An Outline Of Existential Dependency
p1 That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it
p2 That which exists prior to something else cannot consist of it
p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it
p4 That which consists of something else cannot exist prior to it
C1 That which is existentially dependent upon and consists of something else must exist after it(from p1, p2, p3, p4)
p2 That which exists prior to something else cannot consist of it
p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it
p4 That which consists of something else cannot exist prior to it
C1 That which is existentially dependent upon and consists of something else must exist after it(from p1, p2, p3, p4)
Comments (196)
p1 That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it
p2 That which exists prior to something else cannot consist of it
p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it
p4 That which consists of something else cannot exist prior to it
C1 That which is existentially dependent upon and consists of something else must exist after it(from p1, p2, p3, p4)
Starting with the notion of justification...
All justification is existentially dependent upon metacognition. All metacognition consists of pre-existing thought and belief. All justification is existentially dependent upon some thought and belief. All thought and belief is meaningful. All justification is existentially dependent upon some meaning. Some meaning exists prior to all justification. All metacognition is existentially dependent upon pre-existing thought and belief. Some thought and belief exists prior to all justification. Some thought and belief are not existentially dependent upon justification. All justification exists after some thought and belief.
Hmmm...
All this recent talk about hinge propositions, absolute presuppositions, and what not. This seems relevant to them all...
p2 That which exists prior to something else cannot consist of it
p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it
p4 That which consists of something else cannot exist prior to it
C1 That which is existentially dependent upon and consists of something else must exist after it(from p1, p2, p3, p4)
All attribution of causality is thought and belief. Some attribution of causality is prior to language acquisition. Some thought and belief is prior to language. Not all attribution of causality consists of language. Not all thought and belief consists of language. All propositions consist of language. Not all thought and belief consists of propositions.
Some well-grounded true belief exists prior to language. All well-grounded true belief is justified true belief(knowledge). Some justified true belief exists prior to language. All justification is existentially dependent upon language. Some well-grounded true belief is not existentially dependent upon justification.
:halo:
How so? I mean, I see the point with existentially idependant things, but care to elaborate?
They hold that truth and meaning are existentially dependent upon language.
Upon what? I mean, what part would you like to see better explained, or in more detail? What would an elaboration need to include in order for it to be satisfactory?
I understand lacking what we currently consider as language, but is there a creature which lacks self-expression? I think beliefs and thoughts are part of self-expression which is inherent in all creatures.
If all expression of thought and belief counts as self-expression, then it would follow that no there is not - at least amongst thinking/believing creatures...
However, I do not think that neglecting the distinction between self-expression and other kinds of expression is very helpful. So, I would say yes there are such creatures.
I wouldn't be willing to say that my drake expresses himself, and much as he expresses his own thought and belief. I take the notion of "self" to be a social construct informed by complex language.
Collingwood was setting out what must be presupposed in order to begin inquiry.
Inquiry is existentially dependent upon language. Language upon non-linguistic thought and belief. Inquiry upon the same.
Witt was looking for hinge propositions as the baseline of thought/belief systems. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Some thought and belief are not...
When a creature has a self-conception, statements of thought and belief are a part of their self-expression. Self-conception is existentially dependent upon metacognition... Some thought and belief are not.
Quoting creativesoul
What about being and the world?
Being-in-the-world (Dasein (the human being / consciousness)) is existentially dependent upon the world but does it exist prior to it?
Hmmm. Existence...
Latin:
Ex- (out)
Sistere (take a stand)
Existere (come into being)
So, does being-in-the-world come into being or stand out prior to the world?
Being-in-the-world 'coming into being' would be the predicate.
"Existence is a concept corresponding to something IN THE WORLD."
Ergo existence or Dasein being-in-the-world is "existentially dependent" on the world, but neither is the world prior to existence or is existence prior to the world--if this line of thinking is correct...
But, in that Dasein is "thrown into the world;" that is, its being consists of its possibilities--it is its possibilities of being-in-the-world. So in a certain sense the being of consciousness is prior to the world yet existentially dependent on the world.
However, speaking of it like this seems strangely based, for the being of the world is different than being-in-the-world.
Does the world have a being of its own? Is the being of consciousness absolutely incommensurable in relation to the being of the world?
I think not! It is precisely being along side the world, connected in unison.
No. It cannot.
Quoting Blue Lux
No. It cannot.
Existence is not existentially dependent upon language. Heiddy's notions of "Dasein" and "Being-in-the-world" are. Heiddy's notion are a discovery of that which existed in it's entirety prior to it's discovery(via metacognition), but not prior to language. According to Heiddy, language is the house of Being. Heiddy put forth an unnecessarily overcomplicated notion of the effects/affects that adopting an initial worldview via language acquisition has upon people, and he did so by method of rendering otherwise perfectly intelligible notions - such as "existence" - virtually meaningless.
I'm no fan of Heiddy, although there's much good to be said about the dialogue at the beginning of On The Way To Language... That's another topic.
...
He has a whole section called 'The ontico-ontological priority of the question of being.'
He thought being was uninintelligible. That is the whole premise of his work.
A guy thinks, believes, asserts, and/or otherwise expresses the following proposition...
"Being is unintelligible"
... and yet he still proceeds to base an entire worldview upon it's existence.
His idea is from Plato.
I can't personally read the Greek, but here is the translation
"For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being'. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed."
Isn't it pretty coherent?
I am? Okay yeah, I know I am rather than I am not... But what does it mean to be? I know that I am but I do not not know what the meaning of being is.
That is the formulation... Don't make it harder than it is lol. That is easy to do... But maybe breaking it down might get you somewhere... Maybe...
Coherency is not necessary for the presupposition of truth inherently within all thought and belief formation. It is necessary, but insufficient for propositional truth.
Yes. Both are consistent in some of their terminological use. I enjoyed reading both.
Quoting Blue Lux
Propositional truth is existentially dependent upon propositions. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Propositional truth is existentially dependent upon language.
That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it.
Propositional truth cannot exist prior to language.
The existentially part...
What of it?
Would you like to discuss how convention has taken it to task? There's been several takes on it. Some say it's meaningless. Some say it's not truth-apt. Some say both. Others build a logic upon it. Etc...
I say it is not truth-apt, because it doesn't say anything meaningful. Typically when a competent English speaker says "This proposition is false", it is accompanied by a example of a false proposition. The exemplary proposition ought be a false one, but may not. Where there is no example for the statement itself to describe as being false, there is no meaning.
It is when we are looking at one sentence that speaks of itself that we are looking at something that does not have all the parts to do what we're asking it to do.
One finger cannot point at itself.
A thing can be dependent upon something else for all sorts of things aside from it's own existence.
I'm with Quine here.
No. See the five rules of existential dependency..
No.
It would make it logically impossible - to be nice.
Something cannot require that which it does not require. That is incoherent and/or self-contradictory. It is also existentially impossible.
Our knowledge is about it. Our knowledge of it is not equivalent to it.
:wink:
Didn't you assert yourself as in your early twenties in another thread here recently?
Witt spent much time researching answers to this sort of questioning.
Initial(rudimentary) thought and belief is prior to language acquisition.
If truth is presupposed somewhere along the line within every example of thought and belief, then we've adequate ground to hold that all thought and belief presupposes truth... pre-linguistic thought and belief notwithstanding.
That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.
Initial(rudimentary) thought and belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language acquisition. Our knowledge of it most certainly is. Initial thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon our knowledge of it.
