The kalam/cosmological argument - pros and cons
Here's the kalam/cosmological argument as rendered deductively by Craig (see included links for details):
1. whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. the universe began to exist
3. therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence
4. it's rational to believe that said cause is God
Below I'll round up some pros/justification and cons/objections, for your comments and target practice.
________
Some pros:
[quote=JP Moreland]Further, coming to the present moment by traversing an infinite past is worse than counting to positive infinity from zero, because the former cannot even get started. It is like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit.[/quote]
________
Some cons:
[quote=Aquinas]Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God[/quote]
________
1. whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. the universe began to exist
3. therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence
4. it's rational to believe that said cause is God
Below I'll round up some pros/justification and cons/objections, for your comments and target practice.
________
- The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe by William Lane Craig (at Leadership University)
- The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe by William Lane Craig (at Reasonable Faith)
Some pros:
- item 1 is related to Leibnizian sufficient reason, and nihil fit ex nihilo, which are generally accepted, and also to conservation laws from the physical sciences
- item 2 is consistent with Big Bang models, entropy, and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, from the physical sciences
- Moreland (and others) have also argued that an infinite past duration (or infinite past causal chains) is impossible, which hence supports item 2; see below
- the argument has some degree of intuitive appeal
[quote=JP Moreland]Further, coming to the present moment by traversing an infinite past is worse than counting to positive infinity from zero, because the former cannot even get started. It is like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit.[/quote]
________
- Whitrow and Popper on the impossibility of an infinite past; British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30; William Lane Craig; 1979
- Full Critique of Smith's "Atheism: The Case against God"; Chapter 3: God's Existence; The Skeptical Christian; Mar 2006
- Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity; JP Moreland; Feb 1987
Some cons:
- even if sound, the argument does not suggest anything "divine", sentient, conscious, thinking, caring, loving, warranting worship or prayer, so this amounts to unwarranted or ad hoc personification/anthropomorphization; rather, Craig's conclusion shadows Aquinas' definition in Summa Theologiae, which hence smuggled his God in the backdoor with the baggage; see below
- if there was a definite earliest time (or "time zero"), then anything that existed at that time, began to exist at that time, and that includes any first causes, gods/God, or whatever else
- there are viable alternatives to a definite earliest time, including an infinite past duration (which does not imply a contradiction, albeit counter-intuitive), or a no-boundary, "edge-free" universe (which is not infinite in past duration); for the latter see the reference below (Einstein), or Hartle's and Hawking's models
- item 1 may be questionable or ambiguous, in light of virtual particle pairs, quantum fluctuations, radioactive decay, spacetime foam/turbulence, the "pressure" of vacuum energy, the Casimir effect, Fomin's quantum cosmogenesis, etc; in reference to the expansion of the universe, spatiality is obviously not conserved (not temporally invariant), there's literally more of it by the minute (colloquially), and spatiotemporality appears to be the only prerequisites for mentioned quantum phenomena; additionally see the zero-energy universe hypothesis
- if gods/God can be atemporal (changeless, "outside of time", or something), assuming that makes sense, then we might suppose any such "origin" of the universe
- anything that's changeless (or "atemporal") cannot be a mind, in part or whole, since we already know that mind (consciousness, thinking, phenomenological experiences, etc) is strongly temporal, comes and goes, starts and ends, un/consciousness (anesthetic)
- an "atemporal", "eternal" cause of a universe that has a definite age (like 14 billion years) is incompatible with the principle of sufficient reason, since such a cause leads us to expect an infinite age of the universe - there's no sufficient reason the universe is 14 billion years old and not some other age (yet item 1 is supposedly related to sufficient reason)
- spacetime is an aspect of the universe, but "before time" is incoherent; causality is temporal, but "a cause of causation" is incoherent
- dichotomistically:1. if some God of theism could create something out of "nothing", as it were, then nihil fit ex nihilo is already violated, and we might as well dispose of the principle, in which case said God is an extraneous hypothesis2. if some God of theism created the universe from something already existing, then whatever comprise the universe "always" existed, perhaps "eternally" (to the extent that's meaningful), and we might as well dispose of the extras, i.e. said God3. therefore, by Occam's razor, God is neither implied nor necessary, and may be shaved off and flushed
[quote=Aquinas]Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God[/quote]
________
- Relativity: The Special and General Theory; XXXI. The Possibility of a "Finite" and Yet "Unbounded" Universe; Albert Einstein; 1920
- The entropic brain: a theory of conscious states informed by neuroimaging research with psychedelic drugs; Frontiers in Human Neuroscience; Carhart-Harris, Leech, Hellyer, Shanahan, Feilding, Tagliazucchi, Chialvo, Nutt; Feb 2014
- Every black hole contains a new universe: A physicist presents a solution to present-day cosmic mysteries; Nikodem Poplawski; May 2012
Comments (311)
But it also ought to be noted that anything like a 'divine plan' can't be understood to exist in the same sense that objects of scientific analysis exist. If it really is the case that the just six numbers are an act of the divine will, it is impossible in principle to ascertain that, as by definition this is something that has occurred prior (in both a logical and temporal sense) to the Big Bang event.
The fine-tuning argument is different, though it might presuppose some kalam/cosmological argument.
But, as best I can tell, these apologist arguments have to work in tandem to go anywhere at all, if that was your point.
Quoting "Sorry, the universe wasn't made for you" (Sep 2016):
[quote=Sabine Hossenfelder]This study is hence another demonstration that a chemistry complex enough to support life can arise under circumstances that are not anything like the ones we experience today.[/quote]
There may be an element of incredulity in thinking that, what we know of as life (and what we think of as complex), is somehow "ultimate" of what can come about naturally.
Scientific accounts of causation are generally confined to what is called 'efficient causes' or causal sequences that can be understood in terms of known physical principles. This is what leads Lawrence Krauss to posit that the universe can 'arise from nothing' in the book of that name.
But it turns out that what Krauss means by 'nothing' is not actually nothing. It is the 'quantum vacuum' out of which virtual particles can appear and dissappear. But, is the quantum vacuum actually nothing? I think not, because it was discovered on the basis of the analysis of other aspects of quantum field theory, with which it is intertwined. What gives rise to the laws of physics is not something that Krauss attempts to explain - nor, I think, could he explain them.
So with the cosmological argument, I think it's important to state that it doesn't posit anything like the types of causes that would be considered in a scientific or empirical argument. It concerns the question of what, if anything, caused the laws of physics to be as they are. And that is not, I don't think, a question for physics. (It might not be an intelligible question at all, but that is not the point here.)
* Some people who believe in God will accept premises 1 and 2, but the argument will make no difference to their life because they believed in God anyway.
* The rest of the people who believe in God will reject one or both of premises 1 or 2, and hence reject the argument (like that Christian theologian/philosopher Wes Something from a US university that ripped Craig's argument to shreds). But that will make no difference to their life because they believe in God for reasons that have nothing to do with this silly argument.
* People who don't believe in God will reject one or both of the premises, and hence reject the argument. Why? Because otherwise they'd be convinced by the argument and hence believe in God. By the contrapositive we can conclude that, since they don't believe in God, they must find the argument unsound and hence reject at least one of its premises. So the argument makes no difference to those people either.
It's theoretically possible that there exists one or more person who disbelieved in God and then changed their mind in response to the Kalam argument. I have never heard of such a person. William Craig certainly wasn't such a person. I seem to recall him telling a story that he first got into Jesus because a cute girl in his class at Uni told him that the reason she smiled so much was because she was into Jesus. Now that is a convincing reason to adopt a new worldview. The urge to go through the motions of procreation is very powerful.
The fourth line is a bald assertion. It has no logical argument supporting it. There aren't even any premises to consider and decide whether to accept.
The sole value of the Kalam argument is that it provides good theatre for people that like to watch atheists and Christian apologists doing battle.
No, it's not smuggled - it's basically argued for. The reason why it's a God instead of any other being is i) the being must be simple. Which means it cannot be material as that would be composed of an aggregate of parts that would be conditioned by those parts. As generally parts are contingent entities. ii) The being must be immutable, or else it's conditioned by change. iii) It's unextended, immaterial, and eternal, then since it cannot be conditioned by space and time. It would also have to be omnipotent otherwise it would be conditioned by its limitations. iv) It then follows if it's omnipotent, it's also v) omniscient and vi) omnibenevolent.
The first cause doesn't have to be temporal. It's an instantaneous cause.
God isn't in time as a duration, or an extension of the universe. He's a pure act. The universe being any age is completely compatible with this, and it holds with the PSR since the PSR states all things have to be given a reason for.
Nobody in classic theism denies this, though. That's why the first cause isn't temporal.
Also, I'm not sure of it's very absurdity. Even the transcendentalist would argue for a condition of possibility for causality to exist at all - though as a concept of pure understanding.
One might also ask where this God comes from. Did he spring out of nothing. No. That violates nihil fit ex nihilo. Was this God always here?
Quoting jorndoe
Exactly.
I miss LGU at the moment. If God is the sort of object we can reason about this way, he might as well be some superior extraterrestrial lifeform for whom we are seamonkeys. If God is Love, or something like that, then He is already incarnate, already here. Feuerbach comes to mind. I find it implausible that some "pure mind" without anything like human body would we something we could chat with and pray too. I've tried to imagine the disembodied human mind. The problem is that sensation and emotion (and therefore value) are so bodily. A disembodied mind has nothing to do, nowhere to be, no passion driving its thought.
That makes sense, because I'd expect a physicists to derive the existence of said laws from still more general laws. But the the question might be a pseudo-question is possibly of great relevance here. The whole God-as-cause approach might be flawed from the beginning. If the explanation of X is deduction of X from postulated necessity, then God-as-cause would have the same problem as the most general laws of physics as well as not giving us much to deduce and test against experience. If as if squeezing God into a "scientistic" paradigm is confessing defeat from the first step. If God needs such justification, then such justification is the real God, or something like that.
This is a side point, but it's my understanding that Einstein generalized Newton.
[quote=Wiki]
As Galilean relativity is now considered an approximation of special relativity that is valid for low speeds, special relativity is considered an approximation of general relativity that is valid for weak gravitational fields, i.e. at a sufficiently small scale and in conditions of free fall.
[/quote]
Speeds were low enough and measurement was fuzzy enough so that Newton wasn't seen to be 'wrong.' Instrumentally, Newton was right indeed. He helped us get what we wanted. The "better" equations might have been inconveniently complex and slowed things down practically. I like time separate from space. I suppose we are wired that way.
I agree completely that observation is not the basis of laws. I agree with Popper ("critical rationalist") and Rescher (methodological pragmatist) that we postulate necessity. We dream up a mathematical-conceptual "myth" of how things must behave. Observation is a way to test such a myth. The scientist as "poet" or "myth-maker" is primary. That's my understanding. He just has to be willing to let his dreams die if they don't work. Our theories "do our dying for us." (Popper) The "problem" with God as empirical object is that He would have to be "fleshed out" so that measurements-to-be-expected could be deduced from his nature and compared favorably with actual measurements.
I think you might like Rescher:
[quote=Rescher]
I recall well how the key ideas of my idealistic theory of natural laws - of “lawfulness as imputation” - came to me in 1968 during work on this project while awaiting the delivery of Arabic manuscripts in the Oriental Reading Room of the British Museum. It struck me that what a law states is a mere generalization, but what marks this generalization as something special in our sight -- and renders it something we see as a genuine law of nature -- is the role that we assign to it in inference. Lawfulness is thus not a matter of what the law-statement says, but how it is used in the systematization of knowledge -- the sort of role we impute to it. These ideas provided an impetus to idealist lines of thought and marked the onset of my commitment to a philosophical idealism which teaches that the mind is itself involved in the conceptual constitution of the objects of our knowledge.
[/quote]
As-is the argument isn't valid. 4. is a non-sequitur. However, that's more to do with your paraphrasing than with the actual argument, which instead of 4. has a further argument with 3. as one of its premises:
3. The universe has a cause of its existence
4. If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful;
5. Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.
He justifies 4. by claiming that "agent causation, volitional action, is the only ontological condition in which an effect can arise in the absence of prior determining conditions" (paraphrased by Wikipedia?) and that Occam's Razor maintains that, in light of no evidence to the contrary, there is only a singular cause.
But isn't this just simply anthropomorphizing God? That in order for there to be a mind at all, it must relate to something bodily. It just simply could be that God exists as a pure act, and has an intellect. There are other justifications from the theistic camp to basically show how you can have an aspect of the mind is that is non-physical. Namely, James Ross's argument for the immateriality of the mind.
As for the conclusion in the argument, I think Aquinas basically does give the reason why it's not just simply smuggled in, and has to be a God.
The problem with such arguments are that they are founded on something that is inherently unstable and subject to change - namely the current scientific model of the Universe. I don't understand why anyone bothers. Science will change. What's the point of trying to make up arguments which are based on such fickle considerations? After all ...
Maybe tomorrow science will say that the Universe didn't begin to exist - that it was eternal. What then? The argument is finished?! The argument isn't valid anymore? Your faith is thrown down the drain? Impossible!
Any argument for God's existence needs to provide reasons to believe which are independent of that which is subject to change - transcendental reasons. Furthermore - it must be clarified what it means for God to exist... how can I argue for God's existence in the same way I argue for the existence of a chair? Much rather, an argument about God's existence is very much like an argument for love's existence. All it can do is encourage one to openness of the soul towards the experience of the transcendent - it can stimulate one's aesthetic faculties to the extent that one is overwhelmed by the beauty of it. Take the story of Jesus Christ - the most beautiful story that can be told - it's just impossible to construct a more heroic, and more beautiful story. This great King who has all the power, all the might, and all the happiness in the world - for whom all people are like nothing, mere scum and dirt, and yet this King loves them - with such love that he gives up everything he has, including his own happiness and self-sufficiency in pursuit of them, and he comes to live amongst them, to be mocked and laughed at, spit on and cursed, neglected and insulted, humiliated and vilified, just so that he may save them from destruction, and show them that he loves them. And while they do all this to Him - He still loves them, so much so that he forgives them for all the harm they have caused Him. Truth? Pf. It doesn't even matter, I'd believe in it even if it was false, that's how beautiful it is. As Socrates said about the afterlife, I will say about this - I may be wrong, but at least I will go to the grave with hope and love in my heart, and if death does indeed end all, what better way to meet it than carrying this beauty in your heart.
So I said it is the most beautiful story that can be told. That can be proved. A story's beauty comes from the sacrifices that are made in it, in comparison to the strength of the objective reason to make the sacrifices. If a father sacrifices his wealth to save his child - that is beautiful. But now imagine that the one who has all the power, all the knowledge, all the joy, and all the happiness - that this person were to sacrifice everything - for what? For that which is objectively worthless in his eyes. Now if this is not insanity - and a very beautiful kind of insanity - then I don't know what is. A more beautiful story simply cannot be told because there cannot be a greater sacrifice, and a worse reason for making it!
LOL - he certainly chose one which makes it quite difficult to get to the "motions of procreation"... there are much easier alternatives, you know :) (maybe he loved the girl (interest in procreation being only secondary), in which case it's very good. small L love leads to capital L Love ;) )
But then in a very crude way you are right. It matters how you get to the motions of procreation - if you get there maimed, humiliated, and broken - or you get there whole - most non-religious people get there in the former category. If you don't plan your journey, don't be surprised you don't arrive... Life is such that some things cannot be undone - so much wiser to err on the safe side.
I've been meaning to make a post on Ross's argument. I'm not sure if it is as persuasive as others make it out to be.
The Kalam maybe is since it has to state the universe has a beginning. But any cosmological argument is merely going to state that all we need is a contingent world. All the theist needs to argue for the existence of God is to have Being somewhere in our philosophy.
Quoting darthbarracuda
It doesn't seem very persuasive to me either, but I haven't seen anyone actually answer it and it's a pretty simple argument:
(P1) No physical process is determinate.
(P2) All formal thinking is determinate.
(C) Therefore no formal thinking is a physical process.
...I honestly think the best argument I've seen against the cosmological argument is Kant's.
I know - I haven't criticised Aquinas's arguments. I think they are valid, but NOT persuasive to an unbeliever. Different arguments must be sought out, as illustrated by Pascal. One has to appeal to the heart and to the will - not to the mind and the intellect.
Thanks for the feedback. For the most part it seems that most theists want an anthropomorphic God. He should think and love, just as we think and love, but do it better. I can understand that metaphysically inclined thinkers may focus on God as a solution to an intellectual problem. When I was religious many years, I looked toward God for both reasons. I could talk to an infinite, benevolent intelligence directly, and I has a kosmos that made sense in human terms (God's love, which could only mean something to me in terms of human love).
I do think there are reasonable ways to believe in God. Some theists are maybe erroneously disrespected because it is assumed that they are making empirical assertions or doing metaphysics. Sure, maybe they are in a secondary way while primarily concerning themselves with a feeling that things are fundamentally good. I myself like to invoke "the gods" lyrically, such as in "the laughter of the gods."
I respect this approach. I think we are "seduced" by narratives and find "reasons" when we meet others seduced by other narratives. Or that's a narrative I find seductive. Perhaps you'll agree that "proofs" of God shift the conversation away from the power of the narrative of JC and toward the narrative of logic or pure reason as the king of kings instead.
Thank you :)
I mean, that's fair. I agree with Pascal that the matter is one of disposition and not proposition, but then it becomes a matter of motivation and surrounding oneself in a environment which can't really be addressed philosophically. And I'm not sure if a person with the disposition to cast a blind eye to God will be convinced in any way. I'm not sure if I blame them, though, but the misunderstandings of the cosmological argument are so prominent.
I always took God on a leap of faith.
Exactly - I think most believers have. It's not possible to come to belief in God by argument, by pure reason.
Most of the attributes of God in the scholastic traditions seemed to be defined negatively - by what God is not.
Respectfully, what is the use of prayer then? Why should God send his only son to die? If we take human-like motives away from God, I can't see how he's not only the way to have a teleological world. Even then, don't we need desire of some sort? Why create the world in 7 days? If physical explanation is postulation of necessity, then the explanation of actions tends to be in terms of feelings. So I'm sort of stuck here. But then I might be called a correlationist. "The trail of the human serpent is over all."
Though, again, having a divine intellect and being good would mean that he does have some attributes that we can appeal to. So there is homogeneity between us and God - as there would have to be in classic theism - but it doesn't get us further into anthropomorphizing God into a material, bodily, or finite entity because Aquinas works negatively to show how these properties are all contingent.
I'm not sure if a physical explanation is a postulation of necessity? The very claim made by classic theism is that it's not so. I've always thought, though I may be wrong, that physicalism always leads to a type of naturalism.
So you are coming more from a philosophical defense of a radically simple God? That's a fascinating idea. I think it's a respectable position. I just can't enjoy it myself as an explanation. I experience it as an implicit giving up on explanation. I do think that existence as a whole ("the totality") is necessarily inexplicable, since I see explanation as deduction from postulate necessary relationships, and there's nothing to put the totality in relation to. I'd be tempted to identity this totality with God. Though I totally reject that the scientific image is this totality. Instead, it would just be one more part. From this "pantheistic" perspective, there is nothing that is outside of God, that is not God. I find this poetic, but it doesn't have much use morally. It just associates "God" with the grandest conception I know, namely reality without an ounce subtracted or pronounced unreal. Practically, of course, we need the notion of objective or physical reality. But this is a useful reduction of the totality, in my view. And for me any other notion of God would be swallowed up in this God as Totality.
On the second point, I more or less identity with a generalized instrumentalism. I don't like scientism and I don't really believe in the metaphysical quest. We forge "mind-tools" and use "mind-tools." So it's a vision of man's intellect as an evolving system of myths. We keep the visions-of-reality as tools when they work for us. We try to fix them or change them when they stop making us happy. (By this light, everything I've said here is just itself as vision-of-reality as tool, and my theory of adaptive myths is itself an adaptive myth, an instrument or a meta-instrument.)
