Janus

I have to be honest here: call me obtuse, but I have to say I don't have any idea what Wittgenstein is getting at in those passages from PI. Can it be...

Quick searches produced these from Merriam Webster: MISTAKE noun Definition of mistake 1 : a wrong judgment : misunderstanding 2 : a wrong action or s...

Just look up dictionary definitions of the two words and see if there is any consistent conceptual difference.

This may be of interest, or perhaps take the discussion in a new and hopefully fruitful direction: http://christianebailey.com/wp-content/uploads/2012...

OK, that I can certainly agree with.

OK, then I must have misunderstood you, because I had thought you had said that context exists only in individual temporal instances and not between o...

"The map is not the territory". There is the common model, the "in-hereness" of shared human understanding of the world, as distinct from the "out-the...

Yes, and about how the "world stage" emerges from the earthly; the geological, floral and faunal environment.

Types have identities, just as tokens do. So the type <dog> has an identity as a kind, just as an individual dog has an identity as an individual. Ide...

How do you know "what they mean to say" if there is no context in common?

If you follow that logic it leads to the conclusion that only you exist: solipsism.

Yes, I agree that signs and symbols occur only in the context of sentient/ sapient beings. And I also agree that the things that become signs and symb...

I think smoke being a sign of fire, and the like, are different than, for example a letter symbolizing a sound or a sound symbolizing an object. I wou...

Which joke?

He got this idea from Heidegger no doubt.

It's not difficult to understand. Use is deploying a word, phrase, sentence, group or groups of sentences to refer, command, entreat, explain or whate...

Smoke may be a sign of fire, but it is not a symbol of fire. Seems obvious to me. I think Peirce's distinctions between signs, ikons and symbols make ...

OK, fair enough. I guess if you cannot identify any points of disagreement then there effectively is none.

I don't think we are disagreeing about anything; I thought it was you that had doubts, since you said "I don't know"; which suggests that you think we...

Sure it is a matter of understanding following conventional associations. I don't think chess is a very good analogy, but I agree we don't understand ...

What do you think we are pretending then? We are not pretending that (some) words (sounds and groups of visual symbols) are associated with objects by...

I don't think "pretend" is a suitable term here. We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience. Against...

Right, I didn't say that the correlations animals make when "reading" signs of prey or predators or water and so on cannot be symbolically represented...

I said it was one thing that can give that feeling, not that it is the only thing. And I don't believe it's the same for everyone anyway; for some peo...

They may cultivate your emotions, for example empathy, or not. Depends on the person, I guess.

I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about. For animals scents and sounds are signs of prey, for example, but they don't represent prey symbo...

I still don't know what you mean by "only one way of doing it" or why only one way follows from knowledge being cumulative. The theory implies that kn...

Yes, Peirce is good on this if you are interested.

"Drawing correlations" is not necessarily a symbolizing activity. It could be as simple as responding to signs, which many kinds of animals do all the...

I think you may sharpen your critical knives when you read (some) philosophical works (that is if the works you read sharpen their critical knives). T...

Why would "we each only have one way to do it with, though" ? I am not aware of any compelling argument for that conclusion. I think novel constructio...

Maybe you have. As I said it may well be different for each of us, so better not to generalize. I do doubt that "sayable sense" could mean anything li...

Profundity in this context is a matter of feeling, not intellectual complexity and conceptual density or depth. The inability to "let go". Being stuck...

My experience is that the unexpected connections are precisely not made in the "normal" way, they don't feel 'normal' at all. Having said that I'm not...

You know this from experience? And even if this has been your experience what leads you to conclude that it must be the experience of others? Actually...

I'm still not really clear on what is meant by "normal mechanism of thought". In the altered states of consciousness I have experienced, through music...

Why can't experience be phenomenal even if the "normal mechanism of thought" (whatever that is meant to be) is not occurring?

I dont understand this. If the feeling present in mindfulness is one of all-encompassing interconnectedness then it is not "similar to ordinary consci...

Is our "extant construct system" itself not just another construct according to you? To know that all we experience is a construct, you would need to ...

I don't agree with what you're saying, in particular that you seem to be downplaying the role of the things we experience in constraining our sensory ...

Sure, but the "traffic lights" scenario is a different context, no? In any case as an interesting aside to introduce another wrinkle in the fabric, an...

So, for you, there is no per-linguistic affectivity? If so, this would seem to contradict some of your arguments in your 'Private Language' thread. Fo...

I haven't thought about the distinction between showing and telling much; but to give a quick answer i would say that they are more or less synonymous...

You say here that the content of what is said is not what it shows, and you said that use replaces content, which seems to suggest that what is said s...

I said artworks do not show use; you say 'the use of a poem is not what it is about". Is this meant to be a disagreement? I'm not sure what you mean b...

This can't be unequivocally right, since the content of poems, music and art works is what they show. Artworks do not show "use". There is also a vali...

OK, in that case I have misread you. In any case I identify the fialure to see that conflation of what is actually with what is merely logically possi...

If shopping carts are left scattered around waiting for those whose job it is to put them where they belong, then inconvenience will be cause to those...

You're conflating discursive explication and explanation with the kinds of evocation to be found in poetry. You're making my argument for me. Their cl...

This seems obvious; just as language, and linguistically mediated experience, mirrors the "primitive" pre-linguistic experience.