A statement's ability to be true/false is existentially dependent upon drawing meaningful correlations between different things. The liar is utterly inadequate.
There is some agreement between my position on this subject, and what Creative is inferring. However, there is also significant disagreement on some of these issues. For example, we agree that without prelinguistic thought and belief there would be no language. However, we disagree in terms of what things are pre-linguistic. For example, Creative seems to believe that justification, truth, and knowledge are prelinguistic. My position is that all epistemological constructs are necessarily dependent on language. So, when we talk about truth, justification, and knowledge, these are all necessarily dependent on language. Why do I infer that this is the case?
First, some concepts, such as belief, are both non-linguistic and linguistic, i.e., beliefs can be shown to exist in these two forms. They can be shown by our actions, i.e., by opening the door my actions show that I believe there is a door; and they can be stated as part of a language, “I believe in such-and-such.”
Second, another key feature of non-linguistic beliefs is that they can have existence apart from language, i.e., they are not rule-dependent, and this is key to understanding my position. Any belief that can have existence apart from language, is not dependent on language. You can think of it this way: The word Mars has a referent quite apart from the concept Mars, so the referent is not dependent on language, i.e., the referent is not rule-dependent. Don’t confuse this with using the word Mars linguistically, i.e., there are rules that govern the use of the concept in a linguistic setting. However, this is quite different from the referent itself, which exists quite apart from any linguistic consideration. This is also true of non-linguistic beliefs, which can have an existence (a referent) independent of language. The referent that manifests itself in terms of non-linguistic beliefs, are the actions associated with the belief. In fact, this is what makes some or all of these kinds of beliefs bedrock or hinge.
Third, some concepts or beliefs are necessarily dependent on language in that they are rule-dependent, and there is no independent referent that they can latch onto apart from their use in language. Justification is just such a concept, justification gets its meaning from how it’s used in a language, and only from how it’s used in language. This is very similar to the idea that it’s linguistically impossible to have a private language, which by the way, is very different from using a language privately. The latter is done only after learning a language, the former is supposedly done in a completely private setting. If justification was something that could be done apart from language, then it would also be true that there would be no rules that governed the activity. This follows from the idea that rule-following is necessarily social. Not only would this be true of justification, but it would also be true of truth and knowledge. It’s not you who decide how such words/concepts are used.
This reflects misunderstanding. No fault here, just reporting the facts. There has been a misunderstanding. What I've been arguing is quite unusual, as far as I know. That said, what follows is an attempt to add a bit of clarity where it's needed.
Regarding the idea of prelinguistic justification...
Creative knows that justification is existentially dependent upon metacognition.
Creative knows that metacognition is existentially dependent upon language.
Creative knows that justification is existentially dependent upon language.
Creative knows that that which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it.
Creative knows that justification cannot exist prior to language.
Creative knows that that which is pre-linguistic must exist prior to language.
Creative knows that justification cannot be prelinguistic.
Regarding the idea of prelinguistic truth...
Creative knows that true belief can exist prior to language.
Creative knows that that which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.
Creative knows that true belief that exists prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon language.
Creative knows that true belief is existentially dependent upon truth.
Creative knows that truth cannot be existentially dependent upon language.
Creative knows that truth exists prior to language.
Regarding the idea of prelinguistic knowledge(justified true belief)...
Creative knows that belief exists prior to language.
Creative knows that being justified is being well-grounded.
Creative knows that the act of justification does not cause the belief statement being argued for to be well-grounded; rather it is the act of providing those grounds.
Creative knows that well-grounded belief is not existentially dependent upon justification.
Creative knows that the attribution/recognition of causality can be well grounded.
Creative knows that a prelinguistic creature can believe that touching fire caused discomfort/pain.
Creative knows that that well grounded belief can happen prior to language.
Creative knows that touching fire causes discomfort.
Creative knows that that particular well-grounded true belief is prior to language.
So, in summary...
Creative knows that justification cannot be pre-linguistic, but well-grounded true belief most certainly can be.
My position is that all epistemological constructs are linguistic. Not all things being taken account of are linguistic. Some of our constructs take account of that which exists prior to language.
Quoting creativesoul
Your first premise: I agree that a belief can exist prior to language.
Your second premise: For me justification and being well-grounded are the same. If you can say that I'm justified in believing X, it's the same as saying my belief is well-grounded, both of these are necessarily linguistic. Why is well-grounded prior (maybe because of the causal effect) to language and justification not?
Your third premise: The act of justification doesn't cause any belief, that would be weird. You seem to be saying that the act of justification is different from being well-grounded, in that being well-grounded is causal, or can be causal. I know that I made an argument that prelingistic beliefs are causally generated, but you seem to be taking it one step further, by adding in the idea of being well-grounded. I don't see the need to extend it, it's just another belief that is causally generated, it's not a matter of being well-grounded. By their very nature they are foundational, basic, hinge, or bedrock, there is no need for the idea of being well-grounded. Isn't this a kind of justification. It seems confusing. Moreover, it seems that you're still adding in ideas that are necessarily linguistic.
Your fourth premise: Based on your distinction between justification and being well-grounded I can see how this might follow.
Your fifth premise: I don't know what it means, i.e., "...the attribution/recognition of causality can be well-grounded."
Your sixth premise: I agree.
Your seventh premise: I have a problem as already stated with this idea.
Your eighth premise/conclusion: This seems to be a conclusion, but I'm not sure.
Your ninth statement/conclusion: I disagree, because I have problems with your premises as already stated. Moreover, much of what I said in my previous statement still applies.
Finally, some of this is difficult to follow because of how your defining terms.
That seems to be the sticking point...
Do we agree?
Quoting Sam26
Good. I suspected that we were in agreement there. We can also further surmise something of importance from this...
Justification is not necessary in order for a belief to be well-grounded. Here, we either must draw and maintain a distinction between what counts as being justified, and what counts as being well-grounded or admit that being justified is not existentially dependent upon justification, because being well-grounded most certainly is not.
No. it is not.
Indeed, what I'm arguing isn't exactly along the lines of Witt's hinge propositions. However, I do strongly believe that if there are/is a set of beliefs that all others hinge upon, rest their laurels upon, and/or otherwise serve as/to ground the rest of one's belief system, then the method I'm employing here will help in acquiring knowledge of those, for they must exist prior to all the rest...
p1 Justification is existentially dependent upon metacognition
p2 Metacognition is existentially dependent upon language
C1 Justification is existentially dependent upon language(from p1, p2)
p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it
C2 Justification cannot exist prior to language(from C1, p3)
p4 That which is pre-linguistic must exist prior to language
C3 Justification cannot be prelinguistic(from C2,p4)
How's that look now Sam?
p1 Some true belief can exist prior to language
p2 That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it
C1 Some true belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language(from p1, p2)
p3 All true belief is existentially dependent upon truth
C2 Truth cannot be existentially dependent upon language(from C1, p3)
This one?
p1 Some well grounded belief exists prior to language
p2 Providing ground is existentially dependent upon language
C1 Some well grounded belief is not existentially dependent upon providing grounds(from p1. p2)
... and this one?
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
These are the fourth and fifth posts of the thread Sam...
Sorry, I should have realized that that was your example, my mistake. I did read this a while back.
