We can be short about this one. Banno is applying the common linguistic meaning of proposition and creative soul is talking about the philosophical term. Both right but talking about different things. Next!
bongo furyDecember 22, 2020 at 22:57#4821610 likes
But, when used to define belief, the two senses of the word are alike in appearing (superficially at least) to deny beliefs to cats, who are oblivious to either sense.
Deleted UserDecember 23, 2020 at 00:46#4822010 likes
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We can be short about this one. Banno is applying the common linguistic meaning of proposition and creative soul is talking about the philosophical term. Both right but talking about different things. Next!
Very much yes. It's why I wanted the debaters to refine the sense of proposition before engaging in the debate.
If your sense of the proposition is like: so long as there exists a string of words which states the belief content at some point in time [hide=***] (up to logical equivalence)[/hide] then the belief content is propositional because it can be stated, then yes of course it's propositional.
But if your sense of the proposition has the modality associated with that italicised "can" be temporal - IE there are some beliefs in some organism, or some beliefs at some points in time which cannot be stated at that[hide=*] (or any accessible)[/hide] time, then no of course belief contents aren't always propositional.
I do not expect @creativesoul and @Banno to ever argue this crucial point regarding the modality of expression of belief statements in their debate, so I expect it to be a clash of worldviews without any interfacing - an exchange characterised by attempting to shift frames of interpretation for belief than regarding any thematisation of belief [hide=**] (the frame spelling out the nascent assumptions regarding belief that would be the substantive disagreement)[/hide]
Sort of disappointed with Banno’s reply. He didn’t address what it means for a child or a cat to “believe” that the mouse ran behind the tree. To insist that they do, despite not knowing any language, is to be proposing something like Steven Pinker’s mentalese, which is a bit cheating.
I figure dogs just live in the moment most of the time. They hunt because it's instinct and it's fun. It's a bonus to them that it fills their bellies too.
Same with spiders and their amazing web construction:. they don't do it because they believe anything. They just do it.
Are humans any different? Symbolism is one of our hallmarks. The question is: did we have beliefs before we started expressing our beliefs in symbols?
I mean, it's possible that both things happened at the same time, right? Symbols, abstraction, not living in the moment just doing stuff by instinct?
Maybe only then would we be able to get a vantage point on our thoughts (separate the self from thoughts) so that I now have (own) thoughts and so own commitments (belief)?
Or maybe it wasn't ownership. Maybe it was 'The belief is upon me.'
bongo furyDecember 23, 2020 at 02:34#4822150 likes
Banno can grant beliefs to cats because he assumes beliefs are mythical folk psychology anyway. He needs them to be propositional so that they can be true or false all the same.
Others assume that beliefs are real mental furniture, or real behavioural or systemic dispositions. Or real something. They need to liberate them (the beliefs) from language in order to be able to grant them to cats without having to anthropomorphize.
I'm not really intent on participating here, but the sentence "the present king of France is bald" does express a proposition -- that there exists exactly one x such that x is presently king of France and x is bald -- and that proposition is false, because there is no x that is presently king of France.
The negation of "the present king of France is bald" is not just "the present king of France has hair", but "the present king of France has hair or there is no present king of France", which is true because there is no present king of France.
Also, I have not stopped beating my wife, because I never began beating my wife, because I've never had a wife.
And all my children are dead, yet I've never lost a child, because I've never had any children, and 100% of those zero children I've had are dead, while 0% of those zero children I've had have died.
the sentence "the present king of France is bald" does express a proposition -- that there exists exactly one x such that x is presently king of France and x is bald -- and that proposition is false, because there is no x that is presently king of France.
The underlying issue is that the subject term has no referent. Your comment is one proposal for handling such sentences.
That is, on Russell's view (and yours) the sentence entails that there is a present King of France. The entailment is false, therefore the sentence is false.
However on Peter Strawson's view (and my own and, I assume, Banno's), the sentence presupposes that there is a present King of France. The presupposition fails and so the sentence is not evaluable as either true or false. So the sentence does not express a proposition.
On a presuppositional view, one cannot evaluate a sentence as true or false when the subject term has no referent. For a programming analogy, to attempt to evaluate it is like attempting to dereference a null pointer.
Yes, so it's not enough that "the present king of France is bald" is grammatical and meaningful. There also needs to be a context such that it is evaluable.
Pragmatics is neither syntax nor semantics. — Pfhorrest
Yes, so it's not enough that "the present king of France is bald" is grammatical and meaningful. There also needs to be a context such that it is evaluable.
What I meant was that the strict logical content of a sentence doesn't always include pragmatically implied information. Hence the examples about all of my zero children, etc, as well.
We wouldn't usually bother saying anything about the King of France unless we thought there was such a person, so saying something about him does pragmatically presuppose there is such a person (i.e. in saying it in practice, you're acting as though you think such a person exists), but that doesn't make the sentence have some kind of indeterminate truth value, because its strictly logical content can still be evaluated to false.
In the same way that "all of my children are dead" pragmatically implies that I have had some nonzero number of children, all of which have died, but strictly logically equates to "there does not exist any x such that x is my child and x is not dead", which is true because there does not exist any x such that x is my child.
but that doesn't make the sentence have some kind of indeterminate truth value, because its strictly logical content can still be evaluated to false.
The point here though is that we normally use a sentence to assert something about a (referring) subject. If there is no subject, then we can't be asserting something about one - so the question of whether our assertion is true or false does not arise. Thus the sentence has no use, except perhaps to deceive, or (as you note) in situations where we wrongly thought there was a subject. But that doesn't change the fact that there was no subject to assert something of.
We are apt to fancy we are talking about sentences and expressions when we are talking about the uses of sentences and expressions.
This is what Russell does. Generally, as against Russell, I shall say this. Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a function of the sentence or expression ; mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or expression. [italics mine]
In the same way that "all of my children are dead" pragmatically implies that I have had some nonzero number of children, all of which have died, but strictly logically equates to "there does not exist any x such that x is my child and x is not dead", which is true because there does not exist any x such that x is my child.
Strawson has comments about the use of those kinds of sentences as well in "(c) The logic of subjects and predicates" on p343.
Anyway, just a different point of view to consider! The broader theme is discussed at SEP's Descriptions.
If your sense of the proposition is like: so long as there exists a string of words which states the belief content at some point in time *** then the belief content is propositional because it can be stated, then yes of course it's propositional.
But if your sense of the proposition has the modality associated with that italicised "can" be temporal - IE there are some beliefs in some organism, or some beliefs at some points in time which cannot be stated at that* time, then no of course belief contents aren't always propositional.
I do not expect creativesoul and @Banno to ever argue this crucial point regarding the modality of expression of belief statements in their debate, so I expect it to be a clash of worldviews without any interfacing - an exchange characterised by attempting to shift frames of interpretation for belief than regarding any thematisation of belief **
But words are just scribbles and sounds. Does a dog's bark or a dog's wagging tail qualify as a proposition?
bongo furyDecember 24, 2020 at 16:47#4825780 likes
we normally use a sentence to assert something about a (referring) subject.
Gosh.
"Subject" in the sense of grammatical [or logical] subject, a word or phrase (e.g. "snow" or "king of France") capable of referring to an object or subject-matter (snow or French king), but which is not itself, typically, what the sentence containing it is used to assert something about?
Or "subject" in the sense of a typically non-referring object or subject-matter (snow or French king) about which we use a sentence to assert something? ... Normally to the exclusion of referring to or asserting about any parts of the asserting sentence?
Snow. If I assert that the snow outside is white, then I am (purportedly) referring to snow outside and saying something about it. If there is no snow outside then that is a failure of reference. Hence, on Strawson's view, my assertion is neither true nor false (i.e., it's not truth apt).
On a presuppositional view, one cannot evaluate a sentence as true or false when the subject term has no referent. For a programming analogy, to attempt to evaluate it is like attempting to dereference a null pointer.
It occurred to me tonight that while you cannot access the data in a null pointer, you can still evaluate the attempt to access it as true or false.
I mostly only do web programming, but in that domain there is an awful lot of testing for the existence of features along the lines
if (object.method) {do stuff} else {error handling}
. If there is no such object, or the object has no such method, evaluating "object.method" will return false.
So
if (france.king.hairstyle == "bald") {polish his head} else {do nothing}
will result in nothing being done, because france.king.hairstyle is a null reference (since france has no such property as king) and so comparisons against it universally return false.
unenlightenedDecember 25, 2020 at 10:43#4827140 likes
Reply to Pfhorrest Do be careful with computational logic. It doesn't work the same as propositional logic, because instructions are not statements. "A= A+1" Contradiction as statement, simple commonplace instruction.
Snow. If I assert that the snow outside is white, then I am (purportedly) referring to snow outside and saying something about it. If there is no snow outside then that is a failure of reference. Hence, on Strawson's view, my assertion is neither true nor false (i.e., it's not truth apt).
Asserting that the snow outside is white isnt useful, as it is basically redundant information -as if snow could be another color. I don't know anyone that says such things, except in a philosophy forum.
But if you had said, "There is white snow on the ground outside", would that be any different? If there were no snow, then your sentence would be false, regardless of the color. Statements are either true (useful) or false (useless), not somewhere in between.
Harry HinduDecember 25, 2020 at 12:08#4827240 likes
Do be careful with computational logic. It doesn't work the same as propositional logic, because instructions are not statements. "A= A+1" Contradiction as statement, simple commonplace instruction
Yet A=A+1 still has meaning to both a computer and human being. Such statements produce real outcomes in both computers and human beings. Programmers often define instructions in a computer program as functions. Basically computational logic and propositional logic are just different sets of rules for using symbols. We can translate one set of rules to another. We do it all the time with different languages.
In this case, we have a statement/function that changes the definition of A, which is just a scribble that can mean anything at any moment we define it.
A=A+1 actually doesn't work in a computer program. You have to have A defined prior to this line in order for it to work. The A between the = and + actually means something else, so it's not a contradiction if you write the function correctly. So A=A+1 is actually only part of a statement/function, therefore is meaningless without A=1 before A=A+1.
bongo furyDecember 25, 2020 at 12:23#4827260 likes
if (france.king.hairstyle == "bald") {polish his head} else {do nothing}
will result in nothing being done, because france.king.hairstyle is a null reference (since france has no such property as king) and so comparisons against it universally return false.
Yes, that's a nice example where the language creators have designed it that way.
Whereas other programming languages don't permit null references at all, so that scenario can't arise.
With languages that do allow null references, one approach is to design classes that provide the appropriate context when instantiated. For example, by restricting the evaluation of a French King's baldness to those contexts where there is a French King. Which, in turn, simplifies reasoning about the code.
Asserting that the snow outside is white isnt useful, as it is basically redundant information -as if snow could be another color.
I'm making a comment about failure of reference. If that example doesn't work for you, then see the earlier "the present king of France is bald" example.
That's how it works, and drawing and maintaining the distinction between believing a mouse ran behind the tree, and believing that a description of those events is true does not in any way, shape, or form deny that some statements are about the way things are.
It seems to me that you're describing a state of affairs. So in this case, the state of affairs (or the ways things are) is that the mouse ran behind the tree.
A state of affairs is, at least, like a proposition. But perhaps different in the sense that no-one needs to have stated or believed it. Presumably mice ran behind trees before humans emerged to notice that kind of thing. Another difference is that states of affairs obtain (or fail to obtain) rather than being true or false.
So, on your view, can the content of belief be a state of affairs?
And for Banno, would a state of affairs count as propositional?
Never heard of yellow snow? You can certainly have polluted snow which is brown or black. You could also pour food coloring on it. Snow cones are a thing.
It's like saying, "Water is H2O", which is only true in the pure sense. Water often has other things mixed in. It's something to keep in mind in these philosophical discussions. The real world is messy.
A state of affairs is, at least, like a proposition. But perhaps different in the sense that no-one needs to have stated or believed it. Presumably mice ran behind trees before humans emerged to notice that kind of thing.
Sure, but for whom was the mouse behind the tree? A predator? The mouse? Certainly not the world. States of affairs are a bit tricky. They can contain hidden perspectives like "behind X".
Never heard of yellow snow? You can certainly have polluted snow which is brown or black. You could also pour food coloring on it. Snow cones are a thing.
It's like saying, "Water is H2O", which is only true in the pure sense. Water often has other things mixed in. It's something to keep in mind in these philosophical discussions. The real world is messy
LOL. Its not the snow that is yellow. Notice how you said there are other things mixed in. Those other things mixed in isnt snow. "Yellow snow" is simply lazy use of language. The snow wasn't yellow before you mixed something that isn't snow in.
Notice how yellow snow has more information than white snow because the former isn't redundant and the latter is.
Harry HinduDecember 26, 2020 at 08:06#4828550 likes
I'm making a comment about failure of reference. If that example doesn't work for you, then see the earlier "the present king of France is bald" example.
Like I said, its a matter of some string of scribbles being useful or useless. Scribbles that fail to refer are useless scribbles, just as a dog's bark or the wagging of its tail must refer to something that isn't another bark or tail wag, or else the bark or wag of the tail wouldn't be very useful behaviors. Drawing scribbles that don't refer to anything isn't a useful behaviour. What else could Banno mean by saying that meaning is use? Words are used to refer. If you didn't use scribbles to refer, then you didn't use words. It is what distinguishes scribbles from words.
bongo furyDecember 26, 2020 at 11:43#4828660 likes
Good questions, but I'm unwilling to discuss the debate here and now, while it's still in process. I will say that the bit about "the way things are" was introduced by Banno. I merely obliged by arguing how my position does not result in denying that statements can be about the way things are. Some clearly are. I do prefer different terminology, but my preferences are usually set aside when discussing this stuff with Banno. I would not introduce "states of affairs" either.
bongo furyDecember 26, 2020 at 23:53#4829990 likes
I wonder if that would work as an argument against Davidson: we can't tell if a sentence is truth apt unless we know the context of utterance.
"S" is true IFF S
That may be nonsense?
It's a rule (or definition) that states what it means for a statement to be true. We may not always correctly see how the rule applies. We might think that a particular statement is true that is not. Or we may think the rule applies in contexts where it doesn't.
But that's not a fault of the rule. It's just the fact of human fallibility even when we're being careful. So we develop pragmatic rules to help with that relating to the reasons/justifications for making assertions.
But that's not a fault of the rule. It's just the fact of human fallibility even when we're being careful. So we develop pragmatic rules to help with that relating to the reasons/justifications for making assertions.
What does the T-sentence rule have to do with justifications? It's usually associated with deflation of truth.
I actually didn't realise they were debating. I thought they decided not to.
Anyway, Banno needs to explain that beliefs are either true or false and make a case for his preferred truth bearer (whatever that is) and show that creative's candidate doesn't work.
If creative has chosen some sort of hardware event as his truth bearer, that's a fail.
bongo furyDecember 27, 2020 at 04:04#4830370 likes
Why the stubborn attachment to "subject" at all? Why not referent or object for snow, and term, word, phrase etc. for "snow"? Does a neo-Aristotelian perhaps need to equivocate systematically between the two senses?
Something to do with states of affairs having grammatical form?
That could explain the trouble it took to get you to examine the matter instead of presuming to lecture further.
Harry HinduDecember 27, 2020 at 07:02#4830580 likes
On what? What if the speaker was referring to a dream or a fictional story? There are many instances where the present king of France is bald would be true. So it would appear that it depends on what is being talked about. Propositions are always ontological in the sense that they are about how things are or are not. They are epistemological in the sense that the symbols and rules we agree to use to refer how things are or are not, are arbitrary. We could just as well use barks and tail wags to represent some state of affairs as we could use scribbles and utterances.
What if the proposition was, "The present king of France is imaginary." Does that not change what we are talking about, even though we are still talking about the present king of France?
Does this not show that some propositions have terms that are not clearly defined, or have multiple definitions, and which one is being used isnt clear? Thats why I demand definitions for these nebulous terms.
Just like a computer program, variables need to be defined before you can perform functions with them. Scribbles need to be defined before they can be used.
Harry HinduDecember 27, 2020 at 07:23#4830610 likes
What on Earth are all of these scribbles in this thread is about? Is it about a debate? What is the debate about? Is it about something being the case - the ontological nature of propositions and beliefs? Does a debate not assume that one side is closer to the truth than the other side, and that each side tries to show how their scribbles are more of an accurate representation of the ontological relationship between propositions and beliefs? Are you not trying to show something with your use of scribbles? I'm inclined to believe that many people here are more interested in hearing themselves talk than in actually solving problems.
Number2018December 27, 2020 at 14:16#4831000 likes
What is the debate about? Is it about something being the case - the ontological nature of propositions and beliefs? Does a debate not assume that one side is closer to the truth than the other side, and that each side tries to show how their scribbles are more of an accurate representation of the ontological relationship between propositions and beliefs?
Likely, when @Banno asserts that belief is always about states of affairs, this claim indicates a limited domain where beliefs are easily verifiable:
“If I were to say that belief is always about states of affairs, would you agree? Then it only remains to point out that a state of affairs can always be put in propositional form for us to see that beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form”. However, one can believe in God because one cannot know for sure that He exists. Similarly, one could believe in democracy, communism, climate change, etc. Here, knowledge has to be supplemented by belief; a belief emerges in order to compensate for the failure of knowledge. Even if knowledge and belief can assume the propositional form, they nonetheless express different manifestations of truth.
Harry HinduDecember 27, 2020 at 15:24#4831090 likes
“If I were to say that belief is always about states of affairs, would you agree? Then it only remains to point out that a state of affairs can always be put in propositional form for us to see that beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form”
Beliefs are not about what can be put in propositional form. How beliefs are communicated is a seperate problem than what beliefs are. Seems like you have to solve the latter problem first before solving the prior problem.
Putting beliefs in propositional form is just another state of affairs that is not the state of affairs that the proposition is about. We can talk about talking, just as we can talk about anything.
Number2018December 27, 2020 at 16:14#4831180 likes
Beliefs are not about what can be put in propositional form. How beliefs are communicated is a seperate problem than what beliefs are.
If I believe that it is raining, there is my mental state that is expressed in belief. Yet, would my mental state be identifiable and recognizable if I could not understand and articulate it in a sentence “It is raining”? The existence of the statement has two propositional dimensions: ontological subjectivity and a completely objective fact.
Harry HinduDecember 28, 2020 at 00:24#4832040 likes
Yet, would my mental state be identifiable and recognizable if I could not understand and articulate it in a sentence “It is raining”?
Again, communicating beliefs is a seperate issue than having beliefs. Making sounds with your mouth is a behaviour that expresses your belief just as covering your head and running inside does.
As an observer of others, your only have access to their beliefs via their actions. Do you need to observe your own actions to know you have beliefs? Do you need to say, "it is raining." to have a belief that it is raining, or do you simply need to experience water falling from the sky to have the belief that it is raining? If simply stating it is raining means you have a belief that it is raining, then who needs water falling from the sky to believe that it is raining?
Truth is undefinable. IOW, if you don't know what it is, no one could explain it to you.
Tarski's definition is, admittedly, abstract. However Aristotle's definition was:
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1011b25:To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.
But that's not a fault of the rule. It's just the fact of human fallibility even when we're being careful. So we develop pragmatic rules to help with that relating to the reasons/justifications for making assertions.
— Andrew M
What does the T-sentence rule have to do with justifications? It's usually associated with deflation of truth.
Nothing. I mean we develop other (pragmatic) rules.
Tarski's definition is, admittedly, abstract. However Aristotle's definition was:
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. — Aristotle, Metaphysics 1011b25
I could explain that if need be.
Very generous of you to explain correspondence theory to me, but it's wrong, Tarski knew it was wrong, and did not propose to define truth.
Very generous of you to explain correspondence theory to me, but it's wrong, Tarski knew it was wrong, and did not propose to define truth.
If you're referring to Tarski's undefinability theorem, then that's true for the object language, but not for metalanguages. And for that reason it doesn't apply to Aristotle's definition since, in effect, a metalanguage hierarchy is built in (i.e., statements presuppose a world but not vice-versa).
subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
So subjects are nouns? Looks like objects and subjects are synonyms, unless you're saying that objects can't be discussed, described, or dealt with. :chin:
Number2018December 28, 2020 at 15:29#4832770 likes
communicating beliefs is a seperate issue than having beliefs. Making sounds with your mouth is a behaviour that expresses your belief just as covering your head and running inside does.
As an observer of others, your only have access to their beliefs via their actions. Do you need to observe your own actions to know you have beliefs?
As far as I understand, your point is that our mental states are ultimately independent of the corresponding verbal expressions. This position fails to take account of the complex social and collective character of our beliefs. They are developed, shaped, and exercised within the networks of our interpersonal interactions. Can we reduce them to simple rituals and behavioural patterns, deprived of the signifying symbolic mechanisms?
My attempt at arguing against "belief content is propositional" in response to Reply to Banno 's most recent post.
Intentionality is the capacity of agents to have directed states towards things which are not themselves and for those states to have content regarding what the state is directed towards.
Eg, I grasp the cup; my body and mind are directed towards the cup in a specific way, to grasp it, to reach for its handle, to lift to to my mouth etc. This state is directed towards the cup. The content will include the location of its handle, the type of liquid in the cup, that the cup is to be grasped for drinking and so on. SEP characterises intentionality as:
In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. Furthermore, to the extent that a speaker utters words from some natural language or draws pictures or symbols from a formal language for the purpose of conveying to others the contents of her mental states, these artifacts used by a speaker too have contents or intentionality.
I will call an instance of intentionality an intentional state. The state in the example was an example of an intentional state. I will call the content of an intentional state intentional content. IEP describes intentional content as such:
The intentional content of an intentional event is the way in which the subject thinks about or presents to herself the intentional object. The idea here is that a subject does not just think about an intentional object simpliciter; rather the subject always thinks of the object or experiences it from a certain perspective and as being a certain way or as being a certain kind of thing. Thus one does not just perceive the moon, one perceives it “as bright”, “as half full” or “as particularly close to the horizon”. For that matter, one perceives it “as the moon” rather than as some other heavenly body. Intentional content can be thought of along the lines of a description or set of information that the subject takes to characterize or be applicable to the intentional objects of her thought. Thus, in thinking that there is a red apple in the kitchen the subject entertains a certain presentation of her kitchen and of the apple that she takes to be in it and it is in virtue of this that she succeeds in directing her thought towards these things rather than something else or nothing at all.
Summarised, then, intentional content is the character of the agent's intentional state, what kind of disposition is held - for what, for what purpose, what is felt and so on. [hide=*] (There are some issues here regarding "intentional objects" not being identical to worldly events; they might instead be representative mental states which regard them; but I shall assume that intentional objects can be worldly events)[/hide].
SEP gives "loving", "admiring" as examples of intentional states. They are thus marked by a few properties:
(1) Intentional states are relations between agents and some other domain; it might be an agent and an object (I grasp the cup), an agent and an agent (Sally loves Mary), an agent and some social institution (Robespierre was critical of monarchy), an agent and an abstraction (I believe 1+1=2) and so on. The agent comes in the first place in the relation, the other domain comes in the second place. [hide=**] (There are formulations that reverse the order, like Mary is loved by Sally, but that means the same thing as Sally loves Mary).[/hide]
(2) Intentional states are directional; logically and in terms of disposition. logically - Sally loves Mary doesn't mean Mary loves Sally - it might be unrequited and so on. Dispositionally, Sally's love of Mary is a disposition Sally has towards Mary; it has behavioural commitments, emotional resonances and so on.
(3) The relation ascribes some content to the relation which characterises the relation in terms of the agent; Sally loves Mary ascribes an understanding of love to Sally which she directs towards Mary. These contents coincide with the character of the disposition.
(4) The content ascribed is somehow a representation of the item of the other domain (the cup) that the agent (me) embodies.
For the remainder of the post, I will use "intentional state" to refer only to states which satisfy the first three properties. "Intentional content" will refer to the content of an intentional state with the above restriction. I'm doing this because I don't believe the dispute turns on the representational aspect of intentional states, and I believe it is contentious to claim that beliefs are representational.
I claim that belief is an intentional state in the weakened sense. This can be checked by going through the three items.
(1) The state of belief is directed towards some other domain; I believe 1+1=2, I believe my cup is on the table and so on. So belief satisfies (1).
(2) Belief is directional: I believe that 1+1=2 doesn't mean the same thing as 1+1=2 believes in me. Belief is also dispositional; I believe that 1+1=2 tells you an opinion I hold regarding 1,1 and 2 and engenders other commitments, things I will find obvious and so on. So belief satisfies (2).
(3) Belief has content: that I believe 1+1=2 has specificities to it, regarding the relationships of 1,1,+,= and 2 - I understand what role the terms play and how they relate, and in doing that I believe the statement. The specificities serve to explain the disposition I hold towards the statement as well as characterising my disposition.
At this point, it is worthwhile to take stock of what (1) to (3) demonstrate; the intentional content of my belief that 1+1=2 regards 1+1=2, the intentional content of my belief that my cup is on the table regards the cup on my table. In the latter case, I do not believe any item of language is on my table. What this shows, then, is that belief as an intentional state can be directed towards pretty much anything; there is no privileged domain of entities - like agents, statements, substances etc - that serve as the sole targets of belief understood as an intentional state. The important result is that belief can be directed towards things which are not items of language. So they need not, and typically do not, occur with accompanying statements. Statements expressing them them occur afterwards.
The phenomenology of intentional content is multifaceted; shapes, colours, textures, purposes, goals, moods, context all superimpose to give an agent's disposition in an action its character. Lois Lane's beliefs about Clark Kent are much different from her beliefs about Superman, despite that the two names co-refer.
Fleeting images, recollections and impressions stabilise into the emerging landscape of our interpretation of the world. It raises the question; does the intentional content of belief require any kind of linguistic expression to have its intentional content? In other words - does having intentional content require that it can be stated somehow? By whom and when?
An indicator that intentional content does not require a statement for it to have the character it does is that intentional states occur without being directed at statements; statements play no part in most beliefs we hold, except to express some of them afterwards. A strong indicator is that we can observe intentional behaviour in animals that do not have statements, concepts, or any of the social furniture we expect to surround opinion and belief, and they behave intentionally to such a degree that it is appropriate to attribute beliefs to them for explanatory purposes.
One attempt to sweep this line of questioning away would be: that the intentional content of belief is simply irrelevant to another sense of belief content which is propositional, but I do not believe this is the case. The intentional content of a belief is what makes it a belief and not any other dispositional state, and that can be seen by mucking with it. A statement of belief that some event is occurring is a commitment to the claim that it is occurring. Statements of the form "It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining" are weird. paradoxical even, and the intentional content of asserting that it is raining comes with the rider that the asserter believes that it is raining, because the act of asserting that it is raining in normal circumstances is rightly assumed to come along with the intentional state of believing the statement! The intentional content of belief is a necessary part of a statement of belief in its normal function.
Now we need to swerve into Banno's argument:
Banno:"The belief is not a statement" is not the same as "the belief has propositional content". It is not something I wish to defend.
Very well!
Banno:The event is not a statement. But that the event occurred can be stated. The belief is not in the form of a statement. but it can be stated. And so on. The flow of your argument seems to be that there is an analogy to be draw between "The event is not a statement" and "The belief is not a statement" such that the conclusion is that the belief does not have propositional content.
There is a major tension between the lack of requirement for a belief's intentional content to be stated and Banno's requirement that the content of belief must be able to be stated. So let's examine it.
It seems the construal of "content" being propositional is that "that the event occurred can be stated". Let's focus on the modality and scope of that "can". Clearly agents have intentional content which they cannot state at the time the intentional state occurs for various reasons. That content could be fuzzy, temporary, weird, ultra specific, highly contextual, anomalous, idiosyncratic etc. To give an example from a detailed description of eye movement patterns when someone is looking into a box of teabags to pick one out to make tea: "during the search phase, subtask relevant teabag features are attentionally prioritised within the attentional template during a fixation" - "subtask relevant teabag features" are whatever aspects of the arrangements of teabags in that box of teabags which facilitate the belief that those teabag aspects are useful for using those teabags to make tea. At the time, the agent cannot articulate what teabag features promoted their actions. Notice that the agent's attention was drawn about the box without requiring any beliefs at the time towards statements of which teabag features were subtask relevant. In that respect, intentional content occurs irrespective of later translation into language. So there are circumstances where people have beliefs and they cannot be stated.
However, there is still the possibility that "can" has a much more ambitious scope; that there exists a statement, even if purely hypothetical and never uttered, which expresses that the belief occurred and its character. With this, we are quantifying over hypothetical objects that bear no relation to the context a belief is formed in and gains its character and content in. That seems sufficiently absurd to conclude the argument. If beliefs attain definite content absent the formation of statements which describe them at the time, why would the content of those beliefs depend upon hypothetical objects which are made later?
I am sure that there is a way to thread the needle there, to describe the sense of that modality without absurdity, but I don't see it in @Banno's argument. Yet anyway.
bongo furyDecember 28, 2020 at 18:24#4832930 likes
in precisely this sense, which is the one you chose when offered a choice.
Fine. Other words for the same kind of thing are available, but that needn't matter, as long as we aren't confusing the two senses. Attachment to "subject" in preference to "object" or "referent" only seems suspect because of,
... which looks very much as though you are using the other, conflicting, sense of the word at the same time. Because, the only obvious reading of "(referring) subject" is to have it mean "word or phrase that refers".
This opposite sense is Strawson's, but he adopts it consistently and exclusively. He does discuss Russell's (further) distinction between grammatical subject and logical subject; but obviously both of these are "snow", and not snow. And we don't
In that respect, intentional content occurs irrespective of later translation into language
It's hard to picture what sort of intentionality could be connected with uninterpreted data.
IOW, I think you're assuming that at some base level of awareness I know the brownish data is tea. Or that I believe it's tea?
Are latent portions of your worldview really down there in the hardware?
Imagine people from several different time periods observing the sky. Their beliefs about the sky are radically different. Is their base awareness of it different? If so, then I think this would be a significant threat to any sort of realism, which requires an uninterpreted realm as a platform for variation in belief.
It's hard to picture what sort of intentionality could be connected with uninterpreted data.
I don't think it's uninterpreted, nor do I think it's interpreted in the manner we'd usually associate with words, essays, statements and so on. I think it relates to your thread on types of information; is semantic content restricted to words? Maybe not! The underlying ideas motivating my post were regarding salience as director of actions and as a driver of the formation of intentional content. Do you characterise intentionality as a property of already formed spaces of perceptual features and agents, or do you characterise it as guiding their formation?
That underlying theme could've been developed more, and I agree that it's a hole in the account.
Are latent portions of your worldview really down there in the hardware?
My specific account? I don't know, I just hope I'm right. People's worldviews in general? I think so. Priors are a thing, it's rare that we find something we have no frame of interpretation for.
As far as I understand, your point is that our mental states are ultimately independent of the corresponding verbal expressions. This position fails to take account of the complex social and collective character of our beliefs. They are developed, shaped, and exercised within the networks of our interpersonal interactions. Can we reduce them to simple rituals and behavioural patterns, deprived of the signifying symbolic mechanisms?
Correspondence is a mental activity. When you use words, you have a belief about how words are used. But what about when you need to use a screwdriver? Do you need words to use a screwdriver, or just the visual of someone using a screwdriver?
Social environments are just a type of natural environment. Sure, being raised by wolves as opposed to apes can have a drastic impact on how you interpret your environment, but we are actually talking about the various environmental niches that certain species fill in the environment. Different rules are required to accomplish different goals. Apes and wolves have different goals, but also similar goals. They both require food and mates, but different food and different mates. A wolf does not interpret an ape of the opposite sex as a thing to mate with. It interprets it as food, or a trespasser in its territory.
Number2018December 29, 2020 at 14:15#4834450 likes
When you use words, you have a belief about how words are used. But what about when you need to use a screwdriver? Do you need words to use a screwdriver, or just the visual of someone using a screwdriver?
Any YouTube video about learning how to use a tool has a complement of verbal or finger-alphabet instructions. When one learns how to work with a screwdriver, she necessarily places herself into an already-given organized space where physical motions and bodily dispositions are combined with a set of cognitive operations, believes, and attitudes. There are no mere imitations, mimicking or the manifestation of instinctive tendencies. It is the enactment of the heterogeneous variety of social presuppositions. A learning process presupposes the existence of various institutionalized practices, ordered by the hierarchical system of oral or written instructions, guidelines, programs, etc.
I'm not finished with the article, but I'm just noting that the author is acknowledging that beliefs have propositional content (maybe some other kind is also being allowed and I haven't gotten to it yet).
"For example, if I am sitting in my garden and register some fluttering in the periphery of my vision, then my internal brain states will change to encode the perceptual hypothesis that the sensations were caused by a bird. This minimizes my surprise about the fluttering sensations. On the basis of this hypothesis I will select prior beliefs about the direction of my gaze that will minimize the uncertainty about my hypothesis. These prior beliefs will produce proprioceptive predictions about my oculomotor system and the visual consequences of looking at the bird. Action will fulfill these proprioceptive predictions and cause me to foveate the bird through classical reflex arcs. If my original hypothesis was correct, the visual evidence discovered by my orienting saccade will enable me to confirm the hypothesis with a high degree of conditional certainty. We will pursue this example later using simulations."
Perhaps! It reads like a class of propositions with unspecified content to me. Which sensations? What's the character of the perceptual features formed? To me there seems to be a big gap between having sensations caused by a bird's actions, and, say, "I saw the wings of a starling fluttering by". The former class of phenomena underdetermines the latter, the latter is an aggregation and stabilisation of the multiple instances of the former (bird caused sensations leading to bird caused stable perceptual features of the bird as an explanatory hypothesis for those sensations).
Perhaps! It reads like a class of propositions with unspecified content to me. Which sensations? What's the character of the perceptual features formed?
I think it's as specific as it needs to be. A person sensed rustling and made a half conscious hypothesis based on previous beliefs.
To me there seems to be a big gap between having sensations caused by a bird's actions, and, say, "I saw the wings of a starling fluttering by".
My point was that the author expressed the garden-person's beliefs as a proposition. No quotation marks are needed for that. If octupi evolve toward something more intellectual, it may be that they'll express propositions in light patterns on their skins. We would still express the proposition in words because that's what we do.
The former class of phenomena underdetermines the latter, the latter is an aggregation and stabilisation of the multiple instances of the former (bird caused sensations leading to bird caused stable perceptual features of the bird as an explanatory hypothesis for those sensations).
I didn't get the impression the author thinks people actually say things like "the rustling is caused by a bird."
I once did an amazing pirouette in the woods because I was running and caught a glimpse of the pattern of a venomous snake. I was only vaguely aware of this during my feat. I went back to see, and I wouldn't have been surprised if it would have just been a pattern in the leaves. It was a snake, but not the venomous one I was trying to avoid. So yes, I think it's apparent that prior beliefs can shape our actions in a time frame that doesn't allow articulation.
I think the author expressed that the sensations were caused by the bird. I don't think the author expressed which sensations were caused by the bird, or anything about the nature of the sensations. Other than that they were caused by the bird.
It's like the difference between "I saw a bird" and "I saw a bird with black wings".
My point was that the author expressed the garden-person's beliefs as a proposition.
So I agree that they expressed that the sensations were caused by a bird as a proposition, I don't believe that implies that the sensations which were caused by the bird were expressed as a proposition.
So yes, I think it's apparent that prior beliefs can shape our actions in a time frame that doesn't allow articulation.
:up:
Maybe this comes down to a modality thing; if you see a proposition as an eternal abstract object, whatever sensations were caused by the bird are easy to construe as one. If you see a proposition as associated with a real (set of) statements or language items, that the time frame blocks (simultaneous) articulation in a statement is more troubling; as there's no statement to to bear the proposition at the time.
I think the author expressed that the sensations were caused by the bird. I don't think the author expressed which sensations were caused by the bird, or anything about the nature of the sensations. Other than that they were caused by the bird.
It's like the difference between "I saw a bird" and "I saw a bird with black wings".
For example, if I am sitting in my garden and register some fluttering in the periphery of my vision, then my internal brain states will change to encode the perceptual hypothesis that the sensations were caused by a bird.
The author doesn't know what caused the fluttering. There's supposed to be some brain states associated with a perceptual hypothesis.
Maybe this comes down to a modality thing; if you see a proposition as an eternal abstract object, whatever sensations were caused by the bird are easy to construe as one
The sensations are easy to construe as an eternal abstract object? That's weird.
If you see a proposition as associated with a real (set of) statements or language items, that the time frame blocks (simultaneous) articulation in a statement is more troubling; as there's no statement to to bear the proposition at the time.
Why do you need a statement to express the proposition at the time?
subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
— Andrew M
So subjects are nouns? Looks like objects and subjects are synonyms, unless you're saying that objects can't be discussed, described, or dealt with.
Depending on the context, they can be interchangeable. Alice (the subject) is kicking the ball (the object). Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). In the first, it is Alice that is being described. In the second, it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form).
Harry HinduDecember 30, 2020 at 00:41#4835750 likes
Depending on the context, they can be interchangeable. Alice (the subject) is kicking the ball (the object). Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). In the first, it is Alice that is being described. In the second, it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form).
It seems to me that both sentences are describing both things, because both sentences say the same thing, just from different views.
I think at this point creativesoul and Banno are saying the exact same thing with different words. They don't really seem to disagree. When Banno said "All beliefs have propositional content" Creativeoul (and I suspect most people) heard "All beliefs are statements in our minds" so Creativesoul tries to dismantle that. But it's more like "All beliefs can be put into a statement". Seems defnitional to me, not much you can disagree with there. Like "Bachelors are not married".
Why do you need a statement to express the proposition at the time?
I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it?
Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring"
Cool. The opposite sense of subject to Strawson's sense, but fine if you are careful not to mix in that other usage without notice, or without noticing. Ah, but you see no such requirement.
subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
— Andrew M
So subjects are nouns?
You instead immediately resume the confused (Aristotelian?) insinuation of some benign parallelism between the two, which the philosopher has just clarified, if only we followed the clear logic.
Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). [...] it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form).
The philosopher has no robes.
unenlightenedDecember 30, 2020 at 12:01#4836570 likes
Being able to ride a bike involves being able to to do whatever it is one has to do to ride and remain upright. I believe I can do whatever it takes ...
"All beliefs are statements in our minds" so Creativesoul tries to dismantle that. But it's more like "All beliefs can be put into a statement".
This is the difference between them. "I believe that the ground will not swallow me up when i step through the front door." is a belief that can be expressed as a proposition (as can be seen), but not a statement that anyone has in mind except when doing philosophy. I have it in mind that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the skirting board hole, but there are no statements in the cat's mind, but a nameless anticipation.
In order to express a belief as a statement, one needs to believe that the words exist and have meaning.
How does one arrive at the belief that "'mummy' means something", at that beginning age when one does not yet believe that 'means something' means anything? The first word is necessarily a complex of beliefs in communication that cannot yet be stated. Language developed as a set of beliefs and practices that did not start with the expression of those linguistic beliefs.
I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it?
I think that when I reflect on my interaction with the world, I frame it as a conversation. As I probe my environment, it's like I'm asking questions. True propositions are the world's answers. False propositions could be mistakes I made in discerning the world's voice, or they could be wrong hypotheses, or attempts to deceive. Like Heidegger, I think this reflective state lives alongside a more fused state.
I asked Nagase this same question once. He said something like "I don't feel the need to address that.".
I think that when I reflect on my interaction with the world, I frame it as a conversation
I do that too. I noticed that I frame my interaction with the world as something like a conversation while reflecting, but that I retroject the narrative beats (as it were). Like they're conjured by the reflecting state as a summary. I think of the narrative beats as a retrojected framing device that inspires us to act as if the story we've just told ourselves is true. I've had plenty of experiences where I've had to revise the narrative - they're panicky, like missing a step on the stairs or hurting someone unexpectedly.
Like Heidegger, I think this reflective state lives alongside a more fused state.
That makes sense. Heidegger (as Dreyfus reads him) has a related distinction. Stuff like propositions; in the form of subject-predicate expressions; are tacked on after most of what we do, and it's very inviting to mistake the moves we've made in conceptualising the world as properties of the world - even conceptualising it in a manner that it somehow always fits into declarative statements.
I do that too. I noticed that I frame my interaction with the world as something like a conversation while reflecting, but that I retroject the narrative beats (as it were). Like they're conjured by the reflecting state as a summary. I think of the narrative beats as a retrojected framing device that inspires us to act as if the story we've just told ourselves is true. I've had plenty of experiences where I've had to revise the narrative - they're panicky, like missing a step on the stairs or hurting someone unexpectedly.
Exactly! We're drawn to conclude that propositions are abstract objects by the logic of communication. If I agree with you, it doesn't make sense to say that I'm agreeing with either the sounds you made or the sentence you uttered.
It's to the proposition you expressed that I agree or disagree. The marks of the proposition's origin in a constructed narrative appear in the fact that I have to reference your point of view in order to understand you.
It's here that propositions finally become unglued from their temporal, linguistic genesis. The point of view you had when you spoke is in stasis. I join you in a position outside the world, on an eternal xyz axis.
That makes sense. Heidegger (as Dreyfus reads him) has a related distinction. Stuff like propositions; in the form of subject-predicate expressions; are tacked on after most of what we do.
Exactly! We're drawn to conclude that propositions are abstract objects by the logic of communication. If I agree with you, it doesn't make sense to say that I'm agreeing with either the sounds you made or the sentence you uttered.
The article I linked to you in the previous post explores the issue. Whether you are agreeing with what you've heard is quite different from hearing a proposition being expressed. The latter might be involved in the former in some cases, but it might not. Dreyfus construes the degree of involvement as the degree to which conceptualisation is required in understanding an act - even a speech act. Though (and the paper I linked argues) that the distinction isn't sharp and the two types of understanding it references should be understood reciprocally.
I agree we're drawn to conclude that propositions are both abstract objects and play a central coordinating role in the connection between practices that involve language and the world. The relevant aspect of it to me is whether being drawn to conclude in that way is an inappropriate framing brought on by ingrained habits of reflection; inappropriate because it misses the relevant phenomena (expression, the connection of intentional states to statements etc).
For Heidegger, the majority of what goes into expression, understanding, interpretation is termed "pre-predicative", that is a style of content distinct from the content of declarative sentences. That is signalled by eg. we can struggle to put things in words which are palpable, urgent and intimately understood. There is a certain compression involved, assertions are just one way of making sense. This is not to say that "there are things which cannot be said", but it is to say "understanding and crafting assertions requires a broader but distinct capacity of understanding the world than the understanding that we're putting into assertions". If someone restricts intentional state content to declarative sentences' propositional content (eg, making beliefs only target propositional content or propositions) it removes both the character of that content and the means of its interpretation.
Since you seem to like visual imagery, the kind of picture here is more similar to; assertions and the like attract meanings which they then engender, "putting things in words" - especially conceptually - is a kind of filter for content. The filter is sharp and distorts what is put in it, pliable square pegs in sharp round square-ish holes. Mistaking the properties of the filter for the properties of what's put in (expression) and what comes out (interpretation) - the dyad of expression and interpretation - is an easy error to make, as the practice of putting things into the filter -especially conceptually- is an ingrained habit. We reflect and see roundish lumps that've been put through the filter, if you realise the shape of the filter you might see that they were pliable square pegs all along.
Since you seem to like visual imagery, the kind of picture here is more similar to; assertions and the like attract meanings which they they then engender, "putting things in words" - especially conceptually - is a kind of filter for content. The filter is sharp and distorts what is put in it, pliable square pegs in sharp round square-ish holes. Mistaking the properties of the filter for the properties of what's put in (expression) and what comes out (interpretation) - the dyad of expression and interpretation - is an easy error to make, as the practice of putting things into the filter -especially conceptually- is an ingrained habit. We reflect and see roundish lumps that've been put through the filter, if you realise the shape of the filter you might see that they were pliable square pegs all along.
I'm answering your post backward. This last paragraph, taken alone, seems to be launching existentialism of a kind I can definitely embrace because I'm somewhat aspy and its very familiar. I rely on memorized soundbites to get through life, but when I'm tired, I can become almost completely nonverbal. It makes for awesome relationships. I also frequently have dreams that don't have rational components. I reach for metaphors and the content of the dream slips through the words like sand through my fingers. I totally get why Nietzsche suggested that the idea of truth takes hold when we've forgotten that we're talking in metaphors all the time.
If someone restricts intentional state content to declarative sentences' propositional content (eg, making beliefs only target propositional content or propositions) it removes both the character of that content and the means of its interpretation.
I agree. Art conveys truth that can't be squashed into propositions. Stephen King said that to stay faithful to childhood memories, our stories of those times have to be mixed with fiction (the english word "truth" is rooted in germanic wording that means fidelity.)
I have it in mind that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the skirting board hole, but there are no statements in the cat's mind, but a nameless anticipation.
An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?
I suggest: those very much future machines skilled not merely in the chasing of mice, but in the chasing of the imaginary trajectories of the pointings of mouse-words and mouse-pictures. A skill which is ascribable literally to humans from infancy. Only anthropomorphically to cats and present-day robots.
That's too restrictive for people who are sure cats literally have beliefs, of course. They must exclude robots some other way. If at all.
The first word is necessarily a complex of [s]beliefs[/s] [nameless anticipations] in communication [in the narrower sense of the chasing of trajectories in games of symbol-pointing] that cannot yet be stated. Language developed as a set of beliefs and practices that did [s]not[/s] start with the expression of those linguistic [and non-linguistic] [s]beliefs[/s] [anticipations].
unenlightenedDecember 30, 2020 at 21:28#4837220 likes
An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?
The thought police are a bit premature here. the legislation has not been passed, and the ten commandments do not specify. No we ought not.
bongo furyDecember 30, 2020 at 21:32#4837250 likes
When Banno said "All beliefs have propositional content" Creativeoul (and I suspect most people) heard "All beliefs are statements in our minds" so Creativesoul tries to dismantle that.
This could not be much farther from truth.
Beliefs have no spatiotemporal location, because it would need to cover the entire area between internal and external content. I have not claimed that beliefs are in the mind.
It seems to me that both sentences are describing both things, because both sentences say the same thing, just from different views.
Yes that seems right, since one logically follows from the other. That is:
(1) Alice is kicking the ball
(2) Alice kicking the ball is equivalent to the ball being kicked by Alice
(3) Therefore the ball is being kicked by Alice
Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring"
— Andrew M
Cool. The opposite sense of subject to Strawson's sense, but fine if you are careful not to mix in that other usage without notice, or without noticing. Ah, but you see no such requirement.
(or even better, omitted the qualifier altogether).
— Andrew M
I think I see how you're reading my sentences now. I used the qualifier to distinguish between an existing and non-existing subject (e.g., the present president of France versus the present King of France, say). But given the context, it wasn't necessary to qualify it, since the subsequent sentence dealt with the non-existing subject case.
Whereas you seem to see the qualifier as distinguishing between claims about the world and claims about words (e.g., snow versus "snow"). If the qualifier is removed, you see my sentence as ambiguous. Is that correct?
You instead immediately resume the confused (Aristotelian?) insinuation of some benign parallelism between the two, which the philosopher has just clarified, if only we followed the clear logic.
There is a parallelism between words and the world, as well as important differences between the two. Which we discussed a while back, as you may recall.
Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). [...] it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form).
— Andrew M
The philosopher has no robes.
I don't see a problem with what I wrote. Feel free to be more specific.
Beliefs have no spatiotemporal location, because it would need to cover the entire area between internal and external content. I have not claimed that beliefs are in the mind.
?
I didn’t say you did. I said you try to dismantle that.
Harry HinduDecember 31, 2020 at 08:56#4838520 likes
I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it?
Start off with the basics. When you have a thought of red, is the thought a color or a word? But then words can be colored scribbles. So is red a color with no shape or a colored scribble?
Statements are sounds and colored scribbles. So to say that you don't know how to think of red apples without sounds and colored scribbles doesn't seem consistent, when you think of words as words, but not apples as apples?
Words are just different types of sensory impressions. You see apples on tables like you see words on screens. You don't need statements to distinguish between words and apples or to have the belief that words and apples are different things. The distinction is obvious in the mind. You only need statements to communicate beliefs, not to actually have beliefs.
I agree. Art conveys truth that can't be squashed into propositions.
I agree with you there. I wanna push back on the idea (if you were suggesting it) that it's exclusive to art though. In terms of the expression of semantic content and engendering intentional content of interpretation, I believe artistic expression uses capacities everyday expressive practices do already. There's one of those where do you draw the line problems between art and non-artistic expressive practice.
I'm answering your post backward. This last paragraph, taken alone, seems to be launching existentialism of a kind I can definitely embrace because I'm somewhat aspy and its very familiar. I rely on memorized soundbites to get through life, but when I'm tired, I can become almost completely nonverbal. It makes for awesome relationships. I also frequently have dreams that don't have rational components. I reach for metaphors and the content of the dream slips through the words like sand through my fingers. I totally get why Nietzsche suggested that the idea of truth takes hold when we've forgotten that we're talking in metaphors all the time.
Dancing's a good example of a nonverbal expressive practice with its own kind of grammar, being attuned to a partner's rhythms I'd guess is a less contextually constrained version of the same thing. With a partner, you don't just have to learn the moves for a specific dance, you have to learn what dance you're doing. That tapestry of cues, interpretations and what is articulated by people's actions is the subject of a more phenomenological and pragmatic take on language and expression. Expecting to be able to fit such things into declarative sentences and being mystified when everything of substance is left out from such an account is the trauma that first silenced Wittgenstein ("whereof we cannot speak...", "“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.” from Tractatus) then attuned him to the essential saturation of language use with all that silenced him:
Philosophical Investigations:102. The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, I use it to say something.
103. The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.—Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.
105. When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs". The proposition and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut. And we rack our brains over the nature of the real sign.—It is perhaps the idea of the sign? or the idea at the present moment?
There's a real tension in any account that places speech acts; which are paradigmatic examples of expressers of intentional content [hide=*](commands, requests, etc)[/hide]; at the locus of control of expression, but cashes out the kind of content they express in terms of more circumscribed analyses of declarative sentences and their truth conditions. Only the pliability that comes with all expressions allows their square pegs to be deformed into the round holes of declarative sentence content.
Luckily, once the glasses have been taken off (and not replaced with a monocle), all that allegedly mystical stuff in expressive practices can be used to thematise itself. That's an embarking point for a phenomenological and pragmatic investigation of expression.
This sentence has tripped me up. I don't know what you mean.
I was gesturing towards something like: propositions are part of an interpretive device we use when analysing sentences and relating them to truth, to say that we hear them construes hearing as the kind of capacity that is characterised by the analysing the truth or falsity of sentences.
bongo furyDecember 31, 2020 at 16:31#4839180 likes
I don't see a problem with what I wrote. Feel free to be more specific.
Again?
You presume to lecture people on failure of reference. You cite Strawson, who uses "subject" explicitly and unambiguously in just one of its two notoriously opposite uses ("snow", not snow). But notions about Aristotle (or whatever) induce you to systematically equivocate between the two. So you are actually confused, here:
Reply to fdrake
So if belief was a movie, the protagonist's having an attitude toward a proposition is just one scene.
There are also moments in a garden where, having lost all grounding in belief, he enters into a state of paralyzing panic by a rustling sound. He eventually loses track of space and time and the spirit of Constraint comes upon him, locking down absurdity and zeroing in on birds.
"But what is a bird?" he asks, "If not a deadening label for the endless mystery of rustling and flashes of light amidst the humid aroma of moss and dirt?
We could get Nils Frahm to compose the soundtrack.
"But what is a bird?" he asks, "If not a deadening label for the endless mystery of rustling and flashes of light amidst the humid aroma of moss and dirt?
I imagine it's like Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency; the plot seems linear once you've already watched the show.
Do be careful with computational logic. It doesn't work the same as propositional logic, because instructions are not statements. "A= A+1" Contradiction as statement, simple commonplace instruction.
Just in case this wasn't picked up, this is not right. If the programming language is such that = is the assignment operator, which I think is what you had in mind, then the above simply means that different languages might use the same symbol for different things. In languages in which = is the equality operator, A = A + 1 equates to false. In languages in which it is the assignment operator, such as Java and Python, there exists another equality operator such as == such that A == A + 1 equates to false and means exactly the same as A = A + 1 in propositional logic.
Harry HinduJanuary 01, 2021 at 13:57#4841210 likes
Reply to Kenosha Kid
My reply to unenlightened showed that A needs to be defined prior to A = A + 1, or else the statement is false (it returns an error). You can't use a variable that wasn't previously defined to define a variable. Its like defining a word with using another word that hasn't been defined.
Kenosha KidJanuary 02, 2021 at 14:15#4842680 likes
Reply to Harry Hindu The assumption that he meant A to have some numerical value appears reasonable. Null pointer errors aren't very relevant to the discussion.
unenlightenedJanuary 02, 2021 at 17:11#4842820 likes
Eg, I grasp the cup; my body and mind are directed towards the cup in a specific way, to grasp it, to reach for its handle, to lift to to my mouth etc. This state is directed towards the cup. The content will include the location of its handle, the type of liquid in the cup, that the cup is to be grasped for drinking and so on. SEP characterises intentionality as:
One's intention is shown in one's acts. This I believe is partly the point of Wittgenstein's remarks about how beliefs are also shown in one's actions. For example, the act of picking up the cup or opening a door shows that we have particular beliefs about cups and doors. Moreover, these actions are quite apart from propositions or statements. Language came later, as something we attached to our mental states.
Mental content or mental states is necessarily reflected in one's actions. If there were never any corresponding acts, it would be difficult, if not impossible to ascribe a mental state to a person. This is true of beliefs, intentions, anger, love, etc. We don't ascribe mental states to trees, because trees don't exhibit the corresponding actions.
What I'm illustrating is that because intention is shown in acts; including speech acts; one's intention forms part of its content. eg, Asserting "It is raining but I don't believe it is raining" is a performative contradiction because one shows one believes a statement by asserting that it is so.
Would you agree that it shows that whatever the intentional content of belief is, because it is expressed (perhaps with some transformation/mutilation) through assertions it forms part of the content of assertions? But remains distinct from the content of the assertions?
Would you agree that it shows that whatever the intentional content of belief is, because it is expressed (perhaps with some transformation/mutilation) through assertions it forms part of the content of assertions? But remains distinct from the content of the assertions?
Yes, which is why, if I understand your point, I believe that although language expresses one's belief, it's not a necessary component of that belief.
Yes, which is why, if I understand your point, I believe that although language expresses one's belief, it's not a necessary component of that belief.
I think we're close then. I didn't want to say language in general was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content; I think there are good reasons to suspect that language use informs what we believe and how we believe it; but that declarative sentence content was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content.
I think we're close then. I didn't want to say language in general was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content; I think there are good reasons to suspect that language use informs what we believe and how we believe it; but that declarative sentence content was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content.
I think we're close too. I only want to say that there are certain base or foundational beliefs that arise quite apart from language content. However, there is no doubt that language plays an important role in how and what we believe. We use language to expand our beliefs, so I don't want to say that language in general is separate and distinct from all beliefs. I'm not sure about your last sentence. For example, what about declarative sentences that arise as we expand our beliefs using language?
Kenosha KidJanuary 02, 2021 at 20:23#4843100 likes
I only want to say that there are certain base or foundational beliefs that arise quite apart from language content.
Putting aside the foundational issue if we can. I'll agree that "hinge propositions" are a thing, hopefully not much turns on our possible foundationalist/anti-foundationalist dispute. I'm also quite happy to grant that some (many) beliefs are proximally due to environmental stimuli (events in the "form of life").
However, there is no doubt that language plays an important role in how and what we believe.
:up:
We use language to expand our beliefs, so I don't want to say that language in general is separate and distinct from all beliefs.
I don't either.
For example, what about declarative sentences that arise as we expand our beliefs using language?
I think it depends on the sense of "arise as we expand". Whether it's the declarative sentence that we've learned or invented doing all the work of expansion or whether there is an interplay between the expansion of intentional content and what our declarative sentences can express.
An example might be that a doctor's trained eye can look for abnormalities in an x-ray scan, the intentional state is abnormality seeking, Asserting "This is an abnormality" would be derivative of finding an abnormality. What I'm trying to highlight is that the content [hide=*](people with phenomenological leanings will hate me using the word this way, sorry)[/hide] of the abnormality finding state is expressed somehow in "This is an abnormality", it would also be expressed in whatever description of the abnormality occurred.
An example might be that a doctor's trained eye can look for abnormalities in an x-ray scan, the intentional state is abnormality seeking, Asserting "This is an abnormality" would be derivative of finding an abnormality. What I'm trying to highlight is that the content * of the abnormality finding state is expressed somehow in "This is an abnormality", it would also be expressed in whatever description of the abnormality occurred.
Do you see this as different from what I've expressed in other threads about beliefs states, say the act of opening a door, shows your beliefs about doors, expressed or not?
Someone else might express "This is an abnormality," as you exhibit the "abnormality finding state." Or, someone else might say he believes X, by observing some intentional act or another. This it seems to me (your e.g. as well as mine) shows that the belief is quite separate from the expression.
Harry HinduJanuary 03, 2021 at 09:23#4844590 likes
Do you see this as different from what I've expressed in other threads about beliefs states, say the act of opening a door, shows your beliefs about doors, expressed or not?
I don't know the specifics of your worldview enough to comment. By the sounds of this thread we seem to agree on things in context.
Someone else might express "This is an abnormality," as you exhibit the "abnormality finding state." Or, someone else might say he believes X, by observing some intentional act or another. This it seems to me (your e.g. as well as mine) shows that the belief is quite separate from the expression.
That sounds right to me. I have the sneaking suspicion that we disagree a lot on some nearby issues, but it's hidden by how you've used the words "separate" and "expression".
To a first approximation, let's imagine what a speech act expresses as a kind of inverse of interpretation. Call the process by which (speech) acts are mapped by people[hide=*] (perhaps people's aggregate activity insofar as that activity is relevant in context) [/hide] to interpretations "interpretation". Expression's then the process by which interpretations are mapped by people to speech acts.
Interpretation takes an act and gives it an interpretation. Expression takes an interpretation and puts it in a speech act.
In that view, if we look at the assertion "It is raining but I do not believe it is raining", the performative contradiction in it can be explained with: assertions of fact (speech acts) express that their asserters believe what they say is so. The intentional content of belief expressed in "It is raining" is [hide=*] (counts as)[/hide] that it's raining, which is contrary to what is expressed by the latter part of the phrase; another assertion of a fact, that the asserter does not believe it is raining.
"It is raining..."->(the asserter believes that it is raining), the -> is expression/showing.
I'd have it that because speech acts can (and indeed routinely) express intentional content in that manner, they should be considered as part of what speech acts mean. [hide=*]Though that relation of "parthood" is icky, as meanings can't be cut like pies.[/hide]
And in the context of the bone I picked with @Banno, I was trying to expand declarative sentence content (what they express) to include the intentional content of the speech acts which assert them, which I imagine goes against the grain of taking belief's content to be an assertion. Butchering it a bit for clarity: assertion's content is a belief vs belief's content is an assertion.
Kenosha KidJanuary 03, 2021 at 11:58#4845060 likes
but then it wouldn't be a contradiction, like they claimed.
I think you misunderstand what unenlightened was saying. In propositional logic, A = A + 1 is always equal to false, '=' being the equality operator. In Java or Python or such, A = A + 1 is true (if A is defined). But this is just because '=' is not the equality operator but the assignment operator, and assignments always either error or yield true: you cannot have false. Same symbol, different meaning.
Harry HinduJanuary 03, 2021 at 12:38#4845170 likes
Kenosha KidJanuary 03, 2021 at 12:43#4845190 likes
Reply to Harry Hindu Even without error, it equates to true in computational logic and to false in propositional logic. That was his point. A being null or undefined or non-numerical is not relevant.
Harry HinduJanuary 03, 2021 at 12:50#4845230 likes
So what? Different languages have different rules for the same symbols. We can still translate the meaning and end up saying the same thing in different ways. Computational logic can be translated to propositional logic and vice versa. The point is that the rules for using symbols to refer to beliefs is arbitrary.
Kenosha KidJanuary 03, 2021 at 12:55#4845270 likes
So what? Different languages have different rules for the same symbols. We can still translate the meaning and end up saying the same thing in different ways.
That was my counterargument, yes.
Harry HinduJanuary 03, 2021 at 16:36#4845660 likes
Reply to Kenosha Kid Right. So, computational logic and propositional logic only differ in the rules they use to refer to, or express, beliefs. You can still make commands with propositional logic and make propositions with computational logic, just using different symbols, like you do when using other languages. Proposition also means a program or plan about how to go about doing something.
So, unenlightened hasn't shown us any meaningful distinction when talking about what symbols and rules can be used to refer to, or express beliefs. It seems that symbol use and beliefs may be inherently related. After all, you need to have beliefs about how some symbol is to be used when using them.
Kenosha KidJanuary 03, 2021 at 17:25#4845830 likes
That sounds right to me. I have the sneaking suspicion that we disagree a lot on some nearby issues, but it's hidden by how you've used the words "separate" and "expression".
To a first approximation, let's imagine what a speech act expresses as a kind of inverse of interpretation. Call the process by which (speech) acts are mapped by people* to interpretations "interpretation". Expression's then the process by which interpretations are mapped by people to speech acts.
Are you saying that even our own speech acts are mapped to interpretation? So, that as I write these words I'm mapping my thoughts through the given speech acts? On the other hand, if I'm reading or listening to someone else's speech act/s it seems truistic that I interpret them, or as you say, the speech act is mapped to "interpretation."
Interpretation takes an act and gives it an interpretation. Expression takes an interpretation and puts it in a speech act.
Okay, so, an interpretation takes any act (speech or otherwise) and applies the interpretation, or overlays an interpretation onto the act. I take it that not all interpretations are speech acts. I may, for example, interpret an order given to me by going from point A to point B without any speech acts.
As to the latter part of this quote, any expression involving interpretation necessarily (my words) commits itself to a speech act.
In that view, if we look at the assertion "It is raining but I do not believe it is raining", the performative contradiction in it can be explained with: assertions of fact (speech acts) express that their asserters believe what they say is so. The intentional content of belief expressed in "It is raining" is * that it's raining, which is contrary to what is expressed by the latter part of the phrase; another assertion of a fact, that the asserter does not believe it is raining.
This seems rather obvious, unless I'm missing some finer point.
"It is raining..."->(the asserter believes that it is raining), the -> is expression/showing.
Are you saying that the expression "It is raining." shows or expresses that he/she believes it is raining? If so, it seems obvious, unless they are trying to deceive or mislead.
I'd have it that because speech acts can (and indeed routinely) express intentional content in that manner, they should be considered as part of what speech acts mean.
And in the context of the bone I picked with Banno, I was trying to expand declarative sentence content (what they express) to include the intentional content of the speech acts which assert them, which I imagine goes against the grain of taking belief's content to be an assertion. Butchering it a bit for clarity: assertion's content is a belief vs belief's content is an assertion.
I definitely don't agree that belief content is necessarily an assertion. I've said this time-and-time again. And, I definitely believe that an assertion is a belief, in the main, providing the intention is not to deceive or mislead.
I'm not sure that I've interpreted everything correctly, but I gave it a try.
Are you saying that even our own speech acts are mapped to interpretation? So, that as I write these words I'm mapping my thoughts through the given speech acts? On the other hand, if I'm reading or listening to someone else's speech act/s it seems truistic that I interpret them, or as you say, the speech act is mapped to "interpretation."
I hadn't given much thought to the mechanics of the mapping process; I imagine that it's done by agents utilising background knowledge of norms and commonalities - in Witty speak how a language game is embedded in a form of life, how epistemic notions require a background and so on.
What I meant to imply was that what speech acts express is dual to how they can be interpreted in context. The agent doing them expresses, the agents receiving them interpret. To a large degree, a speech act expresses that which it can be expected to be interpreted as. Just like a picture of a bird can be expected to be seen as a bird.
This seems rather obvious, unless I'm missing some finer point.
To be clear on the significance I think it holds; if intentional content is expressed in a speech act, so are the type of mental/agential states that characterise that intentional content (with some transduction/transformation involved). Overstating it a bit to provide an upshot; the "meaning is use" conception of language has the connection between mental states and speech acts as part of use, and thus part of meaning. To mix metaphors, Wittgenstein's beetles are crawling all over words and eating them from the inside, not inside our heads.
To be clear on the significance I think it holds; if intentional content is expressed in a speech act, so are the type of mental/agential states that characterise that intentional content (with some transduction/transformation involved). Overstating it a bit to provide an upshot; the "meaning is use" conception of language has the connection between mental states and speech acts as part of use. To mix metaphors, Wittgenstein's beetles are crawling all over words and eating them from the inside, not inside our heads.
I think I agree with the first part of this, but explain your last sentence a bit more.
I think I agree with the first part of this, but explain your last sentence a bit more.
There's a lot of philosophy that says that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, because the connection between a mental state and a word can't be constructed in accordance with a public criterion. Instead, the behavioural states associated with the mental states are treated as the sole informers of language use. In W's private language argument context I think this is a reaction against "language of thought" theories from Frege, but the private language argument can be read (sensibly) as support for logical behaviourism. As SEP puts it:
Analytical or logical behaviorism is a theory within philosophy about the meaning or semantics of mental terms or concepts. It says that the very idea of a mental state or condition is the idea of a behavioral disposition or family of behavioral tendencies, evident in how a person behaves in one situation rather than another. When we attribute a belief, for example, to someone, we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we are characterizing the person in terms of what he or she might do in particular situations or environmental interactions. Analytical behaviorism may be found in the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900–76) and the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–51) (if perhaps not without controversy in interpretation, in Wittgenstein’s case).
If it turned out that internal states were already expressed in words, that the connection between mental states and speech acts was itself part of the norms of language use, that would go against the logical behaviourist conclusions of the private language argument (when it's read that way). We already took the beetle out of the box, as it were.
There's a lot of philosophy that says that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, because the connection between a mental state and a word can't be constructed in accordance with a public criterion. Instead, the behavioural states associated with the mental states are treated as the use. In historical context I think this is a reaction against "language of thought" theories from Frege, but the private language section can be read (sensibly) as support for logical behaviourism. As SEP puts it:
I find it bizarre that anyone would think that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, as if minds don't exist. However, there has to be agreement publicly in terms of the use of words, it can't be about my own private mental state. One's mental state, say one's interpretation for example, is fit within the use of language that's decided publicly. I can't take just any mental phenomena and fit it into an expression as though I decide how a word or expression is used. So, although we have these private mental states, the act of expressing such states is decided publicly, not privately. One's private mental state does not automatically come mapped to some linguistic expression. Language is a public phenomena that we use to express mental phenomena.
I think those who interpret Wittgenstein as a behaviorist based on meaning as use have it wrong.
However, there has to be agreement publicly in terms of the use of words, it can't be about my own private mental state.
I think that applies definitionally; a use can't be set up/a word can't be defined with respect to only the presence/absence of a mental state. But it seems to me we can use speech acts to describe mental states and moreover that speech acts routinely express mental content. The philosophical thought experiment that makes the meaning of the word be the thought that motivated it is blocked, but I don't think that blocks language use in general from thematising mental states or expressing intentional content. Mapping the private with the public is part of the public.
EG, if I claimed that my partner makes me feel a special way and I called it "blimblam", and I described it as a composite of homeliness, horniness, care and calm. You'd know how to use the word. It's not my blimblam thoughts and sensations that are doing the work in the setting up the use of the word, it's leveraging the public criteria we share that characterise the use of those sensations and feeling words we both already know.
I think that applies definitionally; a use can't be set up/a word can't be defined with respect to only the presence/absence of a mental state. But it seems to me we can use speech acts to describe mental states. The philosophical thought experiment that makes the meaning of the word be the thought that motivated it is blocked, but I don't think that blocks language use in general from thematising mental states or expressing intentional content. Mapping the private with the public is part of the public.
I find no disagreement here. You seem to be arguing against something that I also disagree with.
What are facts, though? Presumably, not single objects. Larger space-time regions, of various (e.g. mouse-running-behind-tree) kinds?
Or platonic abstractions, like "states of affairs"? Do you allow such things on your watch? If so, why bother restricting "propositions" to statements?
True statements made about things in the world, that evidently are capable - somehow - of existing in their entirety, of being believed to be true, and of being true, without ever once being uttered/made/heard.
It is a phrase that ought be associated with the position he argues for/from.
In order for the belief of a language-less creature to be an attitude towards a proposition/statement, then eitheri.)propositions/statements must - in some way, shape, or form - be able to exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature could be even able to develop an attitude towards them, orii.)language-less creatures have no belief.
Neither is true.
Harry HinduJanuary 04, 2021 at 11:41#4847920 likes
All Creative had to do was to provide an example of a belief that has no propositional content; that is, a belief that cannot be put into the form "Fred believes that P", for some Fred. That's all the claim that beliefs have propositional content amounts to; It says nothing about cats and small children, let alone claiming that they cannot have beliefs.
"That cannot be put into propositional form"...
What does that have to do with the content of what's being talked about?
It does not follow from the fact that our accounting practices are propositional in content that everything we take an account of is as well.
Reply to creativesoul
Yes. It's probably just different senses of the term. To believe can specify an attitude toward a proposition, or an explanation for the behavior of a volitional being, or something in the way she moves.
Chalmers has a whole thing about how to determine if a conflict just comes down to wording.
Because a belief can be put into linguistic form (a proposition or statement) it doesn't then follow that the content of belief is necessarily linguistic. We observe all kinds of beliefs apart from the use of language. It would be as if we observe someone building a home, handling hammers and nails, picking up lumber, wiring the home, plumbing the home, and digging the foundation, and thinking to ourselves that they have no beliefs about the things they're handling, or the things they're doing. The very acts they're performing show the beliefs they have. It doesn't matter if the belief isn't stated. Moreover, what if a carpenter said he didn't believe in hammers and nails, and yet we see him/her handling hammers and nails almost everyday? Would you say his/her statement overrides the acts that show the opposite. No, you would say that the person is lying or being funny because the actions of the person tell a completely different story, one that contradicts his/her statements. In fact, we often put more stock in one's actions as a picture of what people believe, quite apart from what they say.
Because a belief can be put into linguistic form (a proposition or statement) it doesn't then follow that the content of belief is necessarily linguistic.
Once again, I note a failure here to understand what a proposition is. I think it's localized to this forum, unless somebody knows a source for this alternate meaning?
No, it has nothing to do with understanding a proposition, it has to do with understanding what the content of a belief is.
Right. The carpenter's behavior shows that he knows how to use a hammer. Why do you want to interpret the scene in terms of belief? Wouldn't Witti advise that we focus on using language to be informative? Therefore, in what circumstances would we talk about the beliefs of the carpenter? What would we actually say about his beliefs?
I think following that line of thought will avoid language on holiday, right?
Reply to frank Yes, it also shows that he has knowledge of how to use a hammer, his actions demonstrate the skill (there is knowledge as a belief, and knowledge as a skill). What Wittgenstein would advise, I don't know. Consider what Witt said in OC 284, "...we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not."
Consider what Witt said in OC 284, "...we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not."
Do you understand that this view is not in conflict with framing belief as an attitude toward a proposition?
We need a general relation between an individual and a possible state of affairs, to use when someone is wrong as to the truth.
That's plausible, but it doesn't mean we need to recognise any mysteriously non-actual facts ("possible states of affairs" if they can't be just plain old alternative statements). Any more than we need to recognise mysteriously subsistent individuals ("the present King of France" etc. if they can't be just fictive or hypothetical terms, empty and non-referring).
How it could look for suitably deluded cats is a question not at all clarified by this metaphysical extravagance.
creativesoulJanuary 06, 2021 at 01:35#4851890 likes
Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition.
creativesoulJanuary 06, 2021 at 01:38#4851900 likes
It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not.
It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not.
For me, the debate hinged on how you and @Banno regard states of affairs (which I raised here). It seems to me that you were not really rejecting states of affairs so much as using different terminology, such as events, or perceptible things and their spatiotemporal relations. So there may be more agreement than it seems.
Consider a scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.
Here are three statements we might make:
(1) The mouse ran behind the tree.
(2) The cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.
(3) The cat believed that the proposition "the mouse ran behind the tree" was true.
I think both of you would agree that (1) and (2) is true. And, on the assumption that (3) meant that the cat explicitly formulated a linguistic sentence and assented to it, that (3) is false.
If so, then your differences would be over whether (1) (as an event) should be considered propositional, and how (3) should be best understood (i.e., as assumed above or else as being equivalent to (2)).
It may be well worth setting out the agreements, or similarities between our views. I had hoped that that would take place a bit in the debate, but it did not.
— creativesoul
For me, the debate hinged on how you and Banno regard states of affairs (which I raised here). It seems to me that you were not really rejecting states of affairs so much as using different terminology, such as events, or perceptible things and their spatiotemporal relations. So there may be more agreement than it seems.
Consider a scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.
Here are three statements we might make:
(1) The mouse ran behind the tree.
(2) The cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.
(3) The cat believed that the proposition "the mouse ran behind the tree" was true.
I think both of you would agree that (1) and (2) is true. And, on the assumption that (3) meant that the cat explicitly formulated a linguistic sentence and assented to it, that (3) is false.
As earlier, I would not invoke "states of affairs". Banno's use was rejected, and rightly so.
creativesoulJanuary 07, 2021 at 05:18#4856820 likes
...your differences would be over whether (1) (as an event).
Whoa!
Either (1) is one of three different statements that we might make about events, or (1) is the event being described. It cannot be both at any time. (1) is either a statement or it's an event. If it's both, it's an equivocation of key terms, and that is adequate ground for rejection.
(1) is clearly identified as one of a trio of statements we might make about events.
(1) - as an event - cannot be true, whereas (1) - as a statement about those events - arguably can.
(1) - as an event - cannot be true, whereas (1) - as a statement about those events - arguably can.
:up:
I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else that can potentially be stated). So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false).
creativesoulJanuary 07, 2021 at 16:12#4858050 likes
I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else can potentially be stated).
Whatever else can potentially be stated?
:brow:
That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno.
I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else that can potentially be stated)
Do you believe that it's a property of the world that whatever happens in it can potentially be stated?
creativesoulJanuary 07, 2021 at 16:16#4858070 likes
I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else can potentially be stated).
— Andrew M
Whatever else can potentially be stated?
:brow:
That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno.
No, that's a distinction between the world (which we can potentially talk about) and our talk about the world.
No? Try this...
States of affairs are not equivalent to whatever can potentially be stated. Falsehoods can be stated. True statements as well. States of affairs aren't capable of being true or false. You said so yourself. So...
We do need to draw the distinction between states of affairs and what can be potentially be stated. You are not.
I would add that as you used the terms above, events, relations, and whatever else can potentially be stated are all states of affairs. Look for yourself.
creativesoulJanuary 08, 2021 at 04:08#4860250 likes
States of affairs are not equivalent to whatever can potentially be stated. Falsehoods can be stated. True statements as well. States of affairs aren't capable of being true or false. You said so yourself. So...
We do need to draw the distinction between states of affairs and what can be potentially be stated. You are not.
If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. And that is what is meant by a true statement. (To say of what is that it is, etc.)
Of course we can speak falsely, which just means that we failed to describe the world as it is (i.e., there was no such state of affairs).
Also, if need be, we can say that a state of affairs obtained or failed to obtain (just as we can say that an event happened or not, or a relation holds or does not hold, etc.).
If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x.
So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise unaccountable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?
Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out?
creativesoulJanuary 08, 2021 at 16:38#4861340 likes
Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition.
— creativesoul
Could be...
Oh, it most definitely is, but it's not the only part. He does not seem to continue wanting to have this conversation when it gets to the point that his position is shown to depend upon one of two different falsehoods. We never quite get to setting the criterion/standard for exactly what it makes the most sense for us to say counts as "language-less belief". That is the standard by which we can tell if another is guilty of anthropomorphism.
Language-less belief cannot consist of language. It can consist of things that are themselves existentially dependent upon language, if and when those are directly perceptible, such as red cups full of hot Maxwell House coffee. All belief including cups is itself existentially dependent upon language, for the cup is. Language less belief can consist of that which is existentially dependent upon language, just not language use itself(no predication).
Predication is enabled and/or otherwise facilitated by the fact that language-less belief already consists of a plurality of different things. This further speaks to the first two of three beliefs explicated earlier in the debate. It is also germane to positions seeking some shared 'structure' between language less belief and linguistic belief. Mentalese is the wrong way 'round. Evolution demands that linguistic belief emerge from non linguistic. Semiotics fails miserably here as well, with it's attempt to break all meaning down into semantics and syntax. Syntax describes particular patterns in the structured order of meaningful marks. Some meaning is prior to such marks.
The bridge between language less belief about what's happened or is happening and meaningful expressions thereof is built directly upon and by virtue of correlations being drawn between different directly perceptible elements of those events. When one begins drawing correlations between the names of directly perceptible things and their referent(between "Jack" and Jack), one begins to be able to think(express their thought and belief about what's happened and/or is happening) aloud via naming and descriptive practices about those same events and elements therein.
One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree, and one need not know that one is doing so in order to be able to look for mice behind trees. They look there because they believe that they will find the mouse.
All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. All experience consists of a creature capable of attributing meaning. All meaning is attributed solely by virtue of a creature drawing correlations between different things. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief(drawing the correlations). All language less belief about what happened or is happening is capable of being true or false despite it's inability to be stated by the creature themselves. Some of it actually is true. Arguably most. Some true belief exists in it's entirety prior to language use.
The language less belief that the mouse ran behind the tree, and the simple statement thereof share the exact same truth conditions, because they are about the very same things. The statement need not be made in order for the belief to be formed and/or held. Such belief is prior to linguistic expressions thereof.
I've laid non linguistic meaningful true belief about what's happened or is happening down at your doorstep all packaged up in one neat little bundle. No need for deity. No need for cosmic judgment. No need for language use. Now, to be clear, our understanding all of this certainly requires language. However, all three - belief, meaning, and truth - emerge onto the world stage prior to language use via thought and belief formation(correlations drawn between different directly perceptible things). Therefore, neither truth, nor meaning is existentially dependent upon language.
What's the significance you ask?
Given the shameful fact that there has yet to have been an acceptable theory of meaning, it seems relatively germane to me.
This non linguistic belief exposition also speaks to the stark differences between what's said and what's believed. That has implications for Moore's paradox as well as the liar, and all it's reinforcements. But, notably it speaks to the difference between what makes belief statements true and what makes statements true(when there is a difference between the two but both are being characterized with the exact same marks). What one believes(belief) most certainly plays a determinative role in what would make a statement thereof true. What one believes is part of what makes their own statements thereof true. For example, Gettier conflates here by forgetting that Smith is talking about himself. He's not alone either.
Smith's belief is about himself, and as such it isn't true if anyone else gets the job!
P.S.
Oh, and having a good grasp upon belief and the role it plays in our lives also helps one to navigate the world with as few unhappy unexpected results and/or surprises as possible, regardless of the particular situation one may find oneself in.
creativesoulJanuary 08, 2021 at 16:48#4861350 likes
If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x.
— Andrew M
So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise inexplicable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?
Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out?
Let's put it in more formal terms, I'll label the formalisation (DPC) for "doctrine of propositional content".
(DPC) For every (*) event E there exists (**) a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E )
Do you agree with that formulation?
The implicit domain of quantification of the existential quantifier ( ** ) hides rather a lot of the issue, I think. Here are a few thoughts about assigning a domain to each quantifier.
(1) The class of events ( * ) universally quantified over is all events at all times. The second quantifier (**) is given the same domain.
This raises a question of time.
Say if you truncated the domain to events which occurred 10 billion years ago, at that time there would be events but no statements, so the existential quantifier is false since there do not exist statements at that time, so the whole thing would be false because there would be events without statements - and thus events without corresponding statements.
To restore the truth of the conjecture, those troublesome events which occurred 10 billion years ago can find their corresponding statements now. That seems fine, as the domain is posited to be all events and all times. However, DPC then turns on this hypothetical connection between events which occurred 10 billion years ago and statements now for all events 10 billion years ago. If there did not exist an S(E) at the time of E, S(E) must have occurred later. In turn, that raises the questions, why would DPC be a property of the world if it only applies after the advent of declarative sentences? If it's part of metaphysics, it's not part of the metaphysics of nature; it did fine in the truncated domain.
(2) One way of sidelining this issue would be to claim that the universal quantifier is over all events and all times, but the existential quantifier ranges only over the class of all statements. That gives us a few sub cases:
(2a) statements are events, effectively this is a collapse back into case (1)
(2b) some statements are events, some statements are not events - this is very wooly, under what conditions is a statement an event and under what conditions is it not? I'll not consider it further unless I have to.
