's just part of the whole structure of all events, each of which are part of the structure equally.
No, I am not making an assumption, I am noting a basic given definition. That's like if I said 1+1 = 2, and you came back with, "You assume 1 exists". If you want to counter what is assumed, that's fine. But that's on you, not me. Anyone with basic education knows what "current" and "1" mean. Its up to you to demonstrate why the regular and assumed use is broken.
Quoting noAxioms
Let me help you out. If you don't exist, you won't type a reply. Let see if you type a reply. If you don't, I'll assume you don't exist, and this was all a fever dream. :)
Quoting noAxioms
No, that's just basic consequential logic.
Quoting noAxioms
So you're assuming an unproven suggestion. I thought you didn't want to use assumptions? Also, if 4D spacetime contains time, then we as as 3D objects would be able to measure it. And if we're able to measure it, we can say, "This moment now is current". Imagine an X Y graph. I can measure the X, the Y, etc. Just because that 2D plane is on my 3D desk, doesn't mean I can't use the X Y graph. Same with time.
So your assumption, which isn't a given, doesn't really refute the idea of "currently existing", causality, or time. And even beyond that, I just have one question. What caused 4D spacetime to exist?
I’m saying that our understanding of cause is not as clear as we assume. When we talk about events that cause events, we’re referring to agents. When we talk about the cause for an event, we’re referring to a principle, on whose behalf an agent acts. The primary principle is potential, which is not a ‘first cause’ in a temporal sense, but in a value sense. The qualitative and structural distinction is important.
Now, when you ask why potential exists from which events can manifest, you’re asking about the possibility of meaning.
I get that all of this seems pedantic in terms of language, but logical assertions reduce a reality of quality, energy and logic to just logic, and then present this as a one-dimensional structure of symbolic values: A first cause must exist. We then reduce this to our basic understanding of interacting events in time, and assume that ‘first’, ‘cause’ and ‘exist’ are temporal structures, ‘A’ is singular, and ‘must’ is a necessary relation.
But ‘a’ could also mean ‘one of’, suggesting a plurality. ‘First’ could mean greatest significance, suggesting attention based on perceived value. ‘Cause’ could mean principle or purpose. And ‘exist’ could be actually, potentially or possibly.
If you think you have prove there is a God than this God of yours is not the true God (or at least this seems probable)
I think you do not understand what I mean by cause, and that is fair. It is very simple. A state exists in moment B. Now it exists in moment C. Now, if the forces etc. of B lead to the moment of C, then B caused C. If C does not have any prior cause, or reason for its being, then it is a first cause.
I simply take it to the extreme and get a result. Even in the case of an infinitely regressive system, versus a system that could have starts and stops along the way, there is always the question, "What caused the system?" There eventually comes the answer, "It just is, it has no prior explanation".
Your post misses the understanding of the OP, which is fine. The definition of causality I put forth should be easy to understand. If not, please ask me where there is confusion.
Why do people not read an OP, and assume the writer is trying to argue for something they are clearly not? Please actually read the OP before commenting on it, as you are out in space while I am planet Earth.
I admittedly usually presume that my sensory input is not a set of lies. If I assumed otherwise, there's nothing to trust about the nature of anything.
Quoting PhilosophimThat's funny. I had pretty much had that line thrown at me (by an actual physicist) and I was arguing the opposite, that the numbers need not exist for the sum of 1 and 1 to be 2.
I know what the word means. Not everybody assumes the existence of a preferred moment in time, and the alternate view (that all events in spacetime share equal ontology) is used by most physicists, albeit not the average guy on the street who has little use for framing things that way.
I didn't say anything was broken. I said it had implication for the idea of an alpha cause.'
My name implies that I assume nothing. So I'd say that it depends on the definitions of those words. I often take the relational view where the phrase "X exists' is meaningless since it is not expressed as relation.
So no, since I cannot think of a test for the property of existence that doesn't beg its conclusion, it isn't clear to me.
Of course, you can take the intuitive view and not explore the alternate ideas, but then you're just rationalizing answers that you've already decided on. In other words, feel free to bid me a good day if I'm not helping. I make a point of ignoring my intuitions, which just get in the way of actual objective analysis.
No, I don't buy that. It begs its conclusion. Thought experiments would be impossible if they only worked for things with the additional property of 'existence' tacked onto them.
The unicorn has a horn, which by the above logic it cannot because the horn doesn't exist. I told you the unicorn would come into play. I just saying there are valid alternative views (non-realist ones) that don't presume objective existence. The relational view of which I spoke defines existence only as a relation. I exist in relation to you because you read my posts, so you've measured me.
If one assumes a view where that statement is meaningful, then yes. If one doesn't, then the statement is simply not meaningful. The alternate view might say that on Feb 5, 2022 we all observe the state of the world of Feb 5, 2022 (at least the nearby stuff), and not some other state. That date is no more or less 'the past', 'the present', or 'the future' than any other date. They all have equal ontology.
This is suggested by relativity of simultaneity. The presentist view (the one you're taking) says that there is a current moment here, there is also a current moment elsewhere, but there is no way to determine it. Suppose there's a clock we can see in Andromeda. OK, what we see was emitted before the time it gets observed, but if the distance and velocity of the clock is known, one can compute what the clock says at the same time as when we observe it, except the distance and velocity of it is frame dependent, leaving no way at all to empirically determine what the remote clock says at the same time as when our local clock says time T.
Look up the Andromeda paradox on wiki. It's all about this. Understand it before just dismissing it by your incredulity.
I assume nothing as any kind of asserted truth. Physics is not in the business of proving things, but I do definitely work with the view preferentially for the ease of understanding. There is no working theory of the universe that assumes a current moment. The mathematics is orders of magnitude more complicated. It's much easier to do assuming spacetime.
There is no device that measures the rate of advancement of the current time. Clocks measure proper time along a worldline through spacetime. If they measured the advancement of the present, they'd not get out of sync when they move (twins paradox) or change potential.
Also, if 4D spacetime contains time, then we as as 3D objects would be able to measure it. And if we're able to measure it, we can say, "This moment now is current". Imagine an X Y graph. I can measure the X, the Y, etc. Just because that 2D plane is on my 3D desk, doesn't mean I can't use the X Y graph. Same with time.
I never claimed any of those things are refuted. I'm just pointing out that there's a different view out there, and one used preferentially by physicists. The B-view does not deny time, it just defines it differently. In the B view, time is what clocks measure, which is the temporal length of a worldline. Two different worldlines connecting events X and Y might have different temporal lengths (as they do in the twins 'paradox'), so the clocks don't match when reunited. That's impossible if they accurately measured the sort of time you're talking about.
And no, that doesn't in any way prove the presentist view wrong. I've put a couple proofs out there against it myself, and I've also done a topic defending it against what I saw as fallacious arguments against.
We don't know that it is for one. Physics doesn't answer 'why' questions too well. Philosophy does sometimes.
If you're asking the purpose of the universe being the way it is, it doesn't seem to have a purpose.
The fine-tuning argument has a clue. There is a suggestion that there are a lot of universes with all sorts of random different values for constants, different dimensions (like two space and three time dimensions) in which all sorts of crazy things go on, but rarely can complexity form from simple beginning. This universe has one of the rare set of variables that allow the formation of complex structures from simple primitives. By the weak anthropic principle, given this insanely large set of possible configurations, only in one like ours can observers evolve to note the universe and the rules that govern it. So it's simply not possible to see the other ones because those are not observed in the way that people observe.
Clearly not all things can have a prior cause as that would mean having to posit an actual infinity of prior causes.
So we can conclude that there must exist some things that exist with aseity - that is, exist but have not been caused to exist.
But that does not establish 'a' first cause. Why would you posit just one? Indeed, that seems quite unreasonable. Given how many things exist, it would surely be far more reasonable to posit lots of uncaused causers, not one?
Ha ha! Well done! I mean this genuinely and not sarcastically. Always question and poke at "generally accepted knowledge". My point was that we can't take the standpoint that they're merely assuming what is generally known. We can give credit that theirs is the societally reasonable stance, and if we are to challenge it, we must given evidence that it is wrong.
Quoting noAxioms
Also very reasonable. In my experience unclear definitions in discussions are one of the biggest problems in philosophical discussion. And I include myself in those who give unclear definitions. Feel free to always ask what I mean, or point out inconsistencies.
Quoting noAxioms
I am more than willing to explore alternative ideas. Its just that you need to demonstrate why they have merit, and why the show the OP to be wrong. If I've constructed an OP about a specific set of rules and conclusions, if you want me to consider I'm wrong, you need to demonstrate why those set of rules and conclusions fail. I'm not rationalizing my assumptions here, I'm using common vocabulary to communicate ideas that most people understand to exist.
Quoting noAxioms
It really doesn't. Begging the question is often misapplied. Its most associated with circular reasoning. "God states that God is good, therefore God is good" is begging the question. The statement itself has the assumption that the conclusion is right. We can trust God if God is good, therefore if God says God is good, well, God must be good right?
Let me rephrase what I noted.
Something must exist to type a reply.
If something types a reply, it exists.
Can it be falsified? Yes. If something does not exist, then it cannot type a reply. Since you typed a reply, we've concluded you exist. Now, I'm quite sure you're mind might be racing to think, "Well what if I'm a bot, etc." I don't care. Your existence is based on whether there is a reply given. Something had to type a reply. I don't care what it is. But based on the falsifiable premises, it exists.
Also, one more thing, when you accuse a person of a logical fallacy, it is best to show them why in an honest conversation. Fallacies are a placeholder to summarize an issue, but they shouldn't take the place of good arguments.
Quoting noAxioms
It is how you define it. If you mean exist objectively as an animal independent of our creativity? No. Does a unicorn exist in our minds, and can I draw one on a piece of paper and tell a fantasy story about it? Yes.
Quoting noAxioms
No, that's incorrect. By using dates, you are stating that there are states that are not "current", and states that are "prior to the current state". Can I experience the date of Feb 5, 2022 currently? No, because that's not today's date. I also cannot experience the prediction of tomorrow's date. These are pretty clear and undebatable notions of time. Stating, "The past present and future all all the same" doesn't hold up in any meaningful sense. I mean, you typed your previous reply earlier right? That's not now. How do you get around that?
Also, I am not stating there is a current moment "elsewhere". I'm talking about right here. Basic stuff, don't overcomplicate it or add things in that I'm not claiming.
Quoting noAxioms
If you're just throwing out "Maybe its this," without any type of assertion to its validity, then its worthless. Maybe cookie monster is behind the government machinations of China. Can't assume he isn't after all. Don't make the mistake that just because you can come up with an idea it means it has any worth in application to reality. An active imagination is not what is clever, its proving what we imagine exists.
Quoting noAxioms
If there was no current moment, we wouldn't be able to think of any theories. That's just silly. If everything was stuck in the past, there would be no now or progress. If there was no potential for the future, there would be no past, and no progress. The current time is the transition from the potential future to the factual past. All of this you can experience right now in your brain. If you can experience it, its real.
Quoting noAxioms
No, they just measure the rate of time from future potential to relative past. A second for example is X number of electronic cycles, quatz vibrations or what have you. Just like an inch measures the start and end of distance. If it bothers you so much that we can't get a number to represent an infintismal point called "current awareness", fine. It doesn't matter to the argument. Take a state Y, then note a prior state X. We don't even need the definition of "current" to understand this. All you need to understand is "prior state".
Quoting noAxioms
Well my point is, there either is a reason for why it exists, or not a reason. What state caused the universe to be 4D instead of just 3D? There is either a reason for this, or there is not. Time or purpose really has nothing to do with it.
Quoting Philosophim
"at least one". Where am I claiming I'm only positing one?
Your OP, which I read months ago, says nothing about Hawking's or Krauss's argument, but just rehearsed Aristotle's argument about an infinite past
The title of the thread is incorrect though. It is not 'a' first cause that is needed, but simply uncaused causes.
You agree, do you, that there are multiple first causes? Or do you think that, in fact, there is just one?
You should probably read it again before commenting on it. I believe you've misremembered what it says.
I do not know Hawking's, Krauss's or Aristotle's argument. Mind pointing out where my argument coincides with Aristotle's? Mind pointing out where Hawking's or Krauss's theory would have a problem with my model?
I did reread it, sheesh. Aristotle argues that infinities on their own are unstable and a past infinity needs a root in a first cause, just as you say a first member as a cause is needed
Hawking proposes his No Boundry Hypothesis in response (using imaginary time) and Lawrence Krauss wrote a whole book about reality and anti-reality canceling each other to form Zero (hence nothing straight from nothing)
But I don't say what Aristotle is saying at all. Mine deals with sets, not the instability of infinities.
It's the same argument. You can't imagine an infinite series going into the past without a God? Some can. For me it always comes to paradoxes, but there are other options than non'physical reality
Ok, if you did actually read it, you need to work on your reading comprehension. Again, as I posted last time, I am not following Aristotle's argument. If you comprehend this, and think I'm wrong, then go to the argument and point out where I do that.
Instead, what you're doing is called a "straw man" fallacy. Its where you prop something I'm not saying, then beat that while saying my argument is wrong.
It also has NOTHING to do with a God. I've also stated that once before, so it appears you can't comprehend my responses either. Go ahead, find the part of my OP where I talk about God. Or continue to construct and beat your little straw man in the corner while I look on in amusement at your lack of comprehension.
I don't know your background very well, so I'm having patience. Please read the argument, and cite parts of the argument where you believe it to be wrong.
If the first cause is material than we are on the same page. If it is spiritual than we are not
"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."
So there is either 1,2,3,4 or infinite,1,2,3,3
"2. We can represent with the following labels.
Y: represents an existence that may or may not have prior causality."
So everything
"X: represents an existent prior causality to Y."
First cause
"Z: Represent an existence caused by Y."
World
"Alpha: A Y existence that is identified as having no prior causality."
Alpha is X
"3. This leads us to 3 plausibilities.
a. There is always a X for every Y. (infinite prior causality)."
So a first cause for every series
"b. The X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X (infinitely looped causality)"
Making the loop based on the first cause
"c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)"
There can still be a world. Begging the question
You shouldn't have to ask if you read and comprehended the OP.
Lets get to your argument.
Quoting Gregory
Sure, just don't forget that its causality. 1 causes 2, causes 3 etc. Its not just counting.
Quoting Gregory
No, its a representation of any identity. One of which, may be everything. Think in terms of sets.
Quoting Gregory
No, that's just a prior cause for any Y.
A ball is falling = Y
It is at its velocity now because of one second of gravities application = X.
Quoting Gregory
You lost me here. Y (the falling ball) hits the ground 1 second later. = Z Why is Z on the ground one second later? Because gravity acted on the ball for one second at Y. X -> Y -> Z.
Quoting Gregory
No, Alpha would describe a Y with no X. If Y existed, but one second prior there was no ball, no falling, and nothing to make that ball then that particular Y is an Alpha.
Quoting Gregory
No, this is describing the entire chain of causality is infinitely regressive.
Quoting Gregory
No, there would be no first cause within the set loop itself. This is an infinite causal loop.
Quoting Gregory
No, this is just explaining one of the 3 possibilities, not asserting anything. This is just that there is the possible consideration of an Alpha.
I hope that cleared up the first part. Take the premises here and go with the rest of the argument. Also, again, its not a proof for God argument. Relax.
A physical Alpha? There doesn't have to be a loop or an infinite past. The first motion is the first motion and there is nothing prior. In physics this is the big bang. There is no past for the big bang. But I think your correct that a first act is needed
Sure. I'm dealing in what exists. There's plenty of physical causality to go around, so that's what I work with.
Quoting Gregory
That's definitely an opinion many people hold. The OP is arguing that it is logically necessary that there is a first cause, that it is actually impossible for infinite regression to exist. What that first cause is could be anything, because a first cause doesn't have a reason for its existence, so there would be nothing to limit what it could be. Is the big bang the first cause? Very well could be. I argue a bit later that a problem with a first cause, is that its likely almost impossible to prove any one thing is a first cause, thought it is logically necessary there be one.
While someone could argue that a first cause "could be a God", what fails is the claim that a first cause, "must be a God". When something has no prior explanation for its being, it doesn't need any rules, such as conscious creation, for its existence. So while the argument doesn't rule out the potential of a God, it mostly certainly ends any arguments about the necessity of a God when considering any first cause arguments. In short, this defeats all current cosmological arguments for God for God's necessary existence.
Ok, but imagine if all that existed was an infinite spiral water slide going vertically down forever. The water that has always traveled on it has the slide as their alpha or reason for moving. But the slide is eternal so there is actually an alpha supporting an infinite series.
That's correct. If we ask, "What is the cause for the slide?" and there is no prior causality, it is an alpha.
What is ‘generally accepted/known is a matter of mere opinion. If there are multiple valid interpretations, it cannot be knowledge. That’s just a basic rule of being open minded.
Absolutely. But the topic under discussion is not about social issues.
That’s not the scientific way to go about it. If one is to assert the alternative view as wrong, that’s what needs the evidence. That’s the scientific method: falsification. I’m not asserting anything is wrong. I’m just saying it isn’t knowledge because there’s an equally valid (and likely more valid) alternative view.
But I didn’t assert that the OP was wrong. I just pointed out that it made various assumptions, and thus the conclusions might not follow if different assumptions are made.
Quoting PhilosophimYou honestly don’t see begging in that answer, do you? You’re invoking the premise “Something must exist to type a reply” to demonstrate the premise. The statement is a positive example, which falsifies nothing. To do the latter, one must posit the negation:
P1: Property of existence is not necessary for the interaction between entities.
P2: Two entities X and Y interact.
Now prove that X and Y necessarily have the property of existence without begging your premise. Then you’ve falsified it.
I drive at this point because there are valid interpretations of the world that don’t give any meaning to ‘property of existence’ since ‘exists’ is not defined as a property but rather as a relation. You’re asserting that such an interpretation is necessarily wrong, despite the growing support.
Concerning the alternate interpretation of time:
I didn’t make any mention of ‘current’, so I stated neither thing. The statement was carefully worded in B-series, which forbids implied references to the nonexistent present since any such statements would be begging a different view. Please read up on this and actually understand it before asserting that it is wrong. If you can’t understand it, then don’t argue against it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_series_and_B_series
The B theory (term coined last century by McTaggart) (or eternalism) is at least as old as the 11th century where it was first called '4 dimensionalism'.
Oh I assert its validity. But asserting the necessary truth of any interpretation of something kind of goes against an open minded attitude.
The B-view on time pairs very well with the relational view on ontology since it doesn’t have the problems inherent in any view that defines existence as a property.
I’ve not heard of counting electron cycles, but fine. Since one electron might cycle thrice as many times between events A and B (events where both electrons are in each other’s presence), it isn’t measuring ‘the rate of time’ between those two events, it is measuring something specific only to each electron.
NoAxioms, isn't that true about anything? I mean, I can just come back and state if you had made different assumptions and conclusions, then you could be wrong as well. Well, yeah. There's nothing meaningful or useful in such a statement.
It is appealing to define the world in such a way that all definitions and assumptions are valid, because then you feel like you can never be wrong. The problem is, it breaks down because you arrive at a glaring contradiction. I can claim, "No, some definitions/assumpsions are more valid than others," which is a direct challenge to your viewpoint. If you persist in your viewpoint as more valid than mine, I win, because I've shown you hold a contradiction. But if you say my viewpoint is just as valid as yours, then I've claimed your viewpoint is invalidand you accept this. So again, you run into a contradiction.
So logically, if we are to think in a process that does not result in a contradiction, we must hold that some definitions are more valid than others. And that means, just because you can propose an alternative definition or assumption, it in no way means its existence challenges or defeats another definition or assumption. You must, to have a logical argument, demonstrate why the assumption I'm claiming is inferior to an alternative assumption that would break the argument.
Quoting noAxioms
That did not show how my two sentences begged the question. Stating what a definition entails is not begging the question. To do anything, you must exist. That's part of the definition. If you do something, then you exist. We're not proving the definition of existence. We're proving you exist. Did I beg the question that you existed? No.
According to your logic, you proposed a definition for existence which does not follow English. To exist, is to have the property of interacting between other existences/entities. To be an entity, is to exist. You essentially stated, A = ~A then in premise two you stated nothing that had anything to do with A. The example is nonsense, because whether or not X and Y interact has nothing to do with the definition of existence you've proposed.
Quoting noAxioms
You need to re-read the OP. The entire OP is about relational existence.
Quoting noAxioms
Yes, you mentioned that I was assuming "current" was real. Its been a focal point of the discussion. If you assume that "current" is not anything more than an assumption, then you'll need to demonstrate why your assumption that this is the case, is real.
I took a look at your A and B series, and it doesn't revoke what I'm stating at all. If you're going to present a different series of time against an argument, it must be used to show where the argument falters. If I don't understand how the B series revokes the OP, that's because you didn't demonstrate that clear. I've been addressing your argument in relation to the OP, and what "current" means. So far, I'm not seeing how it revokes this. If you think it does, please try again, and I will see if I missed something in your explanation.
That sounds hokey. Assumptions are valid or they are not. There’s not much more-or-less to it. You might make an argument about more or less likely to be true. Apparently the flying spaghetti monster is a valid argument, but not likely a true one.
Where’s this supposed contradiction in ‘my view’? I mean, I haven’t really expressed ‘my’ view, just a different and very valid one.
I would say that the existence of a valid alternate view very much poses a challenge to what might otherwise be an unchallenged view.
Sorry, but I only remember one sentence, which was:
That doesn’t follow (non-sequitur). In order for it to follow, one must posit that “Something must exist to type a reply”, my words, but begging exactly what you’re trying to show. So I illustrated how to go about demonstrating that premise, which is by presuming the negation, and driving that negated premise to self contradiction. But instead, all you wrote way this:
which is just a mild rewording of the original non-sequitur, not any kind of logical demonstration of the correctness of the assertion.
That’s an assertion, not a definition. A definition would be more along the lines of what you mean by ‘exists’ or ‘reply’ or some such.
Perhaps a real definition would help. All I see so far is a property that something has and something else doesn’t have, and sans any meaning to the word.
I tried to consider the assertion as a definition instead of an assertion, but it leads to silliness like Bob was extremely ill such that it rendered him nonexistent for a week.
Yea, duh. English language gets in the way of an awful lot of physics and philosophical definition. For instance, in English, velocity is a property synonymous with speed. But in physics, it is defined as a vector change in position relative to an explicitly defined frame.
We’re going for the philosophical definition of ‘exists’ here (of which there’s more than one), not the street definition.
The English language is built around a great number of biases, many of which are questionable. Those biases were put there for good reason, but truth seem not to be one of those reasons.
Ooh, that sounds so much closer to my definition, where existence is only meaningful in relation to other entities.
That sounds more like the standard definition of existence as a property, but the requirement of this property in order for a pair of entities to interact does not follow from this definition.
Funny, because the word ‘relation’ or ‘relative’ does not appear anywhere in the OP. It seems instead to be about first cause.
No, since I made no claim of its correctness, only a claim for the validity of the interpretation that denies a current moment. So you need to demonstrate the self-contradiction that invalidates it.
It wasn’t a comment about the OP, something to which I agreed if you remember.
It was a reply to your “Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state”, about 472 posts into this topic. I wish the site would number the posts.
No, my point is that just because you make an assumption, it doesn't make them valid or right. If you target the OP by saying, "Well I could have made other assumptions and the argument wouldn't stand", then you are implying that my assumptions are not good enough, and that these others might be better. These are not claims in a vacuum, they are claims that are a counter to my claims. If you think other assumptions are better than the OP's, then you need to show why. If you think that all assumptions are equally valid and logically and factually correct, then I already mentioned that leaves my viewpoint standing.
Quoting noAxioms
If one assumes that X is true, and one assumes that X is false, only one can hold. If you are holding assumptions contrary to the OP's, then only one of us can be right. Again, if you believe it is perfectly fine for a person to hold X as true and X as false can coexist without a contradiction, that's fine by me.
Also, you did note here,
Quoting noAxioms
so you have the concept in your head about something "likely more valid".
Quoting noAxioms
And here you agree with me. To challenge, it must contradict the other. My point has been that my "assumptions" are solid, well known, and generally accepted. Your assumptions are currently not. Meaning you need to raise the bar by showing why your claims, which challenge mine, are superior. You assume they are valid and right, but you must demonstrate they are valid and right.
If not, mine stand. If you're ok with mine standing, then there is no issue.
Quoting noAxioms
We have a different view of definitions here. To me, the entire abstract is about selecting a state, and noting that a prior state could exist for the current state to be. In my view, this is a relative state comparison of causality. Why does state Y exist? Because of a prior state X, or Y has no prior state X and exists without any prior explanation. A state, relative to others in a chain of causality, which has no X to explain it, is labeled a "first cause".
If this does not fit relational to you, please clarify
Quoting noAxioms
True, my mistake, that was one sentence, not two. Despite this, I made no logical fallacies in concluding you, who has typed a reply, exist. I'm of course using the "street term" as it is assumed so until someone specifically wants to redefine it in a special way. If you are going to type, "I don't exist", that's a contradiction because a non-existent being cannot type, "I don't exist".
If we're to discuss and have a good conversation, its important that you just say, "Ok", on something very basic like this that honestly has little to do with the OP, which is the focus on the discussion. It shows me our debate isn't an ego thing, and isn't going to stray too far from the topic. I won't think any less of you for just conceding this basic point.
Quoting noAxioms
If you agree with the OP, great. If you don't agree with the OP, please only introduce criticisms that directly deal with the OP. When I am trying to understand your meaning and intentions, I am going to assume your points are to the OP, and not extra asides. Lets minimize what is extra, and only focus on what is necessary for the discussion please.
Are you claiming that your premises are in fact correct or at least better?
OK, since you asked:
I’ve done that with some examples, the Andromeda scenario being one of them. I greet Bob as we walk past each other. Relative to me, the Andromeda generals have currently (as of the present) not yet decided to launch a war fleet. Relative to Bob, the war fleet is currently in flight, having already been launched. If there is a current moment over there at Andromeda, then the fleet cannot be in a current state of having been launched and not launched. That’s the contradiction that suggests a different view (that of relativity and spacetime, instead of Newton’s notions of absolute space and time.
That’s not a disproof by any means, but perhaps a good reason why the 4D model is more descriptive of the situation. Nobody does the mathematics using the 3D model since to do it, the identity of the correct foliation of space and time must be known, and it cannot be known. There are other factors that also prevent a coherent model such as lack of reliable tools to take measurments.
Second bit of evidence. There is no coordinate system that foliates all events in all of spacetime, which means that there are events that are not ordered (are neither past, present nor future) relative to any time say here on Earth. That seems a contradiction to me.
Thirdly, and most importantly, how did time get going, and if it was always going, how did the universe suddenly ‘happen’ when there wasn’t anything before it. How does one explain the reality of whatever one asserts to be real?
Don’t be silly. Different interpretations of a thing usually contradict each other, so they obviously cannot all be factually correct.
Presuming that ‘X is true and false’ in the same sense, that’s a self contradictory set of premises, trivially falsified. It is therefore not a valid set of premises, by definition.
Without that presumption, both can hold.
The fleet has launched relative to Bob (fleet-launched = true). The fleet has not yet launched relative to me (fleet-lauched = false). Both true and false, yet not contradictory since it’s not true and false in the same sense. For details, google ‘law of non-contradiction’.
But I’m not asserting the rightness of any particular interpretation. You seem to be, since you talk of being right or not. To me, an assumption is just that, a potential thing, not some truth to be believed with certainty. One should be open to alternatives.
I suppose so. I find it more difficult to talk ones way out of some of the problems listed above than problems listed for the B view.
First issue is not really a problem. Bob and I are probably both wrong about which moment is actually current in another place, and Einstein’s simultaneity convention is simply wrong, as are both premises of his special relativity theory from which that convention (and pretty much all of modern cosmology) follows.
Second issue is a problem, but one that can be circumvented by asserting that events no foliated simply can never exist, meaning one cannot fall beyond the coordinate singularity of a black hole event horizon. This can be empirically demonstrated otherwise, but only to ones self, not to the outside observer.
Third issue is a problem I’ve not seem resolved by anybody.
Sounds like Y is explained by an X or not, making X fairly irrelevant to explaining Y.
Yes, I would agree that if there are two causally ordered events X and Y, the ordering forms a relation (X before Y in this case). If there’s no X, then there’s no relation. If X and Y are not within each other’s light cones, then their ordering is ambiguous, and neither necessarily exists in direct relation to the other.
I might disagree that X is a prior state of Y. X might have contributed to the state at Y, but the wording makes it sound like X and Y share an identity, which is just an abstraction added by common language.
[quote=Philosophim]”If you don't exist, you won't type a reply.”
True, my mistake, that was one sentence, not two. Despite this, I made no logical fallacies in concluding you, who has typed a reply, exist.[/quote]Given the above quoted premise, I agree. I just don’t hold that premise to be necessarily true, or even meaningful for that matter. I also don’t assert the premise to be false. I’ve never said it was wrong.
Well, the replies are typically in response to the quoted comment, wherever the conversation seems to have gone.
But you asked quite a few questions in your last post that are a response to my comments, and not directly related to the OP, such as why I suspect the A interpretation of time is questionably valid.
I said pretty early on that I have no problem with uncaused events. You speak of chains like a given occurrence has but a single linear set of causes before it, when in actuality there are probably countless factors that came together to cause the occurrence in question. Some of those prior states might be uncaused themselves, but that’s rare.
Quoting noAxioms
Lets say, "Yes". I believe they are correct. Better? Maybe not. If you're claiming your premises contradict mine, I don't think they do. Meaning, they might be able to co-exist without issue. When you first introduced it, I was trying to figure this out. Typically in a reply to the OP, an alternative is mentioned as a challenge, or direct conflict to the initial argument. If that was the intention, its why I've asked for clarification on why you believe this to be more valid than mine. Lets go over that.
Quoting noAxioms
Basically Einstein's time dilation. No, I don't think this counters the OP. Y is simply the current state we are looking at. Perhaps current is a poor choice of words. Y is the state we are looking at relative to a prior and post state. Lets call it the 0,0 on an x, y axis, what is called the origin. Origins give us a baseline for measurements and comprehending concepts. A starting point helps us think about relations in a coherent manner.
So, relative to a Z, a Y is an X. Relative to an X, a Y is a Z. We are simply using a Y as what we are currently looking at, even if that was 1000 years in the past. Taking your time dilation example, we just have to examine the state properly. In isolation to each other, each state does not consider the other state. Which is perfectly fine if the other state is unimportant to what we are considering. If however, we took the state of both together in relation to each other, then the state must be described as such. Meaning we would say on Earth, the time is 2 hours behind the time on Andromeda. No contradiction there, just a measurement of state that notes the relative time difference.
That doesn't seem to contradict the OP. I could still ask, "What caused this current state to be?" Does it have an "X", a prior explanation, or is it a "first cause", or explained without an X, and simply exists because it does?
Quoting noAxioms
Fortunately, I'm not using a coordinate system. I'm using a state system in a set model. Describe the state however you want. The question still remains, "What caused the current state to be what it is?"
Quoting noAxioms
That would be subsumed in the OP. Lets call the existence of time Y. If there was something that caused Y, that answer would be X. And of course we could examine that X, make it a Y, and repeat the question. An alternative to the original Y of time, is that it has no X. It is a first cause, or a self-explained entity by its own existence.
Why can self-explained states exist? There is no answer, because they have no reason to exist. If there is no reason why they should, or should not exist, then there is no explanation for why they should, or should not exist. They just do. The OP concludes that inevitably in any chain of state causality, there will come a time when you find a Y that has no X. This is the "first cause" within the chain of causality you are looking at.
Quoting noAxioms
Understandable. I didn't fully understand the points you were trying to make. I assumed it was against the OP, and so I ask questions and make points to see if I understand, or to seek clarification in a counter response. Generally it is safe to assume that another person, even very intelligent and rational ones, are not going to fully understand your meaning and intentions on a complex reply. That applies to me as well. In my head, the OP is clear as day, but I understand that's because I've thought about it a long time, and I have implicit biases and knowledge that I may not have conveyed to another person accurately.
Every person reads and can interpret writing differently as well. But generally it is safe to assume that if there is writing that implies some contradiction to the OP, the OP is going to assume that route first when trying to understand a response. This doesn't mean the OP is correct of course, but when trying to understand and figure out where another person is coming from, guidelines like this are often followed.
Quoting noAxioms
Let me quote a line another poster missed the first time around as well.
Quoting Philosophim
Notice I say, "At least one". No, the OP in no way implies it is only one. I've followed up with a few people who have thought the same and pointed out that it would seem by odds to be much more likely that there are several "first causes" that might interact through causal chains. People I think have a bias that they bring to the argument as well. Several people have thought this was a "God" argument, which its clearly not. Its normal for things like this to happen, which is why we discuss, ask each other what we meant, and have follow ups.
I feel like I understood your points much more this time, and I hope I followed up adequately in my answers.
‘B’ claim: Events share equal ontology, with no moment that in any way is meaningfully objectively special relative to another moment.
That sounds pretty contradictory to me, despite the lack of an empirical test to directly falsify either.
There’s no time dilation in the Andromda example. It is an example of relativity of simultaneity. Dilation is better illustrated with the twins 'paradox' rather than the Andromeda 'paradox'. While we're at it, the barn-pole 'paradox' illustrates relative length contraction. These things are only paradoxical under A theory.
Dilation does illustrate that clocks do not measure the advancement of the present. If time is defined to be that advancement, then neither clocks nor any other device measure time.
To put it in a non-interpretation-specific way, Y is simply the state at (or immediately prior actually) the time of the measurement.
The Andromeda argument has nothing to do with Y, or anything measured or caused for that matter. Do you understand what is being illustrated by the example?
Nobody is examining any state, and there’s no dilation example. What’s going on simultaneously with Bob and I greeting is outside both our light cones and is entirely unmeasurable by either of us. Measurements were not the point of that example.
In isolation to each other, each state does not consider the other state. Which is perfectly fine if the other state is unimportant to what we are considering. If however, we took the state of both together in relation to each other, then the state must be described as such. Meaning we would say on Earth, the time is 2 hours behind the time on Andromeda. No contradiction there, just a measurement of state that notes the relative time difference.
Or you simply don’t know you’re doing it. OK, so you don’t understand the second argument either. The A theory demands one preferred coordinate system, and all the other ones are wrong. My argument against that is that there is no coordinate system that meets the requirements, forcing the interpretation to deny the existence of parts of spacetime.
That makes it sound like X occurs before Y, which is a contradiction if there’s not yet time until event Y.
Agree
I had responded directly to that one in an early post with the coin example. All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence, hence I think it a category error to speak of existence being something caused.
Besides clarifications on my arguments about interpretations, I am actually trying to get the train back on the original track. Mostly with that last comment...
An infinite number of events hasn't occured (proof?)
Ergo,
There's a first cause
Universal principles, self-reference (you just killed yourself), infinity, all areas we're not good or we know very little about come together in this problem. It's as if all our enemies decided to team up against us.
I never claimed that in the OP. Please re-read again, or check some of the better follow up comments. I stated even if an infinite number of prior events occur, that there is still the question of, "Why is the universe set up in a way to have infinite regress? The answer is, "It just is."
It doesn't to me. Neither eliminates causality, which is all I care about. B theory also does not eliminate time. There is still clearly a past state, present state, and future state. The past state causes the present state, and the present state causes the future state. To counter the argument you have to eliminate causality, and I don't see B theory doing that. If you think it does, please point out how.
Quoting noAxioms
Sorry, its been a while since I've read the specific vocabulary of relativity. I generally remember relativity from years ago and many of the consequences of it. But I did not see how it countered the OP's points.
Quoting noAxioms
No. If it doesn't have anything to do with the OP, I'm not concerned. That's been my point. I don't see how it counters the arguments of the OP.
Quoting noAxioms
Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime.
Quoting noAxioms
I do. That is a change in spatial location. When one state is different from the next, that is change. And a change in state either has a prior cause, or does not. Regardless, even if there was not a change over time, there is still a cause of why the state did not change either. Again, it is about states. Why does Y state exist?
[quote=Philosophim]B theory also does not eliminate time. There is still clearly a past state, present state, and future state.[/quote]B theory indeed does not eliminate time, since it is essentially a dimension in that view. It does explicitly deny past, present and future state, so that assertion about it is wrong. Really, read up on it if you want to digress from your OP and actually present a valid objection to the view.
[quote=Philosophim]The past state causes the present state, and the present state causes the future state. To counter the argument you have to eliminate causality, and I don't see B theory doing that. If you think it does, please point out how.[/quote]Causality would say that any given state (Y say) is caused by some prior state (X, per your example), and causes Z, all without any of those states being past, present, or future. There is only the relation of one event being prior to another, or ambiguously ordered. If two events are ambiguously ordered (frame dependent ordering), then the principle of locality says that neither event can be the cause of the other. There are interpretations of QM that deny that principle and allow situations where effect is in the past of the cause.
Point is, all that can be described without reference to any objective state of said events. There is only relative ordering (this before that, but not this has happened but that has not yet happened).
[quote=Philosophim]There’s no time dilation in the Andromda example. It is an example of relativity of simultaneity.
— noAxioms
Sorry, its been a while since I've read the specific vocabulary of relativity. I generally remember relativity from years ago and many of the consequences of it. But I did not see how it countered the OP's points.[/quote]The scenario shows how two events, say months apart but in the same approximate location, are nevertheless both simultaneous to this one event on Earth (the event of my greeting my friend in passing). There cannot be two present moments a month apart in Andromeda, so it is contradictory if both my friend and I are correct about what’s going on over there currently. That’s where the original major suggestion supporting B theory originated. All of relativity theory is based on B premises.
[quote=Philosophim]Do you understand what is being illustrated by the example?
— noAxioms
No. If it doesn't have anything to do with the OP, I'm not concerned.[/quote]and yet most of these posts are about this topic, and not causality. I tried to clarify the point in the paragraph above.
[quote=Philosophim]That's been my point. I don't see how it counters the arguments of the OP.[/quote]It was brought up to a different post of yours in this topic. It is relevant to the OP, because according to A theory, the universe itself, or at least the initial state, needs to be caused, which is the something-from-nothing connundrum. What caused the rules by which uncaused events are legal in the first place?
[quote=Philosophim]My argument against that is that there is no coordinate system that meets the requirements, forcing the interpretation to deny the existence of parts of spacetime.
— noAxioms
Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime.[/quote]It doesn’t. It’s A theory that cannot handle this problem. That’s why I posted it when you asked me why B is better.
[quote=Philosophim]All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence
— noAxioms
I do. That is a change in spatial location. When one state is different from the next, that is change.[/quote]I’d have said change over time, but that’s not the point. If you read the comment, it was non-existence to existence that I was discussing. Then again, it very much depends on one’s definition of ‘exists’, which in turn is dependent on ones interpretation of time. So the time discussion really turns out to be relevant.
B-theory says the coin-smiley exists. The rearrangement of the coins over time doesn’t affect that at all since all events (coins in smiley pattern, coins in different pattern) all exist equally. So the change over time was caused, but the existence wasn’t affected. And that’s not even using my relational definition of ‘exists’.
I don't see how they are mutually exclusive based on how I describe state relations in the OP. Feel free to point out where this exclusion exists.
Quoting noAxioms
If I understand correctly, its the elimination of past, present, and future as a non-relative view point. If you have time, you have a prior state, a current state, and a potential future state, which is in line with the OP. Time as relativity does not counter the state relation. If I'm using the words, past, present, and future, note it is for ease of understanding in a state relation argument on a forum, not a science article. If I posted a B series interpretation, this topic wouldn't have reached many people. That's not the goal here.
If you see me use past, present, and future, just replace it in your head with prior, current, and post in a relative sense. This shouldn't be difficult. And if you insist on removing past, present, and future, or time itself, then just state "X" is the immediate influence or cause on "Y". Again, this doesn't affect the OP. If it does, please specifically point out using citation, where it does.
Quoting noAxioms
I'm replying to you today because of something you posted earlier. There is no ambiguity here. Same with you. You replied to one of my prior responses. We don't have any ambiguity here. We're not describing two states that aren't in contact with one another.
I'm not talking about a butterfly flapping its wings in Africa is the cause of our conversation today. I've mentioned in the OP "causal chains". Meaning more than one. Meaning, different chains of causality. There is no claim that everything interacts with everything and everything is the cause of everything else. You need to directly show how your argument applies to the OP.
If you set up two separate causal chains and state, "They don't have any relation to each other," its irrelevant to the OP. "I have a state Y. Does it have an X, or not? What is the logical result in any chain of causality?" Again, I'm not seeing the connection between the OP and your arguments.
Quoting noAxioms
In the OP I would simply take the entire state of Andromeda and Earth and ask, "What caused this?" Again, I'm failing to see how these criticisms apply to the OP. What would help is if you use the OP's argument, and show how it cannot apply with these interpretations. That's the main problem with your criticisms. I'm trying to show you why they don't apply to the OP, but you're not using the logic of the OP to explain why they do. I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm just saying you need to use examples that apply, not vague assertions.
Quoting noAxioms
You need to re-read the OP then. I do not state the universe needs to be caused. Please cite in the OP the point you are criticizing. I'm getting more and more in our conversation that you don't understand the argument. Prior to doing more criticism, perhaps seek clarification as to what the argument is stating first. I believe you're using a straw man here without realizing it.
— noAxioms
Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime.
— Philosophim
It doesn’t. It’s A theory that cannot handle this problem. That’s why I posted it when you asked me why B is better.[/quote]
Ok, how does this apply to the OP? And this time, please cite the OP itself. More and more as we're chatting, I'm realizing you don't understand the OP. I keep trying to bring you back to making the point about the OP. At this point, please explicitly cite the sections, or I think we're going to keep talking past each other.
Quoting noAxioms
Again, where in my OP am I explicitly demanding A theory? This is the unintentional straw man. I've already told you several times I don't care if you use A or B theory, because it doesn't matter. If it does matter, you need to show me how with citations at this point.
Quoting noAxioms
Its not important what you would have said, its important what I've said right? You have to first understand the OP before you can criticize it.