So we have some prelinguistic human, or even an animal that touches a fire and feels discomfort, and you're saying that in virtue of this sensory experience "...they attribute causality by virtue of inferring..." - I follow the first part, but it's the latter that seems very problematic. It seems to me that you're giving these beings linguistic notions, viz., the concepts of causality and the ability to draw an inference. How do we know they're attributing causality and drawing an inference based on the discomfort they feel. For example, I can say that if a prelinguistic human roots around in the ground for grubs, that the prelinguistic human believes there are grubs in the ground. How do I know that this is the case? I know based on their actions. Apart from their actions I know nothing of what's going on in their minds.
Moreover, all I see are simple beliefs. The prelinguistic human touched the fire and felt discomfort, and as a result, formed a further belief based on these sensory experiences. I do believe there is a causal connection between the touching of the fire and the belief, but it's not because they attributed causality or even inferred this. The causal connection is independent of what they think. It's because the touching of the fire sent an uncomfortable signal to the brain, which caused a further belief, which is then seen in their actions, viz., staying further back from the fire. So we see the actions after the experience, which leads us to observe the further beliefs formed after the experience.
My conclusion is that these are nothing more than simple prelinguistic beliefs. I'm not sure why you want to add all this baggage, viz., that their attributing causality and inferring X.
The sculpture collapses if the box collapses. However, with the help of hydraulic equipment, the tower can be saved by being temporarily suspended as its rotten box gets replaced by a metal box that was fabricated later than the tower was built. Wouldn't you say that the metal box did not exist until it had been fabricated, so it did not exist before the sculpture?
Would the sculpture have seized to exist if the rotten box had collapsed? Someone might think of it still existing but in a collapsed form, but the artist might reject it and say that it stopped existing. If we say it would have seized to exist, after its fix up, is it the same sculpture? What if the artist insists that it is?
However, if any person, such as the artist, is taken to be the arbiter of the sculpture's existence then the person's opinion of its existence is its only direct existential dependency, and any other factors are just a temporary indirect dependencies.
The thing is, did the artist's opinion that the sculpture exists exist prior to the sculpture? It could not have. The sculpture seems to be one with the artist's opinion that the sculpture exists (when the artist is the arbiter.)
Causality is not existentially dependent upon language. Drawing correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things(not language constructs) is not either. Neither of these can be rightfully called a linguistic notion. Together, they are more than adequate for attributing causality, and in this case doing so correctly.
Quoting Sam26
Are you claiming that the creature does not believe that touching fire caused the discomfort, or that such belief is not attributing causality?
Which have went unanswered?
The sculpture existed prior to the metal box. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it. The sculpture is not existentially dependent upon the metal box.
And yet from this quote...
Quoting creativesoul
...it would appear that you were interested in having it explored whether or not P1 could be right.
To be honest, I really don't know what's going on in the mind of a prelinguistic person or animal. My intuition and my metaphysics says there is much more going on than we realize. What that is, again, I don't know. You're going beyond my claims, and my claims are going beyond what Wittgenstein would say. There may be something to what you're claiming, and some of it may just be speculation. Whatever the case, keep thinking about it, but keep thinking about it with Wittgenstein in mind, because I think his thoughts on the subject are important.
And I am. I do not see how what you've provided serves as a counter-example and/or negation.
I understand that, and it follows Witt's line of thinking. The problems, however, are immanent. First actions are not reliable indicators of belief. Second, several different beliefs could be reported as an explanation for most actions. Thirdly, several different beliefs could cause the same behaviour. Lastly, on my view, positing pre-linguistic belief without getting into what belief consists of is to gratuitously assert a pre-linguistic belief.
The interesting part of establishing what pre-linguistic belief consists of lies in the consequences that applying that bit of knowledge has. The sheer scope of rightful and appropriate application could not be any broader. It's downright daunting.
When talking about prelinguistic beliefs actions are the only indicators of a belief. There is no other way to say that a human or animal has a belief other than by observing their behavior.
Your second criticism is a point about interpretation, not the belief, i.e., the action reflects a belief independent of your interpretation of the belief. If a prelinguistic human is using their hands to root around in the soil, then one can say with absolute certainty that the human believes that it has hands. You may infer other obvious and not so obvious beliefs, but that is separate from having the belief state.
The rooting around in the soil does reflect more than one belief, that's for sure, but that doesn't count against the idea that the actions reflect the beliefs. In fact, it supports the idea.
My view does tell you what the belief consists of, viz., the actions of the person or animal in question. It's not at all gratuitous. We do this all the time, linguistic beliefs or not.
Temple Grandin was of the opinion that animals thought in pictures instead of words, and that a lot of people have a hard time with this because they're thinking is so dominated by language. But she calls herself a visual thinker who has to translate pictures to words in order to communicate with others, being that she's a high functioning autist.
My take is all thought and belief consists of drawing correlations between different things, visual memory could be one of those things...
Probably olfactory as well for many animals. Reading a little bit on how dog's experience the world of smell was rather mind blowing.
I tentatively agree. Observation alone is utterly inadequate. We must also have some standard, some criterion, some measure of what counts as belief.
Witt worked from the conventional notion that all thought and belief is propositional in content. It is my strong opinion that that served to stifle his genius on this matter of belief.
You see Sam, this is actually quite contentious. Following the same logic, my chickens believe that they have beaks.
This harks back to the issue I'm raising. We must first have some notion regarding what a belief actually is, and more importantly what belief is existentially dependent upon and/or what belief consists of, prior to our being able to observe and correctly attribute belief to another.
I'm not so much arguing against the idea that thought and belief has efficacy(influence subsequent behaviours). I argue for that. Rather, I'm pointing out the inherent weakness of the idea that behaviour shows belief. Behaviour alone is inadequate justificatory ground for positing any particular belief. There are also clear actual examples that serve to falsify that claim, placing it into the "some" behaviour shows belief category... clearly not all.
You're right to say that positing pre-linguistic belief is not gratuitous. I'm mistaken to say that, now that I actually think about it. My apologies. However, to say that belief consists of actions while also asserting that action shows belief renders the language use incoherent.
Most certainly...
Correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the creature itself.
Owls detect infrared.
Yes. The sculpture existed prior to the metal box.
The sculpture would've changed.
That's the artists' prerogative.
This gets into the ambiguity of what counts as being the same over time/change. I'm reminded of Heraclitus' river. The artist can say whatever s/he wants. It's not the same sculpture. It has different structural integrity, different components, etc.
Come now, let's not lose all sensibility.
All thought and belief about existence is existentially dependent upon language.
Existence is not.
The sculpture as it was prior to the box is not the same as it was after the box. It consists of different things.
The sculpture with the box did not exist prior to the box. The sculpture with the box is existentially dependent upon the box. The sculpture prior to the box is not. They are not the same sculpture.
This just isn't true. In fact, there is much in Wittgenstein's thinking that is just unconventional. Hinge-propositions are not propositions in the conventional sense. In a sense they're not propositions at all.
Quoting creativesoul
It's only contentious because you're allowing a particular interpretation to take root. While it's true that actions reflect belief, it's not true that all actions reflect belief. Many living things act in some way, but that doesn't mean that every action/behavior reflects a belief. It's also true that some actions are more difficult to ascribe a belief to, but that doesn't mean that particular kinds of actions don't reflect beliefs. There are also involuntary and voluntary actions for example, certainly involuntary actions don't reflect belief.