Well, I actually normally wouldn't defend a Thomistic God, as that's a God that's both, in my opinion, transcendent and immanent. The God that I would generally defend is a radically transcendent one, a God that's radically Other - with philosophers like Kierkegaard and Levinas. I also don't think the cosmological argument works because of the explanation Kant gave, but it's hard to say because the there's an on-going feud I'm sure. I just think people in general don't go really far into what the Thomistic tradition has to say. In which case, I don't really think anyone has really addressed people like Feser and Oderberg that I know of.
But anyway, I think saying that the universe - if that's what you mean by world - is the totality of everything then this would simply be question-begging for a Thomistic philosopher. That the world, (as both God and the universe he created as a whole is taken to account) then it follows the universe does have a purpose that follows the original and divine plan of God that set it into motion.
Reasons are just explanations for things, which can be merely casual. It follows the PSR, and if that's true, then all things need a reason for their being. Such as a red ball that's in the middle of a forest needs an explanation, or as something as vast as the sun needing a reason for being there casually and contingently. Even if we don't know the epistemological reason for why things are why they are, and how they got there, the fact remains that they must have a reason - the opposite would mean it's reasonless. Which to the Thomistic is absurd. For if everything in the world was reasonless, this would also include the mind, but if the mind is reasonless, then it follows everything you posit as a reason would be self-defeating.
That's an interesting claim. It is the exact opposite of my own impression, although I would not seek to elevate my impression to a claim.
Perhaps you have a source for your claim?
Yes - it's called (1) keeping my eyes open :P (take this as a joke) and (2) understanding that without the necessary support structures, all human arrangements are very unstable. For example - you take two atheists. They form a couple. What will hold them together? Chance? Then take two Christians, schooled in the virtues, raised up in the faith, and committed first to God and second to each other. What will hold them together? Well let's see - because they are schooled in the virtues, they will practice a sexual morality which will not encourage violent emotions amongst each like - like cheating, looking after other women, etc. They will respect each other, and care for each other spiritually, not just on the emotional and the physical level, another bind between them. Furthermore, because their commitment to God comes first, they understand that their love can only flourish within the world which is limited and guided by the virtues, and thus they will be more likely to respect them.
But the atheist on the other hand - he is likely, just statistically, to have had quite a few sexual partners. What will happen? Their loved one will not be as special. They will also not trust each other as much - because very likely they had been deceived in the past. They will look at other women lustfully, because they already have that habit. They will be tempted to cheat, and nothing will stand in the way. In other words, they will willingly head to destruction - like sheep.
God and divine justice - that is the only principle by which men have ever lived in order and by which they will ever live in order.
I don't mean 'mysticism' in a pejorative way, by the way. I regard mysticism very highly and am trying to cultivate it in myself - although along different lines from Thomism, that are more suited to my temperament.
The reason I see Thomism as mystical is that it relies on various words that have no definition that can escape either circularity or triviality, of which 'simple' is an example. Others are 'contingent', 'conditioned' and 'immaterial'. They mostly seem to be based in ontology and connected to the Aristotelean idea of essence - another term that one either finds meaningful or one doesn't. Since no definitions are available, people either find themselves naturally accepting them as if they mean something, or they don't. I am in the latter camp. But I have great respect for Thomists in that they have, over the centuries set up such a rich, fascinating worldview. It's only when they get start insisting that theirs is the only possible correct view, and that all others should adopt it, that it becomes irritating. And, to their credit, that sort of triumphalist evangelism is not a characteristic of most of the Thomists I have encountered.
What do you mean "radically" transcendent?
This is in fact one of the key reasons why my impression is the opposite of yours. Staying together to ride out the ups and downs that happen even in the best partnership is generally a good thing and, in my experience is practised by both believers and non-believers. It is much more a function of wisdom and maturity than it is of religious beliefs.
But it is often the case that people form a partnership that is bad for both of them, because their personalities and aspirations are simply not compatible. Untold misery is then caused when religious dictates make such a couple remain together.
It depends - some things ruin the value of the partnership, and make its aim impossible to achieve.
Quoting andrewk
Yes that is a problem because (1) people are not willing to change for each other, (2) they pick each other without judgement, (3) they don't share the same aspiration as you said. But if they believed in God - then their aspiration would have been to serve God, and they would share it. Hence, it would still end up as I have stated - such a partnership will intrinsically be more likely to succeed. Granting of course that the two people do honestly love God first, before loving each other. Indeed - it is this other love that makes their own love stable.
How is your radically transcendent God different than the Thomistic conception of God then?
Okay. Rudolf Otto in the Idea of the Holy presents a similar conception of divinity. May I ask you, in your opinion, what is the ethical import, if any, of this conception of God? How do you - as a believer in a God who is Ganz Andere, how do you live your ethical life as a Christian? Are there differences in comparison to someone who is a Thomist?
Something I've contemplated is whether or how God could "fit" in a human mind. A simpler analogy would be with a spiritual guru. We can't know the guru concretely or in fact until we have become the guru and posesses his insights as are own. Before that moment there is the hope or expectation of such a moment. But it's like a empty negation. "I know there's is something I don't know (that the guru knows.)" But how is this knowledge established? How does the guru have authority before he is understood? The point is that he's not fully real for the disciple until he is contained in the disciple as an insight or realization.
Quoting Marty
I can't take the PSR as an axiom. Perhaps it's just an implicit acknowledgement that explanation depends on the projection of necessity. But of course top-level necessities are contingent (why exactly these necessities or laws?), unless one hands them to God, but then God is contingent, unless ...?
As to the totality, maybe that's equivalent to God as Being.
It's meant to place The Other as the metaphysical foundation of ethics, as ethics as first philosophy that comes prior to ontologizing. Which more plainly means to place it outside of the reach of human reasoning.
The tradition comes mainly from a reply to Heidegger's fundamental ontology as the beginning of philosophy, but also as a reply to most of Western philosophy since Descartes whom places the I as the authority, and determination of all knowledge - which include ethics. So it paves the way for ethics to be ontology, to describe the good as a being, and a being that we can understanding inside ourselves since it obviously has a homogenous relationship with reason. I mean, you might even be able to find this within Plato and Socrates who relate knowledge to a moment of recollection (anamnesis), and the good was always within ourselves but lost.
But if you're skeptical of these things - the ability to concretize an ethical system that everyone has a duty towards, in which we place ourselves ourselves as a duty towards our own ethical standards - then you place ethics beyond that domain, into something otherwise than being.
Of course the explanation requires a lot more than I can possibly provide, I think you might be able to see it's a way of humbling yourself and also of seeing the good isn't within ourselves to grasp, but something that always lies within futral possibility.
Because I rarely do it I wanted to quote Descartes on this. It's a passage Levinas really likes:
[quote=Descartes]"And I must not imagine that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of the finite, in the same way that I comprehend repose and darkness by the negation of motion and light: since, on the contrary, I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and therefore that in some way I possess the perception (notion) of the infinite before that of the finite, that is, the perception of God before that of myself, for how could I know that I doubt, desire, or that something is wanting to me, and that I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison of which I knew the deficiencies of my nature?"[/quote]
[quote=Hoo;20400]I can't take the PSR as an axiom. Perhaps it's just an implicit acknowledgement that explanation depends on the projection of necessity. But of course top-level necessities are contingent (why exactly these necessities or laws?), unless one hands them to God, but then God is contingent, unless ...?
As to the totality, maybe that's equivalent to God as Being.[/quote]
I think the laws are contingently so in the sense they could have been otherwise, and rely on each other for their function to be such. But this only means they must be contingent (conditioned) by something that is not-contingent. This would be God, as a perfect being is a necessary being.
The reason for having ethical systems in the first place though is to create order - both in the soul and in society (the latter being merely man writ large as per Plato). If you're skeptical of it, then you slide into an ethics which is very dangerous - because it gives free reign to everyone to decide and judge by themselves, which is anti-thetical to happiness, especially once you realise that one's own happiness is always in part dependent on society and others, and hence demands harmony. Harmony can only be achieved through collaboration, which requires a shared understanding - not caprice.
I'm also not sure how being skeptical of ethics in the normative sense is dangerous. The attempt to deconstruct ethics functions like anarchy philosophy. All it means is to go against (an) ground (arche). All ethics are, if you buy into the argument, groundless. Which means it's an absolute duty for us to challenge them constantly from the "ground" up.
This is contradictory. If they are groundless, then they cannot be challenged from the ground up because there is no ground.
Quoting Marty
Then how do we access ethics if they are radically Other? How does a priest for example teach ethics to his congregation in such a case? If ethics are radically Other, then it would follow that even the ethics illustrated in the Bible are not "real".
Yes. They're challenged for being grounded. But they're not grounded.
Ethics are shown in the absence of being, in what it's not. In the sense of what haunts us in the world isn't whats there, but in what's not in the world. A possibility not actualized.
Ok.
Quoting Marty
Can you give a specific example to illustrate what you mean here? Also how can such an ethics create order in society and in the individual soul? It seems to me to be very close to arbitrary and debatable - precisely because it cannot be decided upon rationally.
Can there be answers that do not admit further questions, even in principle?
Doesn't really seem like it, in which case we may just find ourselves on some indefinite path of inquiry.
Except the religious variety terminates such inquiry (seemingly artificially) with a specific answer, as expressed by Swinburne (the British theologian):
[quote=Richard Swinburne]If God is defined as 'explaining everything else,' then God wouldn't be God if there were an explanation of his existence. God to be God is 'the ultimate truth.' That's just how it is. We can't go further than that.[/quote]
Go ahead and try to exhaustively explain why ? — defined as a circle's circumference divided by its diameter, in the Euclidean plane — is not 3. Or whatever else you might fancy.
Anyway, this is a sidetrack.
There is a tradition in philosophy for philosophers to develop the meaning of a term. This means that one has to read much of the philosopher's work to understand fully the application of the word, how it applies to related concepts. I think that Plato started this with his dialectics. The interesting thing which Plato demonstrated is that the philosopher doesn't even really know the meaning of the word. Instead, the philosopher will take a word, which has much inconsistency in current usage, and try to produce a coherent concept. Plato did this with many words including "idea", Aristotle with "potential", and "form", Aquinas with other words including "contingent".
Quoting Marty
Yes. that's pretty much the point. Contingent means requiring a cause. If we accept the premise that all things require a cause, then "cause" is necessarily prior to "thing", and there is a cause which is prior to all things. One could assume an infinite regress, but this is contrary to the philosophical disposition, as the desire to know, because it renders the wold unintelligible.
What about' What does 2 + 2 equal'?
It sounds trite, but in that case, '4' is the terminus of explanation. There is no point asking 'why does 2+2=4'; it is simply the case.
In the understanding of classical theology, the first cause is real in the same sense, i.e. the terminus of explanation for the question 'why does anything exist'?
The mistake most atheists make in asking 'who made God, then?' (usually with a triumphant crossing-of-arms, as if it's a knockdown argument) is that it fails to grasp the 'uncreated' nature of the first principle. In other words, it attempts to situate the first principle on the same level, or within the same domain, as phenomena. Hence all of those arguments about flying spaghetti monsters and orbiting teapots - which see the first principle as an 'imaginary cause', without understanding the sense in which a 'first cause' is on another level altogether. Dawkins is typical of that, in saying that 'anything that creates must be more complex than what is created, ergo 'a God' must be much vaster and more complex than the entire universe'.
No wonder he thinks theism is absurd; if God were as he thought, then it would be.
Richard J. Bernstein coined the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis.
That corresponds with my understanding of certain sorts of philosophy (eg classical theism, Heidegger) and that's why I see those sorts of philosophy it as mysticism. Plato sometimes sounds non-mystical but I find him to be mystical in much of his work.
There's no way that reading several books can be necessary to comprehend a definition. The definitions and rules of quantum mechanics could be written in no more than ten pages, so I figure anything that takes longer than that is poetry rather than logic. That's not a criticism. I find much of the best philosophy to be poetry. It's just that it would be futile for us to try to interpret it as logic.
It's just hard to find any conceptual "meat" in this first principle. It seems to point beyond the rational/dialectical enterprise. This first principle "doesn't need to be explained" because it is seemingly defined as that which doesn't need to be explained. (I don't think the totality can be explained.)
That putative atheist argument can be viewed in a negative or a positive way, just like how Peter Singer's arguments for animal rights can. Anti Singerians protest 'you're trying to reduce humans to the level of animals' to which Singer would reply 'No, I am trying to raise animals to the level of humans'.
Similarly in this case, the theist protests 'you are vastly underestimating God' to which the atheist can reply 'No, you are vastly underestimating the universe'.
Which one is right? Maybe we'll never know.
It's not definition which I am talking about, it's more like description. It is to describe how a word is used. So perhaps it is closer to poetry than to physics. In the case of many words, how they are used in the public domain tells us more about the meaning of the word then how it is defined in a scientific manual.
Don't think he's going for an ordinary, natural, plain explanation. :)
By the way, that was why I included the Aquinas reference @Marty, which was just intended as a more historical, sociological example of tradition, if you will.
To some, if you say "first cause", then they automatically think "God" — a sentiment successfully promoted by Aquinas it would seem — though 4 does not follow from 1-3.
I know a reasonably intelligent, mild mannered theist, that would vote "Yes" in the poll.
Maybe I'll invite him over; he's a good guy, though of course he's wrong, and I'm right. ;)
Quoting Marty
I'm not sure that makes sense...
The terms "instantaneous" and "cause" are already temporal, and "before time" is incoherent.
So, if said "first cause" did not begin at the definite earliest time, then what?
You could redefine "cause", but that would most likely be special pleading for the occasion.
The subjunctive modalities, and Anselm's ontological argument, are separate arguments.
Stitching them all together may not be trivial.
I suppose you could show existential justification by existence and uniqueness:
1. characterize whatever is claimed so there's something to go by (thereby answering ignosticism)
2. existence: show the evidence thereof
3. uniqueness: show that it's not evidence of something else
If you define God as something necessary, then you might just end up with the usual (archaic) Platonic realm.
For that matter, you may end up with that just from defining God as somehow "atemporal", surely not something living, or thinking, or whatever the usual God of theism is.
Craig has a different goal with his argument, though (as mentioned earlier in the thread) the kalam/cosmological argument clearly fails (at least) on uniqueness.
Therefore, applying the principle to the whole universe, automatically/implicitly assumes something "extra universal" — which just is a subtle form of begging the question.
One answer is that all religion, art and science can do is point towards it; but it is never a 'that' for us, it is never an object of perception. But it is 'the One, the first cause, the uncreated creator, from which everything comes, to which everything goes' (to paraphrase a neoplatonist aphorism).
I'm starting to realise how thoroughly 'animal' is our modern sensibility; that what, for us, is real, is 'out there somewhere'. It has to be conceived of as being in space and time - in meatspace! So to conceive of another domain or dimension, actually takes a noetic transformation ~ meta-noia.
In general, formation of beliefs can be fairly complex.
And not a mere matter of exercising (free) will, though sometimes exercising intellect will make a difference.
(Just try believing there are pink elephants on your lawn for five minutes sharp, and report back with findings.)
We just watched "Holy Hell" (2016) on CNN the other day.
A documentary exemplifying psychology and sociology involved in formation of beliefs, (induced) epic experiences, (emotional) needs and wants, belonging, ...
Worth watching, and giving some consideration, whenever you think of how people come to beliefs and hang onto them (perhaps how Jesus or Muhammad or someone else could have gained followers).
For me the realm of the spiritual is more or less the realm of feeling and the sensual. I can get behind something like "God is love." I suppose one could describe (from this perspective) spirituality-beyond-feeling as a sort of idolatry. It's a desire to "crystallize" the "spirit" or make a graven image (concept) of what is truly non-conceptual and undoubtedly real nevertheless. Yes, we have a concept of feeling, but this concept is not feeling itself. When the heart is full of love, praise is more natural than questioning, unless the questioning is a form of creative play. That for me escapes the problem of theological foundation and makes no empirical claims. From a Blakean perspective, artists experience such feelings and encode them "sensually" in images and music. The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Etc. I'm just presenting this as an appealing option.
But then, you're close to the mark in the objection to 'making a graven image': to try and capture 'the sacred' in words is already to reduce it to the realm of the profane; hence the Hebrew 'tetragrammaton' the original Hebrew name for God, four consonants which were unpronounceable and couldn't be spoken.
Again, we're back to the seminal notion of the first cause as being 'uncreated and unborn', an understanding which even has an analogy in non-theistic philosophies:
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[quote=Jorndoe]I'm not sure that makes sense...
The terms "instantaneous" and "cause" are already temporal, and "before time" is incoherent.
So, if said "first cause" did not begin at the definite earliest time, then what?
You could redefine "cause", but that would most likely be special pleading for the occasion.[/quote]
Is an instantaneous cause temporal, though? I mean, I don't think so. Something that can be said to be in an instant wouldn't be occurring in time at all - that requires duration. I don't think this is a really discrete moment in time, like a Planck time unit, but something without duration. It's resistance to being caught into time at all. And if you think such a thing is impossible, then I would say you estimate time wholes behaving the same way as object wholes, but we might argue that time is not consistent of part wholes at all like extended objects are, and that you merely assumed such in viewing time as a spatialized continuum.
We're just not looking at temporal causes here. We're looking in terms of priority for first cause. First cause would then be the first in priority, not receiving its existence or anything else from a prior cause.
But I think the most important thing to consider is it's just simply logically required by the cosmological argument. Even if we were to say such as thing might be hard to conceive, or even experience, we see rather retrogressively that a contingent universe needs a necessary unconditioned ground. So even if we said it's special pleading, it's a justified case of special pleading.
As for the before time... it is incoherent. This isn't a before time. This is anterior to time. Or perhaps the cause that puts time into motion instantaneously. I don't think this is so ridiculous since we've had at least Kantian transcendentalism demonstrate that the TS could offer us the conditions of possibility for time to occur at all. As well as those people think that time is put into world as soon as consciousness occurs.
Quoting jorndoe
I'm not sure if scholasticism is trying to deduce reason using reason - which would be circular. I think the argument is: the PSR is either false or true (LEM). If it's false, then the world as a totality would be without reason, including our very thoughts which are a part of it. But then our very reasons for justification would not have ground.
Also, we're not saying it's the entire universe. We're saying it's the entire world; it's all of existence. Unless we're question-begging a closed universe in some type of naturalism/physicalism, then the world isn't just the universe.
In that sense, it would then be false, as exemplified prior.
@Wayfarer seems to argue the same with 2+2=4.
A logical structure of "everything and then some" violates the first law, the law of identity.
That said, the principle does make sense, it's just not unconditional, and demarcation of applicability matters as well.
Rather, assuming the principle is easily justified inductively/abductively.
As another member once expressed it:
[quote=180 Proof]the cosmological argument is an invalid a posteriori inductive argument because experience does not justify extrapolating from experience to "beyond"[/quote]
I am reporting back with the findings :D It's not that I can't believe the pink elephants - it's that I don't want to believe it, and I can't make myself want to believe it. Again - it's a matter of the will. If you convinced my will to believe that, then I would, provided that my intellect would not stand in the way.
Quoting jorndoe
Thanks for the recommendation.
It's not begging the question. If observation of existing things leads to the inductive conclusion that all existing things are contingent, then this is a premise from which we can proceed in a deductive argument. If the whole universe is an existing thing, then the univese is contingent. You might question the method of observation, or the inductive reasoning which leads to the premise that all things are contingent, but to simply claim that the premise begs the question, is not only a pointless assertion, but it's simply wrong.
Here's an analogy. Suppose upon observation, someone determines that the colour of objects change depending on conditions external to the objects, the objects' environment. That person might employ inductive logic to produce the premise that the colour of objects is contingent on something external to the object. If we assume that the universe is an object, then we could proceed to say that the colour of the universe is contingent on something external to it.
This type of proceeding is not a form of begging the question. But if there appears to be an obvious problem with the deductive conclusion, you need to examine the premises, and determine how they were derived. What is at issue in both cases above is the concept of "the universe is an object", or as you say, "the whole universe". If the "the universe" is one whole, an object, then it is necessarily bounded, and this forces the question of what acts as the boundary.
