Can Belief Be Moral?
Is belief, or the linguistic expression thereof, the sort of thing that can be moral or immoral, or would that be a category error? It has come to my attention that at least a few people on this forum believe that belief and/or speech is not moral or immoral, but actions [i]are[/I].
Although I agree that actions can correctly be categorised as moral or immoral, I don't agree that this doesn't similarly apply to certain beliefs or certain statements.
On the contrary, it is evident through observation that this is something that we all do, frequently; even on this very forum. So it seems a bit farfetched, at least on the face of it, to suggest that we do so erroneously.
We've all been offended at one time or another because of something that someone has said or because of someones expressed belief which we find objectionable. Conversely, we've all found something that someone has said praiseworthy, or some belief that someone has expressed to be admirable. The simple explanation, which also happens to be the one that I find the most plausible, is that this is because some beliefs are wrong, and ought to be eschewed and condemned, and others are right, and ought to be accepted and promoted.
Can anyone, without being intellectually dishonest, claim to find no belief (or statement of belief) right or wrong? Would you pass the test if this were put to practice, in a real life situation, if you were caught off-guard?
I think that the answer to both of those questions is no, not likely.
Although I agree that actions can correctly be categorised as moral or immoral, I don't agree that this doesn't similarly apply to certain beliefs or certain statements.
On the contrary, it is evident through observation that this is something that we all do, frequently; even on this very forum. So it seems a bit farfetched, at least on the face of it, to suggest that we do so erroneously.
We've all been offended at one time or another because of something that someone has said or because of someones expressed belief which we find objectionable. Conversely, we've all found something that someone has said praiseworthy, or some belief that someone has expressed to be admirable. The simple explanation, which also happens to be the one that I find the most plausible, is that this is because some beliefs are wrong, and ought to be eschewed and condemned, and others are right, and ought to be accepted and promoted.
Can anyone, without being intellectually dishonest, claim to find no belief (or statement of belief) right or wrong? Would you pass the test if this were put to practice, in a real life situation, if you were caught off-guard?
I think that the answer to both of those questions is no, not likely.
Comments (99)
Further, there are opportunities that will be lost where belief itself is put on trial. In order to engage others in an exchange of ideas, it will be necessary to allow free expression.
Do the connotations of 'wrong' mean that most people are unable to effectively differentiate the two. Is there any real distinction between wrong as a matter of fact and wrong in a moral sense?
Can people help what they believe? If not can they be held morally responsible for beliefs that are wrong (in either sense)? Clearly if they act on those beliefs in manners which break the law they can and must be held legally responsible but, morally responsible?
Is belief changeable? If not is there any point to condmenation or protest of beliefs? If so, are we just replacing one brainwashing with another albeit one with the official stamp of approval from the Good Belief Advisory Council?
Is there not a sense in which all belief good,, bad, or indifferent is morally questionable given that it must involve at least some conclusions based on facts not in evidence?
And that's just in the five minuted between reading this and taking the dog out for her final urination of the day! Who knows what I'll have come up with by tomorrow?
No, it's not that black-and-white. There can be a combination of the two, and varying degrees of each. For example, I take responsibility for some of my awful teenage views. I wasn't exactly forced into having such a bad attitude. Sure, I was more naïve, more immature, and more easily influenced, but deep down I knew right from wrong, and chose to be rebellious and bury my conscience when it became an inconvenience.
Quoting Mongrel
I've not argued against freedom of expression - although, as with most things, there will likely be consequences. But freedom of expression is a red herring. The issue in this discussion is whether or not it is correct to categorise or judge beliefs, or the expression thereof, as right or wrong - whether that even makes sense, or is a category error. Whether we [i]should[/I] judge beliefs is a different question (although in general, I'd answer in the affirmative).
The two different senses can certainly be linked, can correlate, and even perhaps be conflated by some people in some cases... but most people, I think, can clearly distinguish between them both abstractly in themselves and by example. People understand the difference in meaning, and can differentiate between that which is factually incorrect (e.g. that the Earth is flat) and that which is immoral (e.g. child abuse).
Quoting Barry Etheridge
It's complicated, but in at least some cases, I think that we do have some control over how our beliefs are formed or determined, and sometimes that can be enough to alter our beliefs. It's about culpability, and there are various factors which play into that, such as age, for example.
Quoting Barry Etheridge
Depends. Can you change the belief that you're alive? Personally, I find that belief of mine practically impossible to change. I cannot change it by will power or attempts at self-deception, nor has anyone succeeded in convincing me otherwise. But not all beliefs are like that. Our beliefs [i]have[/I] changed over time - some of them at least. And we have some influence or control over our circumstances which lead to the formation of beliefs, if not direct influence or control over our beliefs themselves.