(2c) No statements are events, all events are not statements.
Left with (2c), this commits someone to the doctrine that statements are not events; and if they are not events they could not be asserted (unless assertions are not events!). That raises questions regarding how statements work if they need not be the events of their assertion. An ontology of statements as distinct from speech acts. In this case, DPC seems to turn on a construal of statements as a kind of abstraction which is distinct from the speech acts of their assertion.
(DPC) For every (*) event E there exists (**) a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E )
Do you agree with that formulation?
No. An event does need to be representable in language, in principle (i.e., such that language users could potentially make a statement S(E)). But it need not actually be represented by someone in practice, now or ever.
If a purported event were not representable in language, then we would find ourselves up against the private language argument. We would have no grounds for calling it an event.
As you note, many events occurred billions of years ago which haven't been (and perhaps never will be) represented by anyone. Given the language criterion above, there can be such events and they will have state independently of anyone's representations. That's just how we've set up the language game.
No. An event does need to be representable in language, in principle (i.e., such that language users could potentially make a statement S(E)). But it need not actually be represented by someone in practice, now or ever.
So your claim's more like:
(DPC) For every event E possibly there exists a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E ).
?
creativesoulJanuary 09, 2021 at 18:26#4864130 likes
The content of a true belief is a state of the world which we, as human beings, can potentially represent in language. Would you agree with that?
Thanks for asking. As earlier, I would not invoke states of the world or states of affairs.
What does wondering whether or not we could possibly represent some state of the world in language have to do with the content of language-less belief? Most states of the world are not directly perceptible. All language-less belief is about directly perceptible things.
No. An event does need to be representable in language, in principle (i.e., such that language users could potentially make a statement S(E)). But it need not actually be represented by someone in practice, now or ever.
— Andrew M
So your claim's more like:
(DPC) For every event E possibly there exists a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E ).
?
Yes, that seems OK.
Any event can be characterized by a statement. Whether or not it ever is, is a separate matter.
What does wondering whether or not we could possibly represent some state of the world in language have to do with the content of language-less belief?
My purpose there was to distinguish them in a dependency sense. First-order beliefs are about the world. Second-order beliefs are about statements about the world.
Most states of the world are not directly perceptible. All language-less belief is about directly perceptible things.
OK, so consider the scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.
That the cat chased after the mouse suggests that the cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.
If we agree about that, then the question is what to make of the that-clause "the mouse ran behind the tree". I think we would agree that it describes an event that occurred independently of the cat's belief, and also independently of language.
Now I think that is what you mean by language-less belief. And also that this characterizes much of human belief as well. Is that correct?
I may be way out of my depth here, but these are my initial thoughts. I suppose part of this depends on how you define "content", depending on the definition of a technical term, which by virtue of being technical , are subject to fitting a certain framework of understanding. Thus "content" can be defined as being in the head, in our statements, or in the world. Let's bracket the definition of "content", and see what makes most sense.
I don't see why content need be attached to anything external to the creature using the term, so talking about content in the world can be ruled out, we give/provide content, not the world. Of course, what's in the world helps guide what we say about it, but it's not essential to the meaning or significance of the term. It's of course not even necessary for there to be a world out there to even talk about content. We could be brain in vats. Of course, this is extremely unlikely, but raising the scenario serves as an illustration of not needing content to be "out there".
Now, do we want to say that content is found in the statements we say out loud, when put in a propositional manner? Suppose I see a dog running towards me, having escaped its owner's leash. I'd say "This dog is racing towards me", thus the content of the statement can be said to be given in the proposition. But is it necessarily so? Must content be said out loud, or even said to oneself in a propositional manner? It's very doubtful.
In fact, if we look at the world at attempt to do some very basic phenomenology we see that experience vastly outstrips my way of talking about it. So in the case of the dog, there is also the background of the owner being careless, of grass looking beautiful in the sunlight, I can also point to my physiology and notice my adrenaline pumping. The dog probably interrupted me from my train of thought, and so forth. Of course this exercise can go on forever, as I try to verbalize my experiences. But it's clear that the whole complexity of the situation cannot be grasped by a simple proposition. There's also more to say about the nature of thought and language, which are extremely complex, but this can be put aside. The content found in my expression is but a small portion of the total content I experience. Henceforth, content is not necessarily propositional in nature.
What's left then? Well, we can attempt to encapsulate the term content in such a manner that most of these considerations do not apply to the term, but this does not mean that the things mentioned aren't real phenomena that shape the content I experience. What must be true of content? Absent anything else, content is internal to the user, and seems to be an operation of the mind/brain that seeks to concretize the totality of my experience in a way that is communicable through words. But there are many other way to express content too: gestures, moods, paintings etc.
So no, content is not necessarily propositional, though it can be defined in such a manner, if one chooses to do so, but I don't see what's gained by doing this.
(DPC) For every event E possibly there exists a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E ).
Event as in space-time region, or event as in abstract proposition about (or property of) such a region? Or something else? Or both?
Where were we? ... Is the mouse's running behind the tree propositional? Well for the (as for every) event qua space-time region there possibly exist infinitely many statements it makes true, as well as at least that many false. So... ?
Event as in space-time region, or event as in abstract proposition about (or property of) such a region? Or something else? Or both?
I don't think the "doctrine of propositional content" as I've been putting it says much at all if all the terms in it aren't fleshed out. And if they are, it seems the doctrine has rather a lot of baggage.
Space time region probably doesn't fit the sense of event or state of affairs as, say, "The USA and Iran backed out of their nuclear deal" doesn't have a space time region associated with it despite it being, allegedly, propositional because it's a statement of fact. Proposition as abstract object doesn't seem to fit either as propositions remain a component part of assertion events.
It seems to me it either says nothing much, says something not particularly evident, or is a coordinating statement of unarticulated metaphysics surrounding it.
For my part, I don't think the doctrine: " "x" and x pick out the same state of affairs" is innocuous at all, since it starts with statements then projects their content into the world; it's like language has cast a shadow onto the world, and the shadow is held up to language, and people are quite pleased with the fit.
If a purported event were not representable in language, then we would find ourselves up against the private language argument. We would have no grounds for calling it an event.
To: for every event E possibly there exists a statement S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E).
Reply to fdrake
Can an animal believe? Does my cat "believe" the open front door goes to the outside where the trees and squirrels are? Most definitely! Is it propositional belief? I think it is a proto-propositional belief. Consider the propositional structure of the conditional: If X opens the door, there will be Y that ensues. Note that my cats certainly gets this essential structure, but I while it is foolish to think her "getting it" is propositional, what is propositional cannot be wholly other than what actually goes through her mind (yes, mind). After all, our conditional logical form very likely is constructed on t he foundation that pragmatically "mirrors" the primitive, non symbolic cat knowing.
After all, our conditional logical form very likely is constructed on t he foundation that pragmatically "mirrors" the primitive, non symbolic cat knowing.
:up:
I'm not trying to commit myself strongly to the thesis that "for every event E possibly there exists a statement S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E)." is false, I'm trying to point out that it requires an account.
The debate (first post here: Reply to creativesoul ) did touch the issue of animal beliefs, my reading was that @creativesoul was criticising the following claim, which he saw as a consequence of @Banno's account: animal beliefs target statements because we can set some representation of them out using a statement. Banno in turn seemed to insist that all there was to the animal's belief was our attribution of a statement of that belief which is held true by the animal.
For my part, prior to the debate I asked both participants to make the motion more specific:
So, to save it from being Banno arguing that propositional content is a property of statements (or more generally speech acts) and since belief is a propositional attitude, the content of the belief is the proposition it's directed towards, and so concluding it must be propositional content.
And you arguing that belief content is a broader semantic category - I don't know what kind of things you throw in it, other than that it can be "pre-linguistic" - and so since not all of that content is even "linguistic" (presumably not all words or symbols, I don't know where you come from on this), not all of that content can be propositional; since propositions must be linguistic.
If you continued like that, Banno could assert his definition of belief, you could assert your definition of belief, and there's a strong chance you'll both address none of the other's points and retreat to hedges
And I was dismissed, only for it to be unproductive in the way I specified. The real meat of the issue, I think, would've been to discuss something like:
Beliefs as mental states/dispositions with content vs beliefs as holding some statement to be true. Issues there might be: is a disposition towards a state of affairs the same as an attitude towards a statement? What role do t-sentences play in that account?
Reply to fdrakeBeliefs as mental states/dispositions with content vs beliefs as holding some statement to be true. Issues there might be: is a disposition towards a state of affairs the same as an attitude towards a statement? What role do t-sentences play in that account?
To me, the whole matter has to be reconstrued. Don't know if you will appreciate this. If not, then that's fine.
I abide by the pragmatist's hypothetical deductive account of belief: Prior to an affirmation, there is an predisposition to affirm. What is this if not a disposition towards a state of affairs, as you say? But does this stand clearer analysis? I affirm, after all, in time. Can the temporality of the affirmation's nature be analyzed? This goes not just to propositions, but to concepts, as all concepts are inherently propositional: so what is, say, nitroglycerin? We define this as a pragmatic, temporal structure of the conditional form: Nitro is, "If N is impacted with force F, then it will explode." Nitro is also, "If N is combined with chemical C, then result R will occur"; and so on, and so on.
All concepts have this form, and therefore all beliefs have this form. We live our everyday lives in the temporal dynamics of, to put it is Dewey's terms, the consummatory successes of problems solved. Language itself is constructed in a complex series of successful problem solving events whereby signifiers (sounds) and their signifieds (concepts) are matched with their objective counterparts which are achieved by hearing sounds, witnessing associations and assimilating models of language behavior in the environment.
But what does this do for belief being propositional? Well, it presents an understanding of beliefs and propositions that does not recognize the distinction. Propositional affirmations and beliefs are reduced consummations of problems solved. "My cat is on the rug" is true by virtue of a body of anticipations regarding rugs, cats, the copula 'is', the the ascription of properties, etc., which are themselves all confirmed in their repeatable behaviors. Knowledge that there is a sidewalk that will sustain my steps is a science experiment at every step, consummated, and this and a great number of other pragmatically based assumptions about sidewalks is what a sidewalk IS; this collective of pragmatic assumptions are the very definitions of Being.
I'd be interested in hearing your argument for how you get from:
If a purported event were not representable in language, then we would find ourselves up against the private language argument. We would have no grounds for calling it an event.
— Andrew M
To: for every event E possibly there exists a statement S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E).
If the purported event is representable in language and it meets the public usage criteria for an event, then it is an event.
It seems to me that it then follows that it is possible, in principle, for someone to state that the event did (or did not) occur. And, if so, the event would be the truth maker for that person's statement.
If the purported event is representable in language and it meets the public usage criteria for an event, then it is an event.
It strikes me that if there are a class of things that are "purported events", that must be "representable in language" and "meet public usage criteria" to count as events, it would then follow that those purported events do not fall under DPC despite being occurrent:
If DPC is: for all events E possibly there exists a statement S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E).
So long as there are "purported events" which are occurrent, there's a sneaky domain restriction on first quantifier; there are occurrent things which never have statements that state them in DPC's sense since they don't count as events. It makes what it means for something to happen depend on language use. Like the world is language's shadow.
Reply to bongo fury No mysteries here, just possibilities. The deluded cat believed the mouse went behind the tree.
Here's a better argument for Creative's position; it's what I had expected him to argue:
Grant "P" is true IFF P;
If the cat believes that the mouse went behind the tree, then the cat believes that "The mouse went behind the tree" is true.
But the cat, not having a language, cannot believe a fact about a statement.
Would you accept this argument? I think it the best Creative could do. To me, it has an apparent flaw involving substitution in opaque contexts. But I might be wrong.
Reply to fdrake You seem to be equivocating on different senses of what it means to say that events could potentially be stated. It could be said that, at a time when there were no language users, events could not potentially be stated (because there were no language users), but it could equally be said that those events could potentially be stated (because there could potentially have been language users). The first is an expression of actual or real potential, and the second is an expression of purely logical potential.
After all, our conditional logical form very likely is constructed on t he foundation that pragmatically "mirrors" the primitive, non symbolic cat knowing.
This seems obvious; just as language, and linguistically mediated experience, mirrors the "primitive" pre-linguistic experience.
You seem to be equivocating on different senses of what it means to say that events could potentially be stated. It could be said that, at a time when there were no language users, events could not potentially be stated (because there were no language users), but it could equally be said that those events could potentially be stated (because there could potentially have been language users). The first is an expression of actual or real potential, and the second is an expression of purely logical potential.
Those aren't my equivocations, they're attempts to flesh out what "can" means in "Every event can be stated"! Since my discussion partners don't seem to want to flesh out the modality associated with it, despite making a modal claim, I decided to try it.
Reply to fdrake OK, in that case I have misread you. In any case I identify the fialure to see that conflation of what is actually with what is merely logically possible as the problematic omission that gives rise to the disagreement between those who say that all belief has propositional content and those who disagree.
One says all belief has propositional content on the grounds that anything that could count as a belief can in principle be expressed in propositional language. The other says that all belief does not have propositional content on the grounds that not everything we would call a belief can actually be expressed in language (at the time of the occurrence of the belief) if there are no language users around.
You have (I suspect) the background in philosophy to understand Wittgenstein's point. You will understand that it would be trite to attempt a summary of that background in a reply to your question. If something of genuine philosophical interest came up, i might get involved. But as thing stand, I've shown how Creative has misunderstood the topic, although Creative cannot see the error.
There is a difference between saying and showing.
Saying is a kind of showing.
What is said will align with a picture of the world only when its frame (true/false) is held up.
Holding up the frame limits what is shown to the frame of what is said.
The content of what is said is what it shows.
Showing puts the picture in place and paints it beforehand.
Reply to fdrake Oh, yeah, all that. Except "The content of what is said is what it shows" - "content" is wrong, as shown in PI - use replaces content.
All Creative had to do to "win" the debate was to show a belief that could not be put into propositional form. But it can't be done; if it cannot be put into propositional form, it is not a belief.
Oh, yeah, all that. Except "The content of what is said is what it shows" - "content" is wrong, as shown in PI - use replaces content.
I did not mean to suggest the content was "inside" the word, far from it. This is part of what puzzles me about your position, everything's sufficiently (semantically) externalised that it's functionality all the way down in terms of meaning, except for how declarative sentences play a privileged role in the articulation of mental content (or "mental function" if you prefer) and events, those statements are "inside" those dispositional states and events in the same way. It's like you've taken Wittgenstein's propositional glasses off like he does in the PI but put them back on again when reading something else! They're like analytic philosophy reading glasses.
Oh, yeah, all that. Except "The content of what is said is what it shows" - "content" is wrong, as shown in PI - use replaces content.
This can't be unequivocally right, since the content of poems, music and art works is what they show. Artworks do not show "use". There is also a valid distinction between determinate and indeterminate content. Do you think there is a valid distinction between determinate and indeterminate use?
...everything's sufficiently (semantically) externalised that it's functionality all the way down in terms of meaning...
I don't see that. The thing about showing is that it is not saying... Isn't your complaint just that I do not say enough about that of which we cannot speak? The point is to show others that they say too much...
Isn't your complaint just that I do not say enough about that of which we cannot speak?
My complaint is that speaking about that which we allegedly cannot speak is a routine function of language. The stuff we allegedly can't speak about is already baked into use because use is an interaction with the world.
To me, that's too close to referent, to there being something that the sentence must be about, to reified meaning.
I'm not sure what you mean by "about" here. A command is not 'about' anything in the sense that an explanation is. But a command can be said to be about something in the sense that 'about' in this sentence carries: "What are you about?".
Oh, yeah, all that. Except "The content of what is said is what it shows" - "content" is wrong, as shown in PI - use replaces content.
You say here that the content of what is said is not what it shows, and you said that use replaces content, which seems to suggest that what is said shows use.
Sometimes the art shows something. Rarely is what it shows simply what it says.
I'd say that good art always shows something. In the case of music (absent lyrics) and painting, nothing is said in the literal sense of 'said' that applies to sentences. In the case of poetry I agree that what is literally said rarely, if ever, exhausts its meaning. But in the case of poetry meaning is not use at all, but association.
You say here that the content of what is said is not what it shows, and you said that use replaces content, which seems to suggest that what is said shows use.
I'd say that good art always shows something. In the case of music (absent lyrics) and painting, nothing is said in the literal sense of 'said' that applies to sentences. In the case of poetry I agree that what is literally said rarely, if ever, exhausts its meaning. But in the case of poetry meaning is not use at all, but association.
Maybe I'm naive in asking:
Why always the metaphor of "shows" and never that of "tells"? As one example: a good poem tells of things it does not directly say. Or, in the case of lyric-less music, the melody doesn't show you emotions but instead tells you of emotions. Or, a pointing dog doesn't show you where the given is but tells you of where to look so as to discern the given.
"Showings" imply visualized images, which could be construed to be meaningless in the absence of a tale that they invoke. "Tellings" are always telling, bear significance and, hence, meaning, by their very nature.
Reply to javra I haven't thought about the distinction between showing and telling much; but to give a quick answer i would say that they are more or less synonymous in this context.
Perhaps in some cases, but not in the case of poetry though. Looking at these issues from different angles would produce different answers it seems to me. I see meaning as consisting in associative content, and I have never liked the idea of 'meaning as use"; I think reference as use is more apt; which just means that words are conventionally used to refer to this or that. In the case of non-ostensive words it is more a case of 'indication as use'. The words in a command indicate that I want you to do something or notice, for example.
I haven't thought about the distinction between showing and telling much; but to give a quick answer i would say that they are more or less synonymous in this context.
Yea, I'm thinking it through myself. To use an example, if the pointing dog is not showing but telling, then its pointing is itself propositional - could be a true or false telling (which doesn't seem to fit for "showing") - and this sans the use of language. And if its pointing is propositional, then it is indicative of (language-less) belief. Something along these lines. (I know from at least anecdotal evidence that dogs can deceive - and are thereby endowed with a rudimentary theory of mind.)
Haven't read through most of the tread, so I don't know if I'm addressing things already addressed.
Reply to Banno Sure, but the "traffic lights" scenario is a different context, no?
In any case as an interesting aside to introduce another wrinkle in the fabric, and demonstrate the polysemy of some terms, you could say "I can tell from the way you drive that you understand how to respond correctly to traffic lights". That said even "The way you drive tells me that you understand how to respond correctly to traffic lights" would not be a particularly unusual usage
Reply to Janus Yeah, sure, there are other ways of using the words say, talk, show and so on. That does nothing to diminish or blur the distinction at hand. I will not use "talk" here because of that ambiguity.
As for context, what is salient is that there are ways of stating beliefs and ways of showing beliefs. Which is the right hand side of a T-sentence? A showing or a saying? I say both.
Consider how someone might demonstrate to you that they understood what to do at a traffic light.
They might say that they know to stop on red, go on green and dither on yellow.
Or they might take you for a drive, through sets of traffic lights, and show you that they can do as expected.
In still trying to think this through:
It strikes me that the showing can occur even if not intended. For instance, in this quoted example they might intend to show you their understanding but inadvertently show you the opposite via their actions. Whereas a telling would always be an intended conveyance - an intended showing (?) - and, hence, maybe, always propositional.
In other words, I'm currently assuming that what is show may or may not be propositional. But that what is told (via language or otherwise) is always propositional.
As to one possible significance of this: In terms of at least art, since art is an intentionally produced expression, it would then consist of tellings (which might be construed as intended showings). If so, does that then imply all art to be in some abstract way propositional? Haven't thought that far out yet. But the notion of fake rather then genuine art does have some sway ... as in, for example, art that is a sell-out. Might the emotions of some songs, for example, be false rather than true due to the intentions behind their expression? This such that the beliefs via which the songs are produced are, in some highly abstract way, false beliefs? Thereby somehow making the song a propositional expression?
I'll apologize in advance if I need to. I'm freely thinking out loud here, without any discernible conclusions, in what's likely a very idiosyncratic take regarding what propositions can be constituted of ... And I know these thoughts are in a serious muddle.
But I'm posting this anyway, just in case it might be of interest. Still, may the post be overlooked if its train of thought derails the thread's subject matter.
As for context, what is salient is that there are ways of stating beliefs and ways of showing beliefs. Which is the right hand side of a T-sentence? A showing or a saying? I say both.
In other words, I'm currently assuming that what is show may or may not be propositional. But that what is told (via language or otherwise) is always propositional.
Interesting. I don't disagree.
What a painting shows may not be anything like what was intended. Consider:
It's a painting of little merit. The artist was a try-hard.
[hide="Reveal"]What happens to your view of what this painting shows when you learn it is by Hitler? Consider that the Final Solution was planned in a location with a not dissimilar outlook. [/hide]
And you arguing that belief content is a broader semantic category - I don't know what kind of things you throw in it, other than that it can be "pre-linguistic" - and so since not all of that content is even "linguistic" (presumably not all words or symbols, I don't know where you come from on this), not all of that content can be propositional; since propositions must be linguistic.
I found this point about belief being a broader semantic category to be closer to the truth. Just make an observation of one's own, if you will, ready-to-hand "belief" that the cup is on the table. The semantics, that is, the meaning, of spontaneous, unreflected passive affirmation is not explicit at all. It is in the fluid affair of grabbing the cup while reading, adjusting the light, checking the time and so forth. One can hardly call this propositional, only dispositionally propositional; and even when attention turns towards the cup which, say, spills, the "the cup is on the table and it spilled" proposition is certainly not entertained at all. The entire event is a seamless, propositionless doing. I do think we are in a cat's world of prereflective engagement.
As to the content: mostly pragmatic, like walking down the street, each step assumes a secure landing, and the implicit "belief" that is dispositionally "behind" this, stands at the ready if one is called upon to speak, or if one commences to think things out. Language and its propositions stands apart from the execution.
Prelinguistic? Pragmatics is this, and most of our engagements in the world are like this.
Beliefs as mental states/dispositions with content vs beliefs as holding some statement to be true. Issues there might be: is a disposition towards a state of affairs the same as an attitude towards a statement?
A disposition towards some state of affairs: this disposition presents itself as a conditional "if...then.." which is a pragmatic construction. Dispositions are anticipatory and language and logic merely formalizes this.
I found this point about belief being a broader semantic category to be closer to the truth. Just make an observation of one's own, if you will, ready-to-hand "belief" that the cup is on the table. The semantics, that is, the meaning, of spontaneous, unreflected passive affirmation is not explicit at all. It is in the fluid affair of grabbing the cup while reading, adjusting the light, checking the time and so forth. One can hardly call this propositional, only dispositionally propositional; and even when attention turns towards the cup which, say, spills, the "the cup is on the table and it spilled" proposition is certainly not entertained at all. The entire event is a seamless, propositionless doing. I do think we are in a cat's world of prereflective engagement.
This is an excellent account.
I'd just add that each step of the process can be put into the form "Constance believes P" where P is some proposition.
If the purported event is representable in language and it meets the public usage criteria for an event, then it is an event.
— Andrew M
It strikes me that if there are a class of things that are "purported events", that must be "representable in language" and "meet public usage criteria" to count as events, it would then follow that those purported events do not fall under DPC despite being occurrent:
Purported is a qualifier on an event, not another kind of event. Whether or not a purported event is an event depends just on whether it meets the specified criteria for an event.
For example, that there is a purported earthquake does not imply that there is an earthquake. There may be no earthquake at all. If not, then nothing occurred.
Creative is left with the absurdity that
(1) The mouse ran behind the tree.
— Andrew M
is not a proposition.
I think he agrees that my statement of the event is a proposition. He just disagrees that the event itself is a proposition. But I think you would agree with @creativesoul about that as well.
I'd just add that each step of the process can be put into the form "Constance believes P" where P is some proposition.
Do either of you see a tension between "most of our engagements with the world are (prelinguistic)" and "I agree, and those engagements target statements"?
Harry HinduJanuary 12, 2021 at 11:11#4877080 likes
Any event can be characterized by a statement. Whether or not it ever is, is a separate matter.
A contradiction. If you dont know whether or not a event is characterized by a statement, then you can't say for sure that any event is characterized by a statement.
It is more accurate to say that any belief can be characterized by a statement however, whether or not the belief ever characterizes events that are not other beliefs, is a seperate matter.
A disposition towards some state of affairs: this disposition presents itself as a conditional "if...then.." which is a pragmatic construction. Dispositions are anticipatory and language and logic merely formalizes this.
I'd like to say that I generally agree with your pragmatic account of dispositions, and I think we have similar inspirations for holding similar accounts; exposure to Heidegger, going by your reference to "ready-to-hand". I think where we may lose agreement (though I dunno), is whether the act of putting something into words acts as a transformation of semantic content. If we admit that pragmatic engagements have their own broader flavour of semantic content than the semantic content of declarative sentences, and we take a pragmatic (speech-act centric) view on the use of language, it would seem that the broader flavour of semantic content is generic in the use of language, not simply the kind of content which we use declarative sentences to express through their connection to truthmakers/truth conditions.
I don't mean to suggest that "for every event E possibly there exists a sentence S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E)" is strictly false; I think it describes one way of using language rather than a property of nature. If we attempt to describe any phenomenon, it will tend to be cashed out in part using declarative sentences; but it will also contain allusions, metaphors, narrative and rhetorical devices, which function more by cajoling (performativity; illucutionary force and the expectation of perlocutionary effect) than by matching up with a truth maker. This second cajoling kind of content I take as corresponding to a part of the broader conceptualisation of semantic content above. It isn't spelled out in what makes an utterance true, it can only be spelled out in terms of its expected effects and motivations.
To be sure, those expected effects and motivations can in principle be stated as occurrent afterwards, but that switches from a kind of semantic content that is fleshed out by truth conditions to one which is fleshed out by pragmatic considerations.
That's plausible, but it doesn't mean we need to recognise any mysteriously non-actual facts ("possible states of affairs" if they can't be just plain old alternative statements).
The deluded cat believed the mouse went behind the tree.
Was disposed to assent (upon being gifted language) to a pointing of "mouse running behind tree" at the inappropriate choice of space-time region? Cool. Apart maybe from the bit about language. So: was disposed to respond to the event as to a mouse-running-behind-tree event?
Was disposed to assent (upon being gifted language) to a pointing of "mouse running behind tree" at the inappropriate choice of space-time region? Cool. Apart maybe from the bit about language. So: was disposed to respond to the event as to a mouse-running-behind-tree event?
Convolute. The mouse ran up the tree. The cat did not look up the tree, but behind it, and then around the base, not having seen the mouse run up the tree. The cat believed the mouse went behind the tree.
I'n not convinced that talk of dispositions is helpful.
Belief as a propositional attitude, with proposition substituted for statement. The substitution being justified by truth functional equivalence/substitution salva-veritae/disquotation. This goes back to the start of our dispute.
Reply to Banno The discussion of pre-linguistic beliefs (with you and others) goes back to my thread on Wittgenstein in the prior forum. I'm wondering if your position has changed much?
was disposed to respond to the event as to a mouse-running-behind-tree event
seems to me a fairly credible rough and ready behavioural analysis: a reasonable translation of "the cat believed the mouse went behind the tree" into a form less obviously open to the objection of anthropomorphism, to say nothing of theoretical doubts about beliefs altogether. I don't doubt that it presents problems, but it's fairly straight-forward. You seem to be hoping to exhibit the superiority of the natural idiom here,
The mouse ran up the tree. The cat did not look up the tree, but behind it, and then around the base, not having seen the mouse run up the tree. The cat believed the mouse went behind the tree.
Point not taken. All I'm seeing is a dogmatic attachment.
I'm not convinced that talk of dispositions is helpful.
Me neither. But likewise talk of beliefs. I'm just trying to understand how people are understanding this talk. Preferably without having to be uncharitable and conclude mysticism.
I've been at some pains not to use the word "meaning" except as a generic term, and certainly not as the thing the proposition stands for or refers to.
The notion to be avoided is that different statements can say the same thing, and that hence there is a thing called the proposition, which is what the statement means. It's customary here to write "snow is white" in several different languages and then claim these various statements all share the same proposition. There's an odd circularity there that Wittgenstein rids us of: the meaning of the statements is given by the proposition, and yet the proposition is no more than, or exactly, the meaning of the statements. Nothing is explained here.
It isn't spelled out in what makes an utterance true, it can only be spelled out in terms of its expected effects and motivations.
Expected effects is what truth "really" is about? I think if you map out the lived landscape, insert that all that is there is a kind of, well, "thereING" rather than simply "there" then whatever you think about truth, knowledge, reality, ethics, aesthetics, mind is going to have to be reconstrued, for there is now a new foundational term in play: time. The pragmatists talked like this long ago (see Dewey, Peirce, James). Meaning is bound to doing, concepts are dynamic events, truth is, as you say, the expected effect.
So to say, "the contents of belief is propositional" puts the question to the basic assumptions about what a proposition is, and if a proposition is understood in terms of "consummatory events" (Dewey), i.e., the completion of a problem solving affair (See his Art As Experience: the organism approaches the obstacle, feels its way around, searching for a resolution, finds passage; then onward through, having the solution's details now incorporated into future possibilities) then herein lies the understanding! Of course, the content is full, rich, powerful: this goes to value, for value is the essence of caring about this. What is value? This is about metavalue, which I wont' go into unless you want to, but I say it moves the discussion to value because the content is, of course, not discussable. Presence qua presence cannot be spoken, and if the understanding is all about pragmatics, what we call reality, truth and the rest is really ready-to-hand instrumentality of Being in the world.
I read Rorty, Dewey and Heidegger as talking about essentially the same kind of analysis of knowledge, though Heidegger is much more interesting.
Do either of you see a tension between "most of our engagements with the world are (prelinguistic)" and "I agree, and those engagements target statements"?
One source of tension is rather obvious: Talk about what is prelinguistic is done IN language and logic, that is, is propositional, and what can logic and language "say" about things outside of logic and language? Didn't Wittgenstein warn us about this? But this tension has not at all gone unnoticed. Hermeneutics is the only recourse. It is the deferential nature of the meanings of terms, and this runs smack into Derrida, doesn't it?
god must be atheistJanuary 14, 2021 at 23:47#4888850 likes
I'd like us to consider that solipsism is not valid. Without that assumption the following will be meaningless.
Belief is a probability knowledge. You don't know if the king has a beard; but if you believe that it does, then your bets are on the king having a beard.
Knowledge preempts belief. If you see the king, and he has a beard, your belief assumes a probability of one, which is knowledge.
Do either of them need to be propositional? In a sense that all beliefs have the feature of not defying description, whether the description exists, is thought of, or written down in some way or form... all beliefs are propostional.
You don't need to propose them to know they can be expressed as a proposition.
Instead, you wish to disprove this by describing a belief that is indescribable. That would be a valid way of destroying the argument that all thoughts, including beliefs, are propositional.
creativesoulJanuary 15, 2021 at 15:53#4890840 likes
My purpose there was to distinguish them in a dependency sense. First-order beliefs are about the world. Second-order beliefs are about statements about the world.
That's close to what I've argued in the debate. Second post particularly. Existential dependency. However, some belief about 'the world' does not need/require language, and some does.
OK, so consider the scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.
That the cat chased after the mouse suggests that the cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.
If we agree about that, then the question is what to make of the that-clause "the mouse ran behind the tree". I think we would agree that it describes an event that occurred independently of the cat's belief, and also independently of language.
Now I think that is what you mean by language-less belief. And also that this characterizes much of human belief as well. Is that correct?
The clause describes what happened(an event). Nothing above strikes me wrong.
This is about metavalue, which I wont' go into unless you want to, but I say it moves the discussion to value because the content is, of course, not discussable. Presence qua presence cannot be spoken, and if the understanding is all about pragmatics, what we call reality, truth and the rest is really ready-to-hand instrumentality of Being in the world.
If we're using terms in the same way, I don't think it's surprising that "presence qua presence cannot be spoken", words aren't identical to the things they stand in for after all. When we make an assertion, a whole process of interaction has lead to the uttered statement. "This rose is red", what are the boundaries of the rose? How many thorns does it have? How many petals? What is its hue? How reflective is it? How tall? A condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns occurs when using words to stand in for them; what counts as a rose, what counts as red, and what is irrelevant for both instances of counting as.
To say that "x" and x pick out the same thing is quite different than saying "x" is true iff x, the equivalence between the x on the left and the x on the right occurs only after the rose has been counted as red and counted as a rose; that is to say after it has been picked out. A whole regime of phenomena; of representation, of perceptual exploration of the environment, of how word is tailored to world; is hidden if the x on the right is treated as an uninterpreted event in the world. The perspective, norms, use of language, go into x, that is why it can be matched redundantly with "x" being true. In other words, that x on the right is theory ladened, and the theory it is ladened with is set up by how the statement counts as the state of affairs.
Which provides a problem, if how "x" counts as x is internal to norms of discourse - it is indeed part of their execution -, those discursive norms must be taken as a given in order for disquotation to spell out the sense of a declarative sentences. ""x" and x pick out the same thing" works as an account of the sense of "x" only insofar as the means by which they do pick out the same thing is taken for granted. For declarative sentences, this is all buried in truth; truth as direct but interpreted contact between what the sentence is and what it picks out. That burial is also an inversion; what counts as an event becomes the substrate of the declarative sentence, rather than the speech act of its assertion containing within it a generation of what counts as what in interaction with an event. Displacing the generative component of the speech act's content with the norms by which the speech is judged by that generative content. This is an intellectual magic trick; a conjuring of the given by which the relationship between "x" and x is judged as a redundancy. In reality, that relationship is a generative process of interaction, and the conformability between "x" and x can be seen, retrospectively, as its output.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2021 at 17:07#4894390 likes
If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x.
— Andrew M
So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise unacountable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?
Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out?
It's worse than I thought, if "x" isn't even abbreviating "x" is true.
The notion to be avoided is that different statements can say the same thing, and that hence there is a thing called the proposition, which is what the statement means.
Here we agree.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2021 at 18:13#4894720 likes
Smart phones are not the sorts of things capable of attributing meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, including but not limited to themselves...
...and that is how all belief systems emerge/begin. Smart phones do not attribute meaning.
An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?
I suggest: those very much future machines skilled not merely in the chasing of mice, but in the chasing of the imaginary trajectories of the pointings of mouse-words and mouse-pictures. A skill which is ascribable literally to humans from infancy. Only anthropomorphically to cats and present-day robots.
That's too restrictive for people who are sure cats literally have beliefs, of course. They must exclude robots some other way. If at all.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2021 at 18:35#4894890 likes
How am I to think of a cat as drawing correlations?
My cats know the sound of my car, as a result of drawing correlations between it and me. They believe I am home when they hear it. The sound of certain kinds of plastic is also meaningful to them by virtue of being part of the correlation they've drawn between it and getting treats, etc. I've already offered the directly perceptible things in believing the mouse ran behind the tree. Some other things are of course the cat's own hunting desire/instinct, or perhaps hunger pangs, etc. The cat wants to catch the mouse.
Banno's cat has drawn correlations between the sounds and smells of other cats(unfriendly ones) and those other cats. Hence, she spits and hisses because she believes that an unfriendly cat is outside. Certainly these correlations between her past fighting with such cats develop into a predisposition towards those cats and those sounds and smells, that's part of how belief about the world and/or ourselves effects/affects how we think about current events(what we believe is happening).
If we're using terms in the same way, I don't think it's surprising that "presence qua presence cannot be spoken", words aren't identical to the things they stand in for after all. When we make an assertion, a whole process of interaction has lead to the uttered statement. "This rose is red", what are the boundaries of the rose? How many thorns does it have? How many petals? What is its hue? How reflective is it? How tall? A condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns occurs when using words to stand in for them; what counts as a rose, what counts as red, and what is irrelevant for both instances of counting as.
A name is not a description. Nor does a name refer only in virtue of its somehow being the same as a description.
But yes, words are not identical to the thing they refer to; "Banno" is not Banno. However, "Banno" is used to refer to Banno, and Banno is Banno.
T-sentences do not claim that the thing on the left is the very same as the thing on the right. The equivalence is one of truth-function, not of identity. Any interpretation that applies to the proposition on the left also applies to the state of affairs on the right. Hence, they cancel out, like paired variables in any equation.
Reply to bongo fury "Drawing correlations" is not necessarily a symbolizing activity. It could be as simple as responding to signs, which many kinds of animals do all the time.
What would count as a misattribution of belief as compared/contrasted to correctly attributing belief to such language-less creatures?
Ah, not a bad question.
One would suppose that misattribution would be the same for animals and people.
There's an essay here, that I haven't time to write. But one sort of misattribution would be to say Adam believed P when really Adam believed Q.
And this works if Adam is a horse.
In this case it will come down to which of two attributions is the real one...
But this is to base the misattribution on a difference in the propositional content; so the proble for you will be to explain misattribution without a propositional content.
If we're using terms in the same way, I don't think it's surprising that "presence qua presence cannot be spoken", words aren't identical to the things they stand in for after all. When we make an assertion, a whole process of interaction has lead to the uttered statement. "This rose is red", what are the boundaries of the rose? How many thorns does it have? How many petals? What is its hue? How reflective is it? How tall? A condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns occurs when using words to stand in for them; what counts as a rose, what counts as red, and what is irrelevant for both instances of counting as.
I will do my best to use terms in a way that is familiar to your discussion.
The question I have for the above is, to say words aren't identical to the things they stand for, what "things" do you have in mind? Where are the boundaries of thing as a thing? What thingly qualities are implicitly brought to bear in the calling of X a thing? In short, nothing language can say can demonstrate a release from the richness of associated meaning so as to isolate any one thing such that the one thing is one. All terms are multiplicities, so when making assertions at all, any thing is absorbed into the congregation meanings. There are no things such that "words are not identical" to them. Presence qua presence cannot be made sense of UNLESS there is something in the actuality that "speaks" that is not explained in terms of other terms. This would be an absolute, not that such a term can be made sense of, it is the only wheel that rolls to express the peculiar nature of ethics: the injunction.
To say that "x" and x pick out the same thing is quite different than saying "x" is true iff x, the equivalence between the x on the left and the x on the right occurs only after the rose has been counted as red and counted as a rose; that is to say after it has been picked out. A whole regime of phenomena; of representation, of perceptual exploration of the environment, of how word is tailored to world; is hidden if the x on the right is treated as an uninterpreted event in the world. The perspective, norms, use of language, go into x, that is why it can be matched redundantly with "x" being true. In other words, that x on the right is theory ladened, and the theory it is ladened with is set up by how the statement counts as the state of affairs.
Interesting. I tend to abide by what Heidegger says, and I find pragmatism coincides, though I think this needs work on my part to be clearer. I live an everyday life with already intact engagements, like walking down the street, waving at a friend, and so on. It is when something goes wrong that I take notice, and I think Dewey (Rorty following Dewey on this) makes a very good case from here: Meaning is the consummatory event whereby the problem that arises is solved, wherein lies the foundation for all understanding, language structured or otherwise. X, as I take your thinking, is prereflective, that is, the bare recognition that the snow is white, unreflected on, passed over propositionally, a ready-to-hand familiarity. Is this autonomic recognition inherently propositional? For one endowed with language, it is, for what gathers in the familiar event is the language learned. But it also is more, and that more is the rich meanings that are not pragmatic at all, but are simply the givens of the world, and these are value laden, and this brings the matter to the thesis at hand, metaethics. I don't agree with Dewey that such meanings are "wrought out" of pragmatic events, or, if this characterization works, it is not exhaustive of what occurs as one is still left with the presence as such that defies the pragmatics of speech altogether. We should, as Wittgenstein famously says, pass over such things in silence, but what of value? Value qualia, the appearing, not redly, tactilely, but in pain or joy: these cannot be spoken; one does not speak the world of ineffable actualities, these "qualia". But then, there is, I claim again (responding to the quote of mine you responded to), the injunction against causing pain that is "spoken". The proof lies in the pudding: put a flame to your finger and observe. A truly exhaustive analysis of the event cannot overlook its most salient feature, which is its noncontingent "badness".
Which provides a problem, if how "x" counts as x is internal to norms of discourse - it is indeed part of their execution -, those discursive norms must be taken as a given in order for disquotation to spell out the sense of a declarative sentences. ""x" and x pick out the same thing" works as an account of the sense of "x" only insofar as the means by which they do pick out the same thing is taken for granted. For declarative sentences, this is all buried in truth; truth as direct but interpreted contact between what the sentence is and what it picks out. That burial is also an inversion; what counts as an event becomes the substrate of the declarative sentence, rather than the speech act of its assertion containing within it a generation of what counts as what in interaction with an event. Displacing the generative component of the speech act's content with the norms by which the speech is judged by that generative content. This is an intellectual magic trick; a conjuring of the given by which the relationship between "x" and x is judged as a redundancy. In reality, that relationship is a generative process of interaction, and the conformability between "x" and x can be seen, retrospectively, as its output.
If I understand you rightly, the magic trick has to do with attempting to "retrospectively" (after the case) take the question of whether "x" and x is a mere redundancy (tautology?) up IN a truth bearing proposition, which is circular, for such a proposition cannot penetrate into the nature is what is arguably non propositional, the full generative "sense". In other words, it is through the truth of the proposition that all things intelligible must pass. My thoughts go like this: in the execution of x, the passive observation, and "there is a rabbit" is uttered, truth only comes into play after the fact because it is in this afterward that truth, the functional concept's context comes into play. Until one utters the term explicitly, truth is merely a standby notion, along with a cluster of other rabbit and non rabbit notions that implicitly attend, ready to hand.
A name is not a description. Nor does a name refer only in virtue of its somehow being the same as a description.
Wasn't talking about names as definite descriptions. "Standing in" is a reference to the quote: "Words don't stand for things, they stand in for them". Meaning roughly language functions in the absence of the things it is concerned with, and it must be this way. Even when you say "I do" at a marriage, marriage isn't there in the words is it? It's not like you "conjure" marriage by saying "I do", the act's significance is deferred to the historical+institutional+interpersonal contexts, and it's only in relation to those contexts that "I do" stands in for marriage in any way at all. That's the sense of "standing in" I was going for.
T-sentences do not claim that the thing on the left is the very same as the thing on the right. The equivalence is one of truth-function, not of identity. Any interpretation that applies to the proposition on the left also applies to the state of affairs on the right. Hence, they cancel out, like paired variables in any equation.
I never said they were identical, I said they "counted as" each other - not every way for two things to be held equivalent is an identity between them. Indeed, the first part of the post contains "words aren't identical to the things they stand in for".
I'd like to present a hypothetical scenario, which I'll analyze in my own words, and then perhaps you can point out any problems, as you see it.
The scenario is that it is raining and Alice, after looking out her window, says that it is raining.
What is occurring (that it is raining) is just what Alice says is occurring. Her statement is true.
Now people wouldn't normally make statements about rain if they (and others) didn't know what rain was, at least in some rudimentary sense. Their knowledge about rain arises from their interactions with the world. They have experienced wet weather (as distinguished from dry weather) and, collectively, have found it noteworthy enough to create language about it.
Those experiences are what ground the use of that language. So when Alice says that it is raining, she is saying that the particular situation she is currently in is a wet weather situation - something that she is familiar with in her experience. Whether she speaks truly or not depends on whether it is a wet weather situation. If it weren't raining and, instead, Bob were on the roof hosing water, then her statement would be false (unbeknownst to her, at least for now).
I don't see anything mysterious or problematic with this. It's just how the language game operates (in ordinary, everyday communications, at least).
"Standing in" is a reference to the quote: "Words don't stand for things, they stand in for them". Meaning roughly language functions in the absence of the things it is concerned with, and it must be this way.
I must need more coffee, because I can't make sense of this. What are the things language is concerned with? It is concerned with the stuff around us every day. I don't see how it could be said to function in their absence.
When we make an assertion, a whole process of interaction has lead to the uttered statement. "This rose is red", what are the boundaries of the rose? How many thorns does it have? How many petals? What is its hue? How reflective is it? How tall? A condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns occurs when using words to stand in for them; what counts as a rose, what counts as red, and what is irrelevant for both instances of counting as.
When we make the assertion that the rose is red we somehow invoke a "condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns"...?
Looks like you are claiming something along the lines of a description that serves to "pick out" the individual involved. And we know from Kripke that this is not how names work.
Or are you wishing for something like Searle's Background or Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs? That doesn't seem right, either - we don't need to know how tall the rose is in order to believe that the rose is red.
What thingly qualities are implicitly brought to bear in the calling of X a thing?
"The rose is red" is true IFF the rose is red.
What ever "thingly qualities are implicitly brought to bear in the calling of X a rose" that are used in "The rose is red" may also to be used in "'The rose is red' is true". (@bongo fury...?)
We don't need an essence, a definite description, a complete understanding, of what the rose is for it to be "ready-to-hand" that it is red.
in the execution of x, the passive observation, and "there is a rabbit" is uttered, truth only comes into play after the fact because it is in this afterward that truth, the functional concept's context comes into play. Until one utters the term explicitly, truth is merely a standby notion, along with a cluster of other rabbit and non rabbit notions that implicitly attend, ready to hand.
...which looks like no more than a long way of saying that truth is a predicate of statements.
creativesoulJanuary 17, 2021 at 20:03#4898900 likes
What would count as a misattribution of belief as compared/contrasted to correctly attributing belief to such language-less creatures?
— creativesoul
Ah, not a bad question.
One would suppose that misattribution would be the same for animals and people.
Trivially speaking, it's the same in that the misattribution is not what they believe.
Misattributing belief to another(regardless of whether they are language-less) is to provide a false account of the other's belief. In order to know whether or not that account is false, we must first know what the other's belief is, or at the very least what it could possibly be given what else we do know about the other.
What can we know about a language-less creature's belief?
We can know that it cannot include language use. All predication is language use. We can know that it cannot include predication. All propositions are predication. We can know that it cannot include propositions. All statements are language use. We can know that it cannot include statements. We can know that it cannot be about language use, predication, propositions, or statements.
Since language-less belief cannot include or be about predication, propositions, or statements, then the claim that all belief has propositional content is false, for language-less belief cannot.
Can there be a correlation drawn that cannot be put into propositional form?
I've always wondered why you believe that this is so important?
Putting meaningful language-less correlations(language-less belief) into propositional form does not make the language-less belief themselves propositional in their content. Rather, it makes them amenable to being talked about; which, evolutionarily speaking, makes perfect sense. That also speaks to my second post in the debate.
A mouse running behind a tree is an event. Believing that a mouse ran behind a tree is belief about those events. A language-less creature, such as a cat, can form such beliefs about such events. One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree. The event takes place regardless of whether or not any creature forms belief about the event. None of it - the occurrence of event or the occurrence of language-less belief formation about the event - includes or is about language use. None of it is propositional in content.
We might all agree that having a belief is not like having something in one's pocket.
We might suppose that @creativesoul has a handkerchief in his pocket. Here, there is a fact of the matter, that can be decided by Creative producing the kerchief and demonstrating us correct. But Creative cannot produce his belief for our inspection; all Creative can do is to make claims about that belief.
This has odd ramifications for the misattribution of belief. We might all think that Creative has a kerchief in his pocket, but it is really a beetle.
It's as if Creative were not able even to look in to the pocket to see if there is a kerchief there - because we do sometimes talk about our beliefs being misplaced; Perhaps I believed I was doing such-and-such from the best of intentions, but it turned out I was just being selfish.
We might all, Creative included, think that Creative has a kerchief in his pocket, but it is really a beetle. But in the case of belief, we cannot take a look.
The grammar of belief is not like the grammar of things in pockets. I showed in the debate how beliefs are there in order that we can distinguish between what is the case and what we take to be the case, in order to explain things such as when we are in error. They are also of use in explaining why we do things - she reached into her pocket because she believed it contained a kerchief; she was surprised to pull out a gun...
One is tempted to say something like: there is a fact of the matter as to whether there is a kerchief in Creative's pocket, or a beetle, or a gun. But there is no equivalent fact of the matter as to what Creative believes.
A language-less creature, such as a cat, can form such beliefs about such events.
The cat can put something in its pocket? We can explain the cat's behaviour by talking in terms of what it believes. But there is no way to pull the belief out of the pocket to confirm or refute our assertions. The belief does not function in the same way as the kerchief, gun or beetle.
This is another way of expressing something on which I insisted previously: beliefs are not mental furniture. They are not things. So it is misguided to think: Quoting creativesoul
In order to know whether or not that account is false, we must first know what the other's belief is...
But there just is no fact of the matter whether a word or picture is pointed at one thing or another. No physical bolt of energy flows from pointer to pointee(s). So the whole social game is one of pretence.
— bongo fury
When we make the assertion that the rose is red we somehow invoke a "condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns"...?
You know as well as I do that it's unfashionable to make names work like predicates that pick out a unique object. When someone says "This rose is red", and I am talking about "a condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns", I did not intend to set up a correspondence between the noun "rose" and the rose properties, I intended to set up a productive relationship between the rose and the speech act of asserting "This rose is red".
You might want to call it a causal relationship, what was it about the rose that caused me to describe it as red? No doubt you will say that it was a red rose. Then we've got to return to the question; what caused it to count as a red rose? That it was a red rose explains why the assertion was true, but not the cause of the assertion.
Part of the cause of that "counts as" is the rose, part of that counts as is in the norms of language use.
I must need more coffee, because I can't make sense of this. What are the things language is concerned with? It is concerned with the stuff around us every day. I don't see how it could be said to function in their absence.
Maybe you've read "absence" as "it doesn't exist at all", I'm intending "absence" as whatever is allowing us to speak of a hypothetical red rose over the forum. It's in neither of our heads is, it's in neither of our memories, it's in neither of our imaginations, so where is it? Absent, in that sense. But it works all the same.
You might want to call it a causal relationship...
No, I wouldn't; and this is salient because I think @Constance, in reaching for Heidegger, pulls out a misguided picture of how language works. It's not causal, but intentional. We are not caused to call the flower a rose, or to claim that it is red; we choose to do so, we use the words "rose" and "red" in that way.
Reply to frank Sure; the causal theory of reference. I don't think it quite works.
I think "frank" does not refer to you in the way a marble causes another to move; I'm not sure how that could work. I think we are using the word "frank" to refer to you.
But what has this to do with belief?
creativesoulJanuary 17, 2021 at 21:46#4899470 likes
We might all agree that having a belief is not like having something in one's pocket.
I would think. Why then, continue talking about belief as if it is? I've certainly never claimed that having belief is equivalent to having something in one's pocket. I'm left wondering what the point of that post was???
Having belief about mice and trees is the result of having drawn correlations between mice, trees, and other things.
I've certainly never claimed that having belief is equivalent to having something in one's pocket. I'm left wondering what the point of that post was???
That's exactly what you are doing in supposing that the belief of you mouse is some sort of correlation going on in its head.
creativesoulJanuary 17, 2021 at 21:54#4899520 likes
One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree...
— creativesoul
...which can be put into propositional form; hence, all belief is propositional.
If something can be put into propositional form, then it is propositional?
Surely, you're not claiming that, are you?
:brow:
I would think that when something is put into propositional form, it was not propositional prior to the putting.
think "frank" does not refer to you in the way a marble causes another to move; I'm not sure how that could work. I think we are using the word "frank" to refer to you.
I didn't decide to call those red flowers "roses". Are you saying we collectively decided that? That can't be true. Most of the collective is dead.
Reply to bongo fury I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about. For animals scents and sounds are signs of prey, for example, but they don't represent prey symbolically. Symbols (words) stand for objects because the sound of the word or the visible written marks are associated with the objects they (are understood to) represent.
creativesoulJanuary 17, 2021 at 22:29#4899680 likes
Meaningful belief is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location.
A capable language-less creature believes a mouse ran behind the tree if they draw correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of themselves, the mouse, and the tree. The content of that belief is the mouse, the tree, themselves, spatiotemporal locations, and the correlations drawn between all those different directly perceptible things(and others undoubtedly).
The content of all belief about mice running around trees always includes mice, trees, and spatial relationships. All of these different directly perceptible things are necessary elemental constituents of such language-less belief. Remove any one of them and the elemental correlational content is lacking.
creativesoulJanuary 17, 2021 at 22:34#4899690 likes
For animals scents and sounds are signs of prey, for example, but they don't represent prey symbolically.
Indeed. The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents.
The content of that belief is the mouse, the tree, themselves, spatiotemporal locations, and the correlations drawn between all those different directly perceptible things(and others undoubtedly).
...which if it is anything is propositional: "the mouse went behind the tree".
Which was to be proved.
I can't see you doing anything here except agreeing with me most ardently.
I'm bound to call them roses by my desire to communicate.
...bound...?
No, you are not. You might say "them pretty flowers over there", or "the Rosaceae", or "????" or even "the bush I cut down last week because it prickled my foot".
More on that. There's information here; it needs to be over there; it is transmitted as a signal. Introduce Shannon's equations and entropy, and it all becomes very interesting.
But that's not the whole of language, any more than it is the whole of the world.
Indeed. The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents.
I'm tempted, but remain skeptical. Seems like another (along with "belief") anthropomorphic over-extension of the real thing, which in this case is humans' game of pretend: wherein, as you say,
But still, where is this going? "Cause if we don't know where we are going, any post will take you there.
I thought @fdrake was sorting out how the T-sentence rule works? I think the answer is that it does no work. It's not informative. It's trivially true.
"Drawing correlations" is not necessarily a symbolizing activity.
Can you provide an example fo a correlation that cannot be shown to be in propositional form?
That would be a correlation that was not a property nor a relation between things.
So, yes, what you say is correct, but does not exclude the proposal that the content of belief is propositional. Indeed, if anything, it says the same thing.
Reply to Banno Right, I didn't say that the correlations animals make when "reading" signs of prey or predators or water and so on cannot be symbolically represented by us, just that they are not understood symbolically by the animals; they are just associations (correlations) of one thing with another.
Firstly, if we take "P" as some proposition, and A as it's translation, then the T-sentence ("P" is true iff A) sets out the meaning of "...is true". This is what Tarski did with them.
Secondly, if we take truth as understood, the the T-sentence ("P" is true iff A) sets out the conditions under which "P" is true; that is, A. That's what Davidson did with them.
I know quoting from my holy book (apocrypha) isn't an argument, but...
One thread of an argument by Herbert Hochberg runs somewhat as follows: that "white" applies to certain things does not make them white; rather "white" applies because they are white. Plausible enough but misleading. Granted, I cannot make these objects red by calling them red--by applying the term "red" to them. But on the other hand, the English language makes them white just by applying the term "white" to them; application of the term "white" is not dictated by their somehow being antecedently white, whatever that might mean. A language that applies the term "blanc" to them makes them blanc; and a language if any that applies the term "red" to them makes them red.
Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value.
Reply to bongo fury I don't think "pretend" is a suitable term here. We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience. Against what purported actuality could you juxtapose that fact of human experience, such as to justify calling it a "pretence"?
We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience.
Yep, we know how to play the game of agreeing to pretend that certain words and pictures point at certain things. Pretend seems to me a suitable word for that kind of game. I don't mean we don't actually play it.
We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience.
We understand this not in the way we understand that the cat is on the mat, but in the way that we understand that the Bishop only ever stays on the same coloured squares. We understand not a fact, but a procedure that allows us to get on with the game.
That seems to me what is incongruous in @fdrake and @Constance, that in seeing reference as ready-to-hand they are mystified by its being conventional.
Reply to bongo fury What do you think we are pretending then? We are not pretending that (some) words (sounds and groups of visual symbols) are associated with objects by us. It's obvious there is no direct cause and effect (energetic) relation between words and what they represent or any logically necessary relation between any particular sound or group of visual symbols and what they are designated to represent, so where does the supposed pretence sit?
One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree...
— creativesoul
...which can be put into propositional form; hence, all belief is propositional.
We understand this not in the way we understand that the cat is on the mat, but in the way that we understand that the Bishop only ever stays on the same coloured squares. We understand not a fact, but a procedure that allows us to get on with the game.
Sure it is a matter of understanding following conventional associations. I don't think chess is a very good analogy, but I agree we don't understand it in the same way we understand a statement about some sensible state of affairs; I take all this to be trivially true, so much so that I cannot understand why anyone would disagree.
Well you should since I'm certainly not using obscure language; it's very straightforward. I'm happy to explain anything you haven't understood in what I've said.
Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value.
Seems amenable!
Though @Banno here uses it (at least, last time we talked about it) in a deflationary manner. IE the sense of a declarative sentence is spelled out in the conditions that would make it true and only those conditions, and there's no better candidate for spelling out those conditions than disquoting the declarative sentence itself. The major contrast between deflation and correspondence (as I see it) is that a correspondence theory takes a sentence and matches it to some sort of worldly fact - like an event, a thought, an object's properties - and says the sentence is true when it matches the fact.. Banno's deflationary view doesn't match the sentence with some worldly fact, it matches it with other sentences that would be true in all and only the same conditions.
Banno's particular quirk (probably following Davidson) is that he then treats truth (IIRC) as an unanalysable primitive in norms of language; so the meanings of sentences are spelled out by how they are true, but what it means to say a sentence is true is something that must be assumed of any use of language and can't be spelled out in terms of any other idea or language practice. You already know what it means for a declarative sentence to be true, if you didn't the whole apparatus of language around it would fall apart. For Banno, as for Davidson, it seems the T-sentence isn't a theory of truth; it takes truth as a given and uses the T sentence to provide a theory of meaning.
That seems to me what is incongruous in fdrake and @Constance, that in seeing reference as ready-to-hand they are mystified by its being conventional.
It is conventional, but it isn't merely conventional. I doubt you believe that "this is a red rose" simply because we call it one. Norms play a part, they don't determine it all; otherwise there'd be no ability to coordinate between systems of evaluating sentences - how can we tell "snow is white" is true if and only if schnee ist weiß? Have to look at the snow and the norms of use.
Those experiences are what ground the use of that language
— Andrew M
Yes, what do you mean by "ground", how does it work?
It's the context for our talk. Language doesn't arise in a vacuum, but in our interactions with the world (our experiences). We perceive a difference between wet weather and dry weather, say, and when being aware of such differences is useful for our purposes, language is created and used. Those perceived differences are what our talk is grounded in, i.e., they provide the context for our talk.
Those perceived differences are what our talk is grounded in, i.e., they provide the context for our talk.
If you'll permit me to be a bit socratic, when you say that they "provide the context for our talk", and that this context "grounds" the use of language, I was wondering if you could comment on:
(1) How speech acts are assigned to contexts; how do you tell which context a speech act is in?
(2) Whether the context of a given speech act doesn't just "ground" but also determines some component of its meaning - or in a more pragmatic vocabulary, if the context the speech act arises in influences the norms of use of the speech act?
The norms of use consist of patterns of speech acts in interaction with the world.
Which are used to ground and contextualise speech acts interacting with the world.
One point of the analysis treats speech acts as a given - a base/guarantor of meaning, one point of the analysis treats them as fungible - the superstructure/vehicle of meaning. Both contextualiser and context element - condition of possibility and actual instance.
I agree that speech acts both contextualise norms of language use and arise in contexts, what I think this does is stop them from being appealed to as a ground at one moment and as an expression in that ground the next.
The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents.
So you're arguing for semantic holism?
unenlightenedJanuary 18, 2021 at 12:21#4901190 likes
[quote=Lao Tzu]The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.
The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things.[/quote]
The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents.
— creativesoul
So you're arguing for semantic holism?
I'm arguing that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief; that all belief consists of correlations drawn between different things; that some language-less creatures have belief; that not all belief is propositional in content; that all our accounting practices of an other's belief(and our own) are propositional in form.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2021 at 15:52#4901850 likes
...what was the gist of the motivation for the debate about whether beilef is propositional or not?
If all belief has propositional content then either propositions somehow exist in their entirety prior to language use in such a way so that language-less creature's belief can have propositional content or language-less creatures have no belief.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2021 at 16:06#4901880 likes
...what was the gist of the motivation for the debate about whether beilef is propositional or not?
Correcting a long-standing conventional error of treating propositions as equivalent to belief(conflating belief and propositions) that stemmed from epistemology(JTB), by virtue of neglecting the stark differences in the truth conditions of some belief as compared to the truth conditions of a proposition in general when both are represented by the same marks, such as "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" or "Either Jones has a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona".
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2021 at 16:10#4901890 likes
...what was the gist of the motivation for the debate about whether beilef is propositional or not?
Presenting a notion of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression and doesn't lead to anthropomorphism when talking about the minds of other animals.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2021 at 16:11#4901910 likes
Reply to Banno I don't think we are disagreeing about anything; I thought it was you that had doubts, since you said "I don't know"; which suggests that you think we might disagree about something. So, what do you think we might disagree about?
Reasonably accurate, except for two small points. I would drop the use of "meaning" and say we takes truth as a given and uses the T sentence to provide a theory of interpretation. And there is a correspondence between word and world; one that is shown rather than said. We can tell that "schnee ist weiß" can be interpreted as "snow is white" by looking at its place in the lives of germanic folk.
Reply to creativesoul Are you sure? Then our only point of disagreement is your refusal to acknowledge that events have propositional form; that states of affairs are shaped like propositions.
...states of affairs are shaped like propositions.
After all, setting out what is the case is exactly what propositions do;
...our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, it least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon-the most favoured alternative method.
It should not be at all remarkable that our common stock of words includes a way of setting out how things are. Nor is it surprising that we have a way of marking utterances of this sort that are felicitous - they are true. We would also expect ways of talking about non felicitous utterances of this sort; in the case at hand, a way of talking about situations where someone takes what is the case to be one way when someone else takes it to be the other.
Propositions - statements - are about things and their relations; or as Creative puts it, they are about "correlation". Again, in saying that beliefs are correlations Creative is doing no more than saying that beliefs have propositional content.
On the way here we passed by the relation between words and the world; @Constance pointed to the "seamless, propositionless doing" of our everyday encounters with the world. @fdrake followed through on this. There is a way of understanding a rule that is not set out in more rules, but rather is shown in how we enact the rule. There is a way of understanding that "Snow is white" is true that is not only set out in the T-sentence '"Snow is white" is true only if snow is white', but understood in making snowballs, watching the drifting specks, shovelling the pathway. This is not said, but shown. That does not render it unsayable - after all, Constance, fdrake and I have indeed been saying it. The T-sentence sets out the very equivalence between word and world, but to see this, like the duck-rabbit, one has to be able to look at the T-sentence in two ways; what it says is a truth functional equivalence of two sets of words; what it shows is the relation between words and the world. Picture a T-sentence in which the equivalence is between '"Snow is white" is true' and white snow.
I'm arguing that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief; that all belief consists of correlations drawn between different things; that some language-less creatures have belief; that not all belief is propositional in content; that all our accounting practices of an other's belief(and our own) are propositional in form.
Reply to baker ...as if religious belief were not simply a species of the belief genre. Your comments are specious. This is not a discussion of religious belief.
We need a general relation between an individual and a possible state of affairs, to use when someone is wrong as to the truth.
Which show signs of systematic ambiguity (bordering on sophistry) between state of affairs as (A) unquoted statement and (B) worldly fact. Leading to this kind of thing,
What do you think we are pretending then? We are not pretending that (some) words (sounds and groups of visual symbols) are associated with objects by us.
No, agreed, but the association itself is pretended, as you virtually allowed here:
Like the weather or a carburettor, the neural collective is actually pushing and shoving against the real world.
That then is the semantics that breathes life into the syntax.
— apokrisis
Are you sure it's obvious to a bio-semiotician? You know, signs as allegedly so different from symbols?
Smoke may be a sign of fire, but it is not a symbol of fire. Seems obvious to me. I think Peirce's distinctions between signs, ikons and symbols make good sense.
On the way here we passed by the relation between words and the world; Constance pointed to the "seamless, propositionless doing" of our everyday encounters with the world. @fdrake followed through on this. There is a way of understanding a rule that is not set out in more rules, but rather is shown in how we enact the rule. There is a way of understanding that "Snow is white" is true that is not only set out in the T-sentence '"Snow is white" is true only if snow is white', but understood in making snowballs, watching the drifting specks, shovelling the pathway. This is not said, but shown. That does not render it unsayable - after all, Constance, fdrake and I have indeed been saying it. The T-sentence sets out the very equivalence between word and world, but to see this, like the duck-rabbit, one has to be able to look at the T-sentence in two ways; what it says is a truth functional equivalence of two sets of words; what it shows is the relation between words and the world. Picture a T-sentence in which the equivalence is between '"Snow is white" is true' and white snow.
creativesoulJanuary 19, 2021 at 02:29#4904130 likes
I think Peirce's distinctions between signs, ikons and symbols make good sense.
I'm very sympathetic to the idea that meaning is prior to language use, marks, symbols... However, I've found that apo conflates meaning with causality, and he's not alone in that regard. There's a notion...'natural meaning', perhaps, or something like that that believes that meaning is somehow prior to becoming meaningful to a creature. Smoke being called "a sign" of fire is exactly such a conflation when and if it is called such in the complete absence of a creature capable of drawing correlations between the two. In other words, I agree that smoke can become a sign of fire, but do not at all agree that it is in any situation apart from becoming and/or already being meaningful to a creature capable of attributing meaning.
Reply to Banno
The debate between you and creative just comes down to how we want to define belief. We can define it any way we like, obviously.
Your sticking point has to do with some equivalence of word and world. Since words are commonly put together to say untrue things, there can't be any equivalence.
I used it here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/482981
In summary, it shows that the state of affairs is truth functionally equivalent to a proposition; since Creative accepts states of affairs, (calling them correlations...) it follows that states of affairs are truth functionally equivalent to true propositions. Creative accepts that beliefs involve correlations, erstwhile states of affairs, and hence has to agree that his correlations are truth functionally equivalent to a true proposition.
Reply to frank Nope. Not needed for the logic of T-sentences. If you are interested I can reference the Davidson articles that articulate this.
Your sticking point has to do with some equivalence of word and world. Since words are commonly put together to say untrue things, there can't be any equivalence.
This, and your comment re modality, leads me to think that you haven't grokked the logic of a t-sentence. IF the LHS of a T-sentence is false, and the T-sentence is true, the RHS will also be false.
This, and your comment re modality, leads me to think that you haven't grokked the logic of a t-sentence. IF the LHS of a T-sentence is false, and the T-sentence is true, the RHS will also be false.
”Snow is purple" is true IFF snow is purple.
How does this set out an equivalence of word and world?
It is if it is true; and that's what is salient. But I'm not interested in the ontological status of counterfactuals, nor is it relevant. What counts is that if the RHS is true it is how things are, if it is how things are it is true. How that is decided is irrelevant.
As the difference between using a word or phrase to mention (refer to, denote, describe, point at) an object and using a quotation or other word or phrase to mention the word.
we normally use a sentence to assert something about a (referring) subject.
— Andrew M
I'm cool with phrase extending to cover statement, even though I dispute that (or at least how) whole statements refer. As long as the statement isn't systematically confused with its alleged referent (event, or worldly fact as fdrake puts it). E.g. virtually any reference to "states of affairs".
Those perceived differences are what our talk is grounded in, i.e., they provide the context for our talk.
— Andrew M
If you'll permit me to be a bit socratic, when you say that they "provide the context for our talk", and that this context "grounds" the use of language, I was wondering if you could comment on:
(1) How speech acts are assigned to contexts; how do you tell which context a speech act is in?
Speech acts occur in a context. So part of the context in the hypothetical I presented was that it was raining. How you tell what the context is is both a matter of looking (as Alice did) and being correct (as Alice was).
(2) Whether the context of a given speech act doesn't just "ground" but also determines some component of its meaning - or in a more pragmatic vocabulary, if the context the speech act arises in influences the norms of use of the speech act?
If I understand you then, yes. If someone were unclear about what rain was, then it could be ostensively demonstrated. If someone claims that it is raining, then they are identifying their situation as being that kind of situation.
I agree that speech acts both contextualise norms of language use and arise in contexts, what I think this does is stop them from being appealed to as a ground at one moment and as an expression in that ground the next.
While confusion of use and mention is endemic, can we please focus on ordinary declarative statements?
If you like. I think they're being emphasised in an oscillatory manner.
To my tastes @Banno is trying to have his cake and eat it too - language is pragmatic, generically speech acts aren't assertions, truth plays a central role in a theory of meaning (of assertions).
Allegedly: belief's a two place relation with an agent on the left and a statement on the right, but that works out the same as the agent having a belief about the statement's disquotation because the statement and its disquotation are truth functionally equivalent (despite that one is a statement, and one is a worldly event - the world as a metalanguage).
When you push on the alleged connection between the statement and its truth condition, we end up with "use", pragmatics, norms being used to justify the belief claim.
When you push on the pragmatics, you end up with something like a formal semantics of statements alone to justify the belief claim.
Repeat ad nauseum, never talk about anything substantive. It feels like a holism that will use anything it deems connected to avoid articulating a point.
Reply to Banno
Sorry, I had on intention to disrupt. When I first started reading the debate, it seemed oddly familiar, and now I remembered why: I had a Christian "friend" who, over the years, went to great lengths in trying to convert me. His style was to produce a science-inspired or philosophy-inspired argument, parts of which were indisputable and to which I agreed, and then he'd go for the jugular. I didn't convert. But now and then I notice and become aware of the consequences (and damage) that being exposed to his conversion effors left on me. Your debate about propositions was one such instance.
...our only point of disagreement is your refusal to acknowledge that events have propositional form; that states of affairs are shaped like propositions.
The above conflates what accounting practices require with what that which is being taken into account requires. Another conflation here is between our accounting practice and that which is being taken into account by virtue of using that practice. These confusions are part and parcel to Banno's approach, for they are built in. There is an utterly inadequate notion of belief at work here as a direct result.
creativesoulJanuary 19, 2021 at 17:59#4906210 likes
There's an emaciated notion of truth, meaning, and belief at work here in Banno's position, which comes as no surprise to me given that truth and meaning are both existentially dependent upon belief formation. They both emerge via correlations drawn between different things.
When you push on the alleged connection between the statement and its truth condition, we end up with "use", pragmatics, norms being used to justify the belief claim.
To be clear, the metalanguage is on the left, and contains the truth predicate. The object language is on the right. So the object language is the world.
The missing piece may be that the world is, in Davidson's words, always and already interpreted. The illocution of making statements involves representing the world in words - that's what the game is.
Use is deploying a word, phrase, sentence, group or groups of sentences to refer, command, entreat, explain or whatever else we do with words, phrases, sentences or groups of sentences.
Mention is referring to a word, phrase, sentence or group of sentences.
Smoke may be a sign of fire, but it is not a symbol of fire. Seems obvious to me.
Fair enough. Even Goodman explored in that direction early on. But Catherine Elgin (chapter 8 here, but no pdf or preview) argues that his mature theory shows how being a sign of fire, in the sense meant, is fully explained as a species of symbolising fire. Not something essentially different, and hence (though this isn't Elgin's point) not an excuse to impute symbolic thinking (or an alleged cousin of it) anthropomorphically.
Not something essentially different, and hence (though this isn't Elgin's point) not an excuse to impute symbolic thinking (or an alleged cousin of it) anthropomorphically.
I think smoke being a sign of fire, and the like, are different than, for example a letter symbolizing a sound or a sound symbolizing an object. I would agree they are related of course, you might say symbolizing evolves out of signifying. I haven't read Elgin though.
I am not sure I am exactly in line with Peirce on this (it's a long time since I've read him), but the way I see it is that signs are material correlations (the habit of association forms when one phenomenon is repeatedly found to be proximally occurrent with another), Ikons are imagistic correlations (the ikon or pictograph looks like what it represents) and symbols are conventional (the association has been established by traditional or social usage). This seems to make good sense to me, but I'd be happy to have this view corrected or improved upon.
To be clear, the metalanguage is on the left, and contains the truth predicate. The object language is on the right. So the object language is the world.
I take it you mean the object language considered as a whole domain of symbols plus its own semantic world of denoted objects comprises the semantic world of the metalanguage? (Nothing like "the world as a metalanguage", but fine. Thank goodness, indeed.)
But that wouldn't excuse blurring the distinction between syntactic and semantic layers of the object language.
It doesn't matter that it's natural language, where the layers aren't as clear cut as for Tarski. There's still no need to confuse use vs mention, logical or grammatical subject vs subject-matter, state of affairs or disquotation as in statement vs state of affairs or disquotation as in event (or whatever).
It doesn't matter that it's natural language, where the layers aren't as clear cut as for Tarski. There's still no need to confuse use vs mention, logical or grammatical subject vs subject-matter, state of affairs or disquotation as in statement vs state of affairs or disquotation as in event.
So... you think I am jumbling use and mention?
I want to be clear about this. "The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.
That's not an ambiguity.
One can use a screw driver to drive a screw, or one can put it away into the toolbox. That does not make the use of a screwdriver ambiguous.
Use is deploying a word, phrase, sentence, group or groups of sentences to refer, command, entreat, explain or whatever else we do with words, phrases, sentences or groups of sentences.
Sure. I was responding to Bongo Fury's comment that confusion of use and mention had reached pandemic status. I was asking for his view of it to set alongside Banno's (which is kind of unique, I think).
I take it you mean the object language considered as a whole domain of symbols plus its own semantic world of denoted objects comprises the semantic world of the metalanguage?
I mean that the world is all that is the case.
Look at that and reassure me that you can see that it is about what can be stated.
The sentence on the right is being used, not mentioned.
— Banno
Used as in setting out a state of affairs.
— Banno
What is on the RHS is a state of affairs
— Banno
I want to be clear about this. "The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.
That's not an ambiguity.
One can use a screw driver to drive a screw, or one can put it away into the toolbox. That does not make the use of a screwdriver ambiguous.
I shall try to contrast what I've been thinking to what you've been thinking, but I'd like you to answer a couple of questions first. I need you to spell out how you think this works before I try and make the contrast.
The missing piece may be that the world is, in Davidson's words, always and already interpreted. The illocution of making statements involves representing the world in words - that's what the game is.
When you say "the object language is the world", what does that mean? Does it entail that the world is a language because it is an object language, or are you making a different claim? If you are making a different claim, what metaphysics justifies treating the world as a language?
Moreover, I'll grant that the world is "always already interpreted", but I don't see why that should make the content of that tacit interpretation propositional or even just language-like. Can you spell that out for me? Heidegger's emphatically against the claim that tacit interpretation works primarily by how it comes to be embedded in declarative sentences. Even though he sides with the claim that language ("discourse") plays a central role in giving the world its interactive texture (of institutions, intentions, rituals, signposts, jokes etc) and that texture is "always already there".
For Heidegger, propositionality; called the predicative "as structure" - conceived of as the adequation of thought and being through sententially expressed judgements - is retrojected onto pragmatic activity. It arises during conceptual/intellectual judgements regarding activities. It's like Witty's seeing-as applied to statable judgements - a seeing that (such and such) is the case. This is contrasted to the pre-predicative "as structure"; the pragmatic, procedural and existential components of interpretation - more of a seeing-how and the how of seeing-as. He has language "discourse" interweaving+coordinating both of those "as-structures" without exhausting all of their aspects, notably only the first has statements (judgements) playing a central role.
The missing piece may be that the world is, in Davidson's words, always and already interpreted. The illocution of making statements involves representing the world in words - that's what the game is.
There's a great sci-fi movie called Arrival in which the protagonist gains the alien's worldview as she learns their language. She subsequently has the ability to travel forward in her her own timeline like the aliens can.
On the one hand, this plot expresses your point that what we know of the world is bound by language and vice versa.
But it also conflicts in the idea that the world (in total) is expressable in language. It's logically possible that there are aspects of the world that we can't point to with language because we don't have the concepts (yet).
So you could narrow down your assessment of the RHS to 'the world as we know it presently'.
You can't say it's the world in total unless you can rule out the plot of Arrival and say our worldview is presently complete. And don't bring up Davidson's translation thing. I'm not saying these supposed hidden parts of the world are necessarily untranslatable. Just that our languages don't necessarily cover every aspect of the world in total.
Reply to frank
To support your point you might present an aspect of the world that is not covered by our language.
You show us, a new riff or artwork or film and say "see, that's new", and then we talk about it. Language grows.
Nothing in that counts against statements representing the world. Pointing out that words present the world, that the world is what is the case, is not claiming that there are things we do not know.
I was responding to Bongo Fury's comment that confusion of use and mention had reached pandemic status. I was asking for his view of it to set alongside Banno's (which is kind of unique, I think).
Yep. Well, maybe not unique but characteristic. Mention of use incites, in many, insurrection against pointing (naming, denoting, describing) as the presumed basis of meaning. So they probably hope the use-mention distinction is at least half-way not about pointing. They must be frequently disappointed, in that case.
"The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.
That's not an ambiguity.
Not if it's the choice between mention and use, no. But it isn't quite that. The first half is about mention and is fine. Use of (other) words to mention or point at a sentence. But what is pointing at what when we
use it [the sentence] to show that the cup is on the table.
?
Nothing so low class as pointing seems to be implied. Much better, we are invited (roughly every other sentence) to see the cup situation as somehow one with the sentence. Distinguishing between picked-out and picker-outer would obviously spoil that mystical game.
What do you mean when you claim that the world and/or states of affairs are 'shaped' like statements or propositions?
Surely that's not to be taken at face value.
Trees and mice and mice running around trees are not shaped like statements or propositions(using these terms synonymously). And... some statements are false. Someone else raised this point earlier, as have I on more than one occasion. The world is not the sort of thing capable of being true/false either, so... I'm a bit confused regarding exactly what you're trying to say here.
By the way, just so you know better, I'm not using "correlations" as you're using "propositions"... not even close.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 01:44#4910450 likes
I'm not saying these supposed hidden parts of the world are necessarily untranslatable...
I would say exactly that. The unknown(hidden parts of the world) is most certainly untranslatable, for it is utterly meaningless, and all translation is of that which is already meaningful.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 02:26#4910550 likes
There is such a thing as language-less belief.
It is the simplest of all the different kinds that I'm convinced exist, and we talk about; where "kinds" are determined by the content of the correlations being drawn.
Here's the point:No language-less belief uses or mentions language. Period. The use/mention distinction is totally irrelevant with regard to what language-less belief consists of - the content - of language-less belief. Honestly, the only sensible use I find is that use is not always about language use, and mention has it as the focal point.
Language-less creatures are capable of neither using nor mentioning language.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 02:53#4910660 likes
Statements and propositions are both existentially dependent upon language use. While language-less belief is prior to language, it can still be about language use and/or products thereof. Some language-less belief is about language use and/or directly perceptible stuff that is itself existentially dependent upon language use. Some language-less belief is about cups, shelves, and cupboards. Language-less belief that is about cups, shelves, and cupboards can be so, can have such content, because those terms pick out directly perceptible things, and some language-less creatures are capable of drawing correlations between directly perceptible things.
A creature cannot have belief about "red cups full of Maxwell House coffee" unless it can say that. However, some of us [s]may[/s] DO need to be reminded that while a cat can most certainly chase a mouse, and that mouse can most certainly run behind a red cup full of Maxwell House coffee(for the sake of argument, we'll pretend it's a big cup and a small mouse), the mouse most certainly does not hide behind a statement, a proposition, a use, a mention, language, or "red cups full of Maxwell House coffee".
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 02:54#4910670 likes
Thanks for your efforts. That's an excellent reply.
This might take a while.
The "claim" is nothing but the commonplace that when what we say is true, it sets out how things are. I have difficulty in seeing how you might maintain that the world is interpreted and yet treat this interpretation as tacit; especially if that tacit interpretation is thought of as not being capable of interpretation in propositional form.
The notion of a level of interpretation that is not linguistic is counterintuitive. I gather the notion is that the world is already divided into cups and tables before these are spoken of; (the before here being a logical, not a temporal, priority? I understand time plays an odd role in Heidegger's metaphysics...)
The question you ask - how one moves from the tacit to the explicit presentation, "...retrojected onto pragmatic activity", is psychological, rather than logical. The logic of propositions does not have a place for the tacit; how could it, given that logic is in essence about grammar?
When you push on the pragmatics, you end up with something like a formal semantics of statements alone to justify the belief claim.
I gather the issue is, at what stage do we conclude that some given statement is true - what is it that justifies a belief? That's fraught; it requires psychology rather than logic... Quoting fdrake
I don't see why that should make the content of that tacit interpretation propositional or even just language-like.
Well, if it is not propositional, what is it? What other form could it have? And even if there is some alternative form, that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form. If it were not, then we would have no grounds for referring to it as "content".
That is, the tacitly understood relations of individuals to each other must themselves be interpretable in propositional form.
