Michael

What are the other options? It's not insane to insist that any object can only remain physically the same so long as it remains physically the same in...

There is a concrete difference between the building in the morning and the building in the evening. So what does it mean to say that it's the same bui...

That doesn't explain in what sense two physically different things are the same thing. Are they the same in a concrete sense or an abstract sense?

So in what sense are two physically different things the same thing? Obviously they're not physically the same thing. If it isn't a concrete identity ...

But presumably the building isn't identical to its bricks-being-used-a-certain-way? Otherwise it doesn't make sense to consider a counterfactual claim...

So is the difference between the building and its bricks a concrete difference or an abstract difference? Is the difference the sort of thing that obt...

So now we're back to the issue of the building and its bricks. If when we're referring to the building we're not referring to its bricks then what is ...

Well, andrewk's position seems to be that when we talk about Obama we're not talking about a formal object, but the actual person. So that the formal ...

Individuals as formal objects in models. So we have two separate notions of an individual. We have the ontological individual, which just is the concr...

Then individuals are just elements of some logical model, which makes them an abstract thing. So either Platonism or anti-realism. Then the term "buil...

The individual is to his properties as a building is to its bricks. If when we refer to a building we're referring to its bricks then to suggest that ...

This all depends on what sort of thing the term "I" refers to, i.e. the ontological nature of the self. If the self just is some set of concrete prope...

Let's not forget that philosophy gave rise to natural philosophy which gave rise to science. Also, mathematics and logic. Philosophy certainly hasn't ...

I'm not mistaking them. I'm asking you why they differ. If there are legitimate problems with the Left then why not just make them known? Why use lies...

If the reasons you give for wanting the Left to fail are caricatures, rhetorical points, and lies, then what are the real reasons you want Left to fai...

We had them, but then we removed them.

So are you saying that individuals are abstract things? This is why I claimed that this entails an anti-realist interpretation of identity (unless you...

This seems consistent with a fictionalist/quasi-realist interpretation. You just seem to be saying that we talk about individuals as if they're some a...

So we talk about people as if they're just "referential pegs". But the question, then, is whether or not people are just such things. If they're not –...

Yes, I think there's been a bit of a mix up between rigid designators and counterfactuals. We don't need the latter to make sense of the former. Even ...

Well, think of something like "water is H2O". According to Kripke, this is necessarily true. It doesn't make sense to consider a counterfactual world ...

Too much time is spent arguing over what some -ism means. Better to just ask what the proponent means by it and go with it.

I don't know if Kripke mentioned them but according to this Kaplan (1989) did, and argued that they are rigid designators. (Interestingly, Barack Obam...

If my parents never had children then I would never have been born. The term "I" here is a rigid designator that either refers to a person who doesn't...

You said (of Kripke's position) that "we can imagine situations in which every descriptive feature of a thing is replaced and have the proper name sti...

You said that a thing's identity (as Barack Obama) is not to be found in its properties but in its "referential peg". So unless this referential peg i...

Do you then think it makes sense to consider a possible world where the Earth is a star rather than a planet? Or where Napoleon was born a horse (to h...

This seems to touch on the ship of Theseus paradox. What makes it the case that the ship that left is the same ship that returned (if anything)? I'd s...

It seems me, then, that if we're to make sense of counterfactuals then we can't be a realist about identity. Identity is a linguistic/conceptual impos...

We don't need to consider counterfactuals to consider possible worlds. We can just consider possible futures if you like. When you use the term "I" to...

Does the "I" there refer to you or to someone who is like you? If the former then you understand the concept of referring to yourself as being somethi...

What of something like "imagine if the Earth were a star rather than a planet"? It seems to me that this is a nonsensical counterfactual. Perhaps this...

Well, consider that right now I could say "I might win the lottery on Saturday" and "I might not win the lottery on Saturday". Surely in both cases I'...

Doesn't this then entail that every counterfactual claim about a real thing is a contradiction? If I claim that Barack Obama might have spoken Mandari...

You didn't ask for an argument, and nor did I claim to have one. You asked for a hidden variable theory that agrees with the results of quantum mechan...

I don't understand them. I only know (from what's been said of them) that they add to the de Broglie–Bohm theory the one thing that it doesn't normall...

It only suggests that I disagree with your inference.

There's a difference between being conceivable and being conceived, and so B. doesn't follow.

What about this and this?

@"andrewk" Use @ followed by the name in quotes (the quotes are then automatically removed). I don't think it has much to do with ontology. You can ju...

But the convention is itself a rule that can be broken, much like moving chess pieces a certain way. Of course, you're free to make up your own rules ...

Then you understand the concept of a rigid designator. When you talk about a possible world where Barack Obama isn't the president the term "Barack Ob...

I'm not sure what you mean. But consider this; do you understand the difference between talking about a possible world where Barack Obama isn't the pr...

It's not about what terms they use to talk about things in their world. It's about what terms we use to talk about things in their world.

It doesn't help that those in power either don't know what they're doing or are just lying. All this talk about remaining in the single market but hav...

My assertion was causally influenced, yes. But, under the standard view (and not your view), the assertion's truth maker is something else.

Logic is concerned with the relationship between sentences. To talk about logical causes is to commit a category error. And to claim that such things ...

Because presumably we can make true claims about things beyond any causal influence, e.g. the future or the distant, and about things that aren't caus...

Yes, which are all truth-apt assertions, not stipulations. In context it should be clear that by "definition" Mongrel meant "a statement of the exact ...

But if someone asks me what a word (like "truth") means my response isn't simply "let 'truth' mean ".