Quoting Barry Etheridge
My previous answers provide an answer to this also, namely that there can be, and almost always is, a point to condemnation and protest of beliefs. But if the aim is to alter said belief, then there is no guarantee of success, nor even in some cases is it likely. But this can't be crudely equated with brainwashing. It's a bit more nuanced than that.
Quoting Barry Etheridge
Sure. Absolute certainty is rare, if even achievable. We are fallible by nature and not omniscient. We don't always have access to [i]all[/I] of the facts or available evidence - in fact, we rarely do.
Are you asking whether it can be immoral to hold beliefs that immoral acts are good, such as, for example, that it is good to rape and murder infants?
Or are you asking whether it can be immoral to hold certain beliefs that are not themselves beliefs about moral or ethical matters at all?
No, not specifically.
Quoting John
No. Again, that wasn't the question. I'm assuming an ethical context, or at least what would appear to be an ethical context. I accept that some beliefs are amoral, but the question is whether belief itself is, by virtue of being belief, not the sort of thing that can be moral or immoral in [i]any[/I] context.
Quoting Ovaloid
Quoting Mongrel
Quoting Sapientia
Quoting Michael
Quoting Terrapin Station
Quoting Ovaloid
I'd like to clarify: I meant matter-of-fact beliefs not attitudes.
Quoting Terrapin Station
What about the classic example of shouting 'fire!' in a crowded theatre?
Quoting Mongrel
Freedom in what ideas can be expressed, freedom in how they are expressed, neither or both?
I think yes about what ideas can be expressed but not about how they are expressed. I think it's good to moderate heated comments.
So, you are asking whether beliefs that are not acted upon can be immoral? Say someone believed that it was good to rape and murder infants; are you asking whether that belief is immoral even if the believer does not act on it, by for example raping and murdering infants or exhort others to do so?
If that is the question, then the answer might be that the belief is immoral only if it leads to an immoral action. And even then, it might be said that it is the action, not the belief per se that is immoral. On the other hand, according to the bible: " He who lusts after a women has already committed adultery with her in his heart". But then, is that holding a belief or entertaining a desire? Can desires, even if not acted upon, be immoral? If desires,per se, can be immoral, then why not beliefs?
Okay. So, does that mean that you believe that matter-of-fact beliefs can't be morally right or wrong? So, for example, if one believes that, as a matter of fact, rape is okay, or even good, then that isn't morally wrong? If so, that requires an explanation.
Quoting Ovaloid
Yes, that's wrong.
Quoting Ovaloid
I think that there is a red line which can be crossed in terms of both content and manner of expression, both in terms of morality and legality. And this is reflected in UK law, as well as here on the forum.
Is that even possible? Surely belief cannot ever be separated from action. At the very least, belief must moderate behaviour or it's not a genuine belief at all. If I believe that cuckoo clocks are a major health hazard, can I nevertheless enter a clock shop with complete ease? If I believe that atheists are going to Hell, can I have any kind of relationship with one that is completely unaffected?
Yes. I think that it's still a bad thing to believe. The belief itself is immoral. The believer should not have that belief. It is wrong to believe that it's good to rape and murder infants. That's not likely to be just an innocent mistake either; it is immoral.
Even in the unrealistic and improbable hypothetical scenario that the believer does not act on it, by, for example, raping and murdering infants or exhorting others to do so, it is still damaging in terms of virtue or how infants should be understood.
It's a very scratched, dull, and cracked mirror then!
Not necessarily, but only if one is culpable. And there can be mitigating circumstances. But in some cases, yes.
What's the difference between being culpable for having a false moral belief and not being culpable?
Moral responsibility. The former has it, whereas the latter lacks it.
Yes, in reality, beliefs affect people, even if not in terms of actions you might expect to see as a result, or in terms of any (external) action at all, but rather psychologically.
Well, there are [url=http://www.civilrightsmovement.co.uk/right-freedom-speech.html] legal exceptions[/URL] based on ethical reasoning, whether you agree with them or not. And the U.K. is much better in terms of freedom of speech and expression than many, many other places around the world.
It can be complex. But, for example, usually children aren't as morally responsible as adults with full mental capacity. So, that's two factors: age and mental capacity.
So it's immoral for an adult with full mental capacity to have a false moral belief?
Then can you give me an example of an immoral false moral belief and a not-immoral false moral belief (assuming an adult with full mental capacities)?
Sure. I mentioned one already. When I attended secondary school, I was at times judgemental and abusive without good reason, and I believed that that was okay. I was culpable for that, although there were some mitigating factors.
But if I was, say, six-years-old, and I didn't really know any better, and my single parent mother hadn't put much effort into teaching me right from wrong, then I wouldn't be culpable for that wrong belief about acceptable ways of treating others.
The former is morally wrong on two accounts: the irresponsibility of the agent as well as the belief itself; and the latter is morally wrong on just one: the belief itself.