I think smoke being a sign of fire, and the like, are different than, for example a letter symbolizing a sound or a sound symbolizing an object. I would agree they are related of course, you might say symbolizing evolves out of signifying
I would agree that smoke being a sign of fire is different than marks symbolizing, referencing, picking out, etc., other things.
What's interesting to me though, is exactly how much they are alike.
They both require a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. They both require something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between them.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 03:14#4910760 likes
...that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form.
I would agree that language-less belief is capable of being talked about and our talking about it has propositional form. All our interpretations come in exactly such a form.
Well, if it is not propositional, what is it? What other form could it have? And even if there is some alternative form, that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form. If it were not, then we would have no grounds for referring to it as "content".
Correlational form, if we must talk like that. Both require a plurality of things, but propositional form requires that some of those things are meaningful marks or sounds(language use).
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 03:52#4910870 likes
...that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form...
Well, much of our talk uses propositional form because that's just a matter of how our naming and descriptive practices work. It quite simply does not follow that everything we talk about(name and describe) has propositional form.
Mt. Everest certainly does not. Nor does a chair. Nor does a correlation drawn between one's own instinctual involuntary urge, drive, and/or desire(if we must) to chase a rodent and the rodent's whereabouts.
Our reports of chairs, mountains, and mice most certainly do.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 04:01#4910900 likes
If your correlations cannot be put into the form of a proposition, then what are they?
What kind of question is that? As if everything can be put into the form of a proposition, aside from correlations drawn between different things?
Mice, trees, chairs, and mountains cannot be put into the form of a proposition.
Well, I suppose a creative butcher-type material reconstruction could amount to parts and pieces of mice, trees, and mountains being arranged into the shape of names and/or descriptions themselves, but that's not what we're after here.
The point is that mice, trees, chairs, and mountains can become meaningful to a creature capable of drawing correlations between those things and others. Part of the content of the language-less belief in question here is a mouse. Another part is a tree. Another part is the desire to catch the mouse. All language-less belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief. Trees, mice, and spatial relations are part of the content of that particular language-less belief. Tress, mice, and spatial relations are not propositional in form, nor are they in any way shape or form existentially dependent upon language use at all. All propositions are. Thus, not all belief content is propositional.
I would agree that smoke being a sign of fire is different than marks symbolizing, referencing, picking out, etc., other things.
What's interesting to me though, is exactly how much they are alike.
They both require a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. They both require something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between them.
Yes, I agree that signs and symbols occur only in the context of sentient/ sapient beings. And I also agree that the things that become signs and symbols, are not merely signs and symbols. Smoke is smoke before, or irrespective of whether, it is a sign of fire. And sounds or inscribed marks are sounds and inscribed marks regardless of whether they are also signs or symbols.
So, it looks like we agree.
counterpunchJanuary 21, 2021 at 04:37#4910960 likes
I read both arguments and see it differently.
I suggest that belief is belief about the self.
"The mouse ran behind the tree" is really, an abbreviation for "I saw the mouse run behind the tree."
It is not the rightness of the proposition:
"The mouse ran behind the tree" to the world, but rather - the rightness of perception of the world by the self.
Consequently, the implied propositional content of belief is "I am right that...."
Further, we cannot put aside how we know that 'the cup is on the shelf' - for the content of belief is always belief about the self. The abbreviated "propositional" content reads "the cup is on the shelf" but in full is something more akin to:
(I am right that) the cup is on the shelf (because I remember emptying the dishwasher.)
or (I am right that) the mouse ran behind the tree (because my eyesight is not that bad)
Truth lies in the relationship between the organism and reality, and the propositional content of belief concerns the validity of that relationship.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 04:43#4910970 likes
You described metacognition. That is thinking about one's own thought and belief. In order to think about one's own thought and belief, there must be something to think about and a means for doing so.
You're not right if you believe that all belief is about the self, because that is not true.
counterpunchJanuary 21, 2021 at 05:03#4911040 likes
...they believe that that proposition is true. The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview. I've no argument against that much.
Well, okay then creativesoul - good talk. Maybe give my approach a little more thought and get back to me if you wish to discuss it. I "believe" it's right, and largely for the reasons you state:
The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 05:23#4911080 likes
The notion of a level of interpretation that is not linguistic is counterintuitive.
I almost concurred.
:wink:
That which is interpreted is already meaningful. Some meaningful belief and behaviour exists in it's entirety prior to language use. Thus, if we have two language-less creatures, we can have one interpreting the other's behaviour when that behaviour is already meaningful to the other, and that level of interpretation would not be at a linguistic level. It does follow the same process as linguistic level interpretation though... drawing correlations between different things. It's just that none of those things in the case of language-less animals includes language use.
Head shaking and...
Growling and...
Dancing and ruffling feathers and...
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 05:37#4911100 likes
Well, okay then creativesoul - good talk. Maybe give my approach a little more thought and get back to me if you wish to discuss it. I "believe" it's right, and largely for the reasons you state:
The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview.
That's about propositional attitude. Not all belief is equivalent to an attitude one has towards a statement/proposition. So, it's right in that particular sense. Some belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude. Not all.
Read the rest of that opening post, perhaps the entire debate and then get back to me if you wish to discuss it further.
:flower:
counterpunchJanuary 21, 2021 at 06:17#4911130 likes
I read your opening essay and banno's before I commented on this subject. What did you read before you wrote it? Anything?
The problem with your essay is that you claim that the proposition is that 'the mouse ran behind the tree' - whereas, the proposition is always...
"I am right that..."
Imagine another person, stood closer to the tree. You say:
"The mouse ran behind the tree."
They say:
"No, it didn't."
Do you accept this as a fact, and change your belief as easily as you change your socks? No! Because what they are really saying is that you are wrong. You refuse to accept it, because propositionally, it's not about whether the mouse ran behind the tree. It's about whether you are right that the mouse ran behind the tree.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2021 at 07:47#4911210 likes
I'm imagining one who is first learning how to use names such as "mouse" and "tree" to pick mice and trees out of the world to the exclusion of all else.
In that circumstance, "the mouse is behind the tree" could be an answer to a question and carry along with it some considerable uncertainty.
counterpunchJanuary 21, 2021 at 08:37#4911300 likes
I'm imagining one who is first learning how to use names such as "mouse" and "tree" to pick mice and trees out of the world to the exclusion of all else.
It's a little early for us to start thinking about children. We've only just met! Let's stick with adult brains, at least capable of knowing what objects are called, and having beliefs about them.
Thanks for your efforts. That's an excellent reply.
:up:
The "claim" is nothing but the commonplace that when what we say is true, it sets out how things are. I have difficulty in seeing how you might maintain that the world is interpreted and yet treat this interpretation as tacit; especially if that tacit interpretation is thought of as not being capable of interpretation in propositional form.
I think the contention isn't that "everything is capable of being set out in a statement", it's where that capability comes from and how it works.
The notion of a level of interpretation that is not linguistic is counterintuitive.
It might be counterinuitive to you? It isn't to me. I'm quite used to throwing more into the notion of interpretation than speech acts and statements. Eg, vision's involved, seeing-as is an interpretation, and there need be no words in a figure-ground relationship.
It might be worthwhile to make a distinction between linguistic interpretation and language involving interpretation. A linguistic interpretation would be a "setting out in words", a description etc, a language involving interpretation would be an interpretation which is informed by and partially constituted with language. Example; a doctor looking at a lung scan for an abnormality, a linguistic interpretation might be the speech act of making the assertion "There's an abnormality here", a language involving interpretation would be seeing the abnormality due to learning how to do it - from textbooks, demonstrations etc. The latter type is simultaneously more expansive and...
I gather the notion is that the world is already divided into cups and tables before these are spoken of; (the before here being a logical, not a temporal, priority? I understand time plays an odd role in Heidegger's metaphysics...)
construable as logically prior to the other. I claim language involving interpretation is logically prior to linguistic interpretation.
But I think it's worthwhile to note the temporal part too; I don't think this distinction between language involving and linguistic interpretation commits me to a temporal ordering between the two types; like one precedes the other; they're more like styles of engagement, ways of "reading off the world". The predicative as-structure; that which seeks, finds and judges propositions and their content; is very similar to Wittgenstein's "glasses" in the PI.
103. The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.—Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.
104. We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality.
The pre-predicative one is more informal and pragmatic, taking off the glasses, the rough ground is blurry but saturated with articulable structure; an encoding in propositional content is one means of articulation. Both the pre-predicative and the predicative seem to be involved in most speech acts, and have distinct styles of content which interweave. Why distinct styles of content? Putting on the glasses of propositional form is a filter, it seeks statements and judgements, it encodes the world in their images. And "we predicate of the thing that which lies in the method of representing (encoding - me) it". If you stop seeing the world in terms of an expectation of sentential logical form, that doesn't stop it from being able to be parsed in accordance with that form. What the routine occurrence in everyday non-glasses-wearing acts does do, however, is show that such logical form shows up in the world (and it is there!) only when using the glasses to see it. It goes from a necessary component of interaction to a contingent one; you can take off the glasses, and the propositional form need not appear. Once you take of the glasses, things still "make themselves manifest" as it were, but are not outside of the scope of language, language is born in interaction with that rough ground. What is articulated has to be wrestled into sentences, and sentential form is the referee's count at the pin.
The predicative as structure is a means of representation of the world's articulable content which yields statements and judgements thereof, it summarises, encodes, condenses, judges. Nothing falls apart if you take off the glasses; and you might need them again for reading. The important thing is the glasses can come off; which destroys the monopoly on content which you're imputing to the propositional form. It only seems like a monopoly because you've got the glasses on.
So what I'm reacting to in your position is that you seem to me to be doing the same thing as in 104:
Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality.
"x" is true iff x. As a theory of meaning through redundancy, of comparing the world to a logical form your vantage point has imputed to it and finding a match - you were looking for one. I have no problem with the match. It's that you're using that to limit other styles of filtering the world. It seems you are claiming it is the only match, a necessary match. It's like you've got the glasses on and define seeing as seeing through those glasses! So from my perspective:
Well, if it is not propositional, what is it? What other form could it have?
The premises underlying those questions are wrongheaded; the form isn't of the state of affairs, it's discovered in seeing the world a certain way. That logical form arises in an interaction; statements have propositional content because we and the world put it there conjointly.
And even if there is some alternative form, that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form.
I'll grant this, you can put the glasses on, but that only limits how the world shows up when they're on. The appeal for that claim is the logical priority of the pre-predicative; that the glasses can be taken off.
If you want examples of other ways of seeing the world that don't turn around what goes into statements; you're looking at other metaphysical vantage points. Maybe the world looks like interacting objects, manifestations of substance, dynamical systems, actor networks, monads, assemblages... I want to emphasise "other" in "other metaphysical vantage points"; claiming "the world is an object language" is a metaphysical claim.
Sorry for interjecting and mentioning, but I will propose something related. I can speculate, without being animal behavior specialist, that at least in animals, the matter of fact may be divorced more strongly from their mental attitudes. They might possess intent and not knowing about "states of affairs", as was previously mentioned. In other words, the cat might acquire stimuli to perform a certain action, to initiate a process of some kind, mental inertia of some sort, starting from the image of a running mouse, which then continues to compel it to chase for food-object behind the tree, This implies that there is pursuit of the object, which means that it moves, as well as its location, because this is where we will chase the object, but the cat probably does not fully conceptualize that there is mouse running behind the tree and hence the pursuit, or at least has a very vague abstract awareness of its motivation. There is some implicit mental correlation, because the action associated with the prompting motivation is indicative of the current state of affairs, but not directly tied to it. I argue, that even in human beings, belief may be about intent, not about states of affairs. States of affairs just strongly correlate with some types of intent.
That is, on Russell's view (and yours) the sentence entails that there is a present King of France. The entailment is false, therefore the sentence is false.
Again, rather out of cuff interjection. How do we know which parts of the sentence are existentially bound and which refer to particulars. The sentence could mean that one well known presently ruling king of France is bald. It could mean that such a king presently exists and is bald. Or in some point in time (prior to reading the statement), a king of France existed and was bald. In fact, it could mean that a country named France existed at some point, that country had a person acting in a particular capacity, called king, he had a condition, which for lack of a better term was named baldness, and that person had it. It seems to me that the battle for revealing propositions behind isolated sentences is obscured by linguistic inadequacy, if we are talking about ordinary language and without context that implies the intent of the author. The result is speculation.
counterpunchJanuary 21, 2021 at 13:45#4912180 likes
Apology accepted, however, I think we need to stick with human, adult brains - capable of knowing what things are, and having beliefs about them, and articulating those beliefs. There's no insight to be gained, from the "beliefs" of babies, or the "beliefs" of cats - because they're not the same thing as an adult, human, articulated belief - with or without propositional content. If the purpose of this debate is to decide if the content of belief is propositional, how can we possibly examine that question in organisms incapable of articulating a belief? I'm really not sure what question you are answering.
If the purpose of this debate is to decide if the content of belief is propositional, how can we possibly examine that question in organisms incapable of articulating a belief?
When you say "organisms incapable of articulating a belief", you seem to imply that having a belief requires the bearer to be able to articulate what it believes. In fact, I think you might be suggesting that believing and articulating beliefs are the same at some level. Am I correct? Why do you think that that is the case? Or is it a definitional matter.
P.S. It seems to me that this is what the original debate was about.
So they probably hope the use-mention distinction is at least half-way not about pointing.
— bongo fury
Then what do they think use is doing, if not pointing?
Everything in "How to do things with words", for starters? (I presume.)
Which is of course laudable. Why ever assume that thought is all in declarative sentences?
In which case, why ever think that meaning is all pointing?
counterpunchJanuary 21, 2021 at 14:09#4912320 likes
Reply to simeonz It's a matter of being able to examine the belief - no more or less. Now I say that, I seem to recall some TV show, where they showed simple magic tricks to chimps. What I remember is the chimp's surprise that the ball was, or wasn't under the cup. One could argue the chimp had formed a "belief" about it, as demonstrated by their emotional response to discovering things were not as they had imagined. I'm not so familiar with cats that I could say, if they are capable of a similar expression of surprise - that betrays the existence of an expectation of a particular state of affairs, but I am familiar enough with cat owners to know, I cannot expect an objective opinion about their cat from them! Still, even if chimps are capable of beliefs - where does that get us? We cannot discuss with the chimp what it believed, or how it formed that belief, or in what terms it would express it. In terms of the question, "the content of belief is propositional" - we are no further along.
All I need is the movie to demonstrate that it's conceivable that there are aspects of the world that can't be pointed to by a sentence of English. — frank
If this were so, we would have no way to claim these were "aspects of the world"; as if you could show something and yet not be able to point to it.
I'm leveraging conceivability to shift the burden.
You need to prove that everything can be pointed to with a sentence of English because it's conceivable that our cognition is limited so that there are things that can't be.
The metalanguage points to the fixtures of some form of life. If there are things in the world that don't fit in our form of life, those things won't be expressable by a sentence of English.
The metalanguage is not the world. It's our form of life.
We cannot discuss with the chimp what it believed, or how it formed that belief, or in what terms it would express it. In terms of the question, "the content of belief is propositional" - we are no further along.
Either way, depends on how fundamental the question wants to be. On whether the debate assumes a point of reference of "human beliefs as commonly practiced presently". For me at least, acknowledging the limitations of the discussion is still a result.
Fundamentally speaking then, it seems to me that beliefs are possible as dispositions, intentions, attitudes. I don't see any reason why they should only form in an explicit structured mental language. I claim that even the structured statements boil down to attitudes, if observed closely and reduced to elements. Using surprise as impromptu verification principle, can it not form as the result of simpler, inarticulate neurological and psychological states? I am not talking about acting surprised, which can happen due to all sorts of non-sense, but about being confounded from contradiction between your experience and your current attitude.
Edit: As to where this would lead. Lets assume that beliefs are not articulate (merely) by definition, which could be argued for or against on taxonomical grounds, observing how the term will be used for a mental state that maps meaningfully to behavior patterns, as you alluded to in your response above. Then the speculation would indicate that dispositions are the basis for beliefs and not propositions. The latter merely correlate.
Reply to fdrake
I've long been looking for points of agreement and disagreement between Davidson and Wittgenstein, the two recent philosophers with whom I am most in agreement. You've pointed to an apparent area of disagreement between them; so damn you and thank you.
I'd previously understood the pieces in and around your quotes as a breaking of the 'crystalline purity of logic' (§ 97, 107, 108) that is embedded in the Tractatus. It's the expectation that language should be made to conform to subject-predicate form, central to the project of the Tractatus, that is being rejected. Where Wittgenstein had thought that philosophy was the revealing of the hidden logical perfection of our everyday language, he now "rotates" the angle of our examination so that common language use takes primacy. He thus expands his view of language from nothing but propositions to everything, including propositions.
You it seems would take this further in positing that we might somehow have a language (or some such) that is outside of propositional forms, that in effect cannot be put into propositional form.
Compare what you have said with the Davidsonian rejection of incommensurability. If something is true in one language, and here we include any conceptual schema, then it will be true under suitable interpretations in any other language. The word is a fixed point in a triangulation between world, language and use. The great joy in this is the rejection of relativism, the reintroduction of the notion that sometimes folk say things that are wrong.
"An encoding in propositional content is one means of articulation". I'd suggest that any other form of articulation, given a certain requirement, must be interpretable in terms of propositions. That requirement is, that the articulation is to be about how things are, that it is to be the sort of thing that can be true or false.
This is not to rule out 'articulations' that are not subject to the rigour of being true or false; commands, questions, and so on; but also, showing the glory of a sunset, the horror of an injury.
So I agree that 'claiming "the world is an object language" is a metaphysical claim'; but all that has ben done in this metaphysics is to set up the language game of talking about how things are by setting out individuals and their relations. Yes, we set up the game of names, predicates, truth functions, and with it the notions of true and false; And for our purposes here, belief is part of that game. Hence, in so far as we can talk of our beliefs as being true or false, we must also include that their content is also capable of being true or false.
So I agree with you that belief is part of a much bigger game. Nevertheless, belief has propositional content.
There's a favourite Existentialist Comic of Sartre and Camus playing Candyland. Like Camus, I'm pointing out the rules of the game; Like Sartre, you are pointing out that we are not limited to the game.
You need to prove that everything can be pointed to with a sentence of English because it's conceivable that our cognition is limited so that there are things that can't be.
Meh. If there is stuff that is beyond our reckoning, there is no point in talking about it. You want to "Eff" the ineffable again. If there are things in the world that don't fit in our form of life, those things would be entirely unrecognisable to us.
What happens is that stuff outside our reckoning is brought inside it by extending the language.
What happens is that stuff outside our reckoning is brought inside it by extending the language.
You don't know that. We may have to evolve to understand more of the world. We may have to ditch our previous languages altogether, as Russian communists imagined.
So yes. We talk about the world as we know it. That's all.
You're Sartre needs work. Since we are free, our use of language included, English could be used to talk about anything at all. There is nothing conceivable that English (or any other language) could not talk about. The game of English can be anything we choose.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2021 at 02:19#4914120 likes
Hence, in so far as we can talk of our beliefs as being true or false, we must also include that their content is also capable of being true or false.
This is a point I also agree with, with the additional caveat that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it.
The fire example is a case of learning that fire causes pain when touched. We know that that is the case. We know that that statement is true. A language-less creature can learn that fire causes pain by virtue of drawing correlations between the fire, the touching, and the ensuing pain. That could be described as a belief that touching fire caused pain, but the creature has no language, so this puts the claim that that language-less creature's belief is propositional in content in serious doubt.
There's certainly a bridge between the language-less belief and the simple belief statement, but it cannot be propositions, unless propositions somehow exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature is capable of drawing correlations between them, or having an attitude towards them, etc.
The bridge, it seems to me, is the ability to attribute meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. With the language-less creature, the correlations are drawn between the touching, the fire, and the pain in such a way that amounts to the recognition/attribution of causality. With the belief statement, it's all that in addition to the naming and descriptive practices.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2021 at 02:39#4914130 likes
There's no insight to be gained, from the "beliefs" of babies, or the "beliefs" of cats - because they're not the same thing as an adult, human, articulated belief - with or without propositional content. If the purpose of this debate is to decide if the content of belief is propositional, how can we possibly examine that question in organisms incapable of articulating a belief?
By virtue of acquiring knowledge of what all belief has in common. The insight is a notion of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression. The result is a reliable standard by which we can discern between what counts as anthropomorphism and what does not.
Furthermore, think about the sheer scope of the consequences of getting our own thought and belief wrong...
Nothing I've said should be read as putting limitations on English. Yep, everything conceivable can be said or shown. Just not the inconceivable stuff - because it's not stuff, and hence cannot be chosen.
Reply to creativesoul You keep talking about meaning. It obscures what's going on. Attributing meaning is just finding a use, which has already been done in your correlations.
He claimed that all propositions are about the self, which is absurd on it's face. There's adequate ground for doubting his sincerity already.
However, the comment about what we can know about creatures' belief when the creatures under consideration are incapable of articulating that belief via language is one worth considering though, even if that consideration eventually leaves counterpunch behind...
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2021 at 03:05#4914200 likes
l You keep talking about meaning. It obscures what's going on.
I don't think it does though; at least not when it comes to taking proper account of all belief. It provides a simple undeniable true statement(all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it) that serves as standard of sorts. Drawing correlations is attributing, and sometimes (mis)attributing meaning, so in that sense, you're close when you say I've done it already with correlations.
Finding a use though, that seems to me to be more about language.
TheWillowOfDarknessJanuary 22, 2021 at 03:09#4914220 likes
I'm saying you're playing Sartre. Since any use of English could mean anything, there is nothing beyond the scope of what could be said in English. fdrake is arguing the opposite to Sartre, suggesting there was some essence to English, such that it is incapable of talking about some concepts.
...the comment about what we can know about creatures' belief when the creatures under consideration are incapable of articulating that belief via language is one worth considering though...
As previously discussed, I don't see that as any different to what we can know about creature's beliefs when the creature under consideration is capable of articulating that belief. We do after all attribute beliefs to folk that are contrary to what they claim to believe, often the basis of their other behaviours. So now Trump claims to believe in peaceful protest, in the face of his previous behaviour.
provides a simple undeniable true statement(all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it) that serves as standard of sorts.
I don't think it is undeniable, nor fixed. Belief is far more fluid than that; in a state of constant flux.
Again, rather out of cuff interjection. How do we know which parts of the sentence are existentially bound and which refer to particulars. The sentence could mean that one well known presently ruling king of France is bald. It could mean that such a king presently exists and is bald. Or in some point in time (prior to reading the statement), a king of France existed and was bald. In fact, it could mean that a country named France existed at some point, that country had a person acting in a particular capacity, called king, he had a condition, which for lack of a better term was named baldness, and that person had it. It seems to me that the battle for revealing propositions behind isolated sentences is obscured by linguistic inadequacy, if we are talking about ordinary language and without context that implies the intent of the author. The result is speculation.
Yes, so context matters. That sentence had an obvious use in a time when a French King existed. But it doesn't have that use now.
TheWillowOfDarknessJanuary 22, 2021 at 04:14#4914320 likes
Could is not does. Just because I could use English to say anything, it doesn't mean I do. In any given instance where I use English, I make a choice (to keep to the context Sartreian terms) to speak one meaning or another. I could have said "Banno ate ghosts for breakfast" with this entire paragraph of this post, in English (a new, novel use of English compared to what people usually use), but I didn't. I said something else, with an entirely different meaning, which will never be "Banno ate goats for breakfast."
Since could is what I possiblity might have said, and did is what I did, both are true at the same time. I did use language which never says, "Banno ate goats for breakfast", but that use could have (even though it never will).
Yes, so context matters. That sentence had an obvious use in a time when a French King existed. But it doesn't have that use now.
Actually, I failed to convey my remark. Meanwhile, I have also reviewed and revised my original position. What I meant was that the sentence, independent of when it was said, was actually ambiguous on its own terms, without knowing the particulars of the context in which it was delivered. If we tried to translate it in a formal language, such as first order predicate logic, to allow encapsulation of its meaning, the translation would be ambiguous. For example:
BaldAsPredicate(PresentKingOfFranceAsNamedConstant)
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
Even the rather exotic:
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Exists BaldAsBoundVariable Condition(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable, BaldAsBoundVariable))
Imagine the following paragraph:
We came to earth on our spaceship. There was a description of a person that the people here used to obey and was called their king. In one particular territory, called France, the person had no hair on his head. He tried to hide it, but all his subjects knew it and it was obvious. The present king of France is bald.
Only later, I realized that not only existential, but also universal quantifiers could apply:
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable ForAll InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
Maybe the first translation to predicate logic would satisfy your objections (edit: because existence is not entailed by it, just material implication in case of actual existence). I am not sure. Obviously, I could invent context that indicates such meaning. But altogether, my point was that our everyday language does not produce encapsulated sentences with individual semantics, a la mathematical logic. We could only guess what the most probable meaning was as we anticipate the surrounding context.
Later I realized that there was another angle. That, in terms of my take on the problem, even if the translation to a formal statement was somehow made, the result could have required a logical framework that was not classical logic. Something akin to intuitionistic logic. Since the law of excluded middle does not apply there, a person could end up being neither the king, nor not the king. Thus, for example,
not Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
does not infer automatically that
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
The question may have been about soundness vs validity in ordinary language and I may have misunderstood. About whether ordinary sentences require actual application to be considered meaningful or can they have vacuously correct meaning.
P.s. Either way, I realize that this is detour. But decided to mention my view.
Edit: Found some duplicated predicate names in the logic formulas.
There's a great sci-fi movie called Arrival in which the protagonist gains the alien's worldview as she learns their language.
I watched it again last night. The premise that learning a language could somehow bestow the power to see the future struck me again as unworkably magical.
In Solaris, the protagonists deal with extraordinary events by adjusting their conceptual scheme, accepting the reality of the returning dead as a form of communication. In comparison Arrival has the causal chain arse about.
To be sure there is a sort of magic in language; its recursive acceptance brings into being such things as ownership of property, politics and shared knowledge. But Arrival's premise does not derive from recursion, and remains unexplained; it has little merit.
Nor does the movie show a conception that cannot be pointed to by English; indeed, the key role of the main character is to do exactly that; and she succeeds.
In Solaris, the protagonists deal with extraordinary events by adjusting their conceptual scheme, accepting the reality of the returning dead as a form of communication
.
It's interesting that you took that idea from the Tarkovskyvs movie. The author of the story meant the contrary:
"As Lem wrote, "The peculiarity of those phenomena seems to suggest that we observe a kind of rational activity, but the meaning of this seemingly rational activity of the Solarian Ocean is beyond the reach of human beings."[4]" --wikipedia
it again last night. The premise that learning a language could somehow bestow the power to see the future struck me again as unworkably magical.
That would be unworkable. The idea that learning a language might unlock abilities isn't outlandish. I see what learning European languages did for native americans. That someone has to remind you that capabilities are bound up in language shows how much you take for granted.
Does this mean you are arguing Europeans are only human in appearnce because they thought some concepts in their language that other people didn't at a certain time?
One also wonders what this means for babies, since they have to learn language. Are babies the only time anyone is human, before they start thinking in the concepts of only appearing-older-people in language they never had access to before?
Belief is far more fluid than that; in a state of constant flux.
Of course it is. We begin drawing meaningful correlations between different things long before we start talking about it. That happens autonomously.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 05:36#4917700 likes
The speech act theorists paved some new paths, and some very good ones. They drew new correlations between some particular already meaningful marks. Austin's bit on promises left quite an impression on me. However, it's not the correlations they drew and captured our attention by doing so that is interesting and relevant here, in this discussion. It's the fact that they drew new correlations between already meaningful marks. They added to the meaning of some already familiar language use by virtue of using different terms to describe the same set of meaningful marks. Or perhaps, articulated some previously undisclosed meaningful aspects of familiar use...
No?
:brow:
Looking at use is all interesting and sheds some much needed light of all sorts of stuff regarding how we attribute meaning to language use.
However, what does that have to do with how a language-less creature forms, has, and/or holds belief? What does that have to do with how a belief can even be and/or become meaningful to a language-less creature capable of having one?
Well, it shows us that drawing correlations between things is something that both complex linguistic belief and simple language-less belief have in common with one another. It supports the very part of the claim that you seem to balk at.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 05:39#4917710 likes
and yes...
Trump is a walking, talking, living, eating, and breathing performative contradiction.
Maybe the first translation to predicate logic would satisfy your objections (edit: because existence is not entailed by it, just material implication in case of actual existence). I am not sure.
Yes, my translation would just be the first. The background to my original comment was Russell's analysis of definite descriptions and Strawson's criticism of it:
P. F. Strawson argued that Russell had failed to correctly represent what one means when one says a sentence in the form of "the current Emperor of Kentucky is gray." According to Strawson, this sentence is not contradicted by "No one is the current Emperor of Kentucky", for the former sentence contains not an existential assertion, but attempts to use "the current Emperor of Kentucky" as a referring (or denoting) phrase. Since there is no current Emperor of Kentucky, the phrase fails to refer to anything, and so the sentence is neither true nor false.
Obviously, I could invent context that indicates such meaning. But altogether, my point was that our everyday language does not produce encapsulated sentences with individual semantics, a la mathematical logic. We could only guess what the most probable meaning was as we anticipate the surrounding context.
I think your spaceship example captured the ordinary meaning just fine. As the above Wikipedia quote suggests, we would ordinarily use such a sentence as a referring phrase. So to use it today would, in effect, be a misuse.
The question may have been about soundness vs validity in ordinary language and I may have misunderstood. About whether ordinary sentences require actual application to be considered meaningful or can they have vacuously correct meaning.
So my view here is that ordinary sentences require actual application to be true (or false). The issue is not so much one of meaningfulness (i.e., we know what the sentence means, as your spaceship example shows) as one of usefulness (i.e., if the sentence is non-referring, it doesn't have a use). My view is similar for so-called vacuous truths - they also fail to refer to anything and so are also neither true nor false.
Yes, my translation would just be the first. The background to my original comment was Russell's analysis of definite descriptions and Strawson's criticism of it:
P. F. Strawson argued that Russell had failed to correctly represent what one means when one says a sentence in the form of "the current Emperor of Kentucky is gray." According to Strawson, this sentence is not contradicted by "No one is the current Emperor of Kentucky", for the former sentence contains not an existential assertion, but attempts to use "the current Emperor of Kentucky" as a referring (or denoting) phrase. Since there is no current Emperor of Kentucky, the phrase fails to refer to anything, and so the sentence is neither true nor false. — Criticism of Russell's analysis - P.F.Strawson
Actually, if Russell meant something more akin to
Exists P (KingOfFrance(P, Now) and Bald(P, Now))
which will be rephrased back into ordinary speech as "exists a bald king of France", its opposite would have been
ForAll P (KingOfFrance(P, Now) implies not Bald(P, Now))
which in ordinary speech is "all kings of France have hair", not "there exists no king of France". If Strawson wants to interpret claims of ordinary sentences in the intuitionistic sense, as indicated from the "neither true nor false" remark, the two statements above are not complementary, but "there exists no king of France" is still not the opposite of "exists a bald king of France" and doesn't prevent Russell from inferring (however frivolously) that there is some implicit existential quantifier in the original sentence.
P.S. I would have quantified the time instant also, if I wanted to make the claim meaningful. It is common sense to reject it as such right now. But this would be a second-order translation, between the original and the present context, not between the ordinary language and formal language counterpart in that original context.
I feel that the ambiguity is not a matter of a fixed choice of interpretation. Reading an old newspaper report stating that "the president initiates a lockdown" implies that some president was in charge of some country at some moment in time and that he/she had issued a lockdown, as opposed to the institution having tendency for issuing lockdown orders. On the other hand, for a textbook making examination of an institution, stating that "the president commands the army" does not guarantee that the model of government was ever implemented and was not just proposed at some point. The binding of terms (not simply as referring phrases, but universals, existence claims) depends on the precise context. The sentence about the king of France we can heavily infer from knowing that France has no king, and that prescribing the baldness attribute to a general group of people is improbably useful. But such suggestion lacks rigor, and cannot be argued strictly. In my opinion anyway.
So my view here is that ordinary sentences require actual application to be true (or false). The issue is not so much one of meaningfulness (i.e., we know what the sentence means, as your spaceship example shows) as one of usefulness (i.e., if the sentence is non-referring, it doesn't have a use). My view is similar for so-called vacuous truths - they also fail to refer to anything and so are also neither true nor false.
Fair enough. This makes an interesting point that mathematical and ordinary language have different objectives, which result in different kinds of senses of the word "useful".
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 17:59#4919010 likes
drawing correlations between things
— creativesoul
Ok, so drawing of correlations between things is formation of dispositions to respond to them which are relative to each other? Maybe?
— bongo fury
Or is it only another way of saying having beliefs?
Which are irreducible mental stuff?
It's the basis, the common denominator, the basic process by which all minds emerge; by which all experience can be had; by which all thought, belief, and statements thereof are formed; by which all meaning emerges(via attribution); by which all successful communication happens.
The process is irreducible, but neither mental or physical(it's both after-all). It provides a basic outline which is rightfully applicable to any and all discourse. We can 'watch' people offer different correlations when needed to clarify what was originally meant by some use or another. Happens all the time, here in this thread even, within the side conversations going on.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 18:50#4919160 likes
Not sure if you remember Banno's recent Davidson thread on malapropism A Nice Derangement Of Epitaphs, which was a critique of what counts as successful communication and/or learning/having a language. In that paper Davidson was repeatedly claiming that something more was needed aside from just learning, knowing, and/or following conventional rules, and that the conventional understanding did not offer an acceptable description of that, as the success of malapropisms show.
Attributing meaning and misattributing meaning is what we do when interpreting another's language use, and we do that solely by virtue of drawing correlations between the use and other things. When we draw correlations between the same things, we correctly interpret. What I've been arguing here is germane to that paper as well as Moore's paradox, Gettier, and so many other historically challenging philosophical 'problems'.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 19:27#4919360 likes
It directs our attention to what we ought be paying attention to when taking account of another's belief; the content thereof.
What is meaningful and how does it become so?
I'm left a bit confused regarding how you've no problem assenting to "all belief is meaningful" but balked at "all belief is meaningful to the creature having the belief".
Did I assent to "All belief is meaningful"? Must have been a moment of weakness. Try this:, talk of meaning here is revving the engine without engaging the clutch.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 20:23#4919560 likes
Try this:, talk of meaning here is revving the engine without engaging the clutch.
Interesting that you'd draw correlations between talking of meaning and revving the engine without engaging the clutch, and in doing so change the focal point from how things become meaningful to doing it by virtue of drawing correlations between different things...
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 20:27#4919570 likes
Did I assent to "All belief is meaningful"? Must have been a moment of weakness.
You did. Should the time ever come when I finally convince you to incorporate correlations into your position regarding meaning(and truth), I will have done my job.
We draw correlations between different things for all sorts of reasons, as a means for doing all sorts of things.
Talking about how we use our beliefs, or how we use language(doing things with words) neglects how we form belief. How we form belief is germane to all belief, not just how we use our beliefs, or what we do with language. I'm not even sure if it makes sense to say that language-less creatures use their beliefs, so...
I'm having trouble understanding how talk of language use is relevant to the content of language-less belief, aside from supporting the claim that all belief is correlational in content, but never admitting that much.
Besides that, don't worry about me... I'm just fine! My position has served me very well in real life... I do put it into everyday practice. Yup... obsessive, but well worth it!
Reply to creativesoul I'v a very dark roast imported from Palestine that quite comfortably meets my needs. I bring four teaspoons of coffee and four of sugar in one cup of water to the boil and pour immediately.
No french press will match that.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2021 at 22:14#4920180 likes
Gotcha! My better half just informed me that Turkish coffee is quite strong, and too strong for her, which is saying something. You must prefer very strong coffee. Kona is more smooth, so. You're right then. No match for what you like!
No. You use scribbles and sounds, not words. Using scribbles and sounds to point to things makes those scribbles and sounds words, and not just merely scribbles and sounds.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2021 at 18:13#4923490 likes
I've some sympathy for the idea that the limit of one's language is the limit of 'one's world', if by that we mean worldview or belief system. However, Banno proudly conflates word and world, by not drawing and maintaining the actual distinction between belief statements that are about language use and belief statements that are about mice and trees. Part of that comes as a result of overstating the strength of the case that the belief that approach makes. Another part comes from the idea that truth is unanalyzable. Another from his preference for a redundancy approach. Another from a conflation between truth as coherence and truth as correspondence.
Truth - as correspondence - is presupposed in all belief statements. That's how/why "is true" becomes a redundant use of language. However, "is true" is not equivalent to truth. "Is true" marks belief(assuming sincerity), and belief while it is necessary, is also insufficient for truth. <-----Banno would object to the necessary part, but the objection is based upon a misunderstanding. Belief is necessary for correspondence between belief and fact(what's happened) because when and where there has never been meaningful belief, there could never have been a meaningful correspondence between belief and what's happened. It's insufficient because some belief is false.
Human thought, human belief, meaning, and truth are all things that exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them. Those sorts of things are peculiar in that it requires language to become aware of them and their role in our lives, and we can most certainly get them wrong.
Since all belief is meaningful, being meaningful requires meaning, and language-less creatures can form, have, and/or hold belief, it only follows that meaning is prior to language.
The question then is what does such meaningful belief consist of? Hence, this debate.
Not propositions.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2021 at 18:21#4923530 likes
I can talk about the content of a lemon. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of the lemon is propositional in form.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2021 at 18:23#4923550 likes
I can talk about the content of a proposition. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of a proposition is propositional in form.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2021 at 18:24#4923560 likes
I can talk about the content of the government. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of the government is propositional in form.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2021 at 18:25#4923580 likes
I can talk about the content of my cupboards. I can talk about the content of my cat's stomach. I can talk about the content of the ocean. I can talk about the content of...
Harry HinduJanuary 24, 2021 at 19:56#4924190 likes
The question then is what does such meaningful belief consist of?
Visuals, sounds, smells, feelings, etc.
Words are a particular type of visual or sound.
Thinking in words is no different than thinking in visuals and sounds. Words are typically one color - black, and come in simple shapes. What they represent can be multicolored and complex, or not colored at all as in a smell, taste or feeling. So words are simple symbols meant to represent more complex concepts that are more than one color and more visually complex than a scribble on paper. We ultimately use words to simplify communication of ideas and beliefs to others.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2021 at 20:23#4924380 likes
Reply to creativesoul This may be of interest, or perhaps take the discussion in a new and hopefully fruitful direction: http://christianebailey.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Davidson-Rational-Animals-1982.pdf
I agree with you about truth consisting in correspondence between propositions, statements or beliefs and actuality. I have never been able to understand why many want to deny that Tarski's formulation just is a minimalist formulation of truth as correspondence.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2021 at 23:38#4925430 likes
If Strawson wants to interpret claims of ordinary sentences in the intuitionistic sense, as indicated from the "neither true nor false" remark, the two statements above are not complementary, but "there exists no king of France" is still not the opposite of "exists a bald king of France" and doesn't prevent Russell from inferring (however frivolously) that there is some implicit existential quantifier in the original sentence.
I think Strawson is just saying that such a statement isn't propositional (due to a false presupposition), rather than interpreting in the intuitionistic sense. As he puts it:
And this comes out from the fact that when, in response to his statement, we say (as we should) "There is no king of France", we should certainly not say we were contradicting the statement that the king of France is wise. We are certainly not saying that it's false. We are, rather, giving a reason for saying that the question of whether it's true or false simply doesn't arise.
This idea can be found in traditional (Aristotelian) logic, as Strawson notes in Introduction to Logical Theory (where, in this case, he's discussing vacuous statements):
Introduction to Logical Theory, p174 - P. F. Strawson:The more realistic view seems to be that the existence of children of John's is a necessary precondition not merely of the truth of what is said, but of its being either true or false. And this suggests the possibility of interpreting all the four Aristotelian forms [A, E, I, O] on these lines: that is, as forms such that the question of whether statements exemplifying them are true or false is one that does not arise unless the subject-class has members.
Strawson goes on further to distinguish between sentences and statements:
Introduction to Logical Theory, p174 - P. F. Strawson:It is important to understand why people have hesitated to adopt such a view of at least some general statements. It is probably the operation of the trichotomy 'either true or false or meaningless', as applied to statements, which is to blame. For this trichotomy contains a confusion: the confusion between sentence and statement. Of course, the sentence 'All John's children are asleep' is not meaningless. It is perfectly significant. But it is senseless to ask, of the sentence, whether it is true or false. One must distinguish between what can be said about the sentence, and what can be said about the statements made, on different occasions, by the use of the sentence. It is about statements only that the question of truth or falsity can arise; and about these it can sometimes fail to arise.
Fair enough. This makes an interesting point that mathematical and ordinary language have different objectives, which result in different kinds of senses of the word "useful".
It seems so. Certainly with ordinary language, the focus is on what is said by someone on a specific occasion (i.e., the use of a sentence).
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2021 at 16:00#4928150 likes
Strawson goes on further to distinguish between sentences and statements.
This sheds some light. But when do we consider a sentence truly "complete". Is the sentence's encapsulation related to us by the author? Do we realize that the author had no presuppositions by being at a vantage point that simply allows it? Better yet, is any sentence ever complete? We make statements from sentences all the time, by pivoting our reading of the author's intent as necessary.
I think Strawson is just saying that such a statement isn't propositional (due to a false presupposition), rather than interpreting in the intuitionistic sense.
I am sorry to quote out of order. So sentences have no corresponding statement, and statements have no corresponding proposition. That is a lot of relativism. I can speculate that Strawson considers certain statements deliberately relativistic as per the author's intention? How does he know which ones, especially when, if I understood his taxonomy correctly, the sentence has no unique corresponding statement.
Harry HinduJanuary 26, 2021 at 11:39#4931540 likes
So your beliefs are composed of actual mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables, rather than visuals and feelings OF mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables? Lazy thinking on your part.
I'd previously understood the pieces in and around your quotes as a breaking of the 'crystalline purity of logic' (§ 97, 107, 108) that is embedded in the Tractatus. It's the expectation that language should be made to conform to subject-predicate form, central to the project of the Tractatus, that is being rejected. Where Wittgenstein had thought that philosophy was the revealing of the hidden logical perfection of our everyday language, he now "rotates" the angle of our examination so that common language use takes primacy. He thus expands his view of language from nothing but propositions to everything, including propositions.
You it seems would take this further in positing that we might somehow have a language (or some such) that is outside of propositional forms, that in effect cannot be put into propositional form.
I think the rejection is of the glasses. Part of that rejection is the "subject-predicate form", but I believe that's not all which is rejected. The metaphysical vision associated with logic in the Tractatus is what is rejected. But what is that metaphysical vision - the filter that wearing the glasses puts on?
Tractatus, Wittgenstein:The world is all that is the case, and what is the case is the existence of states of affairs/atomic facts, a proposition is a truth function of elementary propositions.
What is the connexion between atomic facts and elementary propositions? That's the glasses, the "picture frame" that ensures accordance (truth) and discord (falsity) of the elementary proposition with the atomic fact represented in the picture frame. That things/events (atomic facts) can be mapped in to a corresponding picture element - truth function of elementary propositions - is a restatement of the doctrine of propositional content; everything that can happen can be stated.
Given that this is rejected, how is it rejected? Not through a negation; as if some things that can happen cannot be stated ("the manifest"), that negation remains within the ambit of defining the world through how it comes to be embedded in a logical picture of facts, and is the "final move" so to speak in the Tractatus - a realisation of how limited a vocabulary a logical picture alone provides.
PI, Wittgenstein:The general form of propositions is: This is how things are." (4.15 Tractatus)——That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is
tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.
115. A. picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
It's rejected through improvisation, a metaphysical "yes, and" to a doctrine which purported to hold a monopoly on the sense of things. Recognising the contingency of the connexion between elementary propositions and atomic facts is enough to refute it, as it was before construed as a necessary component of language. Within its operation; with the glasses on; yes, necessarily, everything that happens is the disquotational image of a true statement - the atomic fact kernel of an elementary proposition. Outside of it? Well... There's a lot.
General speech acts just don't fit into it; how could flipping someone the bird be true or false? Why would truth matter for it? Truth would only matter when parsing it later as an event in game which required the glasses to be played. "X flipped Y the bird". The sense of the act isn't spelled out in truth or falsity, it's spelled out through the analysis of the role it plays in a "language game" - truth and falsity might be grammatical mistakes within that game, not eligible moves, but they may still play a role in a meta-game of language game description. It can be true, or false, that truth or falsity have nothing to do with the sense of flipping someone the bird. But a description, a "logical picture" of flipping someone the bird might be able to be true or false - eg "you only flip the bird to people you love" would be false, "people tend to flip the bird to insult people or things" would be true.
Taking aim at Davidson: In putting on the glasses, and setting out a speech act through the truth of a statement which represents it "X P'd Y at t", the sense is expressed in how the interpreter would assign truth or falsity to it, not in the truth or falsity of it. This sleight of hand is rendered imperceptible if one has forgotten the glasses can come off. The centrality of truth to meaning only makes sense in terms of this sleight of hand - truth is central to the filter.
With the glasses off, things that break the schema of the glasses seem commonplace, because they are. But you can put the glasses on again to assess descriptions of things which break the picture frame.
creativesoulJanuary 27, 2021 at 01:50#4933240 likes
Or is it already the content? Of a belief? Or is it the belief?
The content of any and all belief is only understood and/or known by considering the correlation(s) being drawn by the creature in question. The content of any and all belief is naturally limited to and facilitated by biological machinery; that is to say that the content of any creature's belief is naturally limited to what is made possible by virtue of their biological capabilities. This next bit of paving ought go uncontested.
The content of each and every(all) belief includes exactly and only the things being correlated one to another by the very creature drawing the correlations; by the very creature associating between the different things; by the very creature that is making connections between the different directly perceptible things(at first, anyway); by the very creature that is attributing/recognizing causality; by the very creature attributing meaning; by the very creature having conscious experience.
Thus...
A creature devoid of the ocular structures we currently deem necessary and/or responsible for our color vision capabilities will not draw correlations between visible light, the visually perceptible effects/affects of reflected light(color emission), and anything else. A creature devoid of those ocular structure can directly perceive red cups. However, it cannot possibly perceive the color aspect at all, due to the not having the necessary biological machinery to do so. The color of, and/or reflected by the cup, is simply incapable of ever being or becoming part of the experience of such a creature. No such creature can form belief about red or experience red in any way, shape, or form unless it is a creature capable of directly perceiving any single one of a number of different particular ranges of frequencies within the visible light spectrum that we've long since named "red", and drawing a correlation between red and something else.
A creature devoid of olfaction definition will not draw correlations between the smell of an apple pie and anything else. A creature cannot actually form belief about or experience the smell of an apple pie, unless it is a creature capable of smelling apple pies. A creature that cannot smell an apple pie cannot possibly know what it means when someone says that they smell an apple pie, even if they know what counts as "an apple pie".
A creature devoid of language will not draw correlations between language use and anything else, unless it is a creature amidst language creation and/or acquisition. The very ability to create and/or use language requires a creature capable of drawing correlations between language use and other things. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language.
The process of drawing correlations between different things offers us as simple an outline as possible, as it very well must. It's amenable to naturally occurring evolutionary progression. It's capable of growing in it's complexity. Human belief began simply and accrued in it's complexity. An acceptable criterion/description of belief must be capable of taking proper account of all belief, ranging from the simplest through the most complex. Convention seems to be at a remarkable loss for adequate explanation/description of language-less belief, and many analytics and post-moderns outright deny that such a thing even exists. They are wrong.
Many pragmatists, analytics, and post-moderns hold that both meaning and truth are somehow, in some way, existentially dependent upon language. That is quite simply not true. Neither is. We can know that as a result of knowing that language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief about what's happened, what's happening, and what has yet to have happened but is expected to(what will happen soon).
There is no such thing as meaningful true belief devoid of meaning and truth.
If we hold that meaning and truth are dependent upon language use, then either meaningful true belief can somehow exist without meaning or truth(in the case of the meaningful true belief of a language-less creature), or meaningful true belief cannot be formed by a creature devoid of language; language-less creatures have no belief. Coherency demands that those who hold that meaning and truth are dependent upon language reject the very possibility that meaningful true belief can exist in it's entirety prior to language.
Any and all positions based upon the ideas that all belief presupposes truth and all truth depends upon language arrive at a crossroads of sorts - a choice to be made - when considering whether or not language-less creatures are capable of presupposing truth(having belief). Coherence alone demands rejecting the claim that language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief, for all belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line, and those who hold this view believe that truth depends upon language.
At what cost do we continue to maintain this basis of falsehood? At the cost of successfully acquiring a basic understanding of human thought and belief.
Language-less creatures most certainly form, have, and/or hold belief. If our accounting practices, if our linguistic devices, if our linguistic framework, if our conceptual schema, if our worldview, if our belief system, if our definitions, if our philosophical beliefs and/or positions cannot make sense of language-less belief while avoiding self-contradiction, then that does not constitute adequate ground for believing that language-less creatures do not have belief. To quite the contrary, it serves as more than adequate ground to realize and/or conclude that we've gone horribly wrong somewhere along the line.
If language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief, if all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it, if all belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line, and some language-less belief is true, then it must be the case that both meaning and the presupposition of truth somehow exist in their entirety prior to language use.
I've been setting out exactly how that happens; how truth and meaning both emerge from within the process of belief formation(drawing correlations between different things).
Does that answer your question?
:wink:
creativesoulJanuary 27, 2021 at 02:32#4933460 likes
So your beliefs are composed of actual mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables, rather than visuals and feelings OF mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables? Lazy thinking on your part.
Of course. My beliefs about my cat include the cat. A visual of a cat may not.
Lazy thinking?
Pfft.
:zip:
Harry HinduJanuary 27, 2021 at 11:40#4934410 likes
Then what does it mean to be about your cat if it includes your cat? You either have beliefs about cats in your mind (realism), or cats in your mind (solipsism). Not both. Which is it?
creativesoulJanuary 29, 2021 at 16:05#4942980 likes
General speech acts just don't fit into it; how could flipping someone the bird be true or false?
Well, Davidson would simply put it into a proposition: "fdrake flipped the bird" is true iff fdrake flipped the bird.
Taking your analogy on board, it's not that you can take the glasses off. It's that you can put on a different set of glasses. The world is always interpreted.
Davidson's argument (in On the very idea...) is that what you see in some other glasses will be a transformation of what you see with subject-predicate glasses; and hence with suitable interpretations the very same things will be true in both. I'll not present his argument here, I'm sure you are familiar with it.
As my old professor would ask, if you knew what needed to be the case for it to be true that fdrake flipped the bird, well....
And you've been trolling us with his remarks ever since.:roll:
Pretending not to understand is exceedingly frustrating; the onus is on you to give an account of how the statement "fdrake flipped the bird"'s truth or falsity spells out the meaning of the speech act of flipping the bird, not to turn the question around for the 9 millionth time. What does truth or falsity have to do with the speech act of flipping the bird?
And you've been trolling us with his remarks ever since.:roll:
You don't gotta reply if you don't like it. Again, if you know what makes "fdrake flipped the bird" true, what more do you need in order to understand "Fdrake flipped the bird"?
What is it that is not included in the propositional analysis?
In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth -quite the contrary. Given the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, and truth relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by the board. Of course truth ot sentences remains relative to language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false.
No, Rousseau, I use words. These are a subset of the scribbles and sounds.
Not much different than what said. What makes a subset of scribbles and sounds words and not just scribbles and sounds?
You use scribbles and sounds. HOW you use scribbles and sounds is what makes them words or not. Are you writing or drawing? Depends on how you use the scribbles.
I tend to agree with @creativesoul and disagree with @Banno. The latter claims: "beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional."
The second statement sounds a sloppy way of render the first one, for the simple reason that the actual content of a belief is the "what" (the possible state of affairs?) prior to being put into propositional form (by means of a statement?). The content of a glass is not water just because you can pour into it water!
@Banno perceptual beliefs are not identical to beliefs that such-and-such, yet they can often be more or less broadly rendered as beliefs that such and such. The possibility of having perceptual beliefs is not grounded on the linguistic capacity of rendering perceptual beliefs in linguistic terms. Briefly, while I can concede the first part of your statement "If you can't put it into propositional form, your belief is not a belief that such-and-such", the consequence "hence it is not a belief" doesn't follow unless you stipulate it. And yes beliefs can be about something (like all perceptual beliefs which refer to possible state of affairs through sensations), without being beliefs that such and such.
perceptual beliefs are the ones your cat has while staring at the window. And you form when looking at the road while driving your car and listening to some songs on the radio.
HeracloitusDecember 06, 2021 at 22:20#6285610 likes
What exactly do you believe your cat to be believing when it's staring at the window? Reply to neomac
@emancipate exactly? I don't know. Broadly speaking I might render the cat's belief as "my cat believes there is an intruder in our yard" or "my cat believes that my wife is coming home" etc.
HeracloitusDecember 06, 2021 at 22:41#6285710 likes
Reply to neomac Yes and those would be propositional statements. Your proposed pre-rendered belief states are impossible to communicate without language. So can they even be determined as such?
@emancipate yes indeed, I put my cat's beliefs in propositional form. That doesn't mean that my cat's beliefs were originally in propositional form nor that they wouldn't be beliefs if we couldn't render them in propositional form.
@emancipate
> Your proposed pre-rendered belief states are impossible to communicate without language.
So what? You can have it backwards, without perceptual beliefs you couldn't even learn a human language for communicating anything, since to learn a language you need to rely on the ability to detect perceptual patterns and reproduce them e.g. phonetically without being able to render the related perceptual beliefs in linguistic terms (since you are still learning the language).
HeracloitusDecember 06, 2021 at 23:06#6285940 likes
Reply to neomac Beliefs are potentially either true or false. Propositions are the bearers of these truth values. The perceptual non-linguistic beliefs you describe have no capacity for truth or falsity, unless there exist non-linguistic propositions. I don't know if I agree about the language acquisition. Been a long time since I learned mine.
@emancipate I disagree with the following statement: "Propositions are the bearers of these truth values." And therefore with what ensues. I'm reluctant to give "propositions" the role you attribute to them for reasons related to the ontology of propositions and to the nature of language. To sum up my view (without arguing further), I'd say that "perceptions" have truth-conditions, they can be accurate or not, effective or illusory without being propositional (one might recall here the distinction between "seeing" and "seeing as" suggested by Wittgenstein).
I'm inclined to reject the idea that truth is a predicate for similar reasons as to why Frege, Hume and Kant rejected the idea of existence as a predicate.
Suppose that a belief is a truth-apt mental state. If the truth of beliefs is identified with either their mental content or their material causes, then all beliefs must be necessarily and vacuously true. For example, i believe i am tying at a desk which i see before me. If "desk" is considered to refer to my experience directly, or to it's perceptual causes, then the truth of my belief is vacuously true in expressing nothing over and above the fact i am seeing something i call "desk" as a result of whatever caused me to say such a thing.
On the other hand, if the truth criteria of beliefs is considered to be independent of their mental content, as is normally considered where the truth of beliefs is regarded as being future-contigent, then the truth of beliefs is divorced from their mental content and material causes. In which case truth is no longer attributable to beliefs in themselves, but refers to an external convention for classifying belief-behaviour.
creativesoulJanuary 11, 2022 at 02:56#6411060 likes
Banno and myself have very similar views, but there are crucial differences. He is more Wittgensteinian than I. Much more actually. However, although I am quite confident that where we disagree I am correct and he's not, I must admit that Banno is remarkably efficient at making his points. I admire his brevity.
@creativesoul
Could you pls elaborate more on this "He is more Wittgensteinian than I. Much more actually"?
Would you be able to briefly clarify how you understand the following concepts and their relation: "sensation", "intentionality", "representation", "perception", "concept", "belief", "proposition"?
Would you be able to briefly clarify how you understand the following concepts and their relation: "sensation", "intentionality", "representation", "perception", "concept", "belief", "proposition"?
Yeah, come on, @creativesoul, write us an explanation of how the whole world works. Preferably in less than a hundred words.
I disagree with the following statement: "Propositions are the bearers of these truth values."
What this shows is that you have not understood how the word "proposition" is used. Disagree all you like, you are just wrong. If perceptions have truth values, then perceptions are propositional.
The only out you might make would be to vacillate between propositional truth and "true" as in "accurate", which you verge on. That might be philosophically interesting. However I expect that accuracy is ultimately parsed in proposition terms. The plank is true if it conforms to specifiable criteria.
So it seems your case is lost.
But it's good to see you setting simple challenges for folk like Creative. He's been a bit slack of late. :wink:
Could you pls elaborate more on this "He is more Wittgensteinian than I. Much more actually"?
He is much more averse to metaphysics than I. He places higher value upon propositional logic than I. He places propositions in a more fundamental role than I. He holds that all belief content is propositional. He holds that we cannot get 'beneath' language. He does not draw and maintain the actual distinction between belief and thinking about belief. He does not draw and maintain a distinction between the content of our accounting practices and the content of what's being taken into account, particularly, to keep in line with the debate topic, when talking about language less creatures' belief he does not discriminate between his account and what's being taken into account. He also leans on speech act theorists as well as Davidson more than I.
Would you be able to briefly clarify how you understand the following concepts and their relation: "sensation", "intentionality", "representation", "perception", "concept", "belief", "proposition"?
Well, sure I could, but why ought I here? I will say this, the question itself is based upon the belief that all those things mentioned are concepts. I do not share that belief. Rather, much of the time regarding many of the aforementioned things, Reply to Banno and I are in agreement regarding historical use of these terms. We're much the same amount of Wittgensteinian, in that regard.
You and I do seem to agree on one salient point. Banno conflates his account of the cat's belief with the cat's belief. Not sure if that is a consequence of unstated premisses underlying his reasoning here, or a personal shortfall, but he's not alone.
creativesoulJanuary 12, 2022 at 02:48#6414700 likes
Beliefs are potentially either true or false. Propositions are the bearers of these truth values. The perceptual non-linguistic beliefs you describe have no capacity for truth or falsity, unless there exist non-linguistic propositions. I don't know if I agree about the language acquisition. Been a long time since I learned mine.
Upon what ground are you stating that language-less creatures' belief has no capacity to be true or false, unless there are such things as non-linguistic propositions?
What reason is there to hold that there need be such things as truth bearers(propositions) in order for language-less creatures' belief to be true or false?
It's true if it corresponds to the way things are.
If the ducks outside hear the food bin lid being removed, they will immediately go to where it is, all the while displaying all sorts of different behaviours that are put on display during feeding or when they are pleading to be fed.
What reasons are there for us to believe that the ducks cannot form, have, and/or hold belief about being fed unless there are such things as non linguistic propositions, unless we've already placed the fate of our own position into the idea that all belief content is propositional?
That's a common view, quite common actually, given all the work regarding the belief that approach, such as the one Banno relies upon at times. However, you've presented but one set of options here, both resting their laurels upon a premiss that I do not share. It is only if we first hold firmly to the notion that all belief content is propositional, that we come to later find that we must propose such things as non linguistic propositions if we are going to admit that language less creatures can have true and/or false belief.
You and I do seem to agree on one salient point. Banno conflates his account of the cat's belief with the cat's belief. Not sure if that is a consequence of unstated premisses underlying his reasoning here, or a personal shortfall, but he's not alone.
This is your present rendering of this dead horse? You've gone back to thinking of beliefs as magical items of mental furniture? That "The cat believes it's bowl is empty" is the name for a specific individual item within the mind of the cat?
No. That the cat believes it's bowl is empty is not one thing int he cat's mind, because that belief is the cat meowing and leading you to the food bowl and feeling hungry and getting under your feet and so on; a long, flexible and indeterminate list. A belief is an account of the cat's behaviour in intentional terms. It's a linguistic convenience.
You see, what Creative attributes to the cat, that is not propositional, is also not belief. It instead is actions or perceptions or some such.
A belief is an account of the cat's behaviour in intentional terms.
So if we asked the cat, "do you believe the bowl is empty?", we're asking the cat for its account of its own behaviour in intentional terms, rather than asking it to express something inside (a thought, perception, or attitude)? Is this the same sense of "belief" as when I ask the cat "do you believe in God?"
creativesoulJanuary 12, 2022 at 06:04#6414890 likes
When I'm heading towards the shed out back, the ducks about my residence can and most certainly do believe that they are about to be fed. They do this not as a result of the existence of some non linguistic proposition, but rather they form such belief solely by virtue of the sheer amount of prior correlations repetitively drawn between directly perceptible things such as eating food, my presence near the food bin, the sound of the lid being removed, etc. The notion of a language less proposition is itself a contradiction in terms, a meaningless nonsensical use of language. There quite simply is no need for us to posit language less propositions in order to make sense of language less true or false belief.
It's not a mystery, or all that complicated. When the ducks do end up eating soon thereafter, their expectation about what's about to happen is met/satisfied, and thus the belief becomes or 'ends up' being true solely by virtue of corresponding to what happened. If they do not eat soon after thinking they were about to eat, the belief becomes or ends up being false... solely by virtue of a lack of correspondence to what happened.
So, my question has been and remains...
Where is a need for language here, aside from the ability for usto be able to take the ducks' belief into account? There are no propositions contained in the correlations drawn by the ducks. We certainly need language to know that and say as much, but surely we can all agree that the ducks' belief is neither equal to nor existentially dependent upon our knowledge or account thereof?
Right?
creativesoulJanuary 12, 2022 at 06:11#6414930 likes
Have I misrepresented the position you argue for/from? You most certainly have just misrepresented mine. Misattributing all those uses of language to me is quite unacceptable. Anyone can see for themselves that I've said none of those things you've attributed to me.
But to answer the question you asked...
No. What you quoted was not my current rendition of our decade long disagreement.
creativesoulJanuary 12, 2022 at 15:55#6418300 likes
> Yeah, come on, @creativesoul, write us an explanation of how the whole world works. Preferably in less than a hundred words.
Your sarcasm is understandable but there is a specific reason for my request. Indeed in the literature these notions can be all related in a way that it is not possible to understand one without reference to others: e.g. the notion of “proposition” and that of “concept” are related if one understands proposition as a mental representation made of a combination of concepts, the notion of “proposition” and that of “belief” too are related if one understands proposition as a mental attitude toward propositions, etc.
I wasn’t looking for arguments but more for some terminological coordinates to better understand his exchange with you.
> What this shows is that you have not understood how the word "proposition" is used
I can admit it was just poor phrasing. My skepticism is more related to the metaphysics of propositions e.g. fregian propositions. For me propositions are just abstract representations resulting from metalinguistic analysis on the truth-functionality of our descriptive statements. So there are no “propositions” as mind-independent entities, nor as original bearers of truth values. Since propositions for me require developed human linguistic skills then they can not constitute the content of perceptions.
> The only out you might make would be to vacillate between propositional truth and "true" as in "accurate", which you verge on.
Indeed, I think that perceptions have mind to world “accuracy” conditions.
> However I expect that accuracy is ultimately parsed in proposition terms. The plank is true if it conforms to specifiable criteria.
Whatever you think you are parsing in proposition terms: 1. Either that content wasn’t a proposition before that parsing, but if that content wasn’t already representational without being a proposition, the parsing would be arbitrary, and there would be no criteria for establishing if the parsing was correct or not. 2. Or it was already a proposition then there is no need for parsing.
Besides, can you clarify what you mean by proposition? There are different ways of understanding it.
> I will say this, the question itself is based upon the belief that all those things mentioned are concepts. I do not share that belief.
In this context I used the term “concept” as equivalent to “notion” so not in theoretically loaded terms as to categorize the type of referents of those notions. And therefore I see this use in this context as philosophically neutral and harmless.
> Banno and I are in agreement regarding historical use of these terms.
Well I don’t know much about your reciprocal knowledge and terminological agreements. And I didn’t mean to interfere. I was just curious to understand better what these terminological agreements amount to, because I found your exchange stimulating.
> We're much the same amount of Wittgensteinian, in that regard.
Well I'm not sure yet what you mean by that, I don't k now if you are referring to some Wittgensteinian approach (in this respect we can say at least that there is the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations [1]) or stance on specific topics, in this case which ones and how you would understand that stance. Anyways this is a marginal issue wrt the current topic so let's just drop it.
[1] In both cases I don't think e.g. that Wittgenstein believed in fregian propositions
Beliefs and other propositional attitudes don't objectively exist.
For example, I notice a person standing at a bus stop. Unless I subjectively empathise with the person who is doing the standing, I cannot form the proposition that the person is waiting for a bus . Objectively speaking, I can at most hypothesize a causal explanation as to their standing behaviour, an explanation that refers only to their past behavioural conditioning and makes no reference to belief-states or to future-contingent phenomena such as whether or not a bus comes and the person gets on it.
I am more than willing to interpret the person as waiting for a bus, via an instinctive act of empathy, but in doing so I am mixing together my own beliefs regarding the person with my concept of their beliefs.
Deleted UserJanuary 12, 2022 at 19:38#6420360 likes
Reply to fdrake
The point being made is the relatively simple one that we use the term belief to talk about a particular attitude towards a proposition. It's not an all-and-some.
The general structure of beliefs is of the form "? believes that p" where "?" is the name of the believer(s) and "p" is some proposition.
A proposition here is (at least) a statement that is either true or false.
Now I will go so far as to say that there is no philosopher who disagrees with this account.
And yet this topic arrises again and yet again. The only place this account is doubted in in pop forums such as this.
And as you might notice if you read through the comments, it's not about belief, it's about neophytes learning how to think.
Seems to be. 'Every belief can be put into propositional form' = 'For every belief there exists a statement such that that statement expresses the belief'.
And for context, you don't need to look far to find that at least the linguistic framing of the issue is contentious, see this bit from SEP article on belief:
[quote='SEP, Belief']A number of philosophers have argued that our cognitive representations have, or can have, a map-like rather than a linguistic structure (Lewis 1994; Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996; Camp 2007, 2018; Rescorla 2009; though see Blumson 2012 and Johnson 2015 for concerns about whether map-like and language-like structures are importantly distinct). Map-like representational systems are both productive and systematic: By recombination and repetition of its elements, a map can represent indefinitely many potential states of affairs; and a map-like system that has the capacity, for example, to represent the river as north of the mountain will normally also have the capacity to represent, by a re-arrangement of its parts, the mountain as north of the river. Although maps may sometimes involve words or symbols, nothing linguistic seems to be essential to the nature of map-like representation: Some maps are purely pictorial or combine pictorial elements with symbolic elements, like coloration to represent altitude, that we don’t ordinarily think of as linguistic.[/quote]
In this context I used the term “concept” as equivalent to “notion” so not in theoretically loaded terms as to categorize the type of referents of those notions. And therefore I see this use in this context as philosophically neutral and harmless.
Understood. Good to know. So many terms are loaded and around here, it's far too easy to get distracted by futile arguing over semantics/definitions, despite such great methods available for deciding which conceptual scheme/linguistic framework is best. There's a bit of that going on in the debate as well. Unfortunately, this time around, after re-reading the debate I was disappointed in myself for several reasons.
If there are any questions you have for me about the position I argue for/from, I'd be happy to answer. It could be quite helpful for you to re-read my posts only. That's the only way to avoid taking on the misunderstandings that Banno was arguing against.
I too find this topic and all that underwrites it very intriguing, and of utmost importance to proper understanding.
creativesoulJanuary 13, 2022 at 02:35#6421160 likes
If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example.
But why demand this? Who is arguing otherwise? It does not follow from this that the content of all belief is propositional. It follows that the presentation of all beliefs is, but even that hinges upon what counts as a belief being presented. Jack does not present his beliefs to you in propositional form. Be all that as it may, it's an aside, relevant but an aside.
The gist here is that we take account of belief using propositions. I totally agree. That's not the matter in contention. The matter in contention is what belief content is, what belief consists of, language less belief in particular.
creativesoulJanuary 13, 2022 at 02:44#6421180 likes
I am still quite content with the first three posts in the debate. If you'd like to discuss these, I'd be happy to oblige and grateful to have piqued a genuine interest.
:smile:
creativesoulJanuary 13, 2022 at 03:30#6421230 likes
Some folk hold that all belief amounts to an attitude towards a proposition. This seems to be the basis of Banno's arguments as well. I've already levied arguments against that position in the opening argument and first three posts of the debate this thread is discussing.
I'll condense what I see as the main issues...
If all belief are propositional attitudes, then...
All belief are about propositions.
All belief are existentially dependent upon propositions.
Either there are language less propositions or there are no language less belief.
Unspoken is not language less in the relevant sense. Language less means that they exist in their entirety prior to language. Propositions that somehow exist completely independent of language. All unspoken propositions belong to linguistic creatures. Creatures with language are not language less. Creatures without language are. Jack does not have unspoken propositions 'going through his mind', so to speak...
Reply to creativesoul Is your disagreement with @Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about.
A proposition is usually taken to be the intentional object of a belief, by definition of both "proposition" and "belief". By this understanding, they are internally related on a conceptual level and neither concept can be understood without the other, as opposed to each concept existing independently and being contingently related through external happenstance.
Part of the confusion might stem from the fact that in logic, propositions are expressed using a formally recognizable linguistic structure in the form of composable predicates, terms and quantifiers, leading to the paradox of the unity of the proposition, which indicates that the meaning of propositions isn't syntactically decomposable into reusable terms and predicates in the way that logical analysis appears to suggest.
The mutually dependent definitions of belief and proposition also invites scepticism regarding the existence or utility of belief concepts. For example, in Wittgenstein's remarks concerning what turns an arrow sign into a pointer, he comments to the effect that the a priori phenomena that we might associate with the propositional attitude of an observer of the arrow (e.g feeling that the arrow is pointy), is only partially relevant, if at all, to the observer's eventual use of the arrow.
Likewise, Bertrand Russell identified the intentional object of a state of hunger to be whatever food is eventually used to satisfy the hunger, as opposed identifying the intentional object with the imagined food that a hungry person thinks about before eating.
The general structure of beliefs is of the form "? believes that p" where "?" is the name of the believer(s) and "p" is some proposition.
The structure is now "? believes that p" where "?" is the name of the believer(s) and "p" can be expressed in propositional form.
Since a picture is worth a thousand words, I would just like to see more argument than "because otherwise we aren't talking about beliefs." If you just want to define belief as a relationship to propositional content, that's fine.
creativesoulJanuary 13, 2022 at 15:48#6423720 likes
Rendering the content of something into propositional form warrants neither concluding that the content is propositional nor that the thing is an attitude towards a proposition.
The content of my fridge can be rendered in propositional form. The content of my fridge is not propositional, and my fridge is not an attitude towards a proposition.
I read your three posts, and I’m inclined to agree on all points. Still the comments of @Banno to them look pretty messy to me both in addressing your points and in providing a consistent account on his own terms.
Since you abundantly discussed the former issue already I would like to take a closer look at his own view. I would appreciate if you could give me your feedback on my remarks (notes are quotations of his statements).
- If proposition is a “more abstract entity” [1] supposed to be “common between certain statements”, then proposition are not statements, and they are not interchangeable with statements, yet he prefers to talk in terms of propositions as “statements that can be either true or false”. Well if they are statements then they can not at the same time be intrinsic truth bearers and the content of our beliefs, why? Because believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true, yet “the cup is on the shelf” and "la taza está en el estante" have the same truth value.
- Commands and desires are also considered propositional attitudes but they have satisfaction conditions not truth conditions as beliefs. And as long as beliefs and desires can express different attitudes toward the same propositions, propositions themselves are not intrinsically truth bearers by themselves [2], but only dependently on the direction-of-fit conferred by the intentional attitude.
- The manifest inconsistency of claiming that beliefs about statements are exactly the same as beliefs about the way things are [3] has been already spotted by you. But his other formulations elsewhere [4] turned out to be even more preposterous because claiming that beliefs are about how we think things are is exactly like saying beliefs are about how we believe things are (kind of intrinsically reflexive beliefs).
- He claims that both beliefs [5] and state of affaires [6] can be put in the form of a proposition, but if the possibility of putting in propositional form a belief is enough to claim that belief have propositional content, then it should be also enough to claim that state of affaires have propositional content. And since propositions are sentences that can be true or false [7], then also state of affaires can be true or false as much as beliefs can be, thanks to their propositional content.
- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.
- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.
- If belief is a way to explain action [12][13] and cats do not show human linguistic skills, how could one possibly explain Lilly’s behavior by attributing to her a belief that a certain sentence about her environment is true? However this sounds too preposterous and it’s probably not what he means, what he more probably means is instead that the human capacity of rendering Lilly’s beliefs through sentences that can be true or false is what explains Lilly’s behavior. Which sounds as preposterous, doesn’t it?
[1] Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition.
[2] My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable
[3] To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; to deny this is to deny that our statements are about the way things are.
[4] Saying that beliefs have propositional content is nothing more than saying that beliefs are about how we think things are.
[5] that every belief has propositional content does not imply that every belief has indeed been put in propositional form.
[6] It should be clear from the preceding discussion that while it is not the case that every proposition has been stated, every possible state of affairs can be put in the form of a proposition.
[7] Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. Since there is no present King of France, he can be neither bald nor hirsute. "The present king of France is bald" is not the sort of sentence that can be true or false.
[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …
The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs…
[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.
[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.
[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true.
[12] Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away. This is at least part of what belief is about: that our actions follow from our beliefs, that what we do, we do in the light of what we hold to be true.
[13] My own inclination is more towards beliefs being a way of talking about, and hence explaining, our actions; that is, that they are not things stored so much as interpretations of what we do.
creativesoulJanuary 14, 2022 at 07:29#6427510 likes
I'd be honored to offer my feedback to such a carefully well-crafted post.
Due to personal time constraints, ease of reading, the desire to offer subsequent long overdue attention to this topic in particular, I think it best to address each set of remarks in their own respective posts. As a show of appreciation for the effort, it may take a couple of days to address all five. Luckily enough, I've a quite a bit of 'spare' time for the next week. I would consider it time well spent. After that, I will not be visiting the site daily. However, I would be more than happy to continue when I do. I'd like to help foster a long term respectful and productive discussion about the subject matter itself, after the critique. Thank you again. I was pleasantly surprised by the genuine interest.
Regarding the set of remarks and relevant footnote(again kudos for this!) copied below...
- If proposition is a “more abstract entity” [1] supposed to be “common between certain statements”, then proposition are not statements, and they are not interchangeable with statements, yet he prefers to talk in terms of propositions as “statements that can be either true or false”. Well if they are statements then they can not at the same time be intrinsic truth bearers and the content of our beliefs, why? Because believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true, yet “the cup is on the shelf” and "la taza está en el estante" have the same truth value.
[1] Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition.
On pains of coherency alone, I would concur that if propositions are supposed to be what is common between certain statements, then they are not statements, cannot be statements, and thus cannot serve as substitutes thereof(salva veritate).
I agree that believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true. Although those two statements are in completely different languages, they do have the same truth conditions; both are true if the cup is on the shelf. Banno has used Tarski to talk about this situation with "Snow is white" and the German equivalent.
If we have two individual believers, each from a community that uses one of the two respective languages, we would have two individuals that had the same meaningful belief in two different languages. What they believe is not so muchthat the statements are true(even though if asked they would say as much), but rather they both believe that things are a certain way(that the cup is on the shelf). The two statements make the same claim, say the same thing, express the same proposition, and both are about the spatiotemporal relationship between the cup and the shelf, and not themselves(their own truthfulness). The content of such belief is the cup, the shelf, and the relationship between them.
creativesoulJanuary 14, 2022 at 07:54#6427610 likes
- Commands and desires are also considered propositional attitudes but they have satisfaction conditions not truth conditions as beliefs. And as long as beliefs and desires can express different attitudes toward the same propositions, propositions themselves are not intrinsically truth bearers by themselves [2], but only dependently on the direction-of-fit conferred by the intentional attitude.
[2] My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable
I may be of little help or interest here, I'm afraid. This seems to be from speech act theorists(Austin, Searle, Ryle???), and I'm not familiar enough to comment much. I will say that I'm fond of Austin's bit on promises(making the world match the words, i.e., direction of fit???). In addition, I'm not at all impressed by what I think I understand about the conventional notion of truth bearers, having perused the SEP on several occasions regarding it. I do not understand the need to posit them, leaning here on methodological naturalisms tenet regarding refrain from unnecessarily multiplying entities. I would be quite interested in reading your thoughts on the notion, if you find it necessary for explaining some aspect that cannot be adequately explained without invoking it.
In Banno's defense, his qualification above tells me that he already knows that they are not strictly speaking in conventional terms; interchangeable. I strongly suspect that he also knew, and was right, that I would not call him on that, for neither of us are much impressed by the conventional notion of proposition, and talking in terms of statements is easier for the average reader to grasp. We also both strive to speak as plainly as possible without sacrificing any crucial meaning.
Thanks a lot for your feedback and pls take your time in commenting whatever I said you find worth it.
Just let me add that your understanding of his views seem more charitable and probably more accurate than mine due to your past exchanges with him.
Yet I’m still reluctant to agree with what you claim in his defense because:
- I have no reason to indulge in his over-confidence. The content of a belief is what the belief is actually about, while his clearly trying hard to identify the content of a belief based on the ways what a belief is about can be (meta)linguistically rendered or based on its logic implications/equivalences (like if p implies “p” is true or p can be rendered as “p” is true, then the content of believing in p is “p” is true) and based on that explain the related behavior. I find that simply preposterous.
- If we are not clear on what proposition or propositional form or propositional content are supposed to mean and how they relate to beliefs or state of affairs or behaviors, it’s hard to understand what we agree or disagree on.
Harry HinduJanuary 14, 2022 at 14:30#6429180 likes
If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example.
It's that simple.
I use whatever symbol-system I've learned and that I believe my reader knows so that I might translate my beliefs into a form perceivable to them. My beliefs are not only propositions, but can be symbolized using words.
If beliefs were only propositions then are you saying that your beliefs are only composed of visual scribbles and spoken sounds? What color are the words that form your belief, and the corresponding background that provides the contrast for you to be able to easily discern the scribbles that are imposed upon it? What font is used to form your belief? Is the type of font and color of the scribbles and background part of the belief? Just so I can better understand the composition of your beliefs, but I don't think that is going to get me anywhere in understanding your belief. What will help me understand your stated belief is what the scribbles on this page refer to, which can't be just scribbles in your head.
Do propositions exhaust the entirety of your beliefs? In reading your propositions, do I have direct access to your beliefs without missing anything in the translation?
creativesoulJanuary 14, 2022 at 16:50#6429620 likes
- The manifest inconsistency of claiming that beliefs about statements are exactly the same as beliefs about they way things are [3] has been already spotted by you. But his other formulations elsewhere [4] turned out to be even more preposterous because claiming that beliefs are about how we think things are is exactly like saying beliefs are about how we believe things are (kind of intrinsically reflexive beliefs).
[3] To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; to deny this is to deny that our statements are about the way things are.
[4] Saying that beliefs have propositional content is nothing more than saying that beliefs are about how we think things are.
I agree on the points you make here. The false equivalency, it seems to me, comes as a result of using the belief that approach for a task it's not suited for. Seems to me that it's suited for showing the presupposition of truth inherent belief statements, and lends itself to redundancy(Tarski's T sentence), both of which Banno seems to agree with and rely upon.
Witt is strong in Banno's view though, particularly so when it comes to metaphysics in general, the importance of language in all human considerations, and any and all philosophical notions which seem to add nothing to our understanding but unnecessary confusion. Last I knew, like Davidson, he rejects the distinction between scheme and world. What you're seeing here could be a result of not quite having consistently rendered all the different aspects of his worldview? Indeed, that may not even matter much to him.
Banno is excellent at engaging others, and for that the world is a better place. He has certainly been the most influential individual to me personally(regarding philosophy), despite all our disagreements. To put it into my own framework...
Banno has been a necessary elemental constituent of my own philosophical understanding, without which, I would not have even been able to have. A mentor of sorts, a guidepost of the utmost caliber.
If beliefs were only propositions then are you saying that your beliefs are only composed of visual scribbles and spoken sounds?
No.
Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat".
But in addition the model you use of talking as if things in your head were translated into language that is then transmitted and translated in things in your listener's head has been thoroughly critiqued, and found wanting. It's clear that it is much better to deal with the use to which one's utterance are put rather than to invent an enigmatic, disembodied entity called "the meaning of a word" that somehow floats from mind to mind.
> It's wryly amusing to find oneself again the topic of discussion.
And the good news is that I didn't finish yet.
> For a negotiated fee I will appear as a special guest speaker.
I'm afraid @creativesoul's cornucopia of ceremonious compliments to you are all you are going to get, sir.
Sarcasm is surely fun, so pls go ahead. It's simply that if you could add some good philosophical arguments on top of it, it would be even more fun.