Quoting Marty
The nature of time is clearly the key issue to the cosmological argument. There are two distinct ways of looking at the relationship between time and physical (material, or temporal) existence. Change, motion and such, we can understand as inherent within physical existence. There is not problem here, we take this for granted, and this gives us "contingent" existence.
The "way" of the cosmological argument, is to analyze and understand a logical relationship between contingent existence and time. Contingent existence, and therefore all physical existence, which has motion and change inherent within it, is logically dependent on the passing of time. There is no such thing as change and motion without the passing of time. Therefore the passing of time is necessarily prior to all physical existence. The passing of time becomes comprehensible as a type of activity which is prior to physical activity.
The more common "way" in current understandings, which is the way of modern science, ties the passing of time to physical existence, motion and change, such that without physical change, there is no passing of time. I've taken time to study this issue, and I prefer the way of the cosmological argument as providing for a more comprehensive understanding of reality.
Consider what you call an "instantaneous cause". If physical change requires a certain duration of time, a planck time for example, then we know that between one physical state and the next, a duration of time has passed. However during that time period no physical change is occurring, the physical change only occurs after that period of time has passed.
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I think the takeaway from the article, in this context, is that some chemistries (or whatever else we find in nature) cannot evolve life as we know it, and others can (of which the chemistry we know is just one).
And so, lifeforms like us could not evolve in any of the former, but could evolve in any of the latter, to subsequently wonder about "fine-tuning", which puts fine-tuning into perspective.
@Metaphysician Undercover, spatiality and objects are related much like temporality and processes, and they're all aspects of the universe.
At least when going by common ontological terminology.
The problem is JornDoe, that 'the beyond' has now become a necessary postulate for many modern cosmologists, in the form of the so-called 'mutlverse speculation', on the one hand, or Everett's 'many-worlds hypothesis' on the other.
Source
Source
Quoting Marty
The LEM is a little problematic. It seems to assume that propositions aren't fuzzy/ambiguous. But what is a reason or a ground? In our worldly lives, it seems that we naturally postulate necessities, which may just be shared, strong expectations when closely analyzed. As we become more critical thinkers, we become more conscious of what we are doing. We attain some distance and apply criteria like falsifiability, for instance. Then we want our postulated necessities or expectations-as-axioms to fit well together into an economical system. The ground may be (usefully described as) psychological.
Could not one say that science has always been about the beyond in its reliance on invisible entities? Where is a point mass or a real number? It's as if we translate everyday experience into an idealist realm of mathematically linked concepts, deduce consequences, and translate back. The scientific image is like a video game that runs parallel to life as we live it.
You can conceive of space and time as attributes of objects and processes, or you can conceive of them as the necessary conditions for objects and processes. The difference is significant. You can also conceive of one as an attribute, and the other as a necessary condition That's what I prefer, space is an attribute of physical objects, and time is a necessary condition for processes.
Can you elaborate further? I'm not sure what you mean. It seems if the cosmological argument proves the universe to be contingent it necessarily implies there's something beyond the universe. That and reason isn't solely contained in the universe - isn't merely physical constrained.
In order to prove God you're assuming he's beyond the physical realm. I must be missing something you or the other members are trying to say?
Are you saying the PSR is a pragmatic and useful way of viewing the world? That only exists in the intellect?
And can you give me examples of where propositions are fuzzy and ambiguous?
The need for a ground is merely to say all unconditioned beings must find their end in something other than themselves. Are you talking about epistemological foundationalism/anti-foundationalism?
Yes, this all seems pretty fair in the classic conceptions of motion, etc...
Real quick:
It seems like what you want is an ethical theory that can ground, but isn't that the very thing that Levinas wants to say is impossible? That normative ethics provide justification for law, and law then becomes violence? Then the reasons we ground an ethical system eventually become subversive. So order becomes a form of power, a way of producing a demand on others to obey some x. But we already know historically this hasn't worked well. We get technocracies, bureaucracies, capitalism, technological enframing, educational systems that begin to take a monopoly of what's right for our children. History hasn't proven to be progressive ethically, and the epitome of violence was seen in second world war for Levinas.
As for offering further phenomenological explanations, I'd go do some research on Levinas' face-to-face. I'd offer an explanation but it's not really related to the topic, and it'd require some work and general phenomenological assumptions which I'd need some time to think about. :-!
Neither modal realism (Lewis) nor the many-worlds hypothesis (Everett) are particularly necessary, and remain more controversial than "problems". They're just speculation, pending research, until they can be verified/falsified. You could perhaps add M-theory, except a good lot of theoretical research has been put into this one.
Yeah, fine-tuning works best without modal realism and many-worlds, so maybe there's an odd sort of competition going on? Which do you think has the best chance of becoming verified/falsified (or scientific) anyway...?
Here's more theorizing, but at least it's not magical thinking:
Still a side-track from the opening post. Kick off a new thread?
I thought the task was to show a (unique) first cause, like Craig, and then (perhaps) that the first cause is necessary?
Quoting Marty
The principle of sufficient reason is just not unconditional. As per earlier posts, you can find examples to which the principle does not apply, so you have to rule those out before applying it.
Quoting Marty
I'm wondering if it's not just the formalization of expectation. We are future oriented beings, so we want to find relationships in the past and present that help us meet or create this future. Obviously there is some serious structure in the everyday external world. Obviously we trust science, too, at least as far as technology. But why should any event have a cause or (in other words?) have been somehow predictable? Is it because we are helpless against utterly unpredictable events? It makes sense that we would have evolved to look for "causes" or to posit relationships in events. So maybe there's a gut-level itch for a cause and yet no strong argument for PSR beyond economy and instinct.
Quoting Marty
Sure, I'll try.
"God is love."
"The real is rational and the rational is real."
"If metaphysics is metaphorical, then metaphor is metaphysical."
"The sign is that ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: what is it?"
"Being is not a being."
"There's nothing ambiguous about ambiguity itself."
"No finite thing has genuine being. "
Quoting Marty
There's a view of the self as a self-reweaving network of beliefs and desires that I find plausible. I think the representational paradigm (truth as correspondence) is great for ordinary life, but I lean toward an instrumentalist view as ideas become more abstract. It becomes less clear that they correspond to anything. But if they bring us pleasure and get us what we want, we learn to trust them, or put weight on the them so that we'll defend them against skeptics or opposite beliefs. Roughly, our abstract beliefs are underdetermined by the social and physical constrains on our behavior. So there's a trial and error process of acting as if and then there's the constant attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance or friction between under-determined ideas as instruments. For instance, this theory is one such instrument, since you've probably been doing just fine without it. So, yeah, common sense with a variable cream on top where religion and metaphysics and poetry live. And must we assume that there is a single truth in abstract matters? Or just differing, useful mind-tools? Forgive the spiel! I was trying to give context...
My point is relatively simple: the naive argument that the physical sciences have somehow eliminated the need to a 'supernatural' explanation, is not actually borne out by the current state of science, which feel compelled to appeal to 'alternative' supernatural explanations, such as the existence of infinite universes. Sure such theories are speculative - but they're also found to be necessary by at least some theorists (and, no doubt, on more than a few grant applications.)
* I don't agree with (1). I think that's rather an assumption that we don't really have any good empirical or logical justification for, as with the assumption that all events in general (not just coming-into-existence events) are causal.
* (3) I don't agree with terminologically/semantically. If the universe began to exist, then it can't have a cause, because whatever we'd posit as the cause would be part of the universe; hence the universe already existed at that point.
* (4) seems arbitrary; it seems to be a non-sequitur. What would actually follow is "Therefore there was some-we-haven't-the-faintest-idea-what that was the cause, where somehow unspecified it would make sense to say that the cause in question was not a part of the universe."
What are examples of things that don't begin to exist?
But sure, maybe some things don't have a starting point. Any arbitrary particle could be taken as an example of something with or without a starting point, the gist of that being that it's not something we can actually observe--that some particle did or did not have a starting point. That's rather about our assumptions and interpretations.
Hey, thanks for clearing that up.
Excellent, thanks. :D
We need more samples for the experiment.
I found that honest belief in the elephants didn't come about as a matter of exercising "free will", sort of justifying that sometimes at least "seeing is believing".
On the other hand, I also believe there's snow on the peak of Mount Everest, and that there are exoplanets, though less "seeing", and more thinking, is involved.
"There was a pink elephant on the street"; SP. Kiwiyum; 1m:58s youtube; Jul 2012
Neither naïve, nor eliminated, respectively.
Paraphrasing someone I don't recall, perhaps alluding to magical thinking:
Looking through the history books, break-throughs and striking advances have been conspicuously absent in theology, markedly in comparison to other endeavors, and professional theologians have been at it for centuries. Wouldn't it be cool to see news headlines with "Theologians make new ground-breaking discovery"? :D
Do you think modal realism (Lewis) and the many-worlds hypothesis (Everett) are supernatural...?
The Incredible Shrinking God; Skeptico; Dec 2008
You're right, as also noted by @Michael.
The central part of the argument is 1-3, which has the form of an ordinary syllogism.
4 should have been separated out, instead of my paraphrase.
There are no cases where the principle of sufficient reason does not apply, if there were, they would be unverifiable as unknowns. Your claim is a trick of definition, the magic of self-deception. The cosmological argument is directed toward contingent existence. The premise is that things are contingent. The conclusion is that the premise, which defines all existence as contingent is a mistaken premise. It does not lead to the conclusion that there is something outside of "existence".
Quoting jorndoeThe magic trick of self-deception which you are pulling off here, is that you are attempting to apply the PSR to a generality, a universal, "existence", when the PSR clearly only applies to particular things. When you make such categorical errors you should expect any manner of paradoxical results. "Existence" is what existing things have. If we attempt to apply the PSR to an attribute or property, which has been separated from the object of which it is a property, we should have no expectations that the PSR would apply, because the separated property exists only in abstraction, not as a thing which the PSR would apply to.
Well, they would say they have, that it's in the Bible, that it is indeed big news, and that it's been disregarded by you. But the headline 'JornDoe doesn't believe in Bible' wouldn't sell a lot of newspapers. ;-)
Honestly, researching this topic, I found a grant application, here in Australia, for research group who are going to try and prove Everett's MWI. David Deutsch is evangelical about MWI. And, sure, I think the idea that everything that exists is replicated through an infinite number of ever-so-slightly-different worlds, is supernatural, albeit without the morally edifying add-ons that the traditionalist models have. At least in their's, there's a point.
Again, not that I was talking about things without question starting point in the first place, but it's a metaphysical possibility along with things with a starting point.
Yeah, some of those supposed explanations tend to be arguing from ignorance, and this is also where mentioned personification of the unknown can play a role.
Can anyone give a non-hypothetical example of something supernatural, magic, witchcraft, ...?
Poor examples include the horrible Salem witch trials a few centuries back (though apparently still going in Saudi Arabia, 2013, 2016); Noah's flood; possessions and exorcisms; most miracles that's been examined; ... How about telepathy or telekinesis (by will alone)? :D
What would, theoretically, count as supernatural? Something non-physical? Then, given Hempel's dilemma, what counts as non-physical?
Honesty. It matters. (Y) (was about to hit "Like", but this will have to do)
And the freedom to entertain such beliefs are non-negotiable (in my opinion).
I'll just note on the side that various theisms can engender behavior that has impact beyond voluntary adherents (sometimes alienation from parents/peers, sometimes fatal, sometimes directed indoctrination, sometimes just within one sect/cult/denomination, ...). And sometimes actions are justified from their (interpretation of their) various scriptures, with notable social consequences. Therefore these beliefs warrant examination on this account alone.
Not sure I could say ahead of time.
The alleged miracles of Lourdes? Noah's flood?
It seems a prerequisite that a mind, and perhaps will, have to be behind something for it to be considered supernatural (e.g. witchcraft and sorcery, possessions, divine miracles and creatio ex nihilo, telepathy and -kinesis). Perhaps irreducibility (to something else) is also a prerequisite.
Was just trying to look up the Catholic church's prerequisites for miracles, but didn't find them.
May have to be exemplified before an assessment can be made.
In such matters, maybe more samples will only introduce more errors. The scientific statistical method may very well not be adequate to deal with such matters which depend upon the concepts and beliefs which people already have or don't have - unless of course we're interested to find out what, empirically, the mean of a population is (although this could change in the future - so I don't think it would be a very scientific endeavour). If we're interested in the truth however - then we may need to be careful in the selection of people we consider for the experiment. They should be those people for whom their own behaviour is somewhat transparent - who have followed the train of their minds, and understand what makes them form a belief or not. Otherwise, we'll get a lot of people who are confused and unaware of the ways in which their own minds function - that's not good - that's a source of error. And trying to study the way beliefs form in a confused person's mind is not very helpful - the process becomes intractable, since even the person is not aware of many influencing factors.
Funny video thanks! :D Yes definitely a few things are needed to form and sustain a belief. One is experience, another is reason. I have developed a more extensive framework but will not state it here, although the nuts and bolts are that experience will go through the filter of reason. So to believe in God a few things must happen. First you must clarify for yourself what God means. Second you must have an experience of God. Third your reason must confirm that your experience of God is indeed of God. Then your belief in God will form. So what role does the will have in here? Well the will can intervene either at the first level - meaning that you are simply not interested in God, and therefore have no interest in ever clarifying the concept - or at the third level (or both) - meaning that despite having an experience of God, you will ignore it, refuse to see it, and in other words not be open to it. If you don't have a clear concept of God, your reason will never be able to identify a certain experience as being "of God". If your will is not open to the possibility of God - then your reason will choose another way to interpret your experience in order to avoid God. If you truly want to be honest with yourself, then you must be open to possibility.
Ian Stevenson's research on past-life memories has a large body of actual research, of the same kind you would find in support of epidemiological studies. Rupert Sheldrake's research into morphic resonance was condemned by the editor of Nature 'because it was magic'.
None independently confirmed though, like abductions being examined, recorded and witnessed by outside, credible parties.
They're purely phenomenological experiences.
It would seem alien abductions belong in the identity category.
They're part of the experiencer when they occur, and nothing else (possibly related to sleep paralysis or mild epilepsy or something, well, unless they're hoaxes).
They still exist, they're just entirely "subjective", mind-dependent, much like hallucinations or dreams, which is not to say real abductions couldn't occur of course, but give it an honest evaluation please.
Humans aren't exactly perfect organisms, introspectively or otherwise.
(Not that it matters much here, but I'm not in particular, whatever your impression may be.)
Admittedly it's been a long while since I read up on Stevenson's stuff, was going by memory alone.
Will have to check that "morphic resonance" stuff once time permits.
And a couple references:
Not that my own opinion matters much, but, without further information, I'm with Sagan; here's what he wrote in The Demon-Haunted World (1997), full snippet attached:
[quote=Carl Sagan]
Maybe some undiscovered reptile left over from the Cretaceous period will indeed be found in Loch Ness or the Congo Republic; or we will find artifacts of an advanced, non-human species elsewhere in the solar system. At the time of writing there are three claims in the ESP field which, in my opinion, deserve serious study:
[...]
(3) that young children sometimes report the details of a previous life, which upon checking turn out to be accurate and which they could not have known about in any other way than reincarnation
[...]
I pick these claims not because I think they're likely to be valid (I don't), but as examples of contentions that might be true. The last three have at least some, although still dubious, experimental support. Of course, I could be wrong.
[/quote]
Feel free to open a new thread if you think Stevenson proved supernaturals.
Fire up a new thread. Present your thinking on (justification of) it. Add a vote. (Isn't that what the site is for anyways?)
Wouldn't this just be the movement of information? Impressive if valid. But reincarnation would just be a metaphorical structuring of a child knowing something that it "shouldn't" according to our current understanding of the possible. .
I have encountered a few threads which try to do this with the various conundrums we face philosophically. They all seem to chase their own tail within the chain.
Perhaps it is time for philosophers to try thinking outside the box (chain) a little.
The issue with reincarnation in particular is that it is doubly taboo. Once because it was anathematised by the Church in about the 4th century, and again by science because it seems to undermine materialism.
Tom Shroder, a journalist who wrote a book on Stevenson (Old Souls), said that Stevenson told him that people in the West would often say 'why waste your time on this subject? Everyone knows it is just a superstition', whereas people in the East would say ' why waste your time on this subject? Everyone knows that it happens all the time'.
I like your radical God, might I say a transcendent God, perhaps. But I would not only elevate ethics to that plain, but every experiential concern of humanity*. So in a sense everything about our(and the experience of other beings in the biosphere) experience can be seen as an imperfect reflection/embodiment of the nature of God, or the divine. Likewise our "spacetime" can be viewed as a dim reflection of eternity, embodied in a causal chain. While the divine realm the cosmological argument is considering, in the person of God, is forever beyond the reach of the very tool employed to address it, namely logic.
Hence your "leap of faith".
*By experiential concern of humanity, I am referring to everything that is, or is an aspect of experience, or what can be conceptually generated and understood in the human mind.
[/quote]I see. I thought I addressed this, but I myself wouldn't defend the Kalam cosmological argument all the way through. I was addressing the classic cosmological argument (basically the argument from contingency), and explaining how divine attributes follow. But to answer your question it's the exact reversal: because it is necessary for their to be a first cause, then it follows there must be a first cause, and that since it cannot be temporal, it is unique. There is no special pleading involved, imho.
[quote=jorndoe;20604 ]
- the principle of sufficient reason cannot apply to existence ("everything") without circularity, since otherwise the deduced reason would then not exist, which is contradictory
- 2+2=4 may be another example, as suggested by @Wayfarer, which converges on the strange Platonic realm of old
- thus, before applying the principle to some x, you must ensure x is not one such example (this is usually simple enough, or reasonable, for ordinary everyday trivialities)
- unconditional application can be misapplication, and has a logical structure of "everything and then some", which violates the first law, the law of identity
- if the whole universe is everything, then the principle cannot apply to the universe
- you must first show that the whole universe is not everything, or, more accurately, that the principle applies to the whole universe
[/quote]I'm not sure the mathematical example you said works. I forgot to mention it, but the scholastic PSR states: "everything that is has that by which it is." Which is a weaker PSR. It talks about things that exists, real being, not that there is a reason for things like mathematical equations. That would be a rationalist version of it.
And since you didn't really elaborate and how your other examples really deflate the issue concerning the PSR I'm gonna have to ask you to, again, elaborate on those examples.
As for your last two statements about the universe being everything, this is just simply question-begging. I don't have to demonstrate it's not everything. You have to demonstrate that physicalism/naturalism is true without begging the question.
"The issue with reincarnation in particular is that it is doubly taboo. Once because it was anathematised by the Church in about the 4th century, and again by science because it seems to undermine materialism"
Yes, folk could end up thinking of the world as little more than a dream, or a pool of water, that the soul occassionally dips its toe into. Rather the the totality of existence, perish the thought.
Quoting jorndoe
This illustrates my point very well between you two. One is open to believe, and thus believes. The other isn't open to believe, and therefore doesn't believe. You could present as much evidence as you want to jorndoe on this subject - unless one is honestly open to believe, they will always find reasons not to believe - as such matters are not amenable to the kind of studies jorndoe is open to - double blind studies, etc. The sad part is that evidence is rejected when it doesn't fit a method. But it is precisely the method which ought to be rejected when it has reached its limits and cannot investigate further.
(This essay is long, been published a while, but well worth the read. Last line is a kicker.)
I think though that the secularism is the symptom of a deeper problem. Secularism is merely a refusal to look at certain aspects of reality - a justification for this refusal in fact. But much more interesting is understanding the spiritual problems that one shields from by this refusal and justification...
Quoting Wayfarer
Thanks will have a read! :)
This was might point, "existence", as Jorndoe used it in reference to the PSR, refers to a concept. So we cannot apply the PSR to the thing called "existence", as Jondoe tried, unless we apply it to the concept of existence. This would be to consider the concept of existence as a thing. In this case we would be looking for the reason for the concept of existence, which, like the reason for mathematical equations, is probably the desire to understand, or to know. In any case, the PSR would still apply to concepts if we understand them as things, and there is no exception to the PSR, as Jorndoe suggested.