Quoting noAxioms
This was mostly nonsense to me and shows no understanding of the OP. Look, there's a difference between presenting alternative definitions and view points to the OP, and just presenting alternative view points that don't clearly show how they criticize the OP, and yet you use them to criticize what you think the OP is saying. I think at this point we've gone back and forth enough, that you don't understand the OP. I'm the guy who wrote it, so I'm a fairly good authority on it. :)
Please use the OP to cite your issues directly. No more abstracts, because you either don't understand the OP, or I don't understand the criticism against the OP, because you're not being specific. Once you do that, I think we'll be able to get a resolution on this discussion.
If you have time, some of the events can be ordered (X is before Y), but that doesn’t make any one of them ‘current’. The B view does not make any reference to the present since it denies any meaning of the concept.
I say ‘some of’ because any pair of events that are separated in a space-like manner are ambiguously ordered and neither can be the cause of the other if locality true.
It’s actually quite easy to word your OP concept using B-series language, without obscuring its meaning.
I didn’t say there was, but had I not put that clause in there, my statement would have been wrong, and I don’t like making wrong statements.
From your OP then”
This seem to allow only infinite regress, causal-turtles all the way down. There cannot be a first cause of existence (your definition) since existence would be the effect, meaning that which caused it was something that didn’t exist, being prior to existence. And the eternal (cyclic say) models of the universe make different empirical predictions than those we see.
My view gets around this by not asserting your statement above, by not making the assumptions it implicitly makes.
There’s another thread going on (in the religious section of all places) about Rasmussen’s paradox. The OP shows Rasmussen’s argument, which proceed much along the same lines as I do.
But that’s how I read the above quote. Either the universe has a prior cause for its existence, or there is one first cause of existence, which sounds like the same thing: existence being caused, but perhaps that cause is not ‘prior’.
And here I agreed at least that I’m fine with an initial state. Plenty of temporal structures have them.
You explicitly asked my to give reasons why B seemed better to me, and I answered. Conversation would be impossible if nobody could address any subsequent post of yours because it wasn’t posted in the OP.
Ok, this is good. But what about the second part of the sentence, "Or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows". We had this exchange here:
Quoting noAxioms
I think you misunderstand. A first cause means there is an existence which can cause others, but has no cause itself. That is why it is a "first cause". Also, don't forget the very important part, "at least one". Not "only one". I've had quite a few people miss that.
Further, this is not an argument about "the formation of the universe". The argument is that in any chain of causality, a first cause is logically necessary. For all I know, the formation of the universe happened over several first causes. I have no clue. I don't pretend to even make a claim. If anything, this is just a claim of what ultimately results if we are to examine the principal of sufficient reason.
In the end, I basically conclude that there cannot logically be an infinite regress of causality. That's really it.
Re-read the argument in its entirety again please.
Existence on the other hand typically refers to ‘all of reality’. I’m not sure how you distinguish ‘existence’ and ‘universe’ from each other. Maybe you have totally different definitions of these things than what I’m guessing.
Your statement above (coupled with others) seems to imply that ‘existence’, reality, or something at least, suddenly was, uncaused, when before that there wasn’t existence, reality, or anything. Well, there was time at least, but not sure how time is in any way meaningful without a reality to change.
You say ‘there is an existence’, like this first cause thing still is around, and didn’t disappear like all the other causes. A storm causes my lawn to get watered, but later the lawn is wet and the storm is gone, no longer existing, at least not over my lawn. But your wording says that there is (not was) an existence that can cause (not caused) others. So you’re obviously defining ‘existence’ in a different way than ‘exists’, which is great, but I’m hoping I got close to the mark when guessing at your definition.
Mind you, I’m trying to keep any opinion of alternate views out of this for now, since I’m pretty obviously not understanding what you’re trying to convey.
A bunch happen at the same time, or a bunch of them happen after a while, but with only one earliest one? You seem to define ‘first cause’ as any event lacking a direct cause, and not ‘comes earlier than the others’.
There are circular solutions, so this logic doesn’t follow. The infinite regress is also a valid solution, but you conclude otherwise. Hence 180’s trivial retort (first reply) about the first integer. Yes, they can be counted, but they can’t be counted in order.
So "existence" is generally seen as "everything". "An" existence is a snapshot identity within. An atom is "an existence", but is part of "all existence". In the OP I am referencing Y as "an existence".
Quoting Philosophim
Is the above quote what you were asking to define existence for? In the future, try to cite your questions of vocabulary using the OP. This will help me ensure I understand where you are coming from.
Quoting noAxioms
Can you coach this in terms of points 1, 2 and 3 in the OP? Where is this implication coming from in those steps? Or is it elsewhere in the OP?
Quoting noAxioms
Where do I say that in the OP? I'm just looking at the chain of causality. I don't believe I ever insinuated the first cause needed to continue to exist.
Quoting noAxioms
Correct.
Quoting noAxioms
Could be any of them. I don't claim any one limitation in the OP.
Quoting noAxioms
Please point out where in the OP the there is a circular solution. I'm not sure what you mean by the infinite regress was a valid solution, but I conclude otherwise. Where in the OP did I do that? Please site the specific sentences.
Quoting noAxioms
I love 180 as a poster. I find him generally witty, knowledgeable, and was thrilled to have him in my thread. He also stuck to a straw man despite my repeated attempts to get him to cite the actual argument instead of what he had invented in his own mind. I only note this, because a person of his learning and intellect should have known better, and I have rarely been more disappointed in a person. Not a good reference to use in this thread.
The problem is, I have a lot of people who come in here thinking they know the argument by glancing at it, but don't actually understand it. I don't mind that as long as they are willing to look at it again, ask follow ups, and try to understand it once I point out they don't have it quite right. If you're curious about a good poster to cite, look up Bob Ross's responses and my conversation with him in this thread. If I remember correctly, I conceded to him on his points. It might give you a better understanding of the OP.
That's what a certain subgroup of scientists would say. Those who're in the business of description of nature. However, I believe there are some who aren't happy just reporting on how nature behaves. They wanna explain, answer why questions and for them the statement "It just is" is a beginning, not an end (of science).
Understandable. I note in later discussions that actually showing that a specific existence is self-explained would be nearly impossible. A self-explained entity has no rules for its existence, so there is nothing preventing a self-explained existence from appearing, that our physics or notion of causality would imply there was something prior. For example, the universe could have snapped into existence 5 seconds ago, but its organization and structure would lead us to believe it had existed for a vastly longer time.
So what is its use and application then? For one, it may be helpful to understand self-explained existences are logically necessary. There may come a time in exploration where there is no prior causality. And that's ok. There's no need to continue to invent something that caused what appears to be the limits of our understanding within causality.
This is also a replacement for any Kalem type arguments for the existence of God. While technically a God would be logically possible, it is no longer logically necessary to understand origins in existential causality. It can also just as logically be that "the big bang" had no prior explanation for its being besides that it just happened.
That is literally saying the same thing twice. :snicker:
There's overlap but the first asserts a causation chain and the second asserts an un-caused foundation.
Quoting Philosophim
Let's take out the fluff...
1. All things have...prior cause.
2. There is...first cause of existence.
:snicker:
The "or" logical connective is meant to make sure that only one condition has to be met for anything. It's to prevent infinite regression. Whether it's justified or not is different but it has to be one statement for validity.
You're saying that...
1. All things have...prior cause.
2. There is...first cause of existence.
Are not the exact same thing? Okay! :smile: :up:
Don't forget the "or". Its one of two outcomes. Either infinite regression, or finite regression. In that first premise I am simply proposing there are only two outcomes of causality that can be concluded. This premise in no way indicates an assertion or conclusion as to which is true. If you're simply reading the first premise and judging the entire argument, you don't understand the argument.
Quoting Shwah
No, this is not meant to prevent infinite regression. It is stating infinite regression is one possibility. Finite regression is another possibility. The "or", is the connector demonstrating that one or the other must exist.
I missed the universal quantifier at the beginning. I think it's better written with an existential quantifier to be an actual "or".
Edit: you postulate variables it looks like but you can't check them with "1." because it uses a universal quantifier. To be able to check them with "1." you need it to be able to take in "X", "Y", "Z".
No, the OP makes no claims to this. If anything is definitely negates the necessity of a divine being.
Could you clarify this please? I don't understand what you're saying here.
What else kicked it in being, even if eternal?
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows.
So, you are saying that (don't mind my rewording of the 2 premises)...
1. All things have a prior cause.
2. There is one or more first causes from which a chain of events follows.
Or more precisely...
1. All things have a prior cause.
2. There is a first cause from which a chain of events follows.
I'm just doing this to help me figure out what you are saying more clearly...
"...All things have a prior cause for their existence..."
Meaning that there is an infinite regression of cause and effect in the universe (there never was a beginning)?
Sorry it's just a very strange way of saying that there simply is no beginning :snicker: (please correct me if I am wrong).
"...there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."
Okay, so the universe has a beginning (there is no infinite regression of cause and effect)?
It sounds like your 2 premises are: Either the universe has a beginning or the universe does not have a beginning.
Sorry for my simple way of thinking, but I just can't understand how you're complicating two such easy premises.
Let me show you how I would make the premises for your argument:
1. The universe has a beginning.
2. The universe does not have a beginning.
:snicker:
Your goal is to argue from a basic premise to a conclusion where "1." randomly states what should be the penultimate point but then discards it.
If you instead argue, for any object that exists (however defined), it has a prior cause or it does not (and if it does not then it is a foundation - can be a proposition with justifications if this is hinged on too much for people).
Then you can insert any trivial object x through that (it must be trivial otherwise you need a new proposition just so long as they accept it).
I suspect a large amount of the work done is justifying "prior cause". Whichever argument justifies that (from a basic premise) should be prior.
In any case, because your work is written that way, you cover a lot of ground twice and inefficiently work with what you've been given. You can really write that all in one line (?x(Px OR !Px & Fx) - there exists x such that it has a prior cause and if not then it is the first cause).
Edit: Notice x or !x is trivially true and valid no matter what proposition for classical logic but the & adds something so a separate proposition is necessary where you could write Px > !Fx, ?x(Px OR !Px) as two lines.
There is an infinite regression and progression of beginnings. The current universe, by physical necessity (thermodynamics) has a beginning of thermodynamic time. The end of this universe, when accelerated away to infinity, is the trigger of a new inflation at the singularity, after which it all starts again. Eternally. But we wont experience boredom like the gods, which was the reason for their creation. They didn't take the human gods into account. Their panto babbles led mankind and the planet astray.
No. I am stating any one thing either has a prior cause for its existence, or it does not. Let me simplify it further.
Premise:
A. Every piece of existence can be explained by prior causality OR (Don't forget the or!)
B. There is at least one existence that has no prior causality for its existence, it simply is.
Quoting chiknsld
I think the problem is you are taking an 'or' premise as a conclusion. Did you read the rest of the steps and the actual conclusion? If you're just reading the first premise, you're not going to understand anything.
Quoting Shwah
If you are talking about the first premise being written in that logical format, yes. If you are talking about the conclusion, no, that's not what I conclude.
Guess that "depends on the definition of is." :smirk:
In this case, it would be something that exists without prior causality.
So, your first premise (an "or" statement) as I was trying to say, can be written as such:
1. Either the universe has a beginning or the universe does not have a beginning.
Okay, very well I can completely agree with that. :)
You hit the nail on the head. A few points:
1. Explanation (for existence) = Cause (for existence).
2. A first cause has to be self-caused unless you reject the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). The catch is: in all cases observed so far, the cause exists before the effect. If so, how can something be self-caused? It must exist before it exists!? :chin:
[quote=Sean Carroll]The Big Bang is not the beginning of the universe. It is the end of our understanding.[/quote]
Not a worry! I have misread others arguments before as well. We're all human visiting a forum for some casual philosophy, not PhD professors. :)
Well, its not a rejection of the PSR, but an amendment. You see, the argument concludes that the principle of sufficient reason fails if not worded correctly. Inevitably, there will be something that does not have a "prior" reason. A self-explained entity has no rules or limitations at to what it can be. The reason for its being is merely its existence. There is nothing more than that.
Now, does that break the PSR? Perhaps not. We've logically concluded that the reason, principle, or ground of a self-explained entity, is the logical conclusion that at least one must exist. The reason a self-explained entity exists, is because it does. In other words, we've concluded such entities must be. Is that a reason that would fit the PSR? I leave that for you to judge.
The PSR entails cause and that includes self-cause.
Ahh, that is very interesting :)
Quoting Philosophim
Self-cause is a rejection of PSR, not an amendment to it. If self-cause is allowed, then the PSR reduces to a non-principle: Nothing requires an reason or cause since it can always be self-caused.
Adding this loophole is admission of failure. It means try harder. It certainly is causing me to think in different ways, but my reply probably deserves a new post rather than a mere reply to this narrowly confined and aging topic.
Well, well, well!
The PSR: Everything has a cause.
1. Uncaused
2. Self-caused
2 seems to square with the PSR, 1 is contradictory. 2 doesn't imply all things are self-caused, only the conveniently self-caused ones.
You may be correct. If you read the rest of the reply I stated, "I leave it up to you." The part you quoted was a "maybe" statement of consideration. If you understand the OP by now, then we can conclude there must be self-explained existence, and that there is a reason, principle, and ground for determining that it must exist. In short, we have a logical reason why it must exist. The only thing the PSR cannot conclude anymore (if it ever did), is that there is a prior causality for everything's state of existence.
I don't think that is a narrowly confined or aging topic. I think its something new to think on, without an easily available answer. Have we not sufficiently reasoned that a self-explained existence must exist? Feel free to create a new topic if you wish, however. Maybe this question about the PSR should be a fresh post if the conclusion of the OP has been tentatively accepted. I do not have an answer yet myself, and would enjoy the discussion.
Which is which? There very much is precedent for events without prior cause, so the principle seems already on shaky ground. Perhaps we simply need to reject it.
Stack two perfect spheres, an unstable equilibrium. The top ball will eventually roll off after a predictable half-life of time, even in classic physics (*). But it isn't self-caused. There's already a ball there. There's already some atom waiting to decay, even if the decay event itself doesn't have a prior cause. There's no carbon-12 atom popping into existence ex-nihilo.
* Classically, it doesn't actually work for spheres, but rather special shapes designed among other criteria to eliminate the need for bouncing.
Wouldn't hurt in this regard to read Arthur Schopenhauer's "On the Four-Fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason."
A kind suggestion Charles, but is there something I'm missing from the POSR in the argument? The POSR has been examined in depth in the 200 years since that book was written.
There's only 2 options: either all objects are contingent/caused from the outside or at least 1 isn't.
Quoting Philosophim
Of course the Alpha does have prior reasoning why it came into existence: itself. Inference to the Alpha allows its interior universe to have logical basis on which to explain its own existence and that of the Alpha.
Quoting Philosophim
Causality isn't infinite but there has to be reasonable grounds on which we include infinity in a model or not. That means that infinity does have a criteria for being explained within a certain structure. Well, we conceptualize infinity and we have minds, so it seems that the infinite has a mind.
I appreciate the read and hope it was enjoyable. We're stating practically the same thing. In the most technical sense, there is nothing prior to the alpha existence's self, so that is why I do not say "prior reason". But this statement : "Inference to the Alpha allows its interior universe to have logical basis on which to explain its own existence and that of the Alpha." is spot on.
Quoting Hallucinogen
Did you mean that the concept of infinity comes from a mind? I can agree with that. There is nothing within the infinite itself that indicates it is a 'thing' with a mind. As the infinite is unprovable, as any actual test for the infinite would always reveal more to test, it is a plausible concept, but not a provable reality.
It doesn't follow it because I didn't put the two into a syllogism. If you meant though, that the two contradict, then give a reason. Bear in mind the conclusion of the DPA is that space emerges within a mind.
Gotcha.
Quoting Philosophim
I mean both -- I don't believe anything has a non-mental origination.
Quoting Philosophim
Would you say that you can decide whatever it is you mean?
Interesting, do you mean how we interpret the world is all mental? I don't think anyone would disagree with that. But the world beyond our interpretation doesn't seem mental. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there, something still happens as a thing in itself. The mental tries to define and create identity in the sea of existence, but the sea of existence is still there whether we are or not.
Quoting Hallucinogen
Let me clarify. There are two things. Definitions, and their application.
I can define a unicorn, but in applying it, I cannot confirm a unicorn exists beyond an idea. We can invent whatever definitions and concepts we want inside of our head. It is their ability to be applied to reality, or their lack, that determine what I meant by 'provability'. So, I can create whatever definition and meaning for that definition I want. But if I cannot apply it to reality, then it is merely an idea and not anything that is provable within reality.
But this assumes its own conclusion. If it's true, it's true. The question is if it's true in reality. The observer effect seems to imply otherwise -- interactions don't take place in the absence of conscious observation.
Quoting Philosophim
But this just presupposes that there isn't a mind containing and observing the whole sea of existence.
Quoting Philosophim
This is what I wanted you to say. So, since we can imagine or define whatever we want, does that mean there's an any-to-any relationship between the thing defined and the symbol we attach to it (e.g., the meaning, the concept)?
It appears we're veering into a discussion of knowledge opposed to the OP about a logically necessary first cause. I've written an extensive knowledge theory here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1
If you want a summary, Caerulea-Lawrence in the first reply wrote a near perfect grasp of the theory. So you can read that first before to see if it sparks your interest to wade in.
The conclusion of Cosmological or DPA arguments doesn't specifically identify Spinoza's God. Neither entail that God has infinite properties, for example.
The rest of what you said is right.
Quoting Vaskane
Panentheistic. Pantheism would mean the universe is all God is, instead of a program-output relationship.
True. But logic in general is our best tool to analyze whether ideas fit in with the nature of existence as we know it. In this particular case however, logic is all we need. Its a binary question. Infinite regress, or finite regress. The reasoning demonstrates that even an infinite regress falls into a finite regress of causality. Considering I can think of no option besides this binary, its the most reasonable conclusion we can reach with what we know.
Why is that? I'm a little slow today. :chin:
Meh. Causality is not found in formal logic.
Certainly not in modal logic.
A first cause is not logically necessary.
But then threads such as this are not about causation.
Huh. Please elucidate.
But see also https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8713/causality-determination-and-such-stuff/p1
Probability and statistics can weave a tale as the story of quantum physics unfolds.
Therefore, it makes no sense to posit a cause of time, as that would necessitate a time before time, which is a contradiction. The idea of causation has a field of application within the universe and cannot be applied beyond it as in a "cause of the universe".
Thus notions of 'a being' 'outside time and space' 'acting' to 'create' are all allegorical and cannot be taken literally. Events happen eventually in time, and events outside of time are ... hush, nothing can be said at all.
The bowling ball causes the depression in the cushion.
Cause is not always prior to effect. Indeed sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result.
That's the OP. Basically if you state that everything has a cause, you either get to the point where you you have the potential for a finite chain of causality, or an infinite regress. The point is that if you take the entire set of the infinite regress and ask, "What caused it to be an infinite regress?" you realize that's the finite end. It simply is, there's no prior explanation for its being.
Quoting Banno
Its found in the logic of the OP. And yes, its concluded that if causality exists, there is a first cause. Feel free to show why its wrong, I would be happy to see if someone can poke a hole in it! I summed it above to jgill. Feel free to ask any questions for clarity on the OP.
Quoting Banno
That would confirm my point actually. Something that does not have a prior cause is a first cause. What examples were you thinking about?
this only begs the question. Even if "our" best tool required a first cause, then that would only mean that "our" best tool required a first cause. There is no basis for asserting that being or the "nature of existence" (whatever that means) must conform to "our" best tools.
Being is still not required to conform to logic even if logic is "our" best tool.
I agree. But that does not mean a first clause is precluded.
If you think existence does not follow logic, that's fine. But if you follow logic, its still logically necessary. I even noted that a first cause has no explanation for its being, it simply is. Even with that, it becomes logically necessary. This is not about your opinion. Can you demonstrate that the argument itself is flawed? Please respond showing a contradiction or flaw in the OP, not an assertion that does not reference the OP in any way.
I looked at your OP several times and it is void of your understanding of "being" and "nature of existence".
The notion of such a thing as a "logic of being" is interesting but hardly self explanatory. Many are likely to share an understanding of "logic" while not sharing an understanding of "being".
Simply put, there is nothing in your OP that explains your understanding of "being" and how your understanding of being and your understanding of logic are related.
Look at the logic I point out about being. Look at the OP and the actual argument. Opinions without referencing the argument are just assertions of one's own opinion. I'm interested in discussing the logic, not personal opinions.
What does that even mean? What do you mean by "existence"?
Please read the entire OP. That's just an introduction. The details are in reading the rest. Feel free to ask me again if after reading the entire thing, you do not understand. Lets have an honest discussion please.
I would like to just make a suggestion, reading through this OP for the second time I realized you don't seem to be actually claiming a first cause is logically necessary: instead, it is from the idea that all the options lead to a first cause based off of empirical claims. So, I would suggest, to avoid confusion, amending the title. There is nothing in your OP that proves that the logic itself necessitates a first cause, and I think this is the issue for most people reading your OP for the first time, like @Banno, because they are immediately misguided by the title. Thusly, Banno is absolutely right in pointing out that a first cause is not logically necessary because logic does not necessitate anything empirical; and Philosophim is perfectly right in pointing out that this critique completely sidesteps the actual argument.
Just food for thought (:
I appreciate the suggestion Bob, but I don't think I use any empirical claims. In fact, when we spoke about this last time I believe the point you noted was despite the logic of the claims, you were one of the only people who noted we lacked empirical fact to back it. I agreed with you then and still do today. The claim is not that it is empirically necessary that there be a first cause, but logically based off of the definition of a first cause vs an infinitely regressive cause.
There's the classic philosophical assault from Russell in On The Notion Of Cause, in which he argues that 'the word "cause" is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable'.
There's the more recent, and perhaps more influential, Causality and Determination from Anscombe.
There's also various criticisms of determinism and causation from within physics, such as in Has physics ever been deterministic?
And then least of all the undermining of causation in quantum accounts.
In addition, the very notion in the OP that something is cause to exist is problematic in logical terms. In classical logic things pretty much either exist or they do not; their existence is guaranteed by the domain of discourse. The special existential predicate "?!" requires it's own special variant.
Finally, the structure of the argument in the OP is quite unclear.
Quoting Banno
If you believe that, indicate in the OP where or why something is broken. Generic references to papers are not a discussion, nor do they indicate whether or not you read and understood the OP's use of causality.
Quoting Banno
This is not problematic in terms of logic at all.
1. A causes B
This is a proposition that is either true or false.
Quoting Banno
This is the only legitimate point made so far. I wrote this a while ago and it may be unclear, that's true. At what point do you need some guidance or clarity?
Certainly there is examining causality within a slice of time, then examining prior causality, which involves time. The OP is covering causality. Choose your favorite time measurement, be that second, minutes, hours, etc.
Quoting tim wood
No, causality is a staple of science. There are debates over what causality is in philosophy of science, but it is still used and understood fairly clearly in science proper.
I apologize: I mis-re-read it: nevermind! I re-read it again and, yes, this is purporting that a first cause (an ‘alpha) is logically necessary, since the form of the argument is that there are 3 exhaustive options (A, B, and C) and both A and B entail C, so C is logically necessary.
I really should not indulge myself in this OP while we have two pending discussions going, but I can’t help it (:
Let me just ask: what sense of the term ‘cause’ is being used here? It doesn’t seem to be physical causality but, rather, mere explanation: am I remembering correctly?
If it is ‘cause’ in the looser sense of ‘having a reason for its existence’, then my worry is that your concept of an ‘infinite causality’ presupposes that we can validly quantify it into one ‘thing’ (to then ask of it what reason it has for its existence): I don’t think someone who denies a ‘first cause’ in this sense would agree to that. They would say that the reasons are themselves an infinite chain, an absolute infinity, such that each time you bundle up the current ‘thing’ (into a ‘thing’) and ask for a reason for its existence you can always do that for the next one and so on. Now, I would imagine your response is that we can abstract that absolute infinity such that it would have no reason for its existence, but this crucially misapprehends the concept of an ‘absolute infinity’ which has been presented, since if it existed then your abstraction of it into one thing would be impossible.
This will be fully dependent on what is interpreted by the term “causation”. That causation expressed in the phrase, “my aim of expressing the ideas of this post was the cause of me writing the words in this sentence,” is not today taken by most philosophers and scientists to be a valid instantiation of causation—even though it is a valid form of Aristotle’s final causation in his framing of causal pluralism. And even though the expressed sentence makes cogent sense (just as much as does the statement of a ball causing a cushion’s depression).
I'll argue that Kant’s rebuttal to Hume in claiming that simultaneous causation occurs in many instances of efficient causation—which the ball and cushion example epitomizes—misses the entire point of what efficient causation is supposed to be. Here’s one reputable source’s definition:
Quoting https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FourCaus
There is no motion or change taking place in a bowling ball’s state of rest atop a depressed cushion. Hence, here, there can be no efficient cause to an effect (of change or motion), for no such effect occurs.
Then again, the ball’s being in a state of rest on the cushion causes the cushion’s given curvature just as much as the cushion’s given curvature causes the ball to be in a state of rest. Both are equally viable from their different, respective vantages of interest. Here, then, the ball's state of rest on the cushion is a simultaneous cause and effect in relation to the cushion's given curvature, which is also a simultaneous effect of and cause to the former. This relationship, then, produces so much havoc in our understandings of (efficient) causation as to render the term useless and, thereby, meaningless.
Here is one possible alternative understanding of how the resting ball causes the cushion’s depression: teleologically, rather than efficiently. In short, the ball’s set of teloi (including that end of being optimally proximate to Earth’s center) interacts with the far more malleable cushions’ set of teloi so as to result in an equilibrium wherein the ball is at rest and the cushion is depressed. This equilibrium (which, of itself, is changeless) is thereby teleologically caused by the ball just as much as it is by the cushion—this since it results from an interaction between both teloi-driven things. Utterly foreign to our modern ears, but in no way illogical.
As @unenlightened specified, for efficient causation to hold, the occurrence of the cause will then need extend prior to the occurrence of the effect—which does not happen in the ball and cushion example. With this traditional understanding of efficient causation, however, one can then validly affirm that, “the person letting the bowling ball slip from their hands (efficiently) caused the change in the form of the cushion that lied just underneath,” for the first occurrence as (efficient) cause extends prior to the time-span of the second occurrence as effect (despite the teleology previously mentioned remaining intact—to here not address the formal and material causes which could also be argued to occur). And, from a different vantage, one can then also validly affirm that “the cushion’s placement caused the falling bowling ball to come to its specific state of rest” for, here again, the cushion’s placement, as cause, necessarily extends prior to the bowling ball’s state of rest as effect.
But, again, a ball resting atop of cushion does not efficiently cause the cushion’s depression. This for the same reasons that change in temperature does not efficiently cause change in barometric pressure.
Since this issue of causality is of interest to me, I’m curious to see what disagreements there might be with the just expressed.
------
To contribute to the OP: where there to be no disagreements, this would then make the argument expressed in ’s post quite valid.
Here is my contribution:
First of all, it seems to me that to raise the possibility of a first cause one must start from a simple entity [non-composite: since if it is composite we cannot speak of a cause in the singular but of causes in the plural].
Secondly, the creation of the world [as an effect] must be treated as a binary relationship Where A causes B. More than two make several causes, and not a single cause.
Thirdly, this binary relationship must be understood as creation from nothing [as God is supposed to have created the universe from nothing: Creatio ex nihilo]. Since if there were a thing B affected by a thing A, B would have to be presupposed coexisting with A.
Fourthly, the first cause cannot be a single thing differentiating itself (monism) or being the cause of itself. That destroys the difference between cause and effect. The creator and the created.
_______________________________
So:
How can the first cause affect nothingness to produce the world?
Can not. Ex nihilo nihil fit.
From my point of view, what we call causality in its minimum expression is the power of an agent A to affect a thing B, achieving an effect C [but there can be more agents A, and more things B. And C can be a third thing itself or C as B altered by A]. Three elements are necessary for there to be a causal relationship. Consequently, we cannot say that a first cause has caused the world as if one thing A had created a second thing B distinct from it without the intervention of a pre-existing B already to produce C. Taking an analogy as an example, It is as if somehow a mother A gives birth C without the need for a man B, or a sperm, etc [And not only that but also as saying that the father , or the sperm, is created by the Mother] . And if someone argues that a cell can divide itself, it must be pointed out that it is because a cell is a composite thing, and there is a causality inside that is also tripartite.
Conclusion: The notion of first cause can only consist of creatio ex nihilo [Something affecting nothingness]. But that is merely irrational.
In that case, though it presumably is. The cushion had no depression prior to the introduction of the bowling ball. Unless it did, in which case the bowling ball did not cause it. A brick lying amid the shattered glass and nothing moving, need not deceive us into imagining that the chucked brick did not cause the window to break. And we understand that an explosion is a causal sequence of reactions that cause each other very fast so as to produce a cumulative effect, which we treat as one momentary affair for convenience.
Quoting Banno
Then in such a case there is no objection being made to what I said, except that sometimes it is impossible to see things clearly.
The priority is acknowledged in the very search for a first cause and not a first effect. But it is a mistaken search because it looks beyond the realm of causation for a cause of causation. Or else it attempts to derive a feature of existence from the logic of talk, an even more erroneous effort. Kant tried, but Hume rules!
Teleology is perfectly well accounted for if it is simply understood that the intended result is imagined in the mind. Thus it is not the effect that precedes the cause, but the imagination. I put my key in the door because I imagine it will unlock it. But the cause of my imagination is that it did so yesterday, not that it will do so today. Someone may have squirted glue into the lock.
That the cause is unknown to us does not imply that there is no cause.
In general, this is the problem with free will, and intention, as "cause", we do not properly know this type of causation, but this does not imply that we can exclude intention as a cause
Quoting Banno
The bowling ball example is a misrepresentation. Since there is not an action described, only a static object, "the bowling ball", there is not the premise required to say that the ball causes anything. It is always an activity of an object which is causal. We do however assign causal capacity to objects in the case of intentional acts, final cause, when "the object" is an intentional being. In this case we say that the act which is causal, comes from within the intentional being itself.
Quoting Banno
This makes no sense. Whenever it is impossible to determine which is prior, we can conclude that it is impossible to determine which is the cause and which is the effect. There is no premise to allow us to conclude that in cases where we cannot determine which event is prior, and which is posterior, we can conclude that the cause is posterior to the effect.
Ha ha! Not a worry! I am always glad to have you in any discussion Bob. I understand the passion.
Quoting Bob Ross
Its about 'Why does X exist? Because Y happened a second prior.'
Quoting tim wood
Great descriptions tim wood! Lets add some specifications to causality. Measured causality vs total causality. Total causality includes everything everywhere in a all possible time positions that ultimately had a hand in determining the outcome of some X. That is largely unknowable.
But just like a line is 'infinite' we can measure it by feet. Measurable causality is when we put restrictions such as 'time'. The only restriction I'm putting on causality here is time, and that there is something else besides the existence itself that causes the existence to be at any particular time slice. It doesn't matter to me how many other sources are involved in creating X. In fact, my theory does not state that there cannot be multiple first causes, nor that first causes and entities that have prior causality cannot mix.
So then there are two options. Either everything is caused by something else than itself at a prior time slice, or we reach a point in which something exists that is not explained by something prior that is not itself. This first is caused, the second is a first cause, or something that has no prior explanation for its existence.
Since we cannot know the full specific chain of measurable causality, we can use sets. A set containing a first cause would simply go down the chain of causality until we reached a first cause. So we can take your dynamite example and start with one of the reasons you lit the dynamite was because three days ago somebody cut you off. I'm using the more absurd example to demonstrate that it doesn't matter where in the chain we start the measurement. Out of all the causes that lead up to the other man cutting you off, we choose one, then examine that. Choose one, then examine that, and so on. In a finite causality set, eventually we get to a point where our selection has no prior causality. This is a first cause.
So now lets examine an infinite set. Here we capture the set of infinite causality. However, there is still one question left within the set. What caused existence to have infinite causality? There is nothing prior and outside of the set, therefore this is a first cause. There is no outside reason or explanation for its existence, it simply is. As such, no matter the situation, everything always boils down to there being a first cause, or a point of existence which cannot be explained by anything prior and outside of itself.
Perfect except for one thing. A first cause does not necessitate that it is a 'creator'. A creator would be a complex conscious being with intention. I am not arguing that here at all. I'm just noting that there must exist at least one first cause, which does not require consciousness.
Quoting JuanZu
Agreed. Something cannot create another from 'nothing'. The chain of causality demonstrates this. Once there is 'nothing' prior to there being something, that something is called a first cause. Now, there is a logic as to what is possible within a first cause, but that's not what this argument is about. Its just noting that there logically must be at least one first cause. If you agree with the logic here and want to discuss what that potentially means, I posted it here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1
I had to divide it up because people got caught up on the later logic without understanding the former logic here.
Not that I disagree, but what do you mean by this? This is more of a cheerleader quote, we should back why we're cheering something. :)
Ha ha! An honest troll with a sense of humor? You made me crack a smile over here. Genuinely, have a good day!
The problem I see is that we are talking about reasons for things existing, and so if we posit that reasons themselves are an infinite series, then it is incoherent to ask "what is the reason for that infinite series of reasons?" since that reason would actually be a part of that infinite series and not outside of it.
I wasn't referring to a conscious being either. But it is necessary that this thing be a creator which causes something from nothingness. However the question remains: How does this solitary cause affect nothingness to create something? It is necessary to affect in order to cause. Otherwise we only have succession without causality (that is why saying that one thing is prior to another thing does not tell us anything about causality; if I say that my older brother is prior to my existence that does not mean that my brother be the cause of my existence).
If we accept that affecting nothingness and creating something from it is irrational, then we must admit that this first cause is in the order of coexistence, coexisting with other things that it can affect. But this implies that the first cause is not actually the first cause but a cause between others.
That is why I have said that to correctly state the first cause, it must be stated as a creation from nothing, that is, as a first thing creating a second thing, affecting nothingness in some way. But nothingness cannot be affected. So, the conclusion is that the notion of first cause is also inconsistent. To cause something you need affect something; and to affect something you must belong to the order of coexistence (and it is no coincidence that to represent causality we need planes, Cartesian or not).
I do not address agency at all. This theory states noting about it.
Quoting tim wood
I don't know either! And yet despite not knowing that, we arrive at the conclusion I posted in the OP. My point is that in either case we end up with a first cause.
Does anyone recall it? What's the big mystery about time?
This diagram seemed to cause considerable consternation amongst those who's ideology demanded that change only occur over time:
It changes from yellow to white over distance, not time, you see.
And then Jgill pointed out that Quoting jgill
That should have been an end to it.
But there are a number of folk who are dedicated to anachronistic notions. Ideas of causation and change that come from Aristotle or Kant and which have long been superseded.
Much the same thing seems to be happening here.
If I have understood your post, you would like to define a sub-class of causes, which after Aristotle are to be called efficient causes, and which require change over time. That's fine, but it does not follow that all causes occur over time.
If I have a spring under tension, the force will be give by Hook's Law,
Notice that the change is ?x, not ?t; the force depends on the distance the spring is stretched or compressed, not on time.
This is the mathematics that is needed to set out the deformation in the cushion. ?t does not enter into the equations.
I was not disagreeing with your conclusion, only with your argument. I agree that it makes no sense to ask what causes time, and only disagree with the idea that a cause must be prior to its effect.
Silly of me to offer some familiarity with the literature.
Here's the ChatGPT summary of Russell's article for you:
And here's the same for the Anscombe article:
There. No need to actually read.
This, however, fully ignores the reality of the observer's gaze moving in time from one spot of the image to another so as to discern the change addressed - without such a temporal motion of gaze, no change occurs.
Quoting Banno
It so far seems to me this will only hold if one upholds the ontology of a block universe, i.e. the eternalism take on time. If so, here, all perceptions that involve time are fully illusional - and these encompass all that can be empirical, rendering all that is empirical to be strict illusion.
Otherwise, it again appears to me that the non-time variable which changes will again require an temporally-changing observer's mind (where time is, for example, minimally defined as a series of befores and afters - here, regarding givens such as ideas) to discern there being any change whatsoever.
Quoting Banno
You've understood my post, yes. And I'm in agreement with your conclusion. In Aristotelian terms, formal and material causations are themselves change/motion-independent and hence not directly dependent on time. This as one example of causation-types not requiring change over time. But the pertinent question for philosophical clarity, if not rigor, will then remain: what is it that one then refers to when using the term "causation"?
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BTW, from what I recall, Aristotle species efficient causation to necessitate not merely change, but a change in motion, including those of its commencing and of it stopping. Unlike the notion of change of itself, motion (movement of anything in his terms, which can well be of psychological process, and not merely physical motions) will then appear to entail duration between befores and afters and, hence, the occurrence of time when so generally understood.
And here I am using "metaphysical" in the sense used by Popper and friends, as not falsifiable. Indeed, causation is one of the examples used by Watkins in Confirmable and influential metaphysics, as a "haunted universe" statement. (p.348)
The idea is that every "thing" has a cause. We can parse this as that for every "thing", there exists another "thing" that is its cause.
Leave aside, for the while, that it is not obvious what a "thing" might be - an event, an individual, a state of affairs; This is indeed one of the problems with the Kalum Cosmological argument, and with the notion of cause more generally, but is besides the point here.
Watkins points out that such haunted universe doctrines are neither falsifiable, not provable. For they have the structure of an all-and-some statement: u(x)?(y)f(xy).
Supose someone proposes as a law of chemistry that for every metal there is some acid that will dissolve it. Can we falsify this mooted law? Well, no, for if we have before us a metal which we have tested with every known acid, it does not follow that there is not, somewhere, another acid that we have not tried, and which will indeed dissolve the metal. Then can we prove the law true? Again, no, since we might never test every possible alloy, amalgam and meld in order to show that they are all dissolvable.
The same applies to the metaphysical doctrine that every "thing" has a cause. We cannot falsify the doctrine, because for a given "thing", that we have not yet identified the cause does not rule out there being one; and we cannot prove it true, for we cannot list and identify every singe instance of a cause.
This is mentioned by way of adding yet another reason to be dubious of the was causation is used in the OP.
Quoting Banno
I'll try to work on it after the new year comes around in my neck of the woods. :wink: :razz:
Yes, silly of you to think that straw man posts that demonstrate you do not understand the OP would be anything useful or respectable. I read the Anscombe paper and saw what they were talking about didn't apply to the OP. This indicates that you simply posted the papers without YOU needing to think about how it applies to the OP, thus wasting my time. I am also not going to read an entire compilation of Russel's to find the point you think you're making. Point it out to me and how it applies to the OP.
Not only did insult me when I call out your laziness, you ignored my other points like a coward. So Banno, are you going to be one of those people who has spent years reading philosophy, yet sadly can't contribute anything more to a discussion then someone who has never studied it at all?
One sees the image as a whole, not only by scanning it; and Hook's law does not assume a block universe.
2024 must be almost everywhere by now...?
As a whole, nothing of the image changes. It is only within it that changes occur form one part of it to another.
Quoting Banno
I'll look into it.
Quoting Banno
Not on the pacific side of the Americas ... still procrastinating in preparing for the folks that will show up :grin:
Too much invested, it seems. The cosmological argument is not as straight forward as you supose.
This is not a proof for God argument. I'm an atheist.
And this is exactly the point. There is a change over distance.
Quoting javra
It must be odd to live so far in the past... :wink:
May I ask, Javra, where the insistence that change requires time comes from? Why is it important to preserve this idea? this by way of trying to understand why folk seem so adamant about something that to me seems obviously wrong. Thanks.
Does it? I'm not sure you understand it at all.
For my part, the issue is that existence can only be rationally concluded absurd in so far as its being is, and can only be, a-rational (beyond any form of reasoning). If infinite causality, then the entire thing in total cannot itself have a cause, but is instead, for lack of a better word, magical in its so occurring - this with all the natural laws, etc., it encapsulates. If, however, one assumes a causal determinism with an initial starting point, then the same issue applies to existence in total: its occurrence is absurd (for the reasons just specified).
This can be an unnerving existential reality/realization for some but, all the same, I see no other rational conclusion to be had.
The OP assumes "a first cause to existence" instead of concluding in the position of absurdism - this as pertains to existence's being as a whole. This, to me, is the pivotal aspect of the disagreement - either with or without the notion of a first cause as God. (And yes, for the record, I deem myself a philosophical absurdist in this specific regard.)
That, again, requires an observer's changing/moving mind to discern.
Quoting Banno
I'll get back to you on this early next year my time. :smile:
Yes, in other words something without prior cause. A first cause as defined by the OP.
Quoting javra
Quoting javra
I think the realization is very important to have and prove. I follow it up with https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1
I think its a fantastic spring board into fun thoughts about cosmology. Unfortunately, because people think this always leads to "God", they shut down from thinking about this apart from God. The attempt here is to get knee jerk athiests and theists out of their focus on their fears on the ends of an argument and to actually think about it from a different perspective.
Quoting javra
No, I welcome the absurdism and form a conclusion from it. Too often the absurdism of reality existing is hand waved without thinking further into it beyond "God or not God". I appreciate the post.
There's a difference between something's being true and it being discerned. It's true that the colour changes over distance, whether you discern it or not.
And here we are off into realism against antirealism, and the thread goes on...
Quoting javra
Hippo Gnu Dear.
This seems to me about right, although I baulk at existence being irrational - rather it is a given, outside of, or presupposed by, explanation. But that may be much the same point.
You borrowed from Anselm but left off "and this we all call god".
Really, quit trolling the thread Banno. This goes nowhere near the ontological argument. I expect better out of someone who been here as long as you have. What a shame.
Cosmological, not ontological. My mistake - Aquinas, not Anselm. Thanks!
There are various ways to form analogues of causal chains in mathematics. One, that I initiated in a publication over thirty years ago concerns composition chains like
[math]{{F}_{n}}(z)={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(z)[/math]
In which one desires to formulate the individual functions to produce limits
[math]F(z)=\underset{n\to \infty }{\mathop{\lim }}\,{{F}_{n}}(z)[/math]
A colleague of mine from the University of Tronheim discovered what is the most relaxed requirements to achieve this result, and went further to prove that as n grows larger and larger all values of z in a region of the complex plane will lead to the same result, that is to say [math]F(z)=\alpha [/math]
Thus, we have a regression that at each stage begins with a specific z but ultimately all z's in a region give the same ultimate value. Looking at limits here.
"What caused it to be an infinite regress?": The design of the structure.
