Michael

Okay, then it’s still the case that each person’s box is either empty or has one or more things in it, and that the thing(s) in one person’s box might...

There’s still something inside each person’s box. I don’t understand the point you’re trying to make.

And seeing someone pick up and eat an apple shows nothing that supports Direct Realist Presentation.

The latter. The former doesn’t address the hard problem of consciousness and makes no ontological commitments as one of the papers I referenced explic...

Read up on the arguments presented in the SEP article. Nothing you’re saying here has any relevance to what is meant by direct or indirect realism.

Nothing

It’s not about what people prefer but about what they find the evidence and reasoning shows.

Or perhaps I should say, given that I don’t know much about cognitive science, I can’t understand the attempt to “Bayes” qualia. So the best I can do ...

According to you I don’t know enough about cognitive science to address this comment so I won’t bother. We’ve already gone through it enough in the ot...

I don’t find this interpretation at all reasonable. I think a far more reasonable interpretation is to accept that the brain doesn’t see the vat that ...

So if I put a brain in a vat and configure it to cause the brain to see a cat then the cat that the brain sees is the vat (or me)? Seems to me that it...

I don’t believe that truth consists in a proposition’s correspondence to some mind-independent state of affairs, and so I don’t believe that an apple ...

I agree, but this discussion isn’t about truth, it’s about whether or not the things we see are mind-independent. I see an apple, the apple is red, I ...

It’s certainly possible that the Standard Model is deficient and fails to uncover what ordinary perception shows, but I think that less likely than wh...

Much in the same way that Fitch’s paradox shows that the knowability and non-omniscience principles are incompatible, direct realism and scientific re...

My experience doesn’t show me the nature of the world independent of experience, the Standard Model and other scientific theories do.

Scientific realism isn’t a given, and even if it were true, the world as described by the Standard Model is very unlike the world as seen in everyday ...

From the SEP article: That we can determine whether or not an experience is an hallucination by trying to verify them with other people has no bearing...

Yes. Just like it is not history that informs us about history but the words written in the textbook that do. But it’s still about history.

Yes, by saying that it “can” be called into question I meant to suggest that it was depending on the various interpretations. Sorry if that wasn’t cle...

I wouldn’t make such a claim. To borrow bongo’s example, a history textbook is about history, but it doesn’t provide direct access. The indirect reali...

It might be worth us looking into what is actually meant by “direct perception”. The SEP article is a good place to start: And to better explain what ...

Is there a Cartesian theatre when I hallucinate? Is there a Cartesian theatre when I am presented with an illusion? Is there a Cartesian theatre when ...

It is this visual and auditory imagery that informs our intellectual considerations, not whatever distal causes are responsible for such imagery.

They don't see a picture. They see an apple. And the apple is mental imagery. Your mistake is in conflating two different domains of discourse. It's l...

I didn’t say it’s not a mental image. When a schizophrenic hears voices those voices are just “mental imagery” but it’s bad grammar to then describe t...

Does the schizophrenic who sees people who aren’t there see a picture of people (who aren’t there)? Your Cartesian theatre grammar is a strawman.

I don't know what "directly" means in this context. Regardless, as I said above, reading a history textbook doesn't give us direct access to history, ...

Reading a history textbox doesn't give us direct access to history.

Yes.

You appear to conflate two difference senses of "realism". In the context of the phrase "scientific realism" it's contrasted with "scientific instrume...

Something like: the kind of thing that we hear in the case of a veridical perception is the same kind of thing that we hear in the case of an hallucin...

The brain-in-a-vat and other such hypotheses are just analogies. The underlying principle is best exemplified by Kant's transcendental idealism. There...

Functional integration and the mind, Jakob Hohwy But I don't even know why I even need to quote this. The previous quote of Friston, especially about ...

I don't need to understand cognitive science to understand that it's clearly a form of indirect realism. I speak English and what they say there is qu...

Do I need to properly understand cognitive science to understand the philosophical implications of what Friston and Hobson say here?

I'm not using any, I'm repeating what they're saying. Another quote: Do you want to argue that this theory says that dogs and cats don't exist?

That's not what they say. They say that qualia isn't what most people think it is: It's right there in the quote. They're saying that qualia – colours...

This is misleading. The schizophrenic does hear voices1, she's just wrong to interpret these voices as belonging to some demon (or person, or somethin...

I didn't change it to match my conclusion. I changed it so that the grammar flows better. But if you prefer: I don't know. I don't understand what rel...

I don't know. I don't understand what relevance other papers have to what this paper is explicitly saying? It quite clearly says "qualia distinctive m...

The paper concludes " is realist in that it identifies qualia with distinctive mid-level sensory states known with high systemic (and 100% agentive) c...

And going back to this, no, I don't, but I do know how to speak English and use colour-terms like "red" and "blue", and so it is a mistake to think th...

That's what I've been trying to explain to you all along. When I say that I see a blue dress and you say that you see a red dress, you and I have diff...

The paper says: "Our claim is that when the brain estimates that a suite of mid-level re-codings, couched in terms of features such as redness, roundn...

If that’s what they mean by quaila being a Bayesian model then they’re demonstrably wrong because nothing like that happens when I see red, or indeed ...

Yes. So hot that I even got out the air con. I set it to 18 degrees but it couldn't get below 25.

I don't know. Perhaps we see different colours. Perhaps it's darker for me. Perhaps it's smaller for me. Perhaps your sense data is vertically or hori...

I choose to argue for indirect realism because it's easier than arguing for idealism. What I actually believe is irrelevant.

I'm undecided actually. I just find it simpler to argue for indirect realism than for idealism. There's at least some common ground with the direct re...