Sigh. Your edit was too late! :D
So you are saying that it is immoral to have a false moral belief? It's just that the character of the person determines the severity of the immorality?
OK, so you're drawing a distinction between a person being immoral and a belief being immoral such that a person can have an immoral belief but not be immoral?
Then to rephrase my original question: you're suggesting that a false moral belief is immoral? For any x, if "x is (im)moral" is false then the belief that x is (im)moral is immoral?
Yes.
Quoting Michael
An immoral belief is immoral. There might well be exceptions to the way that you've worded it. A false moral belief isn't necessarily immoral, just false. But at least some false moral beliefs are immoral.
So what factors determine whether or not a belief is immoral?
So how have you determined that the belief "racism is acceptable" is immoral and not just false?
The same factors which determine whether we should or shouldn't believe something (in an ethical context). For example, we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable for a number of reasons: because people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis, and because of the detrimental consequences it would likely bring about, and because it would be indicative of vice, and because we wouldn't want to be considered in that way...
Quoting Michael
See the above.
This just seems like you're saying that the belief is immoral because it's false. The belief that racism is acceptable is immoral because racism isn't acceptable.
It might seem like that to you. It doesn't seem like that to me. That clearly isn't what I said.
Surely "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on [the basis of their race]" just means "racism isn't acceptable". Therefore, we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable because racism isn't acceptable. And given that this is the same factor which determines whether or not a belief is immoral, the belief that racism is acceptable is immoral because racism isn't acceptable. Therefore, the belief is immoral because it's false.
No, they don't mean the same thing, although the latter follows from the former.
Quoting Michael
No, because they don't mean the same thing.
Quoting Michael
The belief is immoral because it's false in addition to other reasons I've mentioned, which you've hardly addressed. You've addressed a single reason, and failed to conflate or reduce it to mere falsity.
What's your point?
Then what does "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on the basis of their race" mean if not "it is unacceptable to devalue people of other races on the basis of their race"?
OK, so let's look at the others:
1)
A false moral belief is immoral if it is likely to bring about detrimental consequences?
2)
A false moral belief is immoral if it would be indicative of vice?
3)
A false moral belief is immoral if we wouldn't want to be considered in that way?
This one doesn't make much sense, so I assume it's supposed to be part of 2), giving
4)
A false moral belief is immoral if it indicates a vice that we don't want to be considered as having?
That's not what I think is a matter-of-fact belief.
I'll make it clear for you. In my view (using race as the example because that was the original one):
I'm sorry if it wasn't clear enough in the beginning.
But the first sort of belief would include belief in offensive racial stereotypes, which is morally wrong.
First, it might be worth saying what I think morality/ethics is. So here's my ethics in a nutshell, quoting myself:
So while I personally do not morally judge any mere beliefs or speech acts, I wouldn't say that no one does, or that the people who do are committing a category error. Something I do judge is people morally judging mere beliefs or speech acts, although I wouldn't say that I morally judge them. What I do rather is make judgments about what I take to be an uncomfortableness with difference, a desire to control others in detail, and so on, depending on the situation.
Regarding offense. I do not see being offended as a moral issue. And I always think that people who are offended are the people with a problem that needs to be worked on rather than the person who they took to be offensive. There are a number of reasons for this, including that the idea of offense doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me in the first place. I look at it this way: what someone says one either agrees with--they either feel the same way or they also believe that it's true, or one disagrees and doesn't feel the same way/doesn't believe that what the person said is true. There's no need to be offended in any of those cases. Obviously, it would be odd to be offended if one agrees. If one disagrees, if it's a matter of feeling and not a factual claim, it's important to be able to be comfortable with different people feeling different ways. If it's a factual claim, then why be upset that someone simply has an incorrect belief about a factual matter? Maybe you can lead them to a correct belief, maybe they're at least temporarily not intellectually capable of coming to a correct belief about that matter. Whatever the case, there's no need to be upset about it.
If one is bothered instead by the fact that someone doesn't like oneself, that someone has malicious feelings towards oneself, etc., one needs to learn to cope with that. No matter what you do, it's going to be the case that not everyone likes you. You can't have anxiety or whatever just in case not everyone likes you. You have to get used to that fact, because it's going to be unavoidable. Some personalities are just going to clash. The thing to do is to try to be as laissez-faire about that as one can be (especially when we're just talking about beliefs and speech acts, which is what we're doing).
I'm never offended by any beliefs or any speech/expression, and I'm a free speech absolutist. For example, I'm not offended by the fact that you said, "We've all been offended at one time or another . . . " which is an incorrect belief about a factual matter. It wouldn't make any sense to me to be offended by you having an incorrect belief about a factual matter. Maybe I can lead you to a correct belief. Maybe, at least at the moment, you're not capable of coming to a correct belief about it. If anything, perhaps I should be concerned if you're not capable of coming to a correct belief about it, but sometimes there isn't anything one can do to help others in that regard. One has to be able to just let it go. There's no need to introduce more stress into one's life just because not everyone can be helped in some ideal way.
