They're inferred as it can be considered the best explanation for the occurrence and regularity of experience. Of course, some don't think this infere...
We're able to ask people what they see. For example, there was the infamous photo of a dress that some people saw as white and gold and some as black ...
I think that the science of the Standard Model shows that the character of our experiences and the nature of the mind-independent world is very differ...
I think that our understanding of visual perception, of electromagnetic radiation, of electrons absorbing and scattering photons, etc. shows that it's...
I think the section on The Character of Experience here gives a simple explanation: "the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least pa...
Even if they don't say that we see qualia, the point still stands that colour terms like "red" (can) refer to this qualia, which according to them is ...
@"Isaac" Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism Regarding the "hard problem" it does refer to this pap...
Do you say the same about being fun, good, scary, painful? You don't understand how these words refer to some feature of the experience and not (just)...
The interesting thing about Putnam's argument is that it's about meaning, not about ontology, and depends on a causal theory of reference. I think it ...
What we know is that if I see a red dress and you see a blue dress then our first-person experiences are different, and that the colour terms "red" an...
Neurology doesn't explain the hard problem of consciousness. We know that changes to the eyes and changes to the brain affect first-person experience,...
And this definitely doesn't follow. Most humans are trichromats. The very rare tetrachromats aren't wrong in seeing different colours to the rest of u...
I don't think that's quite right. I've accepted that we can use words like "red" to refer to that intrinsic property. The disagreement is that I also ...
I'm not saying it's random. I'm saying that it's wrong to say that they "match". The external property may determinately cause the experience, but the...
It's not a problem in ordinary conversation. It can be a problem if it leads you to the philosophical position that being scary is a mind-independent ...
The fact that you and I can look at the same photo and yet I see a white and gold dress and you see a black and blue dress proves this wrong. The exte...
I think this is where we might be talking past each other. When I play a computer game I might say that the game is good or is fun or is scary or what...
Given that we see what we see then it follows that the external world is such that it causes us to see what we see. In terms of the epistemological pr...
Then this shows that trying to understand the philosophy of perception by referring to the cognitive science of Markov blankets is a mistake, as @"Jan...
The article I (and you) referenced above offered an analogy to explain this. The spider is directly aware of the vibrations and indirectly aware of th...
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsif.2017.0792 So if hidden states are only seen indirectly then what is it that is seen directly? The ...
I don't think what I'm saying depends on "qualia". All it depends on is the fact that when you see the dress as black and blue and I see it as white a...
I thought you of all people would be in favour of people living their lives as they like. What's wrong with drugs and hookers? If I were you I'd compl...
It's not about what he says, it's about what he sees. He sees a blue dress. If there is no hidden blue state then him seeing something blue has nothin...
I don't think consciousness is "stored in the brain". Consciousness is a product of brain activity, perhaps as some emergent phenomena. The hard probl...
I know they don't, that's the point. Their body is stimulated by and responds to external stimulation but they don't see. Therefore seeing has nothing...
I'm not. I'm talking about the experience of seeing a red dress or hearing voices. I referenced it before, but see blindsight. Their body is stimulate...
People with schizophrenia hear voices. We see things when we dream. This is a perfectly ordinary and appropriate way to speak. And when we dream, ther...
Because there are two different senses of "seeing" (and "hearing") as I have said. There's the seeing in the sense of light entering the retina and he...
This is the problem. You're saying that seeing1 hidden state X causes person A to see2 a red dress and person B to see2 a blue dress. Two different se...
Seeing is what is meant when we say "person A sees a red dress" and "person B sees a blue dress." To take your approach, the grammar is clear; they're...
The "response" is the seeing. If they're responding differently then they're seeing differently, and seeing differently is seeing different things. So...
@"Isaac", this is the crux of my position: 1. Some hidden state X causes person A to see a red dress and person B to see a blue dress 2. A red dress i...
Sure. Either "the real part of every nontrivial zero of the Riemann zeta function is 1/2" is true or it's false, but we don't (currently) know which. ...
I think it fits within Kant's transcendental idealism or Putnam's internal realism. Colour, shape, eggs, etc. aren't "things" or "properties" in our e...
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