I think for the most part we do know what a belief is, we use the word all the time in ways that show what a belief is. One use of the word belief in reference to actions is the following: There are many instances in courts of law where we can reasonably infer what someone actually believes by their actions even if they're lying. So if someone says, "No, I wasn't with my sister at 9 am on Sunday morning the 5th of August 2018," and there is a video showing him with his sister at that time, then we can reasonably infer that his actions tell another story. His actions reflect what he really believes. In some respects actions are a more reliable indicator of what someone believes.
It's the way you're using the word belief that's causing the confusion.
Quoting creativesoul
Again, not all behavior equates to a belief. I'm not sure why you would conclude this. I sure don't believe it, and I'm fairly certain Wittgenstein didn't believe it. It doesn't logically follow that because some actions or behaviors reflect beliefs, that all actions or behaviors reflect beliefs.
Quoting creativesoul
No need to apologize, it's easy to make mistakes, or to write something that we later see as an error, or even a typo.
In response to your last sentence - I think it's only incoherent based on your interpretation. Hopefully my writings directly above clear up some of this.
We definitely use visualizations, but I'm not sure animals do, maybe. I'd be interested in the evidence that suggests that animals use visualizations. The only reason I have to doubt this, is that our minds do much more than an animals, although they might do more basic kinds of visualizations.
In my opinion, the old sculpture and the new sculpture are sub-existences of a whole time sculpture. To say that the whole time sculpture ceases to exist due to one change seems absurd.
With your approach, it seems impossible to conceive of the existence of Dennis 1967 - 2018.
In year 1967, Dennis was born.
In year 2010, Dennis' heart failed, but luckily he survived thanks to receiving a heart transplant. Thus concluded the existence of Dennis born in 1967 as began the existence of Dennis who got a heart transplant in 2010.
In year 2018, Dennis who got a heart transplant in 2010 swallowed nine lithium batteries on purpose to die and succeeded. On his tombstone it said,
Quoting creativesoul
I agree.
"Belief and thought about existence is dependent on language."
You cannot say you know enough about thought to say that.
Is a child's castration complex a belief dependent on language? Hell no. What about the beliefs of children? Are you ready to say that the LAD is the creator of belief and thought? This is preposterous.
Furthermore, what about neurotic beliefs?
Take the compulsion neuroses that Freud speaks of in Totem and Taboo.
A woman believes that her husband's razors association with the sign of death near where the razors have been in proximity to, is a sign of immanent danger for her husband. This belief is a belief, and it is what Freud explains as 'The omnipotence of thought' of neuroses.
"similarity and contiguity are the two essential principles of the processes of association"
Freud
I did not say that, nor does it follow from what I've written.
The claim in question is this...
That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.
The sculpture - prior to - the box cannot be existentially dependent upon the box. The sculpture - after the box - is not prior to the box.
Do you agree thus far?
:confused:
Surely you see the point here? I do recognize the difficulty you're presenting, so you know, and I appreciate it more than it may seem. You're showing me that there's a bit more sharpening to be done, so to speak.
Present an argument or a valid objection to my own. Not interested in anything else, especially gratuitous assertions.
We just disagree here Sam. Do you have any evidence from posthumous works that support the idea that Witt did not follow the conventional notion of JTB? It is my understanding that hinge propositions were meant to dissolve the issue of justificatory regress. It is also my understanding that Witt never found what he was looking for(a single hinge proposition). He called them "hinge propositions"... not hinge beliefs.
I think it may serve us well to take a moment and review all that we've agreed upon. I'm fairly confident that our disagreements aren't as important, particularly regarding the matter at hand - pre linguistic belief and all that that entails. I'm certain that it interests us both to a significant 'degree'...
What would count as proof to you?
:worry:
:blush:
That's quite clever. I laughed out loud! Thanks. It doesn't follow from the premiss in question, nor does it pose a problem for it.
Dennis prior to the heart transplant cannot be existentially dependent upon the heart transplant.
That is what follows from the claim...
That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.
By the way, I'd argue against Heraclitus, and have. It might be interesting to flesh out the differences. I suspect that you'll take me to task on that. It's my burden.
I agree that to say the sculpture ceases to exist would be absurd. I think that it can be the same sculpture and the sculpture prior to the box cannot be existentially dependent upon the box.
In your opinion, what thing(s) did Dennis 1967-2018 existentially depend on? You don't have to mention Adam and Eve and all that, just the most immediate non-trivial necessity or necessities.
The question itself is conflating distinctly different time periods, according to your own example. Conflating different time periods loses the distinction between Dennis prior to the heart transplant and Dennis after. The outline is all about applying common sense to known temporal order(s) and arriving at knowledge of existential dependency(and vice-versa).
Aren't we looking for a counterexample which negates the outline?
First, OC is not meant to support the notion of JTB. That's not to say there aren't examples of JTB in his notes. I don't know of any interpretation of Wittgenstein that thinks his writings are conventional in this sense, do you? Most interpretations think that Wittgenstein's writings are unconventional, and for the most part original.
Second, one could argue that Moore's propositions are examples of what many would consider propositional knowledge. Yet Wittgenstein is going against this notion, demonstrating that these propositions aren't propositions in the ordinary sense, which is why he calls them hinge-propositions. Hinge-proposition aren't epistemological at all, they are arational beliefs. Again, not just my interpretation, but the interpretation of many others who have studied OC.
I don't see how you can possibly think that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs. Wittgenstein starts out by critiquing Moore's propositions, which by definition are beliefs. My ideas of hinge-propositions go beyond what Wittgenstein said, in that I talk about prelinguistic beliefs. Wittgenstein stays within the bounds of language for the most part. There are many hinge-propositions that are linguistic, starting with Moore's propositions (I know this is a hand), are you saying this is not a belief? Wittgenstein's arguing that they are a special kind of belief, beliefs that fall outside the conventional understanding.
Two passages that I believe show the idea that hinge-propositions are beliefs, is the examples given in OC 284 and 285, but that they are beliefs there is no doubt. There are too many examples to list. Wittgenstein never denies that they are beliefs, he denies that they are pieces of knowledge, and knowledge goes beyond mere belief, in that they are beliefs that are justified in some way, according to particular language-games.
It's true that hinge-propositions solve the problem of infinite regress, but that's not the thrust of OC. His main goal is to come to grips with the nature of these kinds of beliefs, and this he never finished. My theory is that they are prelinguistic, and when language comes into the picture they become foundational beliefs that everyone swallows as part of reality.
By the way all propositions are beliefs. Thus a hinge-propositions could very well be called a hinge-belief. In fact, that may be a better way of talking about them.
So...
Witt has examples of conventional JTB in his writing(follows convention).
He denies that Moore's propositions are propositions in the conventional(JTB) sense(follows convention).
He denies that Moore's propositions are knowledge.
He always stays within the bounds of language(follows conventional JTB).
He denies the justifiability/dubitability of Moore's propositions(original as far as I know).
He claims that knowledge must be dubitable(original as far as I know).
He claims that all doubt is belief based(original as far as I know).
He never calls hinge propositions "hinge beliefs".
He never actually claims to have found a hinge proposition.
He does not call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions".
His notion of hinge proposition includes their being outside of the conventional understanding of JTB.
The conventional notion of JTB has belief as propositional in content(he seeks hinge propositions).
The conventional notion of JTB requires being justified in believing some proposition(he denies Moore's justification).
Everything he bangs on about uses JTB as the standard for what counts as knowledge.
A hinge proposition, if set out sensibly, would dissolve the problem of justificatory regress.
Justificatory regress is/was an issue for JTB.