You can quote someone by highlighting their text; a pop up will appear that will link their name and the text. As here: Quoting neomac
that if you could add some good philosophical arguments
You have come in after what is literally years of discussion. If I were half as good a teacher as @creativesoul suggests, he would have been convinced of the error of his ideas long ago. To suggest that I have not provided "some good philosophical arguments" is puerile.
I wonder, did you perhaps miss the debate from whence this discussion came?
I suppose you did, but it seems worth checking, because you do not seem to be addressing what I actually wrote, so much as a half-understood inference from the writing of other folk.
It looks like it will be a slow wet day, so while I have no great desire to further flog this dead horse, I might rely if addressed directly.
Bye the bye, this supercilious style is intended to get on your goat. It keeps me as the centre of attention.
There's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about this being red and that being red, that there must be a thing which is named by "red". Of course, there isn't. The red in the sunset has nothing in common with the red in the sports car; apart from the name.
The temptation is to reify the red into existence. But all we actually have is a way of talking that has proved useful.
That from Austin. He extended this to meaning - there's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about this meaning this and meaning that, that there must be a thing which is named by "meaning". There need not be any such thing. Again the temptation is to reify meaning into existence. But all we actually have is a way of talking that has proved useful - that form Wittgenstein, who pointed out how useful it was for philosophers to look at the use of words rather than their meaning
So far as this goes I suspect @creativesoul would agree. But here we seem to differ, since I would extent this approach to belief, whereas he baulks.
There's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about our believing this or our believing that, that there must be a thing which is named by "belief". Of course, there need not be. Why could it not just be a convenience for us to talk as if there were such a thing, perhaps a a handy way of summarising our attitudes and actions? He went to the shop because he wanted milk and he believed that's were he could purchase some, and so on...?
SO folk get mislead into looking for the essence of red when there isn't any such thing. And folk get misled into looking for beliefs in minds, as if they were bits of mental furniture. As if, were we to take a mind and dissect it, we would be able to find the belief that Moscow is the capital of Russia, or the belief that vanilla is better than chocolate. I suppose @creativesoul must think something like this, to explain why he is perplexed that a cat might have a belief while not being able to use language. For him, if a belief is an attitude towards a proposition, there must be propositions in minds, and so language.
But perhaps beliefs are a pretence invoked by folk who do use language, including propositions, simply to enable talk of the behaviour of others, including cats.
And here it comes back to the difference between belief and truth. We can explain the cat's going to the bowl by saying he believed it contained food, and this explains his actions whether there is food in the bowl or not.
Because sometimes beliefs are wrong. Truths are never wrong.
Perhaps talk of beliefs is just there to allow us to distinguish what others take to be the case from what we think to be the case; to allow us to explain behaviour that otherwise appears incongruous. We can explain why the cat went to the empty bowl if we infer that he was mistaken, and had taken it to contain food.
Hence, red is not a thing, but a way of talking about sunsets and sports cars. And beliefs are not things, but a way of discussing behaviour.
Reply to Wayfarer I have trouble sometimes differentiating between Hanover and your good self. The Yiddish doesn't help. Besides, this whole forum, indeed, philosophy itself, is kvetching about choice of words.
It's about the sense in which universals are real. Apropos of the broader point, I've been quoting from Russell's discussion in The Problems of Philosophy> The World of Universals, which concludes thus. Note he uses 'whiteness' as an example but 'redness' would do just as well.
[quote=Bertrand Russell; https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm#link2HCH0009]It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless. The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being.[/quote]
Edward Feser makes a similar point:
[quote=Some Brief Arguments for Dualism; http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com.au/2008/10/some-brief-arguments-for-dualism-part_29.html]Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.[/quote]
bolds added in both passages. The salient point being, universals are intelligible objects i.e. objects of thought, but are not the product of the mind. That is how I understand them.
Hence, red is not a thing, but a way of talking about sunsets and sports cars. And beliefs are not things, but a way of discussing behaviour
And yet the spoon remains in the drawer, as this particular spoon, whether I think about it or not. So particular spoons are things but the color red and beliefs are not, right?
You can quote someone by highlighting their text; a pop up will appear that will link their name and the text.
Unless there is a specific reason to adopt it, I still prefer my way of quoting. Anyway thanks for the hint.
> If I were half as good a teacher as @creativesoul suggests, he would have been convinced of the error of his ideas long ago.
Unless he too was just being sarcastic. Just kidding.
> You have come in after what is literally years of discussion.
Well that's an open forum, I'm afraid this happens especially if anybody is invited to debate.
> To suggest that I have not provided "some good philosophical arguments" is puerile.
No sir, I didn't mean to suggest that you didn't come up with "some good philosophical arguments" at all in your entire life. I didn't find good arguments in the posts I've read from the formal debate entitled "The content of beliefs is propositional" (Banno and creativesoul). Therefore I quoted your remarks literally and explained my doubts.
> I wonder, did you perhaps miss the debate from whence this discussion came?
I don't remember if I read this specific post that you are linking. But it doesn't add any argument to better support the claims I quoted and commented. On the contrary I found just more claims to question.
> you do not seem to be addressing what I actually wrote, so much as a half-understood inference from the writing of other folk.
Let me repeat it once more: I didn't find good arguments in the posts I've read from the formal debate entitled "The content of beliefs is propositional" (Banno and creativesoul). Therefore I quoted your remarks literally and explained my doubts.
So I am exactly addressing what you wrote. While we can't say the same of your claims about what I wrote. Can we? Indeed you never even quoted any of my last comments to your statements on the subject under discussion.
> It looks like it will be a slow wet day, so while I have no great desire to further flog this dead horse, I might rely if addressed directly.
You mean your pointless challenge: " If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example".
What about this example: X believes that the present King of France is bald. Did I win anything?
You are forcing us to play a rigged game based on some unjustified assumptions. And when one is addressing what is wrong in your assumptions, in challenging them with the same question, you are implicitly accusing them of cowardly refusing to play your game. This looks either puerile or dishonest, to me.
> Bye the bye, this supercilious style is intended to get on your goat. It keeps me as the centre of attention.
Now it's your turn to address my last comments to your statements on the subject under discussion.
From my exchange with @creativesoul (the notes are quotations of your own statements @Banno):
- If proposition is a “more abstract entity” [1] supposed to be “common between certain statements”, then proposition are not statements, and they are not interchangeable with statements, yet he prefers to talk in terms of propositions as “statements that can be either true or false” [2]. Well if they are statements then they can not at the same time be intrinsic truth bearers and the content of our beliefs, why? Because believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true, yet “the cup is on the shelf” and "la taza está en el estante" have the same truth value.
- Commands and desires are also considered propositional attitudes but they have satisfaction conditions not truth conditions as beliefs. And as long as beliefs and desires can express different attitudes toward the same propositions, propositions themselves are not intrinsically truth bearers by themselves [2], but only dependently on the direction-of-fit conferred by the intentional attitude.
- The manifest inconsistency of claiming that beliefs about statements are exactly the same as beliefs about the way things are [3] has been already spotted by you. But his other formulations elsewhere [4] turned out to be even more preposterous because claiming that beliefs are about how we think things are is exactly like saying beliefs are about how we believe things are (kind of intrinsically reflexive beliefs).
- He claims that both beliefs [5] and state of affairs [6] can be put in the form of a proposition, but if the possibility of putting in propositional form a belief is enough to claim that belief have propositional content, then it should be also enough to claim that state of affairs have propositional content. And since propositions are sentences that can be true or false [7], then also state of affairs can be true or false as much as beliefs can be, thanks to their propositional content.
- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.
- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.
- If belief is a way to explain action [12][13] and cats do not show human linguistic skills, how could one possibly explain Lilly’s behavior by attributing to her a belief that a certain sentence about her environment is true? However this sounds too preposterous and it’s probably not what he means, what he more probably means is instead that the human capacity of rendering Lilly’s beliefs through sentences that can be true or false is what explains Lilly’s behavior. Which sounds as preposterous, doesn’t it?
[1] Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition.
[2] My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable
[3] To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; to deny this is to deny that our statements are about the way things are.
[4] Saying that beliefs have propositional content is nothing more than saying that beliefs are about how we think things are.
[5] that every belief has propositional content does not imply that every belief has indeed been put in propositional form.
[6] It should be clear from the preceding discussion that while it is not the case that every proposition has been stated, every possible state of affairs can be put in the form of a proposition.
[7] Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. Since there is no present King of France, he can be neither bald nor hirsute. "The present king of France is bald" is not the sort of sentence that can be true or false.
[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …
The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs…
[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.
[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.
[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true.
[12] Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away. This is at least part of what belief is about: that our actions follow from our beliefs, that what we do, we do in the light of what we hold to be true.
[13] My own inclination is more towards beliefs being a way of talking about, and hence explaining, our actions; that is, that they are not things stored so much as interpretations of what we do.
@Banno
I've argued at length and to the point what I think about your arguments. While you didn't serve me with the same treatment, instead you are continually dodging my direct challenges to your views, with cheap excuses and attack ad personam. Despite the treatment, I don't take it personally as much as you do. So I'm still waiting for a more focused feedback on my last comments about your views. I'm even ready to thank you for the effort, go figure ;)
Agent SmithJanuary 15, 2022 at 13:08#6433820 likes
The ineffable i.e. nonpropositional experiences of mysticism
Consciousness, the alleged pure subjective aspect of it, is nonpropositional; so said Wittgenstein (re private language argument).
It depends though on what we mean by belief and contents of belief.
Harry HinduJanuary 15, 2022 at 15:48#6434140 likes
Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat".
I don't see the difference in the meaning. Why would you say the cat is on the mat if you weren't implying that it was true that the cat is on the mat?
"Attitudes" doesn't really fit, or leaves one wanting to know: what kind of attitude, if not the attitude that the proposition, or idea, is true?
Beliefs are better described as predictions. We are prediction machines and predictions are attitudes of probability towards some idea or proposition. We often use the phrases, "I think", "I believe", and "I know" to refer to the level of certainty we have of a given idea, with the latter being the most certain you can be.
Saying, "The sun will rise tomorrow." is the same as making a prediction and we make predictions based on prior experiences in similar circumstances. The more experience we have in a certain circumstance, the more certain we become that similar future circumstances will be the same. A belief is no different. Beliefs eventually become knowledge with more justification.
But in addition the model you use of talking as if things in your head were translated into language that is then transmitted and translated in things in your listener's head has been thoroughly critiqued, and found wanting. It's clear that it is much better to deal with the use to which one's utterance are put rather than to invent an enigmatic, disembodied entity called "the meaning of a word" that somehow floats from mind to mind.
If you are interested in formal representations of beliefs, the Stanford article on that topic is quite good.
As per all philosophical considerations, it takes for granted that beliefs are propositional attitudes.
Your use of "attitudes" and "use" is found wanting. What kind of attitudes, if not attitudes of certainty? Used for what if not representing things that aren't words?
I have found that defining meaning as the relationship between cause and effect very useful. Meaning is everywhere causes leave effects. Words are the effects of one's intent to communicate ideas that are not just other words. Some idea and the intent to communicate them is what causes words to appear on this page, and it is now the reader's job to get at the cause of the words - the idea the writer intends to communicate. Sometimes the reader may require re-phrasing or ask questions to better understand the idea.
There's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about this being red and that being red, that there must be a thing which is named by "red". Of course, there isn't. The red in the sunset has nothing in common with the red in the sports car; apart from the name.
The temptation is to reify the red into existence. But all we actually have is a way of talking that has proved useful.
Words are just colored shapes on a background of a contrasting color, or particular sounds in the air. Given that we can talk about words and how they are shaped and how they sound, like we can talk about apples and the way the are colored and shaped and how they taste and smell, and compare them to other words, even from different languages, seems to show that we are talking about something when we use words like, "red", "black letters on white paper", and the way "where" sounds like "wear", as opposed to just "using" them (again, used for what if not to refer to something that isn't a word).
I don't see the difference in the meaning. Why would you say the cat is on the mat if you weren't implying that it was true that the cat is on the mat?
I don't know how to respond to that. Try this: What is the subject of "the cat is on the mat"? I would say it is the cat. But what is the subject fo "Harry believes the cat is on the mat"? It's about Harry. They are quite different.
I don't see any benefit in that. I can see no clear way in which "We believe that Augustus was a Roman Emperor" is just a prediction. However treating belief as a propositional attitude has spawned very many further developments. Again it seems worth pointing out that it is, for better or worse, orthodoxy.
- He claims that both beliefs [5] and state of affairs [6] can be put in the form of a proposition, but if the possibility of putting in propositional form a belief is enough to claim that belief have propositional content, then it should be also enough to claim that state of affairs have propositional content. And since propositions are sentences that can be true or false [7], then also state of affairs can be true or false as much as beliefs can be, thanks to their propositional content.
[5] that every belief has propositional content does not imply that every belief has indeed been put in propositional form.
[6] It should be clear from the preceding discussion that while it is not the case that every proposition has been stated, every possible state of affairs can be put in the form of a proposition.
[7] Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. Since there is no present King of France, he can be neither bald nor hirsute. "The present king of France is bald" is not the sort of sentence that can be true or false.
I agree on both points above. There seems to be some special pleading going on, at a bare minimum. Inconsistent terminological use, certainly. That's unacceptable.
Interesting though...
I've noticed something now that I do not remember noticing during the overwhelming amount of seemingly incongruent argumentation offered by Banno during the debate. I had a very hard time making much sense of any of it towards the end.
Reply to Banno has arrived at incoherence by virtue of self-contradiction. If all belief has propositional content by virtue of being an attitude towards some proposition or other, and "The present King of France is bald" is not a proposition, then it would not even be possible to believe that the present King of France was bald, because "the present King of France is bald" has just been disqualified. That contradicts the way things are. We all know that it would take very little effort, given the right candidate, to convince someone that the statement is true. It is not impossible to believe that the present King of France is bald. The statement is not truth-apt, but can be wholeheartedly believed nonetheless.
:meh:
If "The present King of France is bald" is not a proposition, and yet it can be believed nonetheless, then it cannot be the case that either all belief has propositional content or all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or other.
:death:
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 08:07#6437100 likes
My position is that some belief do indeed have propositional content, but not all. This was explained thoroughly enough in the first three posts of yours truly during the debate this thread is supposed to be about.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 08:18#6437120 likes
To the best of my knowledge, current convention denies that language less creatures can even have belief, to remain consistent with holding that all belief has propositional content(an attitude towards a proposition). Current convention generally holds that truth is a language construct as well. So, appealing to convention doesn't work for me, given convention is wrong about that.
If "The present King of France is bald" is not a proposition, and yet it can be believed nonetheless, then it cannot be the case that either all belief has propositional content or all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or other.
Indeed this is what I already remarked in my previous comment: Quoting neomac
You mean your pointless challenge: " If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example".
What about this example: X believes that the present King of France is bald. Did I win anything?
Maybe he could try to claim that either X doesn't really believe that, which is intuitively preposterous and justifiably so. Or he could try to claim that, in this case, the propositional content of the belief that the present King of France is bald can not be rendered with "'the present King of France is bald' is true" but with "'the present King of France is bald' is a proposition" . However this line of reasoning looks an ad hoc move, at least until it doesn't get properly integrated with the rest of his account (good luck with that!). Besides the metalinguistic sentence "p is a proposition" is not a proposition according to W.'s Tractatus. And we are more and more far from understanding how such an account could ever explain what a belief is about and explain the related behavior not only for non-linguistic creature but also for irrational/ignorant linguistic creature.
Harry HinduJanuary 16, 2022 at 15:37#6438070 likes
Try this: What is the subject of "the cat is on the mat"? I would say it is the cat. But what is the subject fo "Harry believes the cat is on the mat"? It's about Harry. They are quite different.
In the first, the naive realist believes that they can talk about how things are independent of some belief or observation. The first statement could be caused by an illusion, hallucination or a lie.
For the indirect realist, both are the same because you can only talk about your ideas or observations, and your ideas or observations would be about the way things are. So words can be about the way things are, but not without some observation, which is what some proposition is about, not about the way things are independent of some observation. We can only ever speak about our knowledge and hope that our knowledge is accurate.
Language was developed in such a way that it implies that we see the world as it is. When we speak of colors and sounds, we imply that those colors and sounds exist independent of our observations and that we see colors and hear sounds that are actually there. But science has shown that indirect realism is the case where colors only exist in the mind and are representations of wavelengths of EM energy, and sounds are representations of vibrating air molecules. As a result of modern scientific knowledge, it is understood that our words can only be about the way things are indirectly - meaning that our words refer to our ideas and our ideas refer to states-of-affairs. Our words only accurately refer to state-of-affairs when our ideas do the same.
Given that color is a component of the perception and not of the perceived, what is the subject of the statement, "The apple is red."?
I don't see any benefit in that. I can see no clear way in which "We believe that Augustus was a Roman Emperor" is just a prediction. However treating belief as a propositional attitude has spawned very many further developments. Again it seems worth pointing out that it is, for better or worse, orthodoxy.
You predict both future and past state-of-affairs based on observations of current conditions. You can predict past events based on the effects they have left, like a criminal investigator investigating the evidence at the crime scene to predict the identity of the criminal and their motive. While the crime happened in the past, the knowledge of who did it is in the future and is only proved once the evidence is properly interpreted. Your continued reference to orthodoxy and popularity is a logical fallacy and not useful.
And yet we do things with them. There's no point in going over the problems with your referential theory of meaning again.
What do we do with them, Banno? Use them to accomplish what goal? Intent precedes use and use is dependent upon intent. What is the intent of using words? Your "going over the problems of referential theory" were debunked and you abandoned the conversation, like you are doing now. There's no point in going over the problems of meaning is use again when you make the same arguments and keep appealing to popularity.
Meaning is use is not specific enough as words can be used for representation.
Harry HinduJanuary 16, 2022 at 15:46#6438080 likes
To the best of my knowledge, current convention denies that language less creatures can even have belief, to remain consistent with holding that all belief has propositional content(an attitude towards a proposition).
A Man Without Words is a story about a deaf man that grew up without language and only discovered language after becoming an adult.
Idelfonso obviously held beliefs before learning a language, or else how did he find food? He had to have beliefs about where food could be found that were not propositions, or else he would have starved, just like cats that learn and then hold beliefs that the sound of a can opener precedes the smell and taste of tuna.
What are language-less creatures' beliefs composed of? The same thing that words are composed of - shapes, colors, sounds, tastes, smells and the feelings that go along with them.
Agent SmithJanuary 16, 2022 at 16:07#6438140 likes
Reply to Harry Hindu Does qualia meet the conditions for knowledge? If it doesn't then it can't be an answer to a question; what is philosophy without questions?
Or he could try to claim that indeed the content of the proposition can not be rendered with "the proposition X is true"
Poorly articulated, sorry, I meant: or he could try to claim that, in this case, the propositional content of the belief that the present King of France is bald can not be rendered with "'the present King of France is bald' is true" but with "'the present King of France is bald' is a proposition"
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 18:42#6438630 likes
And we are more and more far from understanding how such an account could ever explain what a belief is about and explain the related behavior not only on non-linguistic creature but also in irrational/ignorant linguistic creature.
Over the years, I've come to realize that parsing the issues in terms of linguistic and non-linguistic belief is fraught, it quite simply does not work. Almost, but not quite right, it seems to me. There's a substantial loss of explanatory power when it comes to creatures we call non linguistic having belief content that is existentially dependent upon language; things like bowls, cups, cars, etc. Such things are certainly linguistic things, meaning that they owe their very existence to language, and it leads us to muddle when trying to parse non-linguistic creatures' beliefs if they are about such things.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 18:50#6438670 likes
Philosophy proper has not really recovered from Gettier. That failure is solely as a result of getting belief wrong to begin with, and it's led to approaches like Banno's. While I certainly do understand the need for the JTB account, especially during the time, for some reason or other, that line of thought has been stretched beyond what's warranted. That's where the notion of all belief as propositional attitude comes from. Moore's paradox also shows how that accounting practice is found wanting.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 19:15#6438730 likes
Reply to Banno seems to think that the position I argue for/from is somehow guilty of reifying belief. The notions of reification or misplaced concreteness work from basic taxonomy which I reject. Not all things can be properly taken into account with a dichotomy such as real/abstract, physical/non-physical, real/imaginary, physical/mental, etc. So, when Banno claims that I hold that beliefs are in the head or mind of the believer, or that they are mental furniture, he's quite mistaken. Belief, like many other things, are not the sorts of things that can have a spatiotemporal location, for the content of one individual's belief can be spread across the globe, indeed the entire universe. Or in the example of the mouse running behind a tree, the content does not have a precise location. The tree, the mouse, and the relationship between them are most certainly not inside the skull of the believer. Any dualist account or dichotomy such as internal/external, mental/physical, and the like is doomed to fail here for the belief is a result of a process that includes the individual who draws the correlations, the tree, the mouse, and the relationship between the mouse and tree.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 19:27#6438760 likes
- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.
[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …
The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs…
Here Banno was attempting to support the notion of propositions which had never been proposed, but somehow existed nonetheless as something a believer somehow holds to be true despite never having articulated the proposition or witnessing it having been articulated. To me, that is patently absurd. It amounts to claiming that one can believe something that they have never thought of before ever thinking of it. Such a parsing completely neglects the need for the believer to be a part of the process, and makes a complete muddle of the sequences of events that lead up to forming, having, and/or holding that some proposition or other is true.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 19:44#6438840 likes
- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.
[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.
[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.
[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true.
Yes, it seems that Banno thinks that because belief can be put into propositional form, and has been for centuries, that all belief content is propositional and all belief is an attitude towards that particular proposition.
There is a conflation between reporting upon and/or taking an account of anothers' belief and anothers' belief. The opening post in the debate covers this thoroughly. There are three basic kinds of belief, and believing that some proposition or other is true is but one kind.
It also does not follow from the fact that we can state the cat's belief, and do so using propositions or statements which are truth-apt, that the cat holds those to be true. The cat cannot believe such things, for the cat has no language. The cat believes that the mouse is behind the tree, but quite simply cannot believe that the proposition "the mouse is behind the tree" is true.
In the first, the naive realist believes that they can talk about how things are independent of some belief or observation. The first statement could be caused by an illusion, hallucination or a lie.
You seem to have entirely missed the point. Realist or idealist, one sentence is about the cat, the other about Harry.
You seem to have entirely missed the point. Realist or idealist, one sentence is about the cat, the other about Harry.
No, it is you who missed the point. It wasnt a comparison of realism vs idealism, but between two different versions a realism - direct vs indirect. Idealism would also have two versions: direct vs. indirect.
That's a very heavily theory laden link. Notice the term "representation" too. It's an accounting practice. What is true of it is not necessarily true of what's being taken into account.
Harry HinduJanuary 16, 2022 at 21:02#6439240 likes
"Hello" is the acknowledgement of two or more people to begin an exchange of information (have a conversation). "Good-bye" is the acknowledge of the parties' that the exchange of information has ended.
When a computer targets another to exchange information, they must acknowledge each other and the beginning of the exchange of information with what we call a "hand-shake" and then acknowledge the termination of the exchange with another acknowledgement from both nodes.
The possible world stuff is not that important. Nothing much hangs on the use of "proposition" in "propositional attitude" - as the article says, "statement" works just as well. The only reason for using the term is that it is so widely used.
The mooted counterexample you've been using fits the propositional attitude model.
No, Harry. It does not refer to anything; it does something. It begins the conversation.
But you will continue to try to force it into your referential model. You are engaged in an ad hoc defence of a broken model.
Harry HinduJanuary 16, 2022 at 21:37#6439470 likes
Reply to Banno i dont have to try that hard if "hello" is your one and only example. We can disagree on one example, but it take more than one example to prove your point.
It is an article about the actual difficulties with propositional attitudes. I go along with Davidson, although I must admit never having considered the objections closely.
i dont have to try that hard if "hello" is your one and only example.
Oh, there's plenty more. Most involve referring to things in order to do stuff with them. Have a look at "How to do things with words". It's been commended to you before, many times, and is an easy read - I found it quite amusing.
Edit: There's even a youtube video about the book, for you kids that can't read.
Harry HinduJanuary 16, 2022 at 21:50#6439520 likes
No, Harry. It does not refer to anything; it does something. It begins the conversation.
Like i have said numerous times, meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Effects are about their causes. Use requires intent. Intent is the cause of use, therefore use is about one's intent.
Speaking is a type of behavior and we attempt to get at the intent of other behaviors so that we form beliefs, or predictions about future behaviors.
creativesoulJanuary 16, 2022 at 21:50#6439530 likes
It is an article about the actual difficulties with propositional attitudes. I go along with Davidson, although I must admit never having considered the objections closely.
Will do. Thanks for the link. Now you're just verifying my earlier comment to you about being a guidepost of the highest caliber...
:wink:
Harry HinduJanuary 16, 2022 at 21:51#6439540 likes
Most involve referring to things in order to do stuff with them
Right, using words to refer to things that arent words in order to do stuff with those things that are not words. In other words, words are used to refer to the intent of the user to get some others to behave in a particular way.
I do not think that you understand what I'm arguing. It doesn't so much as contradict your own as much as further qualifies it. Some and all belief... whereas I hold the former and you the latter.
Yes, Harry, words can be used to talk about things. But they can do much more than just refer. The problem with a purely referential theory of language such as yours is that there is so much it cannot explain.
Harry HinduJanuary 16, 2022 at 22:01#6439610 likes
Yes, Harry, words can be used to talk about things. But they can do much more than just refer. The problem with a purely referential theory of language such as yours is that there is so much it cannot explain.
Thats all fine, but if meaning is not simply use, but the relationship between cause and effect, then words can be used to do other things, but as an effect of ones ideas and the intent to communicate them, words can always be used to refer to, or get at, one's intent, just like any one of their behaviors. Its just that "actions speak louder than words" in that its easier to hide the reference to ones intent with words than it is with actions that dont involve words.
I do not think that you understand what I'm arguing.
Perhaps. It does seem to me you are obsessing over a minor point. If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object? I doubt it. And yet here we are.
I'm not aware of any literature of language as the relationship between cause and effect, apart from your own comments.
Is there any?
Not language, meaning. Are you paying attention?
There wasn't any literature on the evolution of organisms by natural selection until Darwin wrote it. Why can't you address the argument instead continually committing these logical fallacies?
No, Harry - it doesn't refer to the begging of a conversation; it is the begining of a conversation.
Not necessarily. What if the other person doesn't respond and say, "Hello" back? "Hello" can't be the beginning of a conversation that never starts. This is why it is better think of "hello" as referring to the intent to start a conversation.
In a way, what we are both saying is true and not necessarily contradictory. Use refers to intent. This is why the theory that meaning is the relationship between cause and effect helps in describing the sound or scribble as the effect with the intent as the cause. The use would be the relationship between the intent and the scribble or sound. It's just that I'm also asserting that meaning also exists everywhere else causes (not just intentional causes) leave effects.
Deleted UserJanuary 17, 2022 at 01:35#6440500 likes
The orthodoxy is that beliefs can be best discussed as propositional attitudes.
Again, this isnt specific enough to be useful. What kind if attitudes? Attitudes of (degrees of) certainty. You keep throwing around, "truth" without properly defining what it is and how one determines some proposition is true or not except as the degree that some proposition referrs to some state-of-affairs or not. What if there are conflicting attitudes toward some proposition? How does truth resolve the conflict?
...It does seem to me you are obsessing over a minor point. If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object? I doubt it. And yet here we are.
Actually, that is exactly what I'm objecting to.
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
creativesoulJanuary 17, 2022 at 16:13#6442760 likes
Well, I agree that he's not taken the criticism head on, not mine at least, nor yours; both of which seem relevant and valid. However, I'd rather not make this about Banno.
Care to further discuss the topic, as compared/contrasted to my interlocutor?
You keep throwing around, "truth" without properly defining what it is and how one determines some proposition is true or not except as the degree that some proposition referrs to some state-of-affairs or not.
"P" is true if and only if P
I think I've mentioned this before. That's as good as it gets for truth. "how one determines some proposition is true" depends on the proposition; something else I've said many times. It's absurd to suppose that there could be one way to determine if a proposition is true.
Grice? That would at least be something. But he thought we should look to meaning, not to use. Inferring intent is fraught. Use has potential for more empirical procedures.
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
Again?
So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diprotodon?
So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diplodocus?
Can a languageless animal experience uncertainty? In my experience at least some of them can. When in any way uncertain - such as when there is hesitation in proceeding a certain way - what else could such animal be possibly uncertain of if not issues regarding what ought and ought not be done in relation to what is or is not?
No proposition is being made yet there occur conflicting beliefs in relation to what is and ought be done for as long as the uncertainty occurs. This proposition-devoid conflict of beliefs* occurring in the mind of the respective languagleless animal.
* Belief as minimally understood to comprise trust in what is or ought to be done.
Where headed towards arguing about whether Bayesian priors of neural networks are properly described as beliefs, again.
Diprotodon did not have items of furniture in their minds that could be properly described as beliefs. Rather they had behaviours that we can set out and explain in terms of beliefs and desires.
I dunno. This seems to be a fairly straight forward corollary of the beetle in the box. That folk with a decent grasp of Wittgenstein - yes, you , @creativesoul - can't see this strikes me as quite odd.
Deleted UserJanuary 17, 2022 at 21:38#6443870 likes
Diplodocus did not have items of furniture in their minds that could be properly described as beliefs. Rather they had behaviours that we can set out and explain in terms of beliefs and desires.
Always Skinner with this one. (Reductionism to operationalized visible behaviors.)
Are you a behavior analyst?
Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.
I believe it nullifies the importance of the beetle in a box argument - for, in this argument, if it isn’t linguistic it is irrelevant. Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. The two appear to stand in direct contradiction.
Do you take issue with this (to my mind non-controversial) position?
Not one bit. I rather take issue with the notion that the linguistic expression of "my pain" has no relevant referent (this as per the beetle in a box argument).
Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.
We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior.
I don't see why it needs to be more complicated than that.
:up: Fully agree.
I don't want to say this due to the can of worms that it is, but I will anyway: the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance. There of course is the evolutionary conundrum to this and like telltales (e.g., shared central nervous system anatomy) to dispel such a view ... but it's not historically uncommon.
Deleted UserJanuary 17, 2022 at 22:31#6444430 likes
the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance.
So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc?
So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc?
Seems to me to be the case, yes.
Deleted UserJanuary 17, 2022 at 22:44#6444520 likes
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language.
So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc?
I don’t know why it would be controversial to Wittgenstein. He famously wrote 'If a lion could speak, we could not understand him'. By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to.
Deleted UserJanuary 17, 2022 at 23:45#6444770 likes
I believe it nullifies the importance of the beetle in a box argument - for, in this argument, if it isn’t linguistic it is irrelevant. Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. The two appear to stand in direct contradiction.
The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia).
By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to.
And yet when a lion does its thing and roars with a certain tonality in a certain context, we non-lions get the gist of what its conveying well enough: the rough English translation being, “I’m the boss”. Going by their behaviors, so too do zebras and gazelles - or else competitors such as hyenas.
For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions?
The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia).
Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 01:29#6445210 likes
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
— creativesoul
Again?
So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diplodocus?
Please address what I write and not some imaginary opponent that you make up in lieu thereof.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 01:59#6445280 likes
Diplodocus did not have items of furniture in their minds that could be properly described as beliefs. Rather they had behaviours that we can set out and explain in terms of beliefs and desires.
I dunno. This seems to be a fairly straight forward corollary of the beetle in the box. That folk with a decent grasp of Wittgenstein - yes, you , creativesoul - can't see this strikes me as quite odd.
Diplodocus are not prehistoric mammals. I chose my classification deliberately. I wish you would pay closer attention, I know you're capable of understanding this. There are no items of furniture inside of any skulls that I'm aware of, so the response is laughable... literally. You are arguing against your own imaginary opponents.
I've no issue at all with the idea that we can explain behaviours in terms of beliefs and desires.
As far as Witt's beetle goes, I am of the understanding that it's an argument against the idea of private language or private meaning of words. I agree with it actually. It's also irrelevant here. Language less creatures' belief does not consist of language or constructs thereof. Our reports of them do, but I'm not so naive as to conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting upon.
Trees, mice, and the spatiotemporal relationship between them that we characterize as one being behind the other do not need language to exist in their entirety exactly as they did when we coined the phrase "the mouse is behind the tree". I'm not arguing that the phrase is some private belief of a prehistoric mammal(say a cat). That's absurd. Rather, I'm saying that a prehistoric cat could have believed that a mouse was behind a tree long before we coined the phrase(call it whatever you want, it matters not).
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 02:15#6445320 likes
...how do you see the relation between concepts and beliefs?
On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language. Language creation and use is existentially dependent upon belief. Therefore, concepts are existentially dependent upon belief. I've no use for the notion of "concept", having found that talking in terms of beliefs, thoughts, and linguistic frameworks is much better than talking in terms of concepts or conceptual schemes.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 02:18#6445350 likes
For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions?
I agree that verbal language isn’t necessary for cognition, that is, for forming expectations that can be met or disappointed, which is the basis for belief in a very general sense, although obviously not belief as the structure of a verbal proposition.
Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic.
If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense.
Deleted UserJanuary 18, 2022 at 03:07#6445550 likes
You accuse me of not addressing your posts, then mis-address mine.
The Diplodocus is hardly historical.
And that you fail to see the relation between this discussion and the private language argument is apparent.
So where does that leave this bloated reanimation of a thrice deceased thread. I dunno. Seems to me you missed something quite important, but...
Try this:
You are perhaps happy to say that red is seen by us in, say, a sunset or a cup, but that it is a secondary property; not to actually be found in the object.
I'm suggesting something analogous is the case with belief.
Edit: Ah, damn. I meant to write Diprotodon. My bad.
If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense.
This seems like a good summary to me. It points to how crucial historical usage is when it comes to the meaning of words, phrases, and other language constructs. It denies the equivalence often drawn between unspoken thought and 'private' thought. Dennet has at least one intuition pump that does much the same thing in "Quining Qualia", except he's arguing against the notion of private sensations or some such and using something like the private language argument to make the point of how socially constructed the notions actually are.
I highly recommend reading that to anyone who has not.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 04:41#6445920 likes
Seems to me you missed something quite important, but...
Try this:
You are perhaps happy to say that red is seen by us in, say, a sunset or a cup, but that it is a secondary property; not to actually be found in the object.
I'm suggesting something analogous is the case with belief.
Well then, perhaps we do agree on something basic. I'm not keen on the 'property' talk though. I'll try to tease out the analogy in as simple terms as I can, using ones with which I believe you'll be okay. I'll try to incorporate both, the private language argument and the secondary property gist, for they seem to be different kinds of objections.
So, seeing red always includes some creature or another, and what is meant by "seeing red" is entirely determined by language use, which is social. Thus, when one claims that their experience of seeing red cups or even thinking about red cups is some personal and private experience or thought, we can surely know that those thoughts and experiences cannot count as private matters at all, because they are the result of social constructs and historical language use, and that which is a social construct cannot be completely private.
I'll leave it there for now. Hopefully, this is the beginning of something more productive between us. It's been a while. If the above is palatable enough for you, could you elaborate on how belief is the same way. Don't get me wrong, I understand how our use of the term "belief" fits into the above so far as language use being social goes. Rather, I'm struggling to see how this is at all applicable and/or lends support to the claim that all belief content is propositional.
What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"?
The question makes no sense on my view. Beliefs are not the sort of things used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else, or to refer to something else; beliefs are not names, do not function like names, although they are certainly necessary for any naming and descriptive practices to begin.
Beliefs are complex things composed of other things. They are a result of cognitive processes. All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things. The complexity of any belief in particular(the correlational content) is congruent with the innate capabilities of the creature.
If the cat believes that the bowl is empty, it is as a result of looking and seeing that there was no food in it. There is no referent of the belief. As above, the cat's belief does not refer to anything. Rather, it's about a food source. It's about the bowl,, but is much more than just the empty bowl.
You say it's not a thing in the mind of the cat. So what is it?
The issue I have is with the use of "mind" as anything other than a loose reference to one's thoughts and beliefs. Layman speak for what are you thinking is "What's on your mind". "I have something in mind" does not mean that the mind is a place where things can be. Indeed, beliefs are the sorts of things that do not have a precise spatiotemporal location, for they are composed of entirely different otherwise seemingly disparate things, connected only by the correlations drawn between them by the believing creature.
Oooo... I remember that from a few years ago. Warning bells. Quoting creativesoul
If the cat believes that the bowl is empty, it is as a result of looking and seeing that there was no food in it. There is no referent of the belief. As above, the cat's belief does not refer to anything. Rather, it's about a food source. It's about the bowl,, but is much more than just the empty bowl.
Then what is it that is "had" by the cat, when it has a belief? Nothing, I say; it's just a way of setting out it's behaviour.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 06:54#6446750 likes
We build red out of our usage. Why shouldn't we think of belief in much the same way?
I think that that overstates the human influence regarding red things. Other language less creatures can also see red, so it is clear that seeing red does not require our language usage. However, more to your point, which I take on in agreement is...
Our usage determines what "seeing red" means. We cannot sensibly talk about seeing red cups unless we've been steeped in language. Our usage determines what "I believe that X" means(where X is some statement believed true). We cannot sensibly talk about our beliefs unless we've been steeped in language. In both cases, it is true that our understanding and knowledge of what those words mean depends entirely upon language use...
However, I would not say the same about all instances of seeing red or all instances of believing that a mouse ran behind a tree. Not all those depend upon language use.
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 07:09#6446890 likes
...what is it that is "had" by the cat, when it has a belief? Nothing, I say; it's just a way of setting out it's behaviour.
It's a tough question to be sure. The belief is what is had by the cat. The cat draws correlations between different things. The bowl. Hunger pangs. The urge to eat, and seek food(gather resources). The belief that the bowl is empty could be accompanied by unsatisfied expectations, if she is expecting food to be there. There are numerous past events, each leaving an impression upon the cat such that it now goes to the bowl when it's hungry. After looking into the bowl, if it is empty, then the cat sees that the bowl is empty. Knowing what an empty food bowl looks like is not a mystery, nor is believing the bowl is empty when looking at an empty bowl. There is language necessary to make the bowl, but there's none necessary to look into it and see that it's empty, resulting in believing so.
Deleted UserJanuary 18, 2022 at 07:13#6446900 likes
We build red out of our usage. Why shouldn't we think of belief in much the same way?
The creature alone with the box can look and see if there is something in the box. The something in the box he can see and retain in memory and categorize alongside other things-seen without giving the thing in the box a name. I imagine the mind would do just fine with the categorization of nameless images. (You might imagine a dog's mind along these lines.) It's easy to imagine a mind running on nameless images (and emotions, smells, feelings, and so on). I suppose a name would make the image easier to categorize. But images are also easy to remember, manipulate, organize.
You may say we decide together how to organize these nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on. I don't think this can be known as enjoyable as it might be to know it.
Most of earthly existence has been languageless. Why get so hung up on language. It has a homocentric ring to it. We've had our Copernicus. We're not at the center anymore. Animals have minds too, the evidence insists: There are languageless creatures who can categorize nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on. There are nonlinguistic creatures who hold beliefs. The cat is assailed with nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on between the sound of the electric can opener and his dashing to the kitchen. Those nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on,* are the cat's belief: belief that the sound of the electric can opener means there's something tasty in the kitchen.
*You would probably like to include the cat's behavior here but to me that's a weird way to talk. I wouldn't talk that way about myself or about you. I wouldn't call your behavior a part of your belief or my behavior a part of my belief. So what warrants this phraseology with the cat? Only a kind of Skinnerian reductionism. Never a wise move. The Skinnerian epoche is always a temptation but vacuous in the end. A distraction designed to postpone the acceptance of uncertainty.
"I have something in mind" does not mean that the mind is a place where things can be. Indeed, beliefs are the sorts of things that do not have a precise spatiotemporal location
Yes. The most wonderful and mysterious thing about the mind is that it has no location. A belief has no location. It's a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and a behavioral pattern and in the case of a linguistic creature a linguistic pattern.
Do you find the account I set out in the first three posts of the debate to be a complete one?
To me, they are enough to seriously challenge Banno's account as he presented it so far. But as I said, we can determine our views on beliefs better by clarifying other related notions, like proposition, concept, reference, perception, sentence, etc. That’s why I’m interested now to explore your understanding of the relation between beliefs and concepts.
On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language.
On what grounds do you believe that all concepts are linguistic constructs? What are the features you ascribe to concepts that essentially require language?
Harry HinduJanuary 18, 2022 at 13:08#6447450 likes
I think I've mentioned this before. That's as good as it gets for truth. "how one determines some proposition is true" depends on the proposition; something else I've said many times. It's absurd to suppose that there could be one way to determine if a proposition is true.
You seem to have changed topics.
True is a type of proposition, as opposed to false propositions. Certain would be a type of attitude of some proposition.
Is it also possible to have an attitude that some proposition is false that is also a belief?
It's not changing topics. It's integrating what you are saying with the rest of what we know.
Banno is excellent at engaging others
— creativesoul
My attitude toward this proposition: :rofl:
— Harry Hindu
And yet here you are.
Proposition 1: Banno is excellent at engaging others
Proposition 2: Banno is not excellent at engaging others
Proposition 3: And yet you are here.
If propositions are true depending on the proposition, then what use is your proposition (#3) in determining the truth of creativesoul's proposition (#1) and my proposition (#2)?
It seems to me that you are implying that P1 is true depending on if P3 true. If a proposition can only be true depending on some other proposition, then we get an infinite regress of needing an infinite amount of propositions for just one to be true.
If propositions are true depending only on the proposition itself, then P3 has no bearing on P1 or P2 being true, which means that your response is an example of us talking past each other. It would also mean that P1 and P2 have no implications on the other being true (which would mean that the LNC is false).
To resolve the infinite regress and abide by the LNC, we must theorize that propositions are true depending on some state-of-affairs that isn't just another proposition, or that propositions refer to some state-of-affairs that is not another proposition.
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
— creativesoul
Again?
So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diprotodon?
Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille). Humans first started with using sounds to create propositions, then visual scribbles, and eventually braille for the blind. Since different sensations can be co-opted to create propositions with, why can't any animal that has sensations form propositions, like this smell means that wolves are in the area and that sound means that they are to my left, which also means I should run to my right? The only difference would be the degree of complexity with which some proposition could be made and the state-of-affairs that it can refer to.
Does it matter what form some proposition takes (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.) as long as the sensation means (refers to, or has a causal relation with) something that isn't another sensation?
What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno
The question makes no sense on my view.
I disagree. The referent of the word "belief" is a cognitive intentional state/event (depending on the dispositional or actual meaning we attribute to the word "belief").
Beliefs are complex things composed of other things. They are a result of cognitive processes. All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things.
My impression is that here you are confusing the content of the belief, with the belief. I think your formulation would sound better if you stated "All belief consists of drawing correlations" instead of "All belief consists of correlations drawn". Yet I wouldn't find it satisfactory: we draw correlations even when we imagine or associate ideas, but imagination is not belief. Besides what is "correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things" supposed to mean when one believes that 3 + 2 = 5 or God is omniscient?
creativesoulJanuary 18, 2022 at 16:04#6447870 likes
On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language.
— creativesoul
On what grounds do you believe that all concepts are linguistic constructs? What are the features you ascribe to concepts that essentially require language?
Short on time.
Name some things that you count as a concept, and it will help this along better. As before, I do not use the notion, finding different ways of talking to be more practical.
Dennet has at least one intuition pump that does much the same thing in "Quining Qualia", except he's arguing against the notion of private sensations or some such and using something like the private language argument to make the point of how socially constructed the notions actually are.
I highly recommend reading that to anyone who has not.
I love that article. I think Dennett does a great job of demolishing g Strawson’s argument for panpsychism. I just wish he had gone a little further in Rorty’s
direction.
It seems to me that you are implying that P1 is true depending on if P3 true
Your use of "dependent" is misleading. Implication is not dependency. Support for Creative's contention that Banno is good an engaging others is found in the fact that you continue to be engaged.
What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno
The question makes no sense on my view.
— creativesoul
I disagree. The referent of the word "belief" is a cognitive intentional state/event (depending on the dispositional or actual meaning we attribute to the word "belief").
Note he asked the referent of the belief, not the word "belief". Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do.
My impression is that here you are confusing the content of the belief, with the belief. I think your formulation would sound better if you stated "All belief consists of drawing correlations" instead of "All belief consists of correlations drawn". Yet I wouldn't find it satisfactory: we draw correlations even when we imagine or associate ideas, but imagination is not belief.
The content of a belief amounts to what a belief consists of. The content of the belief that a mouse is behind a tree is the mouse, the tree, the spatiotemporal relationship between the two, and the correlations drawn between all these by the creature capable of doing so.
Indeed, we do draw correlations when imagining, remembering, creating, envisioning, dreaming, etc. I fail to see how that presents any issue for the position I'm putting forth here. I mean, I've not claimed that all correlations are belief, nor would I.
Besides what is "correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things" supposed to mean when one believes that 3 + 2 = 5 or God is omniscient?
Are those meaningful marks imperceptible? When one believes that 3 + 2 = 5, they've done nothing more than accept the rules of arithmetic. It may be worth noting here that numbers are nothing more than the names of quantities. When one believes that God is omniscient, they've done nothing more than learn to use language to talk about the supernatural beliefs of the community, and believe that what they are saying is true. Believing that God is omniscient is to believe that there is a God, such that God exists, and that God knows everything.
creativesoulJanuary 19, 2022 at 02:00#6449700 likes
Yes. Indeed! That article was very impressive to me as well! I'm not a physicalist either, strictly speaking.
You may find it interesting to search the site by typing the title into the search bar. Banno created a great thread about it. Good stuff in there, between the typical yahoos.
creativesoulJanuary 19, 2022 at 02:20#6449730 likes
creativesoul must think something like this, to explain why he is perplexed that a cat might have a belief while not being able to use language. For him, if a belief is an attitude towards a proposition, there must be propositions in minds, and so language.
No, that's not it at all. My problem with that notion of belief is well known. How to square that with the idea that language less animals are capable of belief. Hence, the need to posit the notion of a language less proposition.
If all belief is an attitude towards a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language use, then language less animals have no belief. That's the argument. The conclusion follows from the premisses. You have argued for both premisses. You cannot admit the conclusion, because you know better. I'm offering a way to make amends.
Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic. — javra
If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense.
While acknowledging other’s rather complex interpretations of Wittgenstein, here’s what the guy actually said in his own words:
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”
As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues. This when reading Witt verbatim. Felt like mentioning that.
Note he asked the referent of the belief, not the word "belief". Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do.
It wasn’t clear to me since "the cat believes the bowl is empty” could be taken as mentioning a sentence not as using it to describe whatever is supposed to be the case. However your reply is misleading as well in this respect, because I would grant that the question doesn’t make sense if the question presupposes a categorisation of belief as a word with some referent instead of an intentional state. And this would be a categorial mistake: beliefs are not words (but is there anybody here who would believe otherwise? If not, then what's the interest in asking this question wrt to the topic under discussion?). Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you? If it is case for you too, then your previous claim was wrong, indeed it does make sense to ask what the reference of a belief is and the plausible answer would be a description of whatever a specific belief is concretely about. On the other side if you disagree, how else do you understand the different meaning of “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to”?
Indeed, we do draw correlations when imagining, remembering, creating, envisioning, dreaming, etc. I fail to see how that presents any issue for the position I'm putting forth here. I mean, I've not claimed that all correlations are belief, nor would I.
Let’s focus. You wrote: “All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”. First of all, to me beliefs do not consist of correlations drawn, but at best of drawing correlations. The second point is that I’m not satisfied with the latter formulation either, not because it's utterly wrong but because at best it provides a necessary condition, it certainly is not necessary and sufficient for belief ascription.
Another potential source of contention could come also from clarifying what kind of ability the expression “drawing correlations” is supposed to mean. But pls let’s ignore this last point for now.
I'm just fine if you agree on the first 2 points I made.
Are those meaningful marks imperceptible? When one believes that 3 + 2 = 5, they've done nothing more than accept the rules of arithmetic. It may be worth noting here that numbers are nothing more than the names of quantities. When one believes that God is omniscient, they've done nothing more than learn to use language to talk about the supernatural beliefs of the community, and believe that what they are saying is true. Believing that God is omniscient is to believe that there is a God, such that God exists, and that God knows everything.
It seems to me here you are confusing the perceptual nature of our representations with what they are about. The belief that God is omniscient or that 3 + 2 = 5 [1] are about something that doesn’t look to be perceptible in nature even if those beliefs can be rendered through perceptible statements. So the correlation of meaningful perceptible marks doesn’t imply that what it represents is a correlation between perceptible things. Unless you can clarify how.
[1] I'm not sure that arithmetic beliefs are best understood as beliefs about something to be the case. But for now I pretend to be they are.
Name some things that you count as a concept, and it will help this along better.
I take the word “concept” as referring to some cognitive abilities presupposed by belief ascription. For now all I’m inclined to add is that concepts essentially involve classificatory intentional abilities (i.e. they can not be reduced to causal explanations) of some kind. What kind? I do not have a clear and straightforward answer to that, I’m still thinking about it. However I leave it open the question if concepts require linguistic abilities (surely linguistic concepts do). Yet I’m inclined to think this is not the case: i.e. what I would take to be conceptual consists in what classificatory features linguistic and non-linguistic concepts share. Related to this, I think there can be non-propositional beliefs, while there can not be non-conceptual beliefs.
To not get lost in uninteresting terminological controversies, I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures.
Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do.
Yet names are part of the belief. If your beliefs don't refer to anything in the world, then your beliefs aren't useful to anyone else. A false belief and a belief without a reference are one and the same. There is a difference between some proposition being understandable and being useful. We can put words together in such a way that follows the rules of some language, but if it doesn't agree with the facts, or state what is the case, then it is useless. Take for instance, "Joe Biden is the first president of the United States." The proposition follows the rules of English, but doesn't agree with the facts. So in what way is the proposition useful?
Harry HinduJanuary 19, 2022 at 14:25#6451630 likes
Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P
Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true.
If you're saying "P" and P are the same thing, as in both are propositions, then you would be begging the question.
It seems to me that in saying "P" if P is somehow projecting the very words we are using out into the world, as if names exist independent of minds. The names are mental things that refer to things that are not names, and not mental.
Belief is a relation between an actor and a statement, such that the actor takes the statement to be true.
Knowledge might variously be understood as a justified true belief or a capacity to perform some action.
Then both beliefs and knowledge can be acted on. The only difference is that knowledge is justified. But then what attitude does one have of some proposition that is true if not justification, which leads to certainty given more justification (successful uses)? Seems to me that one needs a reason to believe in anything. The amount of reasons is what is the difference between beliefs and knowledge.
A justification would be a stored memory of some past event which warrants the belief. The memory of the past event coupled with the belief in causation - that similar causes lead to similar effects - is what makes a belief a belief. Beliefs would be useless if causation wasn't the case. There would be no beliefs without causation.
creativesoulJanuary 19, 2022 at 16:06#6451910 likes
Joe looks at a broken clock which indicates the time is 3 o'clock.
Joe believes that the time is 3 o'clock, because he believes that a broken clock was working. Joe does not know that the clock is broken, so he does not believe the statement/proposition "a broken clock is working" is true. The content of the belief includes a broken clock, but Joe's belief is not about broken clocks.
The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”
As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues
Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant , but his method of answering of them I think has much in common with Wittgenstein’s. That is, consciousness would not be an object but a relational, synthetic activity organized by pragmatic use.
Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant , but his method of answering of them I think has much in common with Wittgenstein’s. That is, consciousness would not be an object but a relational, synthetic activity organized by pragmatic use.
Yes to Husserl and cohort not finding such questions irrelevant.
In this context, “object” can have numerous equivocations. One’s own consciousness can be deemed an object of one’s own awareness (not to be confused with “object” in the sense of a physical entity), for it can be that of which one is aware of; i.e., that which one’s awareness is about. Yet, in so being the object of one’s awareness, it likewise need not be deemed to ontically be an object (here, “object” in the sense of an existent entity) - but, this object of one’s awareness (what one’s awareness is about) can well be appraised to be a process: a be-ing. If it needs saying, I of course reject the notion that consciousness is an entity rather than a process. Either way, however, it remains a beetle in a box in terms of Witt’s philosophy.
Edit: In case one is unfamiliar with the terminology, please check out definition #2 in the APA dictionary for "object of consciousness". Namely: "2. anything of which the mind is conscious, including perceptions, mental images, emotions, and so forth, as well as the observing ego, or “I,” of subjective experience. Compare subject of consciousness."
Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”
The point of the Beetle box analogy was only to dispel the idea that there could be a meaningful inter-subjective notion of sensations in the form of Fregean referents. Yet recall that Witt likened the sense of the word "pain" to a picture of a boiling pot containing real boiling water - in other words, one understands so-called "other people's" pains directly; partly through observing a person's behaviour and partly by drawing upon one's own experiences of pains. Therefore the concept of objective sensation referents is redundant in that it isn't needed for understanding or justifying the existence of so-called 'other minds' (the word 'other' being responsible for most of the grammatical confusion).
Reply to sime I've embarked on Wittgenstein discussions before. While what you say makes sense, it to me runs counter to Wittgenstein's own words which I'll re-post, boldface mine:
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
... not redundant, but irrelevant. To generalize from the one case of one's own being to other people is to be irresponsible. And so forth.
That doesn’t sound a correct report of Jack’s belief. Indeed it would make Jack’s belief contradictory. A better report would be: Jack believes that clock is working. But that belief is false.
Anyway what you mean is that the difference between “content of belief” and “what belief is about” is related to the distinction between how things are and how things appear to Jack?
If so, before commenting on this further, I would like to know how your distinction works when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far). In this case, what is the content of the belief?
If it needs saying, I of course reject the notion that consciousness is an entity rather than a process. Either way, however, it remains a beetle in a box in terms of Witt’s philosophy.
Anthony Nickles grappled with the question of whether for Wittgenstein there is relevant sense in private experience. I believe he concluded that it not the case that everything must be thrown out except what is communicated between people. Rather, when talking to ourselves we cannot expect the sort of language that was designed to be shared with others to be meaningful in private reflection, at least not in the same way. But that does not preclude a different form of usefulness.
The names are mental things that refer to things that are not names, and not mental.
Almost. Names are social. They work because of their use amongst a group of people, not one. Describing them as mental cannot work because it misses the collective use.
If you're saying "P" and P are the same thing, as in both are propositions...
"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with.
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs?
Banno isn't saying a languageless creature can have an attitude toward a proposition. He's saying that the languageless beliefs of languageless creatures can be put into the form of a propositional attitude.
If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object?
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 01:46#6454180 likes
Lots of confusion followed from the above simple misunderstanding, including a Skinnerian-sounding analysis of a languageless creature's belief strictly in terms of its behavior, to the expense of the social aspect (mentalism, Skinner would say, and frown) of our access to the beliefs languageless creatures.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 02:16#6454290 likes
If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object?
Two different things and another source of the confusion and "disagreement" here.
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 02:21#6454320 likes
he believes that a broken clock was working
— creativesoul
That doesn’t sound a correct report of Jack’s belief. Indeed it would make Jack’s belief contradictory. A better report would be: Jack believes that clock is working. But that belief is false.
Evidently, we've very different standards regarding what counts as a "better report" of Jack's belief.
This is a matter of great contention between our views. It seems clear to me that Jack can and does believe both, without any issue at all.
Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken.
Anyway what you mean...
I mean what I write. Let's focus there.
The content of Jack's belief included that particular broken clock, despite the fact that it was about what time it was. Jack's belief was not about broken clocks, it included them.
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 02:29#6454340 likes
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs?
— creativesoul
Banno isn't saying a languageless creature can have an attitude toward a proposition. He's saying that the languageless beliefs of languageless creatures can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.
Non-controversial.
If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object?
— Banno
Is it non-controversial though? At first blush, it may seem innocuous enough, but when placed under scrutiny, it reveals itself to be inherently incapable of taking proper account of language less belief. If all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or another then all language less creatures' beliefs are attitudes towards some proposition.
That's patently absurd on it's face.
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 02:36#6454360 likes
Reply to ZzzoneiroCosm Yes. I made the same point many pages ago. It's remarkable how some threads can motor on needlessly fueled mostly by misunderstanding.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 03:23#6454500 likes
Reply to ZzzoneiroCosm Yep, I guess you have to have something to argue about, and if creativity fails...(willful?) misunderstanding may be resorted to,
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 03:40#6454580 likes
Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude.
What do you mean "not"? Read the debate and see for yourself where belief was described as an attitude towards a proposition on at least one occasion.
Putting language less creatures' belief into the form of a propositional attitude does not make the belief have propositional content. It makes it able to be described using propositional content. Those are two very different claims, and you noted as much yourself, not long ago earlier today.
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 03:42#6454590 likes
Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in?
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 03:49#6454630 likes
I do think you've set out something that can be used to help improve the discussion, and move it along.
I've no issue with claiming that some belief amounts to an attitude towards some proposition. To be clear. Just not all. We could say that such belief are linguistic - resulting from correlations including language use. Whereas non linguistic would be those resulting from correlations not including language use. I'm not married to that taxonomy, but there needs to be something of that sort.
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 03:57#6454690 likes
Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you?
The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about. Beliefs do not refer to anything. Names do that.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 04:01#6454700 likes
So, could you take the time to read my first few posts in the debate and offer a critique or some other summarization? Does anything jump out as suspect?
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 04:21#6454770 likes
To be clear, I'm here because the topic is of great interest to me personally, and I'm fairly certain that understanding how belief works is imperative, crucial even, to understanding ourselves and the world around us. I'm here because I've found doing philosophy with certain individuals has provided enrichment to my life. Banno is one such individual, although certainly not the only one.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 04:49#6454860 likes
I'm unsure of the difference between those. What do you mean?
Here we've been talking about the philosophy of belief: namely, what belief is, what a belief is, what kind of language we should use to talk about beliefs or belief, what can we know about the existential, epistemological, etc., parameters of beliefs and belief.
A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump.
Sure, but again I’m interested to understand better what kind of substantial issues your claims are supposed to address. For the same reason I asked you another question that you didn’t answer yet: how is your distinction (between what belief is about and content of belief) supposed to work when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far)?
Evidently, we've very different standards regarding what counts as a "better report" of Jack's belief
I don’t think so, despite your claim: indeed if we stick to your other claim - “I mean what I write” - in a previous post you reported Jack’s belief as “he believes that a broken clock was working” which is a contradictory belief, while now you report his belief as “he believed that that particular clock was working” (i.e. the same way I would do) which is not contradictory. Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe.
I can readily grant you that you can make a de re/de dicto distinction in Jack’s belief about the clock but it’s still the “de dicto” rendering that is supposed to better show what Jack believes based on his own understanding of the situation.
The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about.
Well so far it shows just your terminological preferences. What substantial issues they are supposed to clarify is another question.
Anyhow, I am familiar with the literature where “reference” is attributed to names (e.g. Frege “Sense and Reference”). But Frege has no problems to talk about the reference of sentences either. Now, I can stick to that terminology, yet the reason why I feel justified to export the term “reference” outside the realm of semantics, it’s because semantics is grounded in intentionality as much as belief in the realm of epistemology. And, if we can talk about the content of a sentence, or what a sentence is about, or the reference of a sentence as much as we can can talk about the content of a belief and what is the belief about, then I don’t see any strong substantial reasons to prevent us from talking about the reference of a belief.
Additionally, I don’t know how much the distinction you make between “the content of belief” and “what belief is about” is supported in the literature: can you pls provide some reference?
Harry HinduJanuary 20, 2022 at 14:30#6456010 likes
Might have to leave it there. After all, your posts are no more than scribbles.
Thats what you would say if i was speaking a different language. What does Arabic and Russian look like to you, compared to English? What do they sound like to you compared to English?
Sign language is adopting hand movements instead of scribbles to refer to things. How can a hand movement mean the same thing as a scribble when their use is different?
Harry HinduJanuary 20, 2022 at 14:48#6456140 likes
"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with.
This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. What is the difference between mentioning and use? Is not mentioning a type of use? What is the difference between speaking about and with?
Almost. Names are social. They work because of their use amongst a group of people, not one. Describing them as mental cannot work because it misses the collective use.
Then describe the beginning of how a new word is used. If we run the risk of talking past each other because we are using names differently then that seems to show that there is a mental aspect of associating a name with what it is about and THEN sharing that relationship with others. Agreement comes after use.
Harry HinduJanuary 20, 2022 at 15:10#6456220 likes
Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude.
Which has been shown to not be helpful in the slightest.
Banno injected truth into the equation: Quoting Banno
Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat".
If the attitude is certainty, as certainty is the attitude that some belief is true, then animals certainly behave as if they are certain of what is the case is - like a wolf is nearby - sometimes better than humans as they may have better hearing or smelling than we do.
Was "propositional", "proposition" and "attitude" ever defined in this discussion?
Some lack of clarity and consistency in Banno's presentation too
Which is to say that Banno doesnt know what he's talking about. Is his lack of consistency and clarity a characteristic of the propositions he makes or his attitude?
creativesoulJanuary 20, 2022 at 16:06#6456270 likes
I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures.
I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism.
Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe.
I'm afraid that I left the reader to draw the conclusion...
Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken.
Therefore, he believed that a broken clock was working.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 16:16#6456330 likes
If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object? I doubt it.
(my bolds)
- might be a point of agreement or starting point for a new approach.
The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.
*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude.
I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism.
I didn't ask for help, I asked you how you understand the relation between the notion of "belief" and the one of "concept". You retorted the question to me and I drafted an answer. Now should be your turn in answering the question I asked, right? If you are not interested to continue the exchange, just tell me. It's simpler, more honest and more respectful of each others' time.
[...] it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put things into the form of a propositional attitude.
Rascal that I sometimes am, I’ll question the weirdness of so doing. As a commonly known example: a snarling dog with hairs on end and bared fangs seems to me to be holding a propositional attitude in so manifesting: basically expressing to its interlocuter the following proposition “I am capable of inflicting gravely unwanted pain upon you” - which can either be true or false - and furthermore holding the conviction that what it is conveying is true. It’s the dog’s momentarily held belief that it can inflict injury, a belief which the dog furthermore conveys to interlocutors. Same then can be said of the cat cornered by a dog, with the cat hissing and spitting again with hairs on end and exposed teeth.
To my mind, then, here are quite plausible examples of languageless creatures actually holding propositional attitudes which they convey, communicate, to other(s).
These examples can be made all the more complex belief wise were we to entertain the possibility that the lesser animal is bluffing: here believing that they will make the other believe the languageless proposition they are conveying though they themselves are at best uncertain of it’s truth.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 19:36#6456840 likes
in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.
That's what I mean by an actual human putting the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. You just did it.
That's what I mean by an actual human putting the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. You just did it.
OK, yea. I can't express my beliefs regarding the cat without doing so. I was however aiming at the notion that the cat expresses its propositional attitude to the dog, sometimes quite successfully - this with both being languageless creatures.
But, yea, I know: in order to so express I need to put both the cat's and dog's beliefs into the form of a propositional attitude. If only the circularity of it all could be somehow done away with ...
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 20:27#6457020 likes
I was however aiming at the notion that the cat expresses its propositional attitude to the dog, sometimes quite successfully - this with both being languageless creatures.
Yeah, I get it. I suppose it's just a matter of opinion whether we should call certain attitudes of languageless creatures "propositional."
It sounds weird to me. Sounds like a stretch possibly deployed to serve some philosophical agenda.
It also commits one to the view that propositions, or at the very least propositional attitudes, can exist in the absence of language. That sounds weird too and (in my mind) points to an agenda.
It sounds weird to me. Sounds like a stretch possibly deployed to serve some philosophical agenda.
It also commits one to the view that propositions or at the very least propositional attitudes can exist in the absence of language. That sounds weird too and (in my mind) points to an agenda.
If I do have an agenda, here it is: I uphold an evolutionary cline in the abilities of life. That's it. I don't uphold a miraculous metaphysical division between such abilities.
As to language, animals don't have (the human) language (wherein, for example, signs can be freely created to reference relatively advanced concepts). But mammals for example readily communicate via things such as body language all the time, not only within species but also between species.
Yeah, I get it. I suppose it's just a matter of opinion whether we should call certain attitudes of languageless creatures "propositional."
At the end of the day, though, I agree. And it's not high up on my list of priorities regarding beliefs/opinions that need to be maintained and justified. So it's known.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 20:46#6457090 likes
Hi. Looking at your first post in the formal debate. Here's what I see. I'm no expert.
I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer.
Is it:
1)statements of belief about events
2)statements of belief about descriptions thereof
3)language less belief about events
?
I'm just not sure. So a numbered list would clear that up.
Banno's conflation of key terms could possibly be fleshed out a little better since it's such an important point: possibly with a list of terms and a description of each conflation.
Other than that, the presentation looks good. (Of course, writing of any kind can always get clearer and more to the point, but that's more of a long-term project (for all of us.))
It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not.
--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 20:51#6457110 likes
In the formal debate, creative says Banno said this:
"A state of affairs is equivalent to a true proposition."
When I mentioned an agenda, I was thinking of Banno. Something like a deep-seated desire to look at everything in the universe through the lens of language.
I don't feel like you have an agenda here.
Deleted UserJanuary 20, 2022 at 20:52#6457120 likes
At the end of the day, though, I agree. And it's not high up on my list of priorities regarding beliefs/opinions that need to be maintained and justified. So it's known.
Right. Interesting as all of this belief talk is, it doesn't seem very important. More important to my mind (in the Facebook age) is the psychology of belief.
I see more of a love of wisdom in modern psychology than in modern (especially analytic) philosophy.
Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno
"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with. — Banno
This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken.
The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality.
Interesting as all of this belief talk is, it doesn't seem very important. More important to my mind (in the Facebook age) is the psychology of belief.
Yup. Hmm. Tentatively addressed, I figure it this way. Can there be belief without trust? I can't discern it if there is. Belief that = trust that. Belief in = trust in. Trust is a funny concept. It's essential to who we are and yet, philosophically, more or less a mystery. Trust can be betrayed. Including by one own very self; like when one trusts that one has set the alarm-clock but has not. One wakes up and might feel self-sabotaged. We humans gain most of our instantiations of trust. Many lesser animals have their instantiations of trust inherited genotypically: e.g. a duckling innately trusting that the silluete of a bird of prey indicates danger wheres that of a goose does not; else its innate trust on what it imprints on.
It gets even more intense in terms of innate trust when it comes to insects. We, on the other hand, are birthed with little preset, innate trust - but yet exhibit it in (for example) trust that caregivers will caregive as needed, this from the moment we first emerge into the world. Most all the rest we build up over time. A lot of what we trust is habitual to us. But to form these habits of trust, we typically initially consciously ponder, deliberate, the issue with some momentary degree of uncertainty: choosing what to trust and what not to trust.
A small hint of background to the following idea: belief is trust (at least for the most part: belief is a thing; trust is a process). Belief/trust can then be a) inborn, phenotypically obtained via genetic inheritance, b) inherent in what we do (like a habit) and formerly learned in part via inborn beliefs/trust, or c) enactively made via conscious deliberation and choice founded on (b), and thereby becoming (b) after the fact.
Might be unclear, but I'm throwing this out there for the sake of sharing. Not currently looking to argue for it. But if its of interest as a possible alternative to other perspectives, there you have it. Belief is a concrete instantiation derived from the general process of trust. Or so I currently believe. :smile:
Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in?
?creativesoul
Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about.
I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul
Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language.
...but yet exhibit it in (for example) trust that caregivers will caregive as needed, this from the moment we first emerge into the worl
If an infant, to any significant degree, trusted his caregiver to caregive he would probably scream less bloodcurdlingly and less often. Bloodcurdling screams you might call evidence of distrust. :)
At any rate, an aside. Your ideas re trust seem solid.
A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump.
Indeed. Understood. Trump is a symptom of much deeper issues in the US I'm afraid. I think that I've a fairly decent grasp of how the ground was cultivated over the nation's history, with particular interest on the past fifty years in order to give Trump a foothold, but that's too far off the main topic here... for now at least. Perhaps we could circle back later if the right circumstances arise.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 03:07#6458580 likes
I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer.
That makes perfect sense, for they were further set out in the second post.
1.)Beliefs about events, particularly those that can happen in places and times where naming and descriptive practices are non-existent. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree serves as an example thereof. These might be described as language-less beliefs, for they are not at all about language.
2.)Beliefs about events that can be and/or are uttered by an unreflective* language user(*say someone learning how to use names and descriptive practices such as a young child). One who sees a mouse run behind a tree and then states "A mouse is behind the tree" offers one such example.
3.)Beliefs about whether or not some statement is true.
The first two are about events. The third is about language use, particularly whether or not some statement is true.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 03:17#6458650 likes
This:
It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not.
— creativesoul
--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation.
On my view, the only things we hold to be true(in the relevant sense) are statements. On yours, are there other things that are capable of being held true, such that a language less creature would be capable of doing so?
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 03:25#6458700 likes
The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality.
That's the way I've always understood it. However, that understanding has been challenged as incorrect by a few around here.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 03:28#6458740 likes
The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.
The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cat holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.
I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 03:39#6458790 likes
Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about.
I've little to no issue with the claim that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. That's what we do when taking account of another's belief. My issue arises when we conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting on.
I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul
Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language.
Yeah! That's the one I could not find. I think that expectation is belief about what's not yet happened. I'm not at all keen on the idea of propositional form somehow existing in such a way that a language less creature's belief could be a kind thereof.
I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 03:58#6458850 likes
The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.
The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.
I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here.
You're correct that our positions differ here.
I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view?
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 04:16#6458870 likes
I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view?
From a mentalistic point of view, the cat remembers the sound and associates it with food.
The association gives the sound meaning. It only requires us to assume or infer that cats have memories and can make associations.
The Skinnerian view would avoid mentalism and focus on the cat's behavior and conditioning.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 05:26#6459150 likes
Interesting. On my own view, the cat draws correlations between the sound and eating afterwards, and that's how the sound becomes meaningful. The notion of association works okay here too. To be clear, that is a very basic and incomplete account, for those meaningful correlations are far more complex by virtue of including far more things, but simplicity is good for now.
I'm still struggling to understand how the cat holds the meaning to be true.
To me, it hears the sound, it believes it is about to eat as a result of drawing much the same correlations that made the sound meaningful to it to begin with.
While I hold that language less belief can be true, I think that holding something as true requires a.)something that can be true in addition to b.)an animal capable of holding something as such. Seems to me that meaning is not the sort of thing that can be true, and the cat is not capable of holding something to be true.
A bit more background regarding my position...
Meaning is required for correspondence with the way things were, are, and/or will be. Meaning is required for coherency. Meaning is required for truth conditions. Indeed, it seems clear to me that meaning and truth are inextricably entwined in belief. However, holding something to be true and holding true belief seem to have remarkably different necessary preconditions.
The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.
The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.
I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here.
I agree that statements are not always necessary in order for a capable creature to attribute meaning(for things to become meaningful to that creature).
Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)?
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 05:46#6459300 likes
b.)an animal capable of holding something as such.
I think here is the point of disagreement.
So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?
Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche.
The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?
All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 05:56#6459340 likes
Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)?
I don't really have much of a background in this kind of philosophy. I just try to follow along and ferret out where the disagreement is. I don't get a lot of nourishment (a feeling of increased wisdom) out of analytic philosophy but it's good exercise for the brain. It seems to be barking up the wrong tree to me. But it's just the analytic-continental counterpoise. I like the continentals.
The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.
*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude.
Again, I need "propositional attitude" defined.
Youre saying the cat has a belief prior to it being put into the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is), which means beliefs are not the propositional attitude but are something that can be put into the form if one. The objective here is to define beliefs, not what form they can be put into after the fact. So youre not explaining what a belief is. You're explaining that beliefs can be referred to with propositional attitudes (whatever that is). I want to know what form the cats belief is in prior to some human putting it in the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is).
To say that it would be weird for a cat to put a belief in the form of a propositional attitude is a strange thing to say when it appears that the cat doesnt need to do so in order to have a belief per your own explanation.
What form do propositional attitudes take in the human's mind if not scribbles and the sounds of spoken words?
Harry HinduJanuary 21, 2022 at 13:13#6460080 likes
The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality.
I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition." You're saying that "P" is proposition and P is the state-of-affairs "P" is about, refers, or points to. If P is not the case, then "P" is false. That is what I said:Quoting Harry Hindu
Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true.
Banno then replied with what I quoted in my post that you quoted. So no, Banno did not explain truth in the way you just did, which is how I've been explaining it as well. So Banno is not being honest.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 15:22#6460370 likes
You might say: A belief is a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and you might tack on a behavioral pattern (which in some cases would include language).
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 17:53#6460730 likes
b.)an animal capable of holding something as such.
— creativesoul
I think here is the point of disagreement.
So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?
Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche.
While I agree that that is one point of divergence between our positions, I'm not keen on invoking psychological terminology. It seems unnecessary, and looks to be quite unhelpful for the task at hand. It has made the issue even more complex than it already is, and in doing so increased entities without adding clarity. I do not share the belief that the task aims at the unknown, or unknowable. Although acquiring knowledge of language less belief requires a stringent methodology replete with certain specific criteria based upon actual differences, it's certainly not a 'fait accompli' situation. The questions can be put as...
1.What sort of things are held to be true?
2.What does holding things to be true require such that some creatures are capable of doing so while others are not?
There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. This may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is imperative to do so for that distinction both honors and subsequently bridges the gap between belief and thinking about belief, whereas the latter requires language use, and is necessary for holding something to be true. Such belief is about language use, and amounts to a charitable reading of Banno's position(belief as an attitude towards some statement/proposition such that they believe it to be true).
I cannot possibly stress how many 'different' historical philosophical problems arose from neglecting that actual distinction(between belief and thinking about belief). From Plato/Socrates to Aristotle to Locke, Hume, and Kant to Descartes, Heidegger, Husserl, all the way through Frege, Russell, Witty, and Moore to Gettier to Quine, Davidson, Rorty, Chalmers, Searle, Dennett, and beyond, there's been a gross misconception of belief at work, and accounting malpractices thereof have been and remain the result.
The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?
All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology.
"The sound of the electric can opener means that there might be something tasty in the kitchen" is an accounting practice. Attributing that practice to a language less creature is a mistake; a conflation of belief and thinking about belief. What you've suggested is an example of thinking about belief. All thinking about belief requires language use.
While I've no issue agreeing that that account is an accurate enough one regarding what the sound means to the cat, I do not agree that the cat also holds the account to be true. The cat cannot hold an accounting practice to be true, for it cannot understand such practices, and in order to hold something as true, one must first understand what's being held so. At the very least, one must believe they do.
In this example, it makes perfect sense to me for us to say that when the cat hears the can opener it believes it is about to eat, thinks so, even expects to, or perhaps that it thinks or believes there is or will be food in the kitchen, so it goes to check.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 18:01#6460780 likes
The cat cannot hold an accounting practice to be true, for it cannot understand such practices, and in order to hold something as true, one must first understand what's being held so.
This seems like reasonable speculative animal psychology.
This may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is imperative to do so for that distinction both honors and subsequently bridges the gap between belief and thinking about belief, whereas the latter requires language use, and is necessary for holding something to be true.
If you mean to say a cat is unable to think about its beliefs, I would probably have to agree. More speculative animal psychology.
When I say the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen I mean the cat has made an association between the sound and the treat. I don't mean the cat is able to think about its beliefs.
Again, speculative animal psychology. We don't know what goes on in the mind of languageless creatures. They won't tell. :)
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 18:06#6460810 likes
We don't know what goes on in the mind of languageless creatures. They won't tell. :)
Indeed. They will neither confirm nor deny with language use. They won't tell. Banno has said much the same thing on any number of occasions, telling me to ask Jack(his cat of days gone by).
How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 18:14#6460870 likes
If by "holding a belief" you mean having the psychical capacity to think about one's beliefs, sure, then probably a cat doesn't hold beliefs.
I do not. The ability to think about one's beliefs is not equivalent to the ability to hold and/or have beliefs. Clearly the former is existentially dependent upon the latter. I've no issue with saying that cats can have and hold beliefs about what's happened, is happening, or is about to happen.
There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true.
Can you exemplify a belief-that-X wherein X is not upheld to be true?
E.g.: If one believes that Santa Clause is fictional, doesn’t that entail one upholds that “Santa Clause is fictional” corresponds to what is?
Or, more in-tune with the thread, if a cat believes that “it will soon have food” doesn’t that entail that it expects its emotive attitude of “I will soon have food” to correspond to what will be - being in some way surprised or dismayed if it turns out otherwise?
This going on the presumption that truth is understood as “that which corresponds to what is (to include what was and what will be)”.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 18:27#6460940 likes
When I say the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen I mean the cat has made an association between the sound and the treat. I don't mean the cat is able to think about its beliefs.
I've no qualm with that. As before, I agree that the sound is meaningful to the cat, and it seems we also agree upon how it became so. It was the bit about the cat holding the account to be true that was the problem.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 18:31#6460970 likes
How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?
It sets a boundary to our philosophical forays. We'll run up against the unknowns of animal psychology.
You say that thinking about a belief requires language. Which is to say a languageless creature is unable to think about its beliefs.
It seems reasonable, but I wouldn't call it knowledge. It has the ring of reasonable speculation.
It's literally impossible (in my opinion) to imagine the mind of a languageless creature. We can try.
Another way to look at it: while it's true that a cat lacks language, it's possible to conceive of the phenomena of its experience as a kind of symbol-language. So for humans, when I see the word "food" I think of food. For a cat, when it hears the sound of the electric can opener it thinks of food. In this example, the sound of the electric can opener is functioning as a meaning-laden symbol. You might say a word, but that's a stretch. Certainly, it has a kind of symbolic content for the cat.
But again, we run up against the unknowns of animal pscyhology.
I'm still struggling to understand how the cat holds the meaning to be true.
So in the case of the electric can opener, I'm okay with saying the cat, when he hears the electric can opener, believes if he runs to the kitchen he'll get a tasty treat. (A belief not about the meaning of the sound of the electric can opener; a belief about "what is about to happen.")
To me that's very close to saying the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means (signifies; is correctly* associated with the idea that) there might be a tasty treat in the kitchen.
So it's easy to leave the notion of meaning out of it, if that's your preference.
*edit - At any rate, the point is that the notion of meaning can be left out.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 18:41#6461010 likes
Can you exemplify a belief-that-X wherein X is not upheld to be true?
If you go to the opening post of this thread, you'll find a link to the debate that this thread is about. My opening post in that debate does exactly that.
Reply to creativesoul To be clear, you're referring to this post. On first reading, I agree with what is said in it. But I gather that it only addresses proportional formats for beliefs in relation to the issue of truth. This as stated here:
Some say, and rightly so, that when we believe some proposition or another, that we have a particular sort of attitude towards that proposition, and that that belief has propositional content. I would readily agree. When a competent user believes the following proposition...
"The mouse ran behind the tree."
...they believe that that proposition is true. The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview. I've no argument against that much.
What I'm asking is how can a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not; so phrased to contrast to belief-in-A) not entail the attitude that X is true?
I ask because I so far disagree with the notion that a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not) can be held without entailing the attitude that X is true - i.e., corresponds to what was, is, or will be. So, if a lesser animal believes-that-X (without this belief being in propositional format), this to me so far entails that it believes-that-X-is-true (or: that X corresponds to what is) - despite there being no linguistic proposition to contemplate.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 19:14#6461210 likes
How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?
— creativesoul
It sets a boundary to our philosophical forays. We'll run up against the unknowns of animal psychology.
So, because language less animals cannot speak, it makes it impossible for us to know what language less belief is about or what it consists of? Surely, we need not know everything about language less belief in order to know some things about it. There will always be unknowns. I say that a very disciplined approach to what we can and do know will yield results that are both well-grounded and true.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 19:33#6461290 likes
We can take a Skinnerian approach and analyze languageless creatures in terms of their observable behaviors and its conditioners and reinforcers. But Skinner wouldn't like the use of the word "belief" (mentalism).
Or we can take a mentalistic view and try to imagine what goes on in the mind of a languageless creature. More speculative and of a different epistemological order: I wouldn't expect the results to be in the form of knowledge, rather of theory. (Skinner's reductionism was, of course, an attempt to set psychology on a more scientific foundation; and behaviorism remains the most scientific branch of psychology, as far as I know.)
Do you agree with this?: The study of languageless belief centers on the psychology of languageless creatures.