You ask, "Can anyone, without being intellectually dishonest, claim to find no belief (or statement of belief) right or wrong?" Yes. I'd be intellectually dishonest, rather, if I were to say that I find some beliefs or any expression morally right or wrong. "Would you pass the test if this were put to practice, in a real life situation, if you were caught off-guard?" Yes, certainly.
It's not morally wrong to think that Asians are good at math. It's a stereotype that will be confirmed by some Asians you meet and disconfirmed by others. To the extent that you demonstrate to Asians in your environment that you see them through a lens of stereotype, you broadcast: "I don't see you, I just see a cartoon version of you."
My experience with Asian-Asians is that even if they're put off by that, they won't say anything. American-Asians are pretty much guaranteed to put it out there that you're being racist. I think most of them do that because they think its funny.
If, on the other hand, you point out that most top-level basketball players are black, most people in your environment are going to wonder what your point is. That there are differences between blacks and whites is a pretty radioactive topic in my culture. That's because we all sit on a giant wound in varying stages of healing. At some point in the future when it's finally healed, we'll be able to address that kind of thing.
Some people do morally judge beliefs or expression. There are no facts whether one should judge beliefs or expression. So there is no correct or incorrect stance on this.
I think people vary in that. It's not really a matter of taking in more data to see the person behind the face, skin-color, religion, gender, etc. I've wondered over the years what exactly it is. It's something you can shift in and out of... seeing the living, breathing, being that animates the form versus seeing mainly the form.
1. I don't think that it makes any sense whatsoever to refrain from judging any belief or statement solely on the basis that it is a belief or a statement. The content matters, and it can be appropriate and right to judge it, and we're free to do so.
2. Judgment and belief are linked. That you morally judge others for judging beliefs indicates to me that you believe it to be morally objectionable, despite your denial of the moral implications and insistence of amorality. This in turn implies that you judge others for an alleged fault of which you yourself are guilty.
3. Offence is, by it's very nature, a moral issue. It implies, or consists of, moral objection. So, how can it not be? Your point about placing the blame on the person being offended - in some cases, the victim - is shallow and one-sided, and only applies to some, but not all, cases. Often, it is the person being offensive, or judged to be offensive, who is at least partially to blame. It's silly and inconsiderate to say that there's no need to get upset about it, when you should know full well that we don't have full control over our emotions.
4. I don't for a second believe that you're never offended by any beliefs or any speech/expression.
5. It is indeed a correct belief that, as a matter of fact, we've all been offended at one time or another, and it would be ludicrous to deny, except to point out trivial exceptions like those who didn't survive for long enough after birth, but that obviously isn't what I was getting at.
6. Regarding the tests I referred to: I think that you'd definitely, at some point, fail the second one about practising what you preach. However, you might pass, or have already passed, the first test about intellectual honestly, but honest and intelligent people can still be mistaken, and mistaken without realising it, and in this case, in the relevant respect, I think that you are one such person.
That you rightly qualify with "some" and "most" and "in my experience" and "I think" is telling, and flies in the face of your first sentence. It can, in some situations, be morally wrong.
That doesn't make sense, since [i]whether[/I] it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression is not a statement, but the issue under discussion. You can say that it's a category error to morally judge beliefs or expression, but I think that you'd be the one making the error.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yes, they do.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Even if not, I don't think that that makes the debate redundant or refutes my position.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That only follows if facts about whether one should judge beliefs or expression are the only valid means of determining correctness or incorrectness, which is arguable, and which I dispute.
By this do you mean you endorse some form of objective morality, where actions,beliefs,etc can be "correctly categorised" in a manner independent of the person doing the categorising?
Not objective morality, but objective or inter-subjective categorisation regarding morality. Just as you'd be mistaken to categorise, say, a wardrobe, as the sort of thing that can be moral or immoral, you could be mistaken about whether beliefs are the sort of thing that can correctly or appropriately be categorised as moral or immoral. Even if you personally exclude beliefs as inapplicable, it still makes sense to question why, and test whether that coheres or fits in well with how we think, and judge, and what we know and observe, and how we speak, and how we feel, and whether it's counterintuitive, or whether we're missing something important or useful or essential. You can be wrong in that sense at the very least.
It means what it says. It's prescriptive, a bit like an instruction, whereas the latter is descriptive. It's not redundant or viciously circular to say, for example, "You shouldn't do that here because it's unacceptable".
Quoting Michael
When you said "let's look at the others", to be honest, I expected a bit more than just a repetition of what I said with a question mark attached.
Quoting Michael
It does, and it wasn't part of 2). It was a reference to the Golden Rule, or a variation of it, which I thought you'd pick up on.