He made himself famous as a result of dissolving historical philosophical 'problems' by virtue of showing how they were a result of language use negatively affecting one's subsequent thought/belief. It looks to me like his aim was to show that justificatory regress was just another example of the bewitchment of language by virtue of showing how some belief are beyond and/or are outside the scope of applicability with regard to justification. The consequence is clear. They cannot be knowledge(JTB).
Thus...
He denied that they were.
What more is necessary to warrant believing that Witt worked from the conventional notion of JTB?
What I've argued here shows why it is the case that we ought not place too much unwavering importance upon the act of justification. If we do we will inevitably lose sight of the fact that it is just plain not necessary in order to form and/or hold justified true belief.
Not all justified true belief is existentially dependent upon language. Any and all positions that hold otherwise are just plain wrong. They work from utterly inadequate notions of thought and belief, notably that all belief is propositional in content. All reports of thought and belief are propositional in content. A report of thought and belief is not equivalent to thought and belief.
Witt follows that mistake. Hence, he did not ever look for hinge beliefs. He was himself, bewitched by language use.
Do not get me wrong Sam. I am not at all denying Witt's brilliance and/or the novelty of his thinking. There are entire schools of thought as a result of it. He clearly added to our understanding of how many different things can go into the attribution of meaning.
He was not without fault though, and he clearly expressed his hope that someday someone or other would pick up where he left off, to put it mildly.
I don't think that there are such things as "hinge propositions" or hinge beliefs, at least not in the sense that all other thought and belief are grounded upon them. Some thought and belief are grounded upon actual events. Witt couldn't arrive at that because he worked from beliefs as propositions(having propositional content). He did not draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, and did not do so as a result of holding to conventional notions such as JTB.
I did much on my thinking about OC on my own, and what I find interesting is how well it matches up with many of those who have studied Wittgenstein. Obviously there are other interpretations of Wittgenstein's thinking, but I think much of my interpretation fits rather well with what's being taught, and with what some of his former students have written.
The problem with what you're claiming is that it doesn't fit with the common ideas gleaned from his writings. For example, that "...all other thought and belief are grounded on hinge-propositions," he certainly didn't say that. It's true that hinge-propositions ground epistemological beliefs, but some hinge-propositions (beliefs) are bedrock, they have no ground except as our inherited background. In that sense they are the ground. And this notion that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs is about as far away from what Wittgenstein is saying as you can get. Moore's propositions are expressed beliefs, i.e., Moore makes the claim that he knows he has hands, and if this is not an expressed belief, then what is? Wittgenstein goes on to demonstrate that Moore's propositions/beliefs are hinge-propositions. It seems odd to me that you would suggest otherwise.
Where did you get this interpretation? Is it something you came up with on your own, or did you get it from what others have written, or both? It's a very different take, and of course there's nothing wrong with thinking outside the box. I did some of that myself.
No problem. I'm glad you took it well :yum:
Well-received humor lightens a disagreement.
Quoting creativesoul
Is Dennis 1967-2018 a known temporal order? I already gave you the bullet points of his life.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm not asking for conflation of time periods or existences. The shorter time periods remain implicit under the existence of Dennis 1967-2018. I'm simply asking to consider an existence which isn't selectively chosen for its compatibility with the very propositions it is supposed to negate.
Dennis 1967-2018 is not just an arbitrary scramble, but the life of a person. What besides bias for the premises necessitates the sweeping of Dennis 1967-2018 under the rug in favor of smaller bites fitting conveniently in the mouth of the argument?
Quoting creativesoul
According to your own interpretation of the example. The example presents a mundane notion of an existence, and illustrates that the outline doesn't parse it. Is the existence of Dennis 1967-2018 a valid notion? Is the outline meant to deal with any and all valid notions of existence? If yes to both, Dennis 1967-2018 is a counterexample.
I no longer understand your objection. I've conceded that Dennis exists prior to and after the transplant. Nothing you have presented follows what I've put forth. It's quite simple.
That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.
You've provided Dennis, who had a heart transplant during his lifetime. Are you claiming that Dennis prior to the heart transplant is/was existentially dependent upon the heart transplant?
This is quite the specious claim, my friend.
Pots and kettles.
Prior to the heart transplant, Dennis is/was not existentially dependent upon it. After the heart transplant, Dennis is/was. What's missing?
Where does your example effectively parse out these distinctions?
Sure. I mean it could be if it fits into some coherent scheme. All alone, strictly speaking, it cannot be valid. Validity is a measure of coherency/consistency. That requires following the rules of correct inference. Loosely speaking...
Sure...
Quoting HuggetZukker
It does...
Quoting HuggetZukker
Come now, you'll have to do better than this. The existence of Dennis 1967-2018 is not an example of that which exists prior to the heart transplant. It is an example of that which exists prior to and after the heart transplant. So, while the existence of Dennis 1967-2018 is an intelligible notion, it is not a valid counterexample to the outline.
Gotta love the rhetoric! It's a shame that so many people are more persuaded by it than good sound reasoning...
Dennis 1967-2018 is not a valid counterexample. That's what...
Specifically, Dennis 1967-2018 is not an example of that which exists prior to something else, if the something else is a heart transplant that occurred in 2010.
There are two clearly defined variables - that which exists prior to something else, and something else. You've not satisfied those parameters. A valid counterexample must...
Does he?
Where at in OC does he clearly call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions"?
By the way, I'm not judging either way whether or not Witt himself held that hinge propositions were beliefs. It seems that he would have. I'm bit baffled why you would think that I've suggested otherwise. I merely pointed out that I cannot remember any of his notes including "hinge beliefs"...
What I clearly remember is his description of bedrock beliefs, and talk of the spade turning up. This fed into his expression of not being able to get beneath language. If hinge propositions are bedrock, and the spade turns up here, then given that propositions are existentially dependent upon language, it would seem that we cannot get beneath propositions(language). He then goes on to further bolster this notion by pointing out how all examples are linguistic/propositional.
That's my down and dirty quick review of his overall thoughts on the matter.
Here's my critique...
An example of thought/belief is a report thereof. A report is not always equivalent to what's being reported upon. JTB is inherently incapable of drawing and maintaining the distinction between beliefs and reports thereof simply because all knowledge claims accompanied by the act of justification are reports. JTB was originally meant to provide a useful outline for further discriminating between knowledge claims. The notion of belief is left sorely neglected. This is clear as JTB fails to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. One must believe a proposition... That's all the attention that was ever really paid to the belief aspect of JTB.
Witt was working on parsing this out, I believe. His talk of arational beliefs, and propositions falling outside the conventional notions, suggested that knew that some belief were not arrived at via rational/reasonable means such as argument, etc. I suspect he knew that not all belief were grounded upon other belief. There had to be an 'end' to justification. It seem that that would be at the beginning of thought and belief. However, because he delimited his own pursuits by staying within the bounds of language, he could not conceive that simple, rudimentary beliefs are not existentially dependent upon language.
I guess the problem happened when you said the following: "It is also my understanding that Witt never found what he was looking for(a single hinge proposition). He called them "hinge propositions"... not hinge beliefs." In this quote you seem to suggest here that hinge-propositions are not equivalent to hinge-beliefs. All of Moore's propositions are by definition beliefs. If you were simply saying that he never used the phrase "hinge-belief," then I agree. It just seemed strange that you would say that if you weren't pointing out some difference between the two. For the most part they're equivalent.