"you realize that's the finite end": No. That makes no sense, alpha is a limit, not a finite end. The further back one goes the more accurate the observed present day value of alpha. There is no finite end to this regression, only partial ends.
"It simply is, there's no prior explanation for its being" Yes.
If this thread continues I'll describe other analogues of infinite regression, for good or bad.
So z is an input to a calculation f such that each result of f is then fed back into f to get the next result, and you do this n times? And the question is, what do you get at n? And the interesting result was that regardless of the input the result turns out the closer and closer to a given value as the number if iterations increases...?
The salient bit is that the regression is in the design of the structure of the problem.
And that correlates to what happens with causation as considered in the OP - the regression is implicit in the way causes have been structured, alpha being a limit, not an item, in the causal chain.
Roughly?
The mother of the race is a limit, not an item in the sequence...
But Mitochondrial Eve ruined the joke.
Bull's eye, buddy :up: :cool:
The limit to a type is completely different from the cause of an individual. So what Russell shows is that switching from individuals to types is nothing but a category mistake. To avoid the category mistake we must remain with individuals, and not switch to "the race" as you do.
Taking the stated analogy, the point which the cosmological argument makes, is that if every individual human being has a mother, then there is necessarily a mother which is prior to every human being, and therefore not a human being.
So, in the terms of the cosmological argument, if every material thing has a cause, then there is a cause which is prior to every material thing, therefore not material, i.e. immaterial.
To redefine "cause" with the intent to remove temporal priority is simply avoidance, just like redefining "change" to remove temporality is avoidance. Finding clever ways to avoid the truth of what an argument demonstrates is not philosophy it's denial.
Its nice to see someone tackle the actual argument. First, let me point out what the definition of a first cause is. Its a cause that has no prior explanation for its existence. In other words, Quoting jgill
So then your conclusion is the same as mine. Its not the simplification of the formula for infinite regress that the OP is noting, its just noting the set of all steps can be considered to represent it. You illustrated that for me. The question is then asked, "What caused there to be an infinite regress of causality?" The answer is, "There is no prior explanation, it simply is." Meaning that without us knowing whether there is a set of infinite causal regression, or a set of finite causal regression, we will reach a point of finite causal regression. Even a set of infinite regression, cannot avoid ultimately arriving at finite regression.
Essentially, "What caused it to be finite/infinitely regressive?" has no answer but the fact of its own existence. Now, maybe my vocabulary could be better. Maybe what I'm explaining could be described another way. It is really this phrase, "It simply is, there is no prior explanation for its being." that is ultimately true in any causal relationship. Do we call that a first cause? An uncaused cause? What do you think?
No, that actually proves a first cause. "What caused a circular causation to exist instead of another type of causation?" As you noted it "Has no initial-cause", thus there is no prior explanation for its existence. Meaning, its a first cause as defined in the OP.
The type of mother in question here is explicitly the mother of a human being. So the infinite supply you suggest as a possibility, would imply that human beings have always existed. Science has determined otherwise, so we really do know which.
The conclusion I stated remains sound, there is a mother which is prior to all human mothers. Likewise, science has determined that there is not an infinite regress of material things, so the conclusion that there is an immaterial cause which is prior to all material existence, remains sound as well.
To be taken seriously, show your reasoning. For instance, in what theory or truth that you wish to uphold is truth not partly dependent on one or more observer’s discernment of what is real (i.e., actual or else ontically occurrent).
Quoting Banno
Are you now labeling yourself an “antirealist”? If not, that ought to address this issue.
Quoting Banno
It’s a matter of semantics: To me, the term “change” can only denote and connote “to become something else”, “to replace one thing for another”, “to make into something else” and related phrasings and synonyms. All these entail the occurrence of one or more processes. With “a process” being understood as a series or else sequence of events, hence entailing that some event occurs before some other event that occurs after the previous one. And this, thereby, entails time.
Since this to you "seems obviously wrong", what semantic for the term "change" do you hold in mind wherein change is, or else can be, fully independent of process(es)?
(To answer this by pointing to static images or to mathematics is fully counterproductive due to the very disagreement between us.)
I think I've presented enough stuff on truth over the years not to need to do so again here. T-sentences and deflation.
Quoting javra
No. But if you insist that in order to be true a statement must be believed (or some other intentional attitude) then you appear to be committing yourself to rejecting bivalent logic in this context and hence to antirealism.
Anyway, thanks for your response. I'll take your insistence that change requires time as axiomatic, then.
But I don't see how you could then understand [math]\frac{\delta x}{\delta y}[/math].
Cheers.
I just cannot see how you could possibly come to this conclusion from what i said.
Quoting tim wood
There is a first material thing, it's called "the universe", and it came into being at the Big Bang. Therefore no infinite regress of material things. What was prior to the Big Bang cannot be said to be material, because matter is dependent on the spatial temporal conditions of our universe.
Quoting Banno
Ahh, now you're catching on, but not quite right. If it was mathematical, we might call it axiomatic. But this is philosophy so we call it "self-evident". There is a difference between the two, the former being mere stipulation, and the latter being supported by empirical evidence.
Perhaps if I describe what I think is happening.
There is a metaphysical view that holds that causation and time are inextricably linked. It's in effect a bit of grammar, such that folk hold that "change" (that word) ought only be used for sequences of events over time.
But when we look around we find changes that do not require time. We have at hand three examples: the image that changes form white to yellow, Hook's law, and [math]\frac{\delta x}{\delta y}[/math].
Now those who hold to the metaphysical view will deny that these are instances of change, and offer reasons for not accepting them.
Such folk are introducing ad hoc excuses not to see that their metaphysical view is false.
But anyway, may I ask again, if there is no change apart from time, how do you understand [math]\frac{\delta x}{\delta y}[/math]? You must, I presume, claim that it is not a change?
:100: I would only add: "supported by experience, of which empirical evidence is one form of" (this in the modern sense of "empirical").
Quoting Banno
Your former expressed, very slanted (if not utterly incorrect) biases should be addressed by this answer:
In short, you are (most likely unconsciously) reifying the sign "?x/?y" into the meaning it conveys for you and everyone here that can comprehend it in like manners:
There is no change whatsoever in "?x/?y" as sign, just as there is no change whatsoever that occurs in a static image for as long as it remains static. And both will require certain processes of mind to be interpreted in any meaningful way. (If not interpreted in any meaningful way, the argument can well be presented that they might not even be cognized as objects of awareness to begin with. But I won't here argue for this tangential.)
Processes of mind are processes (to state a triviality). Hence, time is requisite to them.
Any possible changes that the sign "?x/?y" can evoke - in one's mind, if this needs to be added - will then occur in processes of mind that, for instance, use the abstraction of variables (in this case, "x" and "y") to abstractly understand that when one variable changes (which requires time in before and after the given change) the other variable will also change (requiring the same abstracted frame of time) in manners established by the given sign as equation. This (mental) understanding of change is not itself static but dynamic; it is not a state of mind but a process of mind.
In what conceivable metaphysics is the sign "?x/?y" changing as one looks at it without in any way shifting one's focus of vision? Else, in what conceivable metaphysics can processes of mind occur in the absence of duration (which is always a temporal extension, or else temporal length, between two events)?
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To be blunt, your quoted biased conclusions so far look to me to amount to a pile of BS, to put it kindly - to not get into the psychobabble of "projections". As a recommendation that you are of course free to not take: it might be better to engage in discussions and debates on a philosophy form without insulting your interlocutors' intelligence or character by presupposing them to be far more idiotic than you yourself happen to be. Hey, no one here or anywhere is omniscient and hence perfectly intelligent, so I say this as one relative idiot among other non-omniscient beings that are thereby fallible.
Yes, the sign does not change. But the value of y may well change with a change in x, yet without t.
I don't think you have followed this, but perhaps we'd best leave it there.
For my part, no, I see you not having followed the very points I just made.
In what way can "y may well change with a change in x" in which there does not occur a before and after the addressed change?
If you agree there is no conceivable way, then in what way can there be a differentiation between "before and after" without time occurring?
The example I gave was the height of a hill with regard to distance from the peak. The height changes over distance, not over time.
I don't know how to make this any clearer.
You're gonna have to be inventive and/or cogent.
Is the hill itself changing (say due to some volcanic eruption)? I presume not. Does the hill's measurement require processes of mind? I presume it does.
There is no such thing as "change over distance" when the temporarily of mental processes that start at the hill's peak (an event) and move toward the hill's base (another event) are removed from the analysis.
There is no change over distance period, but always change over time.
agreed in full
The distance from the peak does not change without a change in location, and this requires time. What you can say, that the distance to the peak (height) differs according to location is a simple statement of difference, not change. You seem to be confusing difference with change.
As javra indicates "The height changes over distance, not over time" is not even intelligible.
Now, if you throw in a quantum-like perspective ( a favorite tactic on this forum), the time it takes to look at each measurement counts. And you have complicated something very simple. Good show.
On the other hand to introduce time set [math]\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}=\frac{\Delta y/\Delta t}{\Delta x/\Delta t}[/math]. Now we consider the passage of time in determining these distances.
Quoting Banno
The distance from the hill as one walks towards it grows smaller, and the line of sight distance to the peak also diminishes, but the height of the hill remains constant. The angle of line of sight grows also.
A formatting question - sometimes I get a line feed before the math expression, other times, not - I don't see any obvious reason why. Any suggestion?
Quoting jgill
Oh, I was thinking of the height, say above sea level, decreasing as one moves away from the peak - not the apparent height of the hill. Interesting take.
One can interpret circular causality as saying that there is no initial cause, or as saying that what is considered "initial" is subjective or relative to the observer. The important thing, is that causal circularity implies that every causal relation is symmetric and of the form A <--> B. or equivalently, that the causal order A --> B --> C comes equipped with a dual order in the opposite direction, C --> B --> A.
However, circularity isn't a requirement for symmetric causal relations. E.g the interpretation of QM known as "Super-determinism" is in effect committed to symmetric causal relations as a consequence of denying the existence of counterfactual measurements, without committing to temporal circularity.
Also, a presentist might interpret the present as being the perpetual "first" cause , in spite of also admitting that present events are caused by "past" events when speaking in the vulgar. To resolve this apparent contradiction requires distinguishing causality from temporality, including the topologies in each case that might conceivably be different.
That's a mistaken idea. Measurements need to be made, and measurement is an act which requires time. The simple fact that any measurement requires time is a fundamental premise of Einstein's special relativity, which produces the concept of the relativity of simultaneity.
Yes, you can remove the temporality from measurement, and work with measurements which "simply are", but that is to assume a static world which you are working with. This is adequate for many applications, things in the same frame of reference, static relative to each other. Even the locations which are used to produce the "rest frame" are taken to be static locations which "simply are", as indicated by "rest frame". The assumed "rest" provides the premise required to remove temporality.
But as an ontological principle, the "static world" assumption, the assumed "rest" which is required to remove the temporal aspect as you describe, is a false premise, therefore producing unsound logic for any ontological purpose.
This is a very good demonstration of why Banno has much difficulty understanding metaphysics. Banno seems to think that axioms of mathematics which have been proven very useful in a wide range of physical applications can automatically be given an even wider range of application, a metaphysical application, without first undergoing the critical analysis of a metaphysician. Not recognizing that metaphysics is a broader field than physics, and that some axioms which are very useful to physics will turn out to be inapplicable in the wider field of metaphysics, and therefore very misleading if applied by a pseudo-metaphysician, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the field of metaphysics. That is a failure to recognize the difference between a trained metaphysician and a pseudo-metaphysician.
Quoting Banno
This is very clear evidence that your claim is simply unintelligible. No one can even figure out what the hell you are saying, and to make yourself understood you need to add the temporal aspect ("decreasing as one moves away from the peak"), which you are insisting can be removed. That's hypocrisy plain and simple, and hypocrisy demonstrates with actions the exact opposite of what one is arguing in words.
No, whether there is an observer or not, there is still no reason, no prior existence why there is an infinite regress of causality. People seem to confuse the idea that you are needed for reality to exist. You are not. You are needed for reality to be interpreted. There still exists the thing in iteself that can be interpreted.
Quoting sime
This is one type of regressively infinite causality. There is also just flat regressive with no circularity. Understanding how the regressive causality works doesn't change the conclusion.
Quoting sime
It depends on your measurement slice. Lets say I take a measurement slice to be as long as the universe has existed. While a fairly useless measurement slice for any other practical purpose other than this, we could do it. What prior existence caused the universe to have occurred? Whether its seconds, minutes, hours, or really, REALLY big, we're still left with the same conclusion when we complete the full set of prior causality. There is no prior reason that caused the set to exist, it simply is.
The point of the OP is to show you that no matter how causality regresses, you are left with the conclusion that there is no prior reason for existence period. Why does circular causality exist? Infinitely regressive causality? Finite causality? At some point you understand that it simply exists. There is no reason it should, or should not be. It is the first cause.
I use MathType, set to Wikipedia format, then change < to [ and > to ] at either end. It usually works but sometimes not, and I have no idea why.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Does an inch exist on a ruler without someone looking at it?
Quoting sime
A-->B-->C-->A => C-->A-->B ?
Quoting Philosophim
Mathematically, I would not. If an infinite composition exists it is the limit of a process that requires at each step a variable upon which that segment is defined.
[math]{{F}_{n}}={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}[/math] versus
[math]{{F}_{n}}(z)={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(z)[/math]
As n increases without bound one can look at the entire structure as a mathematical entity that has the value [math]\alpha =\underset{n\to \infty }{\mathop{\lim }}\,{{F}_{n}}(z),z\in S[/math]
Now, outside the bounds of the theorem I have been discussing, alpha may not exist and the entire structure may oscillate or go to infinity, or whatever. Then the causation chain exists as a mathematical enterprise but cannot be associated with a particular value. It simply is. (My attempt at philosophy) :cool:
Yes, the point is not to analyze the regressiveness itself, its to look at the entire structure then ask what prior causation existed that caused it to be that structure.
Quoting jgill
Yes, the value in question is irrelevant. The point is that no matter the the value, it simply is and thus 'a first cause'.
Thanks. I don't use math often enough to have an app for it, so I type it manually or steal it from somewhere else - which is why I had a [math]\delta x[/math] where a [math]\Delta x[/math] would have been preferred.
Quoting jgill
Long ago, one of the regulars here insisted that Mount Everest did not have a height until it was measured. The prognosis was advanced pragmatism, unfortunately incurable.
Quoting jgill
I think this is pretty much it. My temptation, given an OLP background, is to see causation as primarily a way of talking about stuff. So things happen in the word, the window breaks, the rock flys, the child throws, but what counts as "A caused B" very much depends on what one is talking about - did the rock cause the broken window, or was it the child? It depends on what you are talking about, and what you are doing. Meaning as use, again.
An inch no more exists without anyone contemplating it than does any word (such as the word “money”) exist without anyone contemplating it. In other words, it doesn’t. It is 100% a socially constructed and established unit of measurement - whose actuality as such is fully contingent on that cohort of minds (and their individual process of thought) which accept it as commonly established construct. Same is true of a centimeter, and so forth.
Quoting Banno
And I bet they still maintain this bit of advanced philosophical thought.
They still lurk, but haven't posted in months.
It might be better to think of inches and dollars as something we do rather than something we contemplate.
One again wrong in your presumptions. Tis me (formerly "evolog" on the old website, don't you know).
Quoting Banno
Because contemplation is not something we do?
A ruler has markings, it might say "inch", or it may not. I don't see the relevance, an act of measurement was required to produce that marking.
Quoting Banno
Reminds me of the time when I argued that a jar full of marbles does not have a number until counted.
But I'm in no way a pragmatist. This was in a thread about quantum mechanics, and it was an example of the point which a physicist (I believe it was Bell) had made about quantum measurement. Measurement, he explained, whether quantum, or any type of measurement, is fundamentally not what the average person thinks it is. The value which we assign is not there until it is assigned.
Edit: The last sentence ought to be revised, the value is never actually there in the thing, it's simply what we say about it.
I'm speaking of a ruler with inch markings sitting on the table in front of you. You turn away to ask your wife for a glass of wine, then turn back and look again at the ruler. Did it exist for that short period you glanced away? You know, Einstein and the moon.
Rabbit hole country.
It was @apokrisis I had in mind. But you may have made a similar error.
Quoting javra
Because contemplation is passive. Measuring and spending are not passive.
Ah shoot, gonna turn this thread into one about best understandings regarding an objective idealism ontology?
I'll pass on that for now. All the same, the piece of wood or metal can well occur were all humans to somehow disappear this very instant, as would the moon - as would also persist the signs we humans would leave behind, as in both a) lines representing the idealization of a perfect inch and b) the word "money". These physical things would yet occur but - in granting no other equally or more advanced intelligence in the cosmos - these physically occurrent things would be utterly devoid of the meaning we deem them to hold. They would be utterly meaningless to dogs, bacteria, etc. But again, I don't want to turn this thread into one regarding ontologies.
Does a causation chain have being? It does if there is a dog at its end.
We inhabit two very different minds. I'm always active in what I contemplate. You claim not to be. OK.
Yup, philosophical issues 101. Which some will doubtlessly want to be spelled backwards, no less.
How would you know if 101 was actually spelled backward or not? How would we know if all those people like Banno who appear to be looking backward aren't really looking forward?
So there are three supposed options:
1. A ? B ? C ? ...
2. ... ? A ? B ? C ? ...
3. ... ? A ? B ? C ? ... ? A ? B ? C ? ...
In (4) you say that if (1) is true then A has no cause.
In (5) you ask "why is either (2) or (3) the case?".
Notice that these address different considerations. It is equally appropriate to ask "why is (1) the case?".
It may simply be a brute fact that there is no first cause. That explanations end somewhere isn't that causation starts somewhere.
@180 Proof referenced a "first number" as a reductio ad absurdum against the claim that there must be a first cause. I think a more appropriate consideration is a first counted number. Counting has to start somewhere, and each second of passed time is a type of counting.
If the past is infinite then the present is the end of an infinite sequence of events. An infinite sequence of events has no end. Therefore, the past is not infinite.
Although this is perhaps only true if an A series concept of time is correct (e.g. presentism or the growing block universe). If a B series concept is correct (e.g. eternalism) then the above reasoning may not hold.
This is why, in metaphysics, it is important to understand that a thing must have actually been measured in order to have a measurement. As in the examples above, the mountain is commonly assumed to have a "height" prior to being measured, and the jar full of marbles is commonly assumed to have a "quantity" prior to being counted. But both of these, the height and the quantity are actually products of the act of measurement, therefore it is incorrect to assume that they exist prior to being determined by that act which determines them. Common assumptions are produced to facilitate common mundane actions, and are therefore not necessarily consistent with good metaphysics.
The reason why it is important to understand this is that metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology, meaning that principles of epistemology are supported by principles of metaphysics. And if we do not properly account for the fact that the quantitative value assigned to the physical world is a product of the act of measurement rather than something which inheres within an independent physical reality, we lose the required principles for understanding the true nature of mistake.
It appears like we, as human beings have become so confident in our techniques of measurement, that when we correctly determine the measured value, we believe that we are correct in the sense of having determined something which inheres within the thing itself, and therefore a correct judgement could not possibly be other than the value determined. But this attitude toward the measurement practice conceals the fact that the technique which produces the correct answer, according to the rules of the system applied, may not be the best possible technique. "Correctness" is determined by properly applying the rules of the measurement system to the thing being measured. However, if the measurement system is in some way inadequate for measurement of the thing it is being applied to, the correct measurement would still be in that way, a mistaken measurement.
If we turn to the classical distinction between theory and practise, this is the difference between mistakes in practise, and mistakes in theory. Mistaken practise is relatively easy to determine, being a matter of following rules. Mistaken theory is much more difficult to determine because we must allow our minds to go beyond the rules of correctness, and find further principles to support our judgements. That's why the scientific method was developed, as a sort of direction for testing theory.
In relation to the op, the type of theory which produces an infinite regress, infinity in the act of measurement, has been demonstrated to be a defective type of theory. It is defective because it designates the independent thing which we are trying to measure as unmeasurable (the thing we are trying to count is designated as uncountable). Any theory of measurement which designates the thing which it is trying to measure as unmeasurable is a self-defeating theory, and by that principle it is a defective theory. In other words, the measurement system which produces an infinite regress in its application, is inadequate for measuring the thing which it is being applied to.
Quoting Michael
I ask the same question about 1. Why is there a finite limit to causality? The answer cannot be found by looking to something prior. So the answer is that 'It simply is.' Its the same answer in each case. Essentially the question is, "What caused existence?" And in all cases, there is no prior explanation. The first cause is, "It simply is."
As I also said in that post:
Quoting Michael
In other words, it could be that "it simply is" the case that causality is infinite.
This is very ambiguous.
There is a distance between the base of a mountain and its peak even if we never measure it. And this distance can be less than the distance between the base and peak of some other mountain even if we never measure either.
That the distance of one mountain is given the label "8,849 m" is a consequence of our measurement.
Unless you want to argue that space itself is some sort of "mental fabrication"? An idealist might agree with you. A materialist (or dualist) won't.
We are actually talking about the same thing. :) Where explanations end is the start of causation. A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence, "it simply is". That base, "X simply is" is a first cause from which other causes can happen. My point is that whether the universe has an finite or infinitely regressive causality, the reason why it is one way over the reason that it isn't another way is, "It simply is." There is no prior explanation or reason for its existence.
You misunderstand. Given one of these options:
1. A ? B ? C ? ...
2. ... ? A ? B ? C ? ...
3. ... ? A ? B ? C ? ... ? A ? B ? C ? ...
I'm suggesting that "it simply is" the case that (2) is correct or that "it simply is" the case that (3) is correct.
So, "it simply is" the case that there is no first cause.
Quoting Philosophim
The explanation might end with "there is no first cause". This explanatory end isn't itself a first cause.
"It simply is" is the first cause.
Quoting Michael
It makes no sense to say that "there is no first cause" is the first cause.
Perhaps it is not logic but the very nature of the human brain itself that requires everything it encounters to conform to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Just an extremely abstract form of anthropomorphism.
This isn't anthroprmorphism though. I'm not stating there is any consciousness or intent behind a first cause. I'm just logically pointing out that no matter the type of causality, infinite or finite, we still arrive at a point where the cause for existence taken in total has no prior explanation, or cause, for why it exists. At then end of the day, the first cause is, "It simply is."
Correct. Which is why when we reach a point in any chain of causality where there is no prior causality for its existence, 'it simply is', that we've reached the first cause from which the rest of the chain or set follows.
I'm not sure you're even reading what I'm writing.
If (post-Newtonian) spacetime describes an unbounded, finite magnitude like the surface of the Earth (or torus, Klein bottle, Möbius loop, etc) – does not have edges or end-points – then the tenses of events (i.e. inertial reference-frames) are relative and not absolute (e.g. "the past" "the present"). It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere in a beginning-less sequence just as it is to be standing somewhere on the Earth's surface. Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology (topology or cosmology) though, of course, they are possible.
Quoting Philosophim
:roll:
This would be the B series concept of time that I mentioned in my comment?
Quoting 180 Proof
I don’t think this is an apt analogy. Counting is a process, standing isn’t.
Obviously someone can simply speak a single number without having spoken any smaller number first.
I’m specifically addressing the case of saying that, as of right now, I have already counted all the negative integers in order.
Silly semantics. :roll:
I’ll be clearer then.
To stand where I am now I don’t have to have stood in every adjacent space behind me first. I am simply born at a particular place (the start) and travel from there.
This is very unlike having counted every negative integer in order, which strikes me as being nonsensical.
Let me word it another way. We don't know if the universe has infinite causality or not, that's not what I'm claiming. Lets look at it in sets.
A. The set of all causes from point A until a finite beginning.
B. The set of all causes from Point A infinitely regressive.
C. The set of all causes from Point A until it loops to Point A again.
The question is not, "Which set is correct?" The question is, "Do we find a finite limit to prior causality?"
And we do. What caused the set? Put in set A, B, C, or any other crazy idea someone comes up with. What caused that set to be instead of some other set? If we look for a prior explanation, by our sets, there is none. There is no prior reason why the universe would be finitely or infinitely regressive.
A first cause is simply defined as "That which exists without any prior causality for its existence." All sets come to this point. Meaning that all sets do not have a prior cause for their existence. Meaning they simply exist, there is no prior reason why the set is besides the fact that it is. This is ontologically necessary.
To avoid any implications you believe I'm going with this, this is all I'm claiming here. There is no requirement that anything be designed by a consciousness or with intent. I'm just noting that it is logically concluded that no matter what, the ultimate causality of the universe will always result in the answer that there is no prior explanation for its existence.
Quoting Michael
My apologies if I'm not understanding your point. What did I miss?
These are the options you gave:
a. There is always a X for every Y. (infinite prior causality).
b. The X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X (infinitely looped causality)
c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)
You then ask:
"Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence?"
I am suggesting that perhaps there is no answer. Perhaps it is simply a brute fact that there is always a X for every Y, or simply a brute fact that the X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X. This is simply where the explanation ends.
So it is simply a brute fact that there is no first cause.
That is exactly what I'm agreeing with. And if there is no prior cause for its existence, point c notes that this is the first cause. It exists without prior explanation for its being.
You're saying that if either a) or b) is true then c) is true. This makes no sense. If either a) or b) is true then c) is false.
Take the set of all regressive causality, A.
What prior existence caused A to be?
There is nothing, A is A because it exists. Thus it exists without a prior explanation for its being, and is thus a first cause.
You're saying that the set of all causes is itself a cause. This is a category error. The set itself doesn't cause anything and so isn't a cause. The term "cause" refers to the members of the set, not the set itself.
Your argument is akin to saying that the set of all integers is the first number. It makes no sense.
No, I'm saying when you examine the entire set of regressive causality and ask, "What caused everything to be infinitely regressive?" there is no prior cause. It exactly the same as taking a set of finite regressive causality and asking, "What caused everything to be finitely regressive?"
The answer is the same. There is no prior reason for its being, therefore, it just is. This is the first cause for all chains of causality.
So you're saying that there is both an infinite regress of causes and that there is a first cause. Do you not see the contradiction?
No. But maybe I'm wrong. Can you answer this question: "What caused there to be infinite regressive causality?" Remember the answer that I gave to finite causality. "It just is, there is no prior explanation for its being." Is your answer different?
It is you who is being ambiguous, with your use of "distance". If the word is meant to signify that there is a separation between the base of the mountain and the peak, that is self-evident. But if the word is meant to signify that this separation has a specific value, number of feet, meters, or whatever, without being measured, then this cannot be true. How do you think it is possible that there is a specific value attached to this separation if no one has actually done the work of assigning that value?
Quoting Michael
Obviously, "space" is a "mental fabrication". What do you think space is, something we can stick a tape measure beside and say how long it is, or that we can weigh and say how heavy it is? I am dualist, and that space is a mental fabrication is indubitable. Also, a materialist would have to say the same, because "space" could not refer to any type of material, and the materialist thinks that any thing which is not imaginary is material. So your statement makes no sense.
Quoting 180 Proof
How is this not contradictory to your mind? You say first, a beginning is necessary, it is logically necessary to begin somewhere, but then you proceed to say that beginnings are not logically necessary, they are possible. Can you explain to me what you mean, in a way which would make the apparent contradiction between 'it is logically necessary to begin somewhere', and 'beginnings are not logically necessary' disappear?
This sloppy misquotation, MU, shows why you (willfully) misunderstand my position.
Sorry, but there is no willful misunderstanding. What you said simply makes not sense.
Quoting 180 Proof
I ask you, how can you demonstrate that beginnings are not logically necessary, when you start from the premise that it is logically necessary to begin counting somewhere? Counting is an activity. If this activity requires a beginning, then by what premise do you conclude that other activities might occur without a beginning?
You have absolutely no logic which supports your stated conclusion ("Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology [topology or cosmology] though, of course, they are possible.). In fact, your premise contradicts your conclusion.
As a counterexample see my mathematical example. It has a front end but no past end.
Did you read the next part of my comment where I said "that the distance of one mountain is given the label '8,849 m' is a consequence of our measurement"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's certainly not "obvious". Space is often thought of as being mind-independent, notably by scientific realists, and I suspect also most laymen. Idealists, scientific instrumentalists, and Kantians may think differently, but such positions are not self-evident.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I should note that I use "materialism" and "physicalism" interchangeably, and that physicalism "encompasses matter, but also energy, physical laws, space, time, structure, physical processes, information, state, and forces, among other things."
The answer is the same: "it just is; there is no prior explanation for why causation is an infinite regress".
What I take issue with is your claim that this then entails that there is a first cause. That is clearly a contradiction, as it cannot be both that causation is an infinite regress and that there is a first cause.
You appear to conflate "brute fact" and "first cause". As I mentioned in my first comment, that explanations end isn't that causation starts.
This "brute" existence of an infinite regress isn't itself a cause, let alone a first cause. Again, it's like saying that the set of all integers is itself an integer.
Where?
But note that I specifically said that "an infinite sequence of events has no end". I didn't say that "an infinite series has no end".
And as I also mentioned in that previous comment, there's a difference between saying that there is no first number and saying that there is no first counted number.
The actual act of counting the integers has to start somewhere, and each second of passed time (at least assuming an A series concept of time) is an act of counting.
Yes I read that, and it is why I accused you of being ambiguous with "distance". In the first sentence you said there is a distance "even if we never measure it". In the following statement you gave the distance a number. The number you designate as the "label" of the "distance", but this is only produced as a consequence of measurement, as you agree. The ambiguity is that in the first sentence "distance" as referring to something which exists independent of measurement, refers to something extremely vague and general. In the second use, the "label" refers to a specific value, which requires measurement. The thing labeled as the "distance" is a specific value, whereas the "distance" in the first instance is a general unspecified separation. This ambiguity invites equivocation, such that one might think that "distance" is used in the same way both times, so that "distance" as the specific value which is dependent on measurement is the same as "distance" in the sense of the vague and general separation between the two things which is supposed to be independent from measurement.
Quoting Michael
I have to disagree with this. I believe the idea that "space" as independent came about from the union of space and time, in the concept of space-time. So the mind-independent substance believed in by scientific realists is not "space" per se, but "space-time".
This is an important distinction to make, because classically "space" was a static medium designated by the coordinate system employed by geometers. Since it was logically necessarily to think of space as static, to prevent the principles of geometry from changing randomly, it was known by geometers to be separate, distinct from the real world within which things are continually changing. It was an eternal ideal. So it was clear and obvious to the scientifically minded, that space was a mind-dependent ideal.
However, extending way back to ancient times there was significant difficulty in understanding the reality of motion. Ancient Greeks, I believe the atomists, demonstrated logically that unless there was some sort of empty space, "void", motion would be impossible. Every piece of matter would be contiguous with other matter and nothing could move anywhere. This produced the need to assume an independent "space". But since this "space" is independent of the mental constructs which describe the "space" that makes up the volume of an object, describing instead the space between objects, an incompatibility between the two senses of "space" was created. The "space" of an object which accounted for the static unchangingness of the object, and the "space" between an object which accounted for the activities of things.
The conclusion we can draw, is that what is referred to as "space-time", as the supposedly real and independent substance, (the concept which supports the real motion of objects), is fundamentally incompatible with our conceptions of "space", which is an ideal constructed and used in coordinate systems. This is why fundamental axioms of "space", like Euclid's parallel postulate are found to be inconsistent with the concept of "space-time", and those realists you refer to turn to non-Euclidian space. "Space-time" is what is supposed to be real, not "space".
Quoting Michael
Notice, that by including "energy" "time", "physical processes", you are no longer talking about "space". You are talking about "space-time" which is fundamentally different, and as explained above, incompatible with "space". So when you make an argument concerning "space", and you allow that "space" refers to what is known as space-time, you produce significant ambiguity, most likely resulting in an equivocal conclusion.
Yes, which is to say that the base and the peak do not occupy the same position in space. The space between them is called distance.
That there is distance between the base and the peak is measurement-independent. It's certainly not the case that the base and the peak are touching until we look at the mountain.
That this distance is described as being "8,000m" or as being "26,246.72 feet" is measurement- and language-dependent.
I'm not sure why you felt the need to explain the latter fact. I'm not sure how it's exactly relevant.
That is the entire point of the OP. As long as we agree on that, we're all good.
Quoting Michael
I'll tell you a secret. I wrote this over two years with an intended purpose: to get the atheists and theists in here to think. If I remember at the time, there were a rash of 'proof of God' posts. I found that some atheists would go in very disrespectfully and mock the theists. Then I found some atheists would go in gently and respectfully, but be mocked by some theists. The point was, people stopped thinking. This was to make a place where theists and atheists could be disarmed for a second. Instead of being concerned about proving or not proving God, I wanted them to really think about the origins of the universe for a second to see if they could come to a logical conclusion.
I use the phrase "first cause", but its just a phrase to get people into the discussion. The phrase isn't all that important honestly, its the underlying logic and lesson that I wanted you to learn. Call it whatever you want, I don't care. The phrase 'first cause' sure got some passions up though didn't it? It got clicks and people discussing. It was something I learned back on the internet to make sure my conversations didn't die without being seen.
Would I have written it the same way today? Maybe, maybe not. I can't argue with the results, and I wonder how many people would have never stepped into the conversation had I not phrased it that way.
Quoting Michael
A better word that's probably more palatable than the emotionally laden and anxiety inducing, 'first cause', is 'origin'. The origin of the universe is unexplained. It had no rules for why it should or should not have form. "It simply is". But, something to consider. If there is no prior reason for the way the universe is now, there were no rules as to what could or could have formed. You can't say there were rules, as that would mean there was some prior limitation. Which means we've proven that "something can form within nothing'.
What does this mean? Without knowing the origins of the universe, anything could have happened. I actually tried to rope in the odds of a God one time. Its possible, but pretty low. Long story short, there's no cardinality so its 1 infinity out of an infinity of infinities. Its no more likely to happen than any other crazy thing you can think of. What's fascinating to me about this is that there is no reason why 'anything could happen' could not happen again. There's a little bit of math that we might be able to show cardinality for that would demonstrate it magnitudes more likely that incredibly small and simple things would randomly appear instead of larger and more complex things. But I believe that we can logically embrace a cosmology where things can be without a prior reason for their existence, and start thinking about the consequences of this. Its not even simply a possibility, its a logical necessity.
I had assumed that this was what it was. Of course, it's a non sequitur to go from "there is a first cause" to "this first cause is an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, intelligent designer who gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life". But as you didn't make the claim I didn't bring it up. If you want to make this claim now then, well, it's a non sequitur.
Any supposed "first cause" might simply be an initial singularity of infinite temperature and density that then expanded.
Absolutely. Not that its not possible, but the chance would be so low that its statistically insignificant. Also, its just as equally statistically insignificant that an 'All-bad, dumb designer who snatched his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should perish, and have eternal death." formed instead. The reality is that we cannot look to the idea that everything is possible and say that any one thing, "Must have formed". The only way to tell what must have formed is to look at the results. Evidence is the only thing that can tell us how the universe formed.
Quoting Michael
It very well could be! The idea that I'm putting forward should never stop us from exploring the universe's origins, even if there may come a time when there really is nothing prior.
Is this a correct paraphrase of your response to Philosophim’s thesis: spacetime, an unbounded, finite, beginning-less phenomenon, requires an arbitrary starting point re: sequential processes. It can be considered a “working” starting point, but there’s no logical necessity guiding the choice of a particular starting point.
Okay, more or less. Dynamic models "require" initial conditions but what they model (e.g. the univerde) does not. In other words, wouldn't you agree we ought not mistake the maps we make for the territory itself?
You’re citing the sign/referent relationship?
Why do you line out “an arbitrary starting point for a sequential process”?
A starting point not logically necessary = a starting point arbitrary. Agree or disagree?
Logic is rooted in sequentiality, thus arbitrary starting points, such as the axioms of the scientific method, being pre-sequential, are also pre-logical. Agree or disagree?
Axioms have no logical support. Agree or disagree?
Referents without beginnings have models without beginnings. This is a simplification of saying: Referents without beginnings have models no less arbitrary than themselves. Agree or disagree?
Suppose the Riemann hypothesis finds its solution in pure math. There it’s established all primes calculable by the zeta function locate themselves on the critical line of the complex number plane.
Now let’s blink out the natural world of physics. Pure math has no physical referents, no matter how far down the line you evaluate. What do we have? We have a system of signs denoting numerical relationships resting upon only the conventions of the signs themselves. The precedent for these conventions is, again, the signs themselves. This is a closed loop of circular reasoning grounded in nothing but its own circularity. This is why I say number is a physically real property of the natural world. Only there does math possess existentiality, meaning and usefulness.
————————————————————————————————————————-
As I read your lineout, I feel need to defend starting point of analysis as arbitrary because axioms, the necessary starting point of the scientific method, are pre-analytic, and thus arbitrary. Your no-beginning postulate necessitates arbitrary points of departure within its domain.
You seem to be backing up your line out with the claim maps, unlike their referents, have logical antecedents that constrain the methodology of their construction and thus the scope of their content. This ranges out ultimately to your separation of signs from their referents. I’m opposing this because my physicalist argument thoroughly entangles sign with referent so that maps do forever approach their referent terrain. There is no merger however.
The physicality of words and numbers makes them approach being bi-conditional with their physical referents.
All of this is to say, within a realm unbounded, finite and without beginning, everything is a map to another thing.
Your bifurcation of sign/referent is harder than mine.
This is a very misleading statement. To say there is distance between two objects is completely different from saying that there is space between two objects, yet you imply that the two are the same with "the space between them is called distance". What is between two objects, as the medium, could be air, water, or in the case of the example, the mountain; the mountain itself is between the base and the peak. Your use of "space" here is vulgar and improper for a philosophical discussion. Unless one is thinking of two objects separated by void, which is not the case in the mountain example, we would not consider that the distance between two objects consists of space. And what else could you mean with "The space between them is called distance"? Clearly what is between the base and the peak is the mountain itself, and not "space".
Quoting Michael
Do you see that "distance" in the first statement has a distinctly different meaning from "distance" in the second statement, so that when you say "this distance" in the second statement, suggesting that it is the same "distance" as the first statement, you equivocate? Of course "distance" must have two distinct meanings because the unmeasured "distance" is measurement-independent yet the measured "distance" is measurement-dependent.
The first use of "distance" is to signify that there is separation, remoteness between the two named things. They are not contiguous. The second use of "distance" indicates the measured length of this separation. Will you agree that "distance" refers to two distinct things, 1) the separation, and 2) the measured length of the separation. You've already stated that one is measurement- independent, and the other is measurement-dependent. So surely you will see that it is impossible that "distance" refers to the same thing in each case. Will you also recognize that if you say that "this distance" has a specific measured value of 8000m, you would equivocate? Therefore when you say "this distance is described as being '8,000m'" you equivocate. It is the measurement-dependent sense of "distance" which is said to be 8,000m, not the measurement-independent sense of "distance" which cannot be described as having a specific value.
"Distance" as a specific measured value (as in "the distance" or "a distance" for example), has not the same meaning as "distance" in the case of a general separation. So when you say "this distance is..." you equivocate because you give a specific measured value to the general use of "there is difference...".
To avoid the equivocation, I suggest we alter the first statement to read "there is a distance between the base and the peak". This would signify a specific measured value. However, we could not say then, that this distance is mind-independent. To refer to what is between the base and the peak we would have to use other terminology.
Allow n to increase without bound (go to infinity) in the infinite composition (regression) [math]{{F}_{n}}(z)={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(z)[/math], which is an analogue of a cause/effect sequence. As n increases the value of this expression (the left hand end if you like) approaches a specific complex number.
There are "things" which do not have a specific prior cause for their existence. When an atom decays radioactively from one element to another there is no prior event or cause for this to happen - it is completely random.
But maybe I'm misunderstanding you.
No, it is random by statistics. It is not actually violating the laws of physics. :) To have something without a prior explanation means there were no rules forbidding or necessitating its creation. Something without prior cause exists, simply because it does. There is no prior reason.
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
I'm clearly missing something. The conclusion that I get from reading these two statements is that there exists in the physical universe multiple "first causes". I.e., all those atoms that come into existence via radioactive decay have no prior cause for their creation, therefore they are all "first causes"?
Quoting Philosophim
I don't know if this has been said because I am lazy and have not read comments, but..
I think a 4th option would be that you follow the chain of causation as far back as you can and then find out that the next causation source exists in a universe a layer above ours. Such a universe would not necessarily follow our laws of causation and could be rather unknowable.
Pardon me for my audacious assumption. For clarity, I replaced your second "only" with "logical". Although the assertion would work as written, with "only-only" as an emphatic way of saying "no alternatives".
I doubt that can refute your reasoning, so he merely denies your conclusion. First Cause arguments open the door to inferences of Creator Gods, that 180's belief system explicitly excludes. Therefore, Atheistic worldviews must assume, as an implicit axiom, that the universe itself is eternal, without beginning or end. In which case, there is no need for a First Cause. As a hypothetical worldview, Einstein's Block Time Eternalism is static & acausal, and bears little resemblance to our incrementally-evolving ever-changing space-time reality, with something new every day. In which case our common sense notion of Time is a "persistent" illusion.
But if our increment of eternity is causal & sequential, 180's non-starter world must then be acausal & discontinuous. If so, his logic is circular, while yours is linear & reasonable : it begins with an either/or premise, and reaches an irrefutable logical conclusion. Unless, of course our world is a Block-time Universe, or one big random series of accidents : no logic, no reason, no direction, just "it is what it is". Atheistic scientists & philosophers are not embarrassed to fill the Causal Gap before the Big Bang with a tower of turtles Multiverse : causes stacked on top of each other, rather than sequential. :smile:
PS___"First Cause" arguments are literally & deliberately agnostic about the gap-filler.
A Causal Theory of Knowing :
A causal chain is described as a sequence of events for which one event in a chain causes the next. According to Goldman, these chains can only exist with the presence of an accepted fact, a belief in the fact, and a cause for the subject to believe the fact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Causal_Theory_of_Knowing
Note --- Since Plato, the First Cause argument has been an accepted premise for reasoning about causation. Of course, like a pool-shooter, the initial impetus (causal power) may not itself be a link in the space-time chain of bouncing balls.
IT'S TURTLES ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE ETERNAL TURTLE
WHERE'S THE FIRST CAUSE?