So "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis" means "don't devalue people of other races on that basis"?
Then when you say "we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable ... because people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis" you're saying "we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable ... because don't devalue people of other races on that basis", which doesn't make sense.
I'm double-checking that I've interpreted you correctly.
I see, so you're saying that a false moral belief is immoral if we wouldn't want others to have this same false moral belief about us?
I've spent as little time as possible working in my region's intensive care burn unit, but just enough to be able to assert pretty confidently that skin color isn't what a person is.
There is some metaphysics to how the same person can take a number of different forms. I'm into Leibniz's views these days.
My own view has something to do with how I understand love. Love isn't friendly. It's not a matter of wanting to make somebody happy. Love is how you see the person behind the face. Love conquers racism. There are two viewpoints which would contradict me on that... the view that a person is their skin color and self-anti-realism. It never ceases to crack me up when a self-anti-realist proposes to teach other people about racism. Jesus...
What I mean, is a more general question:
Do you think that anything (may it be actions,wardrobes,whatever you name) could be categorized as moral or immoral in an objective way?
No, that isn't what it means, but that is what it conveys, or at least something similar. It's difficult to explain, and its use is fairly unique. I don't know why you think it necessary to attempt to equate it with something similar and related in meaning but distinct and nonidentical. These are words, phrases and statements that you use all the time in common parlance, so you must surely have some understanding of their meaning, and be able to spot the difference.
Quoting Michael
Yes, they obviously don't mean the same thing and can't be interchanged without altering the meaning. I never claimed otherwise, I just said that that sort of statement is prescriptive, or has a prescriptive element. Do you disagree? If so, how about [I]you[/I] explain to me the meaning of that sort of statement.
Quoting Michael
Ok, but it wasn't so much a reiteration as a repetition, and seemed unnecessary, with the exception of the last one you addressed.
Quoting Michael
It can be. I'm not going to rule out the possibility of exceptions, but that is one reason that can be used to justify the claim that a particular false moral belief is immoral.
I don't buy (logical) identity through time (or identity in the indiscernibles sense) as anything other than an abstract way of thinking about things. Me at time T1 is not identical to me at time T2. The "two mes" are causally and contiguously etc. connected, but not identical.
Seems like kind of a side-issue to me. Analytical philosophers stipulate. Phenomenologists refer to their own experiences. If we-none-of-us thought there might be room for improvement in our calculations, we wouldn't bother seeking out discussion, would we?
Just based on what I understand about the nature of assertion and morality, beliefs aren't virtue-apt.
I just made that up. Virtue-apt.
Quoting Terrapin Station
But we weren't talking about that until you changed the subject. As can be seen, although you have taken my quote out of its context, I was talking about the consequences which [i]would[/I] (likely) be brought about [i]as a result of beliefs[/I].
Sure. I'm familiar with that view. My question about it would be whether it runs aground in the face of something like GE Moore's thoughts about common sense. You may say you don't recognize contiguity past to future, but don't your actions contradict that sentiment?
Sentences of the sort "you shouldn't X" are only coherent if they mean either "don't X" or "X is against the rules" – otherwise they're simply vacuous.
It means either "don't be racist" or "racism is against the rules".
If there can be false moral beliefs that are not immoral even though we wouldn't want others to hold such beliefs about us then that we wouldn't want others to hold such beliefs about us isn't a condition that makes a belief immoral.
The only reason I can see for this, though, is because we fear the ramifications of a poor belief or desire the functionality of a good belief. Beliefs, in my opinion, are simply latent actions, or actions that have been repressed because of more dominating actions. They are desires and judgments that inherently have a motivational component to them - unrestrained, all beliefs lead to action.
Indeed if you're going to have a belief and yet not do anything, I would question your honesty or your will. Beliefs without actions are useless. What is scary about bad beliefs is that we can imagine what will happen if these beliefs are put into practice.
But I don't understand [i]why[/I] you feel that way, in spite of your explanation. They [I]do[/I] have to do with ethics, despite your personal feelings. Personal feelings can't invalidate the notable relationship between one and the other.
[I]"I believe that such-and-such is immoral for this, that, and the other."
"I object! You're wrong, such-and-such is perfectly acceptable because of x and y."[/I]
That is an uncontroversial example of ethical discourse.
You're an emotivist. We tend to feel strongly about certain ethical beliefs, like the belief that abortion is wrong, and we naturally react emotionally with approval or disapproval to those statements we are either strongly in favour of or against: your "Yay!" and "Boo!". So, the relevance of beliefs, and statements of belief, and their relationship with morality, can be accounted for according to your own meta-ethical framework.
Interesting. So, if we apply that interpretation, and go back to where we were beforehand, then... What was your query, again? What was it that you were objecting to?
