Michael

You seem to be describing enactivism?

I don't understand why you don't understand what I'm asking and I don't know how to explain it in any simpler terms.

Which is like saying "one difference could be that bachelors exist and unmarried men don't".

So how do you make sense of this: Phenylthiocarbamide tastes bitter to 70% of people and doesn't taste bitter to 30% of people. What does the word "bi...

I don't understand what you're asking. I'm saying that the terms "sense data" and "qualia" refer to the same thing. Therefore, if qualia exist then se...

That's what I don't understand. As I understand it, sense data and qualia are the same thing.

In what sense is an olfactory sensation caused by odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose the "direct" perception of a c...

According to the SEP article adverbialists accept qualia. If sense data and qualia are the same thing then according to the SEP article adverbialists ...

Russell was saying that adverbialism rejects the sense data theory but the SEP article says that adverbialism accepts (and even requires?) qualia. Hen...

I think you're misunderstanding what is meant by "sense-data". From here: Whereas you seem to be suggesting that "sense data" is something involving l...

I don't think it's that simple. From here: So much like we might say that mass is a property of physical objects, he says that colour qualia is a prop...

But also from that article: I don't get the distinction between sense data and qualia. To me it's all just sensations, which are a mental phenomenon. ...

The knowledge that I am in pain and am tasting something sweet is direct. The knowledge that I stood on a nail and am eating something that contains a...

So if "direct" in the naive sense doesn't mean the same thing as "direct" in the non-naive sense then there are two different meanings of "direct", an...

As I suggested here, naming these non-naive direct realisms as being "direct" realisms seems to be a misnomer. At the very least they seem to mean som...

It's not my criterion. I'm summarising the various views as explained here: It is not enough that some distal object causes some sensation (even a "re...

I don't quite understand what you're suggesting I'm saying, but the representational theory of perception is indirect realism. I'm aware of colours. C...

If primary qualities belong to an object then nothing in experience is a primary quality, because objects and their properties are not constituents of...

Yes. Vision is not fundamentally different to any other sense. Are there "primary" taste qualities? Are there "primary" smell qualities? Are there "pr...

Well, I think that there is no “resemblance” between a thing’s appearance and a thing’s (objective) properties. The common example is colour. I reject...

The argument from illusion is indeed one of the arguments against direct realism, much like the argument from hallucination and the common kind claim ...

I think adverbialism provides a better account of what I think you're getting at. It's not that when we see a tree we see a concept but that when we s...

What is the difference between naive and non-naive direct realism? Taking my earlier comment, the naive view is that: 1. Something is an object of per...

Sorry, it was referenced in an earlier comment. It’s from https://plato.stanford.edu/Entries/perception-problem/ quoting M.G.F. Martin’s defence of na...

Using the examples from the SEP article, we can say that the experience of a distal object is direct iff the distal object is a constituent of the exp...

I think that's the sort of approach that many here are taking when they claim to be direct realists, even though whatever they're saying has nothing t...

This is the important part. Indirect realists agree with but disagree with , and if is false then the epistemological problem of perception remains.

There is. There's rational interpretation. There's the "thinking" self. See the duck-rabbit above. Sometimes I see a rabbit, sometimes I see a duck, e...

Let's take the SEP article. Perhaps you could explain how to properly interpret the parts in bold. Under any ordinary reading, the flower is not "dire...

No it's not. The flower is on the ground. The photograph is in my pocket. The photograph is just a photosensitive material that has chemically reacted...

Phenomenal experience doesn't extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist beyond the body. Therefore, distal objects are not present in phenomenal ex...

Yes, that's something that I have argued many times before, and is why I keep saying that arguing over the grammar of "I see X" misses the point entir...

Yes, perhaps. I meant it as an intermediary between the "thinking" aspect of consciousness (that interprets and makes use of phenomenal experience) an...

Phenomenal experience is the intermediary. The epistemological problem of perception questions the reliability of phenomenal experience in informing u...

See A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour and primitivism. Plenty of people thought – and probably still do, particularly if they are not taught science – ...

It's an ambiguous question. Take the duck-rabbit: https://static.independent.co.uk/s3fs-public/thumbnails/image/2016/02/14/12/duck-rabbit.png Sometime...

There are many intermediaries between phenomenal experience and, say, a painting on the wall. There's light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing ...

I'll just quote the Wikipedia article on perception: There are many intermediaries between the distal stimulus and conscious awareness. In the case of...

That's why I specified the senses as being the second part to perception. The senses don't think and cognition doesn't sense. But perception involves ...

To repeat an earlier comment: This is what physics, neurology, and psychology recognise. The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective sur...

There are (at least) two parts to perception; sensation and cognition. The sensation is the body's response to stimulation (e.g. photons interacting w...

The entirety of vision and other senses is the result of interactions between the body and the forces (e.g. light and sound and chemicals in the air) ...

Once you accept that “secondary qualities” are not mind-independent properties of external world objects then you have to ask what are secondary quali...

This is what physics, neurology, and psychology recognise. The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the s...

Consciousness doesn’t extend beyond the body, so objects outside the body are not present in my consciousness, and those objects’ properties are not p...

That is still an open question. Perhaps property dualism is correct and sensory experience, and consciousness in general, is a non-physical phenomenon...

But notice that nothing about phenylthiocarbamide has changed. Its existence and its properties are 'fixed'. So how can it be that a chemical with a f...

That depends on whether or not "is green" and "appears green" mean the same thing. If they mean the same thing then it's a truism that an object that ...

Sorry, I'm a bit confused now as my comment originally misunderstood your answer but your response now suggests that I understood it correctly? Were y...

Then "this object is green but looks green" isn't a contradiction, and so "this objects looks green therefore it is green" is a non sequitur, and so "...