I want to raise a mild objection to this categorisation. I have always resisted 'belief' as such; there is something I don't like about 'people of faith'. (On a personal note, that was the main reason I didn't get confirmation). But then, I've never been a materialist, either; I don't believe in 'the scientific worldview' of secular philosophers, which I see mainly as being largely framed by the centuries-long reaction against religion. That was why I sought out alternative and counter-cultural ways of considering these matters. But having done that, to be honest, I have found I am much nearer to Catholicism in terms of philosophy. But I don't feel any compulsion to convert to it, or to accept the dogma; I think it has value because it points to a greater truth, but I don't for one minute believes that it has a monopoly on that truth. I recognise the value of the neo-scholastics and modern catholic philosophers, mainly because they too argue against the shortcomings of scientific materialism, but it is more like 'the enemy of the enemy being a friend'. :-)
PSR is either true or false. Reasons can be given both ways.
PSR is a premise in the cosmological arguments, one which does not, of itself, imply the conclusion. Hence, not question-begging.
I challenge the LEM and that challenge has not been addressed. It's no big deal. I'm just saying that I think you need the LEM, and that the LEM is problematic. Why? In a word: ambiguity.
LEM?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_excluded_middle
Must the PSR be true or not true? Lots of metaphysical statements can be accused of ambiguity. I tried to give statements in an earlier post that challenged the application of LEM to more abstract propositions.
What do you mean? How do you "resist" belief? Also please note that my categorisation was "open to believe" vs "not open to believe". Being open to believe allows you the possibility of believing, whereas not being open to believe doesn't.
Quoting Wayfarer
Why?
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, neither do I.
But I wanted to know. I didn't want to believe in 'pie in the sky when you die'. I said there was a way of knowing about ultimate truths, not simply standing in the congregation and mouthing the words.
There is a deep tension in Christianity between 'you will know the truth and the truth will set you free' and 'believe, and be saved'. It is a conflict between the gnostic and the pistic orientations. The gnostic is concerned with knowing, not being lead or believing what s/he's been told. That is one of the reasons why the mainstream adopted the pistic orientation - believers are much easier to manage, they're like sheep. 'Believe this!' says the preacher. 'Baa, baa....' say the sheep. Not for nothing all the references to 'flocks and sheep' in scripture.
http://katjavogt.com/belief-and-truth/
The Buddha, likewise, is 'one who knows'. The first step on the Buddhist path is not right belief (orthodoxa) but right view (samma ditthi). My intuition about religion in the West, is that this distinction was obliviated in around the 4th century at about the time of the Nicene councils.
And here we are.
I don't see the issue, it's straight deductive reasoning, based on inductive premises. First, things which have a beginning have a cause. To dispute this inductive premise you simply need to find things which have a beginning and have no cause. Second, all things have a beginning. To dispute this inductive premise, you need to find things which do not have a beginning. The deductive conclusion, all things have a cause.
It is not the case that philosophy is unequipped to address the issue of the cosmological argument, we have been addressing it for thousands of years. What is evident here, is that some people still refuse to accept the obvious conclusion of the cosmological argument. So instead of assuming the philosophical position which it gives us, and proceeding from there, to make reality intelligible, they waste effort of looking for loop holes, and reasons for denying the conclusion.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well it depends on the subject about which you wanted to know. For example, wanting to know in detail about the afterlife is a waste - the focus should be being a good man here on Earth. A vague notion will suffice. So there is something very harmful about an inordinate desire for knowledge - first the fact that it doesn't consider human limitations, second because it is knowledge which is not of importance in this life.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sometimes in order to know one must be led, and one must believe. Some knowledge is not achievable except by first making the "leap of faith".
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes - do you suppose that a society can be organised where everyone adopts a gnostic orientation and wants to know everything through their own experience? Imagine the resulting chaos. The limitations of belief are necessary for order and stability. Knowledge is not necessarily good - it can lead to arrogance, disdain, and a feeling of superiority. "They are sheep, I am not" - that is very harmful.
Interesting but don't forget about Socrates in the Phaedo - he states that he does not know about the afterlife. There is no certainty. Either there is a soul which survives after death, or there is none. But nevertheless, he believes that there is a soul which survives after death. Why? Because it is beautiful to believe so, and it seems just that it is so - and so his love of the Good makes him believe.
Which is what? That there's a beginningless, uncaused cause, i.e. God? That contradicts the initial premise that everything has a beginning (and so a cause).
Indeed, is it even addressing existence atall, rather the concept of existence? A concept subject to human frailty.
Phenomena exist - what 'exists' is what stands apart, what begins and ends, every particular thing, every particular being. They all exist. The uncaused cause does not exist.
Well being a believer means following the practices of a certain religion. What's wrong with that? You don't have to be a sheep to do that...
Regarding the link, I find that kind of semantic quibbling to be empty. What's the significance in saying "God is, but God doesn't exist" or something to that effect? It's just pointless wordplay.
"
Phenomena exist - what 'exists' is what stands apart, what begins and ends, every particular thing, every particular being. They all exist. The uncaused cause does not exist."
It isn't that simple though. We don't actually know what exists, or what it means for something to exist, or what existence is, all we've got is our experience of being in some sort of existence, something which we find on the occasion of our birth, again something not understood(in terms of the origin of our being).
Thus to say "the uncaused cause does not exist" is little more than Chitta Chatta in our heads. We don't know what an uncaused cause is, if it could exist, if there is anything which falls outside of our category of existing*, while still impinging in some way on our existing, or not. We don't have a clue how we got here, where we are, what is going on, or if there are any necessary causes that we can conceive of, or know of. Even if we can work out what is logically most likely to be the case we might be mistaken, or the reality might be odd and seemingly illogical.
*our concept of something existing, what it means to exist, is subject to human frailty and may be a pale reflection, or derivative of the reality out there. It could well be wrong headed, deluded, topsy turvy, inside out.
That is only if you assume that existence is meant in the same sense for all possible things it is attributed to. However, the scholastics made a difference between the way number 2 exists and the way a chair exists for example. Both of them exist - but in different ways.
So what is the cause of the totality? If we can always tell ourselves that we just haven't found a cause yet, then we can avoid a counterexample.
The PSR looks like a pragmatic maxim evolved to succeed in a world of objects. If we find a car parked in front our house that we don't recognize, we assume that someone drove it there. We don't expect cars to just materialize out of then air. But we can conceive of thing. We want causes or necessary/expected relationships so that we can predict/manipulate objects, including other humans. So we all have some vision of human nature as well as object nature. It looks the same with the LEM. Lots of worldly propositions 'must' be true or false. Someone did or didn't fasten their seatbelt.
But all of this gets projected "up" for application to the totality (PSR) and to abstract propositions that admit of ambiguity (LEM.) Yet the strength of these principles (more descriptions or admonitions perhaps) rests on ordinary life.
It's not at all, it has a serious pedigree in neoplatonist and other Western philosophy. There were some seminal texts from around the fifth century AD, now known to scholars as 'pseudo-Dionysius' ('pseudo' because for centuries he was mis-identified as a disiciple of the Apostle Paul.) His texts The Celestial Heirarchy and the Divine Names, were foundational in Christian philosophy, and especially Christian mysticism, for centuries thereafter.
The point of these mystical texts is to reveal how the Divine Simplicity, which is both simple and One, gives rise to the manifold domain of separate beings. I can't possibly do justice to these texts here, but the article I linked to by Bishop (!) Pierre Whalon is based on those premisses. If you read it carefully, it distinguishes between the existence of manifest things, and the reality of their source.
This line of thought was much amplified by Paul Tillich (see http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Paul_Tillich#/God_above_God).
The reason I am making this point, is that practically all atheism is based on the misconception of there being 'a God' or of god as 'a being'. That leads to the equation of God with other 'gods', the sky-father of the ancient world. And it's a form of idolatory, a false conception of the nature of God.
So, not word play.
Quoting Michael
Why must God be beginningless and uncaused?
Quoting Punshhh
What we have, is a cause which is not within the realm of physical existence, because it is the cause of physical existence. There are many directions which one can proceed from here. The concept of physical existence needs to be analyzed, the concept of causation needs to be analyzed. To conclude an "uncaused cause" is somewhat equivocal, or ambiguous at best. Such a cause is "uncaused" in the sense of a physical, efficient cause, but it is necessarily in another sense, like final cause, that it is a "cause" because it is impossible that it is a physical, efficient cause. So in "uncaused cause", "uncaused" refers to a different sense of "cause" from what "cause" refers to.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree with the others, this depends on how you define "exist" and I would not define it that way. We still say that non-physical, immaterial things, such as concepts, and even the soul, exist. Is this your claim that these things do not exist? We couldn't say that they have some other type of being, so what could we say about them, like God, what supports their reality if not some type of existence?
Quoting HooWhich totality, do you mean the inductive principle which classes all caused things together as contingent? The cause of that totality would be the human mind which uses the inductive reason.
Quoting Hoo
What do you mean by this, "projected 'up'"?
I would never have expected that from you. These are the basic attributes of the first cause, they're part of what the term means.
Using words loosely, they do, but in reality they don't. Think of a number - any number - does that exist? no use pointing to the symbol for the number, because that is a symbol, and it can change. But a natural number is always self-identical and the same for any mind capable of counting (according to the law of identity). So, I say that numbers don't exist, but they are nevertheless real; they're intellectual objects (using the term 'objects' metaphorically). The same can be said for all kinds of mental and intellectual structures and operations; we don't notice them, because they constitute the way we think, but they're also (for that reason) constituents of reality itself; what we see 'out there' is structured according to these.
I think what needs to be understood is the sense in which the 'manifest realm' (the 'ten thousand things' in Chinese terminology), is the domain of phenomena, of existing things. We are conditioned by modern thinking to believe that this is the fundamental real, but no traditional philosophy accepts that. In fact, for virtually all traditional philosophies, Western and Eastern, seeing through the illusory nature of the phenomenal domain is the first step. Modernity has turned that upside down, so that it now accords reality to what is the least real, namely the ephemeral objects of sense perception.
By totality I mean everything, including the discourse about it that we're having right now. This includes the human mind. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
One could argue that the PSR and LEM are learned "prejudices," acquired in an everyday context. We project "necessary" relationships (laws of nature, physical and human) in order to map and thrive in the world. If some event surprises us, we look for a "cause" or "law" to put it under. So "everything has a reason" because thinking is largely the construction of a system of such reasons. In that sense, the PSR may be merely descriptive of the kind of thinking that tends to work for us. Similarly, less abstract propositions (there is garlic in this dish) are indeed true or false. But "the real is rational and the rational is real" is perhaps too ambiguous for the LEM. The LEM itself is perhaps to ambiguous for the LEM. So this "projection upward" is just the taking what may be merely useful prejudices as axioms for the derivation of metaphysical truths.
I'd say rather that this is the common sense foundation of the real or objective. In Plato's time, I'm guessing most Athenians took boats, swords, and olives to be real. To call these things illusions with respect to something mental or immaterial was a bold challenging of common sense. Indeed, we have no choice to but to treat such objects as necessities and/or threats. Perhaps there's a shift toward taking these 10000 things as the only real things.
When you define the fist cause as eternal, and mean by "eternal" a beginningless, or unending time, then the first cause becomes beginningless and uncaused. However, I think that the proper way of defining "eternal", in relation to God, is "outside of time". When God is described in this way, then words such as beginning, and cause, which have a temporal reference are inapplicable. But to say that these words are inapplicable is not the same as saying that there is no cause, or no beginning.
All concepts of God are false because, if there is a God, its true nature would be inconceivable to us puny mortals. Hence all concepts of God are idolatrous, which is why the ancient Hebrews started to lose the plot when they made their rules against idolatry, echoed by the Protestant iconoclasts of the Reformation. They were just switching one form of idolatry for another, without realizing it.
What seems a better approach to me is to acknowledge that any concept we have of God will be idolatrous, and to accept that that's not a bad thing. It also prevents one looking down one's nose at 'less sophisticated religions'. A tribesman's carved wooden totem is as valid as a Shiva lingam or a Pure Lander's chanting of Amitabha, or a Tibetan Lama's spinning of the prayer wheels, or Paul Tillich's Ground of Being, or Aquinas's First Cause. I suspect Tillich would agree with me, but I'm not so sure about Aquinas.
It seems that we'd have to be God to understand God. Hence the fascination of the incarnation myth and Feuerbach. Unless we have "direct access" to God (which means what? unless we are God? or the totality knowing itself?), we would seem to need concepts and feelings as a medium. Even if we are God, we'd need a dialectical process to make this clear, we'd only be potentially God. And this wouldn't be the ground of being or timeless authority that is usually craved. But, in any of these cases, God for us would always be concepts and feelings. (How we could insure others that claims of "direct access" were not just concepts/feelings? What would that mean, though, if not God as object?)
Review of 'The God Delusion'
Note his phrase: 'in one sense of that word....' - this is what I was driving at. It's a very hard idea to get your head around but it has plenty of precedents.
It doesn't overlook it. It recognizes that those books are composed of human words and that the notion that anything so gob-smackingly amazing as the explanation of the entire universe could be rendered in mere words is risible and yet at the same time conceited. It is idolatry because it makes out the words, or the childish images the words conjure up (and even sophisticated images such as Tillich's are childish compared to what any reality would actually have to be like), to be actual images of God.
IMHO this is no less reification than identification of God with a stick, mountain, statue or mantra.
That's one reason why I am drawn to mysticism. It is a process of contemplation of the unknowable rather than an attempt to construct a fancy pile of words that one pretends tells us something about the unknowable.
Saying they are 'human words' is basically denying it.
It is the science that says that only human beings are capable of forming an intention, that is conceited.
I too am drawn to mysticism, but I'm not conceited enough to say that I alone understand it, and the ancients didn't.
I won't say that Plato wasn't on to something. Actually I think philosophy is about ascension into a greater reality, but this is also in Hegel. It's a question of location perhaps. Are we talking about an enlarged perspective? Better concept-tools? Heights of feeling? Because that's a reality I do not doubt. I don't even mind the elitism in the private sphere. Certainly that's part of the issue. Claims of hidden realities or access to gods have been abused, or that's the perception. But I like the mystical and think the mystical in terms of subjective experience. I don't think there's much of a bias against that, even if there is skepticism, for here too it's easy to imagine a bogus guru.
I think we want happiness and largely map the objective in terms of what resists our desire or offers pleasure.
But if that's all "He" is, then where is the personality or value? He looks here like the projection of the PSR (itself perhaps a rule-of-thumb or a prejudice or ambiguous) "outside" the totality. Only a little cognitive dissonance is relieved. One doesn't love or pray to a condition of possibility. It seems we have an obviously anthropomorphic god (that actually works some people, however 'uncool' or 'irrational') or a more sophisticated still-anthropomorphic god (PSR, etc.) Or we can take either negative theology and/or the incarnation myth all of the way. God is meaninglessness or we are all the God worth worrying about. Or some new poet comes along with other options.
Maybe what matters the most is how we position our intellectual selves with respect to this family of 'God' meanings. That is accessible right here and now. Is this not at all related to picking out a nice jacket for October?
I'm tempted to say that philosophy proper spans Plato - Hegel but that might be a bit contentious. But in any case, there's a sense of a vertical dimension, something against which the terms 'higher' and 'lower' can be used in respect of truth. I think that's generally missing since Hegel - actually I think that is the meaning of the Victorian Novella, 'Flatland'.
in respect of Eagleton's quote - recall he was reviewing Dawkins' book. One of Dawkins' claims is that God must be 'more complex than the Universe', which he then says is 'wildly improbable'. So Eagleton (who is no religious apologist by the way) is basically lampooning that.
I did take it out of context. I'm a little familiar with Eagleton. I don't love Dawkins. It occurs to me that lots of people might use "God" in a 'soft' way. They don't pride themselves on sharpening every concept, so they don't appear here, for instance, to defend their views. For some of them, maybe God is like some wisest part of their self, the perfect audience for authentic conversation. So omniscience would be a philosopher's cold version of the wisdom and not the knowledge of God as experienced. As a teen believer, I sometimes experienced God as someone who listened but never spoke. But this was mixed up with sin and Hell and the idea of the Bible as a "magic" authority. The best part of God was the least propositional. God is a person, then --just also what we'd call an imaginary friend -- at least that's how I read my past, anyway.
Nice point about the vertical dimension. I lovedFlatland. I suppose philosophy is to some more about science and to others more about wisdom. I think we need wisdom in order to place science in a greater context. We always already have a philosophy. It's just that there's usually room for improvement. Progress is falling uphill.
Quite, how far down this path does philosophy tread? And presumably theology or mysticism carries the baton further?
My basic point is that the cause, or origin is not accessible to us intellectually and like you say "uncaused" is inapplicable. I do also consider that there may be a true uncaused cause, but that it would be way way beyond our humble imaginings. While God in the sense of the origin of our world need not be uncaused in this sense, but just external to our spacetime and spiritual realm(what we normally regard as existing).
Very wise spiritual book I read a couple of years back - Falling Upwards by an actual monk.
"All concepts of God are false because, if there is a God, its true nature would be inconceivable to us puny mortals. Hence all concepts of God are idolatrous, which is why the ancient Hebrews started to lose the plot when they made their rules against idolatry, echoed by the Protestant iconoclasts of the Reformation. They were just switching one form of idolatry for another, without realizing it."
I agree, one should realise that our externally orientated mind cannot find, or describe God(although it can be described through esoteric systems). The mystic finds and knows God internally. The conceptual tools are different and hinge around the realisation of self, or being, as in some way in touch with God naturally, absent the externally orientated mind.
I couldn't follow this. Denying what, exactly?
Which science is that? It's certainly not biology, chemistry or physics, as 'intention' isn't even in the vocabulary of those sciences.
I wasn't implying that you had claimed that you alone understood God, or mysticism. I don't think you said that, nor do I think I ever said you said that.
AndrewK "All concepts of God are false because, if there is a God, its true nature would be inconceivable to us puny mortals."
Wayfarer: "that overlooks the purported revelation of God in the Biblical tradition"
AndrewK "'It doesn't overlook it. It recognizes that those books are composed of human words."
So what I meant was that to say they are 'human compositions' - if that is what you mean - is to deny that they are revealed truths.
To avoid an infinite regress. If everything that has a beginning has a cause and if this proposed God has a beginning then it has a cause. What caused God? So the cosmological argument claims that God doesn't have a beginning and so doesn't have a cause. However, this contradicts the initial premise that everything has a beginning. Therefore, the cosmological argument refutes itself.
But, as a way of focussing on the subject, try and think of one thing that is not compounded, i.e., made of parts.
So, like the fundamental waves/particles(/superstrings/whatever) that make up the universe?
They're not composed of anything. Therefore, if non-compounded things don't have a beginning then the fundamental waves/particles(/superstrings/whatever) that make up the universe don't have a beginning. Therefore there's no need to posit God to explain the origin of the universe.
Very cool. What I had in mind was the crash of a worldview or some self-identification that rips one open so that one has to come up with richer synthesis of the self ---a synthesis of what one was and what one crashed into. For me youth was a sequence of unstable positions (highs and lows), falling upward into greater complexity, until, well, this sort of endless noon. I still read things, work on the details, but I feel a hell of lot more found than lost. And yet it I did this finding myself. I don't at all assume it's universally valid. Experience suggests otherwise. Maybe we all need "religion" customized for our unique wiring.
Oh, whatever! Hey thanks so much for clearing that up. We can all sleep more soundly tonight.
Right! Another great book I read, years ago, by sociologist Peter Berger, 'The Heretical Imperative'. The gist was, in the olden days, you were told what to believe, 'heresy' means 'deciding what to believe'. Whereas nowadays we all have to 'decide what to believe' - hence the title.
Your attempt to avoid is obvious. The fundamental things that make up the universe are not compounded. Therefore, if non-compounded things do not have a beginning then the universe does not have a beginning and so we don't need to posit God to explain its origin.
Perfect. Thank you for that. That was exactly the distinction I was going to point out, until I saw that you had already done it in your post. Yours is expressed better than I would have though.
"Therefore, the cosmological argument refutes itself"
God is not a thing, but rather something supernatural.