Or do you envision a logic-centered, armchair approach?: If a languageless creature holds a belief the belief must logically be of the nature of X.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 19:36#6461310 likes
I reject the rules of entailment on the grounds that using them to characterize another's belief can lead us to say that another believes something that they do not. Gettier shows this nicely. The rules of entailment allow a change to the truth conditions of Smith's belief, which is to change the meaning of his belief entirely, and proceed to talk about something other than what Smith believes. So, just because "I have ten coins in my pocket and I will get the job" entails "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", it does not follow that Smith's belief was true because it was not about someone else, it was about himself, and thus, his belief could only be true if he got the job. The second case is a bit more complex, but amounts to the same thing; an accounting malpractice.
That much aside...
The belief that approach is about statements of belief. Language less creatures do not make those. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree requires only a creature capable of directly perceiving the events leading up to the situation. A cat can believe that a mouse is behind a tree without having the attitude that "a mouse is behind a tree" is true. The former is about the mouse, the tree, and the relationship between them, whereas the latter is about the belief.
Are those the only options, and are our options mutually exclusive? I would say that the first steps would be more of an armchair approach to set out the necessary criterion. What counts as a language less belief? There are certain things we already know cannot be included in such belief.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 19:47#6461380 likes
X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not?
Yes, and in so equating, how does belief-that-X not entail an upheld implicit attitude that X corresponds to what is - thereby, the implicit attitude that X is? An attitude what leads to some form of surprise or bewilderment when and if it turns out that the mouse is not behind the tree.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 20:03#6461470 likes
X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not?
— creativesoul
Yes, and in so equating, how does belief-that-X not entail an upheld implicit attitude that X corresponds to what is - thereby, the implicit attitude that X is? An attitude what leads to some form of surprise or bewilderment when and if it turns out that the mouse is not behind the tree.
Having an attitude that X corresponds to what is amounts entirely to an attitude about X. If X is the belief, then having an attitude towards X is having an attitude towards the belief. Do you see the problem here?
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 20:10#6461510 likes
Consider the simplistic case of perception, for example. One's perception of X can either be true or false. Same with a lesser animal's. When a lesser animal innately trusts what it perceives, it un-reflexively believes what it perceives to so be; and, in so doing, it holds the implicit (un-contemplated) attitude that what it perceives is true. Same as we do on most all occasions. "Is that a real tree that I see?" hardly ever enters into the equation of our believing that the tree we see in fact is, i.e. we hold an implicit attitude that our perceptions are true most always. And, arguably as with at least more intelligent lesser animals (like great apes for one example), we are only uncertain about what we perceive when it conflicts - of fails to fit into - the coherent / consistent body of all associated perceptions and their assumed relations: the "I can't believe my eyes" attitude.
Granting that we believe what we see, do we not then necessarily assume what we see to be true - this even when we do not contemplate our former and present perceptions in terms of propositional beliefs? After all, it's only after the fact that we analyze via analysis of propositional beliefs.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 20:16#6461580 likes
To me that's very close to saying the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means (signifies; is correctly* associated with the idea that) there might be a tasty treat in the kitchen.
This sounds more like the conventional theories of meaning which presuppose symbolism. I'm not averse to them entirely.
If X is equal to a mouse is behind a tree, then X is either the belief or the events/situation. Are you saying that in the belief that approach it is the latter of the two? Because it seems to me that it is the former.
creativesoulJanuary 21, 2022 at 20:25#6461660 likes
As compared to believe that - event/situation - is true? I've no issue that I see with belief - that - event situation, but it's the "is true" part that is problematic for me.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 21:22#6461820 likes
What can we know, beyond any doubt, about language less belief?
Well, Sextus Empiricus is one of my favorites, so if you're in search of what's "beyond any doubt," I might not be much help.
Maybe this is a good place to start:
All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 21:24#6461870 likes
All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature.
I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it.
To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said.
1. Languageless beliefs exist.
2. The form of a languageless belief is propositional.
3. The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional.
4. A languageless belief, though non-propositional in content, in taking the form of a proposition can be apprehended or expressed in the form, and with the content, of a proposition by a language-using creature.
The distinction between form and content seems to be the crucial one in regard to the debate in question, which centers on content.
2. The form of a languageless belief is propositional.
We ascribe beliefs to creatures that do not have language; the form of all beliefs is: This is true; were this is a state of affairs, a statement or indeed a proposition - whichever suits your pet grammar.
3. The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional.
There's much ambiguity in this thread as to the "content". Generally, and widely, the content of a belief is understood to be the targeted state of affairs, statement or proposition: what it is that is believed.
Hence "The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional" is not so much false as ill-formed.
4. A languageless belief, though non-propositional in content, in taking the form of a proposition can be apprehended or expressed in the form, and with the content, of a proposition by a language-using creature.
This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 22:28#6462150 likes
content of a belief is understood to be the targeted state of affairs
This sounds like a good description of the non-propositional content of a languageless belief. It may be objects, mental images, emotions, memories, sensations - but it's some state of affairs and it isn't language.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 22:32#6462180 likes
What is the case is what can be placed into propositional form.
It may be more accurate to simply say: What is the case has the form of a proposition. In the case of an unknown state of affairs we can then say that it has the form of a proposition but its content is unknown.
Deleted UserJanuary 21, 2022 at 23:28#6462310 likes
In the one case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice two are four; in the other case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice four are eight… Now by a proposition, I mean the sort of thing which is apprehended in these two cases…. I hope it is plain that there certainly are such things as propositions in this sense.
Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition. One might say that the proposition gives the meaning of a statement, but meaning is perhaps an even more contentious term than proposition. My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable, and with the option of returning to this issue if necessary.
All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature.
All things we name and describe, though some are non-propositional in their content, take the general form of a proposition when taken account of with naming and describing practices.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2022 at 05:15#6463220 likes
Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way?
Does the cat (fallen among language-users) have a beetle in its box? Maybe, maybe not.
Of course we can be wrong.
We can be wrong without knowing in what way we can be wrong.
If it's certainty you're looking for you had better start with ascription. Otherwise, you'll have to begin with an inference or assumption: there are languageless creatures who hold languageless beliefs.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2022 at 06:51#6463440 likes
I would think that the private language arguments are inapplicable to language less belief.
If it isn't public - if it's truly private - then it ought to drop out of consideration. That's my understanding of one implication of the beetle in the box.
Wittgenstein was likely aiming at certainty too.
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 07:44#6463490 likes
What form do propositional attitudes take in the human's mind if not scribbles and the sounds of spoken words?
Without recruiting scribbles or sounds (even noetic scribbles or sounds) a proposition takes this form: subject-predicate.
The subject-predicate form can be apprehended - held in the mind - reflected upon - in the total absence of scribbles and sounds (even noetic scribbles and sounds).
It's much easier to do this with the help of scribbles and sounds. That's probably why we invented them.
All things [states of affairs], though some are non-propositional in their content, take the [ ] form of a proposition.
I think it's clearer to say 'states of affairs' as opposed to 'things'.
I might be ready to say, boldly: reality has the form of a proposition. Meaning only that it has this form: subject-predicate.
(It's a wild and shocking assertion and seems indisputable but somehow not very important. Kind of like: shrug, sure, we already knew that; back to more important things, like what can I do to make some meaning out of my life.)
Less boldly: We can only think and speak about reality using the subject-predicate form.
Hence: the form of a belief is propositional (since a belief is a part of reality). The form of a languageless belief is propositional (since a languageless belief is a part of reality), though its content (unknown perceptions, thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations) are non-propositional (because they are an unknown and can't be apprehended).
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 08:41#6463610 likes
(I'm making an attempt to synthesize Banno's and Moore's definition of a proposition.)
To clear up my own confusion: especially as regards form and content.
The form of reality is propositional: subject-predicate.
A proposition (what is apprehended in a statement) must have some known content. Otherwise, nothing can be apprehended.
Without some known content nothing can be apprehended. If a proposition is what is apprehended in a statement, and nothing can be apprehended, we aren't dealing with a proposition.
That portion of reality called the unknown is non-propositional because its contents are unknown and some contents of a proposition (what is apprehended in a statement) must be known. Otherwise, nothing can be apprehended and there is no proposition.
Harry HinduJanuary 22, 2022 at 16:01#6464500 likes
There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true.
I'm not sure that I see the difference. To hold a belief would be the same as the act of believing. I'm sure that we can agree that there are beliefs that we acknowledge as existing without holding them as true (believing). In these cases we would hold them as false (disbelief) or indifferent (we just don't know if the belief is true or false). The reason why we have debates is because we agree in the existence of many beliefs, but their truth value is what we are debating.
I would say: an attitude that can be put into the form of a proposition. But I'm not sure. I'm just following along.
Redundant and not helpful. Then it appears that, like Banno, you have no idea what you're talking about either when you say that belief is an attitude towards some proposition or something that can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.
You might say: A belief is a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and you might tack on a behavioral pattern (which in some cases would include language).
So a belief has nothing necessarily to do with attitudes and propositions? Its not a trick question. I'm just trying to reconcile what you are saying now with what you have said before.
I'm not sure if even this is helpful. Are there any thought, emotional and behavioral patterns that are not beliefs? If so, then what kind of thought, emotional and behavioral patterns are beliefs compared to ones that are not beliefs? How would I tell the difference between a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that is a belief and a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that isn't a belief?
Without recruiting scribbles or sounds (even noetic scribbles or sounds) a proposition takes this form: subject-predicate.
And what form do subject-predicates take, if not scribbles or sounds?
Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?
The subject-predicate form can be apprehended - held in the mind - reflected upon - in the total absence of scribbles and sounds (even noetic scribbles and sounds).
What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds? To say that they are held in the mind or reflected upon just means that you're talking to yourself in your head. You hear a voice saying the words and the sound is the form the proposition takes in your mind.
It's much easier to do this with the help of scribbles and sounds. That's probably why we invented them.
Yes, it is much easier to symbolize complex experiences for thinking and especially for communicating. We can think of democracy without words. It would be picturing in your mind people voting, candidates making promises for your vote, counting votes, etc.
This is also how using words can be redundant. If you and I are staring out the window at the rain, you can say, "It is raining." Because I can see that it is raining, hearing you say it would be redundant information. So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 16:46#6464690 likes
This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language
— Banno
Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way?
— creativesoul
Of course we can be wrong.
We can be wrong without knowing in what way we can be wrong.
Undoubtedly, it is quite possible(probable even) to be wrong without knowing in what way. However, discussing some of the ways that we can be is not impossible, and I find it necessary for understanding all belief, from the language less about events to those about events including language use through those about belief and language use itself.
If it's certainty you're looking for you had better start with ascription. Otherwise, you'll have to begin with an inference or assumption: there are languageless creatures who hold languageless beliefs.
I granted that we ascribe beliefs to language less creatures because we do, and I like to work from agreement. That was one.
We could also 'start' with an assumption or inference, but I'm not keen on saying that we're starting this endeavor with any of those suggestions. Afterall, we are where we are in this discussion as a result of a long history of socially constructed narratives, and without such a history the words we're using would be meaningless. The starting point of belief formation, if there is such a thing(it sounds wrong as a result of belief having no spatiotemporal location) is none of the three suggestions.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2022 at 18:11#6465010 likes
There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true.
— creativesoul
I'm not sure that I see the difference.
As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2022 at 18:16#6465040 likes
To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said.
I've no issue talking in terms of belief being about something.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2022 at 18:20#6465050 likes
when taken account of with naming and describing practices.
— creativesoul
I don't think you need this bit. I don't think the naming and taking account play a role.
Denying the role of naming and descriptive practices seems to miss the boat entirely.
From whence comes propositional form, if not as a direct result from naming and descriptive practices?
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 18:29#6465090 likes
While you both seem fine with not incorporating meaning into this discussion concerning the content and form of language less belief, I'm not. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it. So, it seems to me that meaning is always a part of belief.
creativesoulJanuary 22, 2022 at 18:53#6465200 likes
I'm not sure what you're doing here recently. The quality of your contributions has taken a sudden slide downhill... Too bad.
I'm sorry you feel that way. It's likely that we just disagree. I won't be hurt if you step away from the exchange. I'm only here for fun and intellectual stimulation.
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 19:40#6465360 likes
"The cup is in the cupboard" is a statement (dropping the word proposition, which seems to be causing difficulty). .
What would make it a belief?
Isn't it that someone holds it to be true? It becomes a belief when Fred thinks that the cup is in the cupboard; when Fred thinks that the statement "The cup is in the cupboard" is true.
The proposition is not a belief on it's own. Beliefs are held by individuals or groups; hence a belief is a particular relation between a statement and an individual, such that the individual holds the statement to be true.
The individual has an attitude towards the statement such that they take the statement to be true.
Without the attitude, the statement cannot be a belief.
There are other attitudes one might adopt. One might know that the cup is in the cupboard; one might doubt it; one might be certain; one might wonder if it is so. Each represents a relation between an actor and a state of affairs.
So, what was it you thought problematic about attitudes?
It seems worth pointing out that there is not a lot that hangs on the word "propositional" in "propositional attitude". It's an historical term, coming form a time somewhat prior to the analytic criticism of proposition, and can be readily replaced by "statement" if one prefers. I'm using it because it is a standard term.
The very first line of the SEP article on belief is: Quoting SEP
Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 20:07#6465430 likes
To my view, it's more accurate to invite a little of Moore's definition into the mix: a proposition is "the sort of thing which is apprehended" in a statement. (In his example the statements are "twice two are four" and "twice four are eight" and the proposition is "the [ ] thing which is apprehended" in those two statements.)
Do you see an issue with this?
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 20:13#6465470 likes
We do have a pretty good notion of how to use propositions or statements. Their grammar is a commonplace, and is well set out in first order logic. While there are any number of problems with reports of propositional attitudes, these result form iteration, and I don't think they pose any direct problems here.
Propositions are [ ] what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni"...
What would you say "is common between" these three statements apart from what can be apprehended in them?
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 20:32#6465590 likes
As foundational as they are to this kind of discourse, it seems important to know exactly what a proposition is.
Moore wants to center on what is apprehended in a statement. This makes sense to me: the proposition isn't the words or a statement but rather what is apprehended in a statement.
Banno wants to eschew definitions and focus on how propositions are used.
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 20:50#6465690 likes
This makes sense to me: the proposition isn't the words or a statement but rather what is apprehended in a statement.
Only thing is, if I ask you what the "what" is, in "what is apprehended in a statement", what is your answer? A proposition? Then the definition is circular. A possible state of affairs? then you've given me nothing that is not found in statements.
Again, the way we can use propositions and statements is set out for us in the predicate calculus - in first order logic. It's not complete, it has it's own issues, but it is better than anything set up here.
Reply to ZzzoneiroCosm See edit: How does your account of propositions as "existents doing things" deal with "Unicorns do not exist". Your existent - the unicorn - does not exist; is doing not existing.
Compare the simple first order version: for all x, x is not a unicorn.
SO again, why bother trying to invent a new theory when we have a more than adequate grammar already?
@ZzzoneiroCosm, Have a read of the SEP article you yourself cited, immediately after the piece you quote. It ends with:
Moore’s doubts led him to postulate what appear to be merely possible facts as the objects of the propositional attitudes. When a subject believes that x is F and x is not F, the object of belief is the non-existent but possible fact that x is F. See section below for further discussion of possible facts and their relations to propositions.
Hence the modal notion of propositions as possible facts. that might suit your needs better. I won't disagree with it.
Edit: This also shows how the notion of propositional attitudes led to a better understanding of propositions... it was Moore's consideration of propositional attitudes that led him to the modal approach. So a possible state of affairs is a suitable content for knowledge, for hope, for doubt, as well as for belief.
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 23:32#6466030 likes
How does your account of propositions as "existents doing things" deal with "Unicorns do not exist". Your existent - the unicorn - does not exist; is doing not existing.
I see what you're saying.
It's actually my account of the form of propositions. I'll have to think it over and try again.
"Unicorns only exist in the imagination" is more accurate than "unicorns do not exist." They do exist, but only in the imagination. Of course, that raises other issues. :)
Deleted UserJanuary 22, 2022 at 23:33#6466050 likes
It seems worth pointing out that there is not a lot that hangs on the word "propositional" in "propositional attitude". It's an historical term, coming form a time somewhat prior to the analytic criticism of proposition, and can be readily replaced by "statement" if one prefers. I'm using it because it is a standard term.
Can you clarify this?
How can the word "propositional" in "propositional attitude" be replaced by the word "statement"? The former is an adjective, the latter is a noun and the substitution would read: "statement attitude".
I'm not sure if that's really what you meant.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 03:18#6466700 likes
Reply to ZzzoneiroCosmAn attitude towards a statement instead of an attitude towards a proposition. Or if you prefer, an attitude towards a possible state of affairs.
Point being, choose whatever you like. It's of little relevance to the thrust of the discussion. A side issue.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 03:31#6466730 likes
If possible worlds are understood in this way, however, it is important to distinguish two meanings for talk of ‘the actual world’. This may refer either to the totality of what exists, to what Lewis calls “I and all my surroundings”, or to the maximal consistent set which includes all the true propositions. The latter is part of I and all my surroundings, but only a proper part.
Do you know what the word "proper" signifies in the last clause? Looks like a technical usage but I'm not sure how to look it up.
I think it is a subset that does not include all of the elements of the set in question. So {A,B} is a proper subset of {A,B,C}; but not a proper subset of {A.B}.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 03:42#6466770 likes
I think it is a subset that does not include all of the elements of the set in question. So {A,B} is a proper subset of {A,B,C}; but not a proper subset of {A.B}.
6m
Thanks :smile:
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 06:25#6467040 likes
Only thing is, if I ask you what the "what" is, in "what is apprehended in a statement", what is your answer? A proposition? Then the definition is circular. A possible state of affairs? then you've given me nothing that is not found in statements.
If you ask me what is apprehended in a statement I might say: information of one kind or another.
Then I could say: the content of a proposition is information.
I know you want to reduce it to its usage and say we know how to use propositions and that's that.
Do you think it's a mistake to ask what a proposition is? What is its form and how does it have content?
Modal logic, fascinating as it may be, is too much for me. I don't have the time or aptitude.
I'm taking a less dilletantish look at the Tractatus. The language is beautiful. Thanks for your help.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 07:30#6467150 likes
Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.
"unicorns do not exist",
This distinction between a statement and a proposition is what I'm looking at.
Is the statement "unicorns do not exist" of the same order as "the present King of France does not exist"?
If I say "the present King of France does not exist" have I said something true or something nonsensical?
In short: Is "the present King of France does not exist" a proposition?
Harry HinduJanuary 23, 2022 at 12:55#6467490 likes
As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so.
Then the belief exists before holding some string of scribbles as true, but you've only explained the truth value of the statement, not the belief.
Propositions are in the form of scribbles or sounds and are determined to be true if the scribbles represent what is the case.
As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?
Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words? In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs. Like ZzzoneiroCosm, you are only describing how you can put beliefs into a propositional form after the fact of having a belief.
I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into.
The fact that propositions are scribbles and sounds and obtained visually and audibly, how did the cat obtain the state-of-affairs of the mouse being behind the tree if not visually and audibly (saw it run behind the tree and it can hear it behind the tree)?
So i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed.
What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?
Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language? If so, then you can hold beliefs as true prior to knowing how to create propositions.
Harry HinduJanuary 23, 2022 at 13:07#6467520 likes
What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu
The form of images or memories of objects, sensations, emotions, feelings, and their relationships.
I think you're confusing the form the subject-predicate (proposition/statement) takes with the form the belief takes. Going back to what you said about beliefs being put into the form of a proposition, I explained that there is a temporal separation between the belief as it exists and the proposition as it exists, and that one is not the other. Instead one is the cause and one is the effect. Can you put into propositional form a belief that you don't have?
I'm muddling through this and now think the word attitude is problematic and should be dropped.
Instead, in regard to belief, I might say: a belief has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.
Nevermind the attitude.
But you just said that the proposition (subject-predicate) has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if belief and proposition are the same thing, the belief has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if you are agreeing that words are a particular type of image (scribbles), then the cat can believe the mouse is behind the tree using some other type of imagery and sensations. Therefore, propositions are not useful in describing beliefs because beliefs can be in the form of imagery that is not in the form of a proposition (scribbles).
What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu
So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.
— Harry Hindu
This seems to be you answering your question.
I was asking you to see if you agree. It appears that you do - that beliefs take the form of many types of sensations, not just sensations of scribbles and the sounds of spoken words. And that scribbles and sounds refer to those other images and sensations that are not scribbles and sounds, but are images of it raining outside and of a mouse running behind a tree.
I was really looking forward to an answer to this - the question that made Banno abandon our conversation and that you avoided: Quoting Harry Hindu
Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?
Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language?
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2022 at 15:54#6467810 likes
As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?
In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs.
In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, I'm saying that language is not necessary for holding the belief. I'm implying nothing at all with regard to whether or not the cat's belief is true, nor am I implying anything at all regarding whether or not the description of the cat's belief is true. What I'm saying is that if one believes there is a mouse behind the tree, and they are capable of reporting their own belief, then they will believe the statement is true as a result of believing there is a mouse behind the tree and knowing how to talk about it.
What I'm saying is that there is an actual distinction between what it takes to hold the belief and what it takes to hold the belief as true, or hold something to be true. There is an actual difference between holding a belief, and holding something to be true.
I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into.
Indeed.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2022 at 16:00#6467860 likes
...i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed.
No. Checking to see if a belief is true is checking on the belief. Checking on the belief is thinking about the belief. Thinking about the belief requires language.
A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2022 at 17:29#6468110 likes
To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said.
There are some crucial distinctions to be drawn and maintained when discussing belief.
If Jack wants to know what time it is, and he unknowingly looks at a clock that has stopped working at 3 o'clock, and by coincidence it was 3 when he looked, then Jack will believe it is 3 o'clock. But that's not the end of the story here regarding Jack's relevant belief, for belief is not equivalent to a single statement/proposition that can severed and isolated from the individual's worldview as a means for examination. That's what convention does and has done. It's been a mistake to do so, for beliefs are far more entwined with one another, and sometimes when we sever them, we do so at the peril of our own understanding. Russell's clock shows this well.
Jack also believed that that stopped clock was working, but clearly did not believe that "the stopped clock is working" is true. So, he did not have an attitude such that he held that proposition to be true, but he clearly must have believed that that clock was working, otherwise he could not have arrived at the belief that it was 3 o'clock. Change the time on the stopped clock in the example, and what I'm saying becomes undeniable.
This poses significant issues for the notion of belief as propositional attitude, for the belief when put into propositional form, would not be held as true by the believer. However, it would be if and when Jack became aware of his mistake(his own false belief). If it was pointed out to Jack, he would certainly agree that he had believed that the broken clock was working.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 17:37#6468120 likes
Jack also believed that that stopped clock was working, but clearly did not believe that "the stopped clock is working" is true.
If you say it this way, it works:
Jack believed that the clock was working and believed that "the clock is working" is true. Your insertion of the adjective 'stopped' muddies the waters: it adds a perspective: it adds the perspective of some X that knows the clock is stopped.
(Again, I won't be hurt if you don't want to engage. If I can't play with others I'm content to play with myself :sweat: )
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 17:43#6468140 likes
But you just said that the proposition (subject-predicate) has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships.
Form is being used in two ways in this discussion:
I've said:
The form of a proposition is: subject-predicate.
and
A languageless proposition takes the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships.
In the second statement the expression "takes the form" is confusing in light of the previous usage of the word "form." It might be clearer to say: the content of a languageless proposition is images....etc
But I'm not sure it's correct to say a proposition has content.
I'm backing up until I understand what a proposition is.
I'm still a bit confused about it, namely whether it's correct to try to divide it into form and content. Something circular might be happening there.
In short, I don't think I have much to contribute to your more in-depth discussion.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 17:53#6468180 likes
A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true.
Here you make a knowledge claim about the psychology of the cat. You say: I know that the mind of a cat is such that it's unable to check on a belief.
That's speculative animal psychology presented as knowledge.
I'm beginning to think it's a mistake to talk about the minds of languageless creatures as though we have knowledge of them; as though things can be said about them. It might be more appropriate to have recourse to silence here.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2022 at 17:54#6468200 likes
We are thinking about belief here. So, the meta-perspective is par for the course. It's not a flaw, it's a feature of our doing so. We can know that Jack's belief is false without Jack knowing it. Moore's paradox is also relevant here, for the exact same reasons. The task at hand is an accurate accounting practice of another's belief. When another's belief is false, they do not - cannot - know that much. We can.
That said...
Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working?
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 17:56#6468210 likes
Would you like to see the basic ontological arguments/framework grounding the claims regarding language less belief? We were heading there earlier, but then you changed your line of pursuit. No problem from here. You're free to do as you please, of course.
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2022 at 18:04#6468250 likes
Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working?
— creativesoul
I see what you're saying...
Do you see that I've just negated the notion of Jack's belief being equivalent to Jack's attitude towards that belief, when that belief is put into propositional form?
:smirk:
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 18:08#6468290 likes
Do you see that I've just negated the notion of Jack's belief being equivalent to Jack's attitude towards that belief, when that belief is put into propositional form?
Yeah, I see that. It's clear.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 18:09#6468310 likes
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 18:18#6468350 likes
Reply to creativesoul Thanks. Is this your own work or is it something from the canon? If it's your own work, what philosophers influenced this?
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2022 at 18:27#6468380 likes
My own...
Influence? The scope is far too broad to say. Some influence is unknown as well.
:wink:
There are arguments made throughout that thread. It's been quite a while since I've read it, but I am confident that the outline could be put to good use here, for I'm rather certain that it's past use has influenced my contributions.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 18:30#6468400 likes
Reply to ZzzoneiroCosm You beat me to it! Of course Jack didn't know the clock was stopped. So he didn't believe a stopped clock was working, he believed a clock was working.
Jack believed that the clock was working and believed that "the clock is working" is true. Your insertion of the adjective 'stopped' muddies the waters: it adds a perspective: it adds the perspective of some X that knows the clock is stopped.
(Again, I won't be hurt if you don't want to engage. If I can't play with others I'm content to play with myself :sweat: )
?ZzzoneiroCosm
You beat me to it! Of course Jack didn't know the clock was stopped. So he didn't believe a stopped clock was working, he believed a clock was workin
I made the same observation a while ago.
Deleted UserJanuary 23, 2022 at 23:32#6469220 likes
For me propositions are just abstract representations resulting from metalinguistic analysis on the truth-functionality of our descriptive statements. So there are no “propositions” as mind-independent entities, nor as original bearers of truth values. Since propositions for me require developed human linguistic skills then they can not constitute the content of perceptions.
Hi there. I've been enjoying reading your clear and detailed commentary on the debate.
This subject is fascinating but I don't know a lot about it. I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition is. I was looking at Moore's explanation:
In the one case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice two are four; in the other case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice four are eight… Now by a proposition, I mean the sort of thing which is apprehended in these two cases…. I hope it is plain that there certainly are such things as propositions in this sense.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/
Your definition seems clear to me. If you have time I would like to ask you a few questions about your understanding of a proposition.
Can you explain in what way your explanation of a proposition (bolded above) is similar to and different from Moore's explantion?
Is it correct or reasonable to say a proposition has a form and a content?
In understanding a proposition, is it important to draw a distinction between the statement and what is apprehended in the statement?
Thank you! :smile:
creativesoulJanuary 23, 2022 at 23:37#6469230 likes
I am denying that it makes sense to say that Jack believed a stopped clock was working, because there is a fatal ambiguity in that way of describing the situation. Jack believed, or better, simply assumed in that moment, that the clock was not stopped. If he was asked whether he believed the clock was running, and if he was a sensible fellow, he would say "Give me a minute or so and I'll tell you".
Was the clock he believed to be working not stopped?
As I said he just assumed in that moment, in passing, that the clock had not stopped. So, I don't think it is really accurate to say that he believed the clock was working, because if he had thought about it, he probably would have realized that he couldn't know it was working unless he hung around for a bit to check. So there is "believing", and then there is believing, so to speak.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2022 at 00:22#6469350 likes
I don't think it is really accurate to say that he believed the clock was working, because if he had thought about it
There it is!
If he had thought about his belief that that particular clock was working...
Why would he do that? He wasn't engaged in a metacognitive endeavor. He was wondering what time it was. We do not go around second guessing such things as whether or not all our clocks are running when we look to them to know what time it is. We believe that they're working, unless there is some blatant-in-our-face-reasons to doubt that.
Where's the ambiguity? We're talking about a particular clock, a particular person, and a particular belief that that person has about that particular clock.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2022 at 01:04#6469490 likes
When we want to know what time it is, and we look towards a clock to tell us the answer, we believe that that clock is telling us the right time. We believe that that clock is running. If that clock is broken, we believe that a broken clock is telling us the right time.
We do not know that that clock is broken. We do not believe that that clock is broken. We believe that that broken clock is telling us the right time.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2022 at 01:09#6469520 likes
For Pete's sake...
If we knew it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!
If we believed it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!
We believed it was telling us the right time, because we believed that that particular stopped clock was working!
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2022 at 01:29#6469690 likes
Are you saying that Jack did not believe that the stopped clock was working?
You're playing with substitution in an intensional (with the "s" - non-extensional...) context.
One cannot guarantee that substituting coreferential terms within belief statements, or other propositional attitudes preserves truth value. Lane believed that Superman has X-ray vision, but not that Kent had X-ray vision.
You are going to have to do some work to get your head around the relation between intension and intention.
D2OTSSUMMERBUGJanuary 24, 2022 at 01:58#6469840 likes
Reply to fdrake "To quite the contrary, it's always about the mouse, the tree, and the spatiotemporal relation between them; none of which are propositions." - @creativesoul
I didn't track far along the thread but from the first argument:
As you can break down your content of belief, so can I the proposition - that a certain statement about either the mouse, the tree, or the spatiotemporal relation is true or false - and as far as your atomization of content can go so can the proposition.
The interesting part that you mentioned is that belief does not require naming, but does proposition? I don't know.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2022 at 04:44#6470370 likes
The simplest explanation is the best, assuming there is no loss in explanatory power.
What I've presented here is as easily understood as it is explained. It's true and verifiable. It is impossible to believe that it's three o'clock after having looked at a clock that says so without believing that that clock is working. The same holds good of looking at and believing stopped clocks.
Deleted UserJanuary 24, 2022 at 05:08#6470450 likes
I see no reason to suppose that in order to have a belief one must be aware of the fact that they do. Not all belief anyway. Let's say Jack became aware of how he had luckily arrived at his true belief that it was three o'clock by virtue of having the fact that he believed that that stopped clock was working explained to him in those terms. If asked, he would certainly agree that he had believed that that particular stopped clock was working. How else would he come to believe that it was three o'clock after looking at it?
I'm just at a complete loss to explain how any objection to this makes sense in light of what I've put forth here. It's as if the simplest of adequate explanations for some of the simplest beliefs can no longer be understood as a result of placing far too much unquestioned faith in some of the conventional accounting (mal)practices historically and currently used for taking an account of belief.
We can and do have some beliefs without knowing that we do...
Harry HinduJanuary 24, 2022 at 14:11#6471300 likes
Form is being used in two ways in this discussion:
I've said:
The form of a proposition is: subject-predicate.
and
A languageless proposition takes the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships.
In the second statement the expression "takes the form" is confusing in light of the previous usage of the word "form." It might be clearer to say: the content of a languageless proposition is images....etc
But I'm not sure it's correct to say a proposition has content.
It would help if you just stopped avoiding my question and answer it. What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?
I'm backing up until I understand what a proposition is.
But I thought you were asserting that a proposition is a subject and predicate. I've been saying that a proposition is scribbles or the sound of spoken words, or braille, or the movement of hands in sign language. It's like we're arguing whether or not the table is made of atoms or molecules. What is the table made of - atoms or molecules? What is a proposition made of - scribbles and sounds or subjects and predicates?
I'm still a bit confused about it, namely whether it's correct to try to divide it into form and content. Something circular might be happening there.
In short, I don't think I have much to contribute to your more in-depth discussion.
You can contribute an answer to my question above that I've asked several times now and you've avoided it. It makes me think that you aren't interested in being intellectually honest.
Does a table take the form of an arrangement of atoms, or is the content of the table an arrangement of atoms? What state-of-affairs are you trying to show is the case? Is there a difference?
Harry HinduJanuary 24, 2022 at 14:39#6471330 likes
As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?
— Harry Hindu
Correlations.
What form do correlations take? Correlations between what?
In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, I'm saying that language is not necessary for holding the belief. I'm implying nothing at all with regard to whether or not the cat's belief is true, nor am I implying anything at all regarding whether or not the description of the cat's belief is true. What I'm saying is that if one believes there is a mouse behind the tree, and they are capable of reporting their own belief, then they will believe the statement is true as a result of believing there is a mouse behind the tree and knowing how to talk about it.
What I'm saying is that there is an actual distinction between what it takes to hold the belief and what it takes to hold the belief as true, or hold something to be true. There is an actual difference between holding a belief, and holding something to be true.
You're confusing the belief with the report/statement of the belief. Are we checking if the belief is true, or the report of the belief is true? Do we believe a belief is true, or do we believe a report of a belief is true?
What does it mean to believe something if not to have some degree of certainty (that something is true as opposed to false)? What does it mean to hold a belief - that you acknowledge that the belief exists, is true, have it in your hands, or what?
Saying that there is a difference is different than showing the difference. I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true? Can you hold things to be true that are not beliefs? If so, then describe the difference between holding beliefs to be true and holding other things to be true.
All I'm getting from you and Banno is a lot of words but no examples to show what you mean.
No. Checking to see if a belief is true is checking on the belief. Checking on the belief is thinking about the belief. Thinking about the belief requires language.
A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true.
Thinking does not require language. It requires images, sounds, feelings, etc., of which language is a part of (scribbles and voices). You need language to report a belief, not check a belief. You need observations to check a belief.
creativesoulJanuary 24, 2022 at 15:15#6471400 likes
The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.
The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true.
Deleted UserJanuary 24, 2022 at 18:45#6471900 likes
In other words: your statement about Jack's belief is incorrectly formulated because it elides the mental parameters of Jack's belief.
Belief is, at least in part, a psychological thing: to be accurate, the formulation of a person's belief must be to some extent informed by his perceptions.
Deleted UserJanuary 24, 2022 at 22:54#6472740 likes
... and ideas.
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 01:03#6472870 likes
Again, it makes me think of Skinner: your formulation treats Jack like an X, an empty variable, instead of like a person with a mental life (with views, perspective, perception, thoughts, etc.)
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 04:19#6473320 likes
eh
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 05:54#6473550 likes
The floor is mine: exeunt all but Zzz and every night playground has a recess of ghosts to sing and mingle with.
I'm on about Jack still so I'll put this here. Jack is a lubricating friend. (Gay daygadfly still choking.)
Jack believes a stopped clock is working.
A first question: What does Jack know about his belief? A second question: What does your account of Jack say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?
To my view the two should match. If the two fail to match something must be amiss in your account as there can be nothing amiss in what Jack knows about his belief. Only in the denotations, connotations and suggestions of your account (languge can be very - suggestive) can there be something amiss.
So:
What does Jack know about his belief?
He knows there is a clock.
What does your account say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?
He knows there is a stopped clock.
No match.
So: The word 'stopped' should not be included in your account of Jack's belief.
It's tacked-on, extraneous, and supports your argument. When you see something that looks tacked-on, extraneous, at the center of an argument it's wise to beware of that thing. The words want to play games and we want to play with them.
Since this is to no one and no one will ever read it I want to say that this is about wisdom not about winning if this is philosophy we're at here I want to sit Marcus and Jack side-by-side and see if a philosophical dialogue can express a nobility of mind. Marcus is also a philosopher.
Agent SmithJanuary 25, 2022 at 06:32#6473590 likes
Since we're in belief territory, we're at liberty to believe anything we want (justification is about knowledge, not belief).
Ergo, I believe that the content of belief is not propositional!
Agent SmithJanuary 25, 2022 at 06:43#6473620 likes
JTB theory of knowledge:
S (a person) knows P (a proposition) iff
1. S believes P
2. P is true
3. P is justified
When (1) S believes P it means, for S, P is true or S thinks P is true.
The JTB theory of knowledge:
S knows P iff
1. S thinks P is true (S believes P)
2. P is true
3. P is justified
The content of belief is propositional for the simple reason that only propositions can be true.
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 07:02#6473700 likes
What is Jack's belief about? We have to say: A stopped clock.
Can Jack have a belief about a stopped clock if he doesn't know that he's looking at a stopped clock?
I've seen no good reason for denying that we can. Available evidence proves we do. I would venture to say that surveys would show us that it happens far too frequently to deny without sticking our heads in the sand.
Here's my question to anyone who denies this much...
What reasoning and/or justificatory ground could we possibly offer for doubting that we can look at a stopped clock and mistakenly believe that it is working? Surely, we do not surmise such a counterintuitive thought based upon the fact that we do not know it has stopped. That's makes no effin sense at all. As if we must know that a clock is not working in order to believe that it is?
That's patent nonsense. Reductio ad absurdum.
Jack believed that a stopped clock was working. His belief was about a stopped clock, despite the fact that he did not know it had stopped. We cannot say the same about ourselves...
Cue Moore's paradox...
The reason 'why' we can say that it is raining outside, and that another person does not believe it but we cannot say the same thing about ourselves is simple. We cannot know when we're mistaken unless the mistake is somehow pointed out to us and/or otherwise brought to our attention. It always takes another, in some way shape or form, to show us our mistakes. Another's explanation is necessary for us to become aware of our own false belief.
The first question: What does Jack know about his belief? A second question: What does your account of Jack say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?
To my view the two should match.
Are you saying that Jack should know that the clock is broken in order to believe it is working?
Surely not.
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 07:17#6473780 likes
The importance of rigid designators...
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 07:23#6473810 likes
Are you saying that Jack should know that the clock is broken in order to believe it is working?
No. I'm not.
I'm saying one thing:
Your account of Jack's belief should reflect what Jack knows about his belief.
If you disagree, that's okay. But my wording is what I mean and your wording isn't what I mean.
I'm comparing your account to what your account is said to be taking account of and saying your account isn't taking account of what your account is said to be taking account of.
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 07:24#6473830 likes
Some Trump followers believe a lie. They do not know that there was not wide-spread election fraud significant enough to have altered the outcome of the 2020 election. They believe there was. Their belief is false. We know this about their belief. They do not. Cannot. It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.
Believing that a stopped clock is working is no different in that regard. We can know Jack's belief is false. Jack cannot. The clock was stopped. His belief was about that stopped clock. He did not know it was stopped. Hence, otherwise he would not be able to believe that it was working.
It's not that difficult to understand...
Is it?
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 07:27#6473860 likes
Your account of what Jack knows about his belief should reflect what Jack knows about his belief.
Jack's belief is false. Jack does not know that. My account of what Jack knows about his belief does reflect what he knows about his belief, as well as what he doesn't.
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 07:29#6473870 likes
Who in this case knows the sky is actually red? It's the omniscient narrator. Why should the omniscient narrator be included in an account of Mary's belief?
Adding that adjective just seems to dizzy up the logic so I think it's a mistake. It's a fun puzzle. :smile:
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 08:06#6473990 likes
I'd be interested in seeing some sort of logical argument from you that supports the otherwise gratuitous assertions. I've already provided the same.
I'm sure you know more about the burden of proof than I do. If you want to include this tricky adjective in your account of Jack's belief, is the burden on me to prove you shouldn't? Or is the burden on you to justify the inclusion?
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 08:08#6474000 likes
Adding that adjective just seems to dizzy up the logic...
That's one way to put it. It's not the job of common language to take proper account of propositional logic. If common language talks about things that propositional logic is incapable of, then we ought not fault the common language, for common language is not the accounting practice that has been found lacking...
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 08:10#6474010 likes
I'm sure you know more about the burden of proof than I do. If you want to include this tricky adjective in your account of Jack's belief, is the burden on me to prove you shouldn't? Or is the burden on you to justify the inclusion?
I'm the one making the positive assertion. The burden of proof is mine. Should you say I'm wrong, the burden of showing how is on you. I've more than satisfied my burden.
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 08:15#6474020 likes
The position I've been putting forth spans several branches.
And the implications?
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 08:33#6474090 likes
The scope of possible rightful application would be any and all claims and/or positions that are about human thought and belief, and any and all claims based upon those.
Scope could not be much broader.
The implications become known only as a result of critically assessing the aforementioned positions in light of what I've been arguing. I've done much of the work already here, in this thread. Moore. Gettier. Russell. All three simplified while adding some much needed clarity. Occam's razor applies.
creativesoulJanuary 25, 2022 at 08:52#6474130 likes
The content of belief is propositional for the simple reason that only propositions can be true.
If that is the case, then it is also the case that either language less creatures cannot have belief or propositions do not need language. Seems to me that a proposition is what is being proposed. We always propose things using language. So, holding that the content of belief is propositional leads one to the conclusion that language less creatures cannot have belief.
That conclusion is false. Language less animals can have belief. So...
Either propositions do not require language, which they do, or it is not the case that belief content is propositional. It is not the case that all belief content is propositional.
Agent SmithJanuary 25, 2022 at 08:59#6474160 likes
I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true
— Harry Hindu
Read the opening and second posts in the debate.
There is no part in the entire debate that explains the difference between holding something to be true and holding a belief.
Who decided that it would be a good idea for you and Banno to debate this topic? There is no debate when the debaters constantly talk past each other. Quoting creativesoul
The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.
The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true.
:roll: Look up the definition of "believe", creative, and you will find that it means to hold something to be true which means that propsitions are not necessary to hold something as true.
What use is holding a belief?
Do we agree that scribbles are images? If you can hold some images to be true, why not other images - like a mouse behind the tree? You're making a special case for certain images as holding truth. Why?
I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition
The philosophical debate about propositions starts (or should start) from some strong intuitions that should be readily acknowledged by all competent speakers. That doesn’t mean that they are rationally justified, it simply means that philosophical accounts are supposed to neither deny nor underestimate the strength of these intuitions, but to take them as a starting point for their analysis and explanations. Here are at least some strong intuitions:
1. All the following statements say “the same” in different languages:
That apple is on the table (in English)
La pomme est sur la table (in French)
Der Apfel ist auf dem Tisch (in German)
2. All the following statements are about “the same” based on name/description coreference (I.e. “that red apple” and “that Fuji apple” co-refere to the same apple):
That red apple is on the table
That Fuji apple is on the table
3. All the following statements report different types of attitude from different subjects toward “the same”:
Jim sees that apple is on the table
Sally states that apple is on the table
Jack believes that apple is on the table
Cindy does not believe that apple is on the table
Billy hopes that apple is on the table?
Alice orders that apple should be on the table
4. In any belief ascription (e.g. “Jack believes that apple is on the table”), what the belief is about is “the same” as what the statement (related to the belief ascription’s subordinate clause) is about (e.g. “that apple is on the table”)
What is “the same” in all 4 strong intuitions? “Propositions” some/many/most philosophers say, but this is a theory-laden notion and it depends on the theory of proposition one supports (I would suggest you to read Frege’s “Sense and reference” to have a better grasp on the issue).
I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition
Well, I’m not very familiar with his views (which he also revised over time) so I’m not sure how to answer. As far as I’ve understood, Moore initially takes propositions to be mind-independent abstract entities (a view that was probably inspired by Frege’s views) that constitute the objects of our thoughts and the meanings of our statements. My understanding of meaning (in semantics) is highly influenced by Wittgenstein’s views (as reported in his “Philosophical Investigations”), so for me meanings are not mind-independent abstract entities, but rules that present themselves in the course of actual and contextual linguistic practices: this implies that meanings are neither mind-independent, nor practice independent, besides they are not “objects” of thought since they regulate how we think about “objects”, they kind of operate in our thinking when we think more than being things that we consult in order to think.
So “proposition” for me is just a notion that we use for an a-posteriori semantic/logic formalisation of our language, in the same way we use the notion of “name” and “verb” for an a-posteriori grammar formalisation of our language.
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 16:57#6475100 likes
Which version most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes?
He does not believe the propositional form of the belief that he actually holds about a broken clock. That's the whole point of showing how that practice fails. Hence, the earlier allusion to Moore's paradox...
Okay folks, it's been a fun couple weeks, but I've got more productive things in life to do. Will be spending much much less time around here.
Be well to all...
:flower:
Deleted UserJanuary 25, 2022 at 17:25#6475260 likes
That gives me a nice place to start. I'll have a look at Sense and Reference.
creativesoul's ideas about belief ascriptions sound not only preposterous (and justifiably so for me), but also very dangerous: e.g. imagine some christian reported the belief of a high muslim mufti as “he believes that Allah is Jesus” because christians take Jesus to truly co-refere to god. And it doesn't matter if christians' religious beliefs are truly true, because as long they believe they are, they are allowed to make belief ascriptions the way creativesoul is suggesting. Indeed belief ascriptions are second order beliefs, and also description/name coreference is matter of belief, that is why we can't simply overlook de dicto belief ascriptions. De re belief ascriptions, are only apparently so, and when we use them appropriately this becomes more evident.
We cannot conclude Jack believed that the Fuji apple was on the table - he might have thought it a Jonathan. We cannot always substitute into belief statements and preserve their truth value.
...for the belief when put into propositional form, would not be held as true by the believer.
What Creative put into propositional form is not Jack's belief. Jack believed that: the clock was working; Jack believed that: the clock showed 3:00 o'clock. The clock was broken. Because we cannot substitute within the scope of a belief statement salva veritate, it is not implied that Jack believed the broken clock was broken.
The supposed criticism of the propositional structure of belief is muddled.
Comments (1442)
Looks interesting for far. Last sentence sums things up fairly well, imo.
But, when used to define belief, the two senses of the word are alike in appearing (superficially at least) to deny beliefs to cats, who are oblivious to either sense.
Very much yes. It's why I wanted the debaters to refine the sense of proposition before engaging in the debate.
If your sense of the proposition is like: so long as there exists a string of words which states the belief content at some point in time [hide=***] (up to logical equivalence)[/hide] then the belief content is propositional because it can be stated, then yes of course it's propositional.
But if your sense of the proposition has the modality associated with that italicised "can" be temporal - IE there are some beliefs in some organism, or some beliefs at some points in time which cannot be stated at that[hide=*] (or any accessible)[/hide] time, then no of course belief contents aren't always propositional.
I do not expect @creativesoul and @Banno to ever argue this crucial point regarding the modality of expression of belief statements in their debate, so I expect it to be a clash of worldviews without any interfacing - an exchange characterised by attempting to shift frames of interpretation for belief than regarding any thematisation of belief [hide=**] (the frame spelling out the nascent assumptions regarding belief that would be the substantive disagreement)[/hide]
Same with spiders and their amazing web construction:. they don't do it because they believe anything. They just do it.
Are humans any different? Symbolism is one of our hallmarks. The question is: did we have beliefs before we started expressing our beliefs in symbols?
I mean, it's possible that both things happened at the same time, right? Symbols, abstraction, not living in the moment just doing stuff by instinct?
Maybe only then would we be able to get a vantage point on our thoughts (separate the self from thoughts) so that I now have (own) thoughts and so own commitments (belief)?
Or maybe it wasn't ownership. Maybe it was 'The belief is upon me.'
Others assume that beliefs are real mental furniture, or real behavioural or systemic dispositions. Or real something. They need to liberate them (the beliefs) from language in order to be able to grant them to cats without having to anthropomorphize.
Do they really believe beliefs are real?
The negation of "the present king of France is bald" is not just "the present king of France has hair", but "the present king of France has hair or there is no present king of France", which is true because there is no present king of France.
Also, I have not stopped beating my wife, because I never began beating my wife, because I've never had a wife.
And all my children are dead, yet I've never lost a child, because I've never had any children, and 100% of those zero children I've had are dead, while 0% of those zero children I've had have died.
Pragmatics is neither syntax nor semantics.
The underlying issue is that the subject term has no referent. Your comment is one proposal for handling such sentences.
That is, on Russell's view (and yours) the sentence entails that there is a present King of France. The entailment is false, therefore the sentence is false.
However on Peter Strawson's view (and my own and, I assume, Banno's), the sentence presupposes that there is a present King of France. The presupposition fails and so the sentence is not evaluable as either true or false. So the sentence does not express a proposition.
On a presuppositional view, one cannot evaluate a sentence as true or false when the subject term has no referent. For a programming analogy, to attempt to evaluate it is like attempting to dereference a null pointer.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Yes, so it's not enough that "the present king of France is bald" is grammatical and meaningful. There also needs to be a context such that it is evaluable.
What I meant was that the strict logical content of a sentence doesn't always include pragmatically implied information. Hence the examples about all of my zero children, etc, as well.
We wouldn't usually bother saying anything about the King of France unless we thought there was such a person, so saying something about him does pragmatically presuppose there is such a person (i.e. in saying it in practice, you're acting as though you think such a person exists), but that doesn't make the sentence have some kind of indeterminate truth value, because its strictly logical content can still be evaluated to false.
In the same way that "all of my children are dead" pragmatically implies that I have had some nonzero number of children, all of which have died, but strictly logically equates to "there does not exist any x such that x is my child and x is not dead", which is true because there does not exist any x such that x is my child.
The point here though is that we normally use a sentence to assert something about a (referring) subject. If there is no subject, then we can't be asserting something about one - so the question of whether our assertion is true or false does not arise. Thus the sentence has no use, except perhaps to deceive, or (as you note) in situations where we wrongly thought there was a subject. But that doesn't change the fact that there was no subject to assert something of.
The issue is, as Strawson puts it:
Quoting On Referring, p327 - Peter Strawson
Quoting Pfhorrest
Strawson has comments about the use of those kinds of sentences as well in "(c) The logic of subjects and predicates" on p343.
Anyway, just a different point of view to consider! The broader theme is discussed at SEP's Descriptions.
But words are just scribbles and sounds. Does a dog's bark or a dog's wagging tail qualify as a proposition?
Gosh.
"Subject" in the sense of grammatical [or logical] subject, a word or phrase (e.g. "snow" or "king of France") capable of referring to an object or subject-matter (snow or French king), but which is not itself, typically, what the sentence containing it is used to assert something about?
Or "subject" in the sense of a typically non-referring object or subject-matter (snow or French king) about which we use a sentence to assert something? ... Normally to the exclusion of referring to or asserting about any parts of the asserting sentence?
"Snow" or snow?
:up:
Quoting bongo fury
Snow. If I assert that the snow outside is white, then I am (purportedly) referring to snow outside and saying something about it. If there is no snow outside then that is a failure of reference. Hence, on Strawson's view, my assertion is neither true nor false (i.e., it's not truth apt).
It occurred to me tonight that while you cannot access the data in a null pointer, you can still evaluate the attempt to access it as true or false.
I mostly only do web programming, but in that domain there is an awful lot of testing for the existence of features along the lines . If there is no such object, or the object has no such method, evaluating "object.method" will return false.
So will result in nothing being done, because france.king.hairstyle is a null reference (since france has no such property as king) and so comparisons against it universally return false.
Plus the sentence could become truth apt (if we grant that sentences can be) if you named your dog 'The present king of France'
Still have to look to use to discern meaning. The meaning is the proposition (kind of).
Asserting that the snow outside is white isnt useful, as it is basically redundant information -as if snow could be another color. I don't know anyone that says such things, except in a philosophy forum.
But if you had said, "There is white snow on the ground outside", would that be any different? If there were no snow, then your sentence would be false, regardless of the color. Statements are either true (useful) or false (useless), not somewhere in between.
Yet A=A+1 still has meaning to both a computer and human being. Such statements produce real outcomes in both computers and human beings. Programmers often define instructions in a computer program as functions. Basically computational logic and propositional logic are just different sets of rules for using symbols. We can translate one set of rules to another. We do it all the time with different languages.
In this case, we have a statement/function that changes the definition of A, which is just a scribble that can mean anything at any moment we define it.
A=A+1 actually doesn't work in a computer program. You have to have A defined prior to this line in order for it to work. The A between the = and + actually means something else, so it's not a contradiction if you write the function correctly. So A=A+1 is actually only part of a statement/function, therefore is meaningless without A=1 before A=A+1.
Quoting Andrew M
Indeed. Deep and crisp and even. Not composed of four letters. So, just to be clear, this phrase,
Quoting Andrew M
was a typo?
There is the space-time region independent of our talking about it now (or whenever), sure.
Quoting creative soul
Language isn't needed to correlate the event (region) with others of the same (mouse-running-behind-tree) kind?
Because the cat shows it has drawn exactly or roughly this correlation?
Yes, that's a nice example where the language creators have designed it that way.
Whereas other programming languages don't permit null references at all, so that scenario can't arise.
With languages that do allow null references, one approach is to design classes that provide the appropriate context when instantiated. For example, by restricting the evaluation of a French King's baldness to those contexts where there is a French King. Which, in turn, simplifies reasoning about the code.
Quoting frank
Yes, it's not enough to look at the words in isolation, you also have to look at the context they are used in.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I'm making a comment about failure of reference. If that example doesn't work for you, then see the earlier "the present king of France is bald" example.
Quoting bongo fury
No, I meant it in the sense of "existing" or a successful reference, as opposed to a failure of reference (such as the present King of France).
It seems to me that you're describing a state of affairs. So in this case, the state of affairs (or the ways things are) is that the mouse ran behind the tree.
A state of affairs is, at least, like a proposition. But perhaps different in the sense that no-one needs to have stated or believed it. Presumably mice ran behind trees before humans emerged to notice that kind of thing. Another difference is that states of affairs obtain (or fail to obtain) rather than being true or false.
So, on your view, can the content of belief be a state of affairs?
And for Banno, would a state of affairs count as propositional?
Never heard of yellow snow? You can certainly have polluted snow which is brown or black. You could also pour food coloring on it. Snow cones are a thing.
It's like saying, "Water is H2O", which is only true in the pure sense. Water often has other things mixed in. It's something to keep in mind in these philosophical discussions. The real world is messy.
Sure, but for whom was the mouse behind the tree? A predator? The mouse? Certainly not the world. States of affairs are a bit tricky. They can contain hidden perspectives like "behind X".
Quite right. There's no view from nowhere.
LOL. Its not the snow that is yellow. Notice how you said there are other things mixed in. Those other things mixed in isnt snow. "Yellow snow" is simply lazy use of language. The snow wasn't yellow before you mixed something that isn't snow in.
Notice how yellow snow has more information than white snow because the former isn't redundant and the latter is.
Like I said, its a matter of some string of scribbles being useful or useless. Scribbles that fail to refer are useless scribbles, just as a dog's bark or the wagging of its tail must refer to something that isn't another bark or tail wag, or else the bark or wag of the tail wouldn't be very useful behaviors. Drawing scribbles that don't refer to anything isn't a useful behaviour. What else could Banno mean by saying that meaning is use? Words are used to refer. If you didn't use scribbles to refer, then you didn't use words. It is what distinguishes scribbles from words.
So, not
Quoting Andrew M
At all. Not, one instead of the other. Rather,
Something like,
Quoting Andrew M
A typo, then, but a different correction now?
I wonder if that would work as an argument against Davidson: we can't tell if a sentence is truth apt unless we know the context of utterance.
"S" is true IFF S
That may be nonsense?
What if the statement was made by a person that is hallucinating or delusional, or a habitual liar?
Depends I guess.
Good questions, but I'm unwilling to discuss the debate here and now, while it's still in process. I will say that the bit about "the way things are" was introduced by Banno. I merely obliged by arguing how my position does not result in denying that statements can be about the way things are. Some clearly are. I do prefer different terminology, but my preferences are usually set aside when discussing this stuff with Banno. I would not introduce "states of affairs" either.
Typo. (wish to attack?) Or unclear.
"The point here though is that we normally use a sentence to assert something about a subject (where the subject exists)."
Quoting frank
It's a rule (or definition) that states what it means for a statement to be true. We may not always correctly see how the rule applies. We might think that a particular statement is true that is not. Or we may think the rule applies in contexts where it doesn't.
But that's not a fault of the rule. It's just the fact of human fallibility even when we're being careful. So we develop pragmatic rules to help with that relating to the reasons/justifications for making assertions.
Truth is undefinable. IOW, if you don't know what it is, no one could explain it to you.
Quoting Andrew M
What does the T-sentence rule have to do with justifications? It's usually associated with deflation of truth.
Anyway, Banno needs to explain that beliefs are either true or false and make a case for his preferred truth bearer (whatever that is) and show that creative's candidate doesn't work.
If creative has chosen some sort of hardware event as his truth bearer, that's a fail.
So, just to be clear, do you at last see why
Quoting Andrew M
would have to be a typo?
Why the stubborn attachment to "subject" at all? Why not referent or object for snow, and term, word, phrase etc. for "snow"? Does a neo-Aristotelian perhaps need to equivocate systematically between the two senses?
Something to do with states of affairs having grammatical form?
That could explain the trouble it took to get you to examine the matter instead of presuming to lecture further.
On what? What if the speaker was referring to a dream or a fictional story? There are many instances where the present king of France is bald would be true. So it would appear that it depends on what is being talked about. Propositions are always ontological in the sense that they are about how things are or are not. They are epistemological in the sense that the symbols and rules we agree to use to refer how things are or are not, are arbitrary. We could just as well use barks and tail wags to represent some state of affairs as we could use scribbles and utterances.
What if the proposition was, "The present king of France is imaginary." Does that not change what we are talking about, even though we are still talking about the present king of France?
Does this not show that some propositions have terms that are not clearly defined, or have multiple definitions, and which one is being used isnt clear? Thats why I demand definitions for these nebulous terms.
Just like a computer program, variables need to be defined before you can perform functions with them. Scribbles need to be defined before they can be used.
Likely, when @Banno asserts that belief is always about states of affairs, this claim indicates a limited domain where beliefs are easily verifiable:
“If I were to say that belief is always about states of affairs, would you agree? Then it only remains to point out that a state of affairs can always be put in propositional form for us to see that beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form”. However, one can believe in God because one cannot know for sure that He exists. Similarly, one could believe in democracy, communism, climate change, etc. Here, knowledge has to be supplemented by belief; a belief emerges in order to compensate for the failure of knowledge. Even if knowledge and belief can assume the propositional form, they nonetheless express different manifestations of truth.
Beliefs are not about what can be put in propositional form. How beliefs are communicated is a seperate problem than what beliefs are. Seems like you have to solve the latter problem first before solving the prior problem.
Putting beliefs in propositional form is just another state of affairs that is not the state of affairs that the proposition is about. We can talk about talking, just as we can talk about anything.
If I believe that it is raining, there is my mental state that is expressed in belief. Yet, would my mental state be identifiable and recognizable if I could not understand and articulate it in a sentence “It is raining”? The existence of the statement has two propositional dimensions: ontological subjectivity and a completely objective fact.
Again, communicating beliefs is a seperate issue than having beliefs. Making sounds with your mouth is a behaviour that expresses your belief just as covering your head and running inside does.
As an observer of others, your only have access to their beliefs via their actions. Do you need to observe your own actions to know you have beliefs? Do you need to say, "it is raining." to have a belief that it is raining, or do you simply need to experience water falling from the sky to have the belief that it is raining? If simply stating it is raining means you have a belief that it is raining, then who needs water falling from the sky to believe that it is raining?
Tarski's definition is, admittedly, abstract. However Aristotle's definition was:
I could explain that if need be.
Quoting frank
Nothing. I mean we develop other (pragmatic) rules.
I don't. Feel free to say why you think so.
Quoting bongo fury
It's ordinary English. From Lexico:
subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
Very generous of you to explain correspondence theory to me, but it's wrong, Tarski knew it was wrong, and did not propose to define truth.
If you're referring to Tarski's undefinability theorem, then that's true for the object language, but not for metalanguages. And for that reason it doesn't apply to Aristotle's definition since, in effect, a metalanguage hierarchy is built in (i.e., statements presuppose a world but not vice-versa).
So subjects are nouns? Looks like objects and subjects are synonyms, unless you're saying that objects can't be discussed, described, or dealt with. :chin:
As far as I understand, your point is that our mental states are ultimately independent of the corresponding verbal expressions. This position fails to take account of the complex social and collective character of our beliefs. They are developed, shaped, and exercised within the networks of our interpersonal interactions. Can we reduce them to simple rituals and behavioural patterns, deprived of the signifying symbolic mechanisms?
Intentionality is the capacity of agents to have directed states towards things which are not themselves and for those states to have content regarding what the state is directed towards.
Eg, I grasp the cup; my body and mind are directed towards the cup in a specific way, to grasp it, to reach for its handle, to lift to to my mouth etc. This state is directed towards the cup. The content will include the location of its handle, the type of liquid in the cup, that the cup is to be grasped for drinking and so on. SEP characterises intentionality as:
I will call an instance of intentionality an intentional state. The state in the example was an example of an intentional state. I will call the content of an intentional state intentional content. IEP describes intentional content as such:
Summarised, then, intentional content is the character of the agent's intentional state, what kind of disposition is held - for what, for what purpose, what is felt and so on. [hide=*] (There are some issues here regarding "intentional objects" not being identical to worldly events; they might instead be representative mental states which regard them; but I shall assume that intentional objects can be worldly events)[/hide].
SEP gives "loving", "admiring" as examples of intentional states. They are thus marked by a few properties:
(1) Intentional states are relations between agents and some other domain; it might be an agent and an object (I grasp the cup), an agent and an agent (Sally loves Mary), an agent and some social institution (Robespierre was critical of monarchy), an agent and an abstraction (I believe 1+1=2) and so on. The agent comes in the first place in the relation, the other domain comes in the second place. [hide=**] (There are formulations that reverse the order, like Mary is loved by Sally, but that means the same thing as Sally loves Mary).[/hide]
(2) Intentional states are directional; logically and in terms of disposition. logically - Sally loves Mary doesn't mean Mary loves Sally - it might be unrequited and so on. Dispositionally, Sally's love of Mary is a disposition Sally has towards Mary; it has behavioural commitments, emotional resonances and so on.
(3) The relation ascribes some content to the relation which characterises the relation in terms of the agent; Sally loves Mary ascribes an understanding of love to Sally which she directs towards Mary. These contents coincide with the character of the disposition.
(4) The content ascribed is somehow a representation of the item of the other domain (the cup) that the agent (me) embodies.
For the remainder of the post, I will use "intentional state" to refer only to states which satisfy the first three properties. "Intentional content" will refer to the content of an intentional state with the above restriction. I'm doing this because I don't believe the dispute turns on the representational aspect of intentional states, and I believe it is contentious to claim that beliefs are representational.
I claim that belief is an intentional state in the weakened sense. This can be checked by going through the three items.
(1) The state of belief is directed towards some other domain; I believe 1+1=2, I believe my cup is on the table and so on. So belief satisfies (1).
(2) Belief is directional: I believe that 1+1=2 doesn't mean the same thing as 1+1=2 believes in me. Belief is also dispositional; I believe that 1+1=2 tells you an opinion I hold regarding 1,1 and 2 and engenders other commitments, things I will find obvious and so on. So belief satisfies (2).
(3) Belief has content: that I believe 1+1=2 has specificities to it, regarding the relationships of 1,1,+,= and 2 - I understand what role the terms play and how they relate, and in doing that I believe the statement. The specificities serve to explain the disposition I hold towards the statement as well as characterising my disposition.
At this point, it is worthwhile to take stock of what (1) to (3) demonstrate; the intentional content of my belief that 1+1=2 regards 1+1=2, the intentional content of my belief that my cup is on the table regards the cup on my table. In the latter case, I do not believe any item of language is on my table. What this shows, then, is that belief as an intentional state can be directed towards pretty much anything; there is no privileged domain of entities - like agents, statements, substances etc - that serve as the sole targets of belief understood as an intentional state. The important result is that belief can be directed towards things which are not items of language. So they need not, and typically do not, occur with accompanying statements. Statements expressing them them occur afterwards.
The phenomenology of intentional content is multifaceted; shapes, colours, textures, purposes, goals, moods, context all superimpose to give an agent's disposition in an action its character. Lois Lane's beliefs about Clark Kent are much different from her beliefs about Superman, despite that the two names co-refer.
Fleeting images, recollections and impressions stabilise into the emerging landscape of our interpretation of the world. It raises the question; does the intentional content of belief require any kind of linguistic expression to have its intentional content? In other words - does having intentional content require that it can be stated somehow? By whom and when?
An indicator that intentional content does not require a statement for it to have the character it does is that intentional states occur without being directed at statements; statements play no part in most beliefs we hold, except to express some of them afterwards. A strong indicator is that we can observe intentional behaviour in animals that do not have statements, concepts, or any of the social furniture we expect to surround opinion and belief, and they behave intentionally to such a degree that it is appropriate to attribute beliefs to them for explanatory purposes.
One attempt to sweep this line of questioning away would be: that the intentional content of belief is simply irrelevant to another sense of belief content which is propositional, but I do not believe this is the case. The intentional content of a belief is what makes it a belief and not any other dispositional state, and that can be seen by mucking with it. A statement of belief that some event is occurring is a commitment to the claim that it is occurring. Statements of the form "It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining" are weird. paradoxical even, and the intentional content of asserting that it is raining comes with the rider that the asserter believes that it is raining, because the act of asserting that it is raining in normal circumstances is rightly assumed to come along with the intentional state of believing the statement! The intentional content of belief is a necessary part of a statement of belief in its normal function.
Now we need to swerve into Banno's argument:
Very well!
There is a major tension between the lack of requirement for a belief's intentional content to be stated and Banno's requirement that the content of belief must be able to be stated. So let's examine it.
It seems the construal of "content" being propositional is that "that the event occurred can be stated". Let's focus on the modality and scope of that "can". Clearly agents have intentional content which they cannot state at the time the intentional state occurs for various reasons. That content could be fuzzy, temporary, weird, ultra specific, highly contextual, anomalous, idiosyncratic etc. To give an example from a detailed description of eye movement patterns when someone is looking into a box of teabags to pick one out to make tea: "during the search phase, subtask relevant teabag features are attentionally prioritised within the attentional template during a fixation" - "subtask relevant teabag features" are whatever aspects of the arrangements of teabags in that box of teabags which facilitate the belief that those teabag aspects are useful for using those teabags to make tea. At the time, the agent cannot articulate what teabag features promoted their actions. Notice that the agent's attention was drawn about the box without requiring any beliefs at the time towards statements of which teabag features were subtask relevant. In that respect, intentional content occurs irrespective of later translation into language. So there are circumstances where people have beliefs and they cannot be stated.
However, there is still the possibility that "can" has a much more ambitious scope; that there exists a statement, even if purely hypothetical and never uttered, which expresses that the belief occurred and its character. With this, we are quantifying over hypothetical objects that bear no relation to the context a belief is formed in and gains its character and content in. That seems sufficiently absurd to conclude the argument. If beliefs attain definite content absent the formation of statements which describe them at the time, why would the content of those beliefs depend upon hypothetical objects which are made later?
I am sure that there is a way to thread the needle there, to describe the sense of that modality without absurdity, but I don't see it in @Banno's argument. Yet anyway.
Sure, but notoriously ambiguous between conflicting senses as a technical term, if not clarified in favour of one or the other.
Quoting Andrew M
Sure, and I offered
Quoting bongo fury
in precisely this sense, which is the one you chose when offered a choice.
Fine. Other words for the same kind of thing are available, but that needn't matter, as long as we aren't confusing the two senses. Attachment to "subject" in preference to "object" or "referent" only seems suspect because of,
Quoting Andrew M
... which looks very much as though you are using the other, conflicting, sense of the word at the same time. Because, the only obvious reading of "(referring) subject" is to have it mean "word or phrase that refers".
This opposite sense is Strawson's, but he adopts it consistently and exclusively. He does discuss Russell's (further) distinction between grammatical subject and logical subject; but obviously both of these are "snow", and not snow. And we don't
Quoting Andrew M
either of them (the types of "snow"), but only about the snow.
It's hard to picture what sort of intentionality could be connected with uninterpreted data.
IOW, I think you're assuming that at some base level of awareness I know the brownish data is tea. Or that I believe it's tea?
Are latent portions of your worldview really down there in the hardware?
Imagine people from several different time periods observing the sky. Their beliefs about the sky are radically different. Is their base awareness of it different? If so, then I think this would be a significant threat to any sort of realism, which requires an uninterpreted realm as a platform for variation in belief.
I don't think it's uninterpreted, nor do I think it's interpreted in the manner we'd usually associate with words, essays, statements and so on. I think it relates to your thread on types of information; is semantic content restricted to words? Maybe not! The underlying ideas motivating my post were regarding salience as director of actions and as a driver of the formation of intentional content. Do you characterise intentionality as a property of already formed spaces of perceptual features and agents, or do you characterise it as guiding their formation?
That underlying theme could've been developed more, and I agree that it's a hole in the account.
My specific account? I don't know, I just hope I'm right. People's worldviews in general? I think so. Priors are a thing, it's rare that we find something we have no frame of interpretation for.
Correspondence is a mental activity. When you use words, you have a belief about how words are used. But what about when you need to use a screwdriver? Do you need words to use a screwdriver, or just the visual of someone using a screwdriver?
Social environments are just a type of natural environment. Sure, being raised by wolves as opposed to apes can have a drastic impact on how you interpret your environment, but we are actually talking about the various environmental niches that certain species fill in the environment. Different rules are required to accomplish different goals. Apes and wolves have different goals, but also similar goals. They both require food and mates, but different food and different mates. A wolf does not interpret an ape of the opposite sex as a thing to mate with. It interprets it as food, or a trespasser in its territory.
Any YouTube video about learning how to use a tool has a complement of verbal or finger-alphabet instructions. When one learns how to work with a screwdriver, she necessarily places herself into an already-given organized space where physical motions and bodily dispositions are combined with a set of cognitive operations, believes, and attitudes. There are no mere imitations, mimicking or the manifestation of instinctive tendencies. It is the enactment of the heterogeneous variety of social presuppositions. A learning process presupposes the existence of various institutionalized practices, ordered by the hierarchical system of oral or written instructions, guidelines, programs, etc.
I'm not finished with the article, but I'm just noting that the author is acknowledging that beliefs have propositional content (maybe some other kind is also being allowed and I haven't gotten to it yet).
"For example, if I am sitting in my garden and register some fluttering in the periphery of my vision, then my internal brain states will change to encode the perceptual hypothesis that the sensations were caused by a bird. This minimizes my surprise about the fluttering sensations. On the basis of this hypothesis I will select prior beliefs about the direction of my gaze that will minimize the uncertainty about my hypothesis. These prior beliefs will produce proprioceptive predictions about my oculomotor system and the visual consequences of looking at the bird. Action will fulfill these proprioceptive predictions and cause me to foveate the bird through classical reflex arcs. If my original hypothesis was correct, the visual evidence discovered by my orienting saccade will enable me to confirm the hypothesis with a high degree of conditional certainty. We will pursue this example later using simulations."
The bold section refers to a proposition.
Perhaps! It reads like a class of propositions with unspecified content to me. Which sensations? What's the character of the perceptual features formed? To me there seems to be a big gap between having sensations caused by a bird's actions, and, say, "I saw the wings of a starling fluttering by". The former class of phenomena underdetermines the latter, the latter is an aggregation and stabilisation of the multiple instances of the former (bird caused sensations leading to bird caused stable perceptual features of the bird as an explanatory hypothesis for those sensations).
I think it's as specific as it needs to be. A person sensed rustling and made a half conscious hypothesis based on previous beliefs.
Quoting fdrake
My point was that the author expressed the garden-person's beliefs as a proposition. No quotation marks are needed for that. If octupi evolve toward something more intellectual, it may be that they'll express propositions in light patterns on their skins. We would still express the proposition in words because that's what we do.
Quoting fdrake
I didn't get the impression the author thinks people actually say things like "the rustling is caused by a bird."
I once did an amazing pirouette in the woods because I was running and caught a glimpse of the pattern of a venomous snake. I was only vaguely aware of this during my feat. I went back to see, and I wouldn't have been surprised if it would have just been a pattern in the leaves. It was a snake, but not the venomous one I was trying to avoid. So yes, I think it's apparent that prior beliefs can shape our actions in a time frame that doesn't allow articulation.
I think the author expressed that the sensations were caused by the bird. I don't think the author expressed which sensations were caused by the bird, or anything about the nature of the sensations. Other than that they were caused by the bird.
It's like the difference between "I saw a bird" and "I saw a bird with black wings".
Quoting frank
So I agree that they expressed that the sensations were caused by a bird as a proposition, I don't believe that implies that the sensations which were caused by the bird were expressed as a proposition.
Quoting frank
I didn't either.
Quoting frank
:up:
Maybe this comes down to a modality thing; if you see a proposition as an eternal abstract object, whatever sensations were caused by the bird are easy to construe as one. If you see a proposition as associated with a real (set of) statements or language items, that the time frame blocks (simultaneous) articulation in a statement is more troubling; as there's no statement to to bear the proposition at the time.
This was the passage:
Quoting frank
The author doesn't know what caused the fluttering. There's supposed to be some brain states associated with a perceptual hypothesis.
Quoting fdrake
The sensations are easy to construe as an eternal abstract object? That's weird.
Quoting fdrake
Why do you need a statement to express the proposition at the time?
Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring" (or, even better, omitted the qualifier altogether).
Quoting Harry Hindu
Depending on the context, they can be interchangeable. Alice (the subject) is kicking the ball (the object). Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). In the first, it is Alice that is being described. In the second, it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form).
It seems to me that both sentences are describing both things, because both sentences say the same thing, just from different views.
I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it?
Quoting frank
Sorry, ambiguous "it", I meant seeing the proposition as an eternal abstract object.
Cool. The opposite sense of subject to Strawson's sense, but fine if you are careful not to mix in that other usage without notice, or without noticing. Ah, but you see no such requirement.
Quoting Andrew M
Hence no need, apparently, to point out that Harry's usage is at least partly the opposite one:
Quoting Harry Hindu
You instead immediately resume the confused (Aristotelian?) insinuation of some benign parallelism between the two, which the philosopher has just clarified, if only we followed the clear logic.
Quoting Andrew M
The philosopher has no robes.
I believe whatever.
Quoting khaled
This is the difference between them. "I believe that the ground will not swallow me up when i step through the front door." is a belief that can be expressed as a proposition (as can be seen), but not a statement that anyone has in mind except when doing philosophy. I have it in mind that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the skirting board hole, but there are no statements in the cat's mind, but a nameless anticipation.
In order to express a belief as a statement, one needs to believe that the words exist and have meaning.
How does one arrive at the belief that "'mummy' means something", at that beginning age when one does not yet believe that 'means something' means anything? The first word is necessarily a complex of beliefs in communication that cannot yet be stated. Language developed as a set of beliefs and practices that did not start with the expression of those linguistic beliefs.
I think that when I reflect on my interaction with the world, I frame it as a conversation. As I probe my environment, it's like I'm asking questions. True propositions are the world's answers. False propositions could be mistakes I made in discerning the world's voice, or they could be wrong hypotheses, or attempts to deceive. Like Heidegger, I think this reflective state lives alongside a more fused state.
I asked Nagase this same question once. He said something like "I don't feel the need to address that.".
I do that too. I noticed that I frame my interaction with the world as something like a conversation while reflecting, but that I retroject the narrative beats (as it were). Like they're conjured by the reflecting state as a summary. I think of the narrative beats as a retrojected framing device that inspires us to act as if the story we've just told ourselves is true. I've had plenty of experiences where I've had to revise the narrative - they're panicky, like missing a step on the stairs or hurting someone unexpectedly.
Quoting frank
That makes sense. Heidegger (as Dreyfus reads him) has a related distinction. Stuff like propositions; in the form of subject-predicate expressions; are tacked on after most of what we do, and it's very inviting to mistake the moves we've made in conceptualising the world as properties of the world - even conceptualising it in a manner that it somehow always fits into declarative statements.
Exactly! We're drawn to conclude that propositions are abstract objects by the logic of communication. If I agree with you, it doesn't make sense to say that I'm agreeing with either the sounds you made or the sentence you uttered.
It's to the proposition you expressed that I agree or disagree. The marks of the proposition's origin in a constructed narrative appear in the fact that I have to reference your point of view in order to understand you.
It's here that propositions finally become unglued from their temporal, linguistic genesis. The point of view you had when you spoke is in stasis. I join you in a position outside the world, on an eternal xyz axis.
Quoting fdrake
Oh. Maybe it was Dreyfus then, and not Heidegger?
The article I linked to you in the previous post explores the issue. Whether you are agreeing with what you've heard is quite different from hearing a proposition being expressed. The latter might be involved in the former in some cases, but it might not. Dreyfus construes the degree of involvement as the degree to which conceptualisation is required in understanding an act - even a speech act. Though (and the paper I linked argues) that the distinction isn't sharp and the two types of understanding it references should be understood reciprocally.
I agree we're drawn to conclude that propositions are both abstract objects and play a central coordinating role in the connection between practices that involve language and the world. The relevant aspect of it to me is whether being drawn to conclude in that way is an inappropriate framing brought on by ingrained habits of reflection; inappropriate because it misses the relevant phenomena (expression, the connection of intentional states to statements etc).
For Heidegger, the majority of what goes into expression, understanding, interpretation is termed "pre-predicative", that is a style of content distinct from the content of declarative sentences. That is signalled by eg. we can struggle to put things in words which are palpable, urgent and intimately understood. There is a certain compression involved, assertions are just one way of making sense. This is not to say that "there are things which cannot be said", but it is to say "understanding and crafting assertions requires a broader but distinct capacity of understanding the world than the understanding that we're putting into assertions". If someone restricts intentional state content to declarative sentences' propositional content (eg, making beliefs only target propositional content or propositions) it removes both the character of that content and the means of its interpretation.
Since you seem to like visual imagery, the kind of picture here is more similar to; assertions and the like attract meanings which they then engender, "putting things in words" - especially conceptually - is a kind of filter for content. The filter is sharp and distorts what is put in it, pliable square pegs in sharp round square-ish holes. Mistaking the properties of the filter for the properties of what's put in (expression) and what comes out (interpretation) - the dyad of expression and interpretation - is an easy error to make, as the practice of putting things into the filter -especially conceptually- is an ingrained habit. We reflect and see roundish lumps that've been put through the filter, if you realise the shape of the filter you might see that they were pliable square pegs all along.
I'm answering your post backward. This last paragraph, taken alone, seems to be launching existentialism of a kind I can definitely embrace because I'm somewhat aspy and its very familiar. I rely on memorized soundbites to get through life, but when I'm tired, I can become almost completely nonverbal. It makes for awesome relationships. I also frequently have dreams that don't have rational components. I reach for metaphors and the content of the dream slips through the words like sand through my fingers. I totally get why Nietzsche suggested that the idea of truth takes hold when we've forgotten that we're talking in metaphors all the time.
Quoting fdrake
I agree. Art conveys truth that can't be squashed into propositions. Stephen King said that to stay faithful to childhood memories, our stories of those times have to be mixed with fiction (the english word "truth" is rooted in germanic wording that means fidelity.)
Quoting fdrake
This sentence has tripped me up. I don't know what you mean.
An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?
I suggest: those very much future machines skilled not merely in the chasing of mice, but in the chasing of the imaginary trajectories of the pointings of mouse-words and mouse-pictures. A skill which is ascribable literally to humans from infancy. Only anthropomorphically to cats and present-day robots.
That's too restrictive for people who are sure cats literally have beliefs, of course. They must exclude robots some other way. If at all.
Quoting bongo fury
The thought police are a bit premature here. the legislation has not been passed, and the ten commandments do not specify. No we ought not.
:smile:
Smart phones, though?
This could not be much farther from truth.
Beliefs have no spatiotemporal location, because it would need to cover the entire area between internal and external content. I have not claimed that beliefs are in the mind.
That's been Banno's imaginary opponent.
Yes that seems right, since one logically follows from the other. That is:
(1) Alice is kicking the ball
(2) Alice kicking the ball is equivalent to the ball being kicked by Alice
(3) Therefore the ball is being kicked by Alice
I think I see how you're reading my sentences now. I used the qualifier to distinguish between an existing and non-existing subject (e.g., the present president of France versus the present King of France, say). But given the context, it wasn't necessary to qualify it, since the subsequent sentence dealt with the non-existing subject case.
Whereas you seem to see the qualifier as distinguishing between claims about the world and claims about words (e.g., snow versus "snow"). If the qualifier is removed, you see my sentence as ambiguous. Is that correct?
Quoting bongo fury
There is a parallelism between words and the world, as well as important differences between the two. Which we discussed a while back, as you may recall.
Quoting bongo fury
I don't see a problem with what I wrote. Feel free to be more specific.
?