You wanted to know the reasoning behind my belief that the belief that "racism is acceptable" is immoral, rather than just false. I then provided several reasons. You then focused on one of them and attempted to reduce it to "Racism is unacceptable because racism is unacceptable", and then, after a little prodding, proceeded to "look at" the rest. Then you questioned the meaning of "you shouldn't X", to which I replied that it's prescriptive, which you accept, given that your own interpretation is prescriptive.
So, where do we disagree?
Quoting Michael
Yes, that's logically valid. However, the premise is arguable. But the Golden Rule isn't essential to my reasoning. I was merely citing it as an example of a possible justification for why a belief is immoral.
Re quoting, I only quote the sentence(s), or even just the phrase(s), that I'm commenting on, so it's clear what I'm commenting on.
I care about behavior/action morally. Not beliefs/expression. So I care about something morally when it gets to the point that we're talking about behavior/action. Not prior to that.
Re Moore's comments, I'd have to review them.
You wanted to know the reasoning behind my belief that the belief that "racism is acceptable" is immoral, rather than just false. I then provided several reasons. You then focused on one of them and attempted to reduce it to "Racism is unacceptable because racism is unacceptable", and then, after a little prodding, proceeded to "look at" the rest. Then you questioned the meaning of "you shouldn't X", to which I replied that it's prescriptive, which you accept, given that your own interpretation is prescriptive.
So, where do we disagree?[/quote]
I asked what is required for a false moral belief to be immoral. One of your reasons was (paraphrased) "because we shouldn't be racist". But given that I'm saying "we shouldn't be racist" means "don't be racist" this amounts to "the belief is immoral because don't be racist", which isn't a coherent sentence. So we can cross off this proposed reason.
Then the claim "the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to have such a belief" doesn't work, given that the former doesn't follow from the latter. So we can cross off this proposed reason.
I meant that it can be the right thing to do. In other words, that it can be warranted, or that one would be justified in doing so. And I stand by that.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I know what you [i]said[/I]. I was taking about what you [I]do[/I], in spite of what you [I]say[/I]. I could similarly "point out" that I don't ever get emotional or that I never judge anyone for anything, ever... but that would be poppycock.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Language is communal. It makes a lot more sense for someone to appeal to common usage than to think up an idiosyncratic meaning. There are appropriate and inappropriate ways to think about it, and one can, if one so chooses, use that as a means of determining correctness.
Now, you can disagree as strongly as you like with my claim that offence is, by its nature, a moral issue, but this is common sense, and can be backed up by linguistic analysis and empirical observation.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Relativism is sensible up to a point, but beyond that point, it becomes unreasonable and can be frankly ridiculous.
"Well, [i]you[/I] might think about Earth as being spherical, and you're entitled to your opinion, but I think of it as being flat".
Quoting Terrapin Station
For someone who talks about feelings quite a lot, you aren't very sympathetic. Nor do you have a particularly attuned sense of injustice.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Sure, one can work on oneself to be less susceptible to taking offence; and where that can do good, I'm all in favour of it. Although it is practically impossible to be unoffendable, indefinitely. But I was objecting to your lack of empathy and your unqualified endorsement of a rash, harsh, and potentially counterproductive "pull-yourself-together!" sort of reaction in that situation.
No, since that depends on us. Removing us from that equation results in nonsense. But it doesn't depend on whatever a single individual just happens to conjure up in their mind, either. Nor is any one categorisation as valid as the next. It's about what's appropriate, given how [i]we[/I] - particularly as a community of language users and moral agents - commonly categorise what is and is not moral. It's about inter-subjectivity and convention.
I like that: the belief is immoral because - don't be racist! :D
But no, that isn't a fair representation of my position, and your attempted [I]reductio ad absurdum[/I] has failed to hit its target.
Better luck next time?
Quoting Michael
What? You've lost me. Your prior reasoning is indeed valid, as I said, but the above doesn't follow from it, or from its validity. Furthermore, regarding the claim that "the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to have such a belief": the former does follow from the latter, given the right additional premises.
But like I said, the Golden Rule logic isn't essential, so I don't really mind if we cross it off.
Quoting Sapientia
Supposing that in a community of 100 people, 50 endorse one side of a moral issue and the other 50 endorse the contrary, how would you decide what is "appropriate" through "common categorization"?
Better luck next time?[/quote]
Then what does "you shouldn't be racist" mean if not "don't be racist"?
That's like saying regarding the claim "I am immortal because my name is Michael": the former does follow from the latter, given the right additional premises. Strictly speaking that's true, but it isn't at all helpful – and as it currently stands the former doesn't follow.
Unless I can provide the additional premises it's wrong to say that I am immortal because my name is Michael, and so unless you can provide the additional premises it's wrong to say that the belief is immoral because we wouldn't want others to believe the same way about us.