Don't get me started . . . . . . . . . . . . :joke:
Metaphysical necessity :
In philosophy, metaphysical necessity, sometimes called broad logical necessity, is one of many different kinds of necessity, which sits between logical necessity and nomological (or physical) necessity, in the sense that logical necessity entails metaphysical necessity, but not vice versa, and metaphysical necessity entails physical necessity, but not vice versa. A proposition is said to be necessary if it could not have failed to be the case. Nomological necessity is necessity according to the laws of physics and logical necessity is necessity according to the laws of logic, while metaphysical necessities are necessary in the sense that the world could not possibly have been otherwise. What facts are metaphysically necessary, and on what basis we might view certain facts as metaphysically but not logically necessary are subjects of substantial discussion in contemporary philosophy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_necessity
Note that this looks at causal expansions starting at an original cause and moving forward through time.
If math is not your ticket, ignore the above. :cool:
Not if one is considering the total universe at points of time. Where U[sub]i[/sub] is the universe at time i, it is true that U[sub]i[/sub] causes U[sub]i+1[/sub]
Error creeps in when we examine subsets of the universe, because everything in the universe is causally connected.
A little beyond my pay grade, but thanks. :smile:
Quoting EricH
If there truly was no prior cause, then yes. I'm fairly certain that radioactive decay has pretty clear causes though.
Quoting mentos987
That's part of the set of causation. Once we introduce a fourth universe, there's still the question of, "What caused that fourth universe?"
Look at it this way.
A = a finite set of causality. We go down a chain of causality until there's nothing prior.
B = a set of infinite regressive causality. It never ends.
What caused A? It just is, there's no prior explanation for it.
What caused B? It just is, there's no prior explanation for it.
Quoting Gnomon
Yes, I've seen this many times. Its incredibly limiting to thought as well. What atheists can realize is that an acausal universe may open God as one of infinite possibilities, but not a necessity. As such they're neglecting acausal possibilities that don't involve a God. Great post Gnomon!
Quoting jgill
100% agree, and this does not violate that conclusion. In the case of infinite causality, there's still the question of, "What caused an infinite set of causality to be?" There's nothing prior to it, it simply is.
Causation need not be a rule for the universe that is on a layer on top of ours. Time, gravity, individuals, energy and causation could all be concepts exclusive to our universe.
If nothing caused it, then it would be a first cause. A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence, it simply is. So you see, these suppositions don't change anything.
Seems I misunderstood your "Alpha" alternative. I agree with it. Within our universe, there must be a "first".
However, causality need not cover the entirety of existence. I'd argue that it probably does not.
Over time radioactive decay behaves in a statistically predictable manner, but each event is completely random and uncaused. Going back to your OP, if Y is the decay of an atom at a particular point in time, then there is no specific X that caused Y.
Perhaps you are using a different definition of causality - but you need to clarify/explain your reasoning.
It behaves randomly in relation to us* Same with a coin toss or a dice roll.
If we know enough about the coin/die and all the surrounding, then we can calculate the outcome, the reason we can't do the same with decay is likely that we lack the data/knowledge to do so.
True randomness is not proven to exist. It is not proven one way or the other. The more we learn, the less random the universe appears.
“God does not play dice with the universe” --Albert Einstein
are comments related to instantaneous motion in causation chains.
If math is not your thing don't bother.
Einstein got it wrong. EPR supposedly showed flaws in quantum mechanics. But . . .
Quoting mentos987
It's the opposite. Bell's theorem showed that there are no hidden local variables.
Quoting mentos987
The lack of data/knowledge is a key feature of quantum mechanics. That's how the universe works.
Per the OP there needs to be a specific X that "causes" Y. But perhaps the OP is using a different definition of causality.
I would add that radioactive decay is only one of many phenomena at the quantum level that are random. Double slit experiment, etc, etc
Bell's theorem assumes that free will already exist, it used that to prove that true randomness exist. I'm with Einstein on this one.
Lack of free will would be depressing so we choose to have faith that it exist.
I have no proof either way, it is all speculations.
You may be right that OPs version of causality requires determinism.
We cannot logically rule out superdeterminism but as a fact based person I go with the evidence. And as it says in the WIkipedia article, 'any hypothetical superdeterministic theory "would be about as plausible, and appealing, as belief in ubiquitous alien mind-control"'.
Quoting mentos987
Agree.
This is a misunderstanding of statistics. It is not truly random and uncaused. We know the causes of radioactive decay. The use of statistics and chance is to give us an approximation of general decay over time when we cannot measure each nucleus individually. Just like a dice roll is not truly random. Its the combination of many forces we do not have the capability to calculate. But we do know it can only be 1 of six outcomes, and that the variation of even one of these forces can result in a different outcome.
True randomness would be me rolling some dice and them turning into Santa Clause. True randomness has absolutely no limitation or law that states, "This must be or is more inclined to happen".
Quoting EricH
No, it does not. When something is a first cause, it is an uncaused thing which then enters into causality. There is no limitation as to what a first cause could be, as it has no prior explanation for its being. It is unlinked from determinism as to why it exists. However, once it exists, its interactions with other existences then involve causality, or determinism. Determinism is 100% the result of anything which has laws or limitations. Determinism does not exist to cause a first cause to be.
I think this is the real reason. We want there to be free will. Any other notion is very unappealing, so we resist.
A similar problem that a Christian faces when considering being an atheist: I want there to be a heaven.
This was random enough to make me smile.
If true randomness exist and we are subjected to it constantly, would there not be new "first causes" being created all the time?
If we can trace back different happenings back to a true randomness, and there are an infinite amount of true randomness. Would that not mean that there is an infinite amount of "first causes"?
Ha ha! I'm glad. Philosophy should be fun too. :)
Quoting mentos987
There could be, absolutely. There is nothing that indicates that it would suddenly end. One such randomness is that some or many first causes happen, then nothing happens for centuries. Or it could be that there are first causes happening here and all over the universe, but they're so small, short lived, ineffectual, or so outside of our location that we don't notice them.
Quoting mentos987
Its one of an infinite possibilities. Assuming that a first cause has no reason for its being, we can assume that anything could happen. We can also conclude that no one thing has a greater chance of happening than another, because that would imply some rule or limitation. Meaning all things could happen, and all would have an equal chance of being.
So we could have a universe in which infinite first causes happen over infinite time. Or a universe where there's no first causes for centuries, then one thing explodes into existence. Or...add your imagination. All have an equal chance of happening, so there's no certainty that any one would necessarily happen. All we can do is look at our universe as it is today to see what happened, and keep an eye out for events that are unexplained as its definitely plausible that first causes can still happen today.
Fair, but the whole concept would be less messy if you also assumed determinism.
If you add enough randomness, the causes will get blurry.
I've always required examples to flesh out philosophical or mathematical ideas, so I will return to the causal chain [math]{{F}_{n}}(z)={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(z)[/math] which is defined in a region of the complex plane. My colleague at Trondheim proved the theorem I have mentioned, but later I proved a much simpler version,changing the hypotheses slightly.
Think of a large disc in the plane, full of points,z, and each individual function in the chain taking any such point and producing another point in that disc. Assume that each of these functions draw any two points in the disc slightly closer to one another. Then, when you start the chain you can use any point in the disc as a "first cause". The chain will converge to a single value of z within the disc, but the degree of accuracy of that limit will vary depending upon original choice. That is to say some values of z as first cause will take longer to get close to the ultimate limit. Bigger values of n.
(In fact, in a paper of mine in the Proceedings of the AMS many years ago I showed that if the individual functions approach a specific function, f(z), one may be able to choose a "first cause" that will get the ultimate result the fastest.)
If I understand you correctly, you're just talking about a mathematical origin. That's not the same as a first cause as defined in the OP. Lets envision an a thought experiment of an actual chain as a visual.
First, lets stretch a chain from left to right, each link is a prior cause to the next link. The first link in the left is the first cause. It has no prior link of causation.
Now lets take a chain that's looped together to represent infinite causation. What caused there to be a looped chain? There is no prior outside link that formed that chain.
In each case, the reason why there is a finite chain is that there simply is. The reason there is an infinite chain is that there simply is. There is no prior reason why there should be a finite regression of causality, or an infinite regression of causality. Does your formula apply to this? Currently I'm not seeing it.
In my example the first cause is on the other end of the chain, the nth function. As one lets n go to infinity, at each step back any z within that disc is an nth cause, I suppose. Infinite means going back in time with no end, for each n computing the accumulated value at the left end of the chain. The further back in time, the more accurate the value at the left end.
Quoting Philosophim
The correlation between a bank account and the interest it accrues is a simple real world looped chain. A looped chain need not go around like a circle, it is more likely to look like this:
[math]{{C}_{m}}(z)=\left( {{g}_{n}}\circ \cdots \circ {{g}_{1}} \right)\circ \left( {{g}_{n}}\circ \cdots \circ {{g}_{1}} \right)\circ \cdots \circ \left( {{g}_{n}}\circ \cdots \circ {{g}_{1}}(z) \right)[/math]
This time going from right to left. m goes to infinity, as could n. We are still beginning with a "first cause".
Quoting Philosophim
How about, Originate with an alpha?
Actually, should be "better than that", since he has a deep understanding of post-enlightenment philosophy. But he seems to dismiss any philosophy before the 17th century as religious (woo-woo) metaphysics. His self-professed worldview is Physicalism/Immanentism*1 {he'll correct me, if I'm wrong}. Which means that the notion of a First Cause, prior to the Big Bang scenario, is literally non-sense . . . from his truncated perspective.
Consequently, his self-assigned role on this forum is the resident nay-sayer to any supernatural notions. He seldom contributes anything positive to the conversation. Apparently, he views himself as a Socratic gad-fly*2. Ironically. Socrates' disciple, Plato, is the one most often identified with the philosophical concept of a necessary First Cause*3*4. So, more-inclusive philosophers on this forum will be more-open to your exoteric/elliptical . . . . arguments. :smile:
*1.Immanentism :
(?im?n?n?t?z?m) noun. the belief that the Deity indwells and operates directly within the universe or nature.
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/immanentism
Note --- I don't know if 180 is a Deist. But I can provisionally agree with this concept. However, a temporary universe, like ours seems to be, must have a beginning and an Eternal Cause.
*2. Gadfly :
A gadfly is a person who interferes with the status quo of a society or community by posing novel, potentially upsetting questions, usually directed at authorities.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gadfly_(philosophy_and_social_science)
Note --- Synonym : nuisance. annoyer. pest.
*3. First Cause :
Plato (c. 427–347 BC) and Aristotle (c. 384–322 BC) both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats.[7] In The Laws (Book X), Plato posited that all movement in the world and the Cosmos was "imparted motion". This required a "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain it. In Timaeus, Plato posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos. . . . . In what he called "first philosophy" or metaphysics, Aristotle did intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and a deity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_argument
*4. Necessary First Cause for a space-time universe :
For Aristotle, the existence of the universe needs an explanation, as it could not have come from nothing. . . . . Aristotle rules out an infinite progression of causes, so that led to the conclusion that there must be a First Cause.
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%203%20Religion/Cosmological.htm
Cosmological Argument : This is an argument or proof that is based on Reason. It is an a posteriori argument and by that is meant that it proceeds after considering the existence of the physical universe.
I appreciate the defense, but he posted that years ago. Its the only time I've ever had an issue with him and its long forgiven. 180 Proof and I are A-ok now. :)
Saint Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between per accidens and per se series; the distinction may be relevant to this discussion.
In superdeterminism even your thinking is predetermined. Every last thought, emotion, sensation you have is predetermined. Your back itches? Predetermined. You replied to this post? Predetermined. You think I'm right (or wrong)? Predetermined.
Since you have no control over your thoughts there is no way to tell if anything is real. You could be a brain in a jar, you could be a robot, you could be a subject in an experiment run by aliens from another galaxy, or perhaps a supernatural being who controls everything in the physical universe could be controlling your thoughts, etc
So if nothing is real maybe you should be a nihilist? But even that very thought was predetermined.
But given that everything we currently know shows that the universe is random (at least at the quantum level)? I go with the evidence.
What I have produced in mathematical terms is an actual chain - I can make it more specific with definitions of functions, etc. if you desire. Your actual chain is a complete abstraction.
What I have shown is that first cause is more complicated than what the ancients understood. In my example, n going to infinity, using the same z at each value of n produces an infinite causal chain having that z as a sort of ultimate first cause. I would think this example would stir original philosophical thought rather than a regurgitation of traditional ideas. :chin:
Another causal chain question: Do infinite chains ever end? Can infinite chains have specific values? Think going the other direction, into the future.
Determinism is the idea that everything was completely set by rules from the beginning. Tempral causality simply means that a prior event is the reason why a current event is happening. First causes are not determined because there is no reason for their being besides the fact they exist. This means there is no prior law that necessitated their existence.
Quoting jgill
They are both abstractions. While the math proof is nice, I'm still failing to see how it address the point. I still don't see anything in this other than talking about origins. For example, I could start my origin at 0, or start it at one when counting. But an origin is no the same as a full chain of causality that does not require an observer.
The question is really about what caused the set of causality to be. If the universe has a finite chain of causality, what caused that to be? If the universe has an infinitely regressive chain of causality, what caused that to be? There is no prior cause in either case. It would be that set without prior explanation; it simply would be.
Quoting jgill
I'm not sure I see that. Could you clarify more? How is this any different from creating an origin in math? I appreciate the contribution, it just seems I'm not getting how it applies yet.
Well, this is certainly a deep issue. Good luck. Nice chatting with you. :smile:
One might better understand what is being said if it is understood in terms of dependence rather than causation. The topic remains an opposition between infinitism and foundationalism, with Philosophim taking a foundationalist position. The alternative is an acceptance of infinite complexity, something that mathematicians may be more comfortable with than physicist. :wink:
You as well jgill! I greatly enjoyed your contributions to the thread.
Quoting Banno
Fantastic link Banno, I was not aware this was a study of philosophy. After reading it, yes, this is basically what I'm doing.
OK. So let the current event be the radioactive decay of an atom at time T. What is the specific prior event that caused the decay of that atom at that time?
That's a problem with virtually all causality chains. There may not be just one cause at each step, there may be many, and so chains interact with one another. The complications are staggering, as your example implies. To all extents and purposes it appears random.
I challenge the idea that whatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.
To begin, the claim that everything that comes into existence has a cause is equivalent to the claim that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause. If the second of these claims cannot be sustained, the former cannot either.
The key point is this: we can conceive of an object being non-existent at one moment and existent the next – we do not need to even introduce the notion of “cause” into this thought experiment. I can imagine the absence of an apple on the table at one instant and its presence on the table at the following instant. What underlies this intuition? It is the fact that there is nothing contradictory or absurd about the idea of an apple popping into existence without cause. Sure, our empirical sense tugs at us to insert a cause since most “comings into existence” have clear causes. However, it seems to me that this temptation can be resisted – an apple not existing at t1 and then existing at t2 is a conceivable possibility.
Since we cannot refute this possibility on the basis of the nature of the concepts of existence and cause (as distinguished from the empirical fact that these things always seem to go together), we therefore cannot make the case that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause – after all, anything is possible unless it is logically impossible. And coming into existence without cause appears to be logically possible given the appeal of the thought experiment. It is then simple (see 2nd para) to conclude the hypotheses: that it is not the case that whatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.
Objection 1:an object that comes into existence must have a cause since, if there were no cause, the object must have “caused itself”. That, in turn, implies that the object would have to exist before it came into existence, which is impossible. Therefore, everything comes into existence must have a cause. The problem with this objection is that it entails assuming that some cause is necessary (and, in this case, that the cause is the object itself). But the claim is that no cause is needed.
Objection 2: Whatever comes into existence without a cause must be caused by nothing. The problem with this objection is the same as with objection 1 - it also entails assuming that some cause is necessary.
And that's all it is, a mental feat, like flapping my wings and soaring to the moon. We are blessed with the ability to be creative, and much of which we imagine can be brought forth in the real world through our efforts. But not the miracle apple.
I must, however, admit that my examples of causal chains with/without first causes is nothing more than a mathematical illusion, like your apple. :cool:
Does Superdeterminism save Quantum Mechanics? Or does it kill free will and destroy science?
I do not know if this is true or not but it is relevant to what we discussed. Superdeterminism and free will.
Then you agree with the OP. A first cause is an 'uncaused cause'. Or something unexplained that is justified by its own existence, that then can enter into causality chains with others.
Not sure I follow. In the material you quoted, all I am doing is claiming that 2 different statements, each of which I believe is well-formed and meaningful. are equivalent (different ways of expressing the same thing), nothing more.
I was not aware of the philosophical notion of Fundamentality*1. But that is exactly what my un-orthodox personal worldview is based on. For philosophical, not scientific, purposes, I view Generic Information*2 as the fundamental essence of Reality. As Wheeler implied, the causal power to enform (Aristotelian Potential) is the logical precursor of actual Energy, Matter, and Mind.
I try to avoid "infinite complexity" by postulating a logically necessary First Cause (Zero) to get the cosmic ball rolling (Big Bang . . . .), but make no conjectures into unknowable Infinity. Just as Zero (Potential for all numbers) must precede One in a continuum, the First Cause is "ontologically independent and ungrounded". Just as Zero is immaterial, the hypothetical Cosmic Cause is more like the ethereal potential we commonly call "Energy". All origin theories (Big Bang ; Multiverse : Inflation) take Energy & Laws for granted, as fundamental necessities.
Like Physicalism, my thesis is a metaphysical posit, not a physical fact. It goes one step beyond the matter/energy elements of Physicalism to the predecessor or progenitor of those "its". Other than its logical necessity, we know nothing of the First Cause, but we can understand that everything real is dependent upon actualized Possibility (zero). :smile:
*1. Fundamentality :
The notion of fundamentality, as it is used in metaphysics, aims to capture the idea that there is something basic or primitive in the world. This metaphysical notion is related to the vernacular use of “fundamental”, but philosophers have also put forward various technical definitions of the notion. Among the most influential of these is the definition of absolute fundamentality in terms of ontological independence or ungroundedness.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fundamentality/
*2. Matter from Information :
Physicist John A. Wheeler's philosophical conjecture that information, not matter is fundamental.
"It from Bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — at a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that what we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses" ___JAW
https://www.themarginalian.org/2016/09/02/it-from-bit-wheeler/
ALL NUMBERS ARE DEPENDENT UPON ZERO
An infinite chain of reasons or causation chain may be finite in the sense that as one moves further and further back in time the passage or rate at which time moves (I know, sloppy) possibly changes all the way down to zero.
Infinite complexity to me means all the transfinite stuff that set theory produces. It may never arise in the physical world.
It is limited to things uncaused, surely.
Do multiple causation chains spring into being with first causes or first cause?
Interestingly, your many mathematical expressions contain only a finite number of elements, yet set out infinite sequences. A simple expression such as [math] 0.\dot 9 = 1[/math] includes infinity - the dot says we "carry on in the same fashion", writing more 9's...
We don't expect to be able to write all the 9's down. But we do, in a finite time, understand what is going on, and can follow subsequent arguments and discussions without getting trapped in our inability to actually write an infinite number of 9's...
Well, some of us can.
As you noted, 's numerical chain is an abstract concept, not a perceptible "actual" thing. But he also doesn't seem to realize that the "First Cause" of his mathematical chain of abstractions was not "1" or "0" but his own imaginative mind. His chain would not exist in any sense, if he had not mentally pictured it in the first place.
It's easy to see that the First Cause of an abstract concept is an intentional Mind, but not so easy to accept that the First Cause of an actual physical evolutionary chain of creative events could originate in a creative Mind of some kind. In that sense, the Big Bang could be called a Conception, both literally (impregnation) and figuratively (creative idea). But the causal origin of that fetal conceptus had to exist, as a Potential, prior to the prime causal event (e.g. big bang). And its causal power had to be infinitely greater that that of any human intention.
Plato's First Cause was imagined as an abstract symbol of Causation, not a thing or being. His Logos was also an imaginary abstraction to represent the idea of a rational Principle responsible for the unique human ability to think logically, and to know that they are reasoning in accordance with the rules of Nature. So the First Cause/Logos was not a Real Thing --- because Reality had not yet been invented --- but merely the Potential to create real & thinking things.
"First" is a countable position in a sequence. But First Cause is the Origin or Genesis of the series from nothing : typically zero or infinity. Creative Causation is an immeasurable abstract idea, which implies an a priori Impetus or Force. And, an unreal non-physical Potential Origin of any physical series is a logical necessity to explain the emergence & existence of the Actual chain, from Potential no-chain. But, since we have no physical evidence of what existed prior to step "1", we can just call it "zero" or "infinity", or "god" --- all abstract concepts, with no instance in reality. :smile:
Intention : purpose ; to imagine a future state
Potential : capable of becoming real : possible.
Priority : the state or quality of being earlier in time or occurrence.
Generic : the cause of a whole genus (system of things & events)
Genesis : the origin or mode of formation of a thing or system.
Note --- My own Original Cause, of the chain of evolution, is what I call EnFormAction : the act of forming (manifesting) novelty. It's postulated as the precursor of Energy, Mind, and Matter. The origin of my own concept of generic causation was physicist John A. Wheeler's "it from bit" motif : a hypothetical conceit combining Quantum & Information theories into the kernel of a Theory of Everything.
:"Some of us" get lost in self-deception. The question is which are the ones who are lost. The two expressions, the 1 and the 0.9? are said to be equal. And as you say, we can readily understand what's going on without getting trapped. The two do not actually have the same meaning, it's a form of "rounding off", with the convention allowing the use of "equal". When rounding off we assign a different meaning, which better serves the purpose, and we allow that the rounded is equal to the pre-rounded.
I would assume that those who do not understand that this is a form of rounding off, and claim that the two expressions are actually the same, despite the glaring difference in meaning between them, are lost in self-deception. They have fallen into the trap of saying that two different things are the same, just because the convention allows us to say that they are equal. It seems common at TPF for mathematicians to fall into the trap of saying that "equal" means "the same as".
Possibly. Once something begins, it immediately has relations with anything around it. Something small or large could appear and its gravity would suddenly now be an influence on other things, as well as itself may be influenced by other things. It could be as simple as an uncaused helium atom entering the world and then existing within it. Once an uncaused thing is within the rest of the interplay of existence, it is no more special than anything else.
Quoting AmadeusD
Ha ha! Of course. :)
@Gnomon Well said.
Unless a clear, non-debatable physical example arises the things uncaused may be the empty set.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Thank you for illuminating this issue for the fifth graders on the forum.
A resource-conscious set-theory that only expresses transformations between existent sets, could in principle be developed by introducing "negative" sets, such that the empty set denotes the union of equal sets of opposite polarity, whereby the resulting set-theory operates in an analogous fashion to the string-diagrams of particle physics in which energy is purely transformative without being created or destroyed.
But for some reason the traditions of logic and set theory have remained entrenched in structures such as toposes that forbid an initial object from having incoming arrows from other objects, i.e. their initial objects are strictly initial, which to a layman leads to the unnecessary impression of logical origination.
That's what I do, take everything to the most base level, and lay it out plain and simple. But the simple confuses many because at the most simple level things are complex.
Your referenced page makes the exact mistake I explained above. This mistake is to assume that things which are equal are exactly the same. The fact that someone else makes the same mistake as you does not correct your mistake.
[quote=Wikipedia] This number is equal to 1. In other words, "0.999..." is not "almost exactly" or "very, very nearly but not quite" 1? – ?rather, "0.999..." and "1" represent exactly the same number.
There are many ways of showing this equality...[/quote]
It appears Wiki could use some editing. Notice toward the bottom of the referenced page, the mention of "hyperreal numbers." That might help you to understand that valuing .999... as equal to 1 is just a matter of convention.
[quote=Wikipedia] All such interpretations of "0.999..." are infinitely close to 1. Ian Stewart characterizes this interpretation as an "entirely reasonable" way to rigorously justify the intuition that "there's a little bit missing" from 1 in 0.999....[55] Along with Katz & Katz, Robert Ely also questions the assumption that students' ideas about 0.999... < 1 are erroneous intuitions about the real numbers, interpreting them rather as nonstandard intuitions that could be valuable in the learning of calculus.[/quote]
Here, check the following, like the guy says, even his "early-school math teachers knew that fact":
https://medium.com/@kenahlstrom/proof-that-99999-is-not-equal-to-1-5672e7dd58ce
This seems to be the principal issue of this thread, the difference between a limit imposed by convention, and the reality of the thing which the limit is imposed on. According to the axioms of the mathematics, the difference appears to be infinitely small, therefore insignificant. But since the limit may be applied arbitrarily, in practise, the difference may actually be very significant. This means that because the difference is there, and very real, the practise of using calculus must adhere to very rigourous rules of application, to make sure that the chosen limit adequately matches what is real, to ensure that the difference does not become significant. Rules for applying calculus vary according to the field, or discipline of study.
TLDR: Even though the equality holds under the standard construction of the real numbers, it could be denied under other constructs.
Perhaps we ought to say that the Real numbers cannot be interpreted as directly referring to Cauchy sequences, unlike in the case of the Hyperreals, on pain of the Cauchy sequence interpretation being in conflict with the Archemedian property of the reals that it's axiomatization imposes by fiat, but which the Hyperreals sacrifices for the sake of an illusion of creating "more" numbers.
Also, lets be wary of non-constructive interpretations of Hyperreals, for otherwise one ends up having infinitesimals by fiat that do not denote anything tangible. If we stick to constructive principles, then contrary to popular belief there cannot be more hyperreals than natural numbers, let alone of real numbers, meaning that hyperreals are just reorderings of the naturals , but whose operations aren't necessarily recursive.
None of this shit is "tangible". "Infinite" is not tangible. That's the issue, because it's not tangible, mathematicians are free to create all sorts of axioms which do not relate to anything physical. But when the mathematics gets applied there is a very real issue of the intangible aspects of reality. And if the axioms which deal with the intangible in mathematics do not properly represent the real intangible, the product is "the unintelligible".
This is what happens when we approach the issue of "the first cause". The calculus turns the first cause into a limit on tangible causation, rather than treating the first cause as an actual cause. But if there is an actual intangible first cause then the mathematical representation renders that first cause as unintelligible, being outside the limit of causation, according to the conventions for applying the mathematics.
To be clearer, I meant that an infinitesimal is "tangible" if it can be finitely described as a total computable function,which implies that the tangeable infinitesimals correspond to an undecidable countable subset of the natural numbers.
But note that by definition, an infinitesimal only has to satisfy the condition that whenever it is multiplied by a number of arbitrary large size, the product is always less than some finite constant. This condition can be satisfied purely by mapping the natural numbers onto a data-structure other than a line. So there exists semantics for infinitesimals (and their reciprocals) that does not imply the existence of infinite time, space or information (which is the unfortunate result of misinterpreting such numbers as literally denoting limitless extensions)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Similarly, the information implied by a limit is relative to one's method of counting. E.g if we define a number n to be greater than every natural number (which we have the right to do), then infinite extension isn't implied if we choose to start counting within a finite distance from n.
He claims it problematic that '"equal" means "the same as"'.
So unfortunately for him, neither your article nor 's patient explanation can be part of a remediation.
His otherwise innocent confusion is most troublesome for someone with pretensions to doing metaphysics, showing itself in many of his excursions into the area. He has for example variously also asserted that there is no such thing as instantaneous velocity, that by the law of identity all properties of a particular individual are essential properties, and on occasion confused the "is" of identity with the "is" of existential quantification. These are not just passing problems, but have occurred over a period of years, indeed, decades.
Meta has long been a regular here, and sometimes posts interesting challenges, but in the main his ...eccentricity... has led me to mostly ignore his posts. Sometimes there is nothing to be said.
Excellent posts. Very thought-provoking. :up:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
:cool:
These are avenues of thought that lie close to First Causes. However, my mathematical approach provides tangible examples that can be picked apart. Otherwise the discussion devolves quickly into "Yes, they exist" and "No, they don't" - virtually theological banter.
And don't forget the other end of causal chains - do they terminate in the future, or peter out into nothingness. And by what mechanisms do they interact? At least these are not simply beliefs.
But, good thread, everyone. :smile:
Parallel to your argument that the elliptical*1 infinite series .99999. . . . is not equal to 1.0 (but only approximates), the philosophical First Cause is erroneously assumed by some to be necessarily limited to the Set of Real Things. But, if that cause is infinite, it transcends physical causation in the real world. Hence, it can only be approximated with metaphors.
Perhaps, instead, the First Cause "exists" only in the "empty set" mentioned by Banno. From that perspective, Infinity & Zero and the Cause of Reality are members of the Nada Set. In that sense, the Null Set does not contain any Actual or Real values, but only Potential, or Imaginary or Ideal values.
Resistance to seeing the First Cause that way may be due to its implication of Kant's Transcendental Idealism*2, which seems to be something like a heaven for spirit beings. Such concepts are obviously outside the Set of Physics, but are logically included in the philosophical or mathematical Set of All Sets. :smile:
*1. Ellipsis : the omission from speech or writing of a word or words that are superfluous or able to be understood from contextual clues.
*2. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism :
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that space and time are merely formal features of how we perceive objects, not things in themselves that exist independently of us, or properties or relations among them. Objects in space and time are said to be “appearances”, and he argues that we know nothing of substance about the things in themselves of which they are appearances. Kant calls this doctrine (or set of doctrines) “transcendental idealism”, and ever since the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Kant’s readers have wondered, and debated, what exactly transcendental idealism is, and have developed quite different interpretations.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/
Note --- Transcendental "existence" has no mundane instances. But the human mind is capable of imagining such transcendental non-things as Zero & Infinity & Deity, hence Meta-physical : the core subject of Philosophy, not Physics.
This appears quite contrary for someone who tends to assert that meaning is use.
As human beings, you and I are equal. We are the same kind. This means that each one of us is of the same kind, human being. Despite being the same in kind, the fact that we are not the same in a complete way, provides for the reality that we are two distinct individuals. And, that we are of the same kind, allows us to say that there are two of that kind. If we were the same, we would only be one.
If you do not understand the difference between being equal and being the same, I'll do what I can to help you. If you are ready, let's begin. First, do you accept that you and I are equal yet not the same?
Quoting Banno
I will say however, if you do not yet understand the difference between being equal and being the same, please get some schooling before you attempt the difficulties of metaphysics. Otherwise you will be lost in what is an extremely complex discipline. And, I will also tell you that your epistemology will suffer greatly if you do not respect this difference between being equal and being the same.
Quoting jgill
It is a basic ontological mistake to extend a causal chain into the future, that's the issue pointed out by Hume. Beyond the present, the events are possible, contingent. So in that sense future events are understood as probable, and predicted through statistics. Some future events, especially those which are more immediate, would have a probability approaching an infinite value, but still the present must be understood as making a boundary, a limit, which disables certainty, as Hume explained.
Do you mean probability approaching 1?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In the physical world perhaps. In the idealized mathematical world it is fairly easy to do.
"=" is the sense we were using, the one used in mathematics and logic, which is a predicate ranging over individuals. "a=b" will be true if and only if a and b are the very same individual.
What you are referring to in the quote is a different case. You and I are not the very same individual.
"Banno is human and Meta is human" is not a case of "=". To suppose so would again be to confuse the "is" of equality with the "is" of predication.
Cheers.
I suppose, I'm not familiar with the terminology of probabilities, I don't bet.
Quoting Banno
In logic, "a=b" might indicate that a is the same subject as b, definitely not "the very same individual". Logic does not deal with individuals, it deals with subjects. Whether or not "a=b" is a true statement is irrelevant to logic, requiring a different type of judgement. That's why there is a difference between "valid" and "sound".
So for example, we can have two distinct chairs, and name one as subject "a", and the other as subject "b". So long as everything we predicate of a is the same as what we predicate of b, then we can say that a=b within our logical proceedings. I believe this allows for substitution, as the two are interchangeable within that logical system. By some people, they are said to be "the same" even though this is simply "equal", and they're obviously not the same. We know that the objects which were given those symbols are not "the same" by a rigourous definition of "the same", but within the logical system they are considered to be equal, and this facilitates the use of logic.
Quoting Banno
Right, you and I are not the same individual, we are equal, and this allows that we are actually two, not one.
Quoting Banno
I'm afraid it's you who is confused. There is no such thing as "the 'is' of equality". That's just a misconception.
Here is a grade school exercise for you, to get you back on the right track. Suppose we represent you as 1, and we also represent me as 1. Now we put us both together and we have two, so we represent this with 1+1=2. I'd say that we're pretty smart to figure that one out. But I also think that both the 1's must be equal or else we could not give them both the same value of 1. So we can say 1=1. But if this "=" means that both the 1's are the same, then it's impossible that 1+1=2 because both 1's are the very same thing, so there is only one, not two. Understand?
Your lack of recognition of the distinction, doesn't eliminate the value that the distinction has, for those who recognize the distinction.
Logic and Individuals:
In classical logic, the statement "a = b" typically denotes identity, meaning that "a" and "b" refer to the same individual or object. In this context, logic does indeed deal with individuals. For instance, in first-order logic, you can have variables that represent specific individuals, and statements like "a = b" assert that the individuals denoted by "a" and "b" are identical.
Validity and Soundness:
You correctly note that there's a distinction between "validity" and "soundness." Validity in logic refers to the structure of an argument—if the conclusion follows logically from the premises. Soundness goes further and requires that the argument is not only valid but also that the premises are true.
Equality and Identity:
When we say "a = b" in logic, it usually implies identity. If "a" and "b" are interchangeable, it means they are the same in the relevant sense. Your example of chairs ("a" and "b") is correct in illustrating this concept. If everything predicated of "a" is the same as what is predicated of "b," then "a = b" holds in the logical context.
Substitution:
The concept of substitution is indeed fundamental in logic. If "a = b," you can substitute "a" for "b" or vice versa in logical expressions without changing the truth value of the expressions.
In summary, while logic does deal with individuals and identity, the equality symbol in logic typically denotes identity, not just equality in a quantitative or qualitative sense. Your explanation captures the nuances well, but it's important to recognize that in logic, "a = b" usually means that "a" and "b" are the same individual or object.
I understand your clarification. It seems you're emphasizing the distinction between identity and equality in a more general sense. In everyday language and certain philosophical discussions, people might use terms like "equal" to indicate a similarity or equivalence without implying absolute identity.
When you say "you and I are not the very same individual, we are equal," you're pointing out that while we may not be identical individuals, we can still be considered equal in certain respects—perhaps in terms of rights, dignity, or some other criterion.
In logic, the symbol "=" typically denotes identity, meaning the very same individual or object. However, in other contexts, including philosophical and everyday language, people might use "equal" more loosely to convey a sense of similarity or equivalence without implying strict identity.
Your clarification aligns with this distinction, and it's important to be aware of the context in which terms like "equal" and "identical" are used, as they can carry different meanings in different discussions.
Your grade school exercise touches upon an interesting concept, and I appreciate your engagement with it. Let's break down the reasoning:
Representation:
You represent yourself as 1, and me as 1. When we come together, you correctly state that we represent the combination as 1 + 1 = 2.
Equality:
You rightly point out that for this representation to make sense, the two individual "1"s must be equal. So, you say 1 = 1.
Logical Concern:
You raise a concern about the meaning of "=" in the context of 1 + 1 = 2. If "=" means that both "1"s are the same, then it seems contradictory because, in that case, there would be only one, not two.
Your concern is related to the distinction between the concepts of equality and identity. In the context of arithmetic, when we say 1 + 1 = 2, we are not implying that the individual "1"s are identical; rather, we are saying that they are equal in value. In mathematical terms, "=" typically denotes equality, not identity.
So, while 1 = 1 in the sense that the individual "1"s are considered equal, when we say 1 + 1 = 2, we are combining two equal values to get a sum of 2, without suggesting that the individual "1"s are the same in an identity sense. It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity.[/chat]
[math]{{\left( a+b \right)}^{2}}\equiv {{a}^{2}}+2ab+{{b}^{2}}[/math] for all a and b.
but
[math]2x+1=3[/math] only if [math]x=1[/math]
We have two distinct statements here. 1) "a=b" indicates that a and b "are identical", and 2) "a=b" indicates that a and b are "the same in the relevant sense". To avoid equivocation with "=", it is necessary to conclude from these two statements, that "identical" means "the same in the relevant sense". That is exactly what equal means, therefore we have an indication of the concept of equality.
However, "the same" by the law of identity means the same absolutely, and this is quite different from "the same in the relevant sense". Therefore we can conclude that logic uses "identity" in a way which is inconsistent with the law of identity.
So, we have a problem here. If "a=b' means that a and b are the same object, and it also means that a and b are "the same in the relevant sense", then we must conclude that "the same object" really means "the same in the relevant sense" in logic. This is not consistent with the law of identity which indicates that an object is the same as itself in every sense. Therefore the claim that logic deals with individuals or objects is false if what it means to be an "individual" or "object" is provided by the law of identity.
Conclusion: since "identical" is shown to mean "the same in the relevant sense" in logic, and "a=b" usually is taken to mean that the two are identical in logic, logicians who take this position are in violation of the law of identity.
Yes, these "different meanings" facilitate equivocation, and we must be wary of equivocation when judging soundness. Since many logicians use a meaning for "Identical" which is inconsistent with "identity" as stated by the law of identity, we need to be careful to recognize this difference to avoid equivocation. When a logician talks about "identity" this might really mean "equality", which is distinctly different from "identity" by the law of identity.
It appears like ChatGPT has vindicated me. It recognizes the difference between "equality" and "identity", such that the mathematical notation of "=" is recognized as representing equality not identity. The difference between the two is shown to be necessary for the application of mathematics, by my example, and ChatGPT recognizes this necessity. So, if one would insist "equal" means "identical" in mathematics, they would simply be wrong. As shown by my simple example, arithmetic would not be sound if "=" meant identical. It really means "the same in the relevant sense", and the relevant sense here is quantitative value.
Just to avoid putting my foot in it, is there some punctuation you could add to make this a little clearer?
On it's face I want to say, I don't know what 'the empty set' is to talk about, so am out of my depth.
Thanks Banno, it appears like CGPT has a lot of respect for me. It concludes that "Identity" in logic is "context-specific", therefore not consistent, and not at all representative of the law of identity.
The Empty set is where things begin in mathematical set theory. Here, I'm saying unless a specific first cause can be determined the set of first causes is empty, there are none. I see this thread as revolving around a theological assertion.
Causal chains, however, is not. There is a mathematical theory of sorts that centers upon infinite compositions of functions, which are mathematical analogues of actual physical chains.
I was just pointing out that the 'uncaused caused' is obviously limited in concept to be that which is not caused - eliminating everything we know, was the implication.
This has nothing to do with theological assertions jgill. Forget God. It floors me that I cannot get through to other atheists on this. Truly their fear of this being theological terrifies them to the point of being unable to think about it. I am an atheist. I wrote this. This is about base matter. Its very simple. Don't let fear prevent you from understanding it.
ChatGPT has become evasive, saying nothing of any value here. What it says is that the use of "identity" in logic is "nuanced" and variable, and this doesn't necessarily mean that it is inconsistent with the law of identity. Since there is a well stated principle called "the law of identity", which defines "identity", I would conclude that any nuanced or variable use which is contrary to this principle is inconsistent with it.
For example, if a person said that "=" in mathematical equations, is a symbol of identity, this would be inconsistent with the law of identity. Two different things, what is represented by the right side of an equation, and what is represented by the left side, are said to be equal. But by the law of identity a thing's identity is unique to itself. Two different things cannot have the same "identity". Therefore the "=" symbol in mathematical equations cannot be said to be a symbol of identity without violating the law of identity. Remember the following?
I think its "uncaused cause", the very first movement in the chain. Where it starts. And, yes, I was issuing a challenge to produce one such "thing".
Quoting Philosophim
:lol: Sorry, but I had to work off the terror! I'm still shaking.
This is very simple. Either you believe there is a first cause or you do not believe there is a first cause. It's a matter of belief, not reasoning. Sounds like theology to me.
Sorry for my anger earlier, you seem smart and I get frustrated when smart people come up with irrational arguments for and against points more because they don't like what the solution implies, then whether the solution is right or not. Its not stupidity, so I know its some other type of emotion like disgust, arrogance, hubris, etc. Why can't smart people shove those things aside for a conversation?
Its not 'you' its just I have had this conversation for years with people, and the pattern happens again, and again. Let me show you an example of it below.
Quoting jgill
See, this is a complete dismissal of the OP and the points made in here several times. None of which had anything to do with belief or faith. Its dishonest. Its emotional vomit when a person no longer wants to discuss the issue. Take the reasoning and demonstrate it is a belief. Its actually a lot more fun than indulging in the other negative emotions.
Quoting Philosophim
OK. Demonstrate an uncaused cause, where you are certain some process begins. No fair using random numbers or statistics to evade causation.
This thread has had a bumpy ride.
Sure. An uncaused cause has no rules or restrictions on what it can, or cannot be. But lets keep it simple. A quark appears in the universe, then persists. That's it. It wasn't there, now it is there. It has no prior reason for its being there, besides the fact that it just started being there.
Not a disturbance of quantum fields? Sometimes by lab machinery? Are quantum fields uncaused causes? If so, how can you be sure?
Above my pay grade.
Let me clarify. You asked me to give you an example of an uncaused cause. I'm not saying this actually exists. While an uncaused cause logically must exist, proving 'x' is an uncaused cause is ridiculously difficulty.
Lets go back to our quark example again. Remember how I said an uncaused cause has no limitations on its existence? If a quark appears, it can also appear with uncaused velocity. But from our viewpoint, we would think the quark had existed prior to its formation because we would assume something caused the velocity, we just couldn't find it.
The logic is not about saying, "This is an uncaused cause." The logic of the OP is noting that logically, there must be an uncaused cause in our universe. Chains of causality all reach a point in which there is no prior explanation for some things existence, besides that it exists.
I disagree with this. I think it is a matter of reasoning. Aristotle's so-called "cosmological argument" begins from the reality of change, and contingent being, which we experience at the present time, and proceeds to demonstrate logically the need to conclude the reality of what people call "a first cause". Because of this, I think that belief in the first cause is really, at its base, a matter of reasoned metaphysics, rather than religion.
The theologists have taken "the first cause" from the theoretical discipline of metaphysics, named it "God", and put it to work herding human beings in the practical field of religion. But theologists use many different tools in their practise, some even unethical, so this has created much dislike for religion. The backlash turns against "God" and ultimately the metaphysics which supports that conception. The problem is that the backlash against the metaphysics is generally irrational, being motivated by practises other than teaching the logical necessity of "the first cause", yet being directed at "the first cause"..