I didn’t say you did. I said you try to dismantle that.
Start off with the basics. When you have a thought of red, is the thought a color or a word? But then words can be colored scribbles. So is red a color with no shape or a colored scribble?
Statements are sounds and colored scribbles. So to say that you don't know how to think of red apples without sounds and colored scribbles doesn't seem consistent, when you think of words as words, but not apples as apples?
Words are just different types of sensory impressions. You see apples on tables like you see words on screens. You don't need statements to distinguish between words and apples or to have the belief that words and apples are different things. The distinction is obvious in the mind. You only need statements to communicate beliefs, not to actually have beliefs.
I agree with you there. I wanna push back on the idea (if you were suggesting it) that it's exclusive to art though. In terms of the expression of semantic content and engendering intentional content of interpretation, I believe artistic expression uses capacities everyday expressive practices do already. There's one of those where do you draw the line problems between art and non-artistic expressive practice.
Quoting frank
Dancing's a good example of a nonverbal expressive practice with its own kind of grammar, being attuned to a partner's rhythms I'd guess is a less contextually constrained version of the same thing. With a partner, you don't just have to learn the moves for a specific dance, you have to learn what dance you're doing. That tapestry of cues, interpretations and what is articulated by people's actions is the subject of a more phenomenological and pragmatic take on language and expression. Expecting to be able to fit such things into declarative sentences and being mystified when everything of substance is left out from such an account is the trauma that first silenced Wittgenstein ("whereof we cannot speak...", "“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.” from Tractatus) then attuned him to the essential saturation of language use with all that silenced him:
There's a real tension in any account that places speech acts; which are paradigmatic examples of expressers of intentional content [hide=*](commands, requests, etc)[/hide]; at the locus of control of expression, but cashes out the kind of content they express in terms of more circumscribed analyses of declarative sentences and their truth conditions. Only the pliability that comes with all expressions allows their square pegs to be deformed into the round holes of declarative sentence content.
Luckily, once the glasses have been taken off (and not replaced with a monocle), all that allegedly mystical stuff in expressive practices can be used to thematise itself. That's an embarking point for a phenomenological and pragmatic investigation of expression.
I was gesturing towards something like: propositions are part of an interpretive device we use when analysing sentences and relating them to truth, to say that we hear them construes hearing as the kind of capacity that is characterised by the analysing the truth or falsity of sentences.
Again?
You presume to lecture people on failure of reference. You cite Strawson, who uses "subject" explicitly and unambiguously in just one of its two notoriously opposite uses ("snow", not snow). But notions about Aristotle (or whatever) induce you to systematically equivocate between the two. So you are actually confused, here:
Quoting Andrew M
And then you go straight from (half) acknowledging the error to encouraging the same confusion in Harry.
That is my specific problem with your pre-modern schtick.
Quoting Andrew M
Good luck with that schtick! But it is confused.
Actually, if you re-read the debate, I've ignored it altogether along with all sorts of other problematic stuff Banno's (mis)attributing to me.
So if belief was a movie, the protagonist's having an attitude toward a proposition is just one scene.
There are also moments in a garden where, having lost all grounding in belief, he enters into a state of paralyzing panic by a rustling sound. He eventually loses track of space and time and the spirit of Constraint comes upon him, locking down absurdity and zeroing in on birds.
"But what is a bird?" he asks, "If not a deadening label for the endless mystery of rustling and flashes of light amidst the humid aroma of moss and dirt?
We could get Nils Frahm to compose the soundtrack.
Yes. The "where are they now" montage at the end.
Quoting frank
I imagine it's like Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency; the plot seems linear once you've already watched the show.
I understand what you're saying. Belief can't be neatly isolated the way the propositional account wants to do.
:lol: Is Tarkovsky still alive? I want some endless shots of seaweed floating by.
Just in case this wasn't picked up, this is not right. If the programming language is such that = is the assignment operator, which I think is what you had in mind, then the above simply means that different languages might use the same symbol for different things. In languages in which = is the equality operator, A = A + 1 equates to false. In languages in which it is the assignment operator, such as Java and Python, there exists another equality operator such as == such that A == A + 1 equates to false and means exactly the same as A = A + 1 in propositional logic.
My reply to unenlightened showed that A needs to be defined prior to A = A + 1, or else the statement is false (it returns an error). You can't use a variable that wasn't previously defined to define a variable. Its like defining a word with using another word that hasn't been defined.
Do either of you dispute my claim that the logic of propositions is not the same as the logic of commands?
Either way, arguing about the trivial illustrative example I offered is irrelevant.
One's intention is shown in one's acts. This I believe is partly the point of Wittgenstein's remarks about how beliefs are also shown in one's actions. For example, the act of picking up the cup or opening a door shows that we have particular beliefs about cups and doors. Moreover, these actions are quite apart from propositions or statements. Language came later, as something we attached to our mental states.
Mental content or mental states is necessarily reflected in one's actions. If there were never any corresponding acts, it would be difficult, if not impossible to ascribe a mental state to a person. This is true of beliefs, intentions, anger, love, etc. We don't ascribe mental states to trees, because trees don't exhibit the corresponding actions.
I think I agree with you.
What I'm illustrating is that because intention is shown in acts; including speech acts; one's intention forms part of its content. eg, Asserting "It is raining but I don't believe it is raining" is a performative contradiction because one shows one believes a statement by asserting that it is so.
Would you agree that it shows that whatever the intentional content of belief is, because it is expressed (perhaps with some transformation/mutilation) through assertions it forms part of the content of assertions? But remains distinct from the content of the assertions?
Yes, which is why, if I understand your point, I believe that although language expresses one's belief, it's not a necessary component of that belief.
I think we're close then. I didn't want to say language in general was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content; I think there are good reasons to suspect that language use informs what we believe and how we believe it; but that declarative sentence content was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content.
I think we're close too. I only want to say that there are certain base or foundational beliefs that arise quite apart from language content. However, there is no doubt that language plays an important role in how and what we believe. We use language to expand our beliefs, so I don't want to say that language in general is separate and distinct from all beliefs. I'm not sure about your last sentence. For example, what about declarative sentences that arise as we expand our beliefs using language?
Begs the question why you offered it. Perhaps you can muster a better one?
:up:
Putting aside the foundational issue if we can. I'll agree that "hinge propositions" are a thing, hopefully not much turns on our possible foundationalist/anti-foundationalist dispute. I'm also quite happy to grant that some (many) beliefs are proximally due to environmental stimuli (events in the "form of life").
:up:
I don't either.
I think it depends on the sense of "arise as we expand". Whether it's the declarative sentence that we've learned or invented doing all the work of expansion or whether there is an interplay between the expansion of intentional content and what our declarative sentences can express.
An example might be that a doctor's trained eye can look for abnormalities in an x-ray scan, the intentional state is abnormality seeking, Asserting "This is an abnormality" would be derivative of finding an abnormality. What I'm trying to highlight is that the content [hide=*](people with phenomenological leanings will hate me using the word this way, sorry)[/hide] of the abnormality finding state is expressed somehow in "This is an abnormality", it would also be expressed in whatever description of the abnormality occurred.
Do you see this as different from what I've expressed in other threads about beliefs states, say the act of opening a door, shows your beliefs about doors, expressed or not?
Someone else might express "This is an abnormality," as you exhibit the "abnormality finding state." Or, someone else might say he believes X, by observing some intentional act or another. This it seems to me (your e.g. as well as mine) shows that the belief is quite separate from the expression.
What are you trying to accomplish when using the logic of propositions vs. the logic of commands? Do both not express some sort if belief?
Quoting Kenosha Kid but then it wouldn't be a contradiction, like they claimed.
I don't know the specifics of your worldview enough to comment. By the sounds of this thread we seem to agree on things in context.
Quoting Sam26
That sounds right to me. I have the sneaking suspicion that we disagree a lot on some nearby issues, but it's hidden by how you've used the words "separate" and "expression".
To a first approximation, let's imagine what a speech act expresses as a kind of inverse of interpretation. Call the process by which (speech) acts are mapped by people[hide=*] (perhaps people's aggregate activity insofar as that activity is relevant in context) [/hide] to interpretations "interpretation". Expression's then the process by which interpretations are mapped by people to speech acts.
Interpretation takes an act and gives it an interpretation. Expression takes an interpretation and puts it in a speech act.
In that view, if we look at the assertion "It is raining but I do not believe it is raining", the performative contradiction in it can be explained with: assertions of fact (speech acts) express that their asserters believe what they say is so. The intentional content of belief expressed in "It is raining" is [hide=*] (counts as)[/hide] that it's raining, which is contrary to what is expressed by the latter part of the phrase; another assertion of a fact, that the asserter does not believe it is raining.
"It is raining..."->(the asserter believes that it is raining), the -> is expression/showing.
I'd have it that because speech acts can (and indeed routinely) express intentional content in that manner, they should be considered as part of what speech acts mean. [hide=*]Though that relation of "parthood" is icky, as meanings can't be cut like pies.[/hide]
And in the context of the bone I picked with @Banno, I was trying to expand declarative sentence content (what they express) to include the intentional content of the speech acts which assert them, which I imagine goes against the grain of taking belief's content to be an assertion. Butchering it a bit for clarity: assertion's content is a belief vs belief's content is an assertion.
I think you misunderstand what unenlightened was saying. In propositional logic, A = A + 1 is always equal to false, '=' being the equality operator. In Java or Python or such, A = A + 1 is true (if A is defined). But this is just because '=' is not the equality operator but the assignment operator, and assignments always either error or yield true: you cannot have false. Same symbol, different meaning.
An error is a fallacy.
So what? Different languages have different rules for the same symbols. We can still translate the meaning and end up saying the same thing in different ways. Computational logic can be translated to propositional logic and vice versa. The point is that the rules for using symbols to refer to beliefs is arbitrary.
That was my counterargument, yes.
So, unenlightened hasn't shown us any meaningful distinction when talking about what symbols and rules can be used to refer to, or express beliefs. It seems that symbol use and beliefs may be inherently related. After all, you need to have beliefs about how some symbol is to be used when using them.
Which is why I suggested to him:
Quoting Kenosha Kid
You got there in the end, well done!
I'm sure that's true.
Quoting fdrake
Are you saying that even our own speech acts are mapped to interpretation? So, that as I write these words I'm mapping my thoughts through the given speech acts? On the other hand, if I'm reading or listening to someone else's speech act/s it seems truistic that I interpret them, or as you say, the speech act is mapped to "interpretation."
Quoting fdrake
Okay, so, an interpretation takes any act (speech or otherwise) and applies the interpretation, or overlays an interpretation onto the act. I take it that not all interpretations are speech acts. I may, for example, interpret an order given to me by going from point A to point B without any speech acts.
As to the latter part of this quote, any expression involving interpretation necessarily (my words) commits itself to a speech act.
Quoting fdrake
This seems rather obvious, unless I'm missing some finer point.
Quoting fdrake
Are you saying that the expression "It is raining." shows or expresses that he/she believes it is raining? If so, it seems obvious, unless they are trying to deceive or mislead.
Quoting fdrake
I'm not sure about this, maybe.
Quoting fdrake
I definitely don't agree that belief content is necessarily an assertion. I've said this time-and-time again. And, I definitely believe that an assertion is a belief, in the main, providing the intention is not to deceive or mislead.
I'm not sure that I've interpreted everything correctly, but I gave it a try.
I hadn't given much thought to the mechanics of the mapping process; I imagine that it's done by agents utilising background knowledge of norms and commonalities - in Witty speak how a language game is embedded in a form of life, how epistemic notions require a background and so on.
What I meant to imply was that what speech acts express is dual to how they can be interpreted in context. The agent doing them expresses, the agents receiving them interpret. To a large degree, a speech act expresses that which it can be expected to be interpreted as. Just like a picture of a bird can be expected to be seen as a bird.
Quoting Sam26
To be clear on the significance I think it holds; if intentional content is expressed in a speech act, so are the type of mental/agential states that characterise that intentional content (with some transduction/transformation involved). Overstating it a bit to provide an upshot; the "meaning is use" conception of language has the connection between mental states and speech acts as part of use, and thus part of meaning. To mix metaphors, Wittgenstein's beetles are crawling all over words and eating them from the inside, not inside our heads.
I think I agree with the first part of this, but explain your last sentence a bit more.
There's a lot of philosophy that says that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, because the connection between a mental state and a word can't be constructed in accordance with a public criterion. Instead, the behavioural states associated with the mental states are treated as the sole informers of language use. In W's private language argument context I think this is a reaction against "language of thought" theories from Frege, but the private language argument can be read (sensibly) as support for logical behaviourism. As SEP puts it:
If it turned out that internal states were already expressed in words, that the connection between mental states and speech acts was itself part of the norms of language use, that would go against the logical behaviourist conclusions of the private language argument (when it's read that way). We already took the beetle out of the box, as it were.
I find it bizarre that anyone would think that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, as if minds don't exist. However, there has to be agreement publicly in terms of the use of words, it can't be about my own private mental state. One's mental state, say one's interpretation for example, is fit within the use of language that's decided publicly. I can't take just any mental phenomena and fit it into an expression as though I decide how a word or expression is used. So, although we have these private mental states, the act of expressing such states is decided publicly, not privately. One's private mental state does not automatically come mapped to some linguistic expression. Language is a public phenomena that we use to express mental phenomena.
I think those who interpret Wittgenstein as a behaviorist based on meaning as use have it wrong.
I think that applies definitionally; a use can't be set up/a word can't be defined with respect to only the presence/absence of a mental state. But it seems to me we can use speech acts to describe mental states and moreover that speech acts routinely express mental content. The philosophical thought experiment that makes the meaning of the word be the thought that motivated it is blocked, but I don't think that blocks language use in general from thematising mental states or expressing intentional content. Mapping the private with the public is part of the public.
EG, if I claimed that my partner makes me feel a special way and I called it "blimblam", and I described it as a composite of homeliness, horniness, care and calm. You'd know how to use the word. It's not my blimblam thoughts and sensations that are doing the work in the setting up the use of the word, it's leveraging the public criteria we share that characterise the use of those sensations and feeling words we both already know.
I find no disagreement here. You seem to be arguing against something that I also disagree with.
:up:
Fair enough then. I wasn't sure if I was arguing against a position you actually held.
:ok:
Seems fair enough.
Quoting Banno
What are facts, though? Presumably, not single objects. Larger space-time regions, of various (e.g. mouse-running-behind-tree) kinds?
Or platonic abstractions, like "states of affairs"? Do you allow such things on your watch? If so, why bother restricting "propositions" to statements?
Quoting Banno
Yes, but isn't it also roughly to be able to recognise the fact (the kind of event), and respond accordingly?
Hey Sam!!!
Good to 'see' you. Hope this finds you well.
:smile:
And it leads to ignoring that Smith was talking about himself.
Cool.
What are facts, though...
True statements made about things in the world, that evidently are capable - somehow - of existing in their entirety, of being believed to be true, and of being true, without ever once being uttered/made/heard.
Existing without existing?
You got me?
Read my final post in the debate. That's the best I could do given what Banno offered. Those were his words, not mine...
Ah, I get you. Although "existing in their entirety" isn't a phrase I associate with Banno... :lol:
True.
It is a phrase that ought be associated with the position he argues for/from.
In order for the belief of a language-less creature to be an attitude towards a proposition/statement, then either i.)propositions/statements must - in some way, shape, or form - be able to exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature could be even able to develop an attitude towards them, or ii.)language-less creatures have no belief.
Neither is true.
I was already there in my first reply to unenlightened. It just took you a while to realize it.
"That cannot be put into propositional form"...
What does that have to do with the content of what's being talked about?
It does not follow from the fact that our accounting practices are propositional in content that everything we take an account of is as well.
Yes. It's probably just different senses of the term. To believe can specify an attitude toward a proposition, or an explanation for the behavior of a volitional being, or something in the way she moves.
Chalmers has a whole thing about how to determine if a conflict just comes down to wording.
Once again, I note a failure here to understand what a proposition is. I think it's localized to this forum, unless somebody knows a source for this alternate meaning?
Right. The carpenter's behavior shows that he knows how to use a hammer. Why do you want to interpret the scene in terms of belief? Wouldn't Witti advise that we focus on using language to be informative? Therefore, in what circumstances would we talk about the beliefs of the carpenter? What would we actually say about his beliefs?
I think following that line of thought will avoid language on holiday, right?
Do you understand that this view is not in conflict with framing belief as an attitude toward a proposition?
You're not in conflict with anyone. :up:
That's plausible, but it doesn't mean we need to recognise any mysteriously non-actual facts ("possible states of affairs" if they can't be just plain old alternative statements). Any more than we need to recognise mysteriously subsistent individuals ("the present King of France" etc. if they can't be just fictive or hypothetical terms, empty and non-referring).
How it could look for suitably deluded cats is a question not at all clarified by this metaphysical extravagance.
Part of the issue between Banno and I is that he equivocates the term proposition.
For me, the debate hinged on how you and @Banno regard states of affairs (which I raised here). It seems to me that you were not really rejecting states of affairs so much as using different terminology, such as events, or perceptible things and their spatiotemporal relations. So there may be more agreement than it seems.
Consider a scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.
Here are three statements we might make:
(1) The mouse ran behind the tree.
(2) The cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.
(3) The cat believed that the proposition "the mouse ran behind the tree" was true.
I think both of you would agree that (1) and (2) is true. And, on the assumption that (3) meant that the cat explicitly formulated a linguistic sentence and assented to it, that (3) is false.
If so, then your differences would be over whether (1) (as an event) should be considered propositional, and how (3) should be best understood (i.e., as assumed above or else as being equivalent to (2)).
Could be. What's the significance of the topic from your point of view?
As earlier, I would not invoke "states of affairs". Banno's use was rejected, and rightly so.
Whoa!
Either (1) is one of three different statements that we might make about events, or (1) is the event being described. It cannot be both at any time. (1) is either a statement or it's an event. If it's both, it's an equivocation of key terms, and that is adequate ground for rejection.
(1) is clearly identified as one of a trio of statements we might make about events.
(1) - as an event - cannot be true, whereas (1) - as a statement about those events - arguably can.
:up:
I would add that as I use the terms, events are states of affairs, as are relations such as Earth being the third planet from the Sun (and whatever else that can potentially be stated). So, as with events, states of affairs can't be true (or false). Instead they are what make statements true (or false).
Whatever else can potentially be stated?
:brow:
That's the same conflation between statements and events(states of affairs) that I reject from Banno.
Do you believe that it's a property of the world that whatever happens in it can potentially be stated?
Part of what makes statements true or false anyway...
No, that's a distinction between the world (which we can potentially talk about) and our talk about the world.
Quoting creativesoul
What else do you have in mind?
Quoting fdrake
Yes.
Quoting Andrew M
No? Try this...
States of affairs are not equivalent to whatever can potentially be stated. Falsehoods can be stated. True statements as well. States of affairs aren't capable of being true or false. You said so yourself. So...
We do need to draw the distinction between states of affairs and what can be potentially be stated. You are not.
I would add that as you used the terms above, events, relations, and whatever else can potentially be stated are all states of affairs. Look for yourself.
Language less belief and the content thereof. You are focusing upon irrelevancy.
You?
Is omniscience a fashionable aim these days?
If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. And that is what is meant by a true statement. (To say of what is that it is, etc.)
Of course we can speak falsely, which just means that we failed to describe the world as it is (i.e., there was no such state of affairs).
Also, if need be, we can say that a state of affairs obtained or failed to obtain (just as we can say that an event happened or not, or a relation holds or does not hold, etc.).
Quoting creativesoul
I don't follow your comment. What irrelevancy?
Quoting creativesoul
No, it's a post-truth world...
So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise unaccountable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?
Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out?
Oh, it most definitely is, but it's not the only part. He does not seem to continue wanting to have this conversation when it gets to the point that his position is shown to depend upon one of two different falsehoods. We never quite get to setting the criterion/standard for exactly what it makes the most sense for us to say counts as "language-less belief". That is the standard by which we can tell if another is guilty of anthropomorphism.
Language-less belief cannot consist of language. It can consist of things that are themselves existentially dependent upon language, if and when those are directly perceptible, such as red cups full of hot Maxwell House coffee. All belief including cups is itself existentially dependent upon language, for the cup is. Language less belief can consist of that which is existentially dependent upon language, just not language use itself(no predication).
Predication is enabled and/or otherwise facilitated by the fact that language-less belief already consists of a plurality of different things. This further speaks to the first two of three beliefs explicated earlier in the debate. It is also germane to positions seeking some shared 'structure' between language less belief and linguistic belief. Mentalese is the wrong way 'round. Evolution demands that linguistic belief emerge from non linguistic. Semiotics fails miserably here as well, with it's attempt to break all meaning down into semantics and syntax. Syntax describes particular patterns in the structured order of meaningful marks. Some meaning is prior to such marks.
The bridge between language less belief about what's happened or is happening and meaningful expressions thereof is built directly upon and by virtue of correlations being drawn between different directly perceptible elements of those events. When one begins drawing correlations between the names of directly perceptible things and their referent(between "Jack" and Jack), one begins to be able to think(express their thought and belief about what's happened and/or is happening) aloud via naming and descriptive practices about those same events and elements therein.
One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree, and one need not know that one is doing so in order to be able to look for mice behind trees. They look there because they believe that they will find the mouse.
All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. All experience consists of a creature capable of attributing meaning. All meaning is attributed solely by virtue of a creature drawing correlations between different things. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief(drawing the correlations). All language less belief about what happened or is happening is capable of being true or false despite it's inability to be stated by the creature themselves. Some of it actually is true. Arguably most. Some true belief exists in it's entirety prior to language use.
The language less belief that the mouse ran behind the tree, and the simple statement thereof share the exact same truth conditions, because they are about the very same things. The statement need not be made in order for the belief to be formed and/or held. Such belief is prior to linguistic expressions thereof.
I've laid non linguistic meaningful true belief about what's happened or is happening down at your doorstep all packaged up in one neat little bundle. No need for deity. No need for cosmic judgment. No need for language use. Now, to be clear, our understanding all of this certainly requires language. However, all three - belief, meaning, and truth - emerge onto the world stage prior to language use via thought and belief formation(correlations drawn between different directly perceptible things). Therefore, neither truth, nor meaning is existentially dependent upon language.
What's the significance you ask?
Given the shameful fact that there has yet to have been an acceptable theory of meaning, it seems relatively germane to me.
This non linguistic belief exposition also speaks to the stark differences between what's said and what's believed. That has implications for Moore's paradox as well as the liar, and all it's reinforcements. But, notably it speaks to the difference between what makes belief statements true and what makes statements true(when there is a difference between the two but both are being characterized with the exact same marks). What one believes(belief) most certainly plays a determinative role in what would make a statement thereof true. What one believes is part of what makes their own statements thereof true. For example, Gettier conflates here by forgetting that Smith is talking about himself. He's not alone either.
Smith's belief is about himself, and as such it isn't true if anyone else gets the job!
P.S.
Oh, and having a good grasp upon belief and the role it plays in our lives also helps one to navigate the world with as few unhappy unexpected results and/or surprises as possible, regardless of the particular situation one may find oneself in.
:point:
Loaded questions
You seem to be looking to disagree on things that, as far as I can tell, we have no real disagreement about.
The content of a true belief is a state of the world which we, as human beings, can potentially represent in language. Would you agree with that?
Quoting Andrew M
:up:
Let's put it in more formal terms, I'll label the formalisation (DPC) for "doctrine of propositional content".
(DPC) For every (*) event E there exists (**) a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E )
Do you agree with that formulation?
The implicit domain of quantification of the existential quantifier ( ** ) hides rather a lot of the issue, I think. Here are a few thoughts about assigning a domain to each quantifier.
(1) The class of events ( * ) universally quantified over is all events at all times. The second quantifier (**) is given the same domain.
This raises a question of time.
Say if you truncated the domain to events which occurred 10 billion years ago, at that time there would be events but no statements, so the existential quantifier is false since there do not exist statements at that time, so the whole thing would be false because there would be events without statements - and thus events without corresponding statements.
To restore the truth of the conjecture, those troublesome events which occurred 10 billion years ago can find their corresponding statements now. That seems fine, as the domain is posited to be all events and all times. However, DPC then turns on this hypothetical connection between events which occurred 10 billion years ago and statements now for all events 10 billion years ago. If there did not exist an S(E) at the time of E, S(E) must have occurred later. In turn, that raises the questions, why would DPC be a property of the world if it only applies after the advent of declarative sentences? If it's part of metaphysics, it's not part of the metaphysics of nature; it did fine in the truncated domain.
(2) One way of sidelining this issue would be to claim that the universal quantifier is over all events and all times, but the existential quantifier ranges only over the class of all statements. That gives us a few sub cases:
(2a) statements are events, effectively this is a collapse back into case (1)
(2b) some statements are events, some statements are not events - this is very wooly, under what conditions is a statement an event and under what conditions is it not? I'll not consider it further unless I have to.
(2c) No statements are events, all events are not statements.
Left with (2c), this commits someone to the doctrine that statements are not events; and if they are not events they could not be asserted (unless assertions are not events!). That raises questions regarding how statements work if they need not be the events of their assertion. An ontology of statements as distinct from speech acts. In this case, DPC seems to turn on a construal of statements as a kind of abstraction which is distinct from the speech acts of their assertion.
Not the first, though:
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting Andrew M
One way or the way other, please clarify.
No. An event does need to be representable in language, in principle (i.e., such that language users could potentially make a statement S(E)). But it need not actually be represented by someone in practice, now or ever.
If a purported event were not representable in language, then we would find ourselves up against the private language argument. We would have no grounds for calling it an event.
Quoting fdrake
As you note, many events occurred billions of years ago which haven't been (and perhaps never will be) represented by anyone. Given the language criterion above, there can be such events and they will have state independently of anyone's representations. That's just how we've set up the language game.
So your claim's more like:
(DPC) For every event E possibly there exists a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E ).
?
Thanks for asking. As earlier, I would not invoke states of the world or states of affairs.
What does wondering whether or not we could possibly represent some state of the world in language have to do with the content of language-less belief? Most states of the world are not directly perceptible. All language-less belief is about directly perceptible things.
Quoting Andrew M
Not looking to disagree, just simply pointing out that you've been equivocating "states of affairs" in the same way that Banno does.
And putting the ability into practice, presumably?
Ok, and you say that such creatures might have no language? Do you mean none at all, and if so, roughly what are you counting as language?
Yes, that seems OK.
Any event can be characterized by a statement. Whether or not it ever is, is a separate matter.
My purpose there was to distinguish them in a dependency sense. First-order beliefs are about the world. Second-order beliefs are about statements about the world.
Quoting creativesoul
OK, so consider the scenario where a cat watched a mouse run behind a tree and then chased after it.
That the cat chased after the mouse suggests that the cat believed that the mouse ran behind the tree.
If we agree about that, then the question is what to make of the that-clause "the mouse ran behind the tree". I think we would agree that it describes an event that occurred independently of the cat's belief, and also independently of language.
Now I think that is what you mean by language-less belief. And also that this characterizes much of human belief as well. Is that correct?
I don't see why content need be attached to anything external to the creature using the term, so talking about content in the world can be ruled out, we give/provide content, not the world. Of course, what's in the world helps guide what we say about it, but it's not essential to the meaning or significance of the term. It's of course not even necessary for there to be a world out there to even talk about content. We could be brain in vats. Of course, this is extremely unlikely, but raising the scenario serves as an illustration of not needing content to be "out there".
Now, do we want to say that content is found in the statements we say out loud, when put in a propositional manner? Suppose I see a dog running towards me, having escaped its owner's leash. I'd say "This dog is racing towards me", thus the content of the statement can be said to be given in the proposition. But is it necessarily so? Must content be said out loud, or even said to oneself in a propositional manner? It's very doubtful.
In fact, if we look at the world at attempt to do some very basic phenomenology we see that experience vastly outstrips my way of talking about it. So in the case of the dog, there is also the background of the owner being careless, of grass looking beautiful in the sunlight, I can also point to my physiology and notice my adrenaline pumping. The dog probably interrupted me from my train of thought, and so forth. Of course this exercise can go on forever, as I try to verbalize my experiences. But it's clear that the whole complexity of the situation cannot be grasped by a simple proposition. There's also more to say about the nature of thought and language, which are extremely complex, but this can be put aside. The content found in my expression is but a small portion of the total content I experience. Henceforth, content is not necessarily propositional in nature.
What's left then? Well, we can attempt to encapsulate the term content in such a manner that most of these considerations do not apply to the term, but this does not mean that the things mentioned aren't real phenomena that shape the content I experience. What must be true of content? Absent anything else, content is internal to the user, and seems to be an operation of the mind/brain that seeks to concretize the totality of my experience in a way that is communicable through words. But there are many other way to express content too: gestures, moods, paintings etc.
So no, content is not necessarily propositional, though it can be defined in such a manner, if one chooses to do so, but I don't see what's gained by doing this.
Event as in space-time region, or event as in abstract proposition about (or property of) such a region? Or something else? Or both?
Where were we? ... Is the mouse's running behind the tree propositional? Well for the (as for every) event qua space-time region there possibly exist infinitely many statements it makes true, as well as at least that many false. So... ?
I don't think the "doctrine of propositional content" as I've been putting it says much at all if all the terms in it aren't fleshed out. And if they are, it seems the doctrine has rather a lot of baggage.
Space time region probably doesn't fit the sense of event or state of affairs as, say, "The USA and Iran backed out of their nuclear deal" doesn't have a space time region associated with it despite it being, allegedly, propositional because it's a statement of fact. Proposition as abstract object doesn't seem to fit either as propositions remain a component part of assertion events.
It seems to me it either says nothing much, says something not particularly evident, or is a coordinating statement of unarticulated metaphysics surrounding it.
For my part, I don't think the doctrine: " "x" and x pick out the same state of affairs" is innocuous at all, since it starts with statements then projects their content into the world; it's like language has cast a shadow onto the world, and the shadow is held up to language, and people are quite pleased with the fit.
I'd be interested in hearing your argument for how you get from:
Quoting Andrew M
To: for every event E possibly there exists a statement S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E).
Can an animal believe? Does my cat "believe" the open front door goes to the outside where the trees and squirrels are? Most definitely! Is it propositional belief? I think it is a proto-propositional belief. Consider the propositional structure of the conditional: If X opens the door, there will be Y that ensues. Note that my cats certainly gets this essential structure, but I while it is foolish to think her "getting it" is propositional, what is propositional cannot be wholly other than what actually goes through her mind (yes, mind). After all, our conditional logical form very likely is constructed on t he foundation that pragmatically "mirrors" the primitive, non symbolic cat knowing.
:up:
I'm not trying to commit myself strongly to the thesis that "for every event E possibly there exists a statement S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E)." is false, I'm trying to point out that it requires an account.
The debate (first post here: ) did touch the issue of animal beliefs, my reading was that @creativesoul was criticising the following claim, which he saw as a consequence of @Banno's account: animal beliefs target statements because we can set some representation of them out using a statement. Banno in turn seemed to insist that all there was to the animal's belief was our attribution of a statement of that belief which is held true by the animal.
For my part, prior to the debate I asked both participants to make the motion more specific:
Quoting fdrake
And I was dismissed, only for it to be unproductive in the way I specified. The real meat of the issue, I think, would've been to discuss something like:
Beliefs as mental states/dispositions with content vs beliefs as holding some statement to be true. Issues there might be: is a disposition towards a state of affairs the same as an attitude towards a statement? What role do t-sentences play in that account?
To me, the whole matter has to be reconstrued. Don't know if you will appreciate this. If not, then that's fine.
I abide by the pragmatist's hypothetical deductive account of belief: Prior to an affirmation, there is an predisposition to affirm. What is this if not a disposition towards a state of affairs, as you say? But does this stand clearer analysis? I affirm, after all, in time. Can the temporality of the affirmation's nature be analyzed? This goes not just to propositions, but to concepts, as all concepts are inherently propositional: so what is, say, nitroglycerin? We define this as a pragmatic, temporal structure of the conditional form: Nitro is, "If N is impacted with force F, then it will explode." Nitro is also, "If N is combined with chemical C, then result R will occur"; and so on, and so on.
All concepts have this form, and therefore all beliefs have this form. We live our everyday lives in the temporal dynamics of, to put it is Dewey's terms, the consummatory successes of problems solved. Language itself is constructed in a complex series of successful problem solving events whereby signifiers (sounds) and their signifieds (concepts) are matched with their objective counterparts which are achieved by hearing sounds, witnessing associations and assimilating models of language behavior in the environment.
But what does this do for belief being propositional? Well, it presents an understanding of beliefs and propositions that does not recognize the distinction. Propositional affirmations and beliefs are reduced consummations of problems solved. "My cat is on the rug" is true by virtue of a body of anticipations regarding rugs, cats, the copula 'is', the the ascription of properties, etc., which are themselves all confirmed in their repeatable behaviors. Knowledge that there is a sidewalk that will sustain my steps is a science experiment at every step, consummated, and this and a great number of other pragmatically based assumptions about sidewalks is what a sidewalk IS; this collective of pragmatic assumptions are the very definitions of Being.
If the purported event is representable in language and it meets the public usage criteria for an event, then it is an event.
It seems to me that it then follows that it is possible, in principle, for someone to state that the event did (or did not) occur. And, if so, the event would be the truth maker for that person's statement.
It strikes me that if there are a class of things that are "purported events", that must be "representable in language" and "meet public usage criteria" to count as events, it would then follow that those purported events do not fall under DPC despite being occurrent:
If DPC is: for all events E possibly there exists a statement S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E).
So long as there are "purported events" which are occurrent, there's a sneaky domain restriction on first quantifier; there are occurrent things which never have statements that state them in DPC's sense since they don't count as events. It makes what it means for something to happen depend on language use. Like the world is language's shadow.
The world is all that is the case.
No sneakiness; this is pivotal, and in plain sight in my posts. It's Proposition 1.
Argue for it?
is not a proposition.
Here's a better argument for Creative's position; it's what I had expected him to argue:
Grant "P" is true IFF P;
If the cat believes that the mouse went behind the tree, then the cat believes that "The mouse went behind the tree" is true.
But the cat, not having a language, cannot believe a fact about a statement.
Would you accept this argument? I think it the best Creative could do. To me, it has an apparent flaw involving substitution in opaque contexts. But I might be wrong.
This seems obvious; just as language, and linguistically mediated experience, mirrors the "primitive" pre-linguistic experience.
Those aren't my equivocations, they're attempts to flesh out what "can" means in "Every event can be stated"! Since my discussion partners don't seem to want to flesh out the modality associated with it, despite making a modal claim, I decided to try it.
I guess you're done here, then.
One says all belief has propositional content on the grounds that anything that could count as a belief can in principle be expressed in propositional language. The other says that all belief does not have propositional content on the grounds that not everything we would call a belief can actually be expressed in language (at the time of the occurrence of the belief) if there are no language users around.
Pretty much.
You have (I suspect) the background in philosophy to understand Wittgenstein's point. You will understand that it would be trite to attempt a summary of that background in a reply to your question. If something of genuine philosophical interest came up, i might get involved. But as thing stand, I've shown how Creative has misunderstood the topic, although Creative cannot see the error.
Fair enough.
There is a difference between saying and showing.
Saying is a kind of showing.
What is said will align with a picture of the world only when its frame (true/false) is held up.
Holding up the frame limits what is shown to the frame of what is said.
The content of what is said is what it shows.
Showing puts the picture in place and paints it beforehand.
All Creative had to do to "win" the debate was to show a belief that could not be put into propositional form. But it can't be done; if it cannot be put into propositional form, it is not a belief.
I did not mean to suggest the content was "inside" the word, far from it. This is part of what puzzles me about your position, everything's sufficiently (semantically) externalised that it's functionality all the way down in terms of meaning, except for how declarative sentences play a privileged role in the articulation of mental content (or "mental function" if you prefer) and events, those statements are "inside" those dispositional states and events in the same way. It's like you've taken Wittgenstein's propositional glasses off like he does in the PI but put them back on again when reading something else! They're like analytic philosophy reading glasses.
This can't be unequivocally right, since the content of poems, music and art works is what they show. Artworks do not show "use". There is also a valid distinction between determinate and indeterminate content. Do you think there is a valid distinction between determinate and indeterminate use?
I don't see that. The thing about showing is that it is not saying... Isn't your complaint just that I do not say enough about that of which we cannot speak? The point is to show others that they say too much...
My complaint is that speaking about that which we allegedly cannot speak is a routine function of language. The stuff we allegedly can't speak about is already baked into use because use is an interaction with the world.
To me, that's too close to referent, to there being something that the sentence must be about, to reified meaning.
The use of a poem is not what the poem is about.
Quoting Banno
I'm not sure what you mean by "about" here. A command is not 'about' anything in the sense that an explanation is. But a command can be said to be about something in the sense that 'about' in this sentence carries: "What are you about?".
Are you disagreeing that poems have content?
No... I ignored that locution; I thought it odd. Art has a use, it does not show a use...
Sometimes the art shows something. Rarely is what it shows simply what it says.
Quoting Banno
You say here that the content of what is said is not what it shows, and you said that use replaces content, which seems to suggest that what is said shows use.
Quoting Banno
I'd say that good art always shows something. In the case of music (absent lyrics) and painting, nothing is said in the literal sense of 'said' that applies to sentences. In the case of poetry I agree that what is literally said rarely, if ever, exhausts its meaning. But in the case of poetry meaning is not use at all, but association.
No; What is said is use.
Quoting Janus
As does any Good Scott; although I take your point, good art is simply art that shows something...
Maybe I'm naive in asking:
Why always the metaphor of "shows" and never that of "tells"? As one example: a good poem tells of things it does not directly say. Or, in the case of lyric-less music, the melody doesn't show you emotions but instead tells you of emotions. Or, a pointing dog doesn't show you where the given is but tells you of where to look so as to discern the given.
"Showings" imply visualized images, which could be construed to be meaningless in the absence of a tale that they invoke. "Tellings" are always telling, bear significance and, hence, meaning, by their very nature.
This question goes out to @Banno as well.
Quoting Banno
Perhaps in some cases, but not in the case of poetry though. Looking at these issues from different angles would produce different answers it seems to me. I see meaning as consisting in associative content, and I have never liked the idea of 'meaning as use"; I think reference as use is more apt; which just means that words are conventionally used to refer to this or that. In the case of non-ostensive words it is more a case of 'indication as use'. The words in a command indicate that I want you to do something or notice, for example.
Yea, I'm thinking it through myself. To use an example, if the pointing dog is not showing but telling, then its pointing is itself propositional - could be a true or false telling (which doesn't seem to fit for "showing") - and this sans the use of language. And if its pointing is propositional, then it is indicative of (language-less) belief. Something along these lines. (I know from at least anecdotal evidence that dogs can deceive - and are thereby endowed with a rudimentary theory of mind.)
Haven't read through most of the tread, so I don't know if I'm addressing things already addressed.
Quoting Janus
...whereas I, following Wittgenstein, make a distinction based on the way we follow a rule.
Consider how someone might demonstrate to you that they understood what to do at a traffic light.
They might say that they know to stop on red, go on green and dither on yellow.
Or they might take you for a drive, through sets of traffic lights, and show you that they can do as expected.
There's more to this than meets the eye; but that might do for a start, or at least to show(!) that Janus and I are not quite on the same page.
In any case as an interesting aside to introduce another wrinkle in the fabric, and demonstrate the polysemy of some terms, you could say "I can tell from the way you drive that you understand how to respond correctly to traffic lights". That said even "The way you drive tells me that you understand how to respond correctly to traffic lights" would not be a particularly unusual usage
As for context, what is salient is that there are ways of stating beliefs and ways of showing beliefs. Which is the right hand side of a T-sentence? A showing or a saying? I say both.
In still trying to think this through:
It strikes me that the showing can occur even if not intended. For instance, in this quoted example they might intend to show you their understanding but inadvertently show you the opposite via their actions. Whereas a telling would always be an intended conveyance - an intended showing (?) - and, hence, maybe, always propositional.
In other words, I'm currently assuming that what is show may or may not be propositional. But that what is told (via language or otherwise) is always propositional.
As to one possible significance of this: In terms of at least art, since art is an intentionally produced expression, it would then consist of tellings (which might be construed as intended showings). If so, does that then imply all art to be in some abstract way propositional? Haven't thought that far out yet. But the notion of fake rather then genuine art does have some sway ... as in, for example, art that is a sell-out. Might the emotions of some songs, for example, be false rather than true due to the intentions behind their expression? This such that the beliefs via which the songs are produced are, in some highly abstract way, false beliefs? Thereby somehow making the song a propositional expression?
I'll apologize in advance if I need to. I'm freely thinking out loud here, without any discernible conclusions, in what's likely a very idiosyncratic take regarding what propositions can be constituted of ... And I know these thoughts are in a serious muddle.
But I'm posting this anyway, just in case it might be of interest. Still, may the post be overlooked if its train of thought derails the thread's subject matter.
Long story short, I agree with this.
Interesting. I don't disagree.
What a painting shows may not be anything like what was intended. Consider:
It's a painting of little merit. The artist was a try-hard.
[hide="Reveal"]What happens to your view of what this painting shows when you learn it is by Hitler? Consider that the Final Solution was planned in a location with a not dissimilar outlook. [/hide]
I found this point about belief being a broader semantic category to be closer to the truth. Just make an observation of one's own, if you will, ready-to-hand "belief" that the cup is on the table. The semantics, that is, the meaning, of spontaneous, unreflected passive affirmation is not explicit at all. It is in the fluid affair of grabbing the cup while reading, adjusting the light, checking the time and so forth. One can hardly call this propositional, only dispositionally propositional; and even when attention turns towards the cup which, say, spills, the "the cup is on the table and it spilled" proposition is certainly not entertained at all. The entire event is a seamless, propositionless doing. I do think we are in a cat's world of prereflective engagement.
As to the content: mostly pragmatic, like walking down the street, each step assumes a secure landing, and the implicit "belief" that is dispositionally "behind" this, stands at the ready if one is called upon to speak, or if one commences to think things out. Language and its propositions stands apart from the execution.
Prelinguistic? Pragmatics is this, and most of our engagements in the world are like this.
Quoting fdrake
A disposition towards some state of affairs: this disposition presents itself as a conditional "if...then.." which is a pragmatic construction. Dispositions are anticipatory and language and logic merely formalizes this.
This is an excellent account.
I'd just add that each step of the process can be put into the form "Constance believes P" where P is some proposition.
Purported is a qualifier on an event, not another kind of event. Whether or not a purported event is an event depends just on whether it meets the specified criteria for an event.
For example, that there is a purported earthquake does not imply that there is an earthquake. There may be no earthquake at all. If not, then nothing occurred.
I think he agrees that my statement of the event is a proposition. He just disagrees that the event itself is a proposition. But I think you would agree with @creativesoul about that as well.
Anyway, if that helps...
Quoting Banno
Do either of you see a tension between "most of our engagements with the world are (prelinguistic)" and "I agree, and those engagements target statements"?
A contradiction. If you dont know whether or not a event is characterized by a statement, then you can't say for sure that any event is characterized by a statement.
It is more accurate to say that any belief can be characterized by a statement however, whether or not the belief ever characterizes events that are not other beliefs, is a seperate matter.
I'd like to say that I generally agree with your pragmatic account of dispositions, and I think we have similar inspirations for holding similar accounts; exposure to Heidegger, going by your reference to "ready-to-hand". I think where we may lose agreement (though I dunno), is whether the act of putting something into words acts as a transformation of semantic content. If we admit that pragmatic engagements have their own broader flavour of semantic content than the semantic content of declarative sentences, and we take a pragmatic (speech-act centric) view on the use of language, it would seem that the broader flavour of semantic content is generic in the use of language, not simply the kind of content which we use declarative sentences to express through their connection to truthmakers/truth conditions.
I don't mean to suggest that "for every event E possibly there exists a sentence S(E) such that E is the truth maker for S(E)" is strictly false; I think it describes one way of using language rather than a property of nature. If we attempt to describe any phenomenon, it will tend to be cashed out in part using declarative sentences; but it will also contain allusions, metaphors, narrative and rhetorical devices, which function more by cajoling (performativity; illucutionary force and the expectation of perlocutionary effect) than by matching up with a truth maker. This second cajoling kind of content I take as corresponding to a part of the broader conceptualisation of semantic content above. It isn't spelled out in what makes an utterance true, it can only be spelled out in terms of its expected effects and motivations.
To be sure, those expected effects and motivations can in principle be stated as occurrent afterwards, but that switches from a kind of semantic content that is fleshed out by truth conditions to one which is fleshed out by pragmatic considerations.
Quoting Banno
Qua plain old alternative statements? Cool.
Quoting Banno
Was disposed to assent (upon being gifted language) to a pointing of "mouse running behind tree" at the inappropriate choice of space-time region? Cool. Apart maybe from the bit about language. So: was disposed to respond to the event as to a mouse-running-behind-tree event?
Quoting Banno
:ok:
Or is a statement not about (at least) what its subject term refers to and (at most) what its predicate term is true or false of?
Or were you just talking about sentences that aren't statements?
Where's that from? What's it mean?
Convolute. The mouse ran up the tree. The cat did not look up the tree, but behind it, and then around the base, not having seen the mouse run up the tree. The cat believed the mouse went behind the tree.
I'n not convinced that talk of dispositions is helpful.
Quoting bongo fury
...about...
Janus was talking about poetry; in a poem, reference need not work as it usually does in a statement.
Belief as a propositional attitude, with proposition substituted for statement. The substitution being justified by truth functional equivalence/substitution salva-veritae/disquotation. This goes back to the start of our dispute.
"engagements..."; "target..."?
...had me puzzled.
Not the second one: not the (debatably) "languageless" one. To say that the cat,
Quoting bongo fury
seems to me a fairly credible rough and ready behavioural analysis: a reasonable translation of "the cat believed the mouse went behind the tree" into a form less obviously open to the objection of anthropomorphism, to say nothing of theoretical doubts about beliefs altogether. I don't doubt that it presents problems, but it's fairly straight-forward. You seem to be hoping to exhibit the superiority of the natural idiom here,
Quoting Banno
Point not taken. All I'm seeing is a dogmatic attachment.
Quoting Banno
Me neither. But likewise talk of beliefs. I'm just trying to understand how people are understanding this talk. Preferably without having to be uncharitable and conclude mysticism.
Quoting Banno
Fine. But I thought this,
Quoting bongo fury
might be also about eschewing propositions as meanings of statements.
I've been at some pains not to use the word "meaning" except as a generic term, and certainly not as the thing the proposition stands for or refers to.
The notion to be avoided is that different statements can say the same thing, and that hence there is a thing called the proposition, which is what the statement means. It's customary here to write "snow is white" in several different languages and then claim these various statements all share the same proposition. There's an odd circularity there that Wittgenstein rids us of: the meaning of the statements is given by the proposition, and yet the proposition is no more than, or exactly, the meaning of the statements. Nothing is explained here.
Yes. Exactly. I thought you were talking about that. Not only about poetry.
Expected effects is what truth "really" is about? I think if you map out the lived landscape, insert that all that is there is a kind of, well, "thereING" rather than simply "there" then whatever you think about truth, knowledge, reality, ethics, aesthetics, mind is going to have to be reconstrued, for there is now a new foundational term in play: time. The pragmatists talked like this long ago (see Dewey, Peirce, James). Meaning is bound to doing, concepts are dynamic events, truth is, as you say, the expected effect.
So to say, "the contents of belief is propositional" puts the question to the basic assumptions about what a proposition is, and if a proposition is understood in terms of "consummatory events" (Dewey), i.e., the completion of a problem solving affair (See his Art As Experience: the organism approaches the obstacle, feels its way around, searching for a resolution, finds passage; then onward through, having the solution's details now incorporated into future possibilities) then herein lies the understanding! Of course, the content is full, rich, powerful: this goes to value, for value is the essence of caring about this. What is value? This is about metavalue, which I wont' go into unless you want to, but I say it moves the discussion to value because the content is, of course, not discussable. Presence qua presence cannot be spoken, and if the understanding is all about pragmatics, what we call reality, truth and the rest is really ready-to-hand instrumentality of Being in the world.
I read Rorty, Dewey and Heidegger as talking about essentially the same kind of analysis of knowledge, though Heidegger is much more interesting.
One source of tension is rather obvious: Talk about what is prelinguistic is done IN language and logic, that is, is propositional, and what can logic and language "say" about things outside of logic and language? Didn't Wittgenstein warn us about this? But this tension has not at all gone unnoticed. Hermeneutics is the only recourse. It is the deferential nature of the meanings of terms, and this runs smack into Derrida, doesn't it?
Nuh. But it helps, when done well.
Belief is a probability knowledge. You don't know if the king has a beard; but if you believe that it does, then your bets are on the king having a beard.
Knowledge preempts belief. If you see the king, and he has a beard, your belief assumes a probability of one, which is knowledge.
Do either of them need to be propositional? In a sense that all beliefs have the feature of not defying description, whether the description exists, is thought of, or written down in some way or form... all beliefs are propostional.
You don't need to propose them to know they can be expressed as a proposition.
Instead, you wish to disprove this by describing a belief that is indescribable. That would be a valid way of destroying the argument that all thoughts, including beliefs, are propositional.
Naming and descriptive practices.
That's close to what I've argued in the debate. Second post particularly. Existential dependency. However, some belief about 'the world' does not need/require language, and some does.
Quoting Andrew M
The clause describes what happened(an event). Nothing above strikes me wrong.
Cool. And,
Quoting creativesoul
might do so by other means or in other ways than are implied by such practices?
@Banno, @Andrew M
If we're using terms in the same way, I don't think it's surprising that "presence qua presence cannot be spoken", words aren't identical to the things they stand in for after all. When we make an assertion, a whole process of interaction has lead to the uttered statement. "This rose is red", what are the boundaries of the rose? How many thorns does it have? How many petals? What is its hue? How reflective is it? How tall? A condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns occurs when using words to stand in for them; what counts as a rose, what counts as red, and what is irrelevant for both instances of counting as.
To say that "x" and x pick out the same thing is quite different than saying "x" is true iff x, the equivalence between the x on the left and the x on the right occurs only after the rose has been counted as red and counted as a rose; that is to say after it has been picked out. A whole regime of phenomena; of representation, of perceptual exploration of the environment, of how word is tailored to world; is hidden if the x on the right is treated as an uninterpreted event in the world. The perspective, norms, use of language, go into x, that is why it can be matched redundantly with "x" being true. In other words, that x on the right is theory ladened, and the theory it is ladened with is set up by how the statement counts as the state of affairs.
Which provides a problem, if how "x" counts as x is internal to norms of discourse - it is indeed part of their execution -, those discursive norms must be taken as a given in order for disquotation to spell out the sense of a declarative sentences. ""x" and x pick out the same thing" works as an account of the sense of "x" only insofar as the means by which they do pick out the same thing is taken for granted. For declarative sentences, this is all buried in truth; truth as direct but interpreted contact between what the sentence is and what it picks out. That burial is also an inversion; what counts as an event becomes the substrate of the declarative sentence, rather than the speech act of its assertion containing within it a generation of what counts as what in interaction with an event. Displacing the generative component of the speech act's content with the norms by which the speech is judged by that generative content. This is an intellectual magic trick; a conjuring of the given by which the relationship between "x" and x is judged as a redundancy. In reality, that relationship is a generative process of interaction, and the conformability between "x" and x can be seen, retrospectively, as its output.
Yes. Some language-less creatures are capable of attributing meaning.
Quoting bongo fury
It's worse than I thought, if "x" isn't even abbreviating "x" is true.
Still cool, perhaps. How, though?
By virtue of drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things.
Yeah. A simple substitution exercise shows the error of equivocation nicely.
Ok, and then what counts as "drawing correlations" that isn't some kind of a game of symbol-pointing?
Just interested.
Quoting Banno
Indeed it does. We may make some headway here.
What would count as a misattribution of belief as compared/contrasted to correctly attributing belief to such language-less creatures?
Drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, none of which are language use.
Example?
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting bongo fury
Here we agree.
Mice, trees, spatial relations between mice, trees, and the creature themselves...
Believing the mouse ran behind the tree...
Yes, and for very good reason. I'm invoking the distinction between our reports of an other's belief, and an other's belief.
Not seeing the relevance of "smart phones"...
Attribution of beliefs to phones is a misattribution.
But an example of how the languageless creature draws a correlation between two or more of these?
Smart phones are not the sorts of things capable of attributing meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, including but not limited to themselves...
...and that is how all belief systems emerge/begin. Smart phones do not attribute meaning.
Cool. Agreed.
Quoting bongo fury
This makes no sense.
The how part is autonomous. It requires certain biological machinery, etc. It just happens(at first anyway)... the drawing correlations, I mean.
If not how, then in what ways? How am I to think of a cat as drawing correlations? By (perhaps?) appreciating how it is
Quoting bongo fury
My cats know the sound of my car, as a result of drawing correlations between it and me. They believe I am home when they hear it. The sound of certain kinds of plastic is also meaningful to them by virtue of being part of the correlation they've drawn between it and getting treats, etc. I've already offered the directly perceptible things in believing the mouse ran behind the tree. Some other things are of course the cat's own hunting desire/instinct, or perhaps hunger pangs, etc. The cat wants to catch the mouse.
Banno's cat has drawn correlations between the sounds and smells of other cats(unfriendly ones) and those other cats. Hence, she spits and hisses because she believes that an unfriendly cat is outside. Certainly these correlations between her past fighting with such cats develop into a predisposition towards those cats and those sounds and smells, that's part of how belief about the world and/or ourselves effects/affects how we think about current events(what we believe is happening).
Ok, so drawing of correlations between things is formation of dispositions to respond to them which are relative to each other? Maybe?
A name is not a description. Nor does a name refer only in virtue of its somehow being the same as a description.
But yes, words are not identical to the thing they refer to; "Banno" is not Banno. However, "Banno" is used to refer to Banno, and Banno is Banno.
T-sentences do not claim that the thing on the left is the very same as the thing on the right. The equivalence is one of truth-function, not of identity. Any interpretation that applies to the proposition on the left also applies to the state of affairs on the right. Hence, they cancel out, like paired variables in any equation.
What do?
So the interpretations cancel out? Or the things on either side of the IFF?
Quoting Banno
??
What do?
Ah, not a bad question.
One would suppose that misattribution would be the same for animals and people.
There's an essay here, that I haven't time to write. But one sort of misattribution would be to say Adam believed P when really Adam believed Q.
And this works if Adam is a horse.
In this case it will come down to which of two attributions is the real one...
But this is to base the misattribution on a difference in the propositional content; so the proble for you will be to explain misattribution without a propositional content.
Quoting creativesoul
Can there be a correlation drawn that cannot be put into propositional form?
Is all Creative doing here nought but using "correlation" were I use "Proposition"?
I see. Not symbols at all. Signs.
I will do my best to use terms in a way that is familiar to your discussion.
The question I have for the above is, to say words aren't identical to the things they stand for, what "things" do you have in mind? Where are the boundaries of thing as a thing? What thingly qualities are implicitly brought to bear in the calling of X a thing? In short, nothing language can say can demonstrate a release from the richness of associated meaning so as to isolate any one thing such that the one thing is one. All terms are multiplicities, so when making assertions at all, any thing is absorbed into the congregation meanings. There are no things such that "words are not identical" to them. Presence qua presence cannot be made sense of UNLESS there is something in the actuality that "speaks" that is not explained in terms of other terms. This would be an absolute, not that such a term can be made sense of, it is the only wheel that rolls to express the peculiar nature of ethics: the injunction.
Quoting fdrake
Interesting. I tend to abide by what Heidegger says, and I find pragmatism coincides, though I think this needs work on my part to be clearer. I live an everyday life with already intact engagements, like walking down the street, waving at a friend, and so on. It is when something goes wrong that I take notice, and I think Dewey (Rorty following Dewey on this) makes a very good case from here: Meaning is the consummatory event whereby the problem that arises is solved, wherein lies the foundation for all understanding, language structured or otherwise. X, as I take your thinking, is prereflective, that is, the bare recognition that the snow is white, unreflected on, passed over propositionally, a ready-to-hand familiarity. Is this autonomic recognition inherently propositional? For one endowed with language, it is, for what gathers in the familiar event is the language learned. But it also is more, and that more is the rich meanings that are not pragmatic at all, but are simply the givens of the world, and these are value laden, and this brings the matter to the thesis at hand, metaethics. I don't agree with Dewey that such meanings are "wrought out" of pragmatic events, or, if this characterization works, it is not exhaustive of what occurs as one is still left with the presence as such that defies the pragmatics of speech altogether. We should, as Wittgenstein famously says, pass over such things in silence, but what of value? Value qualia, the appearing, not redly, tactilely, but in pain or joy: these cannot be spoken; one does not speak the world of ineffable actualities, these "qualia". But then, there is, I claim again (responding to the quote of mine you responded to), the injunction against causing pain that is "spoken". The proof lies in the pudding: put a flame to your finger and observe. A truly exhaustive analysis of the event cannot overlook its most salient feature, which is its noncontingent "badness".
Quoting fdrake
If I understand you rightly, the magic trick has to do with attempting to "retrospectively" (after the case) take the question of whether "x" and x is a mere redundancy (tautology?) up IN a truth bearing proposition, which is circular, for such a proposition cannot penetrate into the nature is what is arguably non propositional, the full generative "sense". In other words, it is through the truth of the proposition that all things intelligible must pass. My thoughts go like this: in the execution of x, the passive observation, and "there is a rabbit" is uttered, truth only comes into play after the fact because it is in this afterward that truth, the functional concept's context comes into play. Until one utters the term explicitly, truth is merely a standby notion, along with a cluster of other rabbit and non rabbit notions that implicitly attend, ready to hand.
Wasn't talking about names as definite descriptions. "Standing in" is a reference to the quote: "Words don't stand for things, they stand in for them". Meaning roughly language functions in the absence of the things it is concerned with, and it must be this way. Even when you say "I do" at a marriage, marriage isn't there in the words is it? It's not like you "conjure" marriage by saying "I do", the act's significance is deferred to the historical+institutional+interpersonal contexts, and it's only in relation to those contexts that "I do" stands in for marriage in any way at all. That's the sense of "standing in" I was going for.
Quoting Banno
I never said they were identical, I said they "counted as" each other - not every way for two things to be held equivalent is an identity between them. Indeed, the first part of the post contains "words aren't identical to the things they stand in for".
I'd like to present a hypothetical scenario, which I'll analyze in my own words, and then perhaps you can point out any problems, as you see it.
The scenario is that it is raining and Alice, after looking out her window, says that it is raining.
What is occurring (that it is raining) is just what Alice says is occurring. Her statement is true.
Now people wouldn't normally make statements about rain if they (and others) didn't know what rain was, at least in some rudimentary sense. Their knowledge about rain arises from their interactions with the world. They have experienced wet weather (as distinguished from dry weather) and, collectively, have found it noteworthy enough to create language about it.
Those experiences are what ground the use of that language. So when Alice says that it is raining, she is saying that the particular situation she is currently in is a wet weather situation - something that she is familiar with in her experience. Whether she speaks truly or not depends on whether it is a wet weather situation. If it weren't raining and, instead, Bob were on the roof hosing water, then her statement would be false (unbeknownst to her, at least for now).
I don't see anything mysterious or problematic with this. It's just how the language game operates (in ordinary, everyday communications, at least).
Yes, what do you mean by "ground", how does it work?
I must need more coffee, because I can't make sense of this. What are the things language is concerned with? It is concerned with the stuff around us every day. I don't see how it could be said to function in their absence.
Quoting fdrake
Then what is this...?
Quoting fdrake
When we make the assertion that the rose is red we somehow invoke a "condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns"...?
Looks like you are claiming something along the lines of a description that serves to "pick out" the individual involved. And we know from Kripke that this is not how names work.
Or are you wishing for something like Searle's Background or Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs? That doesn't seem right, either - we don't need to know how tall the rose is in order to believe that the rose is red.
Quoting Constance
"The rose is red" is true IFF the rose is red.
What ever "thingly qualities are implicitly brought to bear in the calling of X a rose" that are used in "The rose is red" may also to be used in "'The rose is red' is true". (@bongo fury...?)
We don't need an essence, a definite description, a complete understanding, of what the rose is for it to be "ready-to-hand" that it is red.
Quoting Constance
...which looks like no more than a long way of saying that truth is a predicate of statements.
Trivially speaking, it's the same in that the misattribution is not what they believe.
Misattributing belief to another(regardless of whether they are language-less) is to provide a false account of the other's belief. In order to know whether or not that account is false, we must first know what the other's belief is, or at the very least what it could possibly be given what else we do know about the other.
What can we know about a language-less creature's belief?
We can know that it cannot include language use. All predication is language use. We can know that it cannot include predication. All propositions are predication. We can know that it cannot include propositions. All statements are language use. We can know that it cannot include statements. We can know that it cannot be about language use, predication, propositions, or statements.
Since language-less belief cannot include or be about predication, propositions, or statements, then the claim that all belief has propositional content is false, for language-less belief cannot.
I've always wondered why you believe that this is so important?
Putting meaningful language-less correlations(language-less belief) into propositional form does not make the language-less belief themselves propositional in their content. Rather, it makes them amenable to being talked about; which, evolutionarily speaking, makes perfect sense. That also speaks to my second post in the debate.
A mouse running behind a tree is an event. Believing that a mouse ran behind a tree is belief about those events. A language-less creature, such as a cat, can form such beliefs about such events. One believes a mouse ran behind the tree if one draws correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of itself, the mouse, and the tree. The event takes place regardless of whether or not any creature forms belief about the event. None of it - the occurrence of event or the occurrence of language-less belief formation about the event - includes or is about language use. None of it is propositional in content.
Our account most certainly is.
We might all agree that having a belief is not like having something in one's pocket.
We might suppose that @creativesoul has a handkerchief in his pocket. Here, there is a fact of the matter, that can be decided by Creative producing the kerchief and demonstrating us correct. But Creative cannot produce his belief for our inspection; all Creative can do is to make claims about that belief.
This has odd ramifications for the misattribution of belief. We might all think that Creative has a kerchief in his pocket, but it is really a beetle.
It's as if Creative were not able even to look in to the pocket to see if there is a kerchief there - because we do sometimes talk about our beliefs being misplaced; Perhaps I believed I was doing such-and-such from the best of intentions, but it turned out I was just being selfish.
We might all, Creative included, think that Creative has a kerchief in his pocket, but it is really a beetle. But in the case of belief, we cannot take a look.
The grammar of belief is not like the grammar of things in pockets. I showed in the debate how beliefs are there in order that we can distinguish between what is the case and what we take to be the case, in order to explain things such as when we are in error. They are also of use in explaining why we do things - she reached into her pocket because she believed it contained a kerchief; she was surprised to pull out a gun...
One is tempted to say something like: there is a fact of the matter as to whether there is a kerchief in Creative's pocket, or a beetle, or a gun. But there is no equivalent fact of the matter as to what Creative believes.
Quoting creativesoul
The cat can put something in its pocket? We can explain the cat's behaviour by talking in terms of what it believes. But there is no way to pull the belief out of the pocket to confirm or refute our assertions. The belief does not function in the same way as the kerchief, gun or beetle.
This is another way of expressing something on which I insisted previously: beliefs are not mental furniture. They are not things. So it is misguided to think:
Quoting creativesoul
(I need a copy editor...)
...which can be put into propositional form; hence, all belief is propositional.
Quoting bongo fury
(... and you think reference is real.)
You know as well as I do that it's unfashionable to make names work like predicates that pick out a unique object. When someone says "This rose is red", and I am talking about "a condensation of the rose's constitutive patterns", I did not intend to set up a correspondence between the noun "rose" and the rose properties, I intended to set up a productive relationship between the rose and the speech act of asserting "This rose is red".
You might want to call it a causal relationship, what was it about the rose that caused me to describe it as red? No doubt you will say that it was a red rose. Then we've got to return to the question; what caused it to count as a red rose? That it was a red rose explains why the assertion was true, but not the cause of the assertion.
Part of the cause of that "counts as" is the rose, part of that counts as is in the norms of language use.
Quoting Banno
Maybe you've read "absence" as "it doesn't exist at all", I'm intending "absence" as whatever is allowing us to speak of a hypothetical red rose over the forum. It's in neither of our heads is, it's in neither of our memories, it's in neither of our imaginations, so where is it? Absent, in that sense. But it works all the same.
No, I wouldn't; and this is salient because I think @Constance, in reaching for Heidegger, pulls out a misguided picture of how language works. It's not causal, but intentional. We are not caused to call the flower a rose, or to claim that it is red; we choose to do so, we use the words "rose" and "red" in that way.
I think "frank" does not refer to you in the way a marble causes another to move; I'm not sure how that could work. I think we are using the word "frank" to refer to you.
But what has this to do with belief?
I would think. Why then, continue talking about belief as if it is? I've certainly never claimed that having belief is equivalent to having something in one's pocket. I'm left wondering what the point of that post was???
Having belief about mice and trees is the result of having drawn correlations between mice, trees, and other things.
That's exactly what you are doing in supposing that the belief of you mouse is some sort of correlation going on in its head.
If something can be put into propositional form, then it is propositional?
Surely, you're not claiming that, are you?
:brow:
I would think that when something is put into propositional form, it was not propositional prior to the putting.
I didn't decide to call those red flowers "roses". Are you saying we collectively decided that? That can't be true. Most of the collective is dead.
Quoting Banno
I don't know.
I suppose no such thing.
Meaningful belief is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location.
A capable language-less creature believes a mouse ran behind the tree if they draw correlations between the spatiotemporal locations of themselves, the mouse, and the tree. The content of that belief is the mouse, the tree, themselves, spatiotemporal locations, and the correlations drawn between all those different directly perceptible things(and others undoubtedly).
The content of all belief about mice running around trees always includes mice, trees, and spatial relationships. All of these different directly perceptible things are necessary elemental constituents of such language-less belief. Remove any one of them and the elemental correlational content is lacking.
Indeed. The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents.
...then where are we going?
Quoting frank
Sure. So you think you were caused to do so? You could not have done otherwise?
If something is put into square form, is it square?
Would you think that when something is put into square form, it was not square prior to the putting?
It's not put into square form or propositional form. It is square or propositional.
Unless you are heading off into some form of antirealism.
Did too.
...which if it is anything is propositional: "the mouse went behind the tree".
Which was to be proved.
I can't see you doing anything here except agreeing with me most ardently.
I'm bound to call them roses by my desire to communicate.
...bound...?
No, you are not. You might say "them pretty flowers over there", or "the Rosaceae", or "????" or even "the bush I cut down last week because it prickled my foot".
And if they say, "You mean the rose?"
If I want to communicate, I have to follow the rules. My desire makes a slave of me.
And not all language is communication.
But still, where is this going? "Cause if we don't know where we are going, any post will take you there.
But that's not the whole of language, any more than it is the whole of the world.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm tempted, but remain skeptical. Seems like another (along with "belief") anthropomorphic over-extension of the real thing, which in this case is humans' game of pretend: wherein, as you say,
Quoting Janus
The anthropomorphising extends too easily (for my liking) to self-driving cars and Chinese Rooms.
I thought @fdrake was sorting out how the T-sentence rule works? I think the answer is that it does no work. It's not informative. It's trivially true.
Do you agree?
Can you provide an example fo a correlation that cannot be shown to be in propositional form?
That would be a correlation that was not a property nor a relation between things.
So, yes, what you say is correct, but does not exclude the proposal that the content of belief is propositional. Indeed, if anything, it says the same thing.
T-sentences have two uses.
Firstly, if we take "P" as some proposition, and A as it's translation, then the T-sentence ("P" is true iff A) sets out the meaning of "...is true". This is what Tarski did with them.
Secondly, if we take truth as understood, the the T-sentence ("P" is true iff A) sets out the conditions under which "P" is true; that is, A. That's what Davidson did with them.
I know quoting from my holy book (apocrypha) isn't an argument, but...
Yep, we know how to play the game of agreeing to pretend that certain words and pictures point at certain things. Pretend seems to me a suitable word for that kind of game. I don't mean we don't actually play it.
We understand this not in the way we understand that the cat is on the mat, but in the way that we understand that the Bishop only ever stays on the same coloured squares. We understand not a fact, but a procedure that allows us to get on with the game.
That seems to me what is incongruous in @fdrake and @Constance, that in seeing reference as ready-to-hand they are mystified by its being conventional.
I agree with that.
@Banno See above. Are we disagreeing?
Quoting Banno
:smirk:
More self-contradiction.
Sure it is a matter of understanding following conventional associations. I don't think chess is a very good analogy, but I agree we don't understand it in the same way we understand a statement about some sensible state of affairs; I take all this to be trivially true, so much so that I cannot understand why anyone would disagree.
Quoting Banno Well you should since I'm certainly not using obscure language; it's very straightforward. I'm happy to explain anything you haven't understood in what I've said.
And yet I don't. What do you think we might disagree about?
Seems amenable!
Though @Banno here uses it (at least, last time we talked about it) in a deflationary manner. IE the sense of a declarative sentence is spelled out in the conditions that would make it true and only those conditions, and there's no better candidate for spelling out those conditions than disquoting the declarative sentence itself. The major contrast between deflation and correspondence (as I see it) is that a correspondence theory takes a sentence and matches it to some sort of worldly fact - like an event, a thought, an object's properties - and says the sentence is true when it matches the fact.. Banno's deflationary view doesn't match the sentence with some worldly fact, it matches it with other sentences that would be true in all and only the same conditions.
Banno's particular quirk (probably following Davidson) is that he then treats truth (IIRC) as an unanalysable primitive in norms of language; so the meanings of sentences are spelled out by how they are true, but what it means to say a sentence is true is something that must be assumed of any use of language and can't be spelled out in terms of any other idea or language practice. You already know what it means for a declarative sentence to be true, if you didn't the whole apparatus of language around it would fall apart. For Banno, as for Davidson, it seems the T-sentence isn't a theory of truth; it takes truth as a given and uses the T sentence to provide a theory of meaning.
Quoting Banno
It is conventional, but it isn't merely conventional. I doubt you believe that "this is a red rose" simply because we call it one. Norms play a part, they don't determine it all; otherwise there'd be no ability to coordinate between systems of evaluating sentences - how can we tell "snow is white" is true if and only if schnee ist weiß? Have to look at the snow and the norms of use.
It's the context for our talk. Language doesn't arise in a vacuum, but in our interactions with the world (our experiences). We perceive a difference between wet weather and dry weather, say, and when being aware of such differences is useful for our purposes, language is created and used. Those perceived differences are what our talk is grounded in, i.e., they provide the context for our talk.
If you'll permit me to be a bit socratic, when you say that they "provide the context for our talk", and that this context "grounds" the use of language, I was wondering if you could comment on:
(1) How speech acts are assigned to contexts; how do you tell which context a speech act is in?
(2) Whether the context of a given speech act doesn't just "ground" but also determines some component of its meaning - or in a more pragmatic vocabulary, if the context the speech act arises in influences the norms of use of the speech act?
The norms of use consist of patterns of speech acts in interaction with the world.
Which are used to ground and contextualise speech acts interacting with the world.
One point of the analysis treats speech acts as a given - a base/guarantor of meaning, one point of the analysis treats them as fungible - the superstructure/vehicle of meaning. Both contextualiser and context element - condition of possibility and actual instance.
I agree that speech acts both contextualise norms of language use and arise in contexts, what I think this does is stop them from being appealed to as a ground at one moment and as an expression in that ground the next.
So you're arguing for semantic holism?
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.
The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things.[/quote]
You better believe it!
When put that way, what was the gist of the motivation for the debate about whether beilef is propositional or not?
I got the feeling that it was about whether belief in God (and other religious claims) is justified.
My feeling could be wrong, of course.
I'm arguing that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief; that all belief consists of correlations drawn between different things; that some language-less creatures have belief; that not all belief is propositional in content; that all our accounting practices of an other's belief(and our own) are propositional in form.
If all belief has propositional content then either propositions somehow exist in their entirety prior to language use in such a way so that language-less creature's belief can have propositional content or language-less creatures have no belief.
Correcting a long-standing conventional error of treating propositions as equivalent to belief(conflating belief and propositions) that stemmed from epistemology(JTB), by virtue of neglecting the stark differences in the truth conditions of some belief as compared to the truth conditions of a proposition in general when both are represented by the same marks, such as "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" or "Either Jones has a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona".
Presenting a notion of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression and doesn't lead to anthropomorphism when talking about the minds of other animals.
Nah. I'm pretty sure Banno and I are on much the same page when it comes to belief in God.
Important, and a bit ironic, given that I've never said otherwise, but you've acted as if I have.
Read the debate. I explicitly rejected that link.
After all, setting out what is the case is exactly what propositions do;
It should not be at all remarkable that our common stock of words includes a way of setting out how things are. Nor is it surprising that we have a way of marking utterances of this sort that are felicitous - they are true. We would also expect ways of talking about non felicitous utterances of this sort; in the case at hand, a way of talking about situations where someone takes what is the case to be one way when someone else takes it to be the other.
Propositions - statements - are about things and their relations; or as Creative puts it, they are about "correlation". Again, in saying that beliefs are correlations Creative is doing no more than saying that beliefs have propositional content.
On the way here we passed by the relation between words and the world; @Constance pointed to the "seamless, propositionless doing" of our everyday encounters with the world. @fdrake followed through on this. There is a way of understanding a rule that is not set out in more rules, but rather is shown in how we enact the rule. There is a way of understanding that "Snow is white" is true that is not only set out in the T-sentence '"Snow is white" is true only if snow is white', but understood in making snowballs, watching the drifting specks, shovelling the pathway. This is not said, but shown. That does not render it unsayable - after all, Constance, fdrake and I have indeed been saying it. The T-sentence sets out the very equivalence between word and world, but to see this, like the duck-rabbit, one has to be able to look at the T-sentence in two ways; what it says is a truth functional equivalence of two sets of words; what it shows is the relation between words and the world. Picture a T-sentence in which the equivalence is between '"Snow is white" is true' and white snow.
If I had any doubts, they were about what it was you were asserting. So if you now say we are in agreement, I won't disagree.
This holds true for religious belief as well.
Well... it can be hard to tell:
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
Which show signs of systematic ambiguity (bordering on sophistry) between state of affairs as (A) unquoted statement and (B) worldly fact. Leading to this kind of thing,
Quoting Andrew M
and
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting Janus
No, agreed, but the association itself is pretended, as you virtually allowed here:
Quoting Janus
There's definitely a mapping game, but no definition at all to the mapping, unless we "agree to pretend".
Quoting Janus
Are you sure it's obvious to a bio-semiotician? With their signs, which are allegedly so different from symbols?
Quoting bongo fury
Smoke may be a sign of fire, but it is not a symbol of fire. Seems obvious to me. I think Peirce's distinctions between signs, ikons and symbols make good sense.
Quoting Banno
I'm very sympathetic to the idea that meaning is prior to language use, marks, symbols... However, I've found that apo conflates meaning with causality, and he's not alone in that regard. There's a notion...'natural meaning', perhaps, or something like that that believes that meaning is somehow prior to becoming meaningful to a creature. Smoke being called "a sign" of fire is exactly such a conflation when and if it is called such in the complete absence of a creature capable of drawing correlations between the two. In other words, I agree that smoke can become a sign of fire, but do not at all agree that it is in any situation apart from becoming and/or already being meaningful to a creature capable of attributing meaning.
We can believe things that aren't true, so why bring up T-sentences at all?
You must mean possible worlds.
The debate between you and creative just comes down to how we want to define belief. We can define it any way we like, obviously.
Your sticking point has to do with some equivalence of word and world. Since words are commonly put together to say untrue things, there can't be any equivalence.
I used it here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/482981
In summary, it shows that the state of affairs is truth functionally equivalent to a proposition; since Creative accepts states of affairs, (calling them correlations...) it follows that states of affairs are truth functionally equivalent to true propositions. Creative accepts that beliefs involve correlations, erstwhile states of affairs, and hence has to agree that his correlations are truth functionally equivalent to a true proposition.
Nope. Not needed for the logic of T-sentences. If you are interested I can reference the Davidson articles that articulate this.
Quoting frank
No, it doesn't. It comes down to his not recognising the propositional content of what he calls correlations.
Quoting frank
This, and your comment re modality, leads me to think that you haven't grokked the logic of a t-sentence. IF the LHS of a T-sentence is false, and the T-sentence is true, the RHS will also be false.
”Snow is purple" is true IFF snow is purple.
How does this set out an equivalence of word and world?
it's not "Snow is white"; it's that snow is white.
it's not
”Snow is purple" is true IFF "snow is purple".
The sentence on the right is being used, not mentioned.
But let's do it your way.
The quoted part is a sentence that's been mentioned. The RHS is a sentence that's being used. Used as in uttered?
What is on the RHS is a state of affairs, a fact, what is the case, the relevant correlation, the extension of the sentence...
A truthmaker, then. And if it's a state of affairs that does not obtain, what is it?
False.
The RHS can be wrong.
The world can't have the property of being wrong.
The RHS is not the world.
It is if it is true; and that's what is salient. But I'm not interested in the ontological status of counterfactuals, nor is it relevant. What counts is that if the RHS is true it is how things are, if it is how things are it is true. How that is decided is irrelevant.
Ok. :cool:
What's the extension of an apology?
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
Quoting fdrake
While confusion of use and mention is endemic, can we please focus on ordinary declarative statements?
How should we understand use and mention?
As the difference between using a word or phrase to mention (refer to, denote, describe, point at) an object and using a quotation or other word or phrase to mention the word.
I.e. the distinction ignored here,
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting bongo fury
I'm cool with phrase extending to cover statement, even though I dispute that (or at least how) whole statements refer. As long as the statement isn't systematically confused with its alleged referent (event, or worldly fact as fdrake puts it). E.g. virtually any reference to "states of affairs".
Speech acts occur in a context. So part of the context in the hypothetical I presented was that it was raining. How you tell what the context is is both a matter of looking (as Alice did) and being correct (as Alice was).
Quoting fdrake
If I understand you then, yes. If someone were unclear about what rain was, then it could be ostensively demonstrated. If someone claims that it is raining, then they are identifying their situation as being that kind of situation.
Quoting fdrake
I don't follow. Can you give an example here?
If you like. I think they're being emphasised in an oscillatory manner.
To my tastes @Banno is trying to have his cake and eat it too - language is pragmatic, generically speech acts aren't assertions, truth plays a central role in a theory of meaning (of assertions).
Allegedly: belief's a two place relation with an agent on the left and a statement on the right, but that works out the same as the agent having a belief about the statement's disquotation because the statement and its disquotation are truth functionally equivalent (despite that one is a statement, and one is a worldly event - the world as a metalanguage).
When you push on the alleged connection between the statement and its truth condition, we end up with "use", pragmatics, norms being used to justify the belief claim.
When you push on the pragmatics, you end up with something like a formal semantics of statements alone to justify the belief claim.
Repeat ad nauseum, never talk about anything substantive. It feels like a holism that will use anything it deems connected to avoid articulating a point.
Fine, add that to the parenthetical varieties of "alleged referent" above.
Now you're doing it. The statement is a disquotation (of its quotation).
Quoting fdrake
Qué?
Heaps of alleged referents. If we accidentally say something true, the world is born in the shape of our sentences.
This would make a good graphic novel.
Sorry, I had on intention to disrupt. When I first started reading the debate, it seemed oddly familiar, and now I remembered why: I had a Christian "friend" who, over the years, went to great lengths in trying to convert me. His style was to produce a science-inspired or philosophy-inspired argument, parts of which were indisputable and to which I agreed, and then he'd go for the jugular. I didn't convert. But now and then I notice and become aware of the consequences (and damage) that being exposed to his conversion effors left on me. Your debate about propositions was one such instance.
I was summarising what I understood as Banno's account.
@Banno is doing it again.
Quoting Banno
From my second post in the debate...
Quoting creativesoul
There's an emaciated notion of truth, meaning, and belief at work here in Banno's position, which comes as no surprise to me given that truth and meaning are both existentially dependent upon belief formation. They both emerge via correlations drawn between different things.
Your point?
Yep.
Quoting fdrake
That doesn't look like what I am saying...
I'd like you to fill this out.
To be clear, the metalanguage is on the left, and contains the truth predicate. The object language is on the right. So the object language is the world.
The missing piece may be that the world is, in Davidson's words, always and already interpreted. The illocution of making statements involves representing the world in words - that's what the game is.
It's not difficult to understand.
Use is deploying a word, phrase, sentence, group or groups of sentences to refer, command, entreat, explain or whatever else we do with words, phrases, sentences or groups of sentences.