Also, something that I forgot to say in reference to your statement above. You said that it was your understanding that Wittgenstein never found what he was looking for, viz., "a single hinge-proposition." His point was that all of Moore's propositions were hinge-propositions, which was why he thought there was something strange about using the word know in reference to his hands in response to the skeptic.
Quoting creativesoul
If you want a specific passage, there is none, but the implication is so clear that virtually no one that I've read thinks otherwise. His whole effort in On Certainty has to do with the special nature of these propositions/beleifs.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, but bedrock beliefs is just another way of talking about hinge-propositions, another way of describing their special nature. He also implies they're pre-linguistic as I pointed out in a previous post. I don't find your interpretation of Wittgenstein to be accurate on these and other points. I've already stated, it's not just that you're coming up with an interpretation that goes against my interpretation, but you seem to be going against much of what's said about OC. It doesn't necessarily make you wrong (although I do think you are), but it should make you suspicious of your own conclusions.
I don't know why you're emphasizing JTB in reference to OC, because it's not the main thrust, at most it's a very small side issue.
Quoting creativesoul
This is another of your points that doesn't follow from the text. I already partially pointed this out earlier, but there is much that contradicts this idea. The mere fact that beliefs are shown, as Wittgenstein points out over and over, demonstrates that these (hinge-propositions) beliefs are pre-linguistic and not dependent upon language.
I've asked at least twice where you came up with these ideas, but you don't seem to want to answer the question. The reason I ask, is that I was wondering if someone besides yourself wrote about these ideas.
There is intelligent life out there in the universe.
I neither believe nor disbelieve this as the evidence and arguments presented so far are equally good on both sides. Pyhrro and Sextus made this into a philosophy to live by where all belief was allegedly suspended
Carneides famously went to Rome to argue eloquently one day on behalf of Roman justice, just to turn around the next day and and refute everything he said.
I don't know about suspending judgment in everyday matters, but you certainly can in philosophy, or with statements that are unknown, such as the existence of life beyond Earth.
Maybe I could word this a bit better. All propositional claims that something is or is not the case, i.e., that someone asserts as either being true or false, are beliefs. One can assert a statement without believing it however, but that just means that it's not a belief that you subscribe to, but that someone else subscribes to. You may even, as you pointed out, suspend your belief, but then it's just not your belief.
I think we do suspend belief in everyday matters. I may come to a fork in the road not knowing which way to turn; and as I listen to two of my friends give equally good arguments for turning left or right, I may just say, "I don't know, which is correct," thus I suspend my belief. Either assertion is not something you believe. They are propositions, it's just that you don't subscribe to either.
That's an interesting way to define propositions. I would have thought propositions were stating either the truth or a falsehood, and it was up to us to find reasons to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement about any proposition.
So why make the content of propositions belief?
We make the content of a proposition a belief if it's something someone believes, something someone asserts as true or false. One has to act on the proposition for it to become a belief. If I read a statement that asserts that X is either true or false, I have to to do something in relation to the statement for it to become a belief for me. So I may assert that it's true, or I may assert that it's false, then it's my belief.
I repeated myself for emphasis. Beliefs are an interesting topic. There are other kinds of beliefs that are pre-linguistic.
Such as having two hands?
Of course it almost goes without saying that there is no ultimately correct way to use such words. Indeed, the whole discussion is simply about finding a way to use them that is more or less consistent.
The simplest grammatical structure seems to me to be that some strings of words are statements, and that those statements that can be either true or false can be called propositions.
Add to that, different statements can say much the same thing, have much the same use, such as "It is raining" and "Rain is falling", and that it is sometimes useful to say that these statements express the same proposition.
Further, an individual or group can adopt an attitude towards a given proposition, such that they hold the proposition to be true. We call this belief.
It's from here that the discussion should proceed.
It seems to me, and I have said it before, that Creative reifies thought and belief. I think that is an error; thought and belief are not things, but shorthand in a word game about explaining our actions.
Surely they are more than just actions. The stuff between our ears is what is responsible for our actions. It sounds like another form of behaviorism.
Dismissing this view as behaviourism might appeal to some; including those who are more interested in winning than thinking.
A swampman, a philosophical zombie, and a BIV go into a bar ...
Quoting Banno
Take an atheist in a devout Christian society. Wanting to avoid certain undesirable consequences, they go to church, confess their sins, and stay within acceptable conversation. Where would you locate their disbelief?
May I suggest that you re-read the first page?
:wink:
Proceed? That's been adequately exhausted more times than I care to remember. You really should pay a bit more attention. This isn't our first time going over this...
An attitude towards a given proposition is metacognition. Metacognition is thinking about thought and belief. Thinking about thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Some thought and belief is prior to language. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon propositions or language.
It seems to me that both words are nouns, and nouns are persons, places, or things. Thought and belief are not persons or places.
I've also asked several times for you to argue for this gratuitous assertion that I'm reifying thought and belief. I'm not conflating material things with abstract things. I'm not conflating concrete things with abstract things. I'm situating thought and belief where it belongs, based upon what all thought and belief have in common. The argument I offer has the strongest possible justificatory ground, and I would guess that you are well aware of this...
Thought and belief are not the kind of things that have spatiotemporal location.
Edit: I see creative agrees.
Quoting Banno
That's what the thread reduces to, even if it does not say that in the OP.
Don't tell me. Show me.
This is very poorly written.
Do you have a specific example?
How we use words like "proposition" counts as current language use. Current language use requires language.
Some thought and belief do not.
That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.
Some thought and belief are prior to language. Some thought and belief are prior to our use of "proposition". This thread covers both. Our use of "proposition" is not the only thing this thread is about.
Any reduction in scope that leads to a sole focus upon terminological use is inherently inadequate. Your suggestion is this.
How is "Experience exists prior to subsequent experiences, and is existentially dependent on subsequent experience, namely existientiElly" poorly written?
Experience exists prior to subsequent experiences, 'thrownness', but is existentially dependent on this thrownness into the world, to be ones potential for being. Experience is existentially/existentielly (wherever you want to draw a line of demarcation is irrelevant) dependent on the experience it is not yet, and only in terms of this being not yet can experience be.
And so your contention that something prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent on it is false in terms of experience... Or... Existence...
Yes. And that continues, I see.
The former would be throwness if the person has yet to have begun thinking about his/her own belief. The latter experience could be when one is beginning to question one's own belief.
Saying it doesn't make it so.
Just reiterating your completely unsubstantiated assertion does not prove it.
All you are doing is reiterating a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge
What I'm arguing only requires one example to the contrary in order to negate it.
Ya got one or not?
Vague bald assertions won't do here.
Alright, let's fill this out a bit...
My mother gave birth to me. All my experience prior to this conversation cannot be existentially dependent upon this conversation. It didn't exist. My being born is not existentially dependent upon this conversation. This conversation is existentially dependent upon my birth.
That general idea holds good across the board.
Your claiming that something can be existentially dependent upon something else that doesn't even exist.
What proves it is that there are no examples to the contrary. None. That's the strongest possible justificatory ground.
What you are saying is a strawman. And I have provided a contradictory example.
The potentiality of it existed and according to the law that everything that CAN happen WILL happen... In a certain, very real sense, it did exist... But this is irrelevant, because my point still stands. All experience is existentially dependent on further experience, which may or may not be real yet. A psychic fact is a fact nonetheless.
Talking in terms of a continuum is not a problem for the outline. Evidently, you do not understand what a valid counterexample requires...