What 'fundamental thing' are you talking about? And if you know what it is, please invite me to your Nobel ceremony.
Well, if you think that is 'well expressed....' then I hesitate to ask what you really meant.
If the Standard Model is correct then bosons and fermions. If superstring theory is correct then superstring. Another theory suggests quantum foam.
Regardless, it seems that we don't need God at all. The premise of the cosmological argument is either false or doesn't apply to the universe.
Yes, and I've shown that the cosmological argument fails.
This actually is one of the major motivations behind the 'multiverse conjecture' - the idea that if only this universe has these qualities, and all the 'other ones' don't, then the appearance of contrivance can be avoided.
Of course this is all vastly controversial, hugely speculative, and the rest, but one thing is for sure: that you can in no way appeal to 'strings, foam, or whatever' to demonstrate that:
None of that changes the fact that something must be the fundamental thing from which macroscopic objects are composed. It might be fermions, it might be superstring, it might be quantum foam, or it might be something else. Regardless, given that it isn't composed of parts, and given that you've said that only things composed of parts must have a beginning, it then follows that these fundamental things don't require a beginning. Therefore, God is not required to explain the origin of the universe.
Furthermore, you're shifting the goalposts. If I can't use current physical theory to attack the cosmological argument then you can't use current physical theory to defend the cosmological argument. So how do you defend the claim that everything has a beginning and must have a cause?
All-in-all, it seems that you're just engaging in special pleading.
Is your reason for the failure that the argument says all things that exist have a cause, which contradicts the conclusion that an uncaused cause exists?
If so, this is a misunderstanding, the argument is about things which begin to exist. So there may be things in existence, which did not begin to exist, but do exist.
I do not like to remove this cause from the realm of existence, because it is just as present to us as the things which we sense. Existence refers to what is present. Everything we sense, and all empirical observations are in the past, by the time they are sensed, so sensation and empirical observation give us only what is on the past side of the present, which is a boundary between future and past. All that is, on the future side of the present boundary, is given to us from some other source. But we cannot deny all that comes to us from this other source, from the realm of existence, just because it is of the future, any more than we can deny what comes to us from the senses, just because it is of the past.
You think that constitutes an argument?
By asking you to name something that doesn't.
For example?
"Actually, the problem was with the claim "all things have a beginning".
Where is that claim in the Kalam cosmological argument?
"For example?"
Anything eternal.
The universe.
Furthermore, if you want to argue that the universe must have a beginning because everything has a beginning then you're back to the cosmological argument refuting itself, being that it concludes that there is a thing that doesn't have a beginning.
Yes:
1) Everything in the universe is either a simple or composed of simples
2) Simples do not have a beginning
3) Therefore the universe does not have a beginning
I was addressing Metaphysician Undiscovered's formulation of the argument here, where he says "all things have a beginning".
This exchange started with you speaking about 'fundamental waves/particles(/superstrings/whatever) that make up the universe'. What you would have said, and would like to have said, was simply 'atoms'.
But now, regrettably, you can't use 'atoms' - indivisible particles, which are simple - because physics has deconstructed the very notion. The idea of an atom as a 'mereological simple' has been dismantled by science itself, hence the requirement to use the term 'fundamental whatevers'.
So instead you just use the term 'simple' as a placeholder for 'whatever science eventually finds out is the basic stuff'. As if that amounts to an argument!
This makes no sense.
The cosmological argument contradicts itself. It can't use as a premise "everything has a
begining, and so a cause" and then conclude that there is a beginningless, uncaused first cause.
Eternal things don't begin to exist, but do(perhaps) exist.
One might also argue against the premise that all things that begin to exist have a cause. Creatio ex nihilo might be a thing (in the sense that the universe may have spontaneously come into existence).
And then, assuming that the proposed God is more than just some impersonal force, one might take issue with Craig's claim that "agent causation, volitional action, is the only ontological condition in which an effect can arise in the absence of prior determining conditions".
Anyway it is reasonable to group the universe in with things which began to exist.
Regarding having a cause, likewise all we can detect has a cause, although it can't be proven.
Regarding the "agent causation" of a god, yes it is taking the rational on to thin ice, it is a quite rational conclusion in other circumstances. In this case though it only hinges on the conclusion of a first cause, which might not require agent causation, or a mind.
I can't see the contradiction though.
We know that inflation began at some point, but not that the infinitely hot, infinitely massive initial singularity had a beginning.
If you lose the personal aspect of God then this "first cause" might simply be the initial quantum fluctuation(s) which caused the initial singularity to expand in the Big Bang.
The fixed version of the OP's formulation which I provided here isn't a contradiction. The contradiction arose was when Metaphysician Undiscovered tried to justify the second premise by saying that all things have a beginning.
Regarding a personal God, the case seems to rest more on establishing an eternal, supernatural, uncaused origin. I agree it is quite a leap to end up with a personal thinking God, or the like.
But there are other theories which support such a thing, more directly.
Regarding first cause, I think this can only be considered in abstraction, as in application to the universe, the origin might well not make sense to us, be incomprehensible, or imperceptible.
Michael, how is saying that there must be a fundamental thing from which macroscopic objects are composed, therefore I assume the existence of such a thing, any different in principle, from the cosmological argument which says that there must be a first cause therefore i assume the existence of such a thing?
The actual difference, is that the cosmological argument is presented as a valid argument, whereas your assumption of a fundamental, "simple", is not. The cosmological argument demonstrates the weakness of your perspective, by showing that even things assumed to be simples actually come into existence out of something which is prior to that so-called simple. So it looks for a first actuality, which might be the cause of even the apparently simple things.
Even if you assume a simple thing, or a vast number of simple things, these things will not create the objects which we know and observe, without a cause. So the assumption of "simples" is really a dead end route of investigation. It does not look for the reason why the simples have formed into the objects, even if it assumes simples. So once we put aside this desire to locate "the simple", we can get on with the real task of looking for the cause. And this would be the cause of the apparent simples as well.
Quoting PunshhhDo you understand that the present exists as a boundary between the future and the past? But since we are existing in the present, yet still sensing things in the past, then don't you think that we are also in some way experiencing the future as well? Is your mind not in the future, all the time and this is what accounts for awareness? Your mind prepares you for what may occur in the distant future, as well as what is imminent and possible, in the immediate future.
So the point is, that you are not sensing the future at all, yet you know an awful lot about the future. Where does this information concerning the future come from if not from the future itself, just like information about the past comes from the past? So your mind must actually be in the future to be receiving information from the future, in order that you can know about the future.
You might wonder, if my mind is in the future, why can't I see, touch, or otherwise sense, the future objects. But that would be impossible, because sensible objects don't exist prior to the present, they only come into existence as time passes, at the present. It must be the case that sensible objects only come into existence at the present, because human beings have the capacity to make random changes to sensible objects at any moment of the present. So your mind is actually in the future, and it can't see any physical objects there, because they don't exist there, but your mind has the capacity to move and change physical objects as they come into being at the present, because it is prior to them, in the future.
Quoting Michael
There is no contradiction, the conclusion is that the first cause is not a thing. There is some discrepancy between Wayfarer and I, because Wayfarer assumes that if it is not a thing, then it is not a being, and therefore does not exist. I am very hesitant to accept this, I think that the first cause has existence just as much as physical things.
The perspective I was describing to Punshhh, is that "existence" refers to what is at the present. But the present is just a boundary between future and past. Physical things are all in the past. The first cause is in the future, as that which causes things to come into existence as the things which they are, at the present. So it is no more proper to call things of the past (physical objects) existing, than it is to call things of the future (first cause) existing.
New Scientist Why Physics can't avoid a Creation Event
What does this prove? Only that the idea of the universe having had a beginning, is resisted by scientists, because of the implication. So whilst Hawking would never assent to 'belief in God', he still resists the implication of the universe having a beginning, because it implicitly affirms the cosmological principle.
I didn't say that! The 'transcendent' is beyond 'existence and non existence'. Whereas everything that exists, might not exist, a necessary being cannot not exist, so is therefore beyond existence and non-existence.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scottus-eriugena/
All of this has now been thoroughly and utterly forgotten, due to the later Duns Scotus, who dissolved the hierarchy into a unicity and began the descent into materialism.
Yes, indeed. We have to make any tradition deeply our own. It's not real till we have twisted its proteins into our own. That's what I find in Jesus' "eat me!"
A pluralistic culture requires some psychological hardiness. You'll always be a fool or a sinner to someone out there. But if you are plugged in, it's a self-justifying experience. I guess those of us here like holding our "systems" up to the fire/Inquisition of other systems. We invite clever people to hack away at our most sacred ideas and identifications. That's why I love Hegel. He saw the violence from which the complete spirit is born.
We qualify "exists" with "contingent", such that those existing things which might not exist are call contingent. This leaves open the possibility of a necessary being. I see you agree that if there is such a thing as a necessary being, it cannot not exist, so I assume that it exists. Isn't the uncaused cause, that necessary being? How do you proceed to the conclusion that the necessary being is beyond existence and non-existence?
This is all part of what I consider to be the study of ontology, which means 'the nature of being'. Now you might ask 'how is ontology any different to science?' And the answer would be, science is concerned with the study of phenomena, i.e. what exists, whereas 'the study of being' is a question of a different order. This is because we ourselves are beings, and in that sense, not objects of analysis.
If you peruse continental philosophers, such as Heidegger and other existentialists, you will find discussion of questions of the meaning of "being", and the sense in which such questions can be differentiated from questions about what exists. Whereas, generally speaking, in anglo-american analytical philosophy, I don't think you will find distinctions of that kind. I think this is one of the key differentiators between the Continental and Anglo-American philosophy at this time.
So I am trying to develop an ontological understanding which enables the distinction between 'being' and 'existence', which is a hard distinction to draw in the current lexicon. And the reason it's hard to draw, is that for most modern people, 'what exists' is 'what is "out there", i.e. is situated in time and space'. That is instinctive and conditioned.
Accordingly, nearly all discussions about the nature of the First Cause are misconstrued in terms of it referring to something that is 'out there', when of course it is not 'out there' in any sense. The fact that it's not "out there", is then taken to be an indication of its non-reality, when what has actually happened is that the question has been misconceived from the outset. In other words, atheist arguments often deny the existence of something which has never been said to exist.
The clearest statement of that in recent literature is in David Bentley Hart's book The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness and Bliss'
"Hart’s central claim is that the God made manifest in the classical theism of Christianity and, indeed, in all the great religious traditions, is “the unconditioned and transcendent reality who sustains all things in being, the one in whom all that nature cannot contain but upon which nature depends has its simple and infinite actuality.” He notes that
...
Hart concentrates on the fundamental error of conceiving of God as some finite object in a universe of other objects: more powerful, yes, but falling within the same metaphysical order of being. As he says, the God of classical theism “is not merely one, in the way a finite object might be merely singular or unique, but is oneness as such, the one act of being and unity by which any finite thing exists and by which all things exist together.”
So the approach required to understand this is in my view strictly apophatic, i.e. negative - you can't know it as it is never an object of knowledge nor is among them.
I'm still not sure what this means, and I asked four people to clarify your post - none of them could make sense of it either. I'm not trying to be dismissive, your post just confuses me.
Like why can't we apply the PSR to existence without applying it to the concept of existence? And what does it mean to apply the PSR to the concept of existence?
Things have existence, it's an attribute, a property of things, they exist. When we abstract the property from the thing, to talk about the property itself, as if it were a thing, we are then talking about a concept. Consider other attributes for example, big, small, rough, smooth, red, green, etc.. If you think about one of these attributes, in itself, such as "big", you are thinking about the concept "big", what it means to be big.
At this point we are talking about the concept of "big", we have made "big" into a noun, to talk about it as a thing, just like the example of "existence". The PSR applies to things, so if we desire to apply it, we must treat these concepts as if they are things, and apply the PSR to these things.
Consider the concept of "being". We could pick out individual beings and apply the PSR to each one of them, but if we're talking about being in general, we are talking about the concept of being. So if we desire to apply the PSR to being, there is only the concept to apply it to. So if the principle of sufficient reason says that there must be a reason for these things, being, and existence, we must treat these things as the concepts which they are, and look for the reason for these concepts. To do otherwise would be a category error, because the PSR clearly applies to particular things. It is an inductive law, stating a generality, "everything", meaning every particular thing, must have a reason for existence. So if we apply the PSR to "existence", in general, to seek the reason for existence, it is not being properly applied because it is not being applied to a particular thing, but to a generality.
Interesting, I don't generally see it this way, rather I consider the eternal moment, rather than a narrow boundary. That we experience a narrow present due to restrictions imposed on us due to incarnation in the place in which we dwell. The details of our dwelling place I don't take a lot of interest in, as the science to understand it has not been done yet. Yes I do think we are experiencing the future in the present, along with the past and that my mind is preparing me for what may occur.
Yes, but as I say, this all happens in the moment, the future and the past are in some sense present in the moment and this is where a holism of being occurs.
I am not sure of the extent that you consider the momentary generation and dissolution of the objects of sensory experience. Or that they have some kind of longevity?
For me these objects are in a sense eternally present with me in the moment.
I agree with the paragraph that comes before this, but the fact that we talk about the concept "big" does not imply that we are talking about "big" as a noun, in the same way that we talk about cats, brooms and tables as nouns.
We are, in fact, talking about "big" as a different sort of noun, also termed an "adjective".
Quoting hunterkf5732
An adjective is not a different sot of noun.
I never said " existence'' couldn't be used as a noun. My contention all along is that, contrary to what you originally said,
Quoting hunterkf5732(Here I requote)
"big'' cannot be used as a noun.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If we're down to nitpicking, ''sot'' should, in this context, be spelled ''sort''.
Right, but if the moment of the present is to be truly eternal, it cannot partake in either of the two parts of time, future or past. See, we can consider that there is time in the future, and time in the past, but "eternal" means outside of time, so if the moment of the present is to be eternal, it must make a clean division between past and future. I described a slightly different scenario in which the present that we experience consists of partially past, and partially future. The precise division is actually theoretical, such that the concept of a precise, eternal, present, as the division between future and past, is conceptual only, and doesn't adequately represent the reality of time.
However, I still allowed for the eternal (that which transcends temporal existence), by confining temporal existence to the past. Our complete conception of temporal existence, and what it means to exist in time, is based on our experience of the past. This allows that temporal existence comes into being at each moment of the present. The present then is understood under the concept of "becoming". We then have a "prior to temporal existence", which is the other side of the present, and it is what exists on this other side which determines what will come into existence at each moment of the present. This "prior to temporal existence" is where I place the eternal.
Quoting Punshhh
I agree that the narrowness of the present which we experience, is due to our physical constitution, and I think that a narrower, or wider present might be experienced by other types of beings. But if you believe that the present has breadth, then doesn't this deny the possibility that the present is an eternal moment, as explained above?
Quoting Punshhh
I would think that it is necessary to believe that objects do have longevity, but this temporal duration is only in the past. So in a sense, whatever came to be, in the past, is still out there somewhere. It is not evident to us, because of our narrow temporal perspective.
Quoting hunterkf5732Yes "big" can be used as a noun, when we refer to the concept "big" as if it were a thing. That's the point, it's just not common practise to refer to this concept, as it is common practise to refer to the concept of "existence". Say I am describing the concept of big to you, I can say "big is large". Here, big is the subject (noun), and large is the predicate. If you consider "large" itself, you will see that it is a more common practise to use "large" as a noun, this turns "large" into a thing, a concept, such as when we say "at large", large is a thing, but concept only.
If you take a word like "red", you will see that it is an adjective used to describe red things, they are red. However, within the conceptual structure it is also a colour. So when we refer to "red" as a colour, red is a noun, because we are using it to refer to the concept of red.
Causation is temporal, and spacetime is an aspect of the universe, which is how we know causation in the first place.
It would then be natural to ask for sufficient and relevant (non-hypothetical) examples of violations of causal closure, in order to justify such extended causation (no special pleading please).
In the NPR article below, Devinsky (of NYU) mentions the example of love. Consenting couples often declare love for each other, thereby confirming love across people, an untold number of people at that.
[quote=Berowne (Love’s Labour’s Lost)]And when Love speaks, the voice of all the gods
Makes heaven drowsy with the harmony.[/quote]
And that's a common example of purely phenomenological experiences (identity).
We already know of all kinds of conditions — drug induced epic experiences, synesthesia, mild epilepsy, schizophrenia, whichever hallucinations and illusions, ... Homo sapiens is hardly the perfect perception-organism. And cats jump at shadows. A reasonably strong epistemic standard is warranted here.
________
• The serotonin system and spiritual experiences; Borg, Andrée, Soderstrom, Farde; PubMed, NCBI; Nov 2003
• Are Spiritual Encounters All In Your Head?; Barbara Bradley Hagerty; NPR; May 2009
• The Spiritual Brain: Selective Cortical Lesions Modulate Human Self-Transcendence; Urgesi, Aglioti, Skrap, Fabbro; Jan 2010
• The Sensed-Presence Effect; Michael Shermer; Scientific American; Apr 2010
• Listening to the inner voice; John Hewitt; Medical Xpress; Dec 2013
• Argument from inconsistent revelations; Wikipedia article
That is to say that god is uncaused only because by definition god is uncaused.
Mean while everything else must have a cause.
That is a rather convenient position that does not require much critical thought.
from the opening post, like creatio ex materia (or creatio ex deo).
An act is temporal, speaking of "to act" is only meaningful by presupposing temporality. (Can relevant counter-examples be presented?)
If said God created the universe out of something pre-existing, something as "old" as God perhaps, but merely transformed this pre-existing something into the universe, then spacetime (or temporality at least) could not merely be an aspect of the universe (the "created"), and said God could not be (wholly) atemporal, which runs contrary to the hypotheses.
There was no time at which something atemporal ("outside of time") existed. The atemporal never existed, never can.
I'm not sure how the hypothesizers can (pretend to) make sense of this?
I assume you realize that it would be impossible to observe , or prove, empirically, such a violation of causal closure. It would just appear like an activity without a known cause. Such violations are common, everyday occurrences. We call them free will actions.
Believe whatever, but free will is notoriously strange (and controversial) in philosophy and other disciplines.
• Free Will Bibliography; Justin Capes; PhilPapers
• What Neuroscience Says about Free Will; Adam Bear; Scientific American; Apr 2016
• Free Will; Psychology Today
• Free Will; SEP article
• Free Will; IEP article
• Free will; Wikipedia article
That's a good question, but it is only by assuming the reality of free will, or at least giving it the status of being a logical possibility, that we can proceed to enquire in this direction. Are all cases of free will part of one first cause, or are they separate, individual cases of first cause? If one is a determinist denier, that individual will not even make the effort to proceed toward understanding how one instance of a free will act relates to another. But if we allow for the evidence, that there is free will, we can ask what is it that separates one instance of a free will act from another, and in what sense can this separation be considered "real".
Quoting jorndoe
Well, isn't that a surprise? Don't you think that all things in philosophy are strange and controversial, otherwise they wouldn't be philosophy?
Maybe?
How can you have a thing already, except it doesn't "have existence"?
Predicate ontologization or existence as ground?
Something's amiss.
Formally, where ? is a predicate (no unrestricted comprehension), x is a variable, and S is a set, existential quantification is properly written as
?x ? S [ ?x ]
The ? and ? symbols are not interchangeable. Going by Quine, to exist is to be the value of a bound variable, x in the expression.
I don't see your point. We sense differences around us. We single out one thing as separate from its surrounding, and say that this individuated thing, "exists". Clearly the thing could have been individuated, recognized, named, and even picked up and used, by many different human beings, before some decided to say that this thing "exists".
The issue you refer to seems to be involved with predicating other properties to a subject, prior to attributing existence to that subject, and then falsely concluding that the subject must "exist". In other words there is a category error in assuming that a subject is an object. An assumed subject does not necessarily exist, as we can assume many types of fictitious subjects. When we predicate existence to that subject, we designate that it is an object. To conclude that a subject is necessaily an object, without the appropriate premise is invalid procedure.
I'm honestly fairly perplexed. Why is this a categorical error? Why is applying the PSR, when applied to a generality fail? Would you mind formalizing your thoughts? In all the work in Pruss, Feser, and others who talk about the PSR, this type of argument has never been mentioned.