Mention is referring to a word, phrase, sentence or group of sentences.
Do you see any problem with this?
He got this idea from Heidegger no doubt.
Fair enough. Even Goodman explored in that direction early on. But Catherine Elgin (chapter 8 here, but no pdf or preview) argues that his mature theory shows how being a sign of fire, in the sense meant, is fully explained as a species of symbolising fire. Not something essentially different, and hence (though this isn't Elgin's point) not an excuse to impute symbolic thinking (or an alleged cousin of it) anthropomorphically.
I think smoke being a sign of fire, and the like, are different than, for example a letter symbolizing a sound or a sound symbolizing an object. I would agree they are related of course, you might say symbolizing evolves out of signifying. I haven't read Elgin though.
I am not sure I am exactly in line with Peirce on this (it's a long time since I've read him), but the way I see it is that signs are material correlations (the habit of association forms when one phenomenon is repeatedly found to be proximally occurrent with another), Ikons are imagistic correlations (the ikon or pictograph looks like what it represents) and symbols are conventional (the association has been established by traditional or social usage). This seems to make good sense to me, but I'd be happy to have this view corrected or improved upon.
I take it you mean the object language considered as a whole domain of symbols plus its own semantic world of denoted objects comprises the semantic world of the metalanguage? (Nothing like "the world as a metalanguage", but fine. Thank goodness, indeed.)
But that wouldn't excuse blurring the distinction between syntactic and semantic layers of the object language.
It doesn't matter that it's natural language, where the layers aren't as clear cut as for Tarski. There's still no need to confuse use vs mention, logical or grammatical subject vs subject-matter, state of affairs or disquotation as in statement vs state of affairs or disquotation as in event (or whatever).
So... you think I am jumbling use and mention?
I want to be clear about this. "The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.
That's not an ambiguity.
One can use a screw driver to drive a screw, or one can put it away into the toolbox. That does not make the use of a screwdriver ambiguous.
Edit:
Quoting fdrake
Is this what you had in mind?
Sure. I was responding to Bongo Fury's comment that confusion of use and mention had reached pandemic status. I was asking for his view of it to set alongside Banno's (which is kind of unique, I think).
I mean that the world is all that is the case.
Look at that and reassure me that you can see that it is about what can be stated.
I do.
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting Banno
??
I cannot see your point.
Use your words. Show me the ambiguity.
I shall try to contrast what I've been thinking to what you've been thinking, but I'd like you to answer a couple of questions first. I need you to spell out how you think this works before I try and make the contrast.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
When you say "the object language is the world", what does that mean? Does it entail that the world is a language because it is an object language, or are you making a different claim? If you are making a different claim, what metaphysics justifies treating the world as a language?
Moreover, I'll grant that the world is "always already interpreted", but I don't see why that should make the content of that tacit interpretation propositional or even just language-like. Can you spell that out for me? Heidegger's emphatically against the claim that tacit interpretation works primarily by how it comes to be embedded in declarative sentences. Even though he sides with the claim that language ("discourse") plays a central role in giving the world its interactive texture (of institutions, intentions, rituals, signposts, jokes etc) and that texture is "always already there".
For Heidegger, propositionality; called the predicative "as structure" - conceived of as the adequation of thought and being through sententially expressed judgements - is retrojected onto pragmatic activity. It arises during conceptual/intellectual judgements regarding activities. It's like Witty's seeing-as applied to statable judgements - a seeing that (such and such) is the case. This is contrasted to the pre-predicative "as structure"; the pragmatic, procedural and existential components of interpretation - more of a seeing-how and the how of seeing-as. He has language "discourse" interweaving+coordinating both of those "as-structures" without exhausting all of their aspects, notably only the first has statements (judgements) playing a central role.
(substantial edits)
There's a great sci-fi movie called Arrival in which the protagonist gains the alien's worldview as she learns their language. She subsequently has the ability to travel forward in her her own timeline like the aliens can.
On the one hand, this plot expresses your point that what we know of the world is bound by language and vice versa.
But it also conflicts in the idea that the world (in total) is expressable in language. It's logically possible that there are aspects of the world that we can't point to with language because we don't have the concepts (yet).
So you could narrow down your assessment of the RHS to 'the world as we know it presently'.
You can't say it's the world in total unless you can rule out the plot of Arrival and say our worldview is presently complete. And don't bring up Davidson's translation thing. I'm not saying these supposed hidden parts of the world are necessarily untranslatable. Just that our languages don't necessarily cover every aspect of the world in total.
To support your point you might present an aspect of the world that is not covered by our language.
You show us, a new riff or artwork or film and say "see, that's new", and then we talk about it. Language grows.
Nothing in that counts against statements representing the world. Pointing out that words present the world, that the world is what is the case, is not claiming that there are things we do not know.
Solaris(1972) was better.
Yep. Well, maybe not unique but characteristic. Mention of use incites, in many, insurrection against pointing (naming, denoting, describing) as the presumed basis of meaning. So they probably hope the use-mention distinction is at least half-way not about pointing. They must be frequently disappointed, in that case.
Quoting Banno
Not if it's the choice between mention and use, no. But it isn't quite that. The first half is about mention and is fine. Use of (other) words to mention or point at a sentence. But what is pointing at what when we
Quoting Banno
?
Nothing so low class as pointing seems to be implied. Much better, we are invited (roughly every other sentence) to see the cup situation as somehow one with the sentence. Distinguishing between picked-out and picker-outer would obviously spoil that mystical game.
All I need is the movie to demonstrate that it's conceivable that there are aspects of the world that can't be pointed to by a sentence of English.
If you use Tarski, all you can say is that used sentences point to things in the world as we know it.
Quoting Banno
Yea, I can tell you didn't see the movie. Imagine that there's an aspect of the world that we can't presently conceive.
Quoting Banno
I've always really wanted to like Tarkovsky's Solaris, but meh. He was trying to too hard to imitate Kubrick.
Then what do they think use is doing, if not pointing?
The debate is about the content of all belief.
Some belief is prior to language.
:roll:
What do you mean when you claim that the world and/or states of affairs are 'shaped' like statements or propositions?
Surely that's not to be taken at face value.
Trees and mice and mice running around trees are not shaped like statements or propositions(using these terms synonymously). And... some statements are false. Someone else raised this point earlier, as have I on more than one occasion. The world is not the sort of thing capable of being true/false either, so... I'm a bit confused regarding exactly what you're trying to say here.
By the way, just so you know better, I'm not using "correlations" as you're using "propositions"... not even close.
I would say exactly that. The unknown(hidden parts of the world) is most certainly untranslatable, for it is utterly meaningless, and all translation is of that which is already meaningful.
It is the simplest of all the different kinds that I'm convinced exist, and we talk about; where "kinds" are determined by the content of the correlations being drawn.
Here's the point:No language-less belief uses or mentions language. Period. The use/mention distinction is totally irrelevant with regard to what language-less belief consists of - the content - of language-less belief. Honestly, the only sensible use I find is that use is not always about language use, and mention has it as the focal point.
Language-less creatures are capable of neither using nor mentioning language.
A creature cannot have belief about "red cups full of Maxwell House coffee" unless it can say that. However, some of us [s]may[/s] DO need to be reminded that while a cat can most certainly chase a mouse, and that mouse can most certainly run behind a red cup full of Maxwell House coffee(for the sake of argument, we'll pretend it's a big cup and a small mouse), the mouse most certainly does not hide behind a statement, a proposition, a use, a mention, language, or "red cups full of Maxwell House coffee".
Thanks for your efforts. That's an excellent reply.
This might take a while.
The "claim" is nothing but the commonplace that when what we say is true, it sets out how things are. I have difficulty in seeing how you might maintain that the world is interpreted and yet treat this interpretation as tacit; especially if that tacit interpretation is thought of as not being capable of interpretation in propositional form.
The notion of a level of interpretation that is not linguistic is counterintuitive. I gather the notion is that the world is already divided into cups and tables before these are spoken of; (the before here being a logical, not a temporal, priority? I understand time plays an odd role in Heidegger's metaphysics...)
The question you ask - how one moves from the tacit to the explicit presentation, "...retrojected onto pragmatic activity", is psychological, rather than logical. The logic of propositions does not have a place for the tacit; how could it, given that logic is in essence about grammar?
This is what we are addressing:
Quoting fdrake
I gather the issue is, at what stage do we conclude that some given statement is true - what is it that justifies a belief? That's fraught; it requires psychology rather than logic...
Quoting fdrake
Well, if it is not propositional, what is it? What other form could it have? And even if there is some alternative form, that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form. If it were not, then we would have no grounds for referring to it as "content".
That is, the tacitly understood relations of individuals to each other must themselves be interpretable in propositional form.
I would agree that smoke being a sign of fire is different than marks symbolizing, referencing, picking out, etc., other things.
What's interesting to me though, is exactly how much they are alike.
They both require a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. They both require something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between them.
I would agree that language-less belief is capable of being talked about and our talking about it has propositional form. All our interpretations come in exactly such a form.
If this were so, we would have no way to claim these were "aspects of the world"; as if you could show something and yet not be able to point to it.
If your correlations cannot be put into the form of a proposition, then what are they?
You would not be able to say.
Quoting creativesoul
Then what are we arguing about?
About what follows from that...
Correlational form, if we must talk like that. Both require a plurality of things, but propositional form requires that some of those things are meaningful marks or sounds(language use).
Well, much of our talk uses propositional form because that's just a matter of how our naming and descriptive practices work. It quite simply does not follow that everything we talk about(name and describe) has propositional form.
Mt. Everest certainly does not. Nor does a chair. Nor does a correlation drawn between one's own instinctual involuntary urge, drive, and/or desire(if we must) to chase a rodent and the rodent's whereabouts.
Our reports of chairs, mountains, and mice most certainly do.
What kind of question is that? As if everything can be put into the form of a proposition, aside from correlations drawn between different things?
Mice, trees, chairs, and mountains cannot be put into the form of a proposition.
Well, I suppose a creative butcher-type material reconstruction could amount to parts and pieces of mice, trees, and mountains being arranged into the shape of names and/or descriptions themselves, but that's not what we're after here.
The point is that mice, trees, chairs, and mountains can become meaningful to a creature capable of drawing correlations between those things and others. Part of the content of the language-less belief in question here is a mouse. Another part is a tree. Another part is the desire to catch the mouse. All language-less belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief. Trees, mice, and spatial relations are part of the content of that particular language-less belief. Tress, mice, and spatial relations are not propositional in form, nor are they in any way shape or form existentially dependent upon language use at all. All propositions are. Thus, not all belief content is propositional.
Yes, I agree that signs and symbols occur only in the context of sentient/ sapient beings. And I also agree that the things that become signs and symbols, are not merely signs and symbols. Smoke is smoke before, or irrespective of whether, it is a sign of fire. And sounds or inscribed marks are sounds and inscribed marks regardless of whether they are also signs or symbols.
So, it looks like we agree.
I suggest that belief is belief about the self.
"The mouse ran behind the tree" is really, an abbreviation for "I saw the mouse run behind the tree."
It is not the rightness of the proposition:
"The mouse ran behind the tree" to the world, but rather - the rightness of perception of the world by the self.
Consequently, the implied propositional content of belief is "I am right that...."
Further, we cannot put aside how we know that 'the cup is on the shelf' - for the content of belief is always belief about the self. The abbreviated "propositional" content reads "the cup is on the shelf" but in full is something more akin to:
(I am right that) the cup is on the shelf (because I remember emptying the dishwasher.)
or (I am right that) the mouse ran behind the tree (because my eyesight is not that bad)
Truth lies in the relationship between the organism and reality, and the propositional content of belief concerns the validity of that relationship.
It's all about how meaning emerges onto the world stage.
:ok:
Some. Not all.
I explained why (I am right that) you're wrong.
You described metacognition. That is thinking about one's own thought and belief. In order to think about one's own thought and belief, there must be something to think about and a means for doing so.
You're not right if you believe that all belief is about the self, because that is not true.
You said:
...they believe that that proposition is true. The proposition is sometimes said to 'sit well' with the individual's other beliefs whenever there is no readily apparent disagreement between the proposition and the individual's worldview. I've no argument against that much.
Now you say:
Quoting creativesoul
These statements are contradictory. Which would you prefer to retract?
Bald assertions won't do.
Well, okay then creativesoul - good talk. Maybe give my approach a little more thought and get back to me if you wish to discuss it. I "believe" it's right, and largely for the reasons you state:
Quoting creativesoul
I almost concurred.
:wink:
That which is interpreted is already meaningful. Some meaningful belief and behaviour exists in it's entirety prior to language use. Thus, if we have two language-less creatures, we can have one interpreting the other's behaviour when that behaviour is already meaningful to the other, and that level of interpretation would not be at a linguistic level. It does follow the same process as linguistic level interpretation though... drawing correlations between different things. It's just that none of those things in the case of language-less animals includes language use.
Head shaking and...
Growling and...
Dancing and ruffling feathers and...
That's about propositional attitude. Not all belief is equivalent to an attitude one has towards a statement/proposition. So, it's right in that particular sense. Some belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude. Not all.
Read the rest of that opening post, perhaps the entire debate and then get back to me if you wish to discuss it further.
:flower:
I read your opening essay and banno's before I commented on this subject. What did you read before you wrote it? Anything?
The problem with your essay is that you claim that the proposition is that 'the mouse ran behind the tree' - whereas, the proposition is always...
"I am right that..."
Imagine another person, stood closer to the tree. You say:
"The mouse ran behind the tree."
They say:
"No, it didn't."
Do you accept this as a fact, and change your belief as easily as you change your socks? No! Because what they are really saying is that you are wrong. You refuse to accept it, because propositionally, it's not about whether the mouse ran behind the tree. It's about whether you are right that the mouse ran behind the tree.
No, it's not.
I'm imagining one who is first learning how to use names such as "mouse" and "tree" to pick mice and trees out of the world to the exclusion of all else.
In that circumstance, "the mouse is behind the tree" could be an answer to a question and carry along with it some considerable uncertainty.
Quoting creativesoul
Oh, yes it is!
Quoting creativesoul
It's a little early for us to start thinking about children. We've only just met! Let's stick with adult brains, at least capable of knowing what objects are called, and having beliefs about them.
:up:
I think the contention isn't that "everything is capable of being set out in a statement", it's where that capability comes from and how it works.
It might be counterinuitive to you? It isn't to me. I'm quite used to throwing more into the notion of interpretation than speech acts and statements. Eg, vision's involved, seeing-as is an interpretation, and there need be no words in a figure-ground relationship.
It might be worthwhile to make a distinction between linguistic interpretation and language involving interpretation. A linguistic interpretation would be a "setting out in words", a description etc, a language involving interpretation would be an interpretation which is informed by and partially constituted with language. Example; a doctor looking at a lung scan for an abnormality, a linguistic interpretation might be the speech act of making the assertion "There's an abnormality here", a language involving interpretation would be seeing the abnormality due to learning how to do it - from textbooks, demonstrations etc. The latter type is simultaneously more expansive and...
construable as logically prior to the other. I claim language involving interpretation is logically prior to linguistic interpretation.
But I think it's worthwhile to note the temporal part too; I don't think this distinction between language involving and linguistic interpretation commits me to a temporal ordering between the two types; like one precedes the other; they're more like styles of engagement, ways of "reading off the world". The predicative as-structure; that which seeks, finds and judges propositions and their content; is very similar to Wittgenstein's "glasses" in the PI.
The pre-predicative one is more informal and pragmatic, taking off the glasses, the rough ground is blurry but saturated with articulable structure; an encoding in propositional content is one means of articulation. Both the pre-predicative and the predicative seem to be involved in most speech acts, and have distinct styles of content which interweave. Why distinct styles of content? Putting on the glasses of propositional form is a filter, it seeks statements and judgements, it encodes the world in their images. And "we predicate of the thing that which lies in the method of representing (encoding - me) it". If you stop seeing the world in terms of an expectation of sentential logical form, that doesn't stop it from being able to be parsed in accordance with that form. What the routine occurrence in everyday non-glasses-wearing acts does do, however, is show that such logical form shows up in the world (and it is there!) only when using the glasses to see it. It goes from a necessary component of interaction to a contingent one; you can take off the glasses, and the propositional form need not appear. Once you take of the glasses, things still "make themselves manifest" as it were, but are not outside of the scope of language, language is born in interaction with that rough ground. What is articulated has to be wrestled into sentences, and sentential form is the referee's count at the pin.
The predicative as structure is a means of representation of the world's articulable content which yields statements and judgements thereof, it summarises, encodes, condenses, judges. Nothing falls apart if you take off the glasses; and you might need them again for reading. The important thing is the glasses can come off; which destroys the monopoly on content which you're imputing to the propositional form. It only seems like a monopoly because you've got the glasses on.
So what I'm reacting to in your position is that you seem to me to be doing the same thing as in 104:
"x" is true iff x. As a theory of meaning through redundancy, of comparing the world to a logical form your vantage point has imputed to it and finding a match - you were looking for one. I have no problem with the match. It's that you're using that to limit other styles of filtering the world. It seems you are claiming it is the only match, a necessary match. It's like you've got the glasses on and define seeing as seeing through those glasses! So from my perspective:
The premises underlying those questions are wrongheaded; the form isn't of the state of affairs, it's discovered in seeing the world a certain way. That logical form arises in an interaction; statements have propositional content because we and the world put it there conjointly.
I'll grant this, you can put the glasses on, but that only limits how the world shows up when they're on. The appeal for that claim is the logical priority of the pre-predicative; that the glasses can be taken off.
If you want examples of other ways of seeing the world that don't turn around what goes into statements; you're looking at other metaphysical vantage points. Maybe the world looks like interacting objects, manifestations of substance, dynamical systems, actor networks, monads, assemblages... I want to emphasise "other" in "other metaphysical vantage points"; claiming "the world is an object language" is a metaphysical claim.
Sorry for interjecting and mentioning, but I will propose something related. I can speculate, without being animal behavior specialist, that at least in animals, the matter of fact may be divorced more strongly from their mental attitudes. They might possess intent and not knowing about "states of affairs", as was previously mentioned. In other words, the cat might acquire stimuli to perform a certain action, to initiate a process of some kind, mental inertia of some sort, starting from the image of a running mouse, which then continues to compel it to chase for food-object behind the tree, This implies that there is pursuit of the object, which means that it moves, as well as its location, because this is where we will chase the object, but the cat probably does not fully conceptualize that there is mouse running behind the tree and hence the pursuit, or at least has a very vague abstract awareness of its motivation. There is some implicit mental correlation, because the action associated with the prompting motivation is indicative of the current state of affairs, but not directly tied to it. I argue, that even in human beings, belief may be about intent, not about states of affairs. States of affairs just strongly correlate with some types of intent.
A hypothesis.
Again, rather out of cuff interjection. How do we know which parts of the sentence are existentially bound and which refer to particulars. The sentence could mean that one well known presently ruling king of France is bald. It could mean that such a king presently exists and is bald. Or in some point in time (prior to reading the statement), a king of France existed and was bald. In fact, it could mean that a country named France existed at some point, that country had a person acting in a particular capacity, called king, he had a condition, which for lack of a better term was named baldness, and that person had it. It seems to me that the battle for revealing propositions behind isolated sentences is obscured by linguistic inadequacy, if we are talking about ordinary language and without context that implies the intent of the author. The result is speculation.
Apology accepted, however, I think we need to stick with human, adult brains - capable of knowing what things are, and having beliefs about them, and articulating those beliefs. There's no insight to be gained, from the "beliefs" of babies, or the "beliefs" of cats - because they're not the same thing as an adult, human, articulated belief - with or without propositional content. If the purpose of this debate is to decide if the content of belief is propositional, how can we possibly examine that question in organisms incapable of articulating a belief? I'm really not sure what question you are answering.
When you say "organisms incapable of articulating a belief", you seem to imply that having a belief requires the bearer to be able to articulate what it believes. In fact, I think you might be suggesting that believing and articulating beliefs are the same at some level. Am I correct? Why do you think that that is the case? Or is it a definitional matter.
P.S. It seems to me that this is what the original debate was about.
Everything in "How to do things with words", for starters? (I presume.)
Which is of course laudable. Why ever assume that thought is all in declarative sentences?
In which case, why ever think that meaning is all pointing?
I'm leveraging conceivability to shift the burden.
You need to prove that everything can be pointed to with a sentence of English because it's conceivable that our cognition is limited so that there are things that can't be.
The metalanguage points to the fixtures of some form of life. If there are things in the world that don't fit in our form of life, those things won't be expressable by a sentence of English.
The metalanguage is not the world. It's our form of life.
Either way, depends on how fundamental the question wants to be. On whether the debate assumes a point of reference of "human beliefs as commonly practiced presently". For me at least, acknowledging the limitations of the discussion is still a result.
Fundamentally speaking then, it seems to me that beliefs are possible as dispositions, intentions, attitudes. I don't see any reason why they should only form in an explicit structured mental language. I claim that even the structured statements boil down to attitudes, if observed closely and reduced to elements. Using surprise as impromptu verification principle, can it not form as the result of simpler, inarticulate neurological and psychological states? I am not talking about acting surprised, which can happen due to all sorts of non-sense, but about being confounded from contradiction between your experience and your current attitude.
Edit: As to where this would lead. Lets assume that beliefs are not articulate (merely) by definition, which could be argued for or against on taxonomical grounds, observing how the term will be used for a mental state that maps meaningfully to behavior patterns, as you alluded to in your response above. Then the speculation would indicate that dispositions are the basis for beliefs and not propositions. The latter merely correlate.
I've long been looking for points of agreement and disagreement between Davidson and Wittgenstein, the two recent philosophers with whom I am most in agreement. You've pointed to an apparent area of disagreement between them; so damn you and thank you.
I'd previously understood the pieces in and around your quotes as a breaking of the 'crystalline purity of logic' (§ 97, 107, 108) that is embedded in the Tractatus. It's the expectation that language should be made to conform to subject-predicate form, central to the project of the Tractatus, that is being rejected. Where Wittgenstein had thought that philosophy was the revealing of the hidden logical perfection of our everyday language, he now "rotates" the angle of our examination so that common language use takes primacy. He thus expands his view of language from nothing but propositions to everything, including propositions.
You it seems would take this further in positing that we might somehow have a language (or some such) that is outside of propositional forms, that in effect cannot be put into propositional form.
Compare what you have said with the Davidsonian rejection of incommensurability. If something is true in one language, and here we include any conceptual schema, then it will be true under suitable interpretations in any other language. The word is a fixed point in a triangulation between world, language and use. The great joy in this is the rejection of relativism, the reintroduction of the notion that sometimes folk say things that are wrong.
"An encoding in propositional content is one means of articulation". I'd suggest that any other form of articulation, given a certain requirement, must be interpretable in terms of propositions. That requirement is, that the articulation is to be about how things are, that it is to be the sort of thing that can be true or false.
This is not to rule out 'articulations' that are not subject to the rigour of being true or false; commands, questions, and so on; but also, showing the glory of a sunset, the horror of an injury.
So I agree that 'claiming "the world is an object language" is a metaphysical claim'; but all that has ben done in this metaphysics is to set up the language game of talking about how things are by setting out individuals and their relations. Yes, we set up the game of names, predicates, truth functions, and with it the notions of true and false; And for our purposes here, belief is part of that game. Hence, in so far as we can talk of our beliefs as being true or false, we must also include that their content is also capable of being true or false.
So I agree with you that belief is part of a much bigger game. Nevertheless, belief has propositional content.
There's a favourite Existentialist Comic of Sartre and Camus playing Candyland. Like Camus, I'm pointing out the rules of the game; Like Sartre, you are pointing out that we are not limited to the game.
Meh. If there is stuff that is beyond our reckoning, there is no point in talking about it. You want to "Eff" the ineffable again. If there are things in the world that don't fit in our form of life, those things would be entirely unrecognisable to us.
What happens is that stuff outside our reckoning is brought inside it by extending the language.
You don't know that. We may have to evolve to understand more of the world. We may have to ditch our previous languages altogether, as Russian communists imagined.
So yes. We talk about the world as we know it. That's all.
...and in saying that you've said nothing.
I corrected your mistake. I wasn't trying to cure cancer.
My comment was in English, but I didn't think that worth mentioning, either; my apologies.
:up:
You're Sartre needs work. Since we are free, our use of language included, English could be used to talk about anything at all. There is nothing conceivable that English (or any other language) could not talk about. The game of English can be anything we choose.
This is a point I also agree with, with the additional caveat that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it.
The fire example is a case of learning that fire causes pain when touched. We know that that is the case. We know that that statement is true. A language-less creature can learn that fire causes pain by virtue of drawing correlations between the fire, the touching, and the ensuing pain. That could be described as a belief that touching fire caused pain, but the creature has no language, so this puts the claim that that language-less creature's belief is propositional in content in serious doubt.
There's certainly a bridge between the language-less belief and the simple belief statement, but it cannot be propositions, unless propositions somehow exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature is capable of drawing correlations between them, or having an attitude towards them, etc.
The bridge, it seems to me, is the ability to attribute meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. With the language-less creature, the correlations are drawn between the touching, the fire, and the pain in such a way that amounts to the recognition/attribution of causality. With the belief statement, it's all that in addition to the naming and descriptive practices.
By virtue of acquiring knowledge of what all belief has in common. The insight is a notion of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression. The result is a reliable standard by which we can discern between what counts as anthropomorphism and what does not.
Furthermore, think about the sheer scope of the consequences of getting our own thought and belief wrong...
Nothing I've said should be read as putting limitations on English. Yep, everything conceivable can be said or shown. Just not the inconceivable stuff - because it's not stuff, and hence cannot be chosen.
Quoting counterpunch
:roll:
I'm wary. Thanks for the heads up.
He claimed that all propositions are about the self, which is absurd on it's face. There's adequate ground for doubting his sincerity already.
However, the comment about what we can know about creatures' belief when the creatures under consideration are incapable of articulating that belief via language is one worth considering though, even if that consideration eventually leaves counterpunch behind...
I don't think it does though; at least not when it comes to taking proper account of all belief. It provides a simple undeniable true statement(all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it) that serves as standard of sorts. Drawing correlations is attributing, and sometimes (mis)attributing meaning, so in that sense, you're close when you say I've done it already with correlations.
Finding a use though, that seems to me to be more about language.
I'm saying you're playing Sartre. Since any use of English could mean anything, there is nothing beyond the scope of what could be said in English. fdrake is arguing the opposite to Sartre, suggesting there was some essence to English, such that it is incapable of talking about some concepts.
As previously discussed, I don't see that as any different to what we can know about creature's beliefs when the creature under consideration is capable of articulating that belief. We do after all attribute beliefs to folk that are contrary to what they claim to believe, often the basis of their other behaviours. So now Trump claims to believe in peaceful protest, in the face of his previous behaviour.
Meaning Quoting creativesoul
I don't think it is undeniable, nor fixed. Belief is far more fluid than that; in a state of constant flux.
Ah.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
It can? I'm surprise dot see oyu defending the Humpty Dumpty view of meaning!
Yes, so context matters. That sentence had an obvious use in a time when a French King existed. But it doesn't have that use now.
Well, I'm not.
Could is not does. Just because I could use English to say anything, it doesn't mean I do. In any given instance where I use English, I make a choice (to keep to the context Sartreian terms) to speak one meaning or another. I could have said "Banno ate ghosts for breakfast" with this entire paragraph of this post, in English (a new, novel use of English compared to what people usually use), but I didn't. I said something else, with an entirely different meaning, which will never be "Banno ate goats for breakfast."
Since could is what I possiblity might have said, and did is what I did, both are true at the same time. I did use language which never says, "Banno ate goats for breakfast", but that use could have (even though it never will).
Actually, I failed to convey my remark. Meanwhile, I have also reviewed and revised my original position. What I meant was that the sentence, independent of when it was said, was actually ambiguous on its own terms, without knowing the particulars of the context in which it was delivered. If we tried to translate it in a formal language, such as first order predicate logic, to allow encapsulation of its meaning, the translation would be ambiguous. For example:
BaldAsPredicate(PresentKingOfFranceAsNamedConstant)
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
Even the rather exotic:
Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Exists BaldAsBoundVariable Condition(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable, BaldAsBoundVariable))
Imagine the following paragraph:
We came to earth on our spaceship. There was a description of a person that the people here used to obey and was called their king. In one particular territory, called France, the person had no hair on his head. He tried to hide it, but all his subjects knew it and it was obvious. The present king of France is bald.
Only later, I realized that not only existential, but also universal quantifiers could apply:
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable ForAll InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
Maybe the first translation to predicate logic would satisfy your objections (edit: because existence is not entailed by it, just material implication in case of actual existence). I am not sure. Obviously, I could invent context that indicates such meaning. But altogether, my point was that our everyday language does not produce encapsulated sentences with individual semantics, a la mathematical logic. We could only guess what the most probable meaning was as we anticipate the surrounding context.
Later I realized that there was another angle. That, in terms of my take on the problem, even if the translation to a formal statement was somehow made, the result could have required a logical framework that was not classical logic. Something akin to intuitionistic logic. Since the law of excluded middle does not apply there, a person could end up being neither the king, nor not the king. Thus, for example,
not Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
does not infer automatically that
ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
The question may have been about soundness vs validity in ordinary language and I may have misunderstood. About whether ordinary sentences require actual application to be considered meaningful or can they have vacuously correct meaning.
P.s. Either way, I realize that this is detour. But decided to mention my view.
Edit: Found some duplicated predicate names in the logic formulas.
I watched it again last night. The premise that learning a language could somehow bestow the power to see the future struck me again as unworkably magical.
In Solaris, the protagonists deal with extraordinary events by adjusting their conceptual scheme, accepting the reality of the returning dead as a form of communication. In comparison Arrival has the causal chain arse about.
To be sure there is a sort of magic in language; its recursive acceptance brings into being such things as ownership of property, politics and shared knowledge. But Arrival's premise does not derive from recursion, and remains unexplained; it has little merit.
Nor does the movie show a conception that cannot be pointed to by English; indeed, the key role of the main character is to do exactly that; and she succeeds.
It's interesting that you took that idea from the Tarkovskyvs movie. The author of the story meant the contrary:
"As Lem wrote, "The peculiarity of those phenomena seems to suggest that we observe a kind of rational activity, but the meaning of this seemingly rational activity of the Solarian Ocean is beyond the reach of human beings."[4]" --wikipedia
Soderbergh's movie emphasizes that theme.
Quoting Banno
That would be unworkable. The idea that learning a language might unlock abilities isn't outlandish. I see what learning European languages did for native americans. That someone has to remind you that capabilities are bound up in language shows how much you take for granted.
...and yet in the conclusion a new 'form of life' is created. Which was to be proved.
Does this mean you are arguing Europeans are only human in appearnce because they thought some concepts in their language that other people didn't at a certain time?
One also wonders what this means for babies, since they have to learn language. Are babies the only time anyone is human, before they start thinking in the concepts of only appearing-older-people in language they never had access to before?
Yep. :grin:
Are you denying that all belief is meaningful?
Ok. Good.
Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief?
You need to do better than that.
Try it.
Do you have issues making sense of the above?
Of course it is. We begin drawing meaningful correlations between different things long before we start talking about it. That happens autonomously.
No?
:brow:
Looking at use is all interesting and sheds some much needed light of all sorts of stuff regarding how we attribute meaning to language use.
However, what does that have to do with how a language-less creature forms, has, and/or holds belief? What does that have to do with how a belief can even be and/or become meaningful to a language-less creature capable of having one?
Well, it shows us that drawing correlations between things is something that both complex linguistic belief and simple language-less belief have in common with one another. It supports the very part of the claim that you seem to balk at.
Trump is a walking, talking, living, eating, and breathing performative contradiction.
Yes, my translation would just be the first. The background to my original comment was Russell's analysis of definite descriptions and Strawson's criticism of it:
Quoting Criticism of Russell's analysis - P.F.Strawson
Quoting simeonz
I think your spaceship example captured the ordinary meaning just fine. As the above Wikipedia quote suggests, we would ordinarily use such a sentence as a referring phrase. So to use it today would, in effect, be a misuse.
Quoting simeonz
So my view here is that ordinary sentences require actual application to be true (or false). The issue is not so much one of meaningfulness (i.e., we know what the sentence means, as your spaceship example shows) as one of usefulness (i.e., if the sentence is non-referring, it doesn't have a use). My view is similar for so-called vacuous truths - they also fail to refer to anything and so are also neither true nor false.
Quoting bongo fury
Or something else?
Or is it only another way of saying having of beliefs?
Which are?
Irreducible mental stuff?
Actually, if Russell meant something more akin to
which will be rephrased back into ordinary speech as "exists a bald king of France", its opposite would have been
which in ordinary speech is "all kings of France have hair", not "there exists no king of France". If Strawson wants to interpret claims of ordinary sentences in the intuitionistic sense, as indicated from the "neither true nor false" remark, the two statements above are not complementary, but "there exists no king of France" is still not the opposite of "exists a bald king of France" and doesn't prevent Russell from inferring (however frivolously) that there is some implicit existential quantifier in the original sentence.
P.S. I would have quantified the time instant also, if I wanted to make the claim meaningful. It is common sense to reject it as such right now. But this would be a second-order translation, between the original and the present context, not between the ordinary language and formal language counterpart in that original context.
I feel that the ambiguity is not a matter of a fixed choice of interpretation. Reading an old newspaper report stating that "the president initiates a lockdown" implies that some president was in charge of some country at some moment in time and that he/she had issued a lockdown, as opposed to the institution having tendency for issuing lockdown orders. On the other hand, for a textbook making examination of an institution, stating that "the president commands the army" does not guarantee that the model of government was ever implemented and was not just proposed at some point. The binding of terms (not simply as referring phrases, but universals, existence claims) depends on the precise context. The sentence about the king of France we can heavily infer from knowing that France has no king, and that prescribing the baldness attribute to a general group of people is improbably useful. But such suggestion lacks rigor, and cannot be argued strictly. In my opinion anyway.
Quoting Andrew M Fair enough. This makes an interesting point that mathematical and ordinary language have different objectives, which result in different kinds of senses of the word "useful".
It's the basis, the common denominator, the basic process by which all minds emerge; by which all experience can be had; by which all thought, belief, and statements thereof are formed; by which all meaning emerges(via attribution); by which all successful communication happens.
The process is irreducible, but neither mental or physical(it's both after-all). It provides a basic outline which is rightfully applicable to any and all discourse. We can 'watch' people offer different correlations when needed to clarify what was originally meant by some use or another. Happens all the time, here in this thread even, within the side conversations going on.
Not sure if you remember Banno's recent Davidson thread on malapropism A Nice Derangement Of Epitaphs, which was a critique of what counts as successful communication and/or learning/having a language. In that paper Davidson was repeatedly claiming that something more was needed aside from just learning, knowing, and/or following conventional rules, and that the conventional understanding did not offer an acceptable description of that, as the success of malapropisms show.
Attributing meaning and misattributing meaning is what we do when interpreting another's language use, and we do that solely by virtue of drawing correlations between the use and other things. When we draw correlations between the same things, we correctly interpret. What I've been arguing here is germane to that paper as well as Moore's paradox, Gettier, and so many other historically challenging philosophical 'problems'.
Quoting Banno
It directs our attention to what we ought be paying attention to when taking account of another's belief; the content thereof.
What is meaningful and how does it become so?
I'm left a bit confused regarding how you've no problem assenting to "all belief is meaningful" but balked at "all belief is meaningful to the creature having the belief".
:brow:
Left unexplained is how drawing a correlation is not propositional.
The general form of a correlation: P(x,y)
Did I assent to "All belief is meaningful"? Must have been a moment of weakness. Try this:, talk of meaning here is revving the engine without engaging the clutch.
Interesting that you'd draw correlations between talking of meaning and revving the engine without engaging the clutch, and in doing so change the focal point from how things become meaningful to doing it by virtue of drawing correlations between different things...
The latter requires language, the former does not always. That explanation has been expounded upon throughout the entire debate.
You did. Should the time ever come when I finally convince you to incorporate correlations into your position regarding meaning(and truth), I will have done my job.
:wink:
We draw correlations between different things for all sorts of reasons, as a means for doing all sorts of things.
Talking about how we use our beliefs, or how we use language(doing things with words) neglects how we form belief. How we form belief is germane to all belief, not just how we use our beliefs, or what we do with language. I'm not even sure if it makes sense to say that language-less creatures use their beliefs, so...
I'm having trouble understanding how talk of language use is relevant to the content of language-less belief, aside from supporting the claim that all belief is correlational in content, but never admitting that much.
And that will happen until you try parsing your argument in terms of use.
But I'm beginning to get a bit worried about you. This is becoming a but obsessive, don't you think?
Obsessive?
:gasp:
Has any philosopher ever been anything but?
:smile:
Besides that, don't worry about me... I'm just fine! My position has served me very well in real life... I do put it into everyday practice. Yup... obsessive, but well worth it!
:wink:
I've Turkish coffee and enough eggs for an omelet.
Try 100% Kona. Freshly ground and prepared with a French press.
Quoting creativesoul
Go dark roast then! French press is not finesse! Makes the boldest flavour.
No french press will match that.
Gotcha! My better half just informed me that Turkish coffee is quite strong, and too strong for her, which is saying something. You must prefer very strong coffee. Kona is more smooth, so. You're right then. No match for what you like!
:wink:
No. You use scribbles and sounds, not words. Using scribbles and sounds to point to things makes those scribbles and sounds words, and not just merely scribbles and sounds.
I've some sympathy for the idea that the limit of one's language is the limit of 'one's world', if by that we mean worldview or belief system. However, Banno proudly conflates word and world, by not drawing and maintaining the actual distinction between belief statements that are about language use and belief statements that are about mice and trees. Part of that comes as a result of overstating the strength of the case that the belief that approach makes. Another part comes from the idea that truth is unanalyzable. Another from his preference for a redundancy approach. Another from a conflation between truth as coherence and truth as correspondence.
Truth - as correspondence - is presupposed in all belief statements. That's how/why "is true" becomes a redundant use of language. However, "is true" is not equivalent to truth. "Is true" marks belief(assuming sincerity), and belief while it is necessary, is also insufficient for truth. <-----Banno would object to the necessary part, but the objection is based upon a misunderstanding. Belief is necessary for correspondence between belief and fact(what's happened) because when and where there has never been meaningful belief, there could never have been a meaningful correspondence between belief and what's happened. It's insufficient because some belief is false.
Human thought, human belief, meaning, and truth are all things that exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them. Those sorts of things are peculiar in that it requires language to become aware of them and their role in our lives, and we can most certainly get them wrong.
Since all belief is meaningful, being meaningful requires meaning, and language-less creatures can form, have, and/or hold belief, it only follows that meaning is prior to language.
The question then is what does such meaningful belief consist of? Hence, this debate.
Not propositions.
Visuals, sounds, smells, feelings, etc.
Words are a particular type of visual or sound.
Thinking in words is no different than thinking in visuals and sounds. Words are typically one color - black, and come in simple shapes. What they represent can be multicolored and complex, or not colored at all as in a smell, taste or feeling. So words are simple symbols meant to represent more complex concepts that are more than one color and more visually complex than a scribble on paper. We ultimately use words to simplify communication of ideas and beliefs to others.
Yep, those too are part of it(some of the content of some language-less belief).
Quoting Harry Hindu
That is not true. All words are visuals and/or sounds. Not all visuals and sounds are words.
I agree with you about truth consisting in correspondence between propositions, statements or beliefs and actuality. I have never been able to understand why many want to deny that Tarski's formulation just is a minimalist formulation of truth as correspondence.
Nice link. Thank you!
:smile:
What else would there be?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Quoting creativesoul
If all words are visuals and sounds then you think in visuals and sounds. :roll:
... a correlation?
Or is it already the content? Of a belief? Or is it the belief?
:up:
Quoting simeonz
I think Strawson is just saying that such a statement isn't propositional (due to a false presupposition), rather than interpreting in the intuitionistic sense. As he puts it:
Quoting On Referring, p330 - P. F. Strawson
This idea can be found in traditional (Aristotelian) logic, as Strawson notes in Introduction to Logical Theory (where, in this case, he's discussing vacuous statements):
Strawson goes on further to distinguish between sentences and statements:
Quoting simeonz
It seems so. Certainly with ordinary language, the focus is on what is said by someone on a specific occasion (i.e., the use of a sentence).
Mice, trees, cups, cupboards, and tables...
This sheds some light. But when do we consider a sentence truly "complete". Is the sentence's encapsulation related to us by the author? Do we realize that the author had no presuppositions by being at a vantage point that simply allows it? Better yet, is any sentence ever complete? We make statements from sentences all the time, by pivoting our reading of the author's intent as necessary.
Quoting Andrew M
I am sorry to quote out of order. So sentences have no corresponding statement, and statements have no corresponding proposition. That is a lot of relativism. I can speculate that Strawson considers certain statements deliberately relativistic as per the author's intention? How does he know which ones, especially when, if I understood his taxonomy correctly, the sentence has no unique corresponding statement.
So your beliefs are composed of actual mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables, rather than visuals and feelings OF mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables? Lazy thinking on your part.
I think the rejection is of the glasses. Part of that rejection is the "subject-predicate form", but I believe that's not all which is rejected. The metaphysical vision associated with logic in the Tractatus is what is rejected. But what is that metaphysical vision - the filter that wearing the glasses puts on?
What is the connexion between atomic facts and elementary propositions? That's the glasses, the "picture frame" that ensures accordance (truth) and discord (falsity) of the elementary proposition with the atomic fact represented in the picture frame. That things/events (atomic facts) can be mapped in to a corresponding picture element - truth function of elementary propositions - is a restatement of the doctrine of propositional content; everything that can happen can be stated.
Given that this is rejected, how is it rejected? Not through a negation; as if some things that can happen cannot be stated ("the manifest"), that negation remains within the ambit of defining the world through how it comes to be embedded in a logical picture of facts, and is the "final move" so to speak in the Tractatus - a realisation of how limited a vocabulary a logical picture alone provides.
It's rejected through improvisation, a metaphysical "yes, and" to a doctrine which purported to hold a monopoly on the sense of things. Recognising the contingency of the connexion between elementary propositions and atomic facts is enough to refute it, as it was before construed as a necessary component of language. Within its operation; with the glasses on; yes, necessarily, everything that happens is the disquotational image of a true statement - the atomic fact kernel of an elementary proposition. Outside of it? Well... There's a lot.
General speech acts just don't fit into it; how could flipping someone the bird be true or false? Why would truth matter for it? Truth would only matter when parsing it later as an event in game which required the glasses to be played. "X flipped Y the bird". The sense of the act isn't spelled out in truth or falsity, it's spelled out through the analysis of the role it plays in a "language game" - truth and falsity might be grammatical mistakes within that game, not eligible moves, but they may still play a role in a meta-game of language game description. It can be true, or false, that truth or falsity have nothing to do with the sense of flipping someone the bird. But a description, a "logical picture" of flipping someone the bird might be able to be true or false - eg "you only flip the bird to people you love" would be false, "people tend to flip the bird to insult people or things" would be true.
Taking aim at Davidson: In putting on the glasses, and setting out a speech act through the truth of a statement which represents it "X P'd Y at t", the sense is expressed in how the interpreter would assign truth or falsity to it, not in the truth or falsity of it. This sleight of hand is rendered imperceptible if one has forgotten the glasses can come off. The centrality of truth to meaning only makes sense in terms of this sleight of hand - truth is central to the filter.
With the glasses off, things that break the schema of the glasses seem commonplace, because they are. But you can put the glasses on again to assess descriptions of things which break the picture frame.
The content of any and all belief is only understood and/or known by considering the correlation(s) being drawn by the creature in question. The content of any and all belief is naturally limited to and facilitated by biological machinery; that is to say that the content of any creature's belief is naturally limited to what is made possible by virtue of their biological capabilities. This next bit of paving ought go uncontested.
The content of each and every(all) belief includes exactly and only the things being correlated one to another by the very creature drawing the correlations; by the very creature associating between the different things; by the very creature that is making connections between the different directly perceptible things(at first, anyway); by the very creature that is attributing/recognizing causality; by the very creature attributing meaning; by the very creature having conscious experience.
Thus...
A creature devoid of the ocular structures we currently deem necessary and/or responsible for our color vision capabilities will not draw correlations between visible light, the visually perceptible effects/affects of reflected light(color emission), and anything else. A creature devoid of those ocular structure can directly perceive red cups. However, it cannot possibly perceive the color aspect at all, due to the not having the necessary biological machinery to do so. The color of, and/or reflected by the cup, is simply incapable of ever being or becoming part of the experience of such a creature. No such creature can form belief about red or experience red in any way, shape, or form unless it is a creature capable of directly perceiving any single one of a number of different particular ranges of frequencies within the visible light spectrum that we've long since named "red", and drawing a correlation between red and something else.
A creature devoid of olfaction definition will not draw correlations between the smell of an apple pie and anything else. A creature cannot actually form belief about or experience the smell of an apple pie, unless it is a creature capable of smelling apple pies. A creature that cannot smell an apple pie cannot possibly know what it means when someone says that they smell an apple pie, even if they know what counts as "an apple pie".
A creature devoid of language will not draw correlations between language use and anything else, unless it is a creature amidst language creation and/or acquisition. The very ability to create and/or use language requires a creature capable of drawing correlations between language use and other things. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language.
The process of drawing correlations between different things offers us as simple an outline as possible, as it very well must. It's amenable to naturally occurring evolutionary progression. It's capable of growing in it's complexity. Human belief began simply and accrued in it's complexity. An acceptable criterion/description of belief must be capable of taking proper account of all belief, ranging from the simplest through the most complex. Convention seems to be at a remarkable loss for adequate explanation/description of language-less belief, and many analytics and post-moderns outright deny that such a thing even exists. They are wrong.
Many pragmatists, analytics, and post-moderns hold that both meaning and truth are somehow, in some way, existentially dependent upon language. That is quite simply not true. Neither is. We can know that as a result of knowing that language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief about what's happened, what's happening, and what has yet to have happened but is expected to(what will happen soon).
There is no such thing as meaningful true belief devoid of meaning and truth.
If we hold that meaning and truth are dependent upon language use, then either meaningful true belief can somehow exist without meaning or truth(in the case of the meaningful true belief of a language-less creature), or meaningful true belief cannot be formed by a creature devoid of language; language-less creatures have no belief. Coherency demands that those who hold that meaning and truth are dependent upon language reject the very possibility that meaningful true belief can exist in it's entirety prior to language.
Any and all positions based upon the ideas that all belief presupposes truth and all truth depends upon language arrive at a crossroads of sorts - a choice to be made - when considering whether or not language-less creatures are capable of presupposing truth(having belief). Coherence alone demands rejecting the claim that language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief, for all belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line, and those who hold this view believe that truth depends upon language.
At what cost do we continue to maintain this basis of falsehood? At the cost of successfully acquiring a basic understanding of human thought and belief.
Language-less creatures most certainly form, have, and/or hold belief. If our accounting practices, if our linguistic devices, if our linguistic framework, if our conceptual schema, if our worldview, if our belief system, if our definitions, if our philosophical beliefs and/or positions cannot make sense of language-less belief while avoiding self-contradiction, then that does not constitute adequate ground for believing that language-less creatures do not have belief. To quite the contrary, it serves as more than adequate ground to realize and/or conclude that we've gone horribly wrong somewhere along the line.
If language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief, if all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it, if all belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line, and some language-less belief is true, then it must be the case that both meaning and the presupposition of truth somehow exist in their entirety prior to language use.
I've been setting out exactly how that happens; how truth and meaning both emerge from within the process of belief formation(drawing correlations between different things).
Does that answer your question?
:wink:
Of course. My beliefs about my cat include the cat. A visual of a cat may not.
Lazy thinking?
Pfft.
:zip:
Then what does it mean to be about your cat if it includes your cat? You either have beliefs about cats in your mind (realism), or cats in your mind (solipsism). Not both. Which is it?
Neither.
:brow:
Not helpful.
:roll:
Beliefs are not the sort of things that have spatiotemporal location.
Sure, they do. Beliefs exist only in minds for a period of time before you think of something else. Thinking takes time.
Not interested. I've argued extensively on this matter.
Sure you have, and you haven't gotten anywhere. So maybe it's time to think about it differently?
You make an assertion. I show you how your assertion is wrong. You say you aren't interested. Predictable.
Well, Davidson would simply put it into a proposition: "fdrake flipped the bird" is true iff fdrake flipped the bird.
Taking your analogy on board, it's not that you can take the glasses off. It's that you can put on a different set of glasses. The world is always interpreted.
Davidson's argument (in On the very idea...) is that what you see in some other glasses will be a transformation of what you see with subject-predicate glasses; and hence with suitable interpretations the very same things will be true in both. I'll not present his argument here, I'm sure you are familiar with it.
No, Rousseau, I use words. These are a subset of the scribbles and sounds.
That's very much a statement that fdrake flipped the bird being true, not fdrake's act of flipping the bird being true.
As my old professor would ask, if you knew what needed to be the case for it to be true that fdrake flipped the bird, well....
What more would you want to know about "Fdrake flipped the bird"?
But that's not the important part of my reply. That's "The world is always interpreted."
And you've been trolling us with his remarks ever since.:roll:
Pretending not to understand is exceedingly frustrating; the onus is on you to give an account of how the statement "fdrake flipped the bird"'s truth or falsity spells out the meaning of the speech act of flipping the bird, not to turn the question around for the 9 millionth time. What does truth or falsity have to do with the speech act of flipping the bird?
Quoting Banno
Why would "the world is always interpreted" imply "the world is always interpretable as a statement".
You don't gotta reply if you don't like it. Again, if you know what makes "fdrake flipped the bird" true, what more do you need in order to understand "Fdrake flipped the bird"?
What is it that is not included in the propositional analysis?
Quoting fdrake
Quoting fdrake
Hmmm... So you want to change the topic to On the very idea of a conceptual scheme? We can do that.
Here's a link:
https://www2.southeastern.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/conceptualscheme.pdf
This is the salient bit:
What detail should we go into?
I thought "did you mean 'homely'?", while Google thought "did you mean 'homie'?".
Not much different than what said. What makes a subset of scribbles and sounds words and not just scribbles and sounds?
You use scribbles and sounds. HOW you use scribbles and sounds is what makes them words or not. Are you writing or drawing? Depends on how you use the scribbles.
Oh, look - Harry answered his own question. Good.
The second statement sounds a sloppy way of render the first one, for the simple reason that the actual content of a belief is the "what" (the possible state of affairs?) prior to being put into propositional form (by means of a statement?). The content of a glass is not water just because you can pour into it water!
As if one might have a belief that is not a belief about something.
> Your proposed pre-rendered belief states are impossible to communicate without language.
So what? You can have it backwards, without perceptual beliefs you couldn't even learn a human language for communicating anything, since to learn a language you need to rely on the ability to detect perceptual patterns and reproduce them e.g. phonetically without being able to render the related perceptual beliefs in linguistic terms (since you are still learning the language).
Suppose that a belief is a truth-apt mental state. If the truth of beliefs is identified with either their mental content or their material causes, then all beliefs must be necessarily and vacuously true. For example, i believe i am tying at a desk which i see before me. If "desk" is considered to refer to my experience directly, or to it's perceptual causes, then the truth of my belief is vacuously true in expressing nothing over and above the fact i am seeing something i call "desk" as a result of whatever caused me to say such a thing.
On the other hand, if the truth criteria of beliefs is considered to be independent of their mental content, as is normally considered where the truth of beliefs is regarded as being future-contigent, then the truth of beliefs is divorced from their mental content and material causes. In which case truth is no longer attributable to beliefs in themselves, but refers to an external convention for classifying belief-behaviour.
Banno and myself have very similar views, but there are crucial differences. He is more Wittgensteinian than I. Much more actually. However, although I am quite confident that where we disagree I am correct and he's not, I must admit that Banno is remarkably efficient at making his points. I admire his brevity.
Could you pls elaborate more on this "He is more Wittgensteinian than I. Much more actually"?
Would you be able to briefly clarify how you understand the following concepts and their relation: "sensation", "intentionality", "representation", "perception", "concept", "belief", "proposition"?
Yeah, come on, @creativesoul, write us an explanation of how the whole world works. Preferably in less than a hundred words.
:lol:
Quoting neomac
What this shows is that you have not understood how the word "proposition" is used. Disagree all you like, you are just wrong. If perceptions have truth values, then perceptions are propositional.
The only out you might make would be to vacillate between propositional truth and "true" as in "accurate", which you verge on. That might be philosophically interesting. However I expect that accuracy is ultimately parsed in proposition terms. The plank is true if it conforms to specifiable criteria.
So it seems your case is lost.
But it's good to see you setting simple challenges for folk like Creative. He's been a bit slack of late. :wink:
Quoting emancipate
Yes, that'd have been the next question. Nice catch, but it was straight to silly mid-on.
He is much more averse to metaphysics than I. He places higher value upon propositional logic than I. He places propositions in a more fundamental role than I. He holds that all belief content is propositional. He holds that we cannot get 'beneath' language. He does not draw and maintain the actual distinction between belief and thinking about belief. He does not draw and maintain a distinction between the content of our accounting practices and the content of what's being taken into account, particularly, to keep in line with the debate topic, when talking about language less creatures' belief he does not discriminate between his account and what's being taken into account. He also leans on speech act theorists as well as Davidson more than I.
Quoting neomac
Well, sure I could, but why ought I here? I will say this, the question itself is based upon the belief that all those things mentioned are concepts. I do not share that belief. Rather, much of the time regarding many of the aforementioned things, and I are in agreement regarding historical use of these terms. We're much the same amount of Wittgensteinian, in that regard.
You and I do seem to agree on one salient point. Banno conflates his account of the cat's belief with the cat's belief. Not sure if that is a consequence of unstated premisses underlying his reasoning here, or a personal shortfall, but he's not alone.
Upon what ground are you stating that language-less creatures' belief has no capacity to be true or false, unless there are such things as non-linguistic propositions?
What reason is there to hold that there need be such things as truth bearers(propositions) in order for language-less creatures' belief to be true or false?
It's true if it corresponds to the way things are.
If the ducks outside hear the food bin lid being removed, they will immediately go to where it is, all the while displaying all sorts of different behaviours that are put on display during feeding or when they are pleading to be fed.
What reasons are there for us to believe that the ducks cannot form, have, and/or hold belief about being fed unless there are such things as non linguistic propositions, unless we've already placed the fate of our own position into the idea that all belief content is propositional?
That's a common view, quite common actually, given all the work regarding the belief that approach, such as the one Banno relies upon at times. However, you've presented but one set of options here, both resting their laurels upon a premiss that I do not share. It is only if we first hold firmly to the notion that all belief content is propositional, that we come to later find that we must propose such things as non linguistic propositions if we are going to admit that language less creatures can have true and/or false belief.
That's the problem in a nutshell.
This is your present rendering of this dead horse? You've gone back to thinking of beliefs as magical items of mental furniture? That "The cat believes it's bowl is empty" is the name for a specific individual item within the mind of the cat?
No. That the cat believes it's bowl is empty is not one thing int he cat's mind, because that belief is the cat meowing and leading you to the food bowl and feeling hungry and getting under your feet and so on; a long, flexible and indeterminate list. A belief is an account of the cat's behaviour in intentional terms. It's a linguistic convenience.
You see, what Creative attributes to the cat, that is not propositional, is also not belief. It instead is actions or perceptions or some such.
Creative's is a grammatical error.
So if we asked the cat, "do you believe the bowl is empty?", we're asking the cat for its account of its own behaviour in intentional terms, rather than asking it to express something inside (a thought, perception, or attitude)? Is this the same sense of "belief" as when I ask the cat "do you believe in God?"
It's not a mystery, or all that complicated. When the ducks do end up eating soon thereafter, their expectation about what's about to happen is met/satisfied, and thus the belief becomes or 'ends up' being true solely by virtue of corresponding to what happened. If they do not eat soon after thinking they were about to eat, the belief becomes or ends up being false... solely by virtue of a lack of correspondence to what happened.
So, my question has been and remains...
Where is a need for language here, aside from the ability for us to be able to take the ducks' belief into account? There are no propositions contained in the correlations drawn by the ducks. We certainly need language to know that and say as much, but surely we can all agree that the ducks' belief is neither equal to nor existentially dependent upon our knowledge or account thereof?
Right?
Have I misrepresented the position you argue for/from? You most certainly have just misrepresented mine. Misattributing all those uses of language to me is quite unacceptable. Anyone can see for themselves that I've said none of those things you've attributed to me.
But to answer the question you asked...
No. What you quoted was not my current rendition of our decade long disagreement.
That verifies the conflation charge.
So, no such a thing as an account of a belief then?
:brow:
Better tell Gettier.
> Yeah, come on, @creativesoul, write us an explanation of how the whole world works. Preferably in less than a hundred words.
Your sarcasm is understandable but there is a specific reason for my request. Indeed in the literature these notions can be all related in a way that it is not possible to understand one without reference to others: e.g. the notion of “proposition” and that of “concept” are related if one understands proposition as a mental representation made of a combination of concepts, the notion of “proposition” and that of “belief” too are related if one understands proposition as a mental attitude toward propositions, etc.
I wasn’t looking for arguments but more for some terminological coordinates to better understand his exchange with you.
> What this shows is that you have not understood how the word "proposition" is used
I can admit it was just poor phrasing. My skepticism is more related to the metaphysics of propositions e.g. fregian propositions. For me propositions are just abstract representations resulting from metalinguistic analysis on the truth-functionality of our descriptive statements. So there are no “propositions” as mind-independent entities, nor as original bearers of truth values. Since propositions for me require developed human linguistic skills then they can not constitute the content of perceptions.
> The only out you might make would be to vacillate between propositional truth and "true" as in "accurate", which you verge on.
Indeed, I think that perceptions have mind to world “accuracy” conditions.
> However I expect that accuracy is ultimately parsed in proposition terms. The plank is true if it conforms to specifiable criteria.
Whatever you think you are parsing in proposition terms: 1. Either that content wasn’t a proposition before that parsing, but if that content wasn’t already representational without being a proposition, the parsing would be arbitrary, and there would be no criteria for establishing if the parsing was correct or not. 2. Or it was already a proposition then there is no need for parsing.
Besides, can you clarify what you mean by proposition? There are different ways of understanding it.
> I will say this, the question itself is based upon the belief that all those things mentioned are concepts. I do not share that belief.
In this context I used the term “concept” as equivalent to “notion” so not in theoretically loaded terms as to categorize the type of referents of those notions. And therefore I see this use in this context as philosophically neutral and harmless.
> Banno and I are in agreement regarding historical use of these terms.
Well I don’t know much about your reciprocal knowledge and terminological agreements. And I didn’t mean to interfere. I was just curious to understand better what these terminological agreements amount to, because I found your exchange stimulating.
> We're much the same amount of Wittgensteinian, in that regard.
Well I'm not sure yet what you mean by that, I don't k now if you are referring to some Wittgensteinian approach (in this respect we can say at least that there is the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations [1]) or stance on specific topics, in this case which ones and how you would understand that stance. Anyways this is a marginal issue wrt the current topic so let's just drop it.
[1] In both cases I don't think e.g. that Wittgenstein believed in fregian propositions
For example, I notice a person standing at a bus stop. Unless I subjectively empathise with the person who is doing the standing, I cannot form the proposition that the person is waiting for a bus . Objectively speaking, I can at most hypothesize a causal explanation as to their standing behaviour, an explanation that refers only to their past behavioural conditioning and makes no reference to belief-states or to future-contingent phenomena such as whether or not a bus comes and the person gets on it.
I am more than willing to interpret the person as waiting for a bus, via an instinctive act of empathy, but in doing so I am mixing together my own beliefs regarding the person with my concept of their beliefs.
And Banno's belief that he's making a decisive point is Banno's typing on his keyboard and his feeling triumphant and his clicking 'post comment'?
I don't think so.
Skinnerian reductionism - while inordinately effective for intervention vis-a-vis ASDs - should keep its nose out of philosophy.
It's that simple.
Normally when there's an all and some statement, 'for every belief there exists a statement such that...' someone argues for it, no?
The point being made is the relatively simple one that we use the term belief to talk about a particular attitude towards a proposition. It's not an all-and-some.
The general structure of beliefs is of the form "? believes that p" where "?" is the name of the believer(s) and "p" is some proposition.
A proposition here is (at least) a statement that is either true or false.
Now I will go so far as to say that there is no philosopher who disagrees with this account.
And yet this topic arrises again and yet again. The only place this account is doubted in in pop forums such as this.
And as you might notice if you read through the comments, it's not about belief, it's about neophytes learning how to think.
Seems to be. 'Every belief can be put into propositional form' = 'For every belief there exists a statement such that that statement expresses the belief'.
And for context, you don't need to look far to find that at least the linguistic framing of the issue is contentious, see this bit from SEP article on belief:
[quote='SEP, Belief']A number of philosophers have argued that our cognitive representations have, or can have, a map-like rather than a linguistic structure (Lewis 1994; Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996; Camp 2007, 2018; Rescorla 2009; though see Blumson 2012 and Johnson 2015 for concerns about whether map-like and language-like structures are importantly distinct). Map-like representational systems are both productive and systematic: By recombination and repetition of its elements, a map can represent indefinitely many potential states of affairs; and a map-like system that has the capacity, for example, to represent the river as north of the mountain will normally also have the capacity to represent, by a re-arrangement of its parts, the mountain as north of the river. Although maps may sometimes involve words or symbols, nothing linguistic seems to be essential to the nature of map-like representation: Some maps are purely pictorial or combine pictorial elements with symbolic elements, like coloration to represent altitude, that we don’t ordinarily think of as linguistic.[/quote]
But the point remains that both accounts enable beliefs to be rendered as propositional attitudes.
If they did not, they would not be about beliefs.
Understood. Good to know. So many terms are loaded and around here, it's far too easy to get distracted by futile arguing over semantics/definitions, despite such great methods available for deciding which conceptual scheme/linguistic framework is best. There's a bit of that going on in the debate as well. Unfortunately, this time around, after re-reading the debate I was disappointed in myself for several reasons.
If there are any questions you have for me about the position I argue for/from, I'd be happy to answer. It could be quite helpful for you to re-read my posts only. That's the only way to avoid taking on the misunderstandings that Banno was arguing against.
I too find this topic and all that underwrites it very intriguing, and of utmost importance to proper understanding.
But why demand this? Who is arguing otherwise? It does not follow from this that the content of all belief is propositional. It follows that the presentation of all beliefs is, but even that hinges upon what counts as a belief being presented. Jack does not present his beliefs to you in propositional form. Be all that as it may, it's an aside, relevant but an aside.
The gist here is that we take account of belief using propositions. I totally agree. That's not the matter in contention. The matter in contention is what belief content is, what belief consists of, language less belief in particular.
That's the general structure used to describe, report upon, take an account of, and/or make some statement about anothers' belief.
Do you not draw a distinction between the cat's belief and our reports thereof in terms of content? They are not the same things. Clearly.
I am still quite content with the first three posts in the debate. If you'd like to discuss these, I'd be happy to oblige and grateful to have piqued a genuine interest.
:smile:
I'll condense what I see as the main issues...
If all belief are propositional attitudes, then...
All belief are about propositions.
All belief are existentially dependent upon propositions.
Either there are language less propositions or there are no language less belief.
There are unspoken propositions.
But no, I've had enough of this.
Unspoken is not language less in the relevant sense. Language less means that they exist in their entirety prior to language. Propositions that somehow exist completely independent of language. All unspoken propositions belong to linguistic creatures. Creatures with language are not language less. Creatures without language are. Jack does not have unspoken propositions 'going through his mind', so to speak...
Addressed six posts back.
If that is not so, present a belief that cannot be presented in propositional form.
Part of the confusion might stem from the fact that in logic, propositions are expressed using a formally recognizable linguistic structure in the form of composable predicates, terms and quantifiers, leading to the paradox of the unity of the proposition, which indicates that the meaning of propositions isn't syntactically decomposable into reusable terms and predicates in the way that logical analysis appears to suggest.
The mutually dependent definitions of belief and proposition also invites scepticism regarding the existence or utility of belief concepts. For example, in Wittgenstein's remarks concerning what turns an arrow sign into a pointer, he comments to the effect that the a priori phenomena that we might associate with the propositional attitude of an observer of the arrow (e.g feeling that the arrow is pointy), is only partially relevant, if at all, to the observer's eventual use of the arrow.
Likewise, Bertrand Russell identified the intentional object of a state of hunger to be whatever food is eventually used to satisfy the hunger, as opposed identifying the intentional object with the imagined food that a hungry person thinks about before eating.
Wouldn't "I agree", be a belief and not a proposition?
That seems to be a step back from:
Quoting Banno
The structure is now "? believes that p" where "?" is the name of the believer(s) and "p" can be expressed in propositional form.
Since a picture is worth a thousand words, I would just like to see more argument than "because otherwise we aren't talking about beliefs." If you just want to define belief as a relationship to propositional content, that's fine.
Rendering the content of something into propositional form warrants neither concluding that the content is propositional nor that the thing is an attitude towards a proposition.
The content of my fridge can be rendered in propositional form. The content of my fridge is not propositional, and my fridge is not an attitude towards a proposition.
I read your three posts, and I’m inclined to agree on all points. Still the comments of @Banno to them look pretty messy to me both in addressing your points and in providing a consistent account on his own terms.
Since you abundantly discussed the former issue already I would like to take a closer look at his own view. I would appreciate if you could give me your feedback on my remarks (notes are quotations of his statements).
- If proposition is a “more abstract entity” [1] supposed to be “common between certain statements”, then proposition are not statements, and they are not interchangeable with statements, yet he prefers to talk in terms of propositions as “statements that can be either true or false”. Well if they are statements then they can not at the same time be intrinsic truth bearers and the content of our beliefs, why? Because believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true, yet “the cup is on the shelf” and "la taza está en el estante" have the same truth value.
- Commands and desires are also considered propositional attitudes but they have satisfaction conditions not truth conditions as beliefs. And as long as beliefs and desires can express different attitudes toward the same propositions, propositions themselves are not intrinsically truth bearers by themselves [2], but only dependently on the direction-of-fit conferred by the intentional attitude.
- The manifest inconsistency of claiming that beliefs about statements are exactly the same as beliefs about the way things are [3] has been already spotted by you. But his other formulations elsewhere [4] turned out to be even more preposterous because claiming that beliefs are about how we think things are is exactly like saying beliefs are about how we believe things are (kind of intrinsically reflexive beliefs).
- He claims that both beliefs [5] and state of affaires [6] can be put in the form of a proposition, but if the possibility of putting in propositional form a belief is enough to claim that belief have propositional content, then it should be also enough to claim that state of affaires have propositional content. And since propositions are sentences that can be true or false [7], then also state of affaires can be true or false as much as beliefs can be, thanks to their propositional content.
- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.
- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.
- If belief is a way to explain action [12][13] and cats do not show human linguistic skills, how could one possibly explain Lilly’s behavior by attributing to her a belief that a certain sentence about her environment is true? However this sounds too preposterous and it’s probably not what he means, what he more probably means is instead that the human capacity of rendering Lilly’s beliefs through sentences that can be true or false is what explains Lilly’s behavior. Which sounds as preposterous, doesn’t it?
[1] Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition.
[2] My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable
[3] To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; to deny this is to deny that our statements are about the way things are.
[4] Saying that beliefs have propositional content is nothing more than saying that beliefs are about how we think things are.
[5] that every belief has propositional content does not imply that every belief has indeed been put in propositional form.
[6] It should be clear from the preceding discussion that while it is not the case that every proposition has been stated, every possible state of affairs can be put in the form of a proposition.
[7] Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. Since there is no present King of France, he can be neither bald nor hirsute. "The present king of France is bald" is not the sort of sentence that can be true or false.
[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …
The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs…
[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.
[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.
[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true.
[12] Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away. This is at least part of what belief is about: that our actions follow from our beliefs, that what we do, we do in the light of what we hold to be true.
[13] My own inclination is more towards beliefs being a way of talking about, and hence explaining, our actions; that is, that they are not things stored so much as interpretations of what we do.
I'd be honored to offer my feedback to such a carefully well-crafted post.
Due to personal time constraints, ease of reading, the desire to offer subsequent long overdue attention to this topic in particular, I think it best to address each set of remarks in their own respective posts. As a show of appreciation for the effort, it may take a couple of days to address all five. Luckily enough, I've a quite a bit of 'spare' time for the next week. I would consider it time well spent. After that, I will not be visiting the site daily. However, I would be more than happy to continue when I do. I'd like to help foster a long term respectful and productive discussion about the subject matter itself, after the critique. Thank you again. I was pleasantly surprised by the genuine interest.
Regarding the set of remarks and relevant footnote(again kudos for this!) copied below...
Quoting neomac
On pains of coherency alone, I would concur that if propositions are supposed to be what is common between certain statements, then they are not statements, cannot be statements, and thus cannot serve as substitutes thereof(salva veritate).
I agree that believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true. Although those two statements are in completely different languages, they do have the same truth conditions; both are true if the cup is on the shelf. Banno has used Tarski to talk about this situation with "Snow is white" and the German equivalent.
If we have two individual believers, each from a community that uses one of the two respective languages, we would have two individuals that had the same meaningful belief in two different languages. What they believe is not so much that the statements are true(even though if asked they would say as much), but rather they both believe that things are a certain way(that the cup is on the shelf). The two statements make the same claim, say the same thing, express the same proposition, and both are about the spatiotemporal relationship between the cup and the shelf, and not themselves(their own truthfulness). The content of such belief is the cup, the shelf, and the relationship between them.
I may be of little help or interest here, I'm afraid. This seems to be from speech act theorists(Austin, Searle, Ryle???), and I'm not familiar enough to comment much. I will say that I'm fond of Austin's bit on promises(making the world match the words, i.e., direction of fit???). In addition, I'm not at all impressed by what I think I understand about the conventional notion of truth bearers, having perused the SEP on several occasions regarding it. I do not understand the need to posit them, leaning here on methodological naturalisms tenet regarding refrain from unnecessarily multiplying entities. I would be quite interested in reading your thoughts on the notion, if you find it necessary for explaining some aspect that cannot be adequately explained without invoking it.
In Banno's defense, his qualification above tells me that he already knows that they are not strictly speaking in conventional terms; interchangeable. I strongly suspect that he also knew, and was right, that I would not call him on that, for neither of us are much impressed by the conventional notion of proposition, and talking in terms of statements is easier for the average reader to grasp. We also both strive to speak as plainly as possible without sacrificing any crucial meaning.
Thanks a lot for your feedback and pls take your time in commenting whatever I said you find worth it.
Just let me add that your understanding of his views seem more charitable and probably more accurate than mine due to your past exchanges with him.
Yet I’m still reluctant to agree with what you claim in his defense because:
- I have no reason to indulge in his over-confidence. The content of a belief is what the belief is actually about, while his clearly trying hard to identify the content of a belief based on the ways what a belief is about can be (meta)linguistically rendered or based on its logic implications/equivalences (like if p implies “p” is true or p can be rendered as “p” is true, then the content of believing in p is “p” is true) and based on that explain the related behavior. I find that simply preposterous.
- If we are not clear on what proposition or propositional form or propositional content are supposed to mean and how they relate to beliefs or state of affairs or behaviors, it’s hard to understand what we agree or disagree on.
I use whatever symbol-system I've learned and that I believe my reader knows so that I might translate my beliefs into a form perceivable to them. My beliefs are not only propositions, but can be symbolized using words.
If beliefs were only propositions then are you saying that your beliefs are only composed of visual scribbles and spoken sounds? What color are the words that form your belief, and the corresponding background that provides the contrast for you to be able to easily discern the scribbles that are imposed upon it? What font is used to form your belief? Is the type of font and color of the scribbles and background part of the belief? Just so I can better understand the composition of your beliefs, but I don't think that is going to get me anywhere in understanding your belief. What will help me understand your stated belief is what the scribbles on this page refer to, which can't be just scribbles in your head.
Do propositions exhaust the entirety of your beliefs? In reading your propositions, do I have direct access to your beliefs without missing anything in the translation?
I agree on the points you make here. The false equivalency, it seems to me, comes as a result of using the belief that approach for a task it's not suited for. Seems to me that it's suited for showing the presupposition of truth inherent belief statements, and lends itself to redundancy(Tarski's T sentence), both of which Banno seems to agree with and rely upon.
Witt is strong in Banno's view though, particularly so when it comes to metaphysics in general, the importance of language in all human considerations, and any and all philosophical notions which seem to add nothing to our understanding but unnecessary confusion. Last I knew, like Davidson, he rejects the distinction between scheme and world. What you're seeing here could be a result of not quite having consistently rendered all the different aspects of his worldview? Indeed, that may not even matter much to him.
Banno is excellent at engaging others, and for that the world is a better place. He has certainly been the most influential individual to me personally(regarding philosophy), despite all our disagreements. To put it into my own framework...
Banno has been a necessary elemental constituent of my own philosophical understanding, without which, I would not have even been able to have. A mentor of sorts, a guidepost of the utmost caliber.
No.
Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat".
But in addition the model you use of talking as if things in your head were translated into language that is then transmitted and translated in things in your listener's head has been thoroughly critiqued, and found wanting. It's clear that it is much better to deal with the use to which one's utterance are put rather than to invent an enigmatic, disembodied entity called "the meaning of a word" that somehow floats from mind to mind.
If you are interested in formal representations of beliefs, the Stanford article on that topic is quite good.
As per all philosophical considerations, it takes for granted that beliefs are propositional attitudes.
It's wryly amusing to find oneself again the topic of discussion.
Let me know if you would like me to chime in. For a negotiated fee I will appear as a special guest speaker.
> It's wryly amusing to find oneself again the topic of discussion.
And the good news is that I didn't finish yet.
> For a negotiated fee I will appear as a special guest speaker.
I'm afraid @creativesoul's cornucopia of ceremonious compliments to you are all you are going to get, sir.
Sarcasm is surely fun, so pls go ahead. It's simply that if you could add some good philosophical arguments on top of it, it would be even more fun.
You can quote someone by highlighting their text; a pop up will appear that will link their name and the text. As here: Quoting neomac
You have come in after what is literally years of discussion. If I were half as good a teacher as @creativesoul suggests, he would have been convinced of the error of his ideas long ago. To suggest that I have not provided "some good philosophical arguments" is puerile.
I wonder, did you perhaps miss the debate from whence this discussion came?
Here.
I suppose you did, but it seems worth checking, because you do not seem to be addressing what I actually wrote, so much as a half-understood inference from the writing of other folk.
It looks like it will be a slow wet day, so while I have no great desire to further flog this dead horse, I might rely if addressed directly.
Bye the bye, this supercilious style is intended to get on your goat. It keeps me as the centre of attention.
There's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about this being red and that being red, that there must be a thing which is named by "red". Of course, there isn't. The red in the sunset has nothing in common with the red in the sports car; apart from the name.
The temptation is to reify the red into existence. But all we actually have is a way of talking that has proved useful.
That from Austin. He extended this to meaning - there's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about this meaning this and meaning that, that there must be a thing which is named by "meaning". There need not be any such thing. Again the temptation is to reify meaning into existence. But all we actually have is a way of talking that has proved useful - that form Wittgenstein, who pointed out how useful it was for philosophers to look at the use of words rather than their meaning
So far as this goes I suspect @creativesoul would agree. But here we seem to differ, since I would extent this approach to belief, whereas he baulks.
There's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about our believing this or our believing that, that there must be a thing which is named by "belief". Of course, there need not be. Why could it not just be a convenience for us to talk as if there were such a thing, perhaps a a handy way of summarising our attitudes and actions? He went to the shop because he wanted milk and he believed that's were he could purchase some, and so on...?
SO folk get mislead into looking for the essence of red when there isn't any such thing. And folk get misled into looking for beliefs in minds, as if they were bits of mental furniture. As if, were we to take a mind and dissect it, we would be able to find the belief that Moscow is the capital of Russia, or the belief that vanilla is better than chocolate. I suppose @creativesoul must think something like this, to explain why he is perplexed that a cat might have a belief while not being able to use language. For him, if a belief is an attitude towards a proposition, there must be propositions in minds, and so language.
But perhaps beliefs are a pretence invoked by folk who do use language, including propositions, simply to enable talk of the behaviour of others, including cats.
And here it comes back to the difference between belief and truth. We can explain the cat's going to the bowl by saying he believed it contained food, and this explains his actions whether there is food in the bowl or not.
Because sometimes beliefs are wrong. Truths are never wrong.
Perhaps talk of beliefs is just there to allow us to distinguish what others take to be the case from what we think to be the case; to allow us to explain behaviour that otherwise appears incongruous. We can explain why the cat went to the empty bowl if we infer that he was mistaken, and had taken it to contain food.
Hence, red is not a thing, but a way of talking about sunsets and sports cars. And beliefs are not things, but a way of discussing behaviour.
So, if everyone remained shtum, nothing would be red.
What was the question?
[quote=Bertrand Russell; https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm#link2HCH0009]It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless. The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being.[/quote]
Edward Feser makes a similar point:
[quote=Some Brief Arguments for Dualism; http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com.au/2008/10/some-brief-arguments-for-dualism-part_29.html]Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.[/quote]
bolds added in both passages. The salient point being, universals are intelligible objects i.e. objects of thought, but are not the product of the mind. That is how I understand them.
And yet the spoon remains in the drawer, as this particular spoon, whether I think about it or not. So particular spoons are things but the color red and beliefs are not, right?
Quoting Banno
Unless there is a specific reason to adopt it, I still prefer my way of quoting. Anyway thanks for the hint.
> If I were half as good a teacher as @creativesoul suggests, he would have been convinced of the error of his ideas long ago.
Unless he too was just being sarcastic. Just kidding.
> You have come in after what is literally years of discussion.
Well that's an open forum, I'm afraid this happens especially if anybody is invited to debate.
> To suggest that I have not provided "some good philosophical arguments" is puerile.
No sir, I didn't mean to suggest that you didn't come up with "some good philosophical arguments" at all in your entire life. I didn't find good arguments in the posts I've read from the formal debate entitled "The content of beliefs is propositional" (Banno and creativesoul). Therefore I quoted your remarks literally and explained my doubts.
> I wonder, did you perhaps miss the debate from whence this discussion came?
I don't remember if I read this specific post that you are linking. But it doesn't add any argument to better support the claims I quoted and commented. On the contrary I found just more claims to question.
> you do not seem to be addressing what I actually wrote, so much as a half-understood inference from the writing of other folk.
Let me repeat it once more: I didn't find good arguments in the posts I've read from the formal debate entitled "The content of beliefs is propositional" (Banno and creativesoul). Therefore I quoted your remarks literally and explained my doubts.
So I am exactly addressing what you wrote. While we can't say the same of your claims about what I wrote. Can we? Indeed you never even quoted any of my last comments to your statements on the subject under discussion.
> It looks like it will be a slow wet day, so while I have no great desire to further flog this dead horse, I might rely if addressed directly.
You mean your pointless challenge: " If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example".
What about this example: X believes that the present King of France is bald. Did I win anything?
You are forcing us to play a rigged game based on some unjustified assumptions. And when one is addressing what is wrong in your assumptions, in challenging them with the same question, you are implicitly accusing them of cowardly refusing to play your game. This looks either puerile or dishonest, to me.
> Bye the bye, this supercilious style is intended to get on your goat. It keeps me as the centre of attention.
Now it's your turn to address my last comments to your statements on the subject under discussion.
From my exchange with @creativesoul (the notes are quotations of your own statements @Banno):
- If proposition is a “more abstract entity” [1] supposed to be “common between certain statements”, then proposition are not statements, and they are not interchangeable with statements, yet he prefers to talk in terms of propositions as “statements that can be either true or false” [2]. Well if they are statements then they can not at the same time be intrinsic truth bearers and the content of our beliefs, why? Because believing that “the cup is on the shelf” is true, doesn’t equate to believing that "la taza está en el estante" is true, yet “the cup is on the shelf” and "la taza está en el estante" have the same truth value.
- Commands and desires are also considered propositional attitudes but they have satisfaction conditions not truth conditions as beliefs. And as long as beliefs and desires can express different attitudes toward the same propositions, propositions themselves are not intrinsically truth bearers by themselves [2], but only dependently on the direction-of-fit conferred by the intentional attitude.
- The manifest inconsistency of claiming that beliefs about statements are exactly the same as beliefs about the way things are [3] has been already spotted by you. But his other formulations elsewhere [4] turned out to be even more preposterous because claiming that beliefs are about how we think things are is exactly like saying beliefs are about how we believe things are (kind of intrinsically reflexive beliefs).
