By gaining insight into the unexamined beliefs that are, and the ways in which they are, causing you to fall into recurrent patterns of worry, self-ha...
I don't see that. It seems to me that metacognitive beliefs can be replaced by other metacognitive beliefs. Just as beliefs can be replaced by other b...
One changes one's metacognitive beliefs, I suppose, by gaining insight into, and becoming convinced of, the fact that the dysfunctional set has been p...
According to Wiki the CAS ( Cognitive Attenetional Syndrome) consists in three processes: " In the metacognitive model, symptoms are caused by a set o...
No, the beliefs are held only within the verbal expressions of believing, otherwise they would not be expressions of believing. In other words you hol...
No, but verbal expressions of thought are determinate objects...you know, like written words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs and texts and auditory so...
All you are saying is that the constituents are what thought and belief consist of; which is really saying nothingat all or just expressing a tautolog...
OK, but this being a philosophy forum perhaps more precise, less confusing ways of speaking about it would be more productive. Well, if all you are sa...
Well they are not things in the sense of being determinate objects; and I think the idea that you think they are such things is what Banno was critici...
True, it is circular in the virtuous sense, as I described, but my position is not coherentism, or rather, not just coherentism. I say that what we ar...
No, it's not a vicious circularity in the sense of going around and around in a circle. It might be understood to be a virtuous circularity in the sen...
You seem to be taking an atomistic, rather than a holistic, view of justification. As Quine points out particular beliefs are justified within the con...
No, not unless you think "counted as true" is equivalent to 'true'; which I don't. So you think it's OK to believe things without having any rational ...
Not at all; I have explained many times now to apparently little avail, considering Banno's responses (only Michael seems to have understood) that I c...
You appear to be arguing in bad faith, now. The above ad hominem coupled with your continued attempts to distort my arguments, and your failure to att...
Probably, but what relevance does that have? If we say it is true that the triceratops had three horns that is because we have evidence to support tha...
How do you know they are truths if you have no way to verify them? When, and if, you can verify an axiom, hinge proposition, absolute presupposition, ...
I said "what is good cannot be a matter of definition" not that the word "good" has no definition. In any case I agree with what you say there; it's t...
Not at all. I am saying that although of course we could be wrong about the truth of any proposition it makes no sense to say that a proposition is tr...
Are truths confined to just one system then? The other point is that axioms are not truths, but absolute presuppositions or regulative assumptions. If...
OK, I want to say that a proposition is not true because it is verifiable; it is verifiable or falsifiable because it is truth-apt. The other point is...
Well, Michael understood the point and even pointed it out to you. You actually don't know whether you have missed much, or what you might have missed...
ll t No, the point, which you apparently failed to get, was merely that not all truth-apt propositions are true propositions. I can't see what point y...
Firstly that is explicitly the ladder of intellect, not the ladder of reality, and secondly the fact that a stone is at the bottom of the hierarchy do...
What is good cannot be a matter of definition, obviously. It is a matter of general human consensus based on the sum of experience. Because it is not ...
I don't think it makes any sense to say that there are non truth-apt propositions; which is the same as to say that "all propositions are either true ...
OK, I see what the point is now, I think; but, I wasn't thinking that we could know that the truth of a particular true proposition is unknown, but of...
Every false proposition has an observely true counterpart, so truth and falsity are two sides of the one coin. I'd say it's not so much about true pro...
Why can't "p is an unknown truth" itself be an unknown truth (if it is indeed true); why must it be unknowable? Am I missing something here? If p is "...
I think it's the obverse: not taking an interest in the world is a sign that one is a jaded soul; disillusioned on account of entertaining naively unr...
You don't seem to be capable of, or else interested in, engaging with ideas that challenge your own settled views, or of arguing effectively for those...
It's not a question of whether the proposition is presently known, believed or justified. Give me an example of a proposition that could be true and y...
Yes, but a proposition is only true if it would be verified as true after exhaustive inquiry. This rules out the idea of absolute truths that are fore...
Any contradiction is only on account of your misunderstanding. TBH, I don't think you want to understand it or, it seems, anything else that doesn't t...
No, as i understand it, for Collingwood absolute presuppositions are always such in relation to a context. It is obvious that in all senses 'absolute'...
You're responding to the wrong sense of 'absolute'. All it means is that the absolute presupposition in a context is the one that underpins all the ot...
Yes, but as has been pointed out absolute presuppositions are historical. Something can be an absolute presupposition for us at our present stage of k...
There is no contradiction involved in saying that what seems impossible in principle now may not seem so in the future; in other words there may appea...
I think Peirce, as a good scientist, allows for the possibility, and even hope, that what is understood to be possible in principle in the future may ...
If all you are doing is using "uncertain" as a synonym for "undecidable" then I would agree with you. But if you want to say that absolute presupposit...
I don't see that; it seems to me that if truth and falsity are properties of propositions. then the truth of a proposition is justified by its accorda...
The third alternative that you are missing is that we think it is inappropriate to speak about it being true or not, because it is undecidable. We can...
Comments