I'm also not sure why existence is a property.
Why? I can obviously apply it to existence it-self, not the concept.
The PSR says that for every existing thing, there is a reason for its existence. A universal, or generality is a concept. Therefore a universal, or generality, is only an existing thing as a concept. So we have two principal categories, particular things, and universals, or generalities. To treat a member of one category as if it were a member of the other category is a category mistake.
Quoting MartyIf existence itself is a particular thing, and not a concept, can you point to this thing, or describe to me where I might find it.
Well, it's particular type of "thing" - namely the entire world. Definitely not an object/subject in the usual sense, but it's surely not a concept. Conceptual knowledge is existentially neutral. Conceptually, there's no difference between a hundred possible dollars and a hundred actual dollars. So the predicate "existence" adds nothing more to the subject.
Existence surely has to be there prior to any determination on our part.
Since existence is not a concept, I take it I can apply the PSR to the thing which is - existence.
Also, this doesn't make any sense with other universals. What about the universal redness? Does that mean you can't apply the universal redness to existing things?
Anyway, I guess this is how these discussions tend to go. :)
Yes, you can do this. You can put all existing things together in one category, and call this "existence". But don't you see that this is a conception? How can you say that apprehending all as one, is not conceptual?
Quoting Marty Yes, that's right. Take a look around your room at any object there. How would you propose to apply the universal "redness" to any object in that room? You could apply red paint to an object, but you can't apply redness, the universal. If you name that object "X", you make it a subject, and through predication you can say "X is red". You apply the universal to the subject, not to the object. You apply red paint to the object.
Does time exist or is existence temporal?
As suggested by Wittgenstein, we shouldn't let linguistic practices fool us.
Contemporary cosmology will have it that spacetime is an aspect of the universe. It would seem appropriate then, to speak of spacetime/spatiotemporality using non-tensed terminology. I'm not sure how feasible that is, but at least keeping these linguistic curiosities in mind is appropriate.
Quoting jorndoe
I think we've been through this already in this thread jorndoe. We use "cause" in distinct ways. Aristotle outlined four distinct ways. The type of causation referred to in physical activity was named "efficient cause". The type of causation referred to in free will choices was named "final cause". Since these two are completely distinct types of causes, it is not incoherent to say that one type of causation is prior to, and the cause of the other.
In other words, if physical activity acts as a cause, it is not incoherent to seek the cause of physical activity. This simply requires allowing for a broader category of "cause", such that all causes are not necessarily physical activities. Therefore when we refer to "the cause of causation", "causation" refers to physical activity, and we are seeking the cause of this, as the cause of causation.
How does "nothing" categorize here?
It doesn't, it's nonsense.
Ontologization of "nothing" into something is contradictory. "Nothing" isn't something that can be, isn't anything at all. "Nothing" is but a referent-less word (hence quoted), making a stage entry as if it were. Absence of anything and everything also means absence of probabilities, events, conservation, constraints, prohibitions, beer, etc. "Nothing" is merely a linguistic curiosity expressing the missing complement of anything and everything.
How about everything — all of existence — then, how does that categorize (if it does in the first place)?
Does anything necessary necessarily exist?
Well, if you take "nothing" to be the default, then no, at least.
[quote=AJ Ayer]From necessary propositions only necessary propositions follow.[/quote]
The kalam/cosmological argument appeals to causation as we know it; otherwise it would have to demonstrate another kind before appealing to it.
The most common use is that causes and effects are events, and events are subsets of changes — they occur, and are temporally contextual — causation consist in related, temporally ordered events.
That's how we know causation.
It so happens this is aligned with conservation.
Not true, because causation 'as we know it', if scientific causation is the yardstick, which it appears to be, based on your definition, this doesn't recognize formal and final causes. What, for example, causes the laws of motion to have the values they do, and not have some other values, is not a scientific question.
What is "scientific causation"? When you look at the fundamental laws of nature (the ones whose constants you claim we can't inquire about scientifically) there is no mention of "cause".
Rather, it seems that "cause" in abstraction we invent in order to describe events in terms of a fundamental misconception about the nature of time -i.e. contra what our best theories tell us.
I think you're missing the point. The argument demonstrates through logic, that causation as we know it is insufficient to account for existence as we know it. Therefore it demonstrates the need to appeal to a further type of causation to account for existence as we know it.
There is no further need to demonstrate the reality of this other type of causation prior to appealing to it, as you claim, because that's what the argument does, it demonstrates that this other type of causation is necessary, and therefore it must be real. That's what logic does for us, it tells us what must be the case, based on the premises assumed. If there was a need to demonstrate the reality of the conclusion prior to proceeding with the logic, the logic would be rendered useless.
Quoting jorndoe
Assuming only one type of causation like this leads to an infinite regress of causation. An infinite regress does not account for existence. Therefore we have to assume a different type of cause if we want to proceed toward understanding the cause of existence as we know it.
The traditional cosmological argument, as presented by Aristotle goes beyond the simple claim that a different type of causation is necessary to put an end to the infinite regress. It starts from an analysis of the components of change, and proceeds to determine that the component which appears to be prior to the change itself, the potential for that change, cannot be prior in an absolute sense. There must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. So this actuality cannot be brought about by the potential for that actuality.
That would be your reading, not Craig's argument (at Leadership University, at Reasonable Faith).
Craig's aim isn't to show that there are things we don't know. But feel free to show there is a special kind of causation (without extraneous implicit presuppositions, special pleading or the likes), preferably applicable here, or, better yet, in a new opening post (might well be interesting). :)
Just as an aside:
[quote=Mellor]the main reply to the simultaneous causation argument is that the cases appearing to exemplify it are misdescribed[/quote]
Something real exists; not all that exists is real. Fictions and imaginary things exist, for example, and hallucinations similarly, but they're not real. Or that's how I tend to use those words (reality ? existence). (Maybe we could agree on that distinction?)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Craig's justification of a non-infinite past duration is largely scientific (Big Bang, entropy, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem), as mentioned in the opening post, though he evades the no-boundary theories.
We already know that his deductive justification doesn't quite work, doesn't prove that an infinite past duration is impossible. Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel and The diary of Tristram Shandy are known as "veridical paradoxes" because they're not logically inconsistent, they just have certain counter-intuitive implications.
Why wouldn't an infinite past duration account for existence? What would be unaccounted for? For that matter, what else could there be? Non-existence? We don't get to invent things for the occasion.
Quoting the British theologian from a 2009 interview:
[quote=Richard Swinburne]All explanation, consists in trying to find something simple and ultimate on which everything else depends. And I think that by rational inference what we can get to that’s simple and ultimate is God. But it’s not logically necessary that there should be a God. The supposition ‘there is no God’ contains no contradiction.[/quote]
Rather, this would have to proven (after answering the ignostic question, and what warrants worship/prayer).
I really don't find Craig's version of the cosmological argument to be particularly useful, nor do I find it to be completely consistent with versions such as Aristotle's and Aquinas'. And, I think that the changes he makes, perhaps to modernize the argument, distract from the overall coherency of the argument.
Quoting jorndoeActually I've seen Craig claim that the cause of the universe is another efficient cause, but this produces the incoherency which you have referred to.
Quoting jorndoe
When the cause of the universe is understood to be another efficient cause, we end up with a solution to the problem posed by the cosmological argument, such as Aristotle's solution. Notice that I say "problem", because that's what the argument does, it hands us the problem of "what caused the universe?". It determines that it is necessary that there is a cause of the universe, and gives us the problem of figuring out what that cause is.
The Aristotelian solution is to assume a separate type of efficient cause, which is an eternal circular motion. Any solution which assumes an efficient cause, must assign to that efficient cause, the characteristic of "eternal", because it must be separate from the efficient causation which we know of, as the passing of time, which is proper to our universe. It must be separate from the passing of time, and therefore it is necessarily eternal.
No-boundary theories are consistent with this idea of circular motion, and eternal efficient cause, and are therefore consistent with Craig's solution for the cosmological argument, as he as well assumes efficient causation. The problem is that an eternal efficient cause is itself an incoherent idea. It is contrary to the notion of "efficient cause", that such a cause could be eternal, and therefore the proposal of an eternal efficient cause is oxymoronic, or self-contradictory.
The Neo-Platonist solution, which was adopted by Christianity, becoming Aquinas' solution, is to assume a different type of cause, final cause (the will of God), as the cause of the universe. In this way we avoid the self-contradiction of "eternal efficient cause", by referring to a type of cause which is not an efficient cause at all. This type of cause is not unfamiliar to us, because it is known to exist in the free will choices of human beings. Furthermore, the concept of free will represents final cause as the cause of efficient causes, therefore the cause, or beginning, of chains of efficient causes. And this is what the cosmological argument also indicates, that we need to assume a type of cause which is distinct from the efficient causation which we know, as the cause of the universe.
So, we can associate these two facts: the fact that free will demonstrates to us a type of causation which is distinct from efficient causation, and acts as a beginning, or cause, of a chain of efficient causation, and, the fact that the cosmological argument demonstrates that we need to assume a type of causation which is distinct from efficient causation, as the cause of the universe.
Quoting jorndoeThe assumption of an infinite past duration doesn't account for existence, because it doesn't give us the cause of existence. That's what Craig does indicate, that existing things have a beginning, and because they have a beginning, they have a cause. If we assume that the universe does not have a beginning, then it cannot be an existing thing as described. Then we cannot hand to the universe the title of "existence", because existing things are known to have a beginning, and we are denying that the universe has a beginning. So if the universe has an infinite past, "the universe" is necessarily placed in a category other than "existing thing", according to that description, and this designation does nothing for us in accounting for existing things, or "existence" in general, which refers to things that are generated and corrupted, contingent.
What objections are they? (That was part of the intent with the opening post.) By the way, please feel free to present your own argument, if you have it reasonably formalized.
Quoting Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990), regarding Craig's argument (and two others):
[quote=Michael Martin]Although there are other contemporary versions of the cosmological argument, these are among the most sophisticated and well argued in contemporary philosophical theology.[/quote]
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No.
Big Bang is not quite justification towards this, entropy may or may not be (also see the fluctuation theorem), the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem more likely is, no-boundary theories are incompatible.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What else is there? Non-existence? :o
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
?
As mentioned, a scientific response seems to involve virtual particle pairs, quantum fluctuations, radioactive decay (temporal indeterminism), spacetime foam/turbulence, the "pressure" of vacuum energy, the Casimir effect, Fomin's quantum cosmogenesis, ... Whereas there are prerequisites for the existence of quantum fluctuations (for example), like spacetime, whichever particular fluctuations themselves are not otherwise determined. Something that can also be found in radioactive decay, where the duration between absorption/excitation and emission/relaxation is non-deterministic. If a scientist was asked about the kind of "nothing" in the post above, then what would you expect them to talk about...? Hollywood scandals at least are something. :)
However, going by the expansion of the universe, spatiality itself is obviously not conserved, not temporally invariant, there's literally more of it by the second.
So where does that "come from"?
Why wouldn't this then be a counter-example to nihil fit ex nihilo, incidentally consistent with scientific findings?
As to conservation, also check the zero-energy universe hypothesis; the sum total of it all comes to exactly zero.
If that holds, then what does it mean to ask where it all "comes from"?
Basically any appeal to scientific laws begs the question as to origin of those laws.
Right! That is related to the point at issue. Science (or natural philosophy) assumes 'lawful regularity' as the basis of its explanations. Discovering those regularities and making predictions on that basis, is a very large part of what science does. But science doesn't explain those regularities, although it might speculate about their origin - which is what we're doing here. So the kind of cause that science is concerned with is a cause in terms of combinations of factors and antecedents - what are called in Aristotelean terms 'efficient causes'. Whereas this kind of question concerns formal causes, which I don't think has a counterpart in much scientific thinking.
David Albert, review of A Universe from Nothing Lawrence Krauss.
So, not all that exists is real, but all that is real, exists? By "real" do you mean "empirically real", or something else? Because your position here seems to allow that something could exist in some way other the empirical, but not allow that anything could be real in any way other than the empirical.
And that seems to be diametrically opposed to the common theological notion that God does not exist (if to exist means to exist empirically) but that He is nonetheless real. As others have already pointed out numbers do not empirically exist, they cannot be seen or touched, and so on, but yet they seem obviously to be real.
If we take it as a starting assumption that God does not exist empirically, that is as an object of the senses, then is it not still the case that the logical possibilities are that he might be, in some way other than empirically, either real or imaginary?
Like Superman isn't real, but he does exist as a comic/movie character. Here he is:
Of course you may use the terms differently; my suggestion was just directed to @Metaphysician Undercover to avoid confuzzlement (per earlier posts).
Platonism was briefly touched upon in the opening post
... and some later posts here and there, including this one.
Craig's argument is defective because contrary to other versions, such as Aquinas', he simply assumes that the universe has a beginning, rather than proving it as part of the agument, which Aquinas does. Because of this, he gets embroiled in a discussion of actual infinity versus potential infinity instead of starting at the true foundation of the cosmological argument, as formulated by Aristotle, which considers actual versus potential eternity rather than infinity.
I believe the Craig formulation is less complex than Aristotle's or Aquinas'. As I explained in my last post, the cosmological argument presents us with a vey particular set of problems, and offers solutions to those problems. The "argument" part is the presentation of the problems. Depending on how the problems are presented, the solutions vary. The Craig presentation doesn't adequately represent the complexity of the problems, so it is unsuccessful due to being over-simplified. It may be that he is trying to remove, or disguise the inductive aspect, but the inductive aspect is crucial.
Quoting jorndoe
I think that a properly formulated cosmological argument would go something like this:
p1. If there is observable activity, then time is passing.
p2. For any particular observable activity, the potential for that activity is prior in time to the activity itself.
c1. Inductive: The potential for observable activity, in general, is prior in time to that activity.
Problem: We now have a potential which is prior in time to all observable activity.
p3. Any potential requires an actuality as a cause, if it is to be actualized.
c2. If potential is prior to actuality, absolutely, this would ensure an eternal potential without the capacity to actualize itself, and therefore eternally no actual existence.
p4. There is actual existence.
c3. There is an actuality which is prior to observable activity.
Problem: how to describe this actuality. It is generally agreed that this actuality is God, but is God a type of perfect, eternal efficient cause, as Aristotle said, or is God a distinctly different type of immaterial cause, as the Neo-Platonists and Aquinas said?
Quoting jorndoeWhat you are not taking into account here, is that Craig argues for an eternal efficient cause, just like Aristotle's eternal circular motion. Such an efficient cause is distinct from any efficient causes which we know of, because of the necessary element of perfection. The efficient cause can only be eternal due to some perfection. The circular motion can only be eternal if the circle is perfect. No point on the circle can be different from any other point, in order that none is the beginning or the end. This is the same principle utilized by no-boundaries theories. Since Craig argues for an eternal efficient cause, his position falls into this category, as that efficient cause can only be eternal through a similar type of perfection. The difference between Craig and "no-boundaries" is that Craig wants a separation between the perfect (ideal) eternal efficient cause, and the universe which it causes, while "no-boundaries" assumes that the universe is such a perfect (ideal) eternal efficient activity. So Craig takes one step beyond "no-boundaries", to recognize that this is an ideal, and therefore not the universe which we know, separate from it, but he does not proceed to recognize that such ideals do not have actual existence. This, I believe is crucial to a true understanding of the cosmological argument.
The diallelus.
Unless...are you insisting that Krauss start talking about "nothing" (here, here), or make things up, or ...? I once ran into a fellow that had written a whole book about "nothing"; you'd think there wouldn't be much to write about, but...a whole book. :)
From the earlier post:
That is a common (mis)conception about the nature of science, but there is another conception - the conception developed by Karl Popper, which I prefer.
According to Popper, there is no *assumption* of lawful regularity, he did, after all, dispense with induction entirely. Science, in particular our fundamental theories, are explanatory i.e. scientific theories are conjectured explanations of some aspect of the physical world that is testable.
Science as it stands explains a great number of observed regularities and irregularities. As for events such as the big bang, I'm not sure whether you would describe that as a regularity, but there are existing explanatory theories that take us back to almost the beginning of the universe, which are testable.
It doesn't seem sensible to impose arbitrary limits on what aspects of reality science can address.
If someone demonstrated that the rate at which some object fell varied from the prediction it would create a sensation.
And in this context 'almost' doesn't cut it.
As for William Lane Craig, I acknowledge that I think many of his arguments are at least as persuasive of those of his opponents - granted, I am not an atheist - but still not be impressed by him, or his arguments. I think the whole 'scientific argument for God', is barking up the wrong tree, that if you need to prove that God exists, in a sense that would fulfil a scientific requirement then you're already missing the point. You prove what you believe by how you conduct yourself, against a background where you know you don't really know.
As for the scientific arguments concerning a first cause, Karen Armstrong has this to say:
What she says religions really are is a felt relationship with the origin or ground of being, 'that from which everything arises'. That is understood very differently in different traditions and cultures (although it is also pointless to argue whether all these approaches are 'the same' or 'different' or 'in conflict'). The only thing that is important, is in having that felt relationship with the origin of everything. Ultimately it beats even sex (or so legend has it).
Unfortunately many think in terms of the mythical 'sky-father' thereby fulfilling the prejudices of all those who think that religion is infantile.
New theories not only provide better explanations of reality, they explain why previous theories were successful or otherwise. Newton's gravity explained elliptical orbits, general relativity explained gravity in terms of curved geodesics in space-time. What makes you think this process must stop?
And there just happen to exist scientific research programs into the nature of scientific laws e.g. Constructor Theory.
Quoting Wayfarer
Did the law of evolution already exist at the big bang? You keep claiming that science means something by "cause" despite the notion of "cause" being absent from our fundamental theories. Nevertheless, you don't explain why science cannot address any particular type of "cause" if it exists.
Anyway, under our fundamental time-reversible theories, it is a anthropomorphic prejudice to claim the past causes the future and not the reverse.
Quoting Wayfarer
No such in-principle barrier exists.
OK, taking you at your word, what phenomena and their "causes" does quantum mechanics describe? How did we discover quantum entanglement, superposition, and even the Higgs boson, years before the phenomena were observed?
General relativity told us theoretically that there was a big-bang, and that there should be a remnant of that visible in a microwave background. General relativity told us of the existence of the perihelion effect of Mercury, time dilation necessary for GPS, black holes, and gravitational waves.
In fact one of the apparent anomalies of quantum theory is the so-called 'quantum leap' which was said to be truly unpredictable, i.e. couldn't be ascribed to a cause. It was this which caused Einstein to say that he couldn't accept that 'God plays dice'. The other was the discovery of the uncertainty principle, which likewise seems to undermine the idea of deterministic causes giving rise to predictable effects.
General relativity didn't predict the big bang, that idea was first developed by Georges Lemaître in a paper called 'The primeval atom'. When it was first floated, Einstein and many others resisted the idea.
All the predictions arising from general relativity are examples of predictions made on the basis of mathematical reasoning. It is intriguing that Einstein was able by these means to predict many things long before the means to discover them was even available (leading to the many headlines we've seen over the years, 'Einstein Proved Right Again), and using nothing other than a pencil and paper! Quite why mathematical physics is able to make such predictions is another fascinating subject, and one explored in Eugene Wigner's The Unreasonable Efficiency of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences'. (Personally, I think this is related to what Kant describes as 'the synthetic a priori', but that is a separate topic.)
None of which counts against what I said.
Since science is the single most successful epistemic endeavor in all of human history, you might take that as evidence of self-justification - science meets it's own criteria.
But there's no promise of omniscience (assuming omniscience makes sense). In principle, though not (necessarily) in practice, scientific results are descriptive, rather than pro/prescriptive. Scientific results can be useful to a somewhat unparalleled degree. If your kids fall ill, then I personally recommend taking them to your accredited medical doctor, not your homeopath, witch doctor, priest or shaman, and there's a reason for that.
There isn't anything stopping us from taking near death experiences, reincarnation, miracles, Noah's flood or what-have-you serious. If we were to do so, I'd expect development of fallible theories we could learn from, that would be of some use.