Yes, it does. It was a very minor point about your your erroneous wording. And that wasn't the statement that I was addressing in my criticism; that was just a part of it. So that's a strawman. If you go back and read your own quote and my response to it, you can see for yourself. I was actually addressing the following:
Quoting Terrapin Station
To use "whether" there doesn't make sense, but "that" would. Or you could lose "whether" and add a colon after the second "is".
Quoting Terrapin Station
Doesn't follow, since correctness doesn't need to be based on a standard of whether there are facts to that effect.
Quoting Terrapin Station
My argument takes into account facts, yes. But your crude understanding isn't quite what I have in mind.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That's just one theory among many. You're begging the question.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, it wouldn't, because, as I pointed out above, there's a missing premise which is false. There are many various standards of correctness, and you're assuming just one, which it needn't be.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, that would be a misunderstanding, and is quite ridiculous and patronising.
Quoting Terrapin Station
There are countless possible criteria, so I'm not going to attempt to list them all. But as for the set of criteria that I am relying on, I'd say that taking into account facts is definitely a sensible approach - even if they're not "moral facts" as such, but facts which are nevertheless relevant in meta-ethical queries such as this one. And another important thing to take into consideration are the sorts of things that we actually [I]do[/I] consider applicable with regards to moral judgement or what is right or wrong. How we usually do categorise. What is customary or conventional. And if your opinion stands out like a sore thumb, in a similar way to how the opinion that red should be excluded from the category of colour does, then I think that the greater burden is on you.
No, not in other words, in your mistaken analysis.
Then I think that your understanding either overlooks or fails to account for some important aspects of human behaviour, psychology and morality. Some beliefs can be corrosive and corrupting and immoral and indicative of vice. You name a vice, and I'll give you an example of a belief indicative of it.
Sorry I've been away on holiday, I hope I may interject this late on. I'm coming from an Aristotelian angle, where belief in itself doesn't count as moral or immoral because it isn't choice.
Virtue or vice or (lack of) self-control each can only show itself through action, including a speech-act. Our fantasies aren't moral or immoral in themselves. I can't help the thoughts that fly into the windows of my soul, only what my soul gets the body to do once those thoughts have had their sway in deliberation.
Nevertheless once an action is undertaken or under way, our judgment of the state of mind of the perpetrator then matters to us, counts as 'moral', otherwise an unintentional killing with an accidental knife would count the same as murder aforethought. So the inferred belief with which an act is committed counts as moral or immoral, even though belief qua belief does not.
If it is sensible to say that an act is good or bad, 'eating babies is morally wrong', say, then beliefs that lead to eating babies are on the face of it also morally wrong. This seems inescapable, and hardly worth a long discussion.
So the question you seem to be asking is not that? Is it rather a question of culpability? Am I culpable for my morally wrong beliefs and the morally wrong acts that flow from them?
If that is the question, one needs to consider that beliefs are formed socially, and accepted more or less uncritically. So the poor benighted cannibal is minimally culpable for his beliefs (and for the eating of babies that he indulges in), until the missionaries turn up and explain that God has written this book and says not to. And once those ideas have gained currency, then the cannibal ought to know better.
So I think it goes, that one is more responsible (for good or ill), for one's beliefs the more they are at variance with social norms.
Someone could consider whether it's correct or incorrect to morally judge beliefs and expression.
That's what "whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression" refers to, just a bit less verbosely. The term "whether" implies "whether x or not x," without having to type that whole thing out.
I believe that the idea of it being correct or incorrect to judge beliefs and expression is a category error. Morally judging beliefs and expression, as with ALL moral judgments, is not the sort of thing that can be correct or incorrect. Hence, "What I believe is a category error is whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression." If I were to change the word "whether" to the word "that," it wouldn't work the same way, because I'm not only saying that it's a category error to say that it's correct to morally judge beliefs and expression. It's a category error to say that it's incorrect to morally judge beliefs and expression, too.
I'll help things along as I can, though: okay, so you're not saying that something is correct because of what people have agreed upon or how they've agreed or followed suit with each other to do something (which would indeed be an argumentum ad populum), but . . . . what? What, exactly, is the alternative you're presenting?
Do you know of an exception?
The [I]only[/I] reason? I see more than that. I spoke about beliefs we find objectionable, and we find some beliefs inherently objectionable, i.e. prior to or irrespective of a consideration of the consequences. Consequentialist reasoning is very common, but it isn't the only sort of ethical reasoning that we engage in. In fact, before any reasoning even takes place, there's usually a sort of instinctive or emotional reaction about the nature of an ethical belief. That consequentialism isn't taken to be primary in everyones judgement can be put to the test by asking people whether or not they still think that an ethical belief would be wrong, even if there were no bad consequences. And there will be mixed results. Some people will conclude that it is wrong nevertheless.