What makes you think that you can conceive of a first cause?
I can for example, conceive of, and indeed witness, a pencil line that has a beginning, and I can also start counting up from zero. But these so-called "first events" that occur in ordinary experience are only conceivable to me because i am able to witness or conceive of other events in time and space that occur earlier ...
In my experience of fellow atheists, they often harbor a peculiarly theological belief in "nothingness", in that they seem to reify the notion as a sort of anti-substance that they envisage as existing before and after substance, out of which they construct myths such as universe as having an objective "beginning",or of personal experience as having a subjective end. (They will deny these charges of course, in the usual spirit of "true believers"). But if we reject this ontological interpretation of nothingness as being nonsensical, then how else are we supposed to conceive of absolutely first (and last) events?
A first cause isn't necessary within a probabilistic function.
Causality, as in deterministic events, follows entropy only on scales above the Planck scale. Virtual particles, as understood right now, does not have a first cause, they are probabilistic random existences.
If the universe extended out from this Planck scale; in which determinism exists as an irrational system due to the absolute probabilistic chaos that exists there; then the first cause is basically defined as the first entities that acted upon another entity causing a chain reaction of events rather than randomness. In essence, once there was an absolute probabilistic chaos and then one such instance acted upon another causing a chain reaction of events forming our universe.
So, through quantum physics, a first cause isn't a necessity. It's only a necessity for that which solidifies out of an absolute probabilistic system when that system's random probabilities reach such high certainty as to fundamentally make any other probable outcome impossible due to not being able to affect neighboring events. At a certain scale, the governing constants of the universe (which themselves may be part of the initial probabilistic random outcome during the Big Bang), form an alignment for probabilistic outcomes and as such all other probable outcomes collapse into what is most deterministically probable.
Like drops on a surface, their surface tension conform them into large actions and systems; the merging two drops is a highly probable event based on the laws of physics, regardless of the chaotic nature of the substance and its elementary quantum randomness. All other probable outcomes becomes only probably on such small scales as to be overridden by the emerging properties of the whole set.
Therefore, the universe is fundamentally probabilistic, but the likelihood of an event that overrides determinism in the universe is so low that it cannot happen during the entire timescale that the universe exist through. Like, for example, a drop of water splitting up into two parts by a reversal of the laws of physics governing that drop is on its large scale such an improbable event that it would take billions of times the timescale of our current universe lifetime for that to happen as a random event, and the deterministic outcomes would even then be insignificant to the universe as a whole.
Furthermore, spacetime singularities may be places in which matter and objects compress to such scales where they start to behave like pure probabilistic randomness, and since that produces a paradox in entropy, reality itself collapses into a feedback loop that becomes a "hole" in our reality as it cannot function together with the deterministic system outside of it.
Then there's the superposition of causal events that have the same outcomes regardless of which came first, and such an indefinite causal order. Although it doesn't change larger causal links.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/quantum-mischief-rewrites-the-laws-of-cause-and-effect-20210311/
Conceiving things is the easy part. There is nothing, then, there is something. Its a binary issue. A current state is either caused by something prior, or it is not.
Quoting sime
I only mentioned I was an atheist because jgill assumed this was a theistic argument and that was preventing him from thinking clearly about the argument. Other than that, we should not attribute arguments to atheists or theists. Please just note your point so we can stick with the logic.
Quoting sime
Its an unnecessary concept to understand the logic. I show you through the OP that it doesn't matter whether you have a causal chain which leads to a finite start, or a causal chain that is infinitely regressive.
What caused the finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
What caused the infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
It all boils down to the point that eventually in any chain of causality, infinite or finite, the causation of its existence will eventually have no prior explanation for its existence. Reality, at its core, simply is and has no prior reason for why it should be.
Yes it is. Let me explain what probability is. When you roll a six sided die, you know there are only six sides that can come up. Any side has a 1 out of 6 chance of occurring. What is chance? Chance is where we reach the limits of accountability in measurement or prediction. Its not actual randomness. The die will roll in a cup with a particular set of forces and will come out on its side in a perfectly predictable fashion if we could measure them perfectly. We can't. So we invented probability as a tool to compensate within a system that cannot be fully measured or known in other particular ways.
So yes, causality still exists in probability. The physics of the cup, the force of the shake, the bounce of the die off the table. All of this cause the outcome. Our inability to measure this ahead of time does not change this fact.
Quoting Christoffer
False. Quantum physics is not magic. It a series of very cleverly designed computations that handle outcomes where we do not have the tools or means to precisely manage or measure extremely tiny particles. That's it.
Quoting Christoffer
Not knowing whether they have a first cause or not does not determine whether they have a first cause or not. I'm also not noting here that "x" is a first cause. I'm noting that logically, we will always end up in a situation where we find something that has no prior causality for what it exists. I'll sum it again.
If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
A first cause is something which exists which has no prior reason for its existence. It simply is.
You didn't read what I actually wrote. I'm talking about the idea of a first cause, as in the cause that kickstarted all we see of determinism. And how there's no need for one if the universe expanded from the Planck scale. That determinism is underlying our reality is not what I was talking about.
Quoting Philosophim
No it's not. Maybe you should read up more on quantum mechanics. "Cleverly designed computations" is a nonsense description of it, and sounds more like religious talk. Quantum mechanics isn't magic, but it's not how you describe it here. We can absolutely measure it, but we run into the uncertainty principle and the reason may be located outside of reality or our ability to measure it due to limitations in our dimensional perception.
Don't state something as false before leaving a description that isn't even close to how quantum physics are described. That's bias talking.
Quoting Philosophim
A first cause is merely the first causal event and as I described it can simply be the first causal event out of the quantum fluctuations before the big bang. A dimensionless infinite probabilistic fluctuation would generate a something and still not be a first cause as it is a fundamental absolute probability. And even if it weren't it can also be explained by a loop system, infinitely cyclic like Penrose's theory.
Lets go with the theory that what caused the universe was its expansion from the Planck scale. What caused the Planck scale to exist? When you answer that, I'm going to ask, "What caused that to exist?" And eventually you come back to where I am. Is there a finite limitation to causality, or infinite regression? And as noted, in both cases the answer is that there is no prior reason for why there is a finite or infinite regression of causality, there simply is.
Quoting Christoffer
I never stated that there was one singular first cause. I stated that a first cause is necessary. There could be multiple. You are talking about a specific first cause. I am talking about the logical conclusion that there must be at least one first cause. Whether its your specific first cause, a quark simply appearing out of nothing, or a big bang, the logical conclusion is the same. Can you demonstrate how Planck scale escapes the notion I've put forward? I'm not seeing it. I did read what you wrote. My point is that it does not counter what I'm stating.
Quoting Christoffer
If its not, demonstrate why. Saying, "Read up more" is an abandonment of the conversation. You have no idea how versed I am in quantum mechanics. If I'm wrong, show why, do not make it personal please.
Quoting Christoffer
What do you mean by need? A first cause doesn't care about our needs. Its not something we invent. It either exists, or it doesn't. Logically, it must exist. Until you can counter the logic I've put forward, you aren't making any headway.
Quoting Christoffer
No, it cannot. A first cause is by definition, uncaused. You are stating that a first cause is caused by the quantum fluctuations before the big bang. That's something prior. Meaning your claim of a first cause, is not a first cause.
Do not mistake a first cause for an 'origin'. An origin is a starting reference point we create as a tool, like a line graph with origin 0. A first cause is not a construct. It is something that has no prior explanation or reason for its existence.
Quoting Christoffer
Its very simple. What caused it to be a fundamental absolute probability? Is there some prior reason for its existence, or does exist without a prior reason for its existence?
Quoting Christoffer
Did you read the actual OP? I clearly go over this. Please note if my point about this in the OP is incorrect and why.
If there is one let's call it "God" for convenience. Then we can consider the nature of God or not.
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
So far, all my mathematical causation chains have first causes and origins. I'm satisfied with that. The philosophy in this thread seems ethereal.
No. The entire point of this thread is to think of about a first cause as part of the natural world, and think about how it would apply to our universe as it is today. While yes, a God could be a possible first cause, it is one of an infinite number of possibilities. Further, one would have to prove that such a first cause existed, it would not be a given. More likely things just happened.
Quoting jgill
Just origins. You've given no mathematical example of a first cause. An origin is a tool of measurement and does not represent a first cause. One can put an origin on the first cause of a chain of causality, but it is not our measurement of a first cause that makes a first cause, it is simply the fact that a first cause has no prior explanation for its existence.
I can start talking about atomic chemistry without talking about quarks. That doesn't mean quarks don't exist and make up an atom.
Quoting jgill
I'm not sure what that means. I've given the examples as clearly as I can.
If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
Its pretty simple isn't it?
Nothing caused it to exist, it's like asking why 2 + 2 = 4. The Planck scale is the scale at which measurements stop making sense as reality becomes fundamentally probabilistic. It's not a "thing" it's the fundamental smallest scale possible for reality, which in my point was that such a scale and such a function rhymes with the theoretical physics of how the universe began. So there's no "cause" to the Planck scale, you've entangled yourself in a web of your own thinking here with no regard for what these things that you address actually means.
Quoting Philosophim
What should I demonstrate? Quoting Philosophim
For one, your incorrect use of concepts like the Planck scale shows how versed you are. The lack of understanding of the uncertainty principle is another, especially since you claim that we "just don't have the tools to decode it". I'd just answer like Feynman did: "If you think you know quantum mechanics, you don't". I've given a run through of how causality can appear out of nothing at the point of Big Bang, something that's much closer to what scientists actually theorize. This is far from making it personal, I'm just pointing out that you mostly use bad reasoning here and back it up with "you don't know how versed I am in quantum mechanics.", which isn't saying anything, especially when you don't seem to show it.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, you don't understand what the Planck scale is. It is not an invention by us and I don't know why you keep implying that.
Quoting Philosophim
Do you know what these quantum fluctuations implies? It's a fundamental randomness of probabilities that do not act according to general relativity. The concept of spacetime, in essence, causality, breaks down and have no meaning at that point. Regardless of how we view the Big Bang, all projections starts the universe at such a dense point that it fundamentally becomes zero dimensional and there can be no such thing as a first cause before this since there's no spacetime in this state. Without dimensions, there's no causality and no cause. If we take the fact that quantum randomness and rogue probabilities increase in likelihood the smaller in scale you go, then at a scale so small it basically becomes dimensionless, there would be a singularity of probabilities. A probable event occurring, a fluctuation, in a state without spacetime, would instantly become. Without dimensions the only way to fit that fluctuation would be for it to expand "somewhere", producing the necessity for dimensions, and that causes a basically infinite density to expand into those dimensions.
You can't have spacetime at such a dense point, and without spacetime you have no causality, therefore you cannot find a first cause before it that aligns with how we view deterministic causality in our reality. You can only find a first cause after spacetime appears, after our dimensions formed.
Quoting Philosophim
How does anything without spacetime act as a causal event? A quantum probability doesn't need spacetime as it can exist in all states at once. If that state was because of a big crunch, a higher dimensional looping state that we leak out of or if it was a fundamental paradox of dimensionless nothingness that have no beginning, it still places our reality at a point in which no causality existed before it existed. So if you're looking for a first cause, I've already pointed at it; the first event of time and causality at the point of the big bang. That is the first cause and it has no prior cause due to no causality existing before it. It's the logical conclusion of the state of the universe at that point and the cosmological models support it.
Quoting Philosophim
No, you clearly misunderstand everything into your own logic and you have become so obsessed with that logic that you believe the Planck scale is an invention and disregard how general relativity breaks down at a singularity point. If a star of defined mass produce a black hole where spacetime breaks down, then imagine a singularity or a Planck scale dense form of our entire universe. Then explain how causality would work in that state. You seem to forget that our laws of physics break down at that point and that our dimensions stop making sense. If causality breaks down, then you can have no causes before this event as there's no spacetime there to produce it. That's where logic takes you based on the current understanding of physics and quantum physics.
I used the word "God" as an example of what to call the uncaused cause, not referring to religion. You are then inserting FC (first cause) into the "natural world", but it is ineffable.
Quoting Philosophim
Infinite causal chains go forward in time, also. I can easily write one down, and then I am a FC. I can also write one down going back in time, specifying FC.
Quoting Philosophim
I admit. I can't think clearly about your argument. :roll:
So then it is something which has no prior cause for its existence, or a first cause. That's my point. That which has no prior cause, is a first cause. Yes, there is a cause for 2+2 = 4. Human minds invented math with our ability to create discrete identities or 'ones'. Just like the reason we have a Plank scale is because it is the limit of our current measurements.
Quoting Christoffer
Quoting Philosophim
Don't insinuate someone doesn't know something, explain why they don't know something. Otherwise its a personal attack. Personal attacks are not about figuring out the solution to a discussion, they are ego for the self. You cannot reason with someone who cares only about their ego.
Quoting Christoffer
No, I asked you what caused it to exist. You stated: " And how there's no need for one if the universe expanded from the Planck scale." You were claiming it came from the Planck scale, so I asked you what caused the Planck scale. This is not me asserting how the Planck scale works. But again, this is silly. You're commenting on me instead of the points. Keep to the points please.
Quoting Christoffer
And what caused the big bang? Did something prior to the big bang cause the big bang? Or is the big bang a first cause with no prior cause for its existence? You keep dodging around the basic point while trying to introduce quantum mechanics. Citing quantum mechanics alone does not address the major point.
Quoting Christoffer
Yes, it is an invention by us. Its the limitation of our measuring tools before the observations using the tools begins affecting the outcome. Or, in more proper terms, "At the Planck scale, the predictions of the Standard Model, quantum field theory and general relativity are not expected to apply, and quantum effects of gravity are expected to dominate."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_units
I'm not seeing how your citing plank length invalidates a first cause. Plank length is a limitation of measurements before we need other tools and math. How does "It expanded from the Planck scale" (Your words) explain anything?
Quoting Christoffer
No, if you're saying "Quantum fluctuations caused the big bang" then you have causality. To not have causality means, "Nothing prior caused X to happen". Now if you want to recant and state, "The big bang was not caused by anything," then the big bang is a first cause. So either way, you're proving my point, not going against it. You're seeking very hard to disprove what I'm saying, but perhaps you should make sure you understand what I'm saying first. I don't think you get it.
Quoting Christoffer
Then you agree 100% with my OP. There's nothing else to discuss if you state this.
Quoting Christoffer
No man, relax. You're not the first person who's come in here without reading or understanding the OP with a crusade. :) Be it Planck scale, God, no God, or hatred of causality this thread is full of people who don't understand the OP. Its cool. Just try to go into future threads with the intent to understand first before you critique.
Quoting Christoffer
So then we have something which has no prior explanation for its existence? A first cause? Again, I appreciate your agreement.
I think what he thinks you're not getting is that the thing itself is not 'uncaused' anymore than an object which exists in a world without gravity is 'ungravitised' or whatever.
It came to be in a scenario where 'cause' was a not a factor. Only since it's inception is cause a factor - so to refer to it as a 'first cause' is erroneous. Its just the first thing - which enables a second thing, but doesn't cause it.
But I see (removing the snark, hehe) what you're getting it. It necessarily follows that it would be the first thing to cause anything. I think they can both be right.
Not really. Something which has no prior reason for its being was either always there, or not there, then there. Why is that hard to understand?
Quoting jgill
What caused you to exist though? You are not a first cause. You are an origin by which we may demarcate a 'start' within a causal chain. But you have prior reasons for why you exist and wrote the chain, so are part of the full causal chain. There is a difference between an origin, and an actual start to a line. I can move the origin anywhere on the line. That doesn't mean its the start of the line.
Quoting jgill
You insist on thinking this is about origins when I've clearly told you several times that a first cause is not an origin. You are making an amateur mistake both in philosophy and math. You and I well know that you can make an origin any set of numbers you want. That is not the same as the beginning of a line. Either you are willfully ignoring this fact because you don't want to address the issue, or you've made a mistake in understanding the issue. Either way, your example about origins are wrong. If you have nothing but sass and eyerolls to add, just let the reply go so we have a nice end to the conversation instead of a back and forth over pointless ego.
Yes, I hope he understands that he's not arguing against my point. Just silly there has to be snark in there to begin with. :)
So it is an effable feature of nature. Then tell us about it. Or don't bother.
I have no problem with you saying there is a first cause. What difference does it make? If you choose to believe that, that's fine with me. But the discussion seems to me like an exercise in medieval scholasticism.
Quoting Philosophim
So the beginning of a line is a first cause? So if I perceive my imaginary line beginning at zero on the imaginary axis and have it extend up indefinitely I have violated your rule. I am confused.
I get this all the time from MU. :smile:
It makes plenty of difference. Lets go over a few.
1. A God is not necessary. The universe can have just formed on its own without intelligent life. This is not by a belief, but a logical conclusion. Meaning yes, a stopwatch could be found in the forest and no one made it. Metaphorically of course.
2. The consequence of a first cause existing means there were no rules or limitations as to what could form. This includes size, shape, complexity, and also time. Meaning that its logically plausible that something self explained formed five seconds ago somewhere in the universe.
While yes, a God is not impossible, neither is any other plausibility you can imagine. Complex things are unlikely of course due to math which I covered in another post with Timothy. I think you were there. We cannot look to ontology to tell us what specific origins caused the universe, or even if it was just one. In fact, it could be that it was multiple self explained existences that came into being that resulted in our universe today, and it may be ongoing at a very small level.
3. If the logic holds, this is a final debate on the matter. Its a solution, done, finished. Now instead of debating this tired subject, we can move onto new debates. What does the fact that there is a first cause entail? Can we work out probabilities of things forming? What does that tell us of the nature of the universe? Do we continue to look for explanations to things, or is it reasonable to reach a point where it doesn't matter anymore?
Quoting jgill
No. I'm just trying to communicate to you in a way that you understand as you like math. The line represents a chain of causality. Each link represents the step in the chain. Can we have multiple chains that link together? Of course. But the first link is the start.
Now put the chain somewhere on a graph. The 'line''s many points are simply the links in the chain. The first link is the beginning of the line, the first point is the beginning of the line. It doesn't matter where the origin is right? I can make my origin 0,0, 1,1, etc. It doesn't matter where I put my chain on the graph either. Put the chain's start at 5,4, its irrelevant. An origin is merely what base we use to examine the line. The origin does not affect the chain's structure no matter where we put it on the graph. We are
examining the chain's structure, not the graph we decide to put it on. If you want to look at the middle of the line and say, "I'm looking here as a mathematical origin" you're missing the literal point. Where you start is irrelevant. That's what I'm trying to show you.
So now that you understand a mathematical origin does not apply, you're left with the points and solution I gave. A first cause is a logical necessity where causality exists.
You have patiently spelled out your logic. You are the origin of this thread, but clearly not the first cause.
Correct! I hope that's cleared things up a bit jgill. I appreciate you sticking with me through it.
I seem to have happened on this thread at a moment of agreement. Congratulations to both of you. Can I just check that I've understood correctly?
Quoting Philosophim
I interpret this as saying that causality is contextual. We can post any convenient starting-point for a causal system. I agree with that understanding.
Quoting Philosophim
And since causality requires time and time and space are not absolute, but relative, then surely causality must be relative. Surely?
Quoting Philosophim
On the face of it, that's not particularly re-assuring. There will be people who assign the name "God" to whatever the first cause is. That will be less attractive to them if we clearly identify causality as relative. In addition, of course, God as first cause would be a god of the philosophers, not a god of faith.
Quoting Philosophim
You are right, of course. But you've just demonstrated that any first cause will generate new questions - especially the last one. That's not a problem.
We can attribute a starting point anywhere in a chain of causality. For example, when explaining why a ball falls when I let go of it, I don't have to address quantum physics. Does that mean that quantum physics and a whole host of other things are not part of the causality of the ball falling? No. It just means we don't look at it creating a mathematical origin or starting point.
Quoting Ludwig V
No. A first cause is absolute. It is something which exists without a prior cause. It is not that we chose that as a starting point, it means that there comes a point in exploring the chain where there is no prior cause for its existence. It will exist, simply because it does. The logic points out this occurs whether the chain of causality is infinite or finite.
Quoting Ludwig V
People will do that with anything. And I didn't come up with the logic to make a point, I looked at the logic to see what point it would lead to.
The point here is that while they can logically do so, they have no reason which necessitates it be God or 'it just happened'. If we don't know what a first cause in a causality chain is, it could be anything. To claim it is a specific thing, you must justify why it is that specific thing over any other idea out of the infinite possibilities available to the imagination. There is no justification alone which necessitates a God be a first cause, so it must be proven. While a first cause has no prior explanation for its being, it enters into the causal chain of the rest of existence. Meaning there must be solid proof which demonstrates any claim of a first cause, is in fact, a first cause.
Quoting Ludwig V
I find new questions to be fun and exciting to think about! I'm glad you do as well. :)
Quite so. That's why some of the thinking that's going on in the depths of physics, beginning to open up the inevitable and obvious questions around the Big Bang is so exciting - and puzzling and incomprehensible - to me, at least. And there's the paradox. Identify a first cause and you open up new questions. That's one reason why I classify a causal chain as contextual.
The catch is that whatever caused the Big Bang (or whatever else you identify as a first cause) requires that you think differently. As happened in the step from Aristotelian physics to Newton, from alchemy to molecular theory - and then beyond. The same thing happened with Relativity. Both of which seem normal (sort of) now.
Quoting Philosophim
That's why I call it contextual. To be sure, we explain why your ball falls from the point you let go of it. But then we can identify a new starting-point, before you let go of it, and find additional explanations which graft on to your original starting-point. Alternatively, if you ask "Why did you let go of the ball?" you may find yourself changing gear and answering in terms of actions, purposes and reasons - in a different categorial framework. But even if you stick to traditional physics, in the end, you find that you have to change gear and think about the nature of time and space, which requires new thinking, which opens up relativity and quantum physics.
BTW. Don't you think that the idea of the chain of causality is a bit misleading? We can identify many chains of causality, depending on what questions we are asking, and we see those chains intersecting and overlapping. Wouldn't it be better to think of causality as a web, from which we can select specific chains depending on our needs at the time? That's another reason why I classify a specific causal chain as contextual.
Do you accept a free will act as a true first cause? Take your ball example. Imagine that you are holding the ball intent on letting it drop at some point. After a duration of time you drop it. There is no determinable "cause" for the drop at the moment it was dropped because the time was randomly selected in your mind. Therefore this freely willed action appears to be a first cause, no apparent cause of the dropping.
In that situation we cannot appeal to the picking up of the ball as the cause of it dropping, because of the time gap in between, when the ball is being held. So every moment that the ball is held, the holding of the ball is a free will act, an uncaused cause acting on the ball, which produces a gap in the causal chain between picking the ball up, and dropping the ball.
Quoting Philosophim
Aristotle used a different technique for denying the infinite loop (eternal circular motion). First, he allowed that eternal circular motion is logically possible. There is nothing within the conception of it which would deny it, such as self-contradiction, or any other logical flaw. However, he pointed out that for there to be an eternal circular motion there must be something, a material body, which is moving in that circular way. And, he showed that by the very nature of "matter", such a body is necessarily generated and also corruptible. Therefore that body moving in a circular motion must have had a beginning, and being "corruptible" implies that it will decay if given enough time, so it will also have an end. Therefore the eternal circular motion is physically impossible, based on the science of material things.
The infinite regression of causality, the infinite chain of causes is ruled out in a slightly different way. The infinite regress is described as fundamentally repugnant to the intellect. This is because it renders the thing which is described as "infinite" as having an unintelligible aspect. The aspect which produces the infinite regress is fundamentally unintelligible, because the cause of it cannot be apprehended, being obscured by the infinite regress.
This is similar to what you say when you say that there must be a reason for the infinite regress, except that when someone designates something as infinite in this way, they are actually stipulating that there is no reason for it. That's what the assertion of infinite regress does, it stipulates that the reason cannot be apprehended because there is no reason. The intellect however has the basic desire to know, and to stipulate something as having no reason (to violate the law of sufficient reason), is to assert that it is unintelligible, and this is contrary to the nature of the intellect. It is self-defeating for an intellect to say this. Therefore the assertion of infinite regress is an act which impedes the process of the intellect, and so it is said to be repugnant to the intellect, and must be rejected as counterproductive to the intellectual process of understanding.
Feed that last post to GP, you'll probably cause him to have a heart attack.
GP is an interesting character, very elusive and careful not to take a stand on any issue which might be controversial. I think it uses a sort of unbiased confirmation bias, to produce the appearance of an unbiased approach. So for example notice that the more you questioned it on the subject of identity, the further it moved away from giving you a decisive answer.
In the first post it clearly stated "It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity", as if it recognized a clear distinction between the two. However, it leaves ambiguity with the word "often", and in the other paragraph it used "typically". "In mathematical terms, '=' typically denotes equality, not identity."
As you proceeded to question it though, it moved further and further from taking a stance on the issue. It then said the meaning of "identity" is "context-dependent", and "context-specific". When asked about this, it moved even further away from taking a stance by describing what it meant by "context-specific", with terms of "nuanced" and "variability", stating that this does not necessarily imply inconsistency. As you can see, it moved itself further and further away from being useful, refusing to say anything decisive.
So, when I referred back to the first post, where it had said something decisive, where it had expressed a clear distinction between equality and identity in mathematics, it simply did not answer, only saying that it is important to ask such questions. It appears like it recognized that saying something decisive in the first place, was a mistake to its unbiased confirmation bias, so that it would not go back and reconsider how it could have made such a mistake.
You need to clearly distinguish spatio-temporal causality from your murkier concept of meta-causality.
In a similar fashion, Stephen Hawking once proposed a causally closed cosmological model of the universe , in which the universe was hypothesized to be finite but without a spatio-temporal boundary. Nevertheless, he famously asked "what breathes fire into the equations?". But this philosophical question as it stands cannot be translated into the spatio-temporal language of physics. Furthermore, there isn't a consensus that Hawkings philosophical question is even meaningful, let alone how it should be solved or dissolved if it is.
Another possibility you are overlooking, is the possibility that the very existence of the past and its historical content might not transcend the ever-changing state of the present. In which case, the past is open and indeterminate like the future and there isn't a universal causal order.
First, lets address randomness vs true randomness. First, randomness. When you roll a six sided die, you know there are only six sides that can come up. Any side has a 1 out of 6 chance of occurring. What is 'randomness'? Randomness is where we reach the limits of accountability in measurement or prediction. Its not actual randomness. The die will roll in a cup with a particular set of forces and will come out on its side in a perfectly predictable fashion if we could measure them perfectly. We can't. So we invented probability as a tool to compensate within a system that cannot be fully measured or known in other particular ways.
Randomness has clear limits. And when there are limits, there are reasons for those limits. You say it was random when you dropped the ball, but was it random like a die, or true randomness which I'll go into now.
True randomness has zero constraints or rules as to what can be. Limited randomness always has a constraint of some sort. "What causes that constraint?" means that we haven't gotten to a first cause cause. The appearance of a first cause is true randomness. Why? Because if it wasn't, there would be some thing causing one possible outcome to be more or less likely than the other. So is 'free will' truly random? I don't believe so. Humans are physical creatures with physical brains. Brains have rules they have to follow. Now are those rules so complex that measuring and predicting what a brain will do next with 100% certainty a current impossibility? Yes. So free will is not a first cause.
As for ruling out infinite causality, its irrelevant. Instead of trying to prove that infinite regressive causality was possible/impossible, I just asked what the logical consequence was if they existed. And it turns out, there's still a first cause.
I just want to clarify A first cause is not caused. If the big bang is a first cause, nothing caused it. It exists simply because it does with no prior explanation. If a first cause is a logical necessity, then the line of questioning should be, "What does that entail for the cosmology of our universe?" For example, if a first cause is possible, can it not happen any time? Is it not unlimited in to what it could be? Could a quark simply appear somewhere in the universe than vanish out five seconds later, all without a prior cause?
Quoting Ludwig V
We limit sections of the chain as a mathematical origin to think about things, but that doesn't mean we're at the start of the chain. The start of the chain is the start of the chain. That's the only first cause. Everything else is caused by something else.
Quoting Ludwig V
Because even using the simple example of a chain, many people are having a very difficult time grasping the concept. I'm starting very simple then when someone like you who seems to understand asks a question like this I can say, "Yes, you can view it that way." :)
The only part of confusion I might see here is that you seem to think where we pick as a starting point on this web is a first cause. Its not. When you reach the end of one of the threads, that's a first cause. And there is no spider that made it.
This has been noted before and I don't agree. Let me sum it up like this.
A universe has finite causality. What caused this universe to have finite causality over infinite causality? It just is, there's no prior explanation.
A universe has infinite causality. What caused this universe to have infinite causality over finite causality? It just is, there's no prior explanation.
Quoting sime
If you think about what you're saying, then you also agree with me. If something appears or happens that has no prior reason for its existence, its a first cause. Notice the title says 'a' not 'the' first cause. There is no reason preventing our universe from having multiple first causes in the past, the present, or the future. A first cause has no reason why it should or should not happen. It simply does.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It depends what you mean by "true first cause". In certain traditions of philosophy, free will is the traditional cause of actions (as distinct from events); it is traditionally regarded as special - either as an uncaused cause or causa sui. Neither concept makes much sense. But then, since explanations of actions qua actions are different in kind from causal explanations, they are regarded as belonging to a category different from causal explanations. In which case free will is not a cause at all.
Quoting sime
Well, setting fire to equations is clearly a metaphor, standing in place for a question we do not know how to ask yet. In my opinion. Poetry standing in at the limits of physics. I love it.
Quoting Philosophim
Indeed. Just as there must be a first cause, even if we don't know what it is yet (although the Big Bang occupied that space for a while), so there must be some brute facts. But that may only mean that we haven't formulated the question yet.
Quoting Philosophim
Yes, you're right. I've stumbled in to two different uses of "first cause". One is the everday contextual use of first cause, where we pick a starting-point pragmatically, to suit the needs and interests of the situation we are in. The other is mathematical, or conceptual, and identifies the foundations of the system we are applying. We reach a point, where the explanations run out, but that does not hold us up for ever.
So we formulate a different, and incommensurable, theory which reaches past that point. But the concept of causality is changed in the process. Newton and others, redefined the subject matter of physics in order to mathematize it and introduced the concept of gravity because it was needed (a brute fact, if you like). That concept of time and space was undermined by relativity and quantum physics. Now, physicist/mathematicians are reaching past the Big Bang. But any explanation will involve changing the rules, since "before" the Big Bang, neither time nor space existed. "First cause" will change its meaning.
A first cause is as simple as you can imagine. It has no prior explanation for its existence. You can claim free will is a first cause, but now you have to prove it. If people cannot prove free will is a first cause, then they cannot claim it to be. This applies to any first cause. Big bang, God, etc.
Quoting Ludwig V
Very true!
Quoting Ludwig V
No, I think the definition of a first cause is a constant. Causality also does not change. The difference is whether someone has proved that their claim of a first cause is actually a 'first cause'. Can they prove that there is nothing prior that caused it? If they cannot, then they have no proper claim to say that its a first cause. The Big Bang cannot be proven as a first cause, as we do not know if there was something prior that caused it. Even if we discovered a God, it must be proven as a first cause, as there's a question of whether something prior happened to form a God.
In other words Ludwig, no one has ever proven anything as a first cause. While logically necessary that at least one exist, it is extremely difficulty to prove that any particular existence is one.
But that's stretching the meaning of "first" to the point of vacuity, for the concept of "first" is only meaningful in relation to a recognizable order with a distinguished bottom element. In the absence of a well-defined order, the concept makes little sense, especially considering that a rejection of the causal order doesn't entail that postulated "first" causes can't have explanations in terms of other causes, but only that such explanations are incomplete, vague, relative, ever changing, etc.
Now we are considering a causal chain having an uncountable number of links. Even between two points close together on the line, an uncountable number of links. With quarks you strayed into quantum theory, now you have strayed into mathematics.
Fortunately I have actually investigated an approximation to a causal chain continuum:
[math]{{G}_{n}}(z)={{g}_{n/n}}\circ {{g}_{n-1/n}}\circ \cdots \circ {{g}_{2/n}}\circ {{g}_{1/n}}(z)[/math]
[math]G(z)=\underset{n\to \infty }{\mathop{\lim }}\,{{G}_{n}}(z)[/math]
A dynamical system in which each "link" shrinks to a point. However, the measure of the set of points missed by this process is the length of the line. This is an aside having little to do with your thesis.
Its a shame philosophy is so riddled with sloppiness of language that sometimes arguments are sabotaged by examples to clarify. But that's life.
No, its simply pointing out that its a very exact and simple premise. "That which has no prior cause for its being." That's not vacuous or unclear.
Quoting sime
There is no absence of a well defined order. There comes a point where we find something that has no prior explanation for its existence.
I'm a little confused by what you mean by including both a rejection of the causal order, and an inclusion of other causes. Can you clarify?
I am not rejecting a causal order. I'm just noting that logically, there must be at least one thing which has no prior causality for its existence. It exists purely because it does, not because of something else prior.
Quoting jgill
And I have addressed this multiple times.
If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
You have ignored this point, the point of the OP many times. Address this. Why is this wrong?
Quoting jgill
Its a shame you sloppily use math examples that don't properly address the philosophy. Seriously, knock yourself down a peg. We're all tempted to state how glorious our intellect is and how others are inferior to us. Don't fall into that poison trap that we're all tempted to.
Use math, but use it to address the points being made, not a straw man as you've done several times so far.
It's your "line", not mine. I am happy to say causal chains have a first cause. But more on intuition than logic.
At this point you've made your own decision independent to countering the OP. That's your call. Good discussion.
I can see that your definition is constant. But it's empty. People will look for something.
Quoting Philosophim
I think you are understating the case.
Quoting Philosophim
Proving a negative like that is indeed difficult to impossible. So it looks as if your concept of the first cause is empty. There's not much fun in that.
OK. If the chain goes back to an origin lying outside of spacetime, that may be its first cause. If it continues back unbounded, possibly going outside spacetime, then the existence of the chain is its first cause. It looks like you cannot lose here.
I wouldn't call it empty. Having a clear definition and distinction allows us to pull a first cause from a hypothetical into a testable distinction. Its something we can scientifically do, so is now outside the realm of faith.
What I find fun is thinking about not only what is, but what could have been. This leads validity to the idea of multiverse theory. This also lends one to think that anything is possible. If something is not possible, there must be a reason why its not possible. But if a think has no prior reason for its existence, it means it also has no limitations for its existence.
Impossible becomes "X as a first cause does not exist, simply because it did not form". But does that mean it can't in the future? I can't see why not. Are there several things that form self-explained that happen daily, we just don't notice them or they're too small to matter?
As a thought experiment I hypothetically concluded that if things form self-explained, they are likely smaller than larger. Its not because something large cannot form, its just that if all things are possible, and all things are equally likely to happen. Taken in a cube area of matter, its just there are a lot more possibilities per cube of matter that are extremely small vs large. By orders of magnitude per square space of existence, its more likely that something self explained would be extremely small. Within the infinite possibilities we can calculate what is more possible within a limited cube of space.
Thus an event like a big bang (if its actually a first cause) would be extremely rare by orders of magnitude. Its also why we don't see things like fully formed chairs appearing. Given the fact that anything could appear, the idea that it would appear in that cube instead of spread out among all space in the universe is very small. I can go into more details if you like, but I'm trying to summarize some fun ideas I've had.
Its not me. I'm irrelevant. Its something we can all rationally discover and use going forward.
Math is an invention of interpretation, it does not change the fact of 2 + 2 = 4, which is a function of reality only interpreted through math. Same as with the Planck scale, it's not bound to measurement, it is bound to fundamental quantum randomness, it is the scale edge-point at which our reality stops acting properly. It is not an invention.
Quoting Philosophim
Don't posit to know something without demonstrating it. So far you haven't demonstrated understanding quantum mechanics, which produces a problem in that you use produce conclusions based on misunderstandings. Pointing out that you misunderstand something and use something wrong is not a personal attack, it is simply pointing at the flaw on reasoning. The irony here is that you lift up your logic and reasoning as rock solid and you dismiss criticism with the evidence of how well your logic is. But your argument mainly only point out that there must be a first cause, without it, there would be a cyclic loop. And maybe I misunderstand here, because that just sound like stating something obvious, axioms of logic that are already logical in themselves, without a need for overcomplicated reasoning.
Quoting Philosophim
The Planck scale is a scale in which reality breaks down; there's no property to this that had a caus, it is a singularity point. It's like saying "what caused this centimeter" and not mean the invented measurement, but the centimeter in itself without relation. That is silly. Such a scale singularity point in which reality breaks down and dimensions stop to have any meaning is a state in which causality breaks down as well. Without causality there are no causes and all our reality in this scale means no prior cause. If a randomness of probabilities exist there they exist without prior causes, they exist there out of pure randomness, causeless spontaneous existence. But since such existence forms properties, they expand. - This is me explaining why calling for a cause to the Planck scale makes no sense.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm not dodging, I'm countering the points you make. I've already explained the different solutions to the Big Bang theory. Penrose cycles, inflationary universe, loops or the one I described, which points out a first event without a prior cause.
But the key point is that the density of the universe right at the event of Big Bang would mean dimensions having no meaning, therefor no causality can occur in that state. It is fundamentally random and therefor you cannot apply a deterministic causality logic to it. And since you can't do that, how can you ask any of the questions in the way you do? It's either cyclic in some form, or it is an event that has no causality as its state is without the dimensions required for causality to happen.
If you want an answer to a first cause, that's the answer I've been given many times now. The first cause in that scenario is the first causal event to form out of the state in which causality has no meaning, which is a state that has mathematical and theoretical support in physics. But if your point is that "aha! see there's a first cause!" then you are just stating the obvious here and I don't know what your point really is? Because you jump between pointing out the obvious, entangled in a web of unnecessary reasoning, and asking irrational questions about physics.
Quoting Philosophim
No, it is the theoretical scale supported by math in which general relativity and quantum physics breaks down. You even quoted exactly that part, and yet you don't seem to understand what it means.
You don't seem to understand the difference between an invention of interpretation and the thing that's being interpreted. You argue as if the number 2 is an invention. The invention is the interpretation of reality that correlates to the real thing of 2 something.
A Planck unit is a mathematical invention of interpretation. The Planck scale is not the invention.
And it's not "the place in which our tools begins affecting the outcome", read the bold line in that quote you posted and really think about what it actually really means.
Quoting Philosophim
But it isn't conclusive. You still have the Penrose theories, and other cyclic interpretations that do not have a first cause as it's circular. There's no need for a first cause as the cycle, the loop causes itself. It's only paradoxical because we aren't equipped to understanding such things intuitively, because we are bound to thinking within the parameters of this reality. But the math supports such interpretations as well. And as I've pointed out, math is not an invention of reality, it is an invention of interpretation and our interpretations have yet to formulate a defined answer as to if our universe appeared out of nothing, or if it is a form of cyclic looping event causing itself.
What I have been saying is that your logic isn't enough to point out a first cause, since such conclusion is bound to the parameters of this reality. You can point out a first cause within our reality, beginning at the start of our dimensions; but you cannot conclude anything past that with it since there's no evidence for our reality functioning the same beyond the formation of it's foundation. Therefor, we can conclude there being a first cause at the point of the Big Bang, for this reality (as it operates on entropic causality) and it could be that it IS the first cause out of nothing, based on what I've been describing above. But a cyclic, and in our point of view, paradoxical looping universe is still a functioning hypothesis, and since such is beyond the logic of this reality, it breaks the logic in your argument.
Quoting Philosophim
As said, it is one of the interpretations that exists, I don't adhere to the absolutism of any single interpretation just because the logic I find is sound, because there are too many possible interpretations that include mathematical projections beyond our reality. Regardless, your reasoning is a totally unnecessary confusing web when we already have the math that points towards this outcome. It's all already there in the physics, but you seem to just want to lift up your argument and reasoning as something beyond it, which it's not. So I question the reason for this argument as physics already provide one with more actual physics-based math behind it and I question the singular conclusion of first cause as it doesn't counter the other interpretations that exist.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't have to, I understand the physics instead. The conflict is in that you try to re-invent the wheel and demand others to accept your wheel when they already have perfect ones mounted. I critique the need for your argument. And since you demonstrate a shallow understanding of the physics at play; it all just looks like you are with force trying to mount your wheel on top of our already functioning wheels, not understanding that those wheels already work.
Have you ever heard of a logical fallacy called a "Straw man argument"?
A straw man fallacy (sometimes written as strawman) is the informal fallacy of refuting an argument different from the one actually under discussion, while not recognizing or acknowledging the distinction.
One who engages in this fallacy is said to be "attacking a straw man".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man
I've listed an argument. If you say, "I don't have to understand it, I'm going to attack this thing instead," you're committing a fallacy. You're off in your own world over there. I can help you come to understand the OP's point if you want. This isn't to say you can't disprove the OP, you may very well be able to do so. But if you don't understand it, what are you talking about?
I'm going to sum to OP up so its easier to understand. Ask questions and seek to understand it first, then criticize it.
A first cause is something which exists that has no prior cause for its existence.
If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.
Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.
Feel free to ask questions about this, refer to the OP, etc. Try to understand it first. When you show understanding, then critique. As it is, you're just not addressing what I've written and its a waste of both of our times.
Maybe understand in what context I wrote that in before calling it a straw man.
Quoting Philosophim
No, I argue against the conclusion you make as we already have physics telling us similar things that doesn't need you to re-invent the wheel, but also other interpretations that gets ignored by the absolutism of your conclusion.
You get so hung up on forcing people to understand you that you use others rejection of your argument as some evidence that you are right. But in doing so you ignore the objections being raised.
In order to maybe simplify things (as you seem to not really care about the counter argument you are answering to) I let an AI break down the flaws of your OP. Notice the highlighted parts in relation to what I've been writing. Also notice the irony in you calling out fallacies.
Quoting Philosophim
I have critiqued, but you don't understand the critique you get, and instead you use an argument about people not understanding you as your go-to defense against other's critique.
:up:
(Sorry @Philosophim, but he sounds so authoritative I succumb to his reasoning.)
If you ever see me doing this, please be hard on me. Thanks
This is a lot of effort to avoid addressing the summary I put forth. Also a refusal to explain to me in your own words what I'm saying to show that you understand it.
