That's like saying, in response to the claim that moral realism is the position that moral propositions are made true by objective features of the wor...
This isn't a case of the same object having different names. This is a case of different objects having the same name. The envatted person's word "bra...
Sure. But it doesn't then follow that that kind of causal relation allows for the envatted person's use of the word "brain" to refer to real brains. H...
But the language wouldn't have been chosen by the programmer. The programmer only choses what is experienced. The envatted people would develop their ...
This is circular. I asked what it means to see a thing directly and you said it's to see a mind-independent thing as it is. I asked you what it means ...
Are you saying that it's impossible for a thing to appear red if it's orange; that if it's orange then ipso facto we will all see it as orange? All pe...
I'm really not interested in arguing over the wording of my question. I'm interested in the fact that you now seem to admit that, according to naive r...
I did. I asked what it means to have an inaccurate perception. So whether or not a thing is red is independent of what I see. Colour is a perception-i...
I really don't know what you're talking about here. What I'm asking for is how non-veridical perception works under your account of perception. Is it ...
A theory of perception is exactly a theory about the properties we perceive an object to have. That's what it means to have a theory about the nature ...
I don't see how that's an inaccurate perception. An inaccurate perception would be something like "I see it as X, but it's actually Y". How would that...
Then what does it mean to have an inaccurate perception? This account you offer of naive realism appears to be entirely vacuous, and certainly isn't l...
So because the parts are real (meteors and the Earth) then we can simulate a whole that isn't real (an apocalyptic meteor strike on Earth)? Then using...
And its theory on perception is that, in the veridical case, the properties we perceive an object to have are properties that the object has even when...
That doesn't address the issue I raised, and that is on whether or not the apple being red is perception-independent. According to the traditional nai...
Given that the naive realist view is that the properties we see things as having are mind-independent, and that our perceptions are only veridical if ...
But he says of his "naive realism" (notice his scare quotes) in that chapter "what we perceive depends on a transaction between ourselves and the envi...
He started as a naive realist, moved on to internal realism, and then ended up defending natural realism. As explained here, he still embraced concept...
We don't need for there to be real dragons for there to be simulated dragons, just as we don't need for there to be a real apocalyptic meteor strike o...
It was the view that the majority of realists at the time supported, so on that account, assuming the validity of the argument, he successfully refute...
Not that it matters to Putnam's argument, but this isn't true. We have simulated unicorns and dragons without there being real unicorns and real drago...
Then what does "you shouldn't be racist" mean if not "don't be racist"? That's like saying regarding the claim "I am immortal because my name is Micha...
I asked what is required for a false moral belief to be immoral. One of your reasons was (paraphrased) "because we shouldn't be racist". But given tha...
Sentences of the sort "you shouldn't X" are only coherent if they mean either "don't X" or "X is against the rules" – otherwise they're simply vacuous...
Who, the realist? Sure. But given that Putnam was trying to provide an argument against realism it's not enough for him to simply demand that the real...
So "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis" means "don't devalue people of other races on that basis"? Then when you say "we should...
But given metaphysical realism it's also possible that you were always a brain in a vat. However, given the causal constraint on reference, you could ...
If you deny the distinction between truth and epistemology then you avoid global skepticism, and if you avoid global skepticism then you avoid the bra...
Then what does "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on the basis of their race" mean if not "it is unacceptable to devalue people of other rac...
By denying the realist's claim that "truth is not reducible to epistemic notions but concerns the nature of a mind-independent reality"1, which was Pu...
I'm going to be pedantic and point out that your question misrepresents Putnam. He wasn't trying to argue for skepticism but to argue against realism....
I'm aware that, in principle, they could overrule it. But doesn't precedent play a very important role in the U.S. courts? And given that a number of ...
Well, let's break it down: Surely "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on " just means "racism isn't acceptable". Therefore, we shouldn't beli...
This just seems like you're saying that the belief is immoral because it's false. The belief that racism is acceptable is immoral because racism isn't...
Comments