I also disagree with your view that beliefs are simply latent actions. I think that that is far too simplistic a view, and that a better view would be more complex, and involve the recognition of variance, and require a more sophisticated understanding of belief. How would my belief that [URL=https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ross_248]Ross 248[/URL] is a star in the constellation of Andromeda have otherwise lead to action? (Obviously it is a belief that has now resulted in action, since it motivated me to mention it in this discussion - and that can't be avoided if I am to attempt to provide a counterexample). It is quite conceivable that it would never have done so, and that it wasn't a latent action at all, but simply a belief. But then, it's a catch-22, isn't it? Because you could call anything a latent anything, couldn't you? All you have to do is postulate that it hasn't yet manifested itself. I am a latent explosion, and so are you, and so is everyone else. This reminds me a bit of the the argument that John Locke and others were involved in about innate knowledge. The problem is that it's not falsifiable.
By the way, do you mean to talk about belief in general or just ethical belief? Because you didn't specify.
I have a belief that it is wrong to rape someone in Alabama, but I'm probably not going to do anything about it, even if I were to go to Alabama. If I ever go to Alabama, it will probably be just to go there on holiday and do the sorts of things that people usually do on holiday in Alabama. Do you question my honesty or will? Must I take action against [I]everything[/I] that I believe is right or wrong in order to meet your high expectations? If so, then most people won't meet your standards.
There is no moral obligation that we all dedicate our lives to standing up for everything that we believe in and that we speak out against everything that we object to. There are other important things in life, and my way of life is too valuable for me to give up for your moralism.
So, only beliefs which lead to action are useful? Well, usefulness itself, and what you in particular judge to be of use, isn't the be all and end all. I believe what I believe, whether it's useful or not, and I still believe that some beliefs are right and some beliefs are wrong.
I agree that what is concerning, or alarming even, about bad beliefs is that we can imagine what will happen if these beliefs are put into practice. But whether that is the sole reason for our judging them to be bad is arguable.
Yes, and I agree that ethics is about feelings, at least in part. But I don't think that that resolves the issues I raised. That's why I said "in spite of your explanation...".
Quoting Terrapin Station
But this is about more than what an individual personally feels is an ethical issue. That makes sense to me in normative ethics, but we're talking about a meta-ethical issue, and it is descriptive. We can use reason and observation to determine the right answer. We're discussing what is rightly or appropriately categorised as the sort of thing that can be right or wrong. We don't arrive at the conclusion that a category error has been made by appealing to how an individual feels about it. It wouldn't even [i]be[/I] a category error in accordance with this overblown relativism. In that case, we could just say "Okay, red isn't a colour [i]for you[/I]". But that would be silly.
Quoting Terrapin Station
We're not talking about ethical issues, like whether abortion is right or wrong, and under what circumstances. I'm sympathetic towards ethical anti-realism in that regard. We're talking about ethical classification, which is a meta-ethical issue. And I don't think that an individualistic uncritical approach based soley on how someone feels about it or even thinks about it will lead to the right answer.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yes, well, even if what you claim about yourself is true, I said [I]"we"[/I], as in people in general.
Quoting Terrapin Station
People generally do care about beliefs and expression morally, which is part of the justification for my general point. I'm not saying that [i]you[/I] must care, or that [i]you[/I] must categorise beliefs as a moral category; I'm saying that you [i]should[/I]. In the former case, because they matter, even if they don't matter to you; and in the latter case, because it is appropriate and makes sense.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, it's relative to how a community reasonably categorises. An individual can unreasonably categorise something in stark contrast to that, and that's when it's appropriate to simply say that that individual is wrong: that he or she has made a category error.
I've got a backlog of replies to get through, by the way. Including several of yours. I haven't caught up yet.
As I just mentioned to Terrapin Station, I have a backlog of replies to get through, and I feel like I'm 'jumping the queue' by replying to yours before others, but my reply will be brief.
I agree with your first paragraph (after your first question). I think that that should be enough to refute the position that no beliefs can be wrong. But then there is also the related question of whether beliefs can be wrong in themselves, or at least without that condition.
It has come to light throughout this discussion that Terrapin Station's view - and he can correct me if I've got it wrong - is not, as I initially interpreted his comment, that no belief or expression can be morally wrong, but merely that that no belief or expression can be morally wrong [I]for him[/I] and presumably anyone who shares his view. So that poses no real challenge to the claim that beliefs can be morally wrong. He would answer "Yes, in some cases", as would I. And the discussion then turns to different but related issues, like whether he and others like him should change their mind, or whether his sort of moral relativism is credible.
The culpability issue was also an interesting side issue, and I more-or-less agree with your take on it.
Also, re the comment you're responding to re beliefs leading to actions, I'd only consider that if the beliefs in question always led to particular actions (at least barring significant intervening factors), so that we could say those beliefs were causal to the actions in question.