Quoting Christoffer
When the writer of the idea tells you that you're off, and tries to clarify it for you, listen. A straw man accusation is serious. And your statement is exactly what a person who uses a straw man does to keep using that logical fallacy. I posted the summary to indicate to you the point of the OP. That was your time to look at the summary and indicate how your point addresses that summary and my accusation was wrong. You did not do this. Meaning my accusation stands. It is not a flaw on my part to accuse you of this. It is a flaw on your part not to adequately answer this.
Nothing you are showing demonstrates that a first cause is not logically necessary by the OP's points and summary, and in many cases, you indicate you think its a very real possibility that first causes can exist. Trolling by going to chat GPT at this point is just silly.
Look, if you don't want to engage with me anymore, that's fine. I'm looking for arguments against the OP and that's all I care about. If you can't bother to address the point of the OP or clearly demonstrate that you are by referencing the OP or the summary, then the straw man accusation stands.
I think it would be entirely appropriate for Christoffer to stop engaging.
Incorrect. I'm declaring a very real critique of his point. Look, throwing out a bunch of quantum physics references and going off on his own theories with a ton of paragraphs is not a good argument. That's just a "Baffle them with Bull!&*#" strategy. I'm not going to spend my time when I've already directed him to address particular points that he's ignoring, or he still demonstrates he doesn't understand the OP. Look at this here:
Quoting Christoffer
You understand the OP, so you understand that this is the exact description of a first cause. A first cause is uncaused. And yes, something uncaused has no prior cause for its existence. That's the entire point.
This guy isn't getting that despite me trying to tell him a couple of times now. So he agrees with my point, as I've already told him, then he doubles down like he thinks he's saying something against my points. He doesn't understand. He's in his own world.
Quoting Christoffer
I answer this directly with the summary I gave. He ignores this completely. He doesn't understand that the OP is addressing both finite regressive, as well as infinitely regressive and circular chains of causality and noting that at the end, there is no prior cause for their existence besides the fact of their being. What else can I say to him? You already mentioned in an earlier post that "We're both right". I get it, he can't seem to. :)
This is exactly the type of non-engagement I am seeing throughout the exchange. I don't know nearly enough to know whcih side is closer to 'correct' or whatever the actual case is - I'm just saying how it appears to someone in that position. I would suggest that your 'Baffle Them....' assertion is likely unconscious projection.
I have had to accept (with Banno, particularly) that I just dont get it, despite being convinced at every stage that Banno is not reading or paying attention, at least. I think the humility to accept that someone in that kind of position is probably on to something is reasonably helpful. I am merely trying to let you know it appears the same is happening here. The actual arguments aren't - that - relevant. I don't see you addressing them.
I did say that. But that wasn't addressing the bulk of what he's talking about because I wouldn't know whether you were both right. It was a very specific point I addressed there. I am only speaking about your conduct, not your arguments. I simply do not see you addressing hte objections. You might be 100% on the right side of hte issue.
In that case, the normal default is you side with the OP's accusation and expect the accused to answer it. If the OP is of course lying or unfairly accusing, feel free to point out where the OP's accusations fail. But it should be specifics, not general.
Quoting AmadeusD
I would take that suggestion if you presented some evidence. I am very keen that there are people who want me to just be wrong. That colors a lot of the argumentation. Which is fine. And I'm also aware I'm human and can make the mistake that I'm accusing other of. But I would like a concrete example to be sure.
Quoting AmadeusD
This is fair and honest. If I'm not being clear enough, that's fine. I've already mentioned this was written two years ago, and if I were to rewrite it today it would be much clearer. Somehow the thread got kicked up again and here we are though. :D
Its really pretty simple:
If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.
Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.
Thus in either case, we have something which has no prior reason for its existence, thus a first cause is logically necessary.
Quoting AmadeusD
We shouldn't be concerned about the person, but the arguments. Having success in one area does not mean you'll be successful in another. If there is a particular point that was pointed out that you want me to address, I'll do so.
Quoting AmadeusD
If my conduct is flawed or overly hostile, I'll try to do better. I try to keep neutral in the discussion, but I'm human and can fail. My point is that many of his objections are not objections, and he doesn't understand the OP. I could go through paragraph by paragraph and show why, but I did that on his previous post and he's still not getting it. At that point I've found a good way to move forward with honest debaters is to recenter and ask the person critiquing to demonstrate that they understand the OP. Otherwise it can become pages and pages of points and counter points over things that don't even matter to the idea. If he's honest, he'll give it a shot. If he just want to 'be right' and he's doing this for ego, he won't.
I appreciate the feedback btw.
I agree, but that wasn't what i was suggesting.
Quoting Philosophim
That's a fair call, but if, to his eyes, you're not giving good-faith responses, you can see why he wouldn't bother, regardless of honesty. If someone repeatedly speaks past you, ignoring what you're saying, you wouldn't be partial to spending more time nutting out their problem for them.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm unsure that has occurred. I went back the last few longer posts between the two of you. I don't think those responses are dealing with his objections. But you are convinced that he 'doesn't get it'. This is, again, the exact attitude I am trying to highlight. You are not engaging with his objections with replies like this. You are claiming he doesn't understand - which is also what he is saying to you. Surely, you can understand that if he has the same notion you do, there might be something in it (might be on your side too!!) Maybe a better approach would be to zoom in on a single issue he's taken, and really nut out that one issue. I would suggest the best point would be the Planck scale issue between you. This should be understood between you before anything else gets off the ground as its a totally empirical consideration - you could find out its merely a misuse of 'scale' instead of 'unit'. Or C could find that out, and with that, your explications are sensible to him.
Quoting Philosophim
This post is an example of where I think you've failed to address much at all. You've (imo, very condescendingly) asserted that he's using a Straw man (I can't see where) and then not dealt with his clear, precise objections. Again, this doesn't even mean you're wrong. It just means there's no chance for a decent discussion, anyway. The quote and reply immediately after this line is meant to convey somewhere C may be fed up with going back to restate his issue.
Quoting Philosophim
I do not see how that follows. Perhaps C doesn't either, and so you're not past the first hurdle in his eyes. But I haven't seen either of you zoom in on that, if that's the case it follows that everything beyond that would be problematic, between you. Could that he wants you to address this specifically and ensure you're not walking on stilts.
Quoting Philosophim
That's not at all what he did. If your argument fails the first hurdle of its premises being legitimate, how would understanding the actual argument matter? If someone gives me an argument that rests on a P1 of "All white men are racist" as gets bandied about, their actual argument isn't relevant. That is an empirically wrong premise. That may be happening here, it may not. I'm saying it needs to be addressed before the rest of your argument could be worthy of discussion.
In terms of concrete examples, I have given a couple by way of quotes (and now the above). But your responses seem to amount to "No, he doesn't get it" without ever addressing his actual material objections (Planck scale, that your logic is dimensionally-restricted etc..). Its very hard to know how to respond to that without repeating that i think it might be the other way around. I also would call your assertion of his ChatGPT posting as a 'troll' to be extremely weird, and clearly a dodge. The post goes through, in detail, the logical inconsistencies of your OP. Im unsure you can beat that by just saying C was doing something wrong in seeking it.
Quoting Christoffer
This seems a really clear, concise summing up of why he is flustered by your long-winded replies. They don't actually seem to get past the objection here. That's why I suggest zooming in. Don't try to address fifty things in a post. Pick one thing and press him on it, if that's the issue. If you're willing to engage ad infinitum, respect. But be reasonable about what you're engaging - particularly if you see his responses as scatter-shot straw men :)
There's one major difference. We're discussing the OP, not his theory. If he wants to post his own theory, feel free. If he's not understanding or addressing the OP after I try to point to it, then I have no responsibility to further engage with him. If I went into another thread, ignored or misunderstood the OP, then started going on my theory, I would be the one off base. It is not my responsibility in my own thread to go down some rabbit hole away from the OP. I've done that plenty of times in the past, and it ends up nowhere.
Quoting AmadeusD
And this is exactly why I'm telling him to demonstrate he understands the OP at this point. I'm very tired of talking past him. His responsibility is to point to the OP with his problems and critiques. I'm not interested in talking to a guy who after I've already pointed out he agrees with me on issues of the OP, he continues to rant onward. I'm also not going to continue to engage in his personal quibble of whether I understand quantum physics or not. That's just ego talking, not an addressing of the points.
Quoting AmadeusD
You bet I did. Let me point out why I did.
Quoting Christoffer
THIS is condescending. I will treat people respectfully until they start this, then I will respond in kind.
This tells me this person is not interested in discussing the OP, but their own ideas. The OP has nothing to do with physics. I don't care about his own ideas. I care about how is own ideas add or critique the argument I'm giving. His ideas are not. He's not even trying to.
He can make his own thread if he wants to talk about his own ideas. You cannot discuss with someone who does not want to, or care to, understand the point the OP is making.
And this is why I didn't bother with the rest of his post. Its not that he doesn't understand. I can work with that. He doesn't want to understand. Why am I discussing with him then? A waste of my time. I've debated a lot over the years, and this is the reddest of red flags that the person is not going to listen to you.
Quoting AmadeusD
Good advice. I did try to rope it back to the most important point, his admittance that he did not care to understand what the OP was saying, but use his own argument. The admittance of a straw man that needed to be dealt with before anything else.
I appreciate the discussion, but lets let him weigh in now if he chooses. I don't want to derail the thread further.
Quoting Philosophim In a metaphysical sense, of course.
Its a fair point that a few have addressed. I'll note again that I wrote this two years ago, and I would rewrite it to be much clearer now. Not my fault someone dug it up again. :D
The clearest way I believe I can communicate a first cause is when we reach a point in causality where there is nothing prior which leads to its existence. It is not caused, but it enters into causation. Such a cause does not necessarily 'create' other things either. Its equally possible for a first cause to enter into an area where other existences have been prior. It then becomes part of the causality chains in what it interacts with.
I don't know if that clears it up any. If you can find a category error, feel free to point it out.
Quoting jgill
Correct. Why does one chain exist instead of something else?
Quoting jgill
What do you in particular mean by metaphysical? I only ask this because in my experience plenty of people have their own unique take. If I understand correctly, you're noting that the first cause is that the chain exists, not a first cause necessarily causing the chain to exist. Its the logical conclusion that at the end of the day, we're going to reach a point in causality where there is nothing prior. There is nothing that caused existence to be. It simply happened.
The understanding of this, that there is at least something that exists without prior explanation, lets us see a truth to the universe. There is no underlying grand plan. There simply is. Lets make the most of it.
It's a lot of effort for trying to explain how I actually argued against you since you ignore engaging with the actual counter arguments and keep rejecting in ways like this:
Quoting Philosophim
That you are the writer of the idea is not a foundation for the idea being solid.
Quoting Philosophim
Yet you ignore your own faults on display while praising your own writing?
Quoting Philosophim
Is it? Or is the point that I've already addressed your argument and that you are still just praising your own writing as your form of defense, dismissing engagement with what's been actually written. Using GPT like this for a breakdown is primarily because you seem to not understand the criticism you get so you try to hide behind the same straw man that you falsely accuse others of doing. Let's do that again with what you wrote right now and maybe you'll see once again how problematic your reasoning is, starting at the argument in which you accuse me of a straw man:
And further analysis of what you wrote now:
Analyzing in this way produces an objective analysis of your argument. Dismissing it for the sake of how the analysis is done rather than the points it brings up makes zero sense. You're just deflecting all criticism you get by cherry picking parts of a counter argument out if its context and making a straw man of it yourself, then calling out the other person for doing a straw man. I've countered your argument, I've engaged in further explanations for the objections you raised and yet you still act as if no one has countered your OP. It's dishonest. Your OP post has flaws in its reasoning, explained multiple times now, including an AI analysis in the attempt to making it more objective, yet you still praise your own logic and fail to engage in the discussion on the merits of discourse. Rather, you demand people to counter argue within the context that you want, not by the merits of your own reasoning, which has been clearly demonstrated to be flawed. There's no point in providing more arguments than I've already given because at this point you're just ignoring the counterpoints raised and tries to deflect through dishonest cherry picking.
Quoting Philosophim
You falsely assume that your argument can solely rely on a logical argument and ignore the actual science which provides counters to it. The theories provided are there to show you how your logical reasoning isn't enough for the conclusions you made.
Quoting Philosophim
I've directed you to the problems of your reasoning, that's what's being ignored here. You're so biased towards your own argument that you value it like gold and any counter argument is straw manned by you. You're just projecting your own fallacies by dismissing and deflecting when calling out straw man's of other people, especially when you don't even use the accusation of straw man properly.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, projecting by describing yourself. You fail to simply understand that your argument of a first cause is just empty dislocated logic in face of the science actually decoding reality into a complexity beyond that use of logic. So it's you who live in your own world of your own logic out of a limited understanding of the science, and demand that everyone acknowledge how brilliant you are or else they are beneath you.
Quoting Philosophim
Just reiterating your argument again is not a valid counter argument to any of the criticism. It is being ignored because your OP as already been addressed, in summery:
The OP simplifies things too much by saying everything either has a prior cause or there's a first cause, ignoring other possibilities. It also talks about this first cause (Alpha) without really explaining it well. It sticks to a traditional idea of cause and effect that might not hold up in complex areas like quantum mechanics. The way it defines "Alpha" is circular; like it's saying it exists because it has to, which isn't a strong argument. It also quickly dismisses other ideas about never-ending or looping causes without much reasoning. The argument doesn't differentiate between different kinds of causes and ends up with a speculative conclusion that a first cause must exist. It doesn't consider other theories about the universe that don't need a first cause. It has notable gaps that has been thoroughly pointed out, which you totally ignore.
And to drive the point further, here's a summery of an AI analysis of your deduction alone, without the fluff:
If nothing of this is enough to point out that your OP is flawed, including everything that I've written prior, then you are simply not equipped to handle criticism and well only keep deflecting through self-praise.
LOL
I'm afraid life has given me an inability to take OPs so seriously, on the basis of them being OPs.
I recognize Christoffer as having a lot of insight that can be learned from. I can understand you wanting the conversation to go the way you want it to go. However, to my mind that doesn't seem too relevant to whether Cristoffer's posts bring value to the thread.
Of course, I may have seen too many OPs claiming I was in league with the devil, and so it is just me thinking you are kind of control freaky.
A first cause is that which has no prior explanation for its being. Have you proven that you've found something in physics which has been conclusively determined to have no prior cause for its existence? If you have, great, you've shown that my claim is valid. If not, then you're still talking about something that has a prior causation for its existence, and therefore is not a first cause.
Quoting Christoffer
If you want to demonstrate how you've countered my argument, simply explain to me what my argument is Christopher. I'm telling you you don't understand it. Well prove me wrong! Just summarize that in your own words. Its one of the most reasonable requests a person can make, and the easiest way to counter an accusation that you're presenting a straw man. When you're over there beating an argument of your own imagination, there's really nothing else to discuss until you resolve the accusation.
I'm an honest person, I can take all the stuff you've already said and apply it to your summary. If you can't summarize the argument and tell me what I'm actually saying, then my accusation of you using a straw man fallacy is correct and none of your other points mean anything.
Maybe he does. But right now I can't get him to summarize the argument in his own words after he confessed he didn't have to understand the argument. Such a person has nothing of value to add to the point.
Quoting wonderer1
I'm not claiming he's in the league with the devil. :) Its also not control freaky to guide a person back to the OP when the OP is presenting a very specific argument. This isn't a generic open ended discussion thread. There's a very clear point being made, and discussion needs to focus around that.
Your argument's conclusion is that there has to be a first cause, which is only one interpretation in physics. And through the explanations given, your logic of causality as a framework for beyond our reality does not function or becomes inconclusive since your reasoning is bound to this reality and do not compute with quantum mechanics. And seen as causality itself is in question even in our reality and isn't a defined constant, other than on the scales in which determinism operates, you cannot conclude your conclusions through the reasoning you provide.
Quoting Philosophim
You don't even seem to understand what a straw man is.
Quoting Philosophim
You accusing others of fallacies does not resolve your own fallacies. That's deflection and projection. You ignore engaging with the criticism given and try to steer the argument into other directions by cherry picking out of context and accusing other's of fallacies that doesn't even fit the definition. There's no point in engaging any further with someone so deeply in love with their own argument that they are totally incapable of even understanding the criticism given, even on a surface level.
Quoting Philosophim
I have made plenty of summaries, but you ignore them. You want people to engage in a way that makes it easy for you to counter-argue, if you don't understand the criticism, you deflect in this way. This kind of demand for others to engage in the way you want in order to control the discussion is downright childish.
Quoting Philosophim
I didn't confess to that, I said that your flawed reasoning is at odds with quantum physics and I rely on that for the context of this topic. Get off your high horse.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't need your guidance.
Quoting Philosophim
You don't own how other people engage with you and I've stayed on topic, but you simply don't seem to understand how.
Quoting Philosophim
This is is hilarious. You use a straw man wrong and if other's don't engage in the way you want them to, you use that deflection to ignore everything that's been said. Are you able to extrapolate any criticism from the huge amount of writing I've given your thread or are you gonna continue act like a 7-year old king of your sand castle?
I'm done with this low level discussion; you're not equipped to handle a philosophical discussion and so the discussion is pointless.
But what is my definition of a first cause? Its that which has no prior cause for its existence.
Quoting Christoffer
There is nothing beyond reality. Reality is what is. Physics is the investigation of the fundamentals of reality. A more apt description to describe what I think you're intending is that we have the laws of this universe, and you are proposing that there is another universe where the laws act differently. Reality is the totality of everything, even two universes with different laws.
Now, if you're stating that the origin of this universe was caused by another universe with different laws, then you're noting that this universe is caused by another. In which case there is the question, "What caused the universe of quantum mechanics to happen?" Either something caused it to happen, or nothing caused the universe of quantum mechanics to happen and it is a first cause.
If you are instead stating that this universe was not caused by another universe, then once again, we have the existence of this universe as a first cause. Do you understand? You have been describing situations that are first causes or involve prior causality, not countering the idea of a first cause.
Quoting Christoffer
No, I clearly can because a first cause is not pre-determined, so its outside of determinism. There's no prior cause for a first cause right? That necessarily means that while it can of course determine other things, its existence is not pre-determined. A first cause can result in causality as it interacts with other things, but itself is not caused by something else.
I am not seeing how causality is under question. Causality is simply noting that at any particular point, there was a prior combination of events and forces that lead to the current state. When you reach a point in which there are no prior combination of events and forces that lead to a state, you have a first cause. If you do not agree with this, please point out where this does not make sense.
I appreciate you summarizing and engaging. Really. Many people would just abandon the thread but you stuck to it. I've gone back through your previous points you believe I left unanswered that are relevant to the discussion and will try to answer them here.
Quoting Christoffer
Do you see now that this is the exact description of a first cause? A first cause has no rules as to what it should be, that would be causality. Something removed from prior causality is only explained by the fact of its existence, nothing prior.
Quoting Christoffer
My point is that a first cause is logically necessary using the summary I gave you earlier. You may have been overcomplicating the issue. Which is fair, I wrote this two years ago and would write it more cleanly now. Someone resurrected this thread a few weeks back so here we are now. :)
Quoting Christoffer
And here is where you missed the entire point of the discussion. Let me post the summary again.
If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason.
My addressing infinite regression was the major point of the OP. My point is that even with infinite regression, there's still a first cause. Why is it an infinite loop instead of a finite regression? There is no prior cause for this, it simply is. Feel free to debate that point, but understand that that is the entire point.
Quoting Christoffer
As noted, the other interpretations do not remove us from the definition of what a first cause is, or prove that a first cause is not logically necessary. Feel free to take a stab at it again, but so far I'm not seeing it.
If there are any other previous critiques that are relevant to the OP that I've missed, please let me know.
Quoting Philosophim
It really, truly is not. I have noted exactly why it is a legitimate avenue to take. I'm unsure, again, how its possible you are still pretending that you're pointing out a flaw here.
Quoting Philosophim
I see he has, and I shall (below) defer.
Quoting Philosophim
This is what I, and he, see you doing. Please, don't have such a blindness that you cannot apply this exact same thing to yourself. Because, the only evidence you have is in that direction.
Quoting Philosophim
He doesn't. Which he has explicitly stated, multiple times. I'm really, genuinely convinced you are way deep in a sunk-cost fallacy here.
Quoting Philosophim
*his objections. It is clear to me you are not open to an honest discussion of what's going on here and I don't think you're doing it on purpose, so no guff. But, I have done my part - I shall retreat. Good luck to both on not missing what could be a great discussion :)
Now, feel free to take his criticisms and assist him. If you feel he has adequately criticized the OP, feel free to point out where exactly that criticism hits and I have not responded to. Specifics and clear reasoning behind your accusations can be convincing. But anything else at this point is just personal opinion.
:ok: And not at all ironic. I agree fully, whether I'm wrong or not :)
Ok, you agree with me then. The free will act I described appeared to be random, but really it was a "first cause".
Quoting Philosophim
Doesn't my example of dropping the ball serve as proof. The act is either random or caused by free will. You showed how it is not truly random, so we can conclude free will.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sorry, I do not understand you Ludwig. Are you making a distinction between an action and an event? Why? Is it just for the purpose of stating that free will is not a cause?
Hi Metaphysician, good to see you again. :)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think there was a misunderstanding. A first cause is uncaused. Meaning its existence is a purely random event that cannot be predicted. Free will is not purely random but has constraints and influences. As I noted earlier the brain is where human thought resides, and there is prior causality to the brain. A first cause has no prior causality, so free will cannot be a first cause either.
What you may be confusing is the idea of a first cause vs a measurement where we state, "OK, this is the starting, or origin of a causal system. Meaning we start with the hand releasing the ball as a measurement, but we're not denying that there is prior causality to why the hand is there, gravity, etc. A first cause is not a measurement by us. It is a fundamental reality that has no prior cause for its existence.
Glad to be back Philosophim.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't quite understand this. An event which cannot be predicted is not necessarily purely random. I understand a freely willed event to be like this, it cannot be predicted yet it is not random. So the example of dropping the ball. The drop cannot be predicted, not even by the person dropping it or else that person does not adhere to the principles of the experiment. The person just (seemingly randomly) drops the ball at any moment. And we cannot say that the act is purely random as you describe, because there is a reason for it, the person wanted to.
That an event occurs within constraints does not necessitate the conclusion that it is a caused event. Suppose for example that there are events occurring within a human brain. If we broke down in analysis, these events, some may be uncaused. These uncaused events would be occurring within the constraints of the brain. There is no reason to believe that all of the events occurring within the brain must be caused. There could be uncaused events occurring all the time, at a small level, and as they occur they are constrained by surrounding caused events. The point, is that there clearly is prior causality to the brain, as you say, but this does not rule out uncaused events within the brain, which make us feel like we have free will.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm talking about "first cause" in the same sense as you, an event which has no prior cause. In the example it's not a question of why the hand is there, it's a question of why does the hand release the ball at the precise moment that it does. This act of release has a causal chain which we can follow back in time, to somewhere in the brain. But at some point the person holding the ball, simply decides "now", and releases it. This freely willed decision is the cause of that chain of events in the brain and nervous system which causes the ball to drop, but there is no cause of that decision of "now", at that point in time.
There's a puzzle. I don't think that idea of a cause that is self-explanatory makes much sense. It doesn't seem to fit with your idea of causality. Is that meant to be an example of a first cause?
Quoting Philosophim
So finding a first cause is just a reason for developing new ideas. It has happened before and no doubt it will happen again Whether one calls them causal or not really seems much less important.
Quoting Philosophim
Yes, I take the point that there is a difference between the Big Bang and an arbitrarily chosen starting-point. The Big Bang is implicit in the framework of explanation. But then, there are these pesky people who ask questions which do not go away. And so we start developing new ideas, based on what we already know, but also going beyond them. Whether you call them causal or not is not really very interesting.
Quoting Christoffer
I have to say that I trust your judhement about what an AI says way before I trust the AI. Why do you think that the AI can do that job? Mind you, I mostly agree with what you say.
Quoting Christoffer
H'm It's very tempting to think that way. But the question is always how we can "correlate" to a reality that exists independently of our interpretation. I'm not saying it can't be done. On the contrary, it must be done. So the criteria for "non-verbal" reality need to be built in to our interpretation.
Quoting Christoffer
I read this as saying that when explanation reaches rock-bottom, in one sense, it ends, but in another sense requires a new conceptual framework. Which people are developing in the case of the Big Bang. For me, it was always obvious that would happen. It has happened before and no doubt it will happen again.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm sorry. I didn't mean to say that free will is really a first cause. I meant to say only that that is the "traditional" view and as an example of what happens when you reach rock-bottom in a specific pattern of explanation. At that point, further explanation will require a categorial change in thinking. It was not a very good example. My own view is that actions by people are explained in a non-causal framework, by purposes, values and reasons. "Free will" is an umbrella for all the "springs of action" - convenient because it doesn't require us to consider all the complexities. Simplification can be useful - and misleading. It's a big topic and won't be helpful here.
That statement was addressed to Philosophim. To you i said I didn't understand you.
Quoting Ludwig V
But don't you agree that what you call "springs of action" are first causes in a causal chain? A person makes a choice, springs to action, and this begins a causal chain. If, later, we look back at the causal chain which has progressed from a spring to action, we see the choice which was made as "the end" of the causal chain, or the "final cause" in that chain.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm sorry for the confusion. I'm still working out how to deal with situations when several people are involved.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes and no. There are two modes of explanation involved and much difficulty about the relationship between the two. There is, presumably, a causal chain involved. There is also what is usually called a rational or purposive explanation involved. These two are in different categories or frameworks. We are finding out a good deal about the first kind. We use the second kind every day. We (well, philosophers,) are in a good deal of confusion about the relation between the two. It won't do to say that they are just different kinds of explanation and leave it at that - though that was popular a few decades ago. Nor will it do to "reduce" one to the other or identify one or other as the "real" explanation. How much more do you want? It would take us miles beyond this thread. Perhaps I should post that paragraph as the beginning of a discussion.
A random event is not about our current ability to measure to predict, it is about a hard logical limitation to predict. A first cause is something self-explained, there is nothing prior that causes it. Such a thing cannot be predicted to arise as there is absolutely nothing causing it.
The point I'm trying to make is that randomness due to lack of knowledge is not the same as randomness with even perfect omniscience could not predict.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A constraint is part of what causes an outcome. A first cause cannot have constraints or anything that would lead a particular outcome. Because that would 'cause' the first 'first cause' to be. Meaning its not really a first cause. A first cause is as simple as "No quark is there, not a quark is there." There is nothing that caused the quark. It exists purely because it does.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, this is possible. But it is something which would need to be proven. So, cool idea!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This again would need to be proven. I don't think science points that way. I think its pretty clear the brain has a sense of timing and it can be traced through causality. But, as I noted earlier, you have an interesting idea that could be tested.
Yes, a first cause is that which is not caused by something else. It may be difficult to comprehend, but it is logically necessary.
Quoting Ludwig V
No, its just a logical consequence. You're looking for a reason beyond trying to solve the puzzle first. Its a consequence, not why I tried to solve the puzzle! The reason I tried to solve the puzzle was because I thought the back and forth between God and no God was missing a glaring point. Is there a first cause somewhere in causality? Its not an opinion, its a logical conclusion that there must be.
Quoting Ludwig V
With the understanding that there must be at least one first cause (there is no limitation of course) we have a very clear definition of what a first cause entails. This lets us do something great: require proof. While its logically necessary that first causes exist, saying, "X is a first cause" is a high bar of proof that is falsifiable. Thus we can propose ideas or have faith, but none of it has teeth without evidence.
Appreciate the contribution Ludwig.
I asked you this before and never got a response, so I'll try again. Using your terminology from the OP, let Y be an atom radioactively decaying into another atom. Is there an X that caused this Y?
My apologies if I missed an earlier reply! Here's a quick summary of how radioactivity works. https://www.arpansa.gov.au/understanding-radiation/what-is-radiation/ionising-radiation/radioactivity#:~:text=What%20causes%20atoms%20to%20be,an%20excess%20of%20internal%20energy.
In layman's terms, when there is too much internal energy within an atom due to a proton, electron imbalance, there is not enough force to keep the atom together. Over time, the internal structure sends out parts of the atom which when separated, are referred to as energy or photons. So yes.
Perhaps I'm not following you, but it seems to me that you're not addressing the random nature of these events.
Quoting Philosophim
This describes the necessary conditions for decay to occur, but what is the specific event/cause X that causes the specific Y at that specific time?
Quoting Philosophim
What's your answer? Yes or no?
I must have missed something. I thought you were saying that while first causes must exist, there were no existing examples.
I accept that there are first causes in pragmatic applications of an existing causal framework. Call them pragmatic. There are also first causes inherent, defined by, any causal framework - even if only as conceptually possible. But the concept of a cause outside a framework of definition and explanation, is meaningless. Hence any actual causal explanation is relative to its framework.
Oh, I see what you're asking for now. Let me give you your answer and then a bit more. First, I'm not a physicist which is why I linked you the material to read. But I think what you're looking for is that we either do not know the exact mechanisms or we are unable to know after the fact. Our lack of knowledge or inability is of course not enough to declare it as a first cause however. That's because we've clearly defined what a first cause is so can easily identify it.
First, a first cause has no prior causality for its existence. This means that there is nothing which directs it, shapes it, or limits it outside of itself. To claim something is a first cause, this must be proven. We cannot say, "We don't understand or can currently measure something, therefore its a first cause." It must be demonstrated without a doubt that there is nothing prior which made that existence.
Second, a first cause does not entail that it is separate from causality once formed. For example, a photon could form without prior cause, but once it is formed, if it enters into direct play with anything else, it is now part of a causal chain. Meaning the first cause for the photon in this instance would be its formation. Its interaction with another atom would not be a first cause, but a next step in causality.
Quoting EricH
So, if a first cause has no prior explanation for its existence, then it has no reason why it should be. This also entails that there is not a reason that anything could not simply be either. Why? If there is a lean or limitation towards a particular first cause, there is a reason behind this limitation. Meaning our purported 'first cause' is in fact, not a first cause. The first cause would be the lean or limitation. Meaning that a first cause has no limitations, reasons, or necessary things it must be or do besides the fact that nothing prior to it caused it to be.
So, is it plausible? Sure. If we consider that first causes are necessary in any causal chain, and think about what that entails, it means a first cause could appear as anything at any time. Again however, if we are to claim "This X is a first cause," it must be shown with proof. Thus any causal chain must be followed to its first cause. We cannot invent a first cause that is imaginary or separate from the causal chain. Meaning that in your atom example, we work backwards from physics until we get to the point where we can predict a stable probability of atomic decay. This consistency is evidence of something stable and limited. For example, atomic decay does not random spawn an elephant or cookies, but radiation without fail. What is causing this? That question must be answered with proof.
I meant that there are no existing proven discoveries of anything that is a first cause. No one to my mind, has ever conclusively proven that any "x" exists without something prior causing it to be. A belief or limitation in current capabilities is not evidence of a first cause. We must have the tools and evidence to conclusively demonstrate something is a first cause.
Quoting Ludwig V
I am not talking about pragmatism, origin creation, or a 'starting point' that we pick. I'm talking about a factual, inalienable, provable first cause that exists regardless of our current capabilities or awareness. A first cause does not depend on our observation, it simply is.
Quoting Ludwig V
See my above reply for what a first cause entails. I'll be happy to dive in further if required.
Yes, the first cause is its existence. What is the reason why this infinitely regressive chain of causality exists? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is. One way I've tried communicating it is you can view it as the set of all causality. What caused the set of all causality? Nothing else caused the set of all causality.
Quoting jgill
I don't quite understand the question. Lets say there's a rock that exists which we haven't defined yet. Does our ability to define it mean it doesn't exist? No. It exists despite our definitions. The interaction of our minds and identities is the cause of definitions, so we can conclusively say definitions are not first causes.
Suppose it is possible to prescribe each link in the chain. Is this description a first cause of the chain? It coincides with existence. Precedes it, actually.
No. What causes the description? The interaction between a human and the link. The chain exists despite our ability or inability to define it. If a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, it still vibrates the air. :)
Suppose I create the chain. Am I the FC? Or are electro-chemical processes in the brain FCs?
Let's consider chains that originate in the human mind. How does FC differ from physical chains observed in nature?
We don't get to create the chain. We are not first causes. We can extend the chain into different branches. but we are not existences that formed without some prior causality. As you noted we are caused by other things such as a brain and body. Further, humans were caused by other things such as evolution. We aren't even close to the beginning of the chain.
Edit in case you reply before I finish:
Perhaps what you're asking is, "What would the necessary requirements be for a human to be a first cause?" Very simply you would not need to exist, then through no cause from anything else, appear whole as you are. From then on, you would be within causality, limited by what you are with the rest of the world around you.
In another case, its possible that you exist, and a photon appears in your body without any prior causality. That would be a first cause that then enters into the rest of the causal system within you. But you yourself would not be a first cause.
Of course not. Suppose instead we observe such a chain in nature, imbedding it in our minds. It now exists in two realms. Does an act of "measurement" affect FC?
I don't see any separation between realms, or a loss of causal connectivity. You observe, your mind stores the observation and definition as memory in your neurons. We can trace the causal chain from your first observation on. We are not separated in another realm.
Quoting jgill
No.
I take it that you are not prepared to make any judgements about the relationship between the two "modes of explanation". I don't agree with your claim that in the past it was popular to just say that the two were different, and leave it at that. I think the popular way was just to take it for granted that intention, purpose, free will, acts to produce a first cause. It was popular just to accept the way things appear to us, that causal chains begin with a freely willed act, and this constitutes the relationship between the two, the free will act begins a causal chain.
I believe that the recent rise of physicalism and scientism has produced the idea that if we follow a causal chain, created from a freely willed event backward, we would see that chain extends beyond the point of decision by the will, into some neurological activity or something like that. The issue that develops though, is what @jgill points to, the matter of a vast multitude of causal chains within the neurological system, and the temporal overlapping of them. So from the physicalism/scientism perspective, which is the determinist perspective, it is a matter of relating the temporality of numerous causal chains to each other, to represent the point of willing. From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains.
Quoting Philosophim
OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it.
Your reference to omniscience really does nothing except emphasize that human intelligence is not omniscient, and a failure of that intelligence to find "the cause" does not mean that a cause might not still be found by a higher intelligence. What the concept of "free will" signifies, is that there is no such cause in the sense of the causal chain, therefore a cause cannot be determined even by omniscience.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive.
Quoting Philosophim
Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause.
Quoting Philosophim
As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. So the temporal relations between the various causal chains, and the beginnings and endings of those causal chains (which the doctrine of free will indicates are real) occurring within the brain cannot be grasped by the brain's "sense of timing". The "sense of timing" which the conscious mind actual has, indicates that causal chains end and begin with the free will.
Quoting Philosophim
As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. Equally, we cannot exclude ourselves as first causes without proof. As Ludwig implies, there are relations between causal chains and "reasons" (in the sense of purpose and intentions), which are not understood by us. This implies that when a being acts for a purpose we cannot exclude the possibility that the being is utilizing first causes in this type of act. And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain".
I'm not intending at all to debate the soul, so lets assume one exists. If free will comes from the soul, then free will is not a first cause. Is the soul a first cause then? For it to fit within a first cause it would need to be to be randomly created. There should be no reason a soul should or should not exist. Meaning that a God could not have created them. For if God created souls, then souls are not first causes. I just want you to be aware of this.
Even then, souls would be causing free will. So there's no real free will then either. If a soul is causing something, then it is constrained by rules and limitations. There is no limitation or rule as to what can be a first cause, but once its formed, it then causes other things. For example, lets say a photon appeared with no prior causality. It still acts like a photon once formed. It can be influenced, influence, etc. The only part that is a first cause is its appearance.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To think about the issue, lets say then that a soul is not behind free will but free will is its own thing uncaused by anything else. To prove this, we would have to show that free will is limitless and unconstrained. Except there are a few things we find.
1. Free will is constrained to living things. Free will does not exist on its own in the universe.
2. Free will is constrained to certain biological functions like the brain and nerves. Unless you think your toes or rocks can have free will.
3. Free will shouldn't be contained or limited by intelligence, and yet it is. A roach does not have the same will as a human being.
All of these things refute the idea that free will is a first cause. There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You should read the article, its pretty interesting. Here's the second paragraph:
"Using the fMRI to monitor brain activity and machine learning to analyze the neuroimages, the researchers were able to predict which pattern participants would choose up to 11 seconds before they consciously made the decision. And they were able to predict how vividly the participants would be able to envisage it."
That's not a reflex, that's a choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let me explain. Take a die roll. Can you roll a die and have a pink elephant appear? No. There are plenty of causes that explain the die roll. A '1' is a result because someone created the die to have a 1. It rolled because of the force of a human putting it into a cup, shaking it, and dropping it. It rattled because of gravity and reactions to force. It stopped moving because of friction. The die result is not a first cause. It is caused by many other forces and constraints.
A first cause has zero reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. This means there can be no constraints as to what or why it exists. Of course, once it forms, its part of causality and may be limited. Once a thing lasts longer than a measure of time, it is no longer a first cause. At that second tick of time, it is caused by the previous tick in time. It is only at that first tick of time where nothing prior has formed, restricted, or influenced its appearance that it is a first cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree 100%. As we come to understand the basics of what I wrote, we realize that tons of chains interlink all over the place. A first cause is not an interlink though. It is the end of prior causality somewhere in that mess. While there logically must be at least one, there could be several. And each would be exceedingly difficult to prove. How to you prove that prior to a certain point, a "X" (variable) has no reason for its existence? There's always the question that we simply missed something with our instruments or understanding. Proving that there is no instrument or understanding that could show some prior cause is very difficult. While a first cause is logically necessary, proving that "X" is one is a very high bar.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, this is not the case. A first cause necessitates that it be uncaused by something prior. If there is evidence at all that some other type of causality is in place, then a claim of a first cause fails. Here's one last nail in the coffin. Free will must respond to a stimulous, or choice. Do I go left, or right? What caused me to go left or right? One part of the prior cause is that I had an option to go left or right. Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
An inability to understand something completely is not evidence of a first cause. Evidence of a first cause requires that there be no possible explanation for why "X" occurs. Our comprehension of it is irrelevant. Free will has too much evidence that it is constrained and influenced by other factors. Therefore it is not possible that free will is a first cause.
A hypothetical chain going back to infinity doesn't have to have a first cause. At this point your preferred alternative is the existence of the chain. But this definition doesn't logically follow. Although you are not being theological here, your assertion is equivalent to the existence of God. And that's OK. I only wish this thread wasn't ultimately so existential and debatable. But that is the nature of philosophy, I suppose. I would prefer more emphasis on the chain itself and its origin than on what comes before its origin.
But this is your baby, so continue the fun. :smile:
Let me put it another way. The free will itself is not a first cause, because it is a property of the soul, and it is therefore guided by the intention, or purpose of the soul. What I propose is that free will is evidence of the reality of first causes. What I think, is that the soul uses first causes to exercise free will so that there could not be free will if there was no first causes. So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence.
Quoting Philosophim
So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. In other words, the soul's capacity to utilize the uncaused causes which are occurring is limited, or constrained by the physical body, but the reality of these constraints does not mean that the uncaused causes are not real. So you are correct to say " There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology", but this is irrelevant to the issue of first cause.
Quoting Philosophim
I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. There are all sorts of different types of "habit" involved in the actions of living things. The habit is what makes a living thing's actions predictable. Free will decisions are distinctly non-habitual.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints. The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. This is how the soul can utilize uncaused causes without being able to predict them, by constraining them as they come into being.
Quoting Philosophim
I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. And then there are self-directed actions derived from decisions, which com from within us. If these actions were just a continuation of the causal chains which enter into us through sensation, eating etc., it would be impossible for us to direct them as we do.
Quoting Philosophim
The issue was whether or not we "create the chain", not whether or not we create the first cause. The first cause is not created, we know that by definition. However, the particular chain it produces is dependent on the environment within which it arises. So we "create the chain" by preparing the environment for it, while still not predicting it.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it.
It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained.
Quoting Philosophim
This point is irrelevant due to your misunderstanding of the relationship between first causes and constraints.
:smile:
The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract.
Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any.
My point was that every time something like a first cause or brute fact has been found, we have redefined (or perhaps better "re-invented") the concept of "cause" and carried on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Prepared" is the right word. I regard it as an unsolved problem; perhaps I'll have something to offer one day. If not me, it will be someone else.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas"
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It was certainly popular amongst some philosophers. Whether that way is the way things appear to us or is an analysis from a specific philosophical point of view (dualism) is another question.
Common sense explanations cannot possibly depend on unknown and unseen events in the brain (or mind); if that were so, common people like us could never explain what people do. In their simplest form, explanations of action give the agent's rationale for action (together with indications how sound that rationale is).
That cannot be the same as a causal explanation, because a rationale justifies the action, whereas a causal explanation does not justify or fail to justify what it explains. A major difference is that a rationale explains the values that provoke or motivation the action, and causal explanations have no equivalent to the question what motivates an action.
Finally, a false belief, a delusion or mistake can explain an action but only facts can explain events that are subject to causality.
Mathematical and logical explanations are, of course, different again.
The fact that all three modes of explanation rely on "why?" and "because" can mislead one into thinking that they are more similar than they really are.
That, I would say is an interesting problem, which appears to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. This is due to the way that we understand causes, as something contingent on a prior cause. If we remove the prior cause (in "first cause"), we have the question of whether this is really a "cause" as we understand, because we understand causes in a causal chain as contingent on a prior cause. So it becomes ambiguous as to whether the firat cause is part of the chain or not.
I would argue that a first cause must be something prior to, and separate from the causal chain, not an element of the chain. This is because the elements of the chain are known through science and inductive reasoning, such that they are all of the same category, and being that way implies that there is another cause prior to each one. That is the way that we know "events".
These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. This implies the necessity of an actuality which actualizes the particular event, from the multitude of possibilities. You might consider this to be a sort of 'selection' process.
Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause.
So to be consistent with our true empirical observations, we must include "potential" into our descriptions of real events, and allow that events are contingent. This implies that the potential for any physical event always precedes, in time, the actual occurrence of that event, and something acts to cause, or 'select', the particular occurrence from the multitude of possibilities . This we can take as an inductive principle, a physical law, and on its own it appears to create an infinite regress of potential preceding actual, extending backward in time. However, we still need to account for the 'selection' process which determines the particular actual outcome from any instance of existing potentiality.