The irony.
There's the claim in question.
Fill it out with your counterexample. There are two variables. Given them value.
Strictly speaking, we all are.
Making up your own laws?
Nice.
Does that make them true?
:lol:
Rubbish.
The discovery of carbon was an experience. The discovery of carbon is not, was not, and is/was in no way at all existentially dependent upon my birth. My birth was/is also an experience.
See?
That's how it's done. A valid counterexample, I mean.
Now you try.
Oh, but you have not. You provided a contradictory claim. A gratuitous assertion, nonetheless, that has been subsequently, and quite validly, shown to be false(by reductio).
Unless, that is, you wish to claim that the discovery of carbon was existentially dependent upon my birth. Seeing how my birth happened about 5700 years after carbon was discovered, if that's the case you're making, I've nothing further.
The whole of my experience is all of it. The whole of my experience does not exist prior to any particular part of it. Thus, the whole of my experience is not a problem at all for the outline.
It's not that I'm denying such notions. It's rather, that such notions aren't a problem. This was already demonstrated earlier with Dennis...
Wrong...the names of activities and processes can also be nouns.
:yikes:
Well they are not things in the sense of being determinate objects; and I think the idea that you think they are such things is what Banno was criticizing.
Activities and processes are better thought of as doings or becomings, not as beings. I have had this disagreement with you before; where I have pointed out that there is pre-linguistic believing and thinking, but that it is misguided to say that there is pre-linguistic having of or holding beliefs or thoughts, because the latter is a confused way of talking that suggests that pre-linguistic beliefs and thoughts are determinate objects which can be mentally 'held'. This is a deceptive analogy with the notion of physically holding an object that many minds fall into; and I believe Banno is right to think that you are one of them.
I've a couple of directions to go from this.
First...
Indeed. Banno has raised this point a number of times. I'm not denying that I'm prone to talk in terms of having and/or holding a belief. That's just layman's talk.
Do you find that such talk is somehow instrumental to the position I argue for? I mean, do you find that I cannot effectively set out thought and belief without saying those things?
I strongly assert that all thought and belief consists of the same basic set of elemental constituents, of which, we can acquire knowledge thereof.
Does that require me believing that thought and belief are determinate objects?
OK, but this being a philosophy forum perhaps more precise, less confusing ways of speaking about it would be more productive.
Quoting creativesoul
Well, if all you are saying is that animals think and believe, then what you claim is nothing controversial, but something that I believe most would take for granted.
To sum that I would say that thoughts and beliefs as the kinds of things that can be held; are dependent on language; whereas thinking and believing as organic pre-linguistic processes are not. It's not rocket science!
Why is it ok to talk about thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language in terms of being held but it is not ok to talk about thought and belief that is not existentially dependent upon language in the same terms?
And no...
It's not rocket science. It underwrites rocket science.
Because words enable thoughts and beliefs to be held before the mind in determinate forms.
Well, for someone who has levied several different charges against my position, I'm surprised that you do not know what I mean by "elemental constituents". Those would be what all thought and belief consist of, thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language notwithstanding.
So, thought and belief that are dependent upon language are determinate objects?
All you are saying is that the constituents are what thought and belief consist of; which is really saying nothingat all or just expressing a tautology. So, what exactly are those constituents?
Well not really. It's expressing the fact that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon other things.
Well of course. Language enables us to become aware of the fact that we have thought and belief, in addition to allowing us to be able to think about our own thought and belief. Furthermore, it also allows much more complex thought and belief to be formed.
As it pertains to the OP...
Metacognition is existentially dependent upon language. Some thought and belief exists prior to language. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Some thought and belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. That which exists prior to something else cannot consist of it. Some thought and belief cannot consist of language or metacognition.
Well sure, if that was all I was saying... I'm sure most folk would agree. On the other hand, there is a large swath of philosophers who would not... lest they would suffer incoherence and/or self-contradiction...
The position I'm arguing for has the broadest scope of rightful application that I am aware of. It rightfully applies to everything ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or written - as a measure nonetheless. I don't think most folk would take that for granted.
No, but verbal expressions of thought are determinate objects...you know, like written words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs and texts and auditory sounds and combinations of sounds, and so on.
Quoting creativesoul
What, you mean like we have to have experiences of things and events before we can have thoughts and beliefs about them?
If that's what you mean, it's obvious, but experiences of things and events don't constitute thoughts and beliefs about them; surely there is a distinction between constitution and dependence.
Quoting creativesoul
I can't see that you are arguing for any position which does not merely consist in truisms; tautologies which no one would deny. I'm sorry to say I can't find anything substantive there to either disagree with, or to use as a beginning point for further discussion.
If thought and belief are not determinate objects, and verbal expressions of thought and belief are, then it only follows that verbal expressions of thought and belief are not equivalent to thought and belief.
So...
When you speak of holding thought and belief, in order for you to meet your own precision standard, you ought be talking in terms of holding expressions of thought and belief.
Have you justified your charge towards me yet? If so I missed it.
That's odd.
If there's nothing to disagree with, and what's been said is applicable to everything talked about, then one could begin application of these true claims anywhere they so choose. I've been piddling with such things the whole thread.
Well no. That's not what I'm saying.
Yes. Surely there's a distinction between elemental constitution and existential dependency. There's also a relation that matters here.
What I'm saying is this...
All thought and belief consist of the same set of elemental constituents. Some thought and belief exist prior to language. That which exists prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon language. That which exists prior to language cannot consist of language.
If put to good use, this outline coupled with a good understanding of thought and belief, squarely places both truth and meaning prior to language. I've not made that argument in this post, but have in the thread and elsewhere. I could easily do so if you like.
You figure that that is just something that everyone would just agree to?
How about you?
No, the beliefs are held only within the verbal expressions of believing, otherwise they would not be expressions of believing. In other words you hold a belief only as an expression of believing; the believing itself, as process, cannot be held.
Quoting creativesoul
I see no reason to believe that. What are those "elemental constituents"? That's the first question; if you can answer that, the next question would be 'what reason do you have for thinking they are always the same?'.
Held...
Like keys?
Can you?
Gotta love the irony...
Dontcha?
:vomit:
Quoting Janus
So, beliefs are not expressions of belief, but rather beliefs are held only within the verbal expressions of believing...
Yeah.
That's exactly the kind of precision we're looking for.
Have you justified the charge you levied against me earlier?
Mirror, mirror...
Pots and kettles...
Projection...
Special pleading...
Double standard...
Yeah yeah, I know. I'm a dick sometimes.
You have something better than this to offer two face?
On my view, "holding a belief" is a proxy phrase meant to simplify what would be an otherwise unwieldy manner of speaking. Creatures that have and/or hold belief are the ones that draw, have drawn, and will once again draw the same or similar enough correlations between different things. All thought and belief consists of such correlations(as does all attribution of meaning). The drawing of the correlation is thought and belief formation. That's how it's always done. That is the basic process. Now, this process, if we must call it such a thing, is replete with the presupposition of it's own correspondence to fact/reality, and the attribution of meaning which makes perfect sense in light of the fact that all thought and belief is meaningful and presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line.
Point being...
Don't take the phrase "holding belief" too literally or seriously. It doesn't serve as philosophical ground.