I guess the word "God" apparently is up for grabs. :-}
The majority of contemporary theists would disagree, or at least speak of a different God/god; they and Armstrong can't both be right.
Hence ignosticism; unlike, say, the Moon, or even dark energy, there just isn't anything particular to show.
Craig's God and Armstrong's God are not the same.
No kidding. I personally drive a car and am employed on a computer. So, I don't spend my days driving sheep around stony paddocks with a staff and slingshot to drive off wolves.
'The map is not the territory' is associated with General Semantics.
'Omniscience' is something attributed to deity. How that can be, and what it means, is a very difficult question of interpretation, but I don't automatically reject it on that account. Religion claims to be 'revealed truth'. Whatever that means, may well not be equatable to a mathematically-precise description of physical facts.
Alternatively, they're seeing different parts of the same elephant, and reacting accordingly.
You should open a new thread. (Y)
I wasn't suggesting platonic realms or anything of that sort; just a purely logical exploration of the concepts "existence' and 'real' to see what ways we can think or imagine them. This would involve trying to start form a position devoid of any ontological commitments, kind of like Husserl 'epoche'
According to Craig God is personal, according to Armstrong God is not; according to your alternative, one end of God is personal, and another end is not. :D
Up for grabs. (Unless there's a means to verify/falsify?)
Craig is going for an omni*, atemporal, aspatial, simple/indivisible/atomic, selfaware, sentient, conscious, perfect, loving/caring/compassionate, personal, intervening all-creator (of the universe, heaven, hell, you, I), that brought the universe about (ex nihilo) by free will, and that warrants worship/prayer. Something along those lines anyway.
From my point of view, however, any of them that say they have a monopoly on truth, I will generally not accept. That is why Karen Armstrong's attitude is superior, in my opinion, because it is analytical and synthetic i.e. finds common threads in various traditions and sees how they indicate common truths (which as a generic approach is different to the 'confessional' approach of Craig et al.)
Oh, OK. Well, the semantics thing (earlier in the thread), Husserlian (reductive) phenomenology and such, seems tangential to Craig's argument, but surely has material for a thread of it's own? I think it came up after one of the side-tracks (subjective/objective, mind/other, ...). Do you think there's an angle to Craig's argument?
I may have picked up on (focused too much on) this comment ...
Quoting John
... recalling this ...
Quoting Wayfarer
Anyway, defining existence and reality, phenomenology and empiricism, abstracts and numbers, are topics with plenty material for topics on their own.
Your misrepresentation of the history of quantum mechanics is utterly woeful. So much so that it is difficult to summon the enthusiasm to correct you.
Fortunately in your misrepresentation of the early history of the theory of the big-bang you make the matter easy. Georges Lemaître's essay 'The primeval atom' was written 30 years after the paper in which he introduced the idea of the big-bang. The first six words of the English translation of that paper are:
The discovery of the big-bang is a direct consequence of general relativity, as are black-holes, wormholes, gravitational waves.
While we are on the subject, the irony is not lost on me that it is General Relativity that tells us that there has to be a "beginning", and that you prefer to pretend that there is some arbitrary barrier to science discovering *why* and *how* that event occurred.
What I said was that it is impossible to 'wind the clock back' to the singularity, because at that point, there were no actual laws, nor time and space. That, I believe, is a fact. It is also of note that there are ongoing conflicts about whether the Big Bang really can be said to constitute 'a beginning', precisely because, in Hawking's words, '“A point of creation would be a place where science broke down. One would have to appeal to religion and the hand of God,”(Why Physics can't avoid a Creation Event,)New Scientist.
Or the facts, apparently.
"The Cosmic Atom" was an essay published in 1957.
Quoting Wayfarer
1927 is 30 years prior to 1957.
I don't recall anyone claiming that Einstein developed all the solutions to his field equations and that others such as Friedmann, Lemaître, Robertson, Walker, De Sitter or Gödel weren't allowed to.
Quoting Wayfarer
So, if general relativity is a fact, inflation is a fact, quantum mechanics is not a fact, then you are certain of the facts that obtain at the end of past-directed timelike geodesic? Good for you!
It might have been, but I didn't use the term 'cosmic atom'. I said that Georges LeMaitre introduced the theory of the primeval atom, which he did, in 1927-1930.
Please spare the sarcasm. What I am saying, which you are not addressing, is that physics has been able to estimate what happened right back to infinitesmal seconds after the 'big bang' event started, but that it cannot 'see' to the singularity, for the obvious reason that at that point, there is no space, time, or physical law in effect. I am not claiming any special knowledge of physics, this is general knowledge, as far as I'm concerned, although apparently it's something you don't know.
All of which is besides the point, but I am loathe to try and explain what that is, again.
Thanks for the vote of confidence, I'll consider that.
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting tom
General relativity, in conjunction with observations of the universe, have forced people to conjure up "the big-bang" to account for the appearance of a time when general relativity does not apply. Black-holes are a place where general relativity does not apply. What this indicates is that general relativity, as a universal theory, is inadequate. It does not indicate that these things, the big-bang, and black-holes really exist in the way described by the theory, because the theory does not apply here, therefore it cannot produce any description of these occurrences. What is revealed by observations of the universe, and the application of general relativity, is that general relativity is very deficient. Instead of re-evaluating general relativity, scientists turn to mathematicians to come up with all sorts of magic tricks to hide the ineptitude of the theory as a universal theory. Its true applicability is really very limited in scope.
A fictional law firm.
Err... The terms just refer to epochs and changes over time as per the model. Lots of technicalities. Many years ago things were much denser.
Big Bang; Wikipedia article
According to the Wikipedia article above:
A linked article entitled 'the gravitational singularity' says:
What I said was:
I don't think "denser" is the proper word. As I understand it, expansion doesn't affect density. What I think, is that when general relativity is applied to vast areas of space and time, a mystery phenomenon appears, which is called "expansion". But expansion doesn't really exist, as a real phenomenon, it's just the failure of general relativity which produces the appearance of expansion. Then instead of approaching the theory of general relativity to see what it is about that theory which produces the appearance of this mystery phenomenon, scientist would rather just give it a name, "expansion", and work out all the necessary mathematics required to deal with this failure.
This paper, for example, is about t=0 and it has 487 citations!
http://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.27.2848
Luke Barnes is a Sydney-based astrophysicist, who is making a name for himself as a philosopher, as well, notably via a critique of Victor Stenger's arguments against the anthropic cosmological principle here, and a recent New Atlantis contribution, here. All of these pieces are on the same basic idea, and all of them very close to the cosmological arguments.
The problem with the argument, however, is that philosophical theology doesn't propose anything of the kind. The classical depiction of deity in the Western tradition is as simple - not composed of parts - nor with any location or with any magnitude. And as such a being is beginningless and endless, then this being cannot also be something that is said to exist, as all existing things come into, and go out of, existence. But that doesn't mean non-existent, so much as beyond existence, i.e. transcendent.
But then, if you put the argument in those terms, the response is that it is meaningless or absurd, because such a being can't even be imagined. 'Whatever could such a thing be?', will come the response. You might say: 'what are you actually asking, here. If you're enquiring into the 'nature of deity', then what kind of question is it? How would you go about asking it? What would you study?'
But then, you're cut off: you wouldn't study anything, because it is obviously all a charade, a ruse.
That's about the state of play.
Indeed, there isn't anything stopping us from doing serious research.
Why would there be?
Such research may even be fruitful, who knows.
That claim might be difficult to defend. God is one, but first and foremost, "one" signifies unity rather than simplicity. Surely the Christian God is understood to be a trinity, and I don't see how a trinity could be simple. As a trinity, this being could be the beginning, end, and all in between, rather than the beginningless, endless, existence-less "being" which you speak off.
I think that designating God as inconceivable, leads to the idea that God is unintelligible, and this leads to the idea that God is incoherent, which leads to the idea that God is logically impossible, contradictory, etc., and this leads to atheism.
Quoting Punshhh
To acknowledge such a cause is to acknowledge intelligibility, and therefore conceivability. Conception should be understood as a process, a process of understanding. One can study, all one's life, trying to understand the mysteries of the universe without ever fully "conceiving", but this does not mean that the individual's efforts were in vain.
The fact that 'you don't see it', doesn't constitute an argument, especially in so recondite a question as this! And I don't want to try and present myself as a Christian apologist, or theologian, either. The point I am labouring to make is that the frequent criticisms directed at classical theism - 'Who made God? Mustn't God be more complex than what he creates?' - are based on no understanding whatever of the nature of the question. Generally the naturalistic attitude is so deeply entrenched in our culture and outlook, that we don't realise we're standing in it, and that it conditions the very way we ask the questions, and indeed the kinds of questions we ask.
And also, from the perspective of depth psychology and comparative religion, the 'divine triad' is represented in more than just Christian doctrine; in Hinduism, the trinity is Brahma-Vishnu-Shiva. In Mahayana Buddhism, the trinity is the 'tri-kaya', or 'three Bodies of the Buddha'. I am not saying these are interchangeable or synonymous, but that the idea of the 'one which is three' is not unique to Christian doctrine to perhaps it denotes a deeper truth.
Well, I must admit that I don't see any logic to this type of criticism, so I generally ignore it, seeing no need to defend against it. It is just a symptom of a much deeper problem, as you correctly point out.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm with you there. Here's a few explanations of the 'one which is three', which I am acquainted with. Plato had the tripartite soul: mind, body, and he demonstrated the necessity to assume a medium between mind and body, spirit. St. Augustine had the three aspects of the intellect: memory, understanding, and will. Then there is Aquinas' explanation. There is no "son" without a father, and no "father" unless there is a son. And, there is a very real relationship between these two which allows them to be what they are, father and son, and this is the holy spirit. I like to understand time in this way, there is no future without a past, and no past without a future, and there is a very real present which allows these two to be what they are. I believe this is the essence of conception, the two opposing terms, and the necessary relationship between them. That is why the 'one which is three' is a common theme.
As you bring up the triad, I would mention that I use an entire philosophical perspective based on the trinity, which I find to more explanatory power than binary thinking.
So we have;
Father = God = spirit
Mother = Holy Spirit = body
Son = the Christ = mind
This can be applied to just about everything.
Well, do you recognize the difference between perceiving something and conceiving something? If you do, you can question what lies in between these two, what creates a difference between them, or what is the difference between them. So suppose someone perceives "divine beauty", as you say. This means that the individual is so inclined as to name what is being perceived as "divine beauty". We can ask the person "why did you use 'divine beauty' to describe your perception?".
If the person can justify this use, give reason for using this phrase, we might say that there is a concept of "divine beauty". But very likely the person will be at a lose of words, or meet criticism with any attempt to justify, and we'd have to conclude that there is no conception of "divine beauty". What you would name "divine beauty", is not what I would name "divine beauty". Sure there are some subliminal inclinations which would make you use this phrase, and you might even come up with reasons for using it, but these reasons don't really justify your use, in the minds of others, so we cannot say that there is a concept of divine beauty.
This is what happens with the word "God". We can proceed through any one of a number of different versions of the cosmological argument, and conclude a first actuality, as I suggested, or a causeless cause, as suggested by another version, or even an eternal cause, and claim this is "God". Someone else might say "God" refers to an omnipotent, omniscient, being, so we are wrong to use the word "God" in reference to what is implied by the numerous different conclusions of the different versions of the cosmological argument. If we quit at this point, and concede, "God" is inconceivable, we will have succumbed to the irrationality of "that which is difficult is impossible".
Now it should be evident that we can perceive things, apprehend them with our minds, and even assert that we have conceived, without actually having the capacity to conceptualize them. Conceptualizing is a completely different process from apprehending or understanding. Conception requires that one justifies what one has apprehended, and understood with one's own mind, in the minds of others. So no matter how clear and distinct this idea is to you, unless you can make the same idea clear and distinct in the minds of others, there is no concept.
I think that in this case you're probably not aware of the nature of apophatic theology, otherwise known as the way of negation. It is not, strictly speaking, a philosophical theory at all, but is associated with contemplative prayer, such as the well-known perennial book called The Cloud of Unknowing which is by an anonymous medieval monastic but is still in wide circulation. But aside from this title, there is an elaborate literature on the 'way of unknowing' which is central to Christian mysticism (and also has parallels in other faith traditions).
The gist of this is not that simply one throws up one's hands - 'eh, what do we know?' - but one enters into the 'cloud of unknowing' through meditative silence. The biblical precedents are such verses as 'the lord sees in secret'. I think, from the viewpoint of a modern depth psychology, what is happening in these meditative states is the mind is actually becoming directly aware of its hidden depths, through non-verbal and non-analytic awareness.
I don't think the apophatic approach is characteristic of the kind of theology that developed such ideas as the cosmological argument, it is considerably more reticent, for obvious reasons (although the inconcievability of the divine nature is basic to Aquinas, as I understand it.) But I think it's a mistake to say that recognition of the 'divine mystery' or the fact that Deity transcends human reason and sense, is simply 'succumbing to the irrational', so much as a recognition of the limits of rationality, in respect of that which is superior to it.
There's a difference between 'supra-rational' and 'irrational', although for obvious reasons a difference which is difficult for naturalism.
It occurs to me that no one thinks they conceive of God(in the sense of conceivable), or claims to have such knowledge, other than in their humble imperfect mind. This is why I accept that any cosmological argument cannot conclude God, because what is it concluding?
Perhaps this is an extreme form of skepticism.
Quoting Wayfarer
This would be very useful, especially in today's materialist society. We tend to think that knowledge is "of" the external world, and even that it is caused by the external world, acting on our passive bodies, failing to see that knowledge manifests within us. So taking such a meditative state might allow one to realize that knowledge really comes from inside us.
Quoting Wayfarer
Aquinas doesn't say that the divine nature is inconceivable, he says that it can only be grasped through revelation, it must be revealed to an individual. This means that it is given, or it must be given to that individual. But anything that is given needs also to be received, or the gift is in vain. Now, any knowledge which is given to an individual, no matter how it is revealed to the person, must be. in some way, justified by that person before it is accepted, and believed. This is the way of the skeptic, to enforce strict criteria of acceptance, and I believe the whole point in approaching the "cloud of unknowing" is to be found here as well. If we can wipe out all so-called truths, facts, and approach knowing anew, with a clean slate, we can ask that all be justified before being accepted.
So let's assume the revelation, and this being from the perspective of the one who receives the revelation. The revelation must be validated, justified, otherwise it's nature, as understood by the receiver, cannot get beyond the appearance of an hallucination. This is what the cosmological argument does, it validates the revelation as something real, supporting it with sound logic. When an individual receives such a revelation, that person must treat the revelation as a revelation, not as an hallucination. If the latter is the case, and the person treats the revelation as an hallucination, the revelation will be meaningless, dismissed and forgotten about. But if, through the persuasion of the cosmological argument, or some other logical argument, the individual comes to understand the revelation as a true revelation, and so treats it as such, it will not be dismissed and forgotten about. See, it is commonly said that God reveals Himself to all of us. But if we don't take notice, the revelation is meaningless.
Quoting Wayfarer
What I characterized as "succumbing to the irrational" was the position of "I cannot conceive of God, therefore God is inconceivable". When we attempt to do something, and fail because it is exceedingly difficult to do that thing, to say "this is impossible" is irrational.
Quoting Punshhh
As I disclosed in my rendition of a cosmological argument a few posts back, what a cosmological argument concludes, is that there is an actuality which is prior to all observable actualities. Prior to any, and every, observable actuality is the potential for that actuality. But it is impossible that potential is prior, in an absolute sense, so there must be an actuality which is prior to all observable actualities. How is this not concluding God?
(De Div. Nom. I.3.77; quoted in Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, p. 49)
https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2016/05/23/st-thomas-aquinas-divine-simplicity-and-knowing-the-unknowable-god/
In the old philosophy forum I started a thread asking "what exists", this was a request to discuss this same absolute prior actuality. But few posters responded, or understood what I was getting at.
I just want to make an observation about revelation here. I have experienced some revelations during my life. So I might be able to convey what is going on here, because it does seem to be a real phenomena, even if the divine reality we imagine and believe in turns out not to be true.
As I see it revelation is an experience which transcends ordinary day to day consciousness. By "transcends", I mean ones self transcends it's normal seat of intellection, of being within the body and has experiences which can be described as a lucid hallucination. An experience or hallucination which in ones sense of self and being within themselves/oneself, is more real, more present, more known than ordinary living experience. So in a real way, one can be lifted up by a divine intervention of some sort and experience something which ones body and mind are not equipped to experience. But you experience it through the body of the intervening deity, are hosted in their body, witness, what they witness. This process enables you to see/witness the inconceivable, inconceivable with our own capacities. Following the revelation you remember what you witnessed, you know what you experienced, but your intellect has to catch up, to give meaning and explanation, but it is always only describing things in its own terms and referring to something beyond, which it can't articulate, convey.
An example which I experienced was that of transcending time. I found myself witnessing a present outside our daily brief moment of time, that we live in, in which I saw my past and my future like viewing a landscape, as I turned to look across the landscape, I was looking across time, not space.
The Supreme Identity, Pp 46-47
Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic
There are problems with the concept of infinity, which I have pointed out from time to time.
incidentally, I think I mentioned before that I got into University on a passage from that Russell essay. Despite his adamant rejection of Christianity, Russell was surprisingly sympathetic to, and insightful about, mysticism, in my view.
I was really thinking that you're clearly wrong about this Wayfarer, because God is immaterial, having the type of existence of an intelligible object, so it would be self-defeating, even contradictory or oxymoronic to assume an intelligible object which is unintelligible, inconceivable. So I looked it up in Aquinas' "Summa Theologica".
The subject is covered in Pt. 1, Q12. In the first article, it is said: "Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light."
He proceeds to explain how some hold that no created intellect can see the essence of God, and demonstrates how this opinion is not tenable. Then he explains revelation, and by article 4 says that no created intellect can see the essence of God, unless God, by His grace, unites Himself to the created intellect as an object made intelligible to it. In the 11th article, it is explained that this cannot be obtained by a living human being, because so long as we live, the soul has its being in corporeal matter, so the intellect cannot be united to God in this way, while the human being is living. In the 12th article he says that we know "of God", and explains the different types of things which we know "of Him", that he is creator, etc.. And in the thirteenth, he says that this is assisted by the revelation of grace.
So, I would say that we are both right, in some way. God is understood here, to be inconceivable to corporeal creatures, including human beings, due to the inability of the material being to be properly united to the immaterial essence of God. But in a fundamental way, God is most highly conceivable.
Quoting Punshhh
I agree, we should focus on "eternity" rather than "infinite". This, I pointed to earlier as a fundamental flaw in Craig's version of the cosmological argument, his focus on infinity. Aristotle's original version deals eternity, as does Aquinas'. The point being that the argument deals with the nature of temporal existence. When we understand, from the cosmological argument, that there is necessarily an actuality which is prior to the actualities of temporal existence, this necessitates that time itself is prior to the actualities of temporal existence.
Quoting Punshhh
I think that when we approach this question, "what is God?", what is God's nature, or essence, we get deflected off from this, by our inadequate understanding of time. In other words, we cannot even get a first impression of what is God, without first developing an understanding of time. But the nature of time is an extremely difficult question. From my perspective, when I started to develop an understanding of the nature of time, I realized just how little we, as human beings, actually know about temporal existence. If God is what brings us to this realization, then "God" is something which we must maintain.
Anyway when I say "what exists", I am considering a transcendent object, or ooze.
Agreed, we are in ignorance. I don't mean in the sense of stupid, but rather that the truth of the matter is concealed/veiled from us.
And the fact that the text then goes on to say that this knowledge 'cannot be obtained by a living human being, because so long as we live, the soul has its being in corporeal matter, so the intellect cannot be united to God in this way, while the human being is living', makes the point that I was pressing about 'unknowability'.
But the key thing is the fact that higher knowledge carries with it a change in perspective, meaning that one who has it, sees things so differently, that he or she might as well be seeing a different world altogether. (Maybe this is the inner meaning of 'new heaven, new earth'.) So what we take to be knowledge, from our perspective, really might not be knowledge at all from a higher perspective. ('The things you think are precious I can't understand'.)