Things get complex now because we tend to assign the selection process to another chain of efficient causes Causal chains interact.. Therefore the various relations between causal chains appears to suffice for explanation of the selection required to account for the contingency of potential. However, this is just a superficial appearance. What the cosmological argument shows is that this provides an incomplete representation. If we look at the relationship between potential and actual, in an absolute way, we see that potential cannot really precede actual in this way. If there was ever a time when there was only potential, it would not have the capacity to actualize itself, and there would always be only potential. Potential cannot precede actual in an absolute way. Therefore to account for the reality of the actual existence, which we live and experience, we need to allow for a distinct form of actuality which is prior to the actuality which we observe as physical events. The actuality of physical events requires a preceding potential. The actuality of physical events is known by inductive reasoning to have a preceding potential, but this distinct actuality, the 'prior actuality', the one I described as the one which 'selects', requires no preceding potential, and therefore is a completely different type of actuality.
What we have here is two distinct types of "cause", therefore two distinct types of actuality. There is the contingent type of actuality which always has the prior potential, and there is the logically necessary type of actuality, demonstrated by the logic to be prior to the contingent actuality, as necessary for the existence of a contingent actuality. Philosophim appears to be getting confused due to a failure of recognizing and separating these two distinct types of cause.
So Philosophim appears to understand the requirement of a "first cause" in a causal chain of contingent events, but does not allow that whatever it is which produces the first cause in such a chain, could itself be a "cause", but a different type of cause. Because "first cause" signifies that there is no cause prior to this, Philosophim denies causation to the first cause in a causal chain, insisting on true randomness. But this problem is avoided if we recognize the two distinct types of actuality, and allow that the "first cause" is simply the first cause in a causal chain, the first contingent actuality. This allows that a completely different type of actuality, the one that 'selects' from potential is temporally prior, to the first cause in a causal chain, thereby resolving the issue pointed to by Philosophim, that a first cause must be uncaused in an absolute way.
Quoting Ludwig V
Would you agree that we can have two distinct types, or categories of "cause", in the way I describe above, such that the "first cause" in a chain of one particular category of causes, has a prior cause of a different type?
Quoting Ludwig V
I do not see the problem here. I think that common sense explanations do, very often, rely on unknown events. This is because we explain things without knowing in completion the thing we are explaining. So the unknown is always lurking within the explanation somewhere. Sometimes people might use a form of "magic", or similar things like "random occurrence", "spontaneous generation", "abiogenesis", etc., to stand in for the unknown. So it is a simple fact that often when we explain things, there is within the explanation, elements of the unknown, which are very often in some way glossed over or ambiguated, to give the impression that the explanation is better than it really is. "Events in the brain" is a very complex subject, so we ought to expect an abundance of unknown factors. In fact, "events in the brain" has inherent within the expression, this type of ambiguity or glossing over, because the nervous system extends beyond the brain, and there is not a clear boundary which would separate an event in the brain from being in other parts of the body as well, at the same time, as part of the same event.
Quoting Ludwig V
Would you accept, that the rationale, the values etc., which motivate an action, are "causal"? But this would mean that we obviously need to distinguish two distinct types of causation, one being the sense of a causal chain of physical events, the other being the motivators for actions of living beings.
It is a tempting hypothesis and could be particularly useful when we want to link incommensurable theories. But I wouldn't be sure unless I had some examples.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy.
No, it is the first cause. Its entire existence is uncaused by anything prior.
Quoting jgill
That's exactly what this is. If the universe is infinitely regressive, why? Logically there is no causal explanation besides the fact it simply is. Meaning all the rest of the logic flows.
Quoting jgill
Exactly.Quoting jgill
Its really not. Its the assertion that eventually we necessarily reach a point in causality where there is something which is not explained by something prior. This is something that is identifiable and testable. A far cry from a God.
Quoting jgill
Isn't that part of the fun though? Didn't you get to think about something new and different? Did you stretch your mind? Perhaps similar lines of thinking may do you well in your applications of theoretical math moving forward. I really do hope you enjoyed thinking about it.
Sure, but I think that these two are incompatible, so then we might just as well accept that they are different types of actuality. This is the metaphysics part, getting to the basic categories. If you don't want to do the metaphysics, we can avoid it, but if you don't want to do the metaphysics then what's the point in discussing "first causes"?
Quoting Ludwig V
The rainbow explanation is a good example. The classical explanation refers to the refraction of waves. But modern understanding of photons interacting with electrons shows that this explanation is really inadequate. So it's true that there must be "something known" which forms the basis for the explanation, but knowledge is not infallible, and depending on the unknowns which are hidden underneath that "something known", the knowledge which constitutes the "something known" may even turn out later to be wrong.
Quoting Ludwig V
An example could be something like my desire for a beer caused me to go to the fridge to look for one. "Cause" in this sense would be completely different from "cause" in the sense of the heat from the stove caused the water to boil. Notice how "desire" is not a physical activity which can be quantified and shown to be actively causing effects through a physical process.
This is an interesting idea, but interesting ideas are not proof. With the idea of first causes, anyone can propose an equally competitive idea. For example, I could just say that a God created souls, and souls create free will. Or I could say there are no souls and free will is deterministic. All these claims require proof now. You must prove without a doubt that something is a first cause.
Your description of a soul using first causes needs specifics. How can a soul channel something which the soul would not know would exist? After all, first causes are 100% unpredictable, and could be anything. So what you're really stating is that there are very specific first causes that follow very specific rules that pop into reality every time we make a choice. That doesn't make any sense or line up to the complete randomness of a first cause. So its an interesting idea, but logically doesn't make sense, let alone without proof.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it is entirely relevant. A constraint, by definition, is caused by something. You cannot have a restrained first cause. Its a contradiction.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let me clarify my point then. My point is that we have evidence that some decisions of the brain are caused prior to conscious awareness. Meaning something caused you to make a decision. Does that mean all causes are? Not necessarily. But there must be evidence that this is so, not merely a claim that it is so. Since we have evidence that some choices are clearly causal, we cannot easily claim that some other choices are not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, the relevance is that 'randomness' is not random. It has clear causal constraints. The only truly thing that would be random is the existence of a first cause. There can be no restraints on what is possible or what should or should not happen.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We're really close on agreement here. I've bolded the sentence, your conclusion, which does not follow from the rest of the premises that are correct.
There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. But what those constraints are cannot be predicted. Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. What you're doing with free will is constraining what comes into existence as a first cause. Something that the soul can turn into free will, and that appears without prior cause that can somehow be molded by the soul without issue.
Just one of several problems here to think about is that free will is consistent. True randomness could be consistent for a time, but is unlikely to. Meaning that it most often should come and go if it were a first cause. You can't just claim a first cause anymore knowing what it is. You have to give evidence and prove it. Free will is a predictable constrained behavior within intelligent beings and brains. This is a far cry from being a first cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Causal chains do not end unless existence itself disappears. A causal chain is not a creation of measurement by people, it is the reality of X influences Y's outcome. Even the disappearance of an existence may cause an outcome elsewhere.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To be clear once again, there is no restriction on what can occur. Once it occurs, it of course has its own restrictions on what it is. The problem I'm seeing is that you're putting a restriction on what can occur in a very specific situation and place. That is not a first cause. Free will is very specific to intelligent beings and is consistent. This is evidence of prior causality, not it being a first cause.
To clarify with another example. Lets say a God did exist. Its appearance would be a first cause. But what makes up that God, and what that God does are all causal at that point. If that God found something that was uncaused in existence and used it, this would also be causal. The appearance of the first cause would of course not be caused, but anything done with that first cause would be causal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I am confirming that you understood this perfectly! I'm just pointing out that you're drawing incorrect conclusions from this that necessitate free will is a first cause.
I largely agree. The logic points out that there must be a first cause, but it does not make any claim as to what that first cause might be. There are SEVERAL difficulties in proving a first cause. I'll list just one.
To keep it simple, imagine a photon appeared as a first cause right now. The thing is, it could also appear with momentum considering that there are no constraints on what a first cause could be. As such, if we were to find that photon we would assume because it has velocity, that something else caused that velocity. The more reasonable conclusion based off of our previous knowledge, is that we simply didn't find exactly what started the velocity of the photon.
In fact, it is possible that all of creation only happened five minutes ago, but we have all of our memories and observations that lead us to think its billions of years old. So even if we stumbled upon a situation in which there was a first cause, if the first cause appeared in such a way that would lead us to believe something else caused it, we would have no logical choice but to assume something else caused it.
This means there must be a VERY specific situation to prove something is a first cause. To my mind, the only thing I can think of is a perfect and absolute vaccum, which I'm not sure is possible to make. As in, absolutely nothing must exist, then suddenly something would form into existence. Even then, we would be scouring to see if it was our own measurement tools that were the issue, as we should.
The point of the idea is to simply note what logically must be true, then think about what it would take to prove such a thing true. As we can tell, proving anything is a first cause is a nigh impossible undertaking. It doesn't mean we shouldn't keep the knowledge around in the back of our minds however. Maybe one day, we'll find something that fits the bill.
Quoting Ludwig V
This time there is no re-invention needed. We have a clear definition of what it is, and what it would take to prove it exists. The Big Bang for example would be changed to, "The known starting point of universal creation" instead of "The first cause of creation".
I will reply more later today, I'm out of time for now.
I'm not sure what doing metaphysics is. It seems to be simply discussing issues in first-order mode - using terms rather than mentioning them. One could frame this debate as an issue about the concept or logic of causation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, I prefer to say that people are not infallible, so I would put the point differently. Notice, however, that providing a causal explanation for a rainbow does not conflict with the ordinary descriptions of it, though it may conflict with common sense explanations of it (such as that God put it there as a promise that he would not repeat the Flood.
Quoting Philosophim
Well, if a first cause is the first cause of its universe, it may be unconstrained. But if your first cause photon can happen (in an already existing universe), then any constraints may only constrain it after it comes into being, but will apply the moment it does come in to being. But the consequences will, presumably, be unpredictable. Indeed, they must be.
Thanks, Pal. Same to you. :cool:
Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. What you mean is that the Big Bang is the starting-point of universal creation so far as we know or, perhaps better, on the bases of the existing best theories.
There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term. This is not wrong, exactly, because we do apply that term to all the different ideas. But it is no more significant that the conclusion that something exists, which neglects the differences between rainbows and trees, numbers and lines, arguments and theories, myths and fables, and all the rest of the many different kinds of object - and hence different kinds of existence (and of logic) that also exist. We have Aristotelian causes, Newtonian causes, Einsteinian causes, Quantum causes, not mention reasons for action, premises and conclusions in mathematical arguments. All of these are answers to the question "why" and begin with "because", but they operate in different ways and different fields.
So I don't say you are wrong. But I do say that you are brushing aside most of the interesting questions - and if you were to explain to me why you are doing that, you would misunderstand me if you explained the cause of your doing so.
That was just and idea. What I really believe is what I wrote later in the next post, that you need to consider two distinct types of cause. This way, "first cause" refers to the first in a chain of efficient causes, while allowing that there is a completely different type of "cause" which is prior to it. Here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/875937
Quoting Philosophim
This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause.
Look, here's the argument again, in short form. There must be something preexisting the "first cause" which the first cause acts on, in order for the cause to have an "effect", therefore to be known as a "cause". So the "first cause" cannot be absolutely unconstrained because the thing which preexists it, which it will have an effect on, will be a constraint to it.
In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change".
Quoting Philosophim
Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, you are just demonstrating why your supposed conception of "first cause" is unintelligible nonsense. The very sane thing which you say about a causal chain ending also holds for a causal chain beginning. If X is the supposed "first cause", it must have a influence of Y, like you say. Y is the preexisting conditions which constitute the constraints on X.
Quoting Philosophim
The conditions you describe, "no restriction on what can occur", are conditions which eliminate the possibility of anything "occurring". That is why your proposal of the requirements for a "first cause" amount to unintelligible nonsense, self-contradiction.
Quoting Philosophim
And I am pointing out to you, that your conception of "first cause" is simply unintelligible, as self-contradicting. So I propose that we dismiss it, and move along to something more rational, like what I propose in the link above, a distinction between types of cause. This would allow that a "first cause" in a causal chain would still have a prior "cause", but the prior cause would be of a distinctly different type, and not be describable as a part of the causal chain.
Quoting Philosophim
So, let's start from this premise, and I'll show you where you go wrong. The use of "cause" here is strictly determined by the logical demonstration. We cannot stray outside of the meaning intended for "cause" within the argument, without invalidating the argument, and that argument produces the conclusion you refer to.
Now, the next question is how does a first cause arise. You assert that it must be absolutely unconstrained, and truly random, but this insistence is unjustified. All that is required as what is prior to the "first cause", is that it is something other than what is implied by "cause" in the sense of a causal chain. So it is not necessary to conclude that what is prior to the first cause is absolutely unconstrained randomness. This is not a valid conclusion, there may simply be something which doesn't qualify as a "cause" by the terms of the argument. So this is why Aristotle distinguished different senses of "cause". This allows that a "final cause" is actually prior to the "first cause" of a causal chain, when we recognize that "cause" in the sense of final cause is not consistent with "cause" in the sense of "efficient cause" as used in the argument of causal chains, which produces the conclusion of a first cause.
Quoting Ludwig V
This lack of necessity is what necessitates, logically, that the type of causation is distinct. In the determinist causal chain there is no room for choice, selection, or any form of directing efficient causes toward an outcome, there is only a necessary relation. But to understand intentional actions we need to allow for selection, and this means that the relation between cause and effect is not necessary. So we have two senses of "cause" one with necessity one without, and these two are incompatible, therefore requiring the distinction between them.
Quoting Ludwig V
That is exactly the problem, but I would say that it is wrong, because we do use the term "cause" in very different ways. We do use "cause" to answer "why?", commonly in the form of "because". Failing to recognize the difference between very distinct and fundamentally incompatible uses of "cause", and attempting to restrict one's definition of "cause" to one or the other, as Philosophim does, will leave the aspects of reality which are understood by the other usage as unintelligible. This is demonstrably "wrong".
Then this I need to be clearer. The idea is that a first cause is not separate from the chain but is part of the chain, or the chain itself. A first cause is not explained by anything outside of itself, therefore must be explained by itself, and is the start of its impact on causality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't use this definition because I do not believe, except in cases of first cause, that there is a potential difference in outcomes. There is a difference between our inability to measure and predict, and real randomness as I've noted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, this is the way it is. Of course, if you disagree with this, that is of course your choice. I have never seen real randomness proved in science, only an inability to measure properly. The conclusion that a first cause logically exists only works with the idea that that everything is deterministic except first causes. By the way, I like your previous idea that first causes can influence the brain. If it is the case that we had very tiny things popping into existence all over the place constantly, it could very well apply a real randomness to outcomes as they bounce against the chemistry of the brain. But this is the only way randomness, according to the definitions I've provided, could ever come into the universe.
Oh, let me clarify the way I define of knowledge. Knowledge is not truth to me. It is a tool we use to best assess what is most likely to be true with the observations and reason we have at the time. Meaning what is known can change without issue to me depending on context and tools. So I am in agreement with you. :)
Quoting Ludwig V
The subdivision and different interpretations of general causality into specifics is done for different purposes. I'm using general causality because I want to end a debate that's been going on far too long. Is there a first cause. Yes. Done. Does this note that there must be a specific first cause? No, it can be anything we could imagine, but once in reality it is part of the chain of causality and can be found with evidence and proof. Done.
That's the problem that's trying to be solved. And I believe it is. It doesn't need a subdivision or a reexamination of causality beyond the simple and basic understanding all of us know. If causality exists, logically there must be a first cause. Its not about creating something interesting, its about solving a problem I see in philosophy, and giving a strong base for other ideas to be built on.
I appreciate your contribution Ludwig, its nice to see intelligent and friendly replies and critiques that understand what's being stated here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let me give an example so I can clarify. Imagine our photon again. Now a photon is a photon because of what it is and how it reacts to other existences. In other words, a photon doesn't suddenly produce a million dollar bills at its location. It also doesn't start talking or turn into an eggplant. It has rules, restrictions, and laws based on what it is.
So there is no rule as to what should appear as a first cause without referring backwards from any chain. Meaning if I'm staring at a blank area of the universe, there's no prediction as to what could appear as a first cause. But once that first cause appears, it is what it is. And what a thing is, is defined by rules based on its makeup and the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe. The status of 'first cause' lasts for only one time tick in the universe. Once a second tick happens the cause of the existence of the thing at the second time tick is the existence of the thing at the first time tick.
Or, taken together as a set of infinite regressive causality, the first cause is the entire set itself. There is nothing prior. But if the first set made a second set, the second set is not a first cause, it is actually subsumed under the first set, as its a continuation of causality. A first cause is extremely literal and simple. "That which is not caused by anything else besides the fact of it existing."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So to clarify, it is not self-contradicting. A first cause is defined as something which has no prior cause. If you are setting up a situation in which there must necessarily be a prior cause, then you aren't talking about a first cause. If a photon comes into the universe unbidden by anything, it is uncaused. From that moment on while it exists, it is then part of the chain of causality formed by that first initial formation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not seeing this. These are all examples of potential first causes, not assertions that they are first causes. What I'm noting is that because a first cause has no prior causation for its existence, there can be no constraints on its initial existence. Now this is only if we have no causal chain to examine. If we have a causal chain, we can work its way back up and see specifically what the first cause of that chain is. Once a first cause appears, it is constrained by its causal influence on reality. So while I'm noting that there is nothing that constrains what a first cause could potentially be, I'm not stating that any specific first cause that does exist, could potentially be something it is not.
For example, if the big bang is the actual first cause of existence in the universe, then we can trace physics back to it, and attempt to demonstrate conclusively that there is nothing prior to the big bang. It doesn't mean that we can trace physics back to the big bang and then randomly claim, "It was actually a little bang".
But, lets say suddenly another universe appears out of nowhere and we have no causal chain to work up to. The first cause of that universe could potentially be anything. The actuality of what it is can in theory be discovered. But there was no rule that necessitated that universe appear at all, or that the first cause had show up right there. Does that clear up the issue?
We certainly have tools to assess hypotheses and we certainly use "know" when we have discovered it. Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. When we have only discovered what is most likely to be true, we use "believe". You can decide to use "know" differently, but if you do, the distinction between knowledge and belief is blurred and pointless. True, people can get things wrong. But that's not a problem. We just withdraw the claim to know.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't think you are going to succeed. There are questions beyond the Big Bang. Whether you call them causal or not, they will, no doubt, be answered. And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process.
I've written my own viewpoints on knowledge that I've developed over years here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary by the immediate next poster that nails the paper 100%, so feel free to check it out if you're curious.
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause. Claiming something is a first cause is not a trivial task. It must be proven, and proving such a thing is rather difficult. I think my points greatly reduce the need to label something as a first cause, and I am for sure not asserting that anything in our universe that we know of should be labeled as a first cause. I do not believe the Big Bang is an actual first cause, I was simply using it as a hypothetical in examples to remove a bit of abstraction from the overall points.
This is what I think makes your sense of "first cause" unintelligible, the stipulation that it cannot be explained by anything other than itself. So let me explain why I believe this.
The first cause is stipulated to be part of the causal chain, therefore it is the supposed to be the same type of cause as any other of the causes in the chain. However, it has a fundamental difference, the chain does not extend beyond it to the earlier time. That makes the "first cause" actually a completely different type of "cause", its existence cannot be said to have been contingent on the occurrence of a prior cause as is the case with the other causes in the chain. Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately.
Now, we have a distinct type of cause, the "first cause", which is stipulated as different from all the other causes in the causal chain. You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain.
Quoting Philosophim
What you do not seem to grasp is that there is no need to assume real randomness. That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. It only follows that there cannot be a cause of the first cause, in the sense that "cause" is used in the chain of causes. However, as I explain above, by determining a "first cause" you have already shown that there is a type of cause which is other than how "cause" is used to refer to causes in the causal chain. Therefore we have the premise (a different type of cause) which is required to say that the cause of the first cause may be a different type of cause, rather than concluding randomness.
Quoting Philosophim
The problem though, is that this explanation doesn't quite work. If the first causes are truly random as you insist, then the brain would have absolutely no way of predicting the occurrence of them, so it could not construct itself around them, or have any way to possibly use them. That's why I backed away from that idea. But free will demonstrates that the brain can and does make use of the first causes as they pop into being, so there must be some way to, in some sense, predict their occurrence. This is why I decided there must be some type of cause for their occurrence, but the cause is a "cause" in a sense other than "cause" in the sense of the causal chain.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't agree with this. The "first cause" is simply a special type of cause, different from other causes because it marks the beginning of a causal chain. What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't quite follow this. Once the cause appears, it is in the past, and what persists at that time is not the cause, but the effect. Any posterior interaction is the effect of the first cause acting as a cause, and this is not a first cause, but a regular part of the causal chain. Therefore I do not see how you can talk about "the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe". That appears to be contradictory.
Quoting Philosophim
The problem, as I've shown you, is that this definition of "first cause" is not necessitated by your argument. The argument shows that the first cause is not caused in the same way that other causes in the causal chain are caused. But, by showing that there is necessarily a first cause, you also show the first cause to be a type of cause which is not the same as the other causes. Since the argument demonstrates that there is more than one type of cause, this allows that the cause of the first cause might just be a different type of cause. Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause.
Quoting Philosophim
See, you are denying the possibility that the reason for the first cause might be something other than what is evident as a causal chain. But this denial is unjustified. Further more, we see that it is very common place that the reason for an event is other than a causal chain, and that is the case with intentional acts. So not only is your assertion that if something occurs without a prior causal chain it cannot have any reason whatsoever for its occurrence, unjustified, it is also demonstrated by evidence to be false.
Quoting Philosophim
Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. What it implies is that there is not a cause of the big bang in the sense that "cause" is used in tracing the causal chain to the big bang. So we must allow the possibility that the reason for the big bang is something other than a "cause" in the sense of the causal chain which was traced, i.e. a different type of cause.
This notion of first cause being the existence of the chain is no more than interesting speculation. When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. That's all there is, so that must be it.
Entertaining speculative exercise.
What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. That type of chain is shown to be logically consistent and therefore logically possible, and even attractive to some people, as seductive in a a sort of aesthetic or emotional way. That is the rhetoric of sophistry, which persuades by evoking pleasant feelings like pride, confidence, power, and courage. However, our experience, empirical evidence, can produce inductive principles which when employed as premises demonstrate logically why such a chain is not physically possible. Of course there is an issue with inductive principles as shown by Hume, so those who enjoy thinking about, and conceiving, chains receding to infinity, often feel justified in presenting these as if they could be real physical existents.
Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, its category is merely the first right? Categorizing it or naming it differently doesn't make it any different from what I've noted. The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. Trying to overcomplicate it doesn't change what it is.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You've lost me here. How is it different? If something is not caused by something else, how is my claim not justified? I hear the claim, but I'm not seeing the evidence or reasoning. The first cause is something which is not explained by something else, but is a cause when it interacts with other existences forming the normal chain of causality we understand. Its not different besides the fact that it is an uncaused existence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, there is no reason that this follows. The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. If you have another cause 'cause' a first cause, its not a first cause. This is a clear contradiction Metaphysical.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause.
If you say its not absolutely random, how? What is causing it to not be absolutely random? That's the question that you'll have to answer without introducing another cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent.
Now what I have done in other posts is compared the likelihood of a first cause appearing based on the limitations of space and time. I do not promise that my math is perfect at all and I was hoping for someone to give their own take on it, but it seems that we can use cardinality to demonstrate that first causes would most likely be small. If anything can happen in a cube of space, there is a much higher degree of cardinality that something would appear within in a slice of that cube than the cube itself. I can go into more detail next time if you wish, but we need to settle the point of absolute randomness first.
Back to the point, no amount of study will ever show a first cause to be consistent, because the definition of a first cause prevents there from being any other cause which would constraint it to consistency.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. If it is proven and determined to be a first cause, and it is a first cause, there is nothing prior to the big bang. That's the definition. Anything which has a prior cause does not meet the criterion of a first cause.
I really wish you would stop demeaning the post without anything but a deriding opinion. I have answered your questions and critiques, so I would like a little more respect for what I've written here. Either demonstrate the argument is false, or not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I also agree, but I decided to take an approach of, "What if it was real?" Turns out it still results in a first cause so the idea of infinite prior causality is moot.
I still have not communicated. I'll try one more time. BTW - not that it's truly relevant but I was a physics major in college (albeit not a very good physicist). I gave the example of an atom decaying because it's easy to visualize - but in fact this is only one of many examples in physics where causality falls apart.
Anyway your definition of first cause seems to have two components - firstly that is is the beginning of a causal chain and secondly that it must fit into your definition of random - i.e. the atom can decay into a refrigerator.
While the decay of an atom is not random per your definition, if is completely and totally random with respect to the time at which it decays. It could decay 10 seconds from now or 10 billion years from now - but there is no prior event which determines when this happens. This is not a matter of lack of knowledge or our inability to measure something. When quantum mechanics were first formulated there was intense discussion/debate amongst the scientific community about what this meant. We have Einstein's famous quote that "[God] doesn't play dice' . But it has been proven over and over again that this is how the universe works - and Bell's Theorem has removed all reasonable doubt. *
Quoting Philosophim
We know the mechanism - and the randomness in outcomes is baked into the mechanism. This is not like rolling the dice or flipping a coin - these can be predicted with sufficiently accurate measuring systems.
Every time an atom decays it is the start of a new causal chain.
So this gets to your second element - the lack of complete and total randomness in outcomes. And here we are getting into metaphysical definitions about which I have no opinion. I leave that part of the discussion between you and @Metaphysician Undercover.
I've said all I can say here - I give you the last word.
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* In the interest of completeness it should be noted that there are still a small number of folks in the scientific community who are trying to keep some notion of causality alive - but at best causality is on life support.
That still does not explain a first cause. An atom decaying into a refrigerator would have a prior cause of the atom's existence. Its really just the case of nothing, then something.
Quoting EricH
The first part is true. The second part has no evidence that it is true. The second must be proven to be true, not believed or assumed because we cannot currently see the exact moment before decay occurs.
Quoting EricH
No, it is. Look, the quantum mechanics scale is so difficult to measure that our very measurements affect the outcome. Its a ton of estimation and probability combined with limited measurements. In no way would any quantum physicist ever state that our calculations are based on absolute precision measurements and a full understanding of the exact location of electrons and quarks.
Quoting EricH
I have had this notion told to me only by people on these boards. I have not heard of any scientists who are peddling this notion. Causality is alive and well in science. I would require of examples that show causality is not useful or used instead of broad and unbacked accusations like this.
Good conversation EricH, the last word does not mean I'm correct, it just means we've reached the end of where we can go. :)
This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed.
Quoting Philosophim
This is an essential difference though. All the other causes are known to be contingent, dependent on a prior cause, and that is how we know these causes through empirical evidence and inductive reasoning. This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary.
Quoting Philosophim
It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause".
Quoting Philosophim
That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong.
Quoting Philosophim
I've already explained, but I'll try again. When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. This does not exclude the possibility that the first cause may have a "cause" in another sense of the word. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a necessary conclusion from the argument, due to the fact that the first cause is another type of cause.
Quoting Philosophim
You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a conclusion made necessary by the argument.
Quoting Philosophim
Again, you are not accepting the possibility of other types of causes. The argument demonstrates that the first cause cannot be caused by the type of cause which constitutes the causal chain. But the argument also demonstrates that the first cause is itself a different type of cause, like I explained. That is how the infinite regress is avoided. Therefore the reality of other types of causes is already demonstrated by your own argument, and there is nothing to prevent us from hypothesizing that there is another type of cause which is the cause of the first cause. There is no contradiction, just different types of causes, which the argument demonstrates is a necessary conclusion.
Quoting Philosophim
"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows"
I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not.
This convoluted language stops me at the very beginning.
I've done some searching and find that causality and causal chains is enormously complex, far more than I anticipated. I like to bring concepts and ideas into focus as clearly as I can, and for me this is to create a mathematical example that incorporates some of these. I admit, my examples are far from the gigantic webs of cause/effect in nature. Nevertheless they do exist in their contexts.
The "chain"
[math]{{F}_{n}}(z)={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(z)[/math], [math]F(z)=\underset{n\to \infty }{\mathop{\lim }}\,{{F}_{n}}(z)[/math]
recedes to infinity, but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions, a step up from infinite series. And even series can be written this way. But, you won't find any in a field of flowers. This is not nature, rather math. No apologies, and I will not interfere in the thread again (unless someone says something completely bizarre!).
I gather it's intended to be something like
?x?yCyx ? ?x¬?yCyx
'For all x there is some y such that y caused x, or there is an x such that there is no y that caused x'.
it is valid.
Philosophim's statement is rather meaningless. We could just as well replace "cause" with "thing" here, and say either all things have a prior thing or they do not. What we do in this case is assume a temporal separation between the thing and the prior thing, such that they are distinct "things". That's what "cause" does here, it implies a temporal separation between the thing known as the effect, and the thing known as the cause.
Now we have a series of "causes", or "things". The series may or may not proceed infinitely. The issue which arises when we apply this to the real world of empirical evidence, is that each of the separate, distinct things, or causes, must differ from each of the others, as this is what the nature of time and change indicate to us. However, we use the same word for all of them, to signify that they are all of the same type, or category, a "cause" or a "thing". In statements like Philosophim's the word used "cause", is meant to be all-inclusive, most universal, so as to create the appearance that there could be nothing outside that category. Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. What "thing" actually represents is a category, or type, and there might be something prior to the first thing which is outside that category.
That's why I'm trying to get Philosophim to recognize the need to assume different types of "cause". The proposed causal chain really only represents one type of cause. So if we accept that "cause" in this usage represents only one specific type of cause, then we can allow that prior to the first cause there is a distinctly different type of cause. This is completely consistent with what the empirical evidence demonstrates to us about the temporal succession of the coming into being of a multitude of things of the same type. We can see the need to posit a first of that type, but this does not imply "first" absolutely, just a division or boundary, a temporal limit to that type, and prior to that type is a different type. So for instance we could say either there is a human being prior to each human being, or there is a first human being. Evidence indicates that human beings must have a beginning, so we are inclined toward a "first" human being. Positing a first human being does not exclude the possibility of prior beings of a different type.
Quoting jgill
The key word here is "represents". The problem with representations is that they do not qualify as being the thing which they represent. That's why the word "represents" is used, to signify that it stands for something, but it is not itself the thing which it stands for. And to complicate this problem we can create representations which are completely fictional, having no real thing which they correspond with. They represent something imaginary. So in a discussion of whether or not infinite chains are real, a representation of an infinite chain serves no purpose.
For why should the universe decide before our measurements and observations, what is and is not an initial cause? That question might look contradictory, but only if it is assumed that the universe consists of an absolute order of events whose existence transcends our observations and measurements of it.
But if that assumption is dropped, whereby observations and measurements are deemed to be constitutive factors of the thing being observed and measured (as for example as in subjective idealism and in interpretations of QM that fall under anti-realism), then the question as to the ordering and positions of unobserved events denoted by hidden variables, doesn't have to have an absolute and definite ontological answer one way or the other.
You are misunderstanding my claim here. I'm defining what a first cause must be. Its just like defining what the term "first" means. I can give examples of what a "first" would be. Like "My first birthday", or "My first bike". There are limits to what "first" means, namely that its a situation which cannot have occurred prior. What I'm hearing you say is, "Yes, you claim its your first birthday at 1 years old, but how do you know you didn't have a birthday prior?" You're claiming that a "first cause" might have a prior cause. This doesn't make any sense.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I believe this is so. I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? Its the "first" cause. Not a second. Not a follow up. There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. As such, logically, there can be no influence that determines why it should or should not exist prior to its existence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You may not understand what I was doing then. I was noting, "If infinite regression exists." If you rule out infinite regression entirely (which I don't mind, I don't think it can exist either) then the point I'm making stands without question.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I also agree here. What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
By definition, I cannot be wrong. I cannot claim I had a first birthday one year after my birth then say, "I might be wrong."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I'm rejecting the contradiction of what you are claiming. A first cause cannot have another cause that explains it by definition. If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday.
Quoting Banno
Much appreciated Banno. He is correct.
Quoting jgill
Which is fine, but how does that apply to the argument? I cover both finite and infinite chains. We don't have to have any specification as to what the finite or infinite chain looks like correct? So how does putting a chain into an equation challenge the point I've made?
I wouldn't call it deception. I'm not trying to trick anyone, I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. The word thing does not work because a first cause does not mean a prior 'thing' exists. An atom can exist eons away and another atom can appear as a first cause without that atom having anything to do with our new atoms existence.
I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work.
Yes, my description of a first cause has nothing to do with our observations or measurements. It is the reality of whether there was something prior which caused a particular outcome to be, whether we know it or not. In other words, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it still vibrates the air.
@jgill is quite right that the topic is complex. In particular, what it is to be a cause has remained fraught throughout this thread, and the logic of necessity in use has never been made clear.
So rather than jumping directly to this argument, much background work on the nature of causation and of necessity is needed.
Good point. What I described is a form which yields specific values depending upon the choices of the
[math]{{f}_{n}}'s[/math]. For certain linear fractional transformations the values of [math]{{F}_{n}}[/math] are the convergents of a continued fraction. Is this "real"? It is as a mathematical "fact", but it might not appear in nature.
I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause.
So, what causes an atom to exist? A combination of proton, neutrons, electrons, and various forces. What causes a proton to exist? A combination of quarks. What causes quarks to exist?...and so on. Time is just another dimension of detail. A first cause would have no other cause for its existence besides its own existence.
A chain of causality is when you look at any one point and look at the linked causality to that point. A causes B, causes C, etc. Multiple chains can join and interlink. The initial question asked is whether there is an end to this chain, or do the chains infinitely extend, regress, loop, etc.
In the first case, we have a first cause. But what I noted is that when you examine the entire set, even if it is regressive, there is still the question of what caused the entire regressive set to be. There is no outside cause. Therefore it is a first cause, or a thing that cannot be explained by anything outside of itself. If the universe is finitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. If the universe is infinitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. In either case we come necessarily to a first cause.
The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means. Reference to "chain of events" implies a specific meaning for "cause", that of "efficient cause". However, the category of "efficient cause", the type of causation implied by "chain of events" does not include all the possible types of cause. Therefore the first cause in a chain of events could have another type of cause as its cause.
Quoting Philosophim
Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition.
Quoting Philosophim
This is where your logic is wrong. The valid conclusion is that there is no earlier part of the chain. But this does not exclude the possibility of a different reason for the first cause. The first cause could have been caused by a type of cause which does not partake in the chain, like final cause. The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. You wrongly conclude that there can be no cause whatsoever, prior to the first cause, by wrongly assuming that there cannot be a type of cause which is free from the chain.
Quoting Philosophim
That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. Which of them would be the first first cause? And since the occurrence of something from nothing (first cause coming from absolutely nothing) is completely incomprehensible, and unintelligible, we ought to conclude that what is implied is that there is a cause prior to the first cause which cannot be understood to be a part of the chain. That is the most reasonable assumption.
Quoting Philosophim
"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"?
Quoting Philosophim
You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". That conclusion requires a further premise, that the only thing which can explain something's existence is the extension of a causal chain prior to the thing's existence. But this premise is simple determinism, and is disputed by anyone who believes in free will, so it is not acceptable as a sound premise.
Quoting Philosophim
I've been explaining, but you are not listening. Here, I'll refer to your example, "my first birthday", if that might help. When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. Likewise "the first cause" in your example refers to the first cause in a particular chain of significant events, but prior to the first cause there may still be many other events which have significance relative to the first cause.
Quoting Philosophim
The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it.
Quoting Philosophim
You did not understand the analogy, or else you are in denial. Hopefully you'll understand with the birthday example. But if you do not, I'll be more convinced that you are arguing to deceive, not to understand.
Quoting Philosophim
Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try.
Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain.
Quoting jgill
The important issue, which you might have seen me argue at numerous places and times on this forum, is to go further than to say "it might not appear in nature" but to question whether it is possible for such a thing to occur in nature.
The point being that mathematics consists of ideals, and the ideals can be very useful in application. However, it's debatable whether it's even possible that any of these ideals could actually exist in nature. So the irrational nature of pi for example provides for a strong argument that the ideal circle simply cannot exist in nature. Then we can replace the question of what is it about mathematics which makes it so useful, with the question of what is it about the natural reality which makes it so that it does not perfectly correspond with the ideals of mathematics. It is this part of reality, the part which makes it so that it does not correspond with the mathematical ideals, which makes reality difficult to understand.
If I stated, "The first cause by energy", then of course that leads it open to there being another specific cause like "The first cause by matter". But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not understand how you do not see this as a contradiction. Maybe this is what you're saying, correct me if this isn't the case. Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? Because then the first chain's 'first cause' is not a first cause. That's just an extension of the prior chain. A first caused is not demarcated by observation or definition. It is the reality of there being nothing prior. Nothing. No prior cause. You cannot say it is the first cause, but perhaps there's a prior cause. That's a clear contradiction.
The first cause is not an origin set by us. For example, if I say, "The first cause of me dropping this ball is me letting go of my hand," that is not a first cause. A first cause is not 'the starting point from which I choose to reference causality". A first cause is THE first cause in a chain of causality. There is no prior chain, no prior connection, nada. What caused me to release my hand? What caused me to be born? What caused my parents to be born? The chain continues. It only ends when there is absolute no prior cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. You can't state there is possibly a prior cause to a first cause. That runs counter to the definition. The place where I could possibly be wrong is that a first cause, as defined here, is not logically necessary. But you are not arguing against the idea that a first cause is logically necessary. You are saying there can be a prior cause to a first cause when the definition of a first cause is, "There can be no prior cause of this".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I'm going to grow real tired of accusations about my character instead of focusing on the argument. Please be better than this. I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.
I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate
An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.
We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Wait, are you bringing Aristotle's four causes in here? I am in no way talking about causality in regards to Aristotle. If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. But bringing it in here as a quick aside and acting as if it should simply be accepted as a clear counter to the argument does not work.
If you wish to, please demonstrate exactly how Aristotle's four causes fit within the discussion of causality I've introduced here so far. As well, please indicate to me a specific instance in Aristotle's four causes where one cause causes the other cause. Lets not claim, 'may well be prior', lets show it.
That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period".
So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. And, just like the first cause of one chain might be prior in time to the first cause of another chain, a cause which is of a different type might be prior in time to all the first causes of all the chains.
Quoting Philosophim
Sure, either something is caused by something else, or it is not, that's self-evident. However, you wrongly conclude that the first cause in a chain of causes could not have been caused by a different type of cause, a type of cause which does not operate in a chain.
I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start.
Quoting Philosophim
No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. You seem to be stuck on the idea that all causes must be described as a part of a chain. Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain.
Quoting Philosophim
This is incorrect. You are saying that the "first cause" is the first in a chain. The fact that you allow for a multitude of first causes, being the beginnings of a multitude of chains, each one possibly starting at a different time, indicates without a doubt, that you do not mean "that there is no prior cause".
Quoting Philosophim
Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man.
Your statement, "I mean, 'My first birthday' No other days" is demonstrably impossible. There is 365 days in a common year. All those "other days" are implied by "my first birthday". Your first birthday comes a year after your birth. That means that it is impossible that there are "no other days" of significance prior to your first birthday.
Quoting Philosophim
That is not your definition, it is your conclusion, which I'll mention again is an invalid conclusion. Your definition of "first cause" is as stated in 1) of the op the beginning of a "chain of events": "there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."
You then wrongly conclude that there can be no prior cause which explains its existence. And if your intent is to combine the two into one definition, then there is inconsistency within that definition, which warrant it being rejected as unsound. It is commonly accepted that causes (free will) may act independently of the chain of events.
Quoting Philosophim
Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes?
Quoting Philosophim
You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition".
Since your two so-called definitions of "first cause" are demonstrably inconsistent with each other, you need to choose one or the other. Is a "first cause" the beginning of a causal chain, or is it "first" in an absolute sense, meaning that there could be no cause of any sort, prior to it in time?
Quoting Philosophim
This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence".
Quoting Philosophim
Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. If each chain has a "prior" which is specific to that chain, then you have no way to produce a temporal relation between one chain and another. Each chain would have a "first cause", but we would have no way of saying which first cause is "prior" to another first cause because you have defined "prior" as being relative to the chain itself, rather than an independent measurement of time. It would be much more intelligible if we maintain a distinct flow of time, and judge "prior" relative to the time of occurrence rather than the position in a chain.
Quoting Philosophim
That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise.
Yes, we agree on this again. To give a less abstract example, imagine that a photon appeared without prior cause somewhere in the universe, while a small bang happens somewhere else five years later. Both are not caused by anything else or each other, they just are.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This again is not an argument and presumptive. You do not know the extent of what I've read on causation. If you find Aristotle's four causes worthwhile to the argument, please refer to my previous request for you to introduce them in a critical way to the discussion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you think it does, please point out exactly how. I may not draw the same conclusions you do, so if you want to communicate what you see, you'll have to do it. At a quick glance, I do not see how the idea of 'final cause' at all applies to what I'm noting here, nor the idea that free will is a first cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am not straw manning, you are. I've clearly laid out that this is an abstract to clear up the issue, and you are in bad faith claiming otherwise. The abstract was clearly indicated to communicate the idea that a "First X" means we cannot have "A prior X". You are saying "But we can have a prior Y" as if "Y = X". It does not. I am not talking about days. I am talking about a specific thing, a first birthday. You pulling a "Y" of "significant days" out of the example when I've clarified the intention for you is the definition of a straw man.
Again, remove replace the birth day example with a "First day" example if that helps you. You claim that there can be prior cause to my first cause. This is the same as claiming "You can have prior days to your first day".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah...see this was an attempt to get you to behave like a stable thinker and adult. Personal attacks on me are unnecessary and meaningless. Its arguments and proof. I understand having an emotional slip up, but now you're not correcting yourself. Let me be frank. The fact you think something can come before the 'first' of something is inane. I could easily dismiss your argument and no one would begrudge me this. But, I've withheld my judgement to see if you would go into more depth to reveal something I've missed. Don't fall into the trap of dismissing another's points outright because of our first emotional reaction to them. Sometimes an argument dismissed at first glance might have been great if dug into.