Academia found itself with the need to further discriminate between equally coherent(in terms of a lack of self-contradiction) but diametrically opposed positions and/or claims. Hence, JTB was 'born'. While this proved to be and yet still remains a very useful way to measure knowledge claims(despite Gettier), it also helps one to determine whether or not such claims warrant our assent. However, unfortunately it doesn't draw the aforementioned distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. To be fair, that wasn't an obvious problem to people centuries ago, for it wasn't at all obvious that there was such a distinction. After-all, most still held hat humans were 'special' in their ability to reason, and this was one of the many distinctions historically drawn between humans and animals. Across the board there was and there remains overwhelming evidence to suggest that no philosopher from any camp ever drew this distinction. Rather, the evidence clearly shows that there are multitude of different positions that are built upon the conflation itself. These range from Berkeley through today, as far as I know.
The result?
It's simple. Comparing/contrasting different knowledge claims is nothing more than examining different statements of thought and belief. Further analysis renders belief content in terms of propositions, or believing that some statement/proposition or other is true; is the case; is the way things are;etc. All sorts of different ways, from oppositional groups even from Russel to Rorty, to arrive at the same conclusion... that all belief is propositional in content.
That conclusion either sorely neglects the distinction, and or dubiously presupposes that there is no difference between belief statements(reports of belief) and belief. All of this actually underwrites Gettier as well. What gives his criticism a foothold is an utterly inadequate understanding of what it takes to believe a disjunction. His paper is nothing more than the consequence of a gross misunderstanding of thought and belief. That clearly shows by how he represents and/or takes an account of Smith's belief.
To put this in proper context of the existential outline...
If it is the case, as history has mistakenly held, that all belief is propositional in content, then it is also the case that belief is existentially dependent upon propositions. This has consequences...
Either propositions exist prior to language(no one wants that justificatory burden), or there is no such thing as non-linguistic belief.
Convention has obviously worked from the latter. That's part of how we've gotten to all the talk about mentalese, and absolute presuppositions, and all the other notions meant to take account of how we are able to invent and/or acquire language. It's also what Banno has been helping me with for quite some time now... all the different conventional notions of belief. Notably, the all-too-common one that belief is nothing more than an attitude towards some proposition.
That's a perfect description of thinking about thought and belief, and it follows nicely from historical convention. Sincere speakers believe what they write. That is, they believe that what they're writing is true. What they're writing is statements/propositions. Here again, we're putting things in a way that supports the idea that belief content is propositional. This has the same consequence...
There is no such thing as non-linguistic(ir prelinguistic) belief. At least, it cannot possibly be the same kind of belief that us - special - humans form and hold. It cannot possibly have the same 'structure'...
Ah bullshit...
Don't get me wrong here, the much more simplistic thoughts and beliefs that other creatures are capable of forming and/or holding pales in comparison to the sheer level of complexity that human thought and belief can acquire. These differences and/or 'degrees' of complexity are developed and/or actually determined solely by virtue of the complexity of the correlations themselves. This can be readily observed even within different groups of humans. It completely underscores the notion of "being refined" or "having a refined palate" or any other such continuum that places rudimentary simple talk on one end and purportedly complex and much more sophisticated talk on the other.
This site offers a steady diet of just such things...
My opinion?
More often than not it's nothing more than unnecessarily overcomplicated language. I'll say nothing about the psychology of the users, for it varies tremendously in my experience.
"In later publications appeared as everything that can happen will happen."
I agree with this.
But contrary to your seemingly involuntary opposing reaction... I said that this point was mostly irrelevant with regard to what I have said, because my previous point still remains.
Quoting creativesoul
1. There was no discovery of Carbon. There was a discovery of a classification of things characterized to contain what it called Carbon. This is not 'experience' in the strict sense. This is a model.
2. 'EXPERIENCE' itself aside from all deviations, demarcations, etc, in the strict sense is dependent on further experience, yet EXISTS (to be, to stand out from [etymologically]) prior to further experience. And death, the ultimate end of the line, renders experience nonexistent.
3. Your constant straw man is getting a bit frustrating. How on Earth could you take what I am saying and mutate it into the following "the discovery of carbon is not dependent on my birth"?
Life (its subsistence) is existentially dependent on life that is not yet and is prior to this not-yet life, for life already exists. If there were to be no more life that is not-yet then life would become nonexistent; therefore it is dependent on it.
Experience is dependent on further experience, namely experiences that are not yet for that subject (whatever it may be or may not be) is prior to these subsequent experiences; and these further experiences are not subsidiary, I may add.
Thought is dependent on more thought, namely thoughts that are not yet; perhaps, the potentiation of thought. If I think something, these thoughts only are if there are more that would be concatenated with THOSE thoughts, otherwise... What would they be? What would thinking be if there were no more thoughts and no more thinking? There would be nothing. Actually... There would be [nothing, no words]. There would not be NOTHING but a bracketed nothing; that is, [blank].
Color would not be anything unless there were more colors. Notice a trend here? Existence is constantly moving?
"Time is the moving image of eternity" Plato
Namely, the temporal domain (a posteriori) versus perhaps, what is a priori.
My sexuality exists prior to the object of my sexuality (for it is indeed MINE) which determines it yet is existentially dependent on such an object that would be subsequent.
Maybe what can be said is "What is indeterminate can not be existentially dependent on the determinant it is prior to."
I've nothing further...
Look, all you're doing is talking about stuff that makes sense in it's own context. Your mistake is not realizing that what you've put forth is not a problem for the existential outline.
We can say that the concept of Experience includes any and all experience, and we can further discuss this notion. We do so by making sure that whatever we say about "Experience" is true of any and all experience. This notion of Experience would begin at the first and end at the last. So...
It doesn't pose a problem for the outline, for if someone were to try to carve out some small bit of the whole Experience - say the very first experience - and then claim that the very first experience is existentially dependent upon the very last experience, then that person is guilty of self-contradiction at worst and/or equivocation at best. It is unacceptable to use the same term in the same argument in two different senses.
We have "Experience" as a whole. That includes all individual particular cases of experience.
We have individual particular cases of experience. These are all part of the whole.
The claim in question is this...
That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.
You want to say that the very first experience is existentially dependent upon the very last experience because together they make up the whole "Experience". I would agree with that, for we're merely outlining the parameters of our speech. We would be defining our terms. Here's the problem...
There are two variables in my claim. You're attempting to use three different values.
Experience, or becoming, or phenomenality, or Dasein, or whatever synonymous idea is always dependent on that which it is not yet but is prior to this 'it not-yet'.
Paraphrasing... if one knows what it would take for a claim to be true, then one knows what the claim means. The consequence here is that it would be quite possible for a listener(myself in this case) to better know what a speaker's words mean(Blue's purported counterexample in this case) than the speaker them self does.
Odd. A bit uncomfortable. Seems to be the case though.
Experience, experiencing, the flux of events that is one's life, THE CONTINUUM, not the illusion of causality or segments. Lets call this X.
Experiences, plural, constitute this experience. Lets call this Y. Each individual experience is something said to be apart from what it is a part of. I say, I have experienced such and such, but what I am really doing is premising the prereflective cognition; the realization that I am constantly in a new experience. This is the only truth with regard to experience. An experience is never isolated. This is only in theory.
My life is of experience. This experience is prior to experiences that have not been to materialize yet. This experience of experience that is my life is prior to any experience(s) that have yet to come; and my experience's subsistence is existentially dependent on these experiences.
X is existentially dependent on Y and X is prior to Y.
Life is dependent on the life to come and is prior to this life to come.
Blather...
I'm over it. Come up with something that makes sense.