Normally, our sense of what we know is embedded in a matrix of understanding, supported and buttressed by all kinds of suppositions and previously-formed ideas. I think that what happens on the path is that this structure is always being challlenged and changed, so that we realise that what we thought we knew, no longer seems certain. Then you come upon a new perspective which throws what you thought you knew into a new light. 'Ah, I thought that this meant that, but now I suddenly see it means something different'. All the things you thought were real and solid, suddenly appear inconsequential.
Notice this passage from Eriugena, which I think I quoted previously, but which is relevant here -
This has a counterpart in the Buddhist koan 'first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is'. That koan is about the shifting perspectives that open up through meditative insight. Venerable Nonin-roshi explains this as follows:
__//|\\__
I think there are many different ways to interpret, so when thinking about time, it's good not to really "conclude" anything. This is a big part of that "inconceivability" factor.
Quoting Punshhh
Aquinas uses a term, which others prior to his time had already used, "aeviternal". This is described as a partial eternity, and it is used to account for the type of existence which angels have.
I understand it like this. We can look two directions in time, past and future. If we assume infinite distance, in either direction, a firm of eternity is implied. So we have two distinct potential eternities here, backwards and forwards in time. Angels were believed to have been created in time. However, they were believed to potentially exist forever, immortal, eternal existence, in that forward direction. Having been created in time (generated), the angel should also be corruptible.
Proper "eternity" as defined by the cosmological argument is actual, so the potential for future existence cannot be proper to eternity, there must be actual future existence. This places "the eternal" as outside of time, because it cannot partake in the passing of time whatsoever, or else it would partake in the potential which is proper to "the future", in the passing of time.
Now we can look at time itself, and describe the two parts of time in distinct ways. The past is time which has already occurred, so it has actual existence, and the future has not yet occurred, and due to contingency, the time of the future is potential time. The eternal is an actuality which has been, and forever will be, on the future side of the present, it can never cross that boundary into being something which has actually occurred, because this would put it into the temporal, when it must be purely, and absolutely atemporal. This is why it can never be a physical existent, nor can it ever be empirically "observed", because observation is of things passing into the past. . So while we relate to the things of the future as potentialities, as things which have not yet occurred, the eternal is a necessary actuality, in the future, but it is something which will never actually occur, because this would negate its essence as eternal.
The aeviternal, angels, are necessary to account for the common materialist, or physicalist argument that the eternal cannot interact with the temporal. The angels have providence over the created, temporal world. Being created as immaterial, the essence of their existence is as an actuality, in the future, just like the eternal, but these are like Neo-Platonic Forms, having been created, therefore not truly eternal, their existence as a future actuality, is limited by their manifestation within the temporal world of the past. In other words, the angels share their actuality between future and past, such that they are not truly eternal, (outside of time), but since they have an actuality on the future side of the present, they partake in the realm of the eternal.
First and foremost, an object is a unity, this is described in your passage from Nonin-roshi. We see things as objects, unities, but it is our perceptual system which presents us with the unities which we see. You might see a mountain, while another might see numerous rocks, and trees and such. We see a river, we don't see a bunch of individual molecules interacting. Our perceptual systems in some sense "choose" which unities will be present to our minds, as individual objects.
At a second level, we create intelligible objects, ideas, and concepts. These are also unities, but the elements which are brought together in union, to produce these, are deep within the soul, and not well understood. The intelligible objects are no less objects than the phenomenal objects, because both are created within the mind of the living being and both are unities..
But if we turn back to the external world now, the mountains, rivers, trees, and such things are really out there, there is something real about them which makes us perceive them as the objects which we do instead of as something else. This is the form. But the form is intelligible only, so it is the intelligible aspect of the external, physical world, which causes us to perceive, through sensation, the unities which we do. Now the unity of the physical, material, objects, the mountains etc., which we assume to exist as objects, has been reduced to an intelligible object, a Form, like an idea, or concept. Since an object is first and foremost a unity, and a unity is an intelligible object, or Form, then it is very consistent to refer to the Deity, which is an immaterial Form, as an object. This is why the Deity is sometimes referred to as the One.Quoting Wayfarer
But the point which I was making is also made here as well. This is not "unknowable" in any absolute sense. The "unknowability" is due to a deficiency in the particular intellect which is attempting to know, not due to the Deity itself being unknowable. The Deity is actually supremely knowable. So for example, if you tried to teach advanced mathematics to dogs, and found that the dogs could not learn this math, you might conclude that advanced mathematics is unknowable. But this is not really the case. What is really the case is that the intellects of the dogs are not capable of knowing the advanced math, but the advanced math is still very knowable. So we have the same situation between human beings and God, the human beings are incapable of knowing God, but this does not make God unknowable, God is still highly knowable, but the human intellect is deficient
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, I agree, I think this is exactly the key point. Knowledge evolves, and as we make advancements, our perspective naturally changes along with those changes. So something which is currently unknowable, due to our limited perspective, might in the future become knowable from a new perspective. And something which we thought we knew in the past might prove to be false.
And, the problem of false knowledge is very real, and much more difficult and complex to deal with than simply an advancing perspective. The false knowledge must be expelled, and it isn't necessarily expelled by replacing it with new knowledge, because sometimes it is deeply entrenched. This we can see with ancient cosmology and astrology. The problem is that the false knowledge works for making predictions, but it does not provide an understanding of the phenomena being predicted. Since it works, it becomes pervasive. Remember, Thales predicted a solar eclipse, but the proper orbits of the solar system were not understood. Such deeply entrenched, pervasive false knowledge must be expelled and completely forgotten about, because it is so highly distracting to the pursuit of advanced principles.
...for one willing to die for it!
This is really a discussion about the nature of knowledge. I think there is a distinction to be made between 'mundane knowledge' and 'supramundane insight'. That is not something peculiar to Christian philosophy, either, which is why I brought in Ven. Nonin. The Buddhist philosophy of 'two truths', conventional and mundane, echoes the same understanding you find in Eriugena. Alas, by the late Middle Ages, I think that 'perspectival' insight was to become lost; hence much of our current perplexity.
We notice that positivism as a paradigmatic mode, wishes to limit all discussion to provable propositions. Verificationism, they call it. But during subsequent debates, it became clear that 'the principle of verificationism' could not by verified by it's own criterion! My delightful philosophy professor, David Stove, used to compare positivism to the Uroboros, the snake that consumes itself. 'The hardest thing', he would say, 'is the last bite!'
That article I pointed to above is really worth perusing, if you haven't done so. It is on the blog of a self-described 'eclectic orthodox theologian', Father Aiden Kimel, whose essays I am sure you would like. The post in question enlarges on this question of the nature of knowledge in respect of the Divine:
I find echoes of that in the Taoist 'he that knows it, knows it not'. And actually, it's really not mysterious! Because what all that is about, is 'awakening to the heart', which means become aware of what is usually ignored, which can only be known in meditation. But even when you know it, you don't know it.
But I do find points of agreement with the above.
With which I can only agree. I have often said, I don't believe in a God.
You know, we all die, it's sure to come about whether you will it or not.
Quoting Wayfarer
Could you explain what you mean here, isn't the conventional the mundane? What's supramundane?
This is actually a problem which we have with most words, we don't really know what they mean. We know how to use the words, and do use them quite intelligibly, but when asked what the word actually means, we are often at a lose to provide a coherent explanation. What happens is that when we use the word in common usage, there is usually a clear referent, a thing which is being referred to. So we really don't need to know what the word means, as long as we know what the thing is which is being referred to by the word. When we use words in common practise we know the referent, not the meaning.
Take the word "chair" for instance. There is no doubt in my mind, that you and I would each produce a different definition of what that word means, therefore we don't really know what the word means. However, we can both competently use the word, and know what each other is saying, because we would be using it to refer to a particular chair, and this would be obvious.
Why do you not believe that the same is the case for the word "God"? We probably wouldn't produce the same definition of "God", so we don't really know what the word actually means, just like other words. But when we use the word, we know what the thing is which is being referred to, so we can all use the word competently. How is this any different from any other word? In fact, as long as we all agree that there is only one thing which could possibly be referred to by this word, than it is de facto impossible that one could be confused as to what the referent is. Then it really doesn't matter what the word "God" means, because it doesn't have a meaning, it just has a referent. And just like if we were sitting in a room talking about the chair in the corner of the room, the meaning of "chair" is irrelevant, because we both know the referent.
Perhaps Aquinas' most famous line is that God is a being whose existence is His essence. Therefore there is really nothing to say about what God is, except that God is.
My point is a somewhat Wittgensteinian one - we are lulled into thinking we understand something by the habitual way in which we talk about it. That is why when the word 'God' is bandied about, it lulls us into thinking we really know what we're talking about, when what we really are talking about is a mysterium tremendum et fascinans which, according to the book from which that term is taken, ought to make the hair on the back of your neck stand up.
With tables and chairs and the furniture of common discourse, whereas philosophers might wish to make these appear more mysterious than they are, we both know what is meant by them. Chairs are for sittting on, tables for eating off. But when it comes to the 'ground of being', as soon as the term enters into discourse via a conglomerate of images and connotations, then it's already a form of idolatory - hence that quote from McCabe above. It is a case of 'familiarity breeding contempt'. I think it's important to acknowledge that in this matter, we really don't know what we mean, that words are simply signs or 'fingers pointing at the moon'. Otherwise the divine is reduced to the term in an argument, which is precisely what has happened in most discourse about it.
Yes I do consider something approximating aerviternal, with beings performing acts equivalent to angels. For me this is manifest as an army of such beings attending to your every move*. But in a removed(veiled) sense, as if one is on an operating table with a team of light beings working on the mechanics of your being. This can also be seen as a multidimensional now, in which there is an eternal moment** and an eternity of such beings as a firmanent, inside the very being of each of us. Something which is difficult to convey.
*By an army of beings in attendance, I am referring, perhaps to nature spirits, the beings forming the many and diverse kingdoms of nature.
**in this eternal moment, I see like a hub, or interchange between all moments, wherein they are the one moment.
More precisely, the schema I described has the eternal never passing into the past. That is how it is outside of time. Imagine that we always experience time at the present, such that we observe things as they pass into the past. Now consider that there is something which always remains prior to this, so that it never passes into the past, and we never observe it. We know it is there due to the logical necessity of arguments like the cosmological argument.
Do you recognize, that due to the nature of free will, it is necessary to conclude that the entirety of what we call "the physical world", must come into existence at every moment of the present, as time passes? Free will allows us to make substantial changes to the physical world, at any moment of the present. Because anything in the physical world can be changed at any random moment of the present, we can conclude that no aspect of the physical world exists prior to the present. Therefore the entire physical world comes into existence at each moment of the present. The future is present to us, as a complete void of nothingness in front of us. I think of it as a wall in front of me, one which prevents me from doing anything, or even seeing anything, on the other side, because I have a physical body, and no physical existence can be on that other side.
However, we experience a continuity of existence. We see objects and activities, and notice that their existence continues in a very consistent manner, which we can predict, despite the fact that all physical existence must come into being anew, at every moment of the present. This continuity is described by Newton's first law, the law of inertia. The fact that an existing thing will continue to exist, as it has in the past, indicates that when the thing comes into existence at each moment of the present, something must cause it to come into existence in a way which is consistent with how it came into existence at the last moment, and in the past in general. We can refer to Neo-Platonic Forms as the cause of such continuity, what causes an object to come into existence in the way it does, at each moment.
Quoting Punshhh
If we assume, as I described, that the physical world comes into existence at each moment, then willful actions can be understood as an altering of the Forms which dictate the way that the world will come into existence. So I don't assume "an army of such beings", as you describe, I think there is simply subtle differences to the way that the brain and nervous system materializes at each moment, as time passes, and these subtle changes result in the parts of your body materializing in slightly different places (movement). What causes these differences in the first place is the immaterial form, the soul, operating within those Forms.
This is somewhat contrary to Newton's first law. This law states that a body will not change its direction of movement unless acted upon by a force. It is generally assumed that the force must be of an external origin. But here we have an internal source. So the immaterial Forms, which dictate how the body will come into existence at each moment, act from the inside of the body, producing a continuity described by the law. The willing agent has the power to alter these Forms from within, influencing the way that the body will come into existence at each moment.
If we consider the necessity of such Forms, we can see that each and every body must have a Form particular to itself. Massive bodies such as planets, stars, and galaxies, have Forms which we as human beings cannot alter. We only have the capacity to alter the Forms of tiny bodies. Nevertheless, since we understand that all physical existence is similar, we must conclude that these massive bodies come into existence at each moment of time as well, and are therefore governed by Forms. From here we can produce something like the emanation of Plotinus. There is first, the Form of One which dictates the mass of the entire universe as it comes into existence at each moment of time. The smaller masses are subsequent in the emanation, with the Forms of the smallest particles of matter having the least influence. The power of God's will is to produce the Form of One, the power of the human being's will is to produce the Forms of the smallest particles of matter.
Quoting Wayfarer
I have little sympathy for Wittgenstein. Where in "On Certainty" he assumes that there is a point where doubt becomes unreasonable, I am one to contest this. Wittgenstein argues that knowledge can only proceed from a foundation of certainty. We must have certainty with respect to what words mean, in order that we can proceed to have knowledge. But his argument is circular, we are certain about these things because we take them for granted, yet he insists that we must take them for granted (i.e. it is unreasonable to doubt them) because we are certain about them. So not only are we "lulled into thinking we understand something by the habitual way in which we talk about it", as you say, but he argues that we are "certain" about these things, and it is unreasonable to doubt these things. These things, which are unreasonable to doubt, (and they are unreasonable to doubt simply because of that habit), these certainties, form the foundation, the base our entire knowledge.
Quoting Wayfarer
My point is, that this is not only true about the word "God", it is true about any word, even the foundational ones which massive structures of knowledge are based on. These include words like "universe", "sun", "earth", "matter". We use them in a way which is indicative of the knowledge which we have. But all of these words we can doubt. Do we really understand what the universe is, or what the sun is, or even the earth, or matter? The ancient people thought they knew what the sun and the earth were, but they didn't understand the relationship at all, without an understanding of the solar system. So they really didn't know what the sun was, or the earth, and quite possibly (I would say probably), we still don't. To this day, we say that the sun rises and sets, and that's really how we perceive it. When I see the sun out there, moving through the sky, I'm not imagining all these spinning, and circular motions which the science describes. And even if I did, how would I know that it's really the best description of these things?
Quoting Wayfarer
But I think we know just as well, if not better, what is meant by "God", as by "chair". God is the creator of all existence. But what's a chair, something you sit on, something with legs? Either word, God or chair, all we need is simple agreement on what we are talking about, and there is no problem. The thing is, that there are a whole lot of words which we do not have such simple agreement. Now, with the decline of religion, "God" has become one of them.
Notice how my position differs from yours. You think, like Wittgenstein, that we have certainty about certain words, and we have built knowledge on that certainty. I think that such certainty is an illusion, we've been lulled into assuming certainty, when it's really like a false bravado, a certitude. Furthermore, I think that we can take a word like "God", and define that word very simply, like "creator of all existence", and be very certain of the meaning of that word, because the meaning is produced by that definition. All this requires is to agree on the definition. In this case, we know that the certainty is a function of the definition, such that the certainty only exists so long as the definition is adhered to.
1. whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. the universe began to exist
3. therefore the universe has a cause of its existence
And:
1. whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. causation began to exist
3. therefore causation has a cause of its existence
The 1[sup]st[/sup] premises are the same. This latter argument is clearly nonsense, violates identity (the 1st law). Causation is one more cause than causation...?
So what's the difference anyway? Well, the difference is the application of the 1[sup]st[/sup] premise, and the implications thereof, of which 3 is wrong here. The "whatever" part is a generic wildcard. The analysis, then, is that the 1[sup]st[/sup] premise must be delineated, it's applicability is not unconditional, not just anything can replace "whatever". Before applying the 1[sup]st[/sup] premise, the application to whatever it's being applied to, must be justified. (And, towards that, keep mentioned quantum phenomena and expansion of the universe, in mind.)
As shown, if spacetime and causation are aspects of the universe, then 1 cannot be applied to the universe, the universe cannot take "whatever"'s place.
I just got an email about the latest Closer to Truth interview series, on Why Cosmic Fine-Tuning Demands Explanation (haven't watched it yet). Also went to a book launch recently on the same topic (by two physicists).
It seems a related argument to the Cosmological argument, except for instead of 'cause' it is talking about 'order' - why do natural laws exist? How come the Universe is such that matter, stars, life, exist when it might easily not be that way? What is the cause of the order?
That seems close to the question you're asking. And your answer here is, order itself is something which pre-supposes 'something to be ordered'. Order is only a meaningful concept when something already exists.
If that is what you're arguing, I think the subtle point you're missing is that your view of 'causality' amounts to what Aristoteleanism would call the 'efficient cause', i.e. the kinds of causes that can be described in terms of series of antecedent factors giving rise to some effect. So in that context, you're correct, there can't be any sense of 'cause' outside those that can be observed in the Universe.
But the metaphysical notion of 'first cause' is more like 'why did order arise from chaos in the first place?' It's more like: how can there be sequences of events that gave rise to causal relations (among other things)?
The fine-tuning arguments are about the fact that were any one of a very small set of 'fundamental constraints' even slightly different, then order would not have arisen at all. So it appears as though the 'game is rigged' (in Fred Hoyle's phrase) in such a way that stars>matter>life were woven into the equations from the get-go. In other words, the constraints precede what we perceive as phenomena.
Of course, 'natural theology' will be inclined to answer that this is because 'God made it so'. And the response to that from 'natural science' is, well, we can't have that, because it suggests something outside science, and, after all, that is what we're trying to avoid.
This appears to concede that 'chance' is not a feasible argument, due to the very small likelihoods involved. But multiplying universes indefinitely, one gives a much bigger field for chance to work with, so to speak. This is a suprisingly common rationale for the so-called 'multiverse' conjecture.
I think that a kind of open-minded agnosticism is the best attitude - there are obviously many large imponderables in these questions. But I also think there's a big problem in trying to 'explain laws'. Many things can be explained on the basis of scientific laws, but now the attitude seems to be, if we can infer what is at the basis of these laws, then we will (to use Hawking's memorable phrase) 'know the mind of God'. So I do wonder whether this amounts to a kind of 'reverse engineering of reality' enterprise. And about that I'm very dubious.
The latter argument is nonsense only because you make a category error. The first premise "whatever begins to exist...", refers to particular things. "Causation" refers to a concept, a generality. So the first premise is meant to read "any particular thing which begins to exist...", and you are replacing "any particular thing" with a generality, a universal, or concept, "causation", which, because it is an abstraction is not a particular thing. So you have committed a category error.
Craig does not delineate the "whatever" (wild-card) in the 1[sup]st[/sup] premise thus, but it seems you do.
I'm guessing Craig would hang causation on his deity of choice all the same (God "caused" it all).
Can you specify accurately how you delineate the "whatever" then? (The universe yes, spatiality ?, time ?, causation no, "whatever" else ?)
A per this old post, we know plenty concrete about causation already (including quantifiable).
In terms of ordinary ontology, the "whatever" part would, presumably, apply not just to object-likes, but also process-likes, collections of causal chains included.
Craig implicitly extends causation beyond the universe, and thus have to justify this before applying the 1[sup]st[/sup] premise to the universe.
I don't accept Craig's formulation, partly due to this ambiguity. In other versions that I have read the authors are clear to distinguish between material objects and immaterial concepts. Craig does not seem to do this, so we have ambiguity as to whether "whatever" refers to just material objects, or to immaterial as well as material objects.
Quoting jorndoe
Again, I do not agree with the way that Craig extends causation beyond the limits of the physical universe without providing a clear distinction between efficient causation and final causation.
Quoting jorndoe
I assume causation to be a temporal term. To say that something is a cause, is to give temporal priority to it. Physical, or material existence, is existence which we describe with spatial reference. If there is a cause of all physical (spatial) existence, this implies that there is time prior to physical existence.