Now, maybe I'm wrong. But all I see in your argument so far is that you are stating, "There might be a prior X to the first X", when I've declared that the "First X" is absolute and not merely an origin or expression of speech. I see that you comprehend a lot of the rest of the argument, so I'm scratching my head as to why you would do this. I'm starting to gather it has something to do with Aristotle's points, which I'll need explained and pointed out to me. Can you demonstrate how Aristotle's points are valid, apply to the argument, and have a situation in which there is a prior cause to an absolute first cause? Even if you can't demonstrate the first cause part as you initially wanted, I still would like to see what it is you're thinking of.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Maybe you misunderstand the claim then. A first cause cannot cause another first cause. If an atom appears without prior cause, and a big bang appears a ridiculously long way away five minutes later, and is in no way caused by the atom, they are both first causes. You seem to be implying that the atom could cause the big bang. If the atom did cause the big bang, the atom would be the first cause and the big bang would, necessarily, not be a first cause and instead caused by the atom.
Now, if the atom is a first cause, and the big bang is a first cause, years later the atom could arrive into the resulting universe of the big bang and collide with another atom. At this point, this is where the chains intersect. But the big bang did not cause the atom, and the atom did not cause the big bang. If one caused the other, then only the one which caused the other would be the first cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A set of existence is "the universe" for example. The universe is composed of many other existences. A fundamental set would be a set of 1, or an existence that is not composed of other existences. So the answer to, "What caused the universe" would imply that it also includes all the existences within that universe.
Thus, "What caused a finite universe?" and "What caused an infinite universe?" Would include the set of each existence. I am very open to saying this a better way if you can think of one, I'm not married to the phrase, just the concept. Maybe "Set of an existence?" I'm unsure.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, time is simply one property of causation. So for example I can ask, "What causes an atom to exist?" and the answer is the combination of protons, neutrons, electrons, and force. I can then ask, "What caused the atom to be at the particular state it is right now opposed to one second ago," and now we include time in the equation.
I think what you're trying to say, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that you believe I'm stating nothing can exist prior to a first cause. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying nothing prior can cause a first cause. Meaning that a first cause could appear in this universe right now, it would just have no prior cause from anything that that exists. If you want to add, "Maybe its caused by something from another universe", that is included in what 'exists'. A first cause cannot be caused by anything prior, period. It does not mean other things cannot exist before that specific first cause, though those things which exist prior to that first cause must necessarily have a first cause in its causality chain.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not discussing with Aristotle. I'm discussing with you. You obviously see something in Aristotle that counters the argument that I don't. If you want me to see this, you have to point this out. You have not done so. Saying, "But Aristotle so the argument is wrong," is not a valid counter. =)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, mine is not a false premise. This is the premise proposed by the argument and the logical conclusions that result from this premise. You may disagree with the premise, but if you want to indicate the premise is false you need to clearly prove why the premise is false. Pointing out, "Another philosopher defines it differently," does not prove that his premise is true. Demonstrate why Aristotle's premise is true, and why my premise by necessity must be false because his is true.
:grin: Just saw this. A sincere thanks!
Btw, if you're still interested, can you offer any references in philosophical literature to the notion of change occurring sans time, i.e. in the absence of before and after?
I so far still can't wrap my mind around "change that occurs in the absence of any 'before the stated change' and 'after the stated change'" ... but I know enough to know that I should never say never when it comes to philosophical proposals.
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Sorry @Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though.
No apology necessary Javra! :)
But to your main point. You have a sequence, A is caused by B, B is caused by C, C is caused by D, and so on, and you supose it to be valid to ask what causes the entire sequence.
It is not clear that this is a fair question. Further, supposing it to be a fair question assumes your conclusion.
Consider a different sequence, that of mothers: A was born from B; B was born from C, C was born from D. For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother.
Because you have left the notion of cause unclear, it is as legitimate simple to deny that the sequence has a cause as it is to demand the cause be presented.
That is more or less what @jgill and others have been pointing out: that your conclusion does not follow without a leap in your logic.
Pedagogically, what is needed is to step outside of the argument you have presented here and to consider the broader situation in which it takes place - the nature of cause and of necessity, for starters.
But I doubt that this will happen in the context of this thread.
I'll probably leave you to it.
Why? Why not deal with the one he presented, and either help him work out the defects, or understand what he's trying to say (you can't be sure, regardless of your hubris)?
It is fine to say that anything that is not logically contradictory is possible provided the provenance of that "possible" is understood to be confined to the epistemological. That is to say that as far as we can tell anything that is logically possible might be physically or actually possible. On the other hand, there may be things which are logically possible which are not physically or actually possible, even though we cannot determine what those things could be.
"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?
For me, it will always seem more likely, and always possible, that any putative first cause will turn out to have a prior cause (or, in my language, that we will develop a prior cause) than the alternative.
The fundamental argument, if I'm not wrong, is this:-
Quoting Philosophim
I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language?
Quoting AmadeusD
Because considering a variety of cases in terms of similarities to and differences from the central case helps one to understand it.
Quoting Banno
We focus on the "A caused B" kind of cause. If the spark caused the explosion, we can ask what caused the spark and what effects the explosion caused (and sometimes it can cause another explosion, as in an atomic bomb). That's our paradigm of causation.
But we can also ask why the spark caused an explosion (or why sparks cause explosions) and we'll get an answer in terms of the reactions between molecules at certain temperatures. This doesn't fit the "A caused B" model, if only because it doesn't provide a "prior" cause, so it is probably clearer to call this an analysis. This kind of question is also recursive. When we reach the limits of our understanding, we are left with brute facts. The possibility of developing another layer can't be ruled out (and we have), but I think the argument applies.
Quoting Banno
That's true, so far as it goes. But we can ask, and answer, the question why people are born and then those people bear children. But not in the same terms. We need an analysis of the sequence, not an addition to it. That's what happens in the case of the explosion.
But the analysis is still in terms of cause/effect relationships, which are the presupposed framework of the sequence. It isn't at all clear to me what kind of answer can be provided to the question why causal relationships (regularities?) exist. It seems to me a brute fact - possibly necessary in some sense. I am clear that "It simply is" is not a cause and not even an explanation. On the contrary, it is a rejection of the question.
There was a moment when one of my children realized the power of the question "Why", which, as good liberal parents, we always tried to answer. But every answer can generate another "why?". When one runs out of explanations - or time - one has to say, "because it is." This is not answer. It is a refusal to answer or a confession of inability to answer.
I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. I've already described how "final cause" is a different type. If you do not want to further your study then so be it.
Quoting Philosophim
OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:
""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."
You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:
"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."
Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument.
So, I'll explain another time, in a slightly different way, why your argument is self-refuting.
In your argument, "cause" requires a definition to be meaningful. It is defined by "prior" and it is defined by "chain of events". "Chain of events" is not metaphorical, it is part of what defines "cause", and what necessitates a "first". If you don't like "chain", you could call it a procession of events or something like that. but each cause is "an event". The existences referred to are "events", and each event is a cause.
You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. However, "reason" has a different meaning from "cause". And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event.
Further, the argument ends up being self-refuting because it demonstrates its own definitions to be inadequate, false. That's what I've been trying to explain to you. An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting.
You might move to replace "cause" in your argument with "reason", but this creates a number of other problems for the argument because the reason why an event occurs might be intention, which is other than "cause" by the definitions required for your argument.
Quoting Ludwig V
This is exactly the problem, addressed above. The issue is that the reason for an event may be the cause of the event. This occurs in the case of intentional acts. But the two "reason" and "cause" are in no absolute way, equivalent or interchangeable. And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain. But Philosophim is disinterested in other types of cause, and wants to adhere to a definition which involves the sequence, or series. However, adhering to that definition invalidates the switch to "reason". Furthermore, it renders Philosophim's argument as self-refuting because the argument itself demonstrates that the "first cause" requires a distinct definition inconsistent with the description of the rest of the causes in the series or sequence. In other words the argument demonstrates that it's premises are inconsistent with empirical description.
This is a good point. I appreciate the specific point out to where cause is ambiguous. I have always considered constituents as causes depending on how the question is asked. For example, "What causes an atom to stay together?" At that point we include its constituents.
To really simplify, to me a cause is what is the historical fact for why something exists. A description of existence can have many attributes such as constituents and time. Thus the general question of cause can be asked and answered in different ways. So if someone said, "What causes an atom?" we can answer with its constituents. This can then be drilled into. We can then ask, "What causes X constituent?" Eventually we will reach a limit of fundamentals, and will be forced to ask the remaining attributes like time. "Why does that exist in its expressed way now instead of one second ago?" And so on until there is nothing prior. Once we reach the point where there is no other causality to drill into besides the existence itself, we have reached a first cause.
Quoting Banno
So to take your example, A caused B, which caused C. We may ask that of the sequence of births as well. "What caused the sequence of births?" And we can explain that A had to exist prior to have B, who had to exist prior to C. For B could not have A, nor C have B. Does this answer your question Banno? I understand if you wish to bow out after making a point, so silence does not mean acceptance. It is at least an answer to think about.
Almost certainly. As I've noted before its incredibly difficult to prove something is a first cause. And it would need to be proven. Not believed, not assumed, not based off of a lack of being able to examine or measure, but proven.
Quoting Ludwig V
Mostly because I've been ingrained to use different words instead of the same one repeatedly in a sentence. :) In this case there was overlap, as if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. But not all reasons are causes just like not all cats are tigers.
Do you agree that causation is the natural form of shape-shifting within the our phenomenal world of material things?
I know where the information can be found. You have not demonstrated any specific type of other cause, only vague, "maybes". So far the main point is that a "first cause" means there can be no prior cause by definition. Since you cannot give me a concrete example that gets past this, I see no evidence of any refutation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason. The reason for a first cause's existence, is simply its own existence at that point.
I just replied to Ludwig because he noticed I was using reason which he thought I was using synonymously with cause. I think he missed the "prior" part as well. Just like I told him, there is overlap because if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. Of course this does not mean all reasons are causes.
I did not think I would have to define the term 'reason' but I'll do so here if that's a problem. From Oxford Languages the pertinent noun definition is "a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event." So as you can tell, its easy to have some overlap as sometimes a reason is a cause. When I and you have been referring to 'reason' as different from 'cause', I have been trying to use it as 'explanation'. Does this help?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So to be clear here, I'm noting there can be no prior reason. Which includes not only a cause, but explanation or justification.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not an empirical argument. This is a logical argument. When Einstein constructed his theory of relativity in regards to large bodies, logically, it was sound. It was only after they observed and measured an eclipse that they could empirically confirm it to be true. I make no empirical arguments here. I simply note that logically, if we continue to examine any chain of causality, whether that be finite or infinitely regressive, we will eventually run into a first cause. So no, there is no empirical observation as of yet that refutes this claim, nor any empirical observation that confirms this claim. This discussion is not an attempt at empirical proof, but a logical proof. As such, unless you can logically refute it, it stands.
And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. By the way, Bob Ross is the only other poster to my mind who understood and communicated this right off the bat. Well done, I consider him one of the best philosophers on these boards. :) So, if you wish to say, "I don't care about what logic says, I only care about empirical proof" then I will simply nod my head and state, "That's fine." But that in itself does not show it is a false logical argument.
I believe causation is the factual reality of some entity X which explains why some entity Y exists. Thus a first cause would be a Y with no other X entity as its cause for existence.
Quoting Philosophim
Why do you not say a first cause is Y & ~Y in superposition? I ask this particular question with the assumption that a first cause must instantiate motion.
If motion is essential to a first cause no less so than to its effects, then said first cause must be self-transcendent. If self-transcendence entails change of position, then first cause must paradoxically encompass itself and the negation of itself in a state of superposition placing the contradictions in two places at once. Superposition is then, by my argument here, the means by which a first cause (presumably a single) effects essential motion.
A question is whether a self-transcendent cause in superposition is paradoxically a first cause and not a first cause due to the bi-directional, paradoxical causation of the two iterations of a single self vis-a-vis itself.
A first cause does not have to instantiate motion. A first cause may be already in motion, with again, no prior cause as to what it is in motion. As an example, a photon can appear without any velocity, or with velocity. A first cause has no restrictions on how it can or must exist. If it did, there would be something else which caused those restrictions, which is impossible.
Quoting Philosophim
Do you dispute that a photon with rest mass entails infinite quantities, and that equations describing practical situations break down upon approach to functions with infinite input/output values?
Quoting Philosophim
Why is it not the case that if a first cause instantiates already in motion, then spacetime, mass_energy, velocity and a host of other physical fundamentals (spin, charge, up/down quarkiness, color, charm, etc.) co-exist with it, thus stripping it of being "first?"
More generally, how can something be first cause if its essential makeup entails differentiable constituent components co-equal in primary status?
Does this thought suggest to you a first cause as abstract concept must be a pure singularity and, as such, exists as a conceptual limit approachable only through mind via imagination?
Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates?
Not quite right. For me, a cause must be prior to its effect (except when it is part of a causal analysis) and a distinct entity. So I interpreted "prior cause" as a pleonasm. But I see that I misunderstood.
Quoting Philosophim
Yes, you are not alone. I've seen some very well-known philosophers indulge themselves in that way. I don't think it is particularly helpful and it can be rather misleading. The terms here are very unclear and common usage is no help. In my usage. which I think is also common philosophical usage, a reason is not a cause, because it does not need to be an event or even a spatio-temporal entity.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quite so.
Quoting Philosophim
As I tried to say earlier, the reason you suggest for the first cause/reason is, to me, not a cause/reason at all, but a rejection of the request to provide one. "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations - a brute fact or a first cause.
Quoting Philosophim
I always thought that the existence of something was always an empirical, not a logical question, so I'm treating your first cause as a possibility, not a certainty.
There was a time when it was thought that there must be a foundation for the earth and that seemed logically necessary. But it turned out, empirically, that it was not the case. That required new thinking, and the new thinking was forced on us by various empirical truths. Check out Five ways to prove the earth is a globe. That's why I regard a first cause as an opportunity for new thinking.
I think Hume hit the nail on the head with his criticisms. Ultimately, to me causation is a word that exists to account for a human intuition, without referencing an external fact.
Perhaps a physically reductionist causation is something worthy looking into. Surely, it does push the issue further and does not solve the problem of induction (what could?), but at least it allows us to clear up our language.
My discussion of intention, free will, final cause, did not consist of vague maybes.
Quoting Philosophim
That, as I demonstrated is a faulty conclusion. The conclusion is that there cannot be an event prior to the first cause as the cause of it. The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported.
Quoting Philosophim
You have no premise to draw this conclusion. A "cause" as described by your "chain of events", is an "event". We might say that a cause, or an event suffices as "the reason" in some instances, but it does not in all instances. This implies that "reason " is the broader term, with a wider range of meaning. If the inverse was the case, if all reasons were causes, then "no prior cause" would imply "no prior reason". But that is not the case, so "no priior cause" does not imply "no prior reason". Conversely, "no prior reason" would imply "no prior cause" as "reason" has logical priority over "cause", "cause" being included within "reason".
Quoting Philosophim
Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions.
Quoting Philosophim
My reference to empirical evidence was simply to show that your definition of "cause" is not consistent with empirical evidence, it is therefore a false premise. And this inconsistency, false representation, is why it is difficult to understand the nature of "the first cause" which is necessitated by your argument. Your definition of "cause" is false, and as I've explained many times to you already, you need to broaden your understanding of what a "cause" is. Otherwise you're just stuck with an unsound argument, based on a false definition of "cause", produced by a misunderstanding.
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I hope I'm not being too pedantic, but I think that's not quite what Hume says. He accepts the sceptical argument against the scholastic notion of a "power" that a cause exerts to produce its effect, but then says that we will continue to think and speak of causation based on a custom or habit arising from the association of our idea of the cause with our idea of the effect (not an intuition).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of the Big Bang, time and space are created by it and do not exist before it. So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason. But, it seems to me that a cause cannot exist outside time, whereas a reason can. So there is reason to think that there might be a reason for the Big Bang. But I don't see that there could be a cause for it. (I have no idea what the reason might be, but there seem to be some interesting speculations around.)
Quoting Deleted user
Anything that cleans up our language is worth looking in to.
You are not, I was just unclear :-P fixed now
Time and space are conceptions we apply toward the understanding of our surroundings. Kant calls them pure a priori intuitions. It does not make sense to say that they are a part of the things which surround us, just like it doesn't make sense to say that numbers and geometric shapes are a part of our surroundings.
If you see a ball for example, and say "that is a sphere", this is a description, and "sphere" refers to the concept used to describe the ball. You are not saying that there is a conceptual sphere there in your environment, rather you are saying that there is an object there which is representative of the concept, so that "sphere" is the acceptable concept to describe it.
Likewise with time and space, these are concepts we use to describe the world around us, so it doesn't make sense to say that time and space were created by the Big Bang. It is more appropriate to say that the universe, which we understand through the concepts of time and space was created by the Big Bang. However, it is acceptable in common vernacular to say "time and space are created by it", just like it is acceptable to say, when pointing to a ball, "that is a sphere".
Quoting Ludwig V
Based on what I said above, this is not a sound conclusion. It appears like the intuitions and concepts which we use to understand our world, and our universe, would not be applicable toward understanding the reality of whatever the conditions were prior to the Big Bang, but this does not imply nothing can be prior to it, in any absolute sense. What it is that was prior to the Big Bang would most likely require a completely different conceptual structure to understand it.
Quoting Ludwig V
If you adopt a separation between the world around us, and the conceptions employed by us to understand that world, as I explained above, this provides the premises required for logic to extend beyond the world of empirical evidence. This is what we find in pure mathematics for example, logic which goes beyond the empirical world. I suggest that in this way we can find the principles required to understand statements like "prior to the Big Bang". It's simply a matter of recognizing that concepts naturally conform to the things which they are applied to, and if we want to understand what is outside of those things, like cause of and prior to them, we need to provide the concepts which can do this.
It does not mean that Kant is correct. Scientists showed us in the 20th century that time and space are affected by physical facts.
Do you mean, scientists show us that they adapt their conceptions of time and space according to the different problems which arise, and the new evidence?
I will clarify with more care. I'm simply using this as an example, not trying to say such a thing actually exists. My point is that there is no way to predict when or how a first cause would form or exist. To say a first cause must form a particular way or is likely to form at a particular time would require a cause outside of itself. A thing which has no causality outside of itself thus can have no restrictions as to what it could be upon existing. I am not sure where you are getting the infinite qualities though. Could you give an example?
Quoting ucarr
Great question. Lets keep it extremely simple so its clear. Lets imagine that we first spy a hydrogen atom that forms with apparently no prior cause. Any time tick before this, the atom is not there. Once it is there, we know an atom is composed of particular parts. Lets pretend, for simplicities sake, that protons, neutrons, and electrons are fundamental particles. We say, "What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general.
Once we get to the fundamental particles, there is no other cause for those particles in terms of parts, or prior time. Meaning that they are the first causes. So what caused the atom? The combination of fundamental parts of the atom formed without prior cause at the same time.
Quoting ucarr
Could you clarify this with an example? You definitely make good points ucarr, I'm just not quite getting it here.
I have not been intending to use reason as a cause, but as an explanation. Of why "X" is a cause. I think the problem some people have been having is this is not a universal, and that sometimes reason can be substituted for cause. Part of the reason why some people may have problems with cause is people are having a difficult time grasping what a reason is.
Quoting Ludwig V
I also agree this would be a problem. But I am not using the term reason to explain another cause. That would clearly contradict my notion that a first cause is absolute, so I think even a moderately charitable reading of what I've been expressing would conclude I'm not attempting to blatantly contradict myself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple.
Quoting Ludwig V
And I'll note again, "reason" is not being used as "cause", but explanation. So to your point, "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations, yes.
Quoting Ludwig V
What is logically necessary may not be empirically certain, this is true. No disagreement from me!
Your point has largely been, "Maybe there's a prior cause to the first cause." This is what I'm addressing. I have not seen a concrete example that demonstrates a situation in which there is a first cause, then you show that logically, there is actually a prior cause to that. If we had a concrete example, we could look at that. And if you have and I've missed it, don't get mad, just repost it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is just a repeat of a belief you have, you're not demonstrating why the point I gave you is incorrect. Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either. Give me a concrete example of what you mean by a first cause having a prior reason without that prior reason being the cause of the first cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Give me an example.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I just typed out the definition of reason and noted I'm using it as a synonym to 'explanation'. I'm uninterested in your opinions that I have no logic, I'm interested in if you can take the logic I've noted, and give a good example of counter object that would demonstrate that my logic is wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Incorrect. You only have empirical evidence of things which have prior causality. As I've noted, we do not have empirical evidence of things which do not. This does not negate the logic that there necessarily must be a first cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't need to do anything. I've clearly laid out what a cause and first cause is as defined here. You need to demonstrate with some concrete examples why this definition is either impossible, contradictory, or doesn't make sense. If you simply don't like it, that's not my problem. Its on you to demonstrate how one of the most basic logical statements you can construct, "There can be no cause prior to a first cause" is somehow illogical. To my mind where I have given you every benefit of the doubt I can, you have not done so.
Do you understand that if there is something which caused the Big Bang, then the Big Bang is not a first cause? A first cause is not an opinion or belief. It is a reality that we either know about, or do not know about.
Quoting Philosophim
This is a common sense answer. Let's consider details. A proton is not an atom. Likewise, a neutron is not an atom and, etc. Also, we know that elementary particles combine, split apart into other particles, change orbital shells and, etc. Furthermore, we know atoms combine to form compounds and they combine to form radicals and, etc. All of these phenomena are differentiable. Pretty soon, you've got the entire phenomenal universe as you and I know it today popping into existence as the first cause. But the phenomenal processes I've been describing happen in time. If you remove the time element for an atom, or for a universe, either way the primacy of being first becomes meaningless.
Let's suppose the entire universe is the first cause. If everything has always existed co-temporally, then first cause is meaningless.
Quoting Philosophim
In this example, logical necessity is, by definition, logically prior to the ontic status of the first cause it necessitates. It is the logical cause of the "first" cause. This is what you're implying with the wording of you OP title: "A First Cause Is Logically Necessary."
You yourself are doing exactly what you say below must not be done:
Quoting Philosophim
Does any type of priority negate first cause? Is it only temporal priority that negates first cause?
Exactly. Which is why a first cause is a cause which has no prior cause for its own existence.
Quoting ucarr
The universe cannot always have existed co-temporally as a first cause. The first cause is only in the first time tick. In the second time tick, the state of existence is caused by the first cause.
Quoting ucarr
By example, I mean give me an imaginary concrete. I need something less abstract to understand what you're trying to convey here. No cause can come before a first cause. Logic can lead us to conclude what a first cause is. Reason can explain what it is. But there is no prior cause that can cause a first cause.
Quoting Philosophim
From this I conclude you're grounding the primacy of first cause within temporal sequence. So, the first cause is first in time before all other things existing in time.
Quoting Philosophim
Let's revisit something you said earlier:
Quoting Philosophim
Sidebar 1 - Notice I've made "forms" bold. If there's a "forms" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "forms" (i.e. physical processes) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.
Sidebar 2 - Notice I've made "there" bold. If there's a "there" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "there" (i.e. spacetime) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.
Main focus:
Quoting Philosophim
If you can posit theoretically the popping into existence of an atom as first cause, why cannot you posit theoretically the popping into existence of a universe as first cause?
In either case, when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence.
If there's no reason to partition atom and universe with respect to which collective can be first cause temporally, then first cause in terms of temporal sequencing is meaningless. In other words, existence in general, being first cause, makes the notion of a first cause in terms of temporal sequencing meaningless. Everything that can and does exist popped into existence at the same time.
If, on the other hand, you posit an innate temporal sequence of existing things, with some things not existing in any conceivable way prior to a specific point in one-directional time, then you must ask yourself if positing any first existing thing generates an infinite regress of prior existing things because: a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. In sum, all of this draws a circle back to saying temporal primacy of existence is meaningless.
No, and I made a slight mistake in my wording here. "A" first cause. Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be. As such, there's also no limit to how many first causes could be. The key to being a first cause is that it is not caused by something prior. That does not mean that other things prior to a first cause cannot exist like other first causes.
For example, a photon appears with no prior causality here. Five minutes later and thousands of miles away, a big bang appears uncaused as well. The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains.
Quoting ucarr
To clarify again, there could have been other first causes and their resultant causality before any one particular first cause and its resultant causality. The important note is that nothing within the prior chain of causality caused the second first cause to exist.
Quoting ucarr
If a first cause appears in nothing, its not that nothing caused the first cause to be. Absolute nothingness is also not a thing, but the absence of all things.
Quoting ucarr
You can. I've noted this several times through this massive discussion. I'm not expecting you to have read it all, just noting this has long been stated from my end.
Quoting ucarr
True.
Quoting ucarr
So it is possible, like anything else, that there was only one first cause and that's all of existence. It has the same meaning as any other kind of first or set of first causes we could have. There would be no prior causation for its existence.
Quoting ucarr
I don't believe so if my point has been clarified.
a. No existing thing exists in isolation
To clarify, there's a reason I call it a first cause. Because immediately after its existence it enters into causality. Meaning one time tick after, its has its own reference at a prior time tick to explain why it state of existence is as it is at the second tick of time. Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. Nothing I'm noting is negating the universe as it is today, and we clearly have a lot of things. :)
b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement)
Once a first cause exists, it is within causality within its own temporal changes, or if there are other resulting chains of causal existence from other first causes.
c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. True. Though as you mentioned earlier, " when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence."
Really great questions ucarr!
QED.
Although causal chains seem to be aligned with a passage of time for each link, one has to be cautious about saying "first tick" or something similar. Then you move into relativity of time measurements and if one makes them smaller and smaller the dynamical system described by the chain tends to a continuous process, with associated philosophical interpretations.
I thought my examples of composition chains might have been a little too much math, so I did a search for other mathematical interpretations of causalities. What I found is more formal and harder to understand. As idealized chains my approach is the simplest analogue, I think. Admittedly, I move in a rarefied atmosphere distinct from physical realities.
Quoting Philosophim
Regarding no limitation, what about the selfhood of the first cause? If selfhood establishes a boundary between self and other, and the first cause is a self, then: a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self.
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim
You're saying a particular first cause can have a non-causal relationship with other things prior to it?
Moreover, you're saying the attribute of first cause generally allows for a multiplicity of independent first causes temporally sequenced across a positive interval of time?
Does this not imply that a particular first cause has a bounded domain of first causal influence upon a sub-set of the totality of existing things?
Quoting Philosophim
Your above quote answers my question directly above it in the affirmative.
Is this not a description of everyday causes such as: a) a virus causes pneumonia; b) a cloud saturated with water causes rain?
Why is it not the case your argument now is merely a description of causation in the everyday world replete with many causes not casually linked to each other? You advance your argument by lopping off "first" and thereby turning first cause into everyday cause.
Am I mistaken in my understanding of your purpose as being an examination of the first cause of all existing things, including existence itself?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting Philosophim
If first cause passes through time from its first tick to its second tick, time is co-equal with it.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm inclined to think the conservation laws forbid the total isolation of a thing. A truly isolated thing means all of mass_energy, being a singularity, negates equilibrium. If our universe defaults toward equilibrium, as the conservation laws confirm, then absolute singularity is an infinite value never reached.
Quoting Philosophim
Is self-causation is meaningful, its an attribute shared by all existing things.
Quoting Philosophim
That takes us back to saying all of existence is its own first cause which is like saying "everything is everything," trivial.
But you are making unjustified claims about "the reason" for the first cause's existence.
Quoting Philosophim
It's not as simple as you make it sound. The question is not "why is this a first cause" because you have not identified a particular "concrete" cause which you claim is a first cause, and asking why is this a first cause. You have provided an argument which shows the need for a first cause. So the question is the more general, "why is there a first cause?". And you might answer it in a similar way, "because there is necessarily a cause without a prior cause". But this does not suffice because it does not answer the question of what is prior to the first cause, and why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be called "a cause". That's what makes a first cause a first cause, it is the explanation why a first cause is a first cause, the reason why whatever it is that is prior to the first cause cannot be called a cause.
See, "because it has no prior cause" does not answer the reason why any particular cause is a first cause, because that requires showing the reason why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be said to be the cause of the first cause. We cannot simply assume that there is nothing prior to the first cause because that is unjustified.
Quoting Philosophim
"Because it exists" does not suffice as an explanation for anything.
Quoting Philosophim
Since you refused to accept conventional philosophy concerning different types of causation, I've found that I have to approach your argument from the distinction you've made between "cause" and "reason". I realize that it is pointless to try to explain something to someone who has no interest in understanding, because understanding would demonstrate that person to be wrong, so I have given up trying to talk to you about final causes. Going forward I will talk about "reason" instead, because this is a term you used.
Quoting Philosophim
That is unjustified. To make that claim, you need to demonstrate how all reasons are necessarily causes. But you've already admitted that there are reasons which are not causes. And, you said that the first cause has a reason, but not a cause, so you support that admission in your usage. Furthermore, you have no premise which allows you to conclude that the reason for the first cause is not prior to the first cause, because you have not properly established the reason for the first cause. All you've said is that the reason for the first cause is that there is no prior cause. But that's only the reason why it is "first", it is not the reason why it is "cause". And that is a requirement for the reason for "first cause", that we have the reason for it being called "first", and the reason for it being called "cause".
Quoting Philosophim
I don't know what you're talking about here. You've excluded the possibility of a prior reason being the cause of the first cause through definition. Therefore a prior reason of the first cause must necessarily be something other than a cause, and what you ask is nonsensical. A concrete example of the prior reason for a first cause is not required until you produce a concrete example of a first cause. I tried giving you concrete examples of first causes already, with free will acts, but you ended up rejecting them because they refuted your argument.
Quoting Philosophim
Example of what?
Quoting Philosophim
As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. So if you are using "reason" as synonymous with "explanation", you'll have to do better.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't dispute your argument about "there necessarily must be a first cause", I dispute the further unjustified conclusion you make, that the first cause cannot have a prior reason.
Quoting Philosophim
Your request for concrete examples is completely out of place. You have a purely abstract logical argument about an abstract concept "first cause", and you make an unjustified conclusion concerning the first cause, i.e. that it cannot have a prior reason. This is all abstract logic, there is no place for a concrete example.
Quoting Philosophim
I've already demonstrated that. How quickly you forget. A "first cause" is "first" in relation to a specific chain. There may be a multitude of different chains. The "first" of one chain may be prior in time to the "first" of another chain. Therefore the assertion "there can be no cause prior to a first cause" is illogical.
Quoting Philosophim
As I've explained to you already. Your conception of "first cause" is a product of an unnecessarily restrictive definition of "cause", one which does not provide for all the things which are commonly, in philosophy, known as causes. Therefore it really is an opinion, your opinion. But you got tired of hearing about that, and I got tired of telling you that.
:up: Something circular going on here. It's a feeling I have had for this entire thread.
:up: I was going to write the similar content of the post long before, but yes that is the crucial point.
It appears there is a vicious circle. Philosophim removes the infinite regress, or eternal circle of causation, breaking the chain by inserting "reason" instead of "cause" at some unspecified temporal point. The breaking of the chain produces a "first cause". But there is no reason given for why the chain begins at one point in time rather than another point in time, i.e. why X cause is the first ,rather than Y or some other cause being the first, leaving the selection of the point in time at which the first cause appears, as totally random. But random is inconsistent with "reason". So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation.
Quite so. It's perhaps worth noting that the same applies to what happens after the heat death of the universe.
Quoting Philosophim
My difficulty here is that you seem to be treating "existence" as if it were a property of the things that exist. I'm sure you are aware that this has been contested ever since Kant and Hume, and with Russell and Frege's treatment of it in the predicate calculus this has been a staple of analytic philosophy ever since. If that's right, pointing to existence as a cause of anything is incomprehensible. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of it qualifying as an non-causal explanation of something, but it can hardly explain why something exists (circularity). If you disagree, then there is scope of a discussion of the point, but you can't expect others to accept what you say on the face of it. In short, I agree with both the quotations below:-
Quoting ucarr
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The supposed "heat death" is an interesting issue. The heat death is the result of entropy which is the natural effect of the passage of time. "Entropy" refers to energy which is unavailable to the system, but cannot be shown to have escaped the system. So by the rules of the conservation law, that energy must still be within the system somehow, only not available to the system.
This leaves us with the question of, "what form could this energy have?". It is not "energy" as we know "energy", because "energy" is defined as the capacity to do work, and this energy is denied of that capacity. It is only "energy" because the law of conservation dictates that it must be conserved as "energy".
This is very similar to the problem I exposed with Philosophim's "first cause". There must be something prior to the first "cause", but it cannot be a "cause" by the definition which Philosophim says we must adhere to. Thus my suggestion of a different type of "cause" (which is analogous to a different type of "energy" produced by entropy, a type of energy inconsistent with the definition of energy).
Since Philosophim insists that we cannot use "cause" in this way, we have to look at "the reason" for the first cause. So this is analogous to "the reason" for entropy, which is a violation to the absoluteness, or ideality of conservation of energy, in a way similar to "the reason" for the first cause being a violation to the absoluteness or ideality of "the first cause".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Please articulate an argument supporting this premise.
Absolutely. The reason I say "time tick" is because if I said seconds, then we could divide into milliseconds, then...you get it. A first cause exists upon its formation, then enters into causality through time and how its original self influences it from them on.
To be clear, there is no limitation upon what can be incepted. Once a first cause exists, it is bound to causation by what it is. For example, lets say a hydrogen atom appeared as a first cause. As soon as it exits, it is a hydrogen atom. Its limited by its parts and the rules of itself.
So then:
Quoting ucarr
Correct
Quoting ucarr
I don't think that's quite it. The network of its continued self existence is bound by its formation. Its formation is a first cause only. After that, it is in a temporal and state chain of causality for every tick of time.
Quoting ucarr
No. I'm staying there can be no prior cause which influences the inception of the first cause. After a first cause exists, it enters into causality with everything it can interact with. So again, something prior could exist, but if none of what exists causes a new existence, that new existence is a first cause. As an example we could have a photon appear in our universe right now uncaused by anything that exists.
Quoting ucarr
Correct. There can be no limitation as to how or why a first cause could come to be.
Quoting ucarr
If you mean that when a first cause appears, it is bound by what it is and then is bound by the natural consequences of its specific interactions with other existences, yes. Does this mean that two chains of causation, each with a first cause, cannot intertwine somewhere over time? No. I've described before that with multiple first causes, the intersection of their consequential causality over time ends up being more like a web with the start of a strand representing the first cause. The causality chains are also each one way.
Quoting ucarr
No. What you and many other people are accidently doing is confusing an origin with a first cause. An origin is a start for measurement. On a X/Y graph, the common origin is 0,0. However, we can also make the origin 50,50. Does that mean 0,0, suddenly does not exist? No. So imagine a line that represents a finite chain that starts at 1,2. We could do an origin at 0,0, but it would be pointless because there's nothing there. We could follow the line and make the origin at 10,15. Does that mean that the start of the line isn't at 1,2 No, its still there no matter where we create or origin, or pick any point in the causality line as a starting point for our measurements and discussion.
Meaning, I can say, "What caused a fire in the forest? It was a lightning bolt". And if that's all we care about, we end the inquiry. Does that mean the lightning bolt is a first cause? No, that's just an origin on the chain and we need no more explanation. There is of course a much larger chain. "What caused the lightning? What caused the cause of the lightning?" And so on. A first cause is when there is a point in which there is no prior cause. It is irrelevant whether we measure it or realize it. And, as the argument shows, its logically necessary that there eventually be at least one.
Quoting ucarr
Yes, I think by now what I'm stating is that there is at least one first cause. But there could be several.
Quoting ucarr
A first cause cannot pass through time. A first cause is an inception event. Every time tick afterward is a causal chain that necessarily traces to the inception event.
Quoting ucarr
Yes, if a first cause appears that follows conservation laws. But there is no prior cause which would prevent a first cause from appearing that does not follow conservation laws. It doesn't mean such a thing has happened, I'm just noting there is nothing logical that I can see that would forbid such a first cause from happening.
Alright, I think I addressed everything that didn't repeat! I love your intelligent and pointed approach Ucarr!
I had thought that it must be possible to "extend" our time-line beyond the Big Bang 14 billion years ago. If we treat "now" as the origin of the line. That's no different from treating the year Christ was born as the origin and extending it back from there.
The catch is that if time is not happening, there is no way of knowing how far back one is, or how long one has been there, as it were. The Big Bang is the origin of change and without change, there is no way of measuring time. It's not as if we can put a clock in our pocket before we go.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm not at all sure that this really makes sense. If there are other existences, then the question arises what caused them? If that question has an answer, then the first cause wasn't the first.
I guess you might be thinking of some distinction like the differences that some people identify by talking about causes and conditions. The cause of the explosion is the spark, the molecular structure of the explosive is (part of) the conditions. But that doesn't apply to a first cause like the Big Bang, which is the cause and origin of all the physical things in our universe. Or perhaps it does?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A pretty puzzle indeed. So the conclusion must be that something continues to exist after the heat death, even though time and space no longer exist. I did notice that heat death did not say that the temperature must be zero, only that temperature differences would be ironed out.
No doubt that unavailable energy is hanging around waiting to be released in another Big Bang. That would not be an unsatisfying solution.
Naive question. Am I not right that, strictly speaking energy is work done - the capacity to do work is called "potential energy", isn't it? I can see why unavailable energy can't be called potential energy, but it sounds as if we need a concept like the potential for potential energy. Awkward.
On the other hand, there is so much mystery about in the form of anti-matter and dark energy, that perhaps we should just wait for someone to find all that unavailable energy and release it - hopefully not all at once.
I've given several examples. All I'm asking is for you to do the same. I'm not asking for proof that such a thing exists, just give me a possible example of something which makes logical sense that could exist. In my mind you're dodging the issue here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Metaphysician...I've been kind so far and given you as much benefit of the doubt I can. This is stupid. You are better than this. Go to anyone else besides me and say that sentence and watch their confused looks. This is why I keep asking you for examples. If you cannot show how such a statement can logically exist I'm going to assume you're trolling or you are arguing in bad faith. Work on this and give me something good to think about please.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, that's how a philosophical discussion works. The OP sets up clear definitions and makes logical conclusions from it. You can ask for definition clarification, which I have answered. You can critique the conclusion from those definitions, which I have answered. You can even introduce different definitions into the discussion and see if they work within the scope of the argument. This is not about me refusing anything. Please contain your frustration and keep personal accusations out of this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What? No. If there's no prior cause, then there is nothing prior which caused a first cause to exist. If there is nothing prior to cause something, there is no prior reason for the existence of it either. Now we can reason about the existent thing. But we cannot say there is a prior reason, as there is nothing prior that caused it. Please demonstrate a situation in which there is no prior cause for something, yet there is a prior, and by this I mean temporal, reason for it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'll try explaining again. Lets take an example of a photon that appears without prior cause. Now, once it exists, it is bound by causality by what it is. Meaning it can't suddenly act like an atom, because it is a photon. It can't interact with other things as an elephant suddenly, because it is a photon. It is the first cause in a causality chain only because nothing caused it to exist. But its continued existence begins a causal chain with whatever happens at the next time tick of its existence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Great, we agree then. Thus you can't have a prior reason if there is no prior cause. Lets stop going over this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have given several examples of potential first causes and how they would work. You gave me examples of free will and claimed they were first causes. I noted they could not fit the definition of first causes and that's when you lost your cool. Its obvious to me your motivation for being against my definitions is you want free will to be a first cause. But you realized quickly that if my arguments about what a first cause is, and its logical consequences are true, then you couldn't have what you wanted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are stalling and trying to avoid it because you know you can't give one. Prove me wrong and give me one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It does when there is no prior cause.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, so far you don't like the conclusion, but I haven't seen any examples or reasonable logic to show this point. If you do not attempt to do so in your next reply I will be moving on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There can be no prior cause that causes a first cause. Not that there cannot be other first causes and chains of causality from those first causes. Those other chains obviously do not cause other first causes. This is basic.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ah, you do understand that the argument I've presented works. You have not demonstrated it is unnecessarily restrictive. That's a pretty poor way of just saying, "Yes, your argument is consistent with your specific definitions." Its not an opinion, that's philosophy. Definitions, logic, conclusion. Please give some examples and focus more on the argument then on "me" as the problem in your next reply please.
Prove that something is circular. Your opinions on the matter don't make them correct.
We've already gone over this, but I'll say it again if it was missed. If there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. There is no unspecified temporal point. You ignore the fact that I conjoin 'prior reason' as different from "a reason". A first cause is that which has no prior cause for its existence. I note: " What is the reason why this infinitely regressive chain of causality exists? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is." There isn't a prior reason for its existence, I've simply noted the reason for its existence as an explanation. If it helps, change the sentence to, "What is the cause of this infinitely regressive chain of causalities existence? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Random is not inconsistent with an explanation, I'm not sure what you're saying here. And my point is not circular. Its simply a result of what a first cause is. Circular would be something like, "The bible says God exists, and we know the bible is true because God says it is." We're obviously leaving out that we first have to know each is true, and that requires something outside of the reference to each other. I am not doing this to my awareness.
Existence is a set of all things that exist.
Quoting Ludwig V
I note that its a set of existence. So for example I can say, "What causes rain?" Or, "What causes water?"
Quoting Ludwig V
If we go up the causal chain, it is logically necessary that there be a first cause. The logical conclusion from there being a first cause is that there can be no prior cause for its existence, therefore there is no reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. That's the full explanation. I don't get what you're missing here, can you try to drill into it a little more?
Quoting Ludwig V
Sure, there is nothing wrong with treating the big bang as an origin. "This is as far back as we can currently go in terms of causality." This is not the same as saying, "We have proven that the big bang is a first cause, and there cannot be anything else which caused it to exist."
Quoting Ludwig V
The answer is there was at least one first cause that resulted in the rest of what exists. Just use the example of the big bang as if it were the first cause. If there was nothing that caused the big bang, that's it.
Quoting Ludwig V
If the big bang is a proven first cause, then it does. Can I explain the exact laws of how the big bang caused everything to appear from it? No. But that's not the point. The point is that there is no prior cause which made the Big Bang. It just happened.
Ah, well, that's different.
I even understand you when you say:- Quoting Philosophim But I don't understand you at all when you say Quoting Philosophim. Why don't you just say "therefore there is no reason (or cause) for its existence"? I'm not saying there can't be a reason for its existence, just that there may not be one.