- He claims that both beliefs [5] and state of affairs [6] can be put in the form of a proposition, but if the possibility of putting in propositional form a belief is enough to claim that belief have propositional content, then it should be also enough to claim that state of affairs have propositional content. And since propositions are sentences that can be true or false [7], then also state of affairs can be true or false as much as beliefs can be, thanks to their propositional content.
- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.
- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.
- If belief is a way to explain action [12][13] and cats do not show human linguistic skills, how could one possibly explain Lilly’s behavior by attributing to her a belief that a certain sentence about her environment is true? However this sounds too preposterous and it’s probably not what he means, what he more probably means is instead that the human capacity of rendering Lilly’s beliefs through sentences that can be true or false is what explains Lilly’s behavior. Which sounds as preposterous, doesn’t it?
[1] Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition.
[2] My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable
[3] To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; to deny this is to deny that our statements are about the way things are.
[4] Saying that beliefs have propositional content is nothing more than saying that beliefs are about how we think things are.
[5] that every belief has propositional content does not imply that every belief has indeed been put in propositional form.
[6] It should be clear from the preceding discussion that while it is not the case that every proposition has been stated, every possible state of affairs can be put in the form of a proposition.
[7] Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition. Since there is no present King of France, he can be neither bald nor hirsute. "The present king of France is bald" is not the sort of sentence that can be true or false.
[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …
The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs…
[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.
[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.
[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true.
[12] Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away. This is at least part of what belief is about: that our actions follow from our beliefs, that what we do, we do in the light of what we hold to be true.
[13] My own inclination is more towards beliefs being a way of talking about, and hence explaining, our actions; that is, that they are not things stored so much as interpretations of what we do.
it means your readers can go back to the original location of the post with a click. So yes, there are.
If what I said in the debate itself is of no use to you, then I have nothing more to add.
Cheers.
I've argued at length and to the point what I think about your arguments. While you didn't serve me with the same treatment, instead you are continually dodging my direct challenges to your views, with cheap excuses and attack ad personam. Despite the treatment, I don't take it personally as much as you do. So I'm still waiting for a more focused feedback on my last comments about your views. I'm even ready to thank you for the effort, go figure ;)
Consciousness, the alleged pure subjective aspect of it, is nonpropositional; so said Wittgenstein (re private language argument).
It depends though on what we mean by belief and contents of belief.
I don't see the difference in the meaning. Why would you say the cat is on the mat if you weren't implying that it was true that the cat is on the mat?
"Attitudes" doesn't really fit, or leaves one wanting to know: what kind of attitude, if not the attitude that the proposition, or idea, is true?
Beliefs are better described as predictions. We are prediction machines and predictions are attitudes of probability towards some idea or proposition. We often use the phrases, "I think", "I believe", and "I know" to refer to the level of certainty we have of a given idea, with the latter being the most certain you can be.
Saying, "The sun will rise tomorrow." is the same as making a prediction and we make predictions based on prior experiences in similar circumstances. The more experience we have in a certain circumstance, the more certain we become that similar future circumstances will be the same. A belief is no different. Beliefs eventually become knowledge with more justification.
Quoting Banno
Your use of "attitudes" and "use" is found wanting. What kind of attitudes, if not attitudes of certainty? Used for what if not representing things that aren't words?
I have found that defining meaning as the relationship between cause and effect very useful. Meaning is everywhere causes leave effects. Words are the effects of one's intent to communicate ideas that are not just other words. Some idea and the intent to communicate them is what causes words to appear on this page, and it is now the reader's job to get at the cause of the words - the idea the writer intends to communicate. Sometimes the reader may require re-phrasing or ask questions to better understand the idea.
Quoting Banno
Words are just colored shapes on a background of a contrasting color, or particular sounds in the air. Given that we can talk about words and how they are shaped and how they sound, like we can talk about apples and the way the are colored and shaped and how they taste and smell, and compare them to other words, even from different languages, seems to show that we are talking about something when we use words like, "red", "black letters on white paper", and the way "where" sounds like "wear", as opposed to just "using" them (again, used for what if not to refer to something that isn't a word).
I don't know how to respond to that. Try this: What is the subject of "the cat is on the mat"? I would say it is the cat. But what is the subject fo "Harry believes the cat is on the mat"? It's about Harry. They are quite different.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Exactly; the attitude of taking the proposition to be true.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I don't see any benefit in that. I can see no clear way in which "We believe that Augustus was a Roman Emperor" is just a prediction. However treating belief as a propositional attitude has spawned very many further developments. Again it seems worth pointing out that it is, for better or worse, orthodoxy.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Not certainty, but truth.
Quoting Harry Hindu
And yet we do things with them. There's no point in going over the problems with your referential theory of meaning again.
I agree on both points above. There seems to be some special pleading going on, at a bare minimum. Inconsistent terminological use, certainly. That's unacceptable.
Interesting though...
I've noticed something now that I do not remember noticing during the overwhelming amount of seemingly incongruent argumentation offered by Banno during the debate. I had a very hard time making much sense of any of it towards the end.
has arrived at incoherence by virtue of self-contradiction. If all belief has propositional content by virtue of being an attitude towards some proposition or other, and "The present King of France is bald" is not a proposition, then it would not even be possible to believe that the present King of France was bald, because "the present King of France is bald" has just been disqualified. That contradicts the way things are. We all know that it would take very little effort, given the right candidate, to convince someone that the statement is true. It is not impossible to believe that the present King of France is bald. The statement is not truth-apt, but can be wholeheartedly believed nonetheless.
:meh:
If "The present King of France is bald" is not a proposition, and yet it can be believed nonetheless, then it cannot be the case that either all belief has propositional content or all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or other.
:death:
Quoting creativesoul
Indeed this is what I already remarked in my previous comment:
Quoting neomac
Maybe he could try to claim that either X doesn't really believe that, which is intuitively preposterous and justifiably so. Or he could try to claim that, in this case, the propositional content of the belief that the present King of France is bald can not be rendered with "'the present King of France is bald' is true" but with "'the present King of France is bald' is a proposition" . However this line of reasoning looks an ad hoc move, at least until it doesn't get properly integrated with the rest of his account (good luck with that!). Besides the metalinguistic sentence "p is a proposition" is not a proposition according to W.'s Tractatus. And we are more and more far from understanding how such an account could ever explain what a belief is about and explain the related behavior not only for non-linguistic creature but also for irrational/ignorant linguistic creature.
In the first, the naive realist believes that they can talk about how things are independent of some belief or observation. The first statement could be caused by an illusion, hallucination or a lie.
For the indirect realist, both are the same because you can only talk about your ideas or observations, and your ideas or observations would be about the way things are. So words can be about the way things are, but not without some observation, which is what some proposition is about, not about the way things are independent of some observation. We can only ever speak about our knowledge and hope that our knowledge is accurate.
Language was developed in such a way that it implies that we see the world as it is. When we speak of colors and sounds, we imply that those colors and sounds exist independent of our observations and that we see colors and hear sounds that are actually there. But science has shown that indirect realism is the case where colors only exist in the mind and are representations of wavelengths of EM energy, and sounds are representations of vibrating air molecules. As a result of modern scientific knowledge, it is understood that our words can only be about the way things are indirectly - meaning that our words refer to our ideas and our ideas refer to states-of-affairs. Our words only accurately refer to state-of-affairs when our ideas do the same.
Given that color is a component of the perception and not of the perceived, what is the subject of the statement, "The apple is red."?
Quoting Banno
Having the attitude that some proposition is true doesn't make the proposition true. What makes some proposition true or not, and how would you know?
Quoting Banno
You predict both future and past state-of-affairs based on observations of current conditions. You can predict past events based on the effects they have left, like a criminal investigator investigating the evidence at the crime scene to predict the identity of the criminal and their motive. While the crime happened in the past, the knowledge of who did it is in the future and is only proved once the evidence is properly interpreted. Your continued reference to orthodoxy and popularity is a logical fallacy and not useful.
Quoting Banno We can know that we can be certain about some proposition, but not that some proposition is true. What does it mean for some proposition to be true?
Quoting Banno What do we do with them, Banno? Use them to accomplish what goal? Intent precedes use and use is dependent upon intent. What is the intent of using words? Your "going over the problems of referential theory" were debunked and you abandoned the conversation, like you are doing now. There's no point in going over the problems of meaning is use again when you make the same arguments and keep appealing to popularity.
Meaning is use is not specific enough as words can be used for representation.
A Man Without Words is a story about a deaf man that grew up without language and only discovered language after becoming an adult.
Idelfonso obviously held beliefs before learning a language, or else how did he find food? He had to have beliefs about where food could be found that were not propositions, or else he would have starved, just like cats that learn and then hold beliefs that the sound of a can opener precedes the smell and taste of tuna.
What are language-less creatures' beliefs composed of? The same thing that words are composed of - shapes, colors, sounds, tastes, smells and the feelings that go along with them.
What is it like to be a bat?
Poorly articulated, sorry, I meant: or he could try to claim that, in this case, the propositional content of the belief that the present King of France is bald can not be rendered with "'the present King of France is bald' is true" but with "'the present King of France is bald' is a proposition"
Over the years, I've come to realize that parsing the issues in terms of linguistic and non-linguistic belief is fraught, it quite simply does not work. Almost, but not quite right, it seems to me. There's a substantial loss of explanatory power when it comes to creatures we call non linguistic having belief content that is existentially dependent upon language; things like bowls, cups, cars, etc. Such things are certainly linguistic things, meaning that they owe their very existence to language, and it leads us to muddle when trying to parse non-linguistic creatures' beliefs if they are about such things.
Here Banno was attempting to support the notion of propositions which had never been proposed, but somehow existed nonetheless as something a believer somehow holds to be true despite never having articulated the proposition or witnessing it having been articulated. To me, that is patently absurd. It amounts to claiming that one can believe something that they have never thought of before ever thinking of it. Such a parsing completely neglects the need for the believer to be a part of the process, and makes a complete muddle of the sequences of events that lead up to forming, having, and/or holding that some proposition or other is true.
Yes, it seems that Banno thinks that because belief can be put into propositional form, and has been for centuries, that all belief content is propositional and all belief is an attitude towards that particular proposition.
There is a conflation between reporting upon and/or taking an account of anothers' belief and anothers' belief. The opening post in the debate covers this thoroughly. There are three basic kinds of belief, and believing that some proposition or other is true is but one kind.
It also does not follow from the fact that we can state the cat's belief, and do so using propositions or statements which are truth-apt, that the cat holds those to be true. The cat cannot believe such things, for the cat has no language. The cat believes that the mouse is behind the tree, but quite simply cannot believe that the proposition "the mouse is behind the tree" is true.
You seem to have entirely missed the point. Realist or idealist, one sentence is about the cat, the other about Harry.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Whatever you choose.
No, it is you who missed the point. It wasnt a comparison of realism vs idealism, but between two different versions a realism - direct vs indirect. Idealism would also have two versions: direct vs. indirect.
Quoting Banno
Not useful. Any examples of use other than representation would be helpful.
Hello.
That's a very heavily theory laden link. Notice the term "representation" too. It's an accounting practice. What is true of it is not necessarily true of what's being taken into account.
We've already been over this. No new examples?
"Hello" is the acknowledgement of two or more people to begin an exchange of information (have a conversation). "Good-bye" is the acknowledge of the parties' that the exchange of information has ended.
When a computer targets another to exchange information, they must acknowledge each other and the beginning of the exchange of information with what we call a "hand-shake" and then acknowledge the termination of the exchange with another acknowledgement from both nodes.
Yep. It's not referential. That's what you asked for.
Quoting creativesoul
It might show you how the notion of proposition fits into the belief stuff.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yep. That's why I'm not overly interested in this thread.
Like i said, it refers to the beginning of a conversation, or the intent to communicate with you.
If its not referential, then what is its use?
Yeah, I noticed the leaning on possible worlds arguments in your replies regarding unspoken statements and propositions.
No, Harry - it doesn't refer to the begging of a conversation; it is the begining of a conversation.
Or a reference to the intent to communicate.
Not sure what use the idea of possible worlds is unless were talking about beliefs as predictions.
The possible world stuff is not that important. Nothing much hangs on the use of "proposition" in "propositional attitude" - as the article says, "statement" works just as well. The only reason for using the term is that it is so widely used.
The mooted counterexample you've been using fits the propositional attitude model.
No, Harry. It does not refer to anything; it does something. It begins the conversation.
But you will continue to try to force it into your referential model. You are engaged in an ad hoc defence of a broken model.
Take a look at Propositional Attitude Reports
It is an article about the actual difficulties with propositional attitudes. I go along with Davidson, although I must admit never having considered the objections closely.
Oh, there's plenty more. Most involve referring to things in order to do stuff with them. Have a look at "How to do things with words". It's been commended to you before, many times, and is an easy read - I found it quite amusing.
Edit: There's even a youtube video about the book, for you kids that can't read.
Like i have said numerous times, meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Effects are about their causes. Use requires intent. Intent is the cause of use, therefore use is about one's intent.
Speaking is a type of behavior and we attempt to get at the intent of other behaviors so that we form beliefs, or predictions about future behaviors.
Will do. Thanks for the link. Now you're just verifying my earlier comment to you about being a guidepost of the highest caliber...
:wink:
Right, using words to refer to things that arent words in order to do stuff with those things that are not words. In other words, words are used to refer to the intent of the user to get some others to behave in a particular way.
Repeating it, even three or more times, does not make it so.
Is there anyone who agrees with you on this, Harry?
I do not think that you understand what I'm arguing. It doesn't so much as contradict your own as much as further qualifies it. Some and all belief... whereas I hold the former and you the latter.
Yes, Harry, words can be used to talk about things. But they can do much more than just refer. The problem with a purely referential theory of language such as yours is that there is so much it cannot explain.
Neither does pleading to popularity or orthodoxy that doesnt exist.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#Repr
Thats all fine, but if meaning is not simply use, but the relationship between cause and effect, then words can be used to do other things, but as an effect of ones ideas and the intent to communicate them, words can always be used to refer to, or get at, one's intent, just like any one of their behaviors. Its just that "actions speak louder than words" in that its easier to hide the reference to ones intent with words than it is with actions that dont involve words.
Perhaps. It does seem to me you are obsessing over a minor point. If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object? I doubt it. And yet here we are.
Quoting Banno
I'm not aware of any literature of language as the relationship between cause and effect, apart from your own comments.
Is there any?
The orthodoxy is that beliefs can be best discussed as propositional attitudes.
Not language, meaning. Are you paying attention?
There wasn't any literature on the evolution of organisms by natural selection until Darwin wrote it. Why can't you address the argument instead continually committing these logical fallacies?
Quoting Banno
Not necessarily. What if the other person doesn't respond and say, "Hello" back? "Hello" can't be the beginning of a conversation that never starts. This is why it is better think of "hello" as referring to the intent to start a conversation.
In a way, what we are both saying is true and not necessarily contradictory. Use refers to intent. This is why the theory that meaning is the relationship between cause and effect helps in describing the sound or scribble as the effect with the intent as the cause. The use would be the relationship between the intent and the scribble or sound. It's just that I'm also asserting that meaning also exists everywhere else causes (not just intentional causes) leave effects.
Is there such a thing as "THE orthodoxy"? It rings puffy and tendentious.
From your own link:
"Most [not all] of these proposals take the objects of belief to be either propositions, or sentences in a formalized language."
Bad faith or blind faith.
No, and that's what.
Quoting creativesoul
so far with half-backed stipulations and random links which he doesn't even care to support or understand. mmmkey.
Again, this isnt specific enough to be useful. What kind if attitudes? Attitudes of (degrees of) certainty. You keep throwing around, "truth" without properly defining what it is and how one determines some proposition is true or not except as the degree that some proposition referrs to some state-of-affairs or not. What if there are conflicting attitudes toward some proposition? How does truth resolve the conflict?
Quoting creativesoul
My attitude toward this proposition: :rofl:
Actually, that is exactly what I'm objecting to.
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
Well, I agree that he's not taken the criticism head on, not mine at least, nor yours; both of which seem relevant and valid. However, I'd rather not make this about Banno.
Care to further discuss the topic, as compared/contrasted to my interlocutor?
And yet here you are.
Quoting Harry Hindu
The attitude that the proposition is true. That's been on the boards since day one.
True, not certain.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I think I've mentioned this before. That's as good as it gets for truth. "how one determines some proposition is true" depends on the proposition; something else I've said many times. It's absurd to suppose that there could be one way to determine if a proposition is true.
You seem to have changed topics.
Quoting Harry Hindu
You are a new Darwin for the epistemologists.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Grice? That would at least be something. But he thought we should look to meaning, not to use. Inferring intent is fraught. Use has potential for more empirical procedures.
Again?
So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diprotodon?
Can a languageless animal experience uncertainty? In my experience at least some of them can. When in any way uncertain - such as when there is hesitation in proceeding a certain way - what else could such animal be possibly uncertain of if not issues regarding what ought and ought not be done in relation to what is or is not?
No proposition is being made yet there occur conflicting beliefs in relation to what is and ought be done for as long as the uncertainty occurs. This proposition-devoid conflict of beliefs* occurring in the mind of the respective languagleless animal.
* Belief as minimally understood to comprise trust in what is or ought to be done.
Diprotodon did not have items of furniture in their minds that could be properly described as beliefs. Rather they had behaviours that we can set out and explain in terms of beliefs and desires.
I dunno. This seems to be a fairly straight forward corollary of the beetle in the box. That folk with a decent grasp of Wittgenstein - yes, you , @creativesoul - can't see this strikes me as quite odd.
Always Skinner with this one. (Reductionism to operationalized visible behaviors.)
Are you a behavior analyst?
Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.
(Call it furniture if you want.)
What's the controversy?
That's all you see because you choose not to think.
Weak.
As is this thread.
It's against you, not Wittgenstein.
Again:Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Tell me what the controversy is.
Nuh. Old stuff. Look it up for yourself.
The more aggressive you get, the more vulnerable you appear.
Why are you spending so much time on something that you consider...
Quoting Banno?
It's not quite rational.
In absence of @Banno's reply:
I believe it nullifies the importance of the beetle in a box argument - for, in this argument, if it isn’t linguistic it is irrelevant. Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. The two appear to stand in direct contradiction.
The only curious issue here is how @creativesoul squares his thinking with the beetle.
Well I'm just afraid that this one is by far the best reply you can come up with on the topic under discussion, sir.
Thanks.
I don't see how we can further it. I and you seem to agree on points that he fails to address. And apparently proudly so.
I have a question more about your own views, but maybe that's not the place to discuss it: how do you see the relation between concepts and beliefs?
Do you take issue with this (to my mind non-controversial) position?
Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.
We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior.
I don't see why it needs to be more complicated than that.
Not one bit. I rather take issue with the notion that the linguistic expression of "my pain" has no relevant referent (this as per the beetle in a box argument).
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
:up: Fully agree.
I don't want to say this due to the can of worms that it is, but I will anyway: the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance. There of course is the evolutionary conundrum to this and like telltales (e.g., shared central nervous system anatomy) to dispel such a view ... but it's not historically uncommon.
So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc?
Seems to me to be the case, yes.
There's plenty of scholarly writing on the link between Wittenstein and Skinner.
Okay, thanks for your input. :smile:
Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language.
And plenty arguing that Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist, which I find much more convincing.
I don’t know why it would be controversial to Wittgenstein. He famously wrote 'If a lion could speak, we could not understand him'. By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to.
Of course.
The SEP mentions him in the behaviorism article.
The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia).
And yet when a lion does its thing and roars with a certain tonality in a certain context, we non-lions get the gist of what its conveying well enough: the rough English translation being, “I’m the boss”. Going by their behaviors, so too do zebras and gazelles - or else competitors such as hyenas.
For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions?
Quoting Joshs
Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic.
Please address what I write and not some imaginary opponent that you make up in lieu thereof.
Diplodocus are not prehistoric mammals. I chose my classification deliberately. I wish you would pay closer attention, I know you're capable of understanding this. There are no items of furniture inside of any skulls that I'm aware of, so the response is laughable... literally. You are arguing against your own imaginary opponents.
I've no issue at all with the idea that we can explain behaviours in terms of beliefs and desires.
As far as Witt's beetle goes, I am of the understanding that it's an argument against the idea of private language or private meaning of words. I agree with it actually. It's also irrelevant here. Language less creatures' belief does not consist of language or constructs thereof. Our reports of them do, but I'm not so naive as to conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting upon.
Trees, mice, and the spatiotemporal relationship between them that we characterize as one being behind the other do not need language to exist in their entirety exactly as they did when we coined the phrase "the mouse is behind the tree". I'm not arguing that the phrase is some private belief of a prehistoric mammal(say a cat). That's absurd. Rather, I'm saying that a prehistoric cat could have believed that a mouse was behind a tree long before we coined the phrase(call it whatever you want, it matters not).
On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language. Language creation and use is existentially dependent upon belief. Therefore, concepts are existentially dependent upon belief. I've no use for the notion of "concept", having found that talking in terms of beliefs, thoughts, and linguistic frameworks is much better than talking in terms of concepts or conceptual schemes.
Do you find the account I set out in the first three posts of the debate to be a complete one?
I believe that it's better to arrive at that as a conclusion that is warranted by and follows from what we can know about our own thought and belief.
I agree that verbal language isn’t necessary for cognition, that is, for forming expectations that can be met or disappointed, which is the basis for belief in a very general sense, although obviously not belief as the structure of a verbal proposition.
Quoting javra
If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense.
Sure, infer sounds better than assume.
You accuse me of not addressing your posts, then mis-address mine.
The Diplodocus is hardly historical.
And that you fail to see the relation between this discussion and the private language argument is apparent.
So where does that leave this bloated reanimation of a thrice deceased thread. I dunno. Seems to me you missed something quite important, but...
Try this:
You are perhaps happy to say that red is seen by us in, say, a sunset or a cup, but that it is a secondary property; not to actually be found in the object.
I'm suggesting something analogous is the case with belief.
Edit: Ah, damn. I meant to write Diprotodon. My bad.
Or this:
What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? What sort of thing is the belief?
You say it's not a thing in the mind of the cat. So what is it?
This seems like a good summary to me. It points to how crucial historical usage is when it comes to the meaning of words, phrases, and other language constructs. It denies the equivalence often drawn between unspoken thought and 'private' thought. Dennet has at least one intuition pump that does much the same thing in "Quining Qualia", except he's arguing against the notion of private sensations or some such and using something like the private language argument to make the point of how socially constructed the notions actually are.
I highly recommend reading that to anyone who has not.
Well then, perhaps we do agree on something basic. I'm not keen on the 'property' talk though. I'll try to tease out the analogy in as simple terms as I can, using ones with which I believe you'll be okay. I'll try to incorporate both, the private language argument and the secondary property gist, for they seem to be different kinds of objections.
So, seeing red always includes some creature or another, and what is meant by "seeing red" is entirely determined by language use, which is social. Thus, when one claims that their experience of seeing red cups or even thinking about red cups is some personal and private experience or thought, we can surely know that those thoughts and experiences cannot count as private matters at all, because they are the result of social constructs and historical language use, and that which is a social construct cannot be completely private.
I'll leave it there for now. Hopefully, this is the beginning of something more productive between us. It's been a while. If the above is palatable enough for you, could you elaborate on how belief is the same way. Don't get me wrong, I understand how our use of the term "belief" fits into the above so far as language use being social goes. Rather, I'm struggling to see how this is at all applicable and/or lends support to the claim that all belief content is propositional.
The question makes no sense on my view. Beliefs are not the sort of things used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else, or to refer to something else; beliefs are not names, do not function like names, although they are certainly necessary for any naming and descriptive practices to begin.
Quoting Banno
Beliefs are complex things composed of other things. They are a result of cognitive processes. All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things. The complexity of any belief in particular(the correlational content) is congruent with the innate capabilities of the creature.
If the cat believes that the bowl is empty, it is as a result of looking and seeing that there was no food in it. There is no referent of the belief. As above, the cat's belief does not refer to anything. Rather, it's about a food source. It's about the bowl,, but is much more than just the empty bowl.
Quoting Banno
The issue I have is with the use of "mind" as anything other than a loose reference to one's thoughts and beliefs. Layman speak for what are you thinking is "What's on your mind". "I have something in mind" does not mean that the mind is a place where things can be. Indeed, beliefs are the sorts of things that do not have a precise spatiotemporal location, for they are composed of entirely different otherwise seemingly disparate things, connected only by the correlations drawn between them by the believing creature.
Good. Nor to mine.
I suspect some fo our company might disagree.
Quoting creativesoul
Oooo... I remember that from a few years ago. Warning bells. Quoting creativesoul
Then what is it that is "had" by the cat, when it has a belief? Nothing, I say; it's just a way of setting out it's behaviour.
I think that that overstates the human influence regarding red things. Other language less creatures can also see red, so it is clear that seeing red does not require our language usage. However, more to your point, which I take on in agreement is...
Our usage determines what "seeing red" means. We cannot sensibly talk about seeing red cups unless we've been steeped in language. Our usage determines what "I believe that X" means(where X is some statement believed true). We cannot sensibly talk about our beliefs unless we've been steeped in language. In both cases, it is true that our understanding and knowledge of what those words mean depends entirely upon language use...
However, I would not say the same about all instances of seeing red or all instances of believing that a mouse ran behind a tree. Not all those depend upon language use.
It's a tough question to be sure. The belief is what is had by the cat. The cat draws correlations between different things. The bowl. Hunger pangs. The urge to eat, and seek food(gather resources). The belief that the bowl is empty could be accompanied by unsatisfied expectations, if she is expecting food to be there. There are numerous past events, each leaving an impression upon the cat such that it now goes to the bowl when it's hungry. After looking into the bowl, if it is empty, then the cat sees that the bowl is empty. Knowing what an empty food bowl looks like is not a mystery, nor is believing the bowl is empty when looking at an empty bowl. There is language necessary to make the bowl, but there's none necessary to look into it and see that it's empty, resulting in believing so.
The creature alone with the box can look and see if there is something in the box. The something in the box he can see and retain in memory and categorize alongside other things-seen without giving the thing in the box a name. I imagine the mind would do just fine with the categorization of nameless images. (You might imagine a dog's mind along these lines.) It's easy to imagine a mind running on nameless images (and emotions, smells, feelings, and so on). I suppose a name would make the image easier to categorize. But images are also easy to remember, manipulate, organize.
You may say we decide together how to organize these nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on. I don't think this can be known as enjoyable as it might be to know it.
Most of earthly existence has been languageless. Why get so hung up on language. It has a homocentric ring to it. We've had our Copernicus. We're not at the center anymore. Animals have minds too, the evidence insists: There are languageless creatures who can categorize nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on. There are nonlinguistic creatures who hold beliefs. The cat is assailed with nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on between the sound of the electric can opener and his dashing to the kitchen. Those nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on,* are the cat's belief: belief that the sound of the electric can opener means there's something tasty in the kitchen.
*You would probably like to include the cat's behavior here but to me that's a weird way to talk. I wouldn't talk that way about myself or about you. I wouldn't call your behavior a part of your belief or my behavior a part of my belief. So what warrants this phraseology with the cat? Only a kind of Skinnerian reductionism. Never a wise move. The Skinnerian epoche is always a temptation but vacuous in the end. A distraction designed to postpone the acceptance of uncertainty.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. The most wonderful and mysterious thing about the mind is that it has no location. A belief has no location. It's a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and a behavioral pattern and in the case of a linguistic creature a linguistic pattern.
To me, they are enough to seriously challenge Banno's account as he presented it so far. But as I said, we can determine our views on beliefs better by clarifying other related notions, like proposition, concept, reference, perception, sentence, etc. That’s why I’m interested now to explore your understanding of the relation between beliefs and concepts.
Quoting creativesoul
On what grounds do you believe that all concepts are linguistic constructs? What are the features you ascribe to concepts that essentially require language?
What is the difference between knowledge and belief?
What is the difference between, "the attitude that some proposition is true", and "certain that some proposition is true"?
What is certainty if not the attitude that some proposition is true?
Quoting Banno
True is a type of proposition, as opposed to false propositions. Certain would be a type of attitude of some proposition.
Is it also possible to have an attitude that some proposition is false that is also a belief?
It's not changing topics. It's integrating what you are saying with the rest of what we know.
Quoting Banno
Proposition 1: Banno is excellent at engaging others
Proposition 2: Banno is not excellent at engaging others
Proposition 3: And yet you are here.
If propositions are true depending on the proposition, then what use is your proposition (#3) in determining the truth of creativesoul's proposition (#1) and my proposition (#2)?
It seems to me that you are implying that P1 is true depending on if P3 true. If a proposition can only be true depending on some other proposition, then we get an infinite regress of needing an infinite amount of propositions for just one to be true.
If propositions are true depending only on the proposition itself, then P3 has no bearing on P1 or P2 being true, which means that your response is an example of us talking past each other. It would also mean that P1 and P2 have no implications on the other being true (which would mean that the LNC is false).
To resolve the infinite regress and abide by the LNC, we must theorize that propositions are true depending on some state-of-affairs that isn't just another proposition, or that propositions refer to some state-of-affairs that is not another proposition.
Quoting Banno
Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille). Humans first started with using sounds to create propositions, then visual scribbles, and eventually braille for the blind. Since different sensations can be co-opted to create propositions with, why can't any animal that has sensations form propositions, like this smell means that wolves are in the area and that sound means that they are to my left, which also means I should run to my right? The only difference would be the degree of complexity with which some proposition could be made and the state-of-affairs that it can refer to.
Does it matter what form some proposition takes (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.) as long as the sensation means (refers to, or has a causal relation with) something that isn't another sensation?
I disagree. The referent of the word "belief" is a cognitive intentional state/event (depending on the dispositional or actual meaning we attribute to the word "belief").
Quoting creativesoul
My impression is that here you are confusing the content of the belief, with the belief. I think your formulation would sound better if you stated "All belief consists of drawing correlations" instead of "All belief consists of correlations drawn". Yet I wouldn't find it satisfactory: we draw correlations even when we imagine or associate ideas, but imagination is not belief. Besides what is "correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things" supposed to mean when one believes that 3 + 2 = 5 or God is omniscient?
Short on time.
Name some things that you count as a concept, and it will help this along better. As before, I do not use the notion, finding different ways of talking to be more practical.
The concept of belief and belief...
Do you draw a distinction?
I love that article. I think Dennett does a great job of demolishing g Strawson’s argument for panpsychism. I just wish he had gone a little further in Rorty’s
direction.
roughly:
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yep. Believing that P is false is just believing ~P.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Your use of "dependent" is misleading. Implication is not dependency. Support for Creative's contention that Banno is good an engaging others is found in the fact that you continue to be engaged.
Quoting Harry Hindu
No, they re not They are composed of predicates and subjects.
Note he asked the referent of the belief, not the word "belief". Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do.
Quoting neomac
The content of a belief amounts to what a belief consists of. The content of the belief that a mouse is behind a tree is the mouse, the tree, the spatiotemporal relationship between the two, and the correlations drawn between all these by the creature capable of doing so.
Indeed, we do draw correlations when imagining, remembering, creating, envisioning, dreaming, etc. I fail to see how that presents any issue for the position I'm putting forth here. I mean, I've not claimed that all correlations are belief, nor would I.
Quoting neomac
Are those meaningful marks imperceptible? When one believes that 3 + 2 = 5, they've done nothing more than accept the rules of arithmetic. It may be worth noting here that numbers are nothing more than the names of quantities. When one believes that God is omniscient, they've done nothing more than learn to use language to talk about the supernatural beliefs of the community, and believe that what they are saying is true. Believing that God is omniscient is to believe that there is a God, such that God exists, and that God knows everything.
Yes. Indeed! That article was very impressive to me as well! I'm not a physicalist either, strictly speaking.
You may find it interesting to search the site by typing the title into the search bar. Banno created a great thread about it. Good stuff in there, between the typical yahoos.
No, that's not it at all. My problem with that notion of belief is well known. How to square that with the idea that language less animals are capable of belief. Hence, the need to posit the notion of a language less proposition.
If all belief is an attitude towards a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language use, then language less animals have no belief. That's the argument. The conclusion follows from the premisses. You have argued for both premisses. You cannot admit the conclusion, because you know better. I'm offering a way to make amends.
:wink:
I was just perusing that thread yesterday.
While acknowledging other’s rather complex interpretations of Wittgenstein, here’s what the guy actually said in his own words:
Quoting Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein
Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”
As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues. This when reading Witt verbatim. Felt like mentioning that.
It wasn’t clear to me since "the cat believes the bowl is empty” could be taken as mentioning a sentence not as using it to describe whatever is supposed to be the case. However your reply is misleading as well in this respect, because I would grant that the question doesn’t make sense if the question presupposes a categorisation of belief as a word with some referent instead of an intentional state. And this would be a categorial mistake: beliefs are not words (but is there anybody here who would believe otherwise? If not, then what's the interest in asking this question wrt to the topic under discussion?). Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you? If it is case for you too, then your previous claim was wrong, indeed it does make sense to ask what the reference of a belief is and the plausible answer would be a description of whatever a specific belief is concretely about. On the other side if you disagree, how else do you understand the different meaning of “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to”?
Quoting creativesoul
Let’s focus. You wrote: “All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”. First of all, to me beliefs do not consist of correlations drawn, but at best of drawing correlations. The second point is that I’m not satisfied with the latter formulation either, not because it's utterly wrong but because at best it provides a necessary condition, it certainly is not necessary and sufficient for belief ascription.
Another potential source of contention could come also from clarifying what kind of ability the expression “drawing correlations” is supposed to mean. But pls let’s ignore this last point for now.
I'm just fine if you agree on the first 2 points I made.
Quoting creativesoul
It seems to me here you are confusing the perceptual nature of our representations with what they are about. The belief that God is omniscient or that 3 + 2 = 5 [1] are about something that doesn’t look to be perceptible in nature even if those beliefs can be rendered through perceptible statements. So the correlation of meaningful perceptible marks doesn’t imply that what it represents is a correlation between perceptible things. Unless you can clarify how.
[1] I'm not sure that arithmetic beliefs are best understood as beliefs about something to be the case. But for now I pretend to be they are.
I take the word “concept” as referring to some cognitive abilities presupposed by belief ascription. For now all I’m inclined to add is that concepts essentially involve classificatory intentional abilities (i.e. they can not be reduced to causal explanations) of some kind. What kind? I do not have a clear and straightforward answer to that, I’m still thinking about it. However I leave it open the question if concepts require linguistic abilities (surely linguistic concepts do). Yet I’m inclined to think this is not the case: i.e. what I would take to be conceptual consists in what classificatory features linguistic and non-linguistic concepts share. Related to this, I think there can be non-propositional beliefs, while there can not be non-conceptual beliefs.
To not get lost in uninteresting terminological controversies, I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures.
Quoting creativesoul
What other ways did you find? Could you provide examples?
Quoting creativesoul
I do. Who doesn’t?
Which are composed of scribbles and sounds.
Quoting creativesoul
Yet names are part of the belief. If your beliefs don't refer to anything in the world, then your beliefs aren't useful to anyone else. A false belief and a belief without a reference are one and the same. There is a difference between some proposition being understandable and being useful. We can put words together in such a way that follows the rules of some language, but if it doesn't agree with the facts, or state what is the case, then it is useless. Take for instance, "Joe Biden is the first president of the United States." The proposition follows the rules of English, but doesn't agree with the facts. So in what way is the proposition useful?
Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true.
If you're saying "P" and P are the same thing, as in both are propositions, then you would be begging the question.
It seems to me that in saying "P" if P is somehow projecting the very words we are using out into the world, as if names exist independent of minds. The names are mental things that refer to things that are not names, and not mental.
Quoting Banno
Then both beliefs and knowledge can be acted on. The only difference is that knowledge is justified. But then what attitude does one have of some proposition that is true if not justification, which leads to certainty given more justification (successful uses)? Seems to me that one needs a reason to believe in anything. The amount of reasons is what is the difference between beliefs and knowledge.
A justification would be a stored memory of some past event which warrants the belief. The memory of the past event coupled with the belief in causation - that similar causes lead to similar effects - is what makes a belief a belief. Beliefs would be useless if causation wasn't the case. There would be no beliefs without causation.
Joe looks at a broken clock which indicates the time is 3 o'clock.
Joe believes that the time is 3 o'clock, because he believes that a broken clock was working. Joe does not know that the clock is broken, so he does not believe the statement/proposition "a broken clock is working" is true. The content of the belief includes a broken clock, but Joe's belief is not about broken clocks.
Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant , but his method of answering of them I think has much in common with Wittgenstein’s. That is, consciousness would not be an object but a relational, synthetic activity organized by pragmatic use.
Yes to Husserl and cohort not finding such questions irrelevant.
In this context, “object” can have numerous equivocations. One’s own consciousness can be deemed an object of one’s own awareness (not to be confused with “object” in the sense of a physical entity), for it can be that of which one is aware of; i.e., that which one’s awareness is about. Yet, in so being the object of one’s awareness, it likewise need not be deemed to ontically be an object (here, “object” in the sense of an existent entity) - but, this object of one’s awareness (what one’s awareness is about) can well be appraised to be a process: a be-ing. If it needs saying, I of course reject the notion that consciousness is an entity rather than a process. Either way, however, it remains a beetle in a box in terms of Witt’s philosophy.
Edit: In case one is unfamiliar with the terminology, please check out definition #2 in the APA dictionary for "object of consciousness". Namely: "2. anything of which the mind is conscious, including perceptions, mental images, emotions, and so forth, as well as the observing ego, or “I,” of subjective experience. Compare subject of consciousness."
The point of the Beetle box analogy was only to dispel the idea that there could be a meaningful inter-subjective notion of sensations in the form of Fregean referents. Yet recall that Witt likened the sense of the word "pain" to a picture of a boiling pot containing real boiling water - in other words, one understands so-called "other people's" pains directly; partly through observing a person's behaviour and partly by drawing upon one's own experiences of pains. Therefore the concept of objective sensation referents is redundant in that it isn't needed for understanding or justifying the existence of so-called 'other minds' (the word 'other' being responsible for most of the grammatical confusion).
Quoting Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein
... not redundant, but irrelevant. To generalize from the one case of one's own being to other people is to be irresponsible. And so forth.
That doesn’t sound a correct report of Jack’s belief. Indeed it would make Jack’s belief contradictory. A better report would be: Jack believes that clock is working. But that belief is false.
Anyway what you mean is that the difference between “content of belief” and “what belief is about” is related to the distinction between how things are and how things appear to Jack?
If so, before commenting on this further, I would like to know how your distinction works when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far). In this case, what is the content of the belief?
Anthony Nickles grappled with the question of whether for Wittgenstein there is relevant sense in private experience. I believe he concluded that it not the case that everything must be thrown out except what is communicated between people. Rather, when talking to ourselves we cannot expect the sort of language that was designed to be shared with others to be meaningful in private reflection, at least not in the same way. But that does not preclude a different form of usefulness.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Almost. Names are social. They work because of their use amongst a group of people, not one. Describing them as mental cannot work because it misses the collective use.
Quoting Harry Hindu
"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Might have to leave it there. After all, your posts are no more than scribbles.
Wittgenstein did not think such questions unimportant. Indeed, for him they had the utmost import.
He was simply honest, acknowledging that they are unanswerable.
Hence the problem with phenomenology is the vain attempt to answer unanswerable questions. But that's a different discussion.
Banno isn't saying a languageless creature can have an attitude toward a proposition. He's saying that the languageless beliefs of languageless creatures can be put into the form of a propositional attitude.
Non-controversial.
Quoting Banno
Here you say something broader. Easily interpreted to mean languageless creatures (who have no clue what a proposition is) are unable to hold beliefs.
Is your position: The contents of belief are propositional?
Or: "Belief" applies only to those things that can be put into a propositional attitude?
Quoting Banno
Two different things and another source of the confusion and "disagreement" here.
Evidently, we've very different standards regarding what counts as a "better report" of Jack's belief.
This is a matter of great contention between our views. It seems clear to me that Jack can and does believe both, without any issue at all.
Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken.
I mean what I write. Let's focus there.
The content of Jack's belief included that particular broken clock, despite the fact that it was about what time it was. Jack's belief was not about broken clocks, it included them.
Is it non-controversial though? At first blush, it may seem innocuous enough, but when placed under scrutiny, it reveals itself to be inherently incapable of taking proper account of language less belief. If all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or another then all language less creatures' beliefs are attitudes towards some proposition.
That's patently absurd on it's face.
You asked for a distinction. There it is. Seems simple enough to me.
Not an attitude toward some proposition.
Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude.
No doubt. Almost as though folks have a preference for disagreement. :smile:
What do you mean "not"? Read the debate and see for yourself where belief was described as an attitude towards a proposition on at least one occasion.
Putting language less creatures' belief into the form of a propositional attitude does not make the belief have propositional content. It makes it able to be described using propositional content. Those are two very different claims, and you noted as much yourself, not long ago earlier today.
Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in?
I do think you've set out something that can be used to help improve the discussion, and move it along.
I've no issue with claiming that some belief amounts to an attitude towards some proposition. To be clear. Just not all. We could say that such belief are linguistic - resulting from correlations including language use. Whereas non linguistic would be those resulting from correlations not including language use. I'm not married to that taxonomy, but there needs to be something of that sort.
The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about. Beliefs do not refer to anything. Names do that.
Some lack of clarity and consistency in Banno's presentation too.
Banno's been inconsistent in that regard.
So, could you take the time to read my first few posts in the debate and offer a critique or some other summarization? Does anything jump out as suspect?
I appreciate the invitation. I'll have a look when I can.
To me, the psychology of belief seems important than the philosophy of belief. As regards understanding ourselves and the world around us.
Here we've been talking about the philosophy of belief: namely, what belief is, what a belief is, what kind of language we should use to talk about beliefs or belief, what can we know about the existential, epistemological, etc., parameters of beliefs and belief.
A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump.
Sure, but again I’m interested to understand better what kind of substantial issues your claims are supposed to address. For the same reason I asked you another question that you didn’t answer yet: how is your distinction (between what belief is about and content of belief) supposed to work when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far)?
Quoting creativesoul
I don’t think so, despite your claim: indeed if we stick to your other claim - “I mean what I write” - in a previous post you reported Jack’s belief as “he believes that a broken clock was working” which is a contradictory belief, while now you report his belief as “he believed that that particular clock was working” (i.e. the same way I would do) which is not contradictory. Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe.
I can readily grant you that you can make a de re/de dicto distinction in Jack’s belief about the clock but it’s still the “de dicto” rendering that is supposed to better show what Jack believes based on his own understanding of the situation.
Quoting creativesoul
Well so far it shows just your terminological preferences. What substantial issues they are supposed to clarify is another question.
Anyhow, I am familiar with the literature where “reference” is attributed to names (e.g. Frege “Sense and Reference”). But Frege has no problems to talk about the reference of sentences either. Now, I can stick to that terminology, yet the reason why I feel justified to export the term “reference” outside the realm of semantics, it’s because semantics is grounded in intentionality as much as belief in the realm of epistemology. And, if we can talk about the content of a sentence, or what a sentence is about, or the reference of a sentence as much as we can can talk about the content of a belief and what is the belief about, then I don’t see any strong substantial reasons to prevent us from talking about the reference of a belief.
Additionally, I don’t know how much the distinction you make between “the content of belief” and “what belief is about” is supported in the literature: can you pls provide some reference?
Thats what you would say if i was speaking a different language. What does Arabic and Russian look like to you, compared to English? What do they sound like to you compared to English?
Sign language is adopting hand movements instead of scribbles to refer to things. How can a hand movement mean the same thing as a scribble when their use is different?
Quoting Banno
This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. What is the difference between mentioning and use? Is not mentioning a type of use? What is the difference between speaking about and with?
Quoting Banno
Then describe the beginning of how a new word is used. If we run the risk of talking past each other because we are using names differently then that seems to show that there is a mental aspect of associating a name with what it is about and THEN sharing that relationship with others. Agreement comes after use.
Which has been shown to not be helpful in the slightest.
Banno injected truth into the equation:
Quoting Banno
If the attitude is certainty, as certainty is the attitude that some belief is true, then animals certainly behave as if they are certain of what is the case is - like a wolf is nearby - sometimes better than humans as they may have better hearing or smelling than we do.
Was "propositional", "proposition" and "attitude" ever defined in this discussion?
Are there attitudes that are not propositional?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Which is to say that Banno doesnt know what he's talking about. Is his lack of consistency and clarity a characteristic of the propositions he makes or his attitude?
I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism.
Quoting neomac
I'm afraid that I left the reader to draw the conclusion...
Quoting creativesoul
Therefore, he believed that a broken clock was working.
My idea was that this:
Quoting Banno (my bolds)
- might be a point of agreement or starting point for a new approach.
The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.
*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude.
I didn't ask for help, I asked you how you understand the relation between the notion of "belief" and the one of "concept". You retorted the question to me and I drafted an answer. Now should be your turn in answering the question I asked, right? If you are not interested to continue the exchange, just tell me. It's simpler, more honest and more respectful of each others' time.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
If you don't care to argue better than this nor to address my points, I guess I'm done here.
Rascal that I sometimes am, I’ll question the weirdness of so doing. As a commonly known example: a snarling dog with hairs on end and bared fangs seems to me to be holding a propositional attitude in so manifesting: basically expressing to its interlocuter the following proposition “I am capable of inflicting gravely unwanted pain upon you” - which can either be true or false - and furthermore holding the conviction that what it is conveying is true. It’s the dog’s momentarily held belief that it can inflict injury, a belief which the dog furthermore conveys to interlocutors. Same then can be said of the cat cornered by a dog, with the cat hissing and spitting again with hairs on end and exposed teeth.
To my mind, then, here are quite plausible examples of languageless creatures actually holding propositional attitudes which they convey, communicate, to other(s).
These examples can be made all the more complex belief wise were we to entertain the possibility that the lesser animal is bluffing: here believing that they will make the other believe the languageless proposition they are conveying though they themselves are at best uncertain of it’s truth.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
That's what I mean by an actual human putting the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. You just did it.
OK, yea. I can't express my beliefs regarding the cat without doing so. I was however aiming at the notion that the cat expresses its propositional attitude to the dog, sometimes quite successfully - this with both being languageless creatures.
But, yea, I know: in order to so express I need to put both the cat's and dog's beliefs into the form of a propositional attitude. If only the circularity of it all could be somehow done away with ...
Yeah, I get it. I suppose it's just a matter of opinion whether we should call certain attitudes of languageless creatures "propositional."
It sounds weird to me. Sounds like a stretch possibly deployed to serve some philosophical agenda.
It also commits one to the view that propositions, or at the very least propositional attitudes, can exist in the absence of language. That sounds weird too and (in my mind) points to an agenda.
If I do have an agenda, here it is: I uphold an evolutionary cline in the abilities of life. That's it. I don't uphold a miraculous metaphysical division between such abilities.
As to language, animals don't have (the human) language (wherein, for example, signs can be freely created to reference relatively advanced concepts). But mammals for example readily communicate via things such as body language all the time, not only within species but also between species.
At the end of the day, though, I agree. And it's not high up on my list of priorities regarding beliefs/opinions that need to be maintained and justified. So it's known.
Hi. Looking at your first post in the formal debate. Here's what I see. I'm no expert.
I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer.
Is it:
1)statements of belief about events
2)statements of belief about descriptions thereof
3)language less belief about events
?
I'm just not sure. So a numbered list would clear that up.
Banno's conflation of key terms could possibly be fleshed out a little better since it's such an important point: possibly with a list of terms and a description of each conflation.
Other than that, the presentation looks good. (Of course, writing of any kind can always get clearer and more to the point, but that's more of a long-term project (for all of us.))
This:
Quoting creativesoul
--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation.
In the formal debate, creative says Banno said this:
"A state of affairs is equivalent to a true proposition."
When I mentioned an agenda, I was thinking of Banno. Something like a deep-seated desire to look at everything in the universe through the lens of language.
I don't feel like you have an agenda here.
That's a healthy agenda to my view. :)
"Cline" is a nice word.
Right. Interesting as all of this belief talk is, it doesn't seem very important. More important to my mind (in the Facebook age) is the psychology of belief.
I see more of a love of wisdom in modern psychology than in modern (especially analytic) philosophy.
The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality.
:grin: I second that. Then again, there is the philosophy of mind to take notice of psychology, at least in principle.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Yup. Hmm. Tentatively addressed, I figure it this way. Can there be belief without trust? I can't discern it if there is. Belief that = trust that. Belief in = trust in. Trust is a funny concept. It's essential to who we are and yet, philosophically, more or less a mystery. Trust can be betrayed. Including by one own very self; like when one trusts that one has set the alarm-clock but has not. One wakes up and might feel self-sabotaged. We humans gain most of our instantiations of trust. Many lesser animals have their instantiations of trust inherited genotypically: e.g. a duckling innately trusting that the silluete of a bird of prey indicates danger wheres that of a goose does not; else its innate trust on what it imprints on.
It gets even more intense in terms of innate trust when it comes to insects. We, on the other hand, are birthed with little preset, innate trust - but yet exhibit it in (for example) trust that caregivers will caregive as needed, this from the moment we first emerge into the world. Most all the rest we build up over time. A lot of what we trust is habitual to us. But to form these habits of trust, we typically initially consciously ponder, deliberate, the issue with some momentary degree of uncertainty: choosing what to trust and what not to trust.
A small hint of background to the following idea: belief is trust (at least for the most part: belief is a thing; trust is a process). Belief/trust can then be a) inborn, phenotypically obtained via genetic inheritance, b) inherent in what we do (like a habit) and formerly learned in part via inborn beliefs/trust, or c) enactively made via conscious deliberation and choice founded on (b), and thereby becoming (b) after the fact.
Might be unclear, but I'm throwing this out there for the sake of sharing. Not currently looking to argue for it. But if its of interest as a possible alternative to other perspectives, there you have it. Belief is a concrete instantiation derived from the general process of trust. Or so I currently believe. :smile:
This is the comment I was referring to:
Quoting Janus
I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:
Quoting Janus
Clear to me. Looks pretty straightforward. One thing I might mention re this:
Quoting javra
If an infant, to any significant degree, trusted his caregiver to caregive he would probably scream less bloodcurdlingly and less often. Bloodcurdling screams you might call evidence of distrust. :)
At any rate, an aside. Your ideas re trust seem solid.
Be well.
Indeed. Understood. Trump is a symptom of much deeper issues in the US I'm afraid. I think that I've a fairly decent grasp of how the ground was cultivated over the nation's history, with particular interest on the past fifty years in order to give Trump a foothold, but that's too far off the main topic here... for now at least. Perhaps we could circle back later if the right circumstances arise.
That makes perfect sense, for they were further set out in the second post.
1.)Beliefs about events, particularly those that can happen in places and times where naming and descriptive practices are non-existent. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree serves as an example thereof. These might be described as language-less beliefs, for they are not at all about language.
2.)Beliefs about events that can be and/or are uttered by an unreflective* language user(*say someone learning how to use names and descriptive practices such as a young child). One who sees a mouse run behind a tree and then states "A mouse is behind the tree" offers one such example.
3.)Beliefs about whether or not some statement is true.
The first two are about events. The third is about language use, particularly whether or not some statement is true.
On my view, the only things we hold to be true(in the relevant sense) are statements. On yours, are there other things that are capable of being held true, such that a language less creature would be capable of doing so?
That's the way I've always understood it. However, that understanding has been challenged as incorrect by a few around here.
The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.
The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cat holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.
I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here.
I've little to no issue with the claim that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. That's what we do when taking account of another's belief. My issue arises when we conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting on.
Quoting Janus
Yeah! That's the one I could not find. I think that expectation is belief about what's not yet happened. I'm not at all keen on the idea of propositional form somehow existing in such a way that a language less creature's belief could be a kind thereof.
I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it.
You're correct that our positions differ here.
I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view?
From a mentalistic point of view, the cat remembers the sound and associates it with food.
The association gives the sound meaning. It only requires us to assume or infer that cats have memories and can make associations.
The Skinnerian view would avoid mentalism and focus on the cat's behavior and conditioning.
Interesting. On my own view, the cat draws correlations between the sound and eating afterwards, and that's how the sound becomes meaningful. The notion of association works okay here too. To be clear, that is a very basic and incomplete account, for those meaningful correlations are far more complex by virtue of including far more things, but simplicity is good for now.
I'm still struggling to understand how the cat holds the meaning to be true.
To me, it hears the sound, it believes it is about to eat as a result of drawing much the same correlations that made the sound meaningful to it to begin with.
While I hold that language less belief can be true, I think that holding something as true requires a.)something that can be true in addition to b.)an animal capable of holding something as such. Seems to me that meaning is not the sort of thing that can be true, and the cat is not capable of holding something to be true.
A bit more background regarding my position...
Meaning is required for correspondence with the way things were, are, and/or will be. Meaning is required for coherency. Meaning is required for truth conditions. Indeed, it seems clear to me that meaning and truth are inextricably entwined in belief. However, holding something to be true and holding true belief seem to have remarkably different necessary preconditions.
I wanted to say a bit more about this...
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
I agree that statements are not always necessary in order for a capable creature to attribute meaning(for things to become meaningful to that creature).
Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)?
I think here is the point of disagreement.
So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?
Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche.
The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?
All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology.
I don't really have much of a background in this kind of philosophy. I just try to follow along and ferret out where the disagreement is. I don't get a lot of nourishment (a feeling of increased wisdom) out of analytic philosophy but it's good exercise for the brain. It seems to be barking up the wrong tree to me. But it's just the analytic-continental counterpoise. I like the continentals.
You too along with your mentor
Again, I need "propositional attitude" defined.
Youre saying the cat has a belief prior to it being put into the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is), which means beliefs are not the propositional attitude but are something that can be put into the form if one. The objective here is to define beliefs, not what form they can be put into after the fact. So youre not explaining what a belief is. You're explaining that beliefs can be referred to with propositional attitudes (whatever that is). I want to know what form the cats belief is in prior to some human putting it in the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is).
To say that it would be weird for a cat to put a belief in the form of a propositional attitude is a strange thing to say when it appears that the cat doesnt need to do so in order to have a belief per your own explanation.
What form do propositional attitudes take in the human's mind if not scribbles and the sounds of spoken words?
I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition." You're saying that "P" is proposition and P is the state-of-affairs "P" is about, refers, or points to. If P is not the case, then "P" is false. That is what I said:Quoting Harry Hindu
Banno then replied with what I quoted in my post that you quoted. So no, Banno did not explain truth in the way you just did, which is how I've been explaining it as well. So Banno is not being honest.
I would say: an attitude that can be put into the form of a proposition. But I'm not sure. I'm just following along.
You might say: A belief is a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and you might tack on a behavioral pattern (which in some cases would include language).
While I agree that that is one point of divergence between our positions, I'm not keen on invoking psychological terminology. It seems unnecessary, and looks to be quite unhelpful for the task at hand. It has made the issue even more complex than it already is, and in doing so increased entities without adding clarity. I do not share the belief that the task aims at the unknown, or unknowable. Although acquiring knowledge of language less belief requires a stringent methodology replete with certain specific criteria based upon actual differences, it's certainly not a 'fait accompli' situation. The questions can be put as...
1.What sort of things are held to be true?
2.What does holding things to be true require such that some creatures are capable of doing so while others are not?
There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. This may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is imperative to do so for that distinction both honors and subsequently bridges the gap between belief and thinking about belief, whereas the latter requires language use, and is necessary for holding something to be true. Such belief is about language use, and amounts to a charitable reading of Banno's position(belief as an attitude towards some statement/proposition such that they believe it to be true).
I cannot possibly stress how many 'different' historical philosophical problems arose from neglecting that actual distinction(between belief and thinking about belief). From Plato/Socrates to Aristotle to Locke, Hume, and Kant to Descartes, Heidegger, Husserl, all the way through Frege, Russell, Witty, and Moore to Gettier to Quine, Davidson, Rorty, Chalmers, Searle, Dennett, and beyond, there's been a gross misconception of belief at work, and accounting malpractices thereof have been and remain the result.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
"The sound of the electric can opener means that there might be something tasty in the kitchen" is an accounting practice. Attributing that practice to a language less creature is a mistake; a conflation of belief and thinking about belief. What you've suggested is an example of thinking about belief. All thinking about belief requires language use.
While I've no issue agreeing that that account is an accurate enough one regarding what the sound means to the cat, I do not agree that the cat also holds the account to be true. The cat cannot hold an accounting practice to be true, for it cannot understand such practices, and in order to hold something as true, one must first understand what's being held so. At the very least, one must believe they do.
In this example, it makes perfect sense to me for us to say that when the cat hears the can opener it believes it is about to eat, thinks so, even expects to, or perhaps that it thinks or believes there is or will be food in the kitchen, so it goes to check.
This seems like reasonable speculative animal psychology.
Quoting creativesoul
If you mean to say a cat is unable to think about its beliefs, I would probably have to agree. More speculative animal psychology.
When I say the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen I mean the cat has made an association between the sound and the treat. I don't mean the cat is able to think about its beliefs.
Again, speculative animal psychology. We don't know what goes on in the mind of languageless creatures. They won't tell. :)
Indeed. They will neither confirm nor deny with language use. They won't tell. Banno has said much the same thing on any number of occasions, telling me to ask Jack(his cat of days gone by).
How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?
If by "holding a belief" you mean having the psychical capacity to think about one's beliefs, sure, then probably a cat doesn't hold beliefs.
I do not. The ability to think about one's beliefs is not equivalent to the ability to hold and/or have beliefs. Clearly the former is existentially dependent upon the latter. I've no issue with saying that cats can have and hold beliefs about what's happened, is happening, or is about to happen.
Can you exemplify a belief-that-X wherein X is not upheld to be true?
E.g.: If one believes that Santa Clause is fictional, doesn’t that entail one upholds that “Santa Clause is fictional” corresponds to what is?
Or, more in-tune with the thread, if a cat believes that “it will soon have food” doesn’t that entail that it expects its emotive attitude of “I will soon have food” to correspond to what will be - being in some way surprised or dismayed if it turns out otherwise?
This going on the presumption that truth is understood as “that which corresponds to what is (to include what was and what will be)”.
I've no qualm with that. As before, I agree that the sound is meaningful to the cat, and it seems we also agree upon how it became so. It was the bit about the cat holding the account to be true that was the problem.
It sets a boundary to our philosophical forays. We'll run up against the unknowns of animal psychology.
You say that thinking about a belief requires language. Which is to say a languageless creature is unable to think about its beliefs.
It seems reasonable, but I wouldn't call it knowledge. It has the ring of reasonable speculation.
It's literally impossible (in my opinion) to imagine the mind of a languageless creature. We can try.
Another way to look at it: while it's true that a cat lacks language, it's possible to conceive of the phenomena of its experience as a kind of symbol-language. So for humans, when I see the word "food" I think of food. For a cat, when it hears the sound of the electric can opener it thinks of food. In this example, the sound of the electric can opener is functioning as a meaning-laden symbol. You might say a word, but that's a stretch. Certainly, it has a kind of symbolic content for the cat.
But again, we run up against the unknowns of animal pscyhology.
---------------------
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
So in the case of the electric can opener, I'm okay with saying the cat, when he hears the electric can opener, believes if he runs to the kitchen he'll get a tasty treat. (A belief not about the meaning of the sound of the electric can opener; a belief about "what is about to happen.")
To me that's very close to saying the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means (signifies; is correctly* associated with the idea that) there might be a tasty treat in the kitchen.
So it's easy to leave the notion of meaning out of it, if that's your preference.
*edit - At any rate, the point is that the notion of meaning can be left out.
If you go to the opening post of this thread, you'll find a link to the debate that this thread is about. My opening post in that debate does exactly that.
What I'm asking is how can a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not; so phrased to contrast to belief-in-A) not entail the attitude that X is true?
I ask because I so far disagree with the notion that a belief-that-X (be it in propositional format or not) can be held without entailing the attitude that X is true - i.e., corresponds to what was, is, or will be. So, if a lesser animal believes-that-X (without this belief being in propositional format), this to me so far entails that it believes-that-X-is-true (or: that X corresponds to what is) - despite there being no linguistic proposition to contemplate.
So, because language less animals cannot speak, it makes it impossible for us to know what language less belief is about or what it consists of? Surely, we need not know everything about language less belief in order to know some things about it. There will always be unknowns. I say that a very disciplined approach to what we can and do know will yield results that are both well-grounded and true.
We can take a Skinnerian approach and analyze languageless creatures in terms of their observable behaviors and its conditioners and reinforcers. But Skinner wouldn't like the use of the word "belief" (mentalism).
Or we can take a mentalistic view and try to imagine what goes on in the mind of a languageless creature. More speculative and of a different epistemological order: I wouldn't expect the results to be in the form of knowledge, rather of theory. (Skinner's reductionism was, of course, an attempt to set psychology on a more scientific foundation; and behaviorism remains the most scientific branch of psychology, as far as I know.)
Do you agree with this?: The study of languageless belief centers on the psychology of languageless creatures.
Or do you envision a logic-centered, armchair approach?: If a languageless creature holds a belief the belief must logically be of the nature of X.
I reject the rules of entailment on the grounds that using them to characterize another's belief can lead us to say that another believes something that they do not. Gettier shows this nicely. The rules of entailment allow a change to the truth conditions of Smith's belief, which is to change the meaning of his belief entirely, and proceed to talk about something other than what Smith believes. So, just because "I have ten coins in my pocket and I will get the job" entails "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", it does not follow that Smith's belief was true because it was not about someone else, it was about himself, and thus, his belief could only be true if he got the job. The second case is a bit more complex, but amounts to the same thing; an accounting malpractice.
That much aside...
The belief that approach is about statements of belief. Language less creatures do not make those. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree requires only a creature capable of directly perceiving the events leading up to the situation. A cat can believe that a mouse is behind a tree without having the attitude that "a mouse is behind a tree" is true. The former is about the mouse, the tree, and the relationship between them, whereas the latter is about the belief.
My own appraisal is that you’ve misread what I’ve said: entails the attitude that X is true; not the fact that X is true.
But OK.
Are those the only options, and are our options mutually exclusive? I would say that the first steps would be more of an armchair approach to set out the necessary criterion. What counts as a language less belief? There are certain things we already know cannot be included in such belief.
Perhaps, but is it of any consequence?
X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not?
Sounds like a good starting point. :)
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, the difference between attitude and fact is of significant consequence.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, and in so equating, how does belief-that-X not entail an upheld implicit attitude that X corresponds to what is - thereby, the implicit attitude that X is? An attitude what leads to some form of surprise or bewilderment when and if it turns out that the mouse is not behind the tree.
Playing around
Having an attitude that X corresponds to what is amounts entirely to an attitude about X. If X is the belief, then having an attitude towards X is having an attitude towards the belief. Do you see the problem here?
Obsessed. :lol:
Consider the simplistic case of perception, for example. One's perception of X can either be true or false. Same with a lesser animal's. When a lesser animal innately trusts what it perceives, it un-reflexively believes what it perceives to so be; and, in so doing, it holds the implicit (un-contemplated) attitude that what it perceives is true. Same as we do on most all occasions. "Is that a real tree that I see?" hardly ever enters into the equation of our believing that the tree we see in fact is, i.e. we hold an implicit attitude that our perceptions are true most always. And, arguably as with at least more intelligent lesser animals (like great apes for one example), we are only uncertain about what we perceive when it conflicts - of fails to fit into - the coherent / consistent body of all associated perceptions and their assumed relations: the "I can't believe my eyes" attitude.
Granting that we believe what we see, do we not then necessarily assume what we see to be true - this even when we do not contemplate our former and present perceptions in terms of propositional beliefs? After all, it's only after the fact that we analyze via analysis of propositional beliefs.
Obsession is a kind of inspiration. I'm familiar with it.
This sounds more like the conventional theories of meaning which presuppose symbolism. I'm not averse to them entirely.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
I find it absolutely necessary in order to achieve many goals, particularly those involving inventing new things. Novelty.
If X is equal to a mouse is behind a tree, then X is either the belief or the events/situation. Are you saying that in the belief that approach it is the latter of the two? Because it seems to me that it is the former.
So then, back to where we were...
What can we know, beyond any doubt, about language less belief?
I'm going to withdraw from this conversation for the time being.
As compared to believe that - event/situation - is true? I've no issue that I see with belief - that - event situation, but it's the "is true" part that is problematic for me.
Well, Sextus Empiricus is one of my favorites, so if you're in search of what's "beyond any doubt," I might not be much help.
Maybe this is a good place to start:
All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature.
Possibly better:
Languageless belief is non-propositional.
All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature.
To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said.
Quoting Harry Hindu
You'll have to take that up with @Banno; I don't know what he had in mind.
Or an even more foundational starting point:
The form of a languageless belief is propositional.
The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional.
ahem, backing up
1. Languageless beliefs exist.
2. The form of a languageless belief is propositional.
3. The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional.
4. A languageless belief, though non-propositional in content, in taking the form of a proposition can be apprehended or expressed in the form, and with the content, of a proposition by a language-using creature.
The distinction between form and content seems to be the crucial one in regard to the debate in question, which centers on content.
That's a phrase that is thrown around with gay abandon, as if it were understood.
What is seems to mean is that we ascribe beliefs to creatures that do not have language.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
We ascribe beliefs to creatures that do not have language; the form of all beliefs is: This is true; were this is a state of affairs, a statement or indeed a proposition - whichever suits your pet grammar.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
There's much ambiguity in this thread as to the "content". Generally, and widely, the content of a belief is understood to be the targeted state of affairs, statement or proposition: what it is that is believed.
Hence "The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional" is not so much false as ill-formed.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language.
It's an assumption or inference. I'm comfortable with it as a starting place.
This sounds like a good description of the non-propositional content of a languageless belief. It may be objects, mental images, emotions, memories, sensations - but it's some state of affairs and it isn't language.
We've already assumed or inferred that languageless beliefs exist so we don't need to couch it in terms of ascription.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Yes, non-propositional content (states of affairs) "can be placed into propositional form."
It may be more accurate to simply say: What is the case has the form of a proposition. In the case of an unknown state of affairs we can then say that it has the form of a proposition but its content is unknown.
Then it would be:
Non-propositional content (states of affairs) have the form of a proposition.
How's this definition of a proposition?:
Moore claims:
In the one case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice two are four; in the other case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice four are eight… Now by a proposition, I mean the sort of thing which is apprehended in these two cases…. I hope it is plain that there certainly are such things as propositions in this sense.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/#history
No more than that "P" is a reference to P, and not P itself.
Quoting Banno
I thought it would be something along those lines; which makes sense.
Thanks. :smile:
All things we name and describe, though some are non-propositional in their content, take the general form of a proposition when taken account of with naming and describing practices.
Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way?
Quoting creativesoul
Does the cat (fallen among language-users) have a beetle in its box? Maybe, maybe not.
Of course we can be wrong.
We can be wrong without knowing in what way we can be wrong.
If it's certainty you're looking for you had better start with ascription. Otherwise, you'll have to begin with an inference or assumption: there are languageless creatures who hold languageless beliefs.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
I would think that the private language arguments are inapplicable to language less belief.
If it isn't public - if it's truly private - then it ought to drop out of consideration. That's my understanding of one implication of the beetle in the box.
Wittgenstein was likely aiming at certainty too.
Without recruiting scribbles or sounds (even noetic scribbles or sounds) a proposition takes this form: subject-predicate.
The subject-predicate form can be apprehended - held in the mind - reflected upon - in the total absence of scribbles and sounds (even noetic scribbles and sounds).
It's much easier to do this with the help of scribbles and sounds. That's probably why we invented them.
I'm not sure what to do with that word 'attitude.' I know I don't like it. And it doesn't seem to be necessary. I think it's okay to just drop it.
I don't think you need this bit. I don't think the naming and taking account play a role.
It should just be:
Quoting creativesoul
I think it's clearer to say 'states of affairs' as opposed to 'things'.
I might be ready to say, boldly: reality has the form of a proposition. Meaning only that it has this form: subject-predicate.
(It's a wild and shocking assertion and seems indisputable but somehow not very important. Kind of like: shrug, sure, we already knew that; back to more important things, like what can I do to make some meaning out of my life.)
Less boldly: We can only think and speak about reality using the subject-predicate form.
Hence: the form of a belief is propositional (since a belief is a part of reality). The form of a languageless belief is propositional (since a languageless belief is a part of reality), though its content (unknown perceptions, thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations) are non-propositional (because they are an unknown and can't be apprehended).
(I'm making an attempt to synthesize Banno's and Moore's definition of a proposition.)
To clear up my own confusion: especially as regards form and content.
The form of reality is propositional: subject-predicate.
A proposition (what is apprehended in a statement) must have some known content. Otherwise, nothing can be apprehended.
Without some known content nothing can be apprehended. If a proposition is what is apprehended in a statement, and nothing can be apprehended, we aren't dealing with a proposition.
That portion of reality called the unknown is non-propositional because its contents are unknown and some contents of a proposition (what is apprehended in a statement) must be known. Otherwise, nothing can be apprehended and there is no proposition.
I'm not sure that I see the difference. To hold a belief would be the same as the act of believing. I'm sure that we can agree that there are beliefs that we acknowledge as existing without holding them as true (believing). In these cases we would hold them as false (disbelief) or indifferent (we just don't know if the belief is true or false). The reason why we have debates is because we agree in the existence of many beliefs, but their truth value is what we are debating.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Redundant and not helpful. Then it appears that, like Banno, you have no idea what you're talking about either when you say that belief is an attitude towards some proposition or something that can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Yup.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
So a belief has nothing necessarily to do with attitudes and propositions? Its not a trick question. I'm just trying to reconcile what you are saying now with what you have said before.
I'm not sure if even this is helpful. Are there any thought, emotional and behavioral patterns that are not beliefs? If so, then what kind of thought, emotional and behavioral patterns are beliefs compared to ones that are not beliefs? How would I tell the difference between a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that is a belief and a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that isn't a belief?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
And what form do subject-predicates take, if not scribbles or sounds?
Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds? To say that they are held in the mind or reflected upon just means that you're talking to yourself in your head. You hear a voice saying the words and the sound is the form the proposition takes in your mind.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm Yes, it is much easier to symbolize complex experiences for thinking and especially for communicating. We can think of democracy without words. It would be picturing in your mind people voting, candidates making promises for your vote, counting votes, etc.
This is also how using words can be redundant. If you and I are staring out the window at the rain, you can say, "It is raining." Because I can see that it is raining, hearing you say it would be redundant information. So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.
The form of images or memories of objects, sensations, emotions, feelings, and their relationships.
I'm muddling through this and now think the word attitude is problematic and should be dropped.
Instead, in regard to belief, I might say: a belief has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.
Nevermind the attitude.
Quoting Harry Hindu
This seems to be you answering your question.
Undoubtedly, it is quite possible(probable even) to be wrong without knowing in what way. However, discussing some of the ways that we can be is not impossible, and I find it necessary for understanding all belief, from the language less about events to those about events including language use through those about belief and language use itself.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
I granted that we ascribe beliefs to language less creatures because we do, and I like to work from agreement. That was one.
We could also 'start' with an assumption or inference, but I'm not keen on saying that we're starting this endeavor with any of those suggestions. Afterall, we are where we are in this discussion as a result of a long history of socially constructed narratives, and without such a history the words we're using would be meaningless. The starting point of belief formation, if there is such a thing(it sounds wrong as a result of belief having no spatiotemporal location) is none of the three suggestions.
As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so.
I've no issue talking in terms of belief being about something.
Denying the role of naming and descriptive practices seems to miss the boat entirely.
From whence comes propositional form, if not as a direct result from naming and descriptive practices?
Reality has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.
It's inherent in the real. No need to name or take accout.
We know better.
Yes, there were things (subjects) doing things (predicates).
While you both seem fine with not incorporating meaning into this discussion concerning the content and form of language less belief, I'm not. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it. So, it seems to me that meaning is always a part of belief.
You're conflating your account with what's being taken into account.
I'm not sure what you're doing here recently. The quality of your contributions has taken a sudden slide downhill... Too bad.
I'm actually not.
Let's try again.
A proposition has this form: things doing things.
Reality has this form: things doing things.
Yes, before humans, things were doing things. This is the propositional form: things doing things. X does Y. Subject-predicate.
I'm sorry you feel that way. It's likely that we just disagree. I won't be hurt if you step away from the exchange. I'm only here for fun and intellectual stimulation.
I meant the starting point for talking about languageless beliefs.
"The cup is in the cupboard" is a statement (dropping the word proposition, which seems to be causing difficulty). .
What would make it a belief?
Isn't it that someone holds it to be true? It becomes a belief when Fred thinks that the cup is in the cupboard; when Fred thinks that the statement "The cup is in the cupboard" is true.
The proposition is not a belief on it's own. Beliefs are held by individuals or groups; hence a belief is a particular relation between a statement and an individual, such that the individual holds the statement to be true.
The individual has an attitude towards the statement such that they take the statement to be true.
Without the attitude, the statement cannot be a belief.
There are other attitudes one might adopt. One might know that the cup is in the cupboard; one might doubt it; one might be certain; one might wonder if it is so. Each represents a relation between an actor and a state of affairs.
So, what was it you thought problematic about attitudes?
The very first line of the SEP article on belief is:
Quoting SEP
It was the expression "propositional attitude" that seemed murky.
Quoting Banno
This is clear. It's confusing to tack on "propositional," likely because I have no knowledge of the history of that expression.
Quoting Banno
To my view, it's more accurate to invite a little of Moore's definition into the mix: a proposition is "the sort of thing which is apprehended" in a statement. (In his example the statements are "twice two are four" and "twice four are eight" and the proposition is "the [ ] thing which is apprehended" in those two statements.)
Do you see an issue with this?
Proposition: the sort of thing which is apprehended in a statement.
This is the propositional form: existents doing things. X does Y. Subject-predicate.
Any issues?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Does this seem accurate to you?
Where does "apprehended" get you?
We do have a pretty good notion of how to use propositions or statements. Their grammar is a commonplace, and is well set out in first order logic. While there are any number of problems with reports of propositional attitudes, these result form iteration, and I don't think they pose any direct problems here.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
As if we understood "existent" better than, say, individuals, predicates and quantifiers.
"What is apprehended" seems to give us "what is common between" the three statements below.
Quoting Banno
What would you say "is common between" these three statements apart from what can be apprehended in them?
Existent: something (anything) that exists. I don't see a problem.
I don't think they have any thing in common.
It's just that, mostly,
"the cup is on the shelf" if and only if "la taza está en el estante" if and only if "bikarinn er í hillunni"
And that's all. Propositional calculus shows us the grammar.
Seems to me you are overthinking propositions, and that this line of thought is not directly related tot he topic of belief.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Despite the innumerable thread on that topic?
Quoting Banno
Is there something "common between certain statements," or not?
Sure.
In this context, 'existent' is a word I define as: something (anything) that exists.
Do we really need to question what it means to exist in the context of this thread?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
SO how will you deal with "unicorns do not exist", let alone "Fred believes unicorns do not exist"?
Maybe.
As foundational as they are to this kind of discourse, it seems important to know exactly what a proposition is.
Moore wants to center on what is apprehended in a statement. This makes sense to me: the proposition isn't the words or a statement but rather what is apprehended in a statement.
Banno wants to eschew definitions and focus on how propositions are used.
Fred is the existent. The thing he is doing is believing unicorns do not exist. An existent doing something.
Only thing is, if I ask you what the "what" is, in "what is apprehended in a statement", what is your answer? A proposition? Then the definition is circular. A possible state of affairs? then you've given me nothing that is not found in statements.
Again, the way we can use propositions and statements is set out for us in the predicate calculus - in first order logic. It's not complete, it has it's own issues, but it is better than anything set up here.
Compare the simple first order version: for all x, x is not a unicorn.
SO again, why bother trying to invent a new theory when we have a more than adequate grammar already?
Hence the modal notion of propositions as possible facts. that might suit your needs better. I won't disagree with it.
Edit: This also shows how the notion of propositional attitudes led to a better understanding of propositions... it was Moore's consideration of propositional attitudes that led him to the modal approach. So a possible state of affairs is a suitable content for knowledge, for hope, for doubt, as well as for belief.
I see what Quoting Banno
I see what you're saying.
It's actually my account of the form of propositions. I'll have to think it over and try again.
"Unicorns only exist in the imagination" is more accurate than "unicorns do not exist." They do exist, but only in the imagination. Of course, that raises other issues. :)
I'm not trying to invent a theory, only to understand what a proposition is and how best to talk about them.
Sounds good. I'll have a look.
Can you clarify this?
How can the word "propositional" in "propositional attitude" be replaced by the word "statement"? The former is an adjective, the latter is a noun and the substitution would read: "statement attitude".
I'm not sure if that's really what you meant.
What is the relation between the unknown and the ("merely") possible? Is there a link?
Point being, choose whatever you like. It's of little relevance to the thrust of the discussion. A side issue.
If possible worlds are understood in this way, however, it is important to distinguish two meanings for talk of ‘the actual world’. This may refer either to the totality of what exists, to what Lewis calls “I and all my surroundings”, or to the maximal consistent set which includes all the true propositions. The latter is part of I and all my surroundings, but only a proper part.
Do you know what the word "proper" signifies in the last clause? Looks like a technical usage but I'm not sure how to look it up.
Trying to scare it out.
I think it is a subset that does not include all of the elements of the set in question. So {A,B} is a proper subset of {A,B,C}; but not a proper subset of {A.B}.
Thanks :smile:
If you ask me what is apprehended in a statement I might say: information of one kind or another.
Then I could say: the content of a proposition is information.
I know you want to reduce it to its usage and say we know how to use propositions and that's that.
Do you think it's a mistake to ask what a proposition is? What is its form and how does it have content?
Modal logic, fascinating as it may be, is too much for me. I don't have the time or aptitude.
I'm taking a less dilletantish look at the Tractatus. The language is beautiful. Thanks for your help.
This distinction between a statement and a proposition is what I'm looking at.
Is the statement "unicorns do not exist" of the same order as "the present King of France does not exist"?
If I say "the present King of France does not exist" have I said something true or something nonsensical?
In short: Is "the present King of France does not exist" a proposition?
Then the belief exists before holding some string of scribbles as true, but you've only explained the truth value of the statement, not the belief.
Propositions are in the form of scribbles or sounds and are determined to be true if the scribbles represent what is the case.
As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?
Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words? In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs. Like ZzzoneiroCosm, you are only describing how you can put beliefs into a propositional form after the fact of having a belief.
I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into.
The fact that propositions are scribbles and sounds and obtained visually and audibly, how did the cat obtain the state-of-affairs of the mouse being behind the tree if not visually and audibly (saw it run behind the tree and it can hear it behind the tree)?
So i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed.
What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?
Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language? If so, then you can hold beliefs as true prior to knowing how to create propositions.
I think you're confusing the form the subject-predicate (proposition/statement) takes with the form the belief takes. Going back to what you said about beliefs being put into the form of a proposition, I explained that there is a temporal separation between the belief as it exists and the proposition as it exists, and that one is not the other. Instead one is the cause and one is the effect. Can you put into propositional form a belief that you don't have?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
But you just said that the proposition (subject-predicate) has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if belief and proposition are the same thing, the belief has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if you are agreeing that words are a particular type of image (scribbles), then the cat can believe the mouse is behind the tree using some other type of imagery and sensations. Therefore, propositions are not useful in describing beliefs because beliefs can be in the form of imagery that is not in the form of a proposition (scribbles).
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
I was asking you to see if you agree. It appears that you do - that beliefs take the form of many types of sensations, not just sensations of scribbles and the sounds of spoken words. And that scribbles and sounds refer to those other images and sensations that are not scribbles and sounds, but are images of it raining outside and of a mouse running behind a tree.
I was really looking forward to an answer to this - the question that made Banno abandon our conversation and that you avoided:
Quoting Harry Hindu
Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language?
Yes.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Correlations.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yes.
Quoting Harry Hindu
In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, I'm saying that language is not necessary for holding the belief. I'm implying nothing at all with regard to whether or not the cat's belief is true, nor am I implying anything at all regarding whether or not the description of the cat's belief is true. What I'm saying is that if one believes there is a mouse behind the tree, and they are capable of reporting their own belief, then they will believe the statement is true as a result of believing there is a mouse behind the tree and knowing how to talk about it.
What I'm saying is that there is an actual distinction between what it takes to hold the belief and what it takes to hold the belief as true, or hold something to be true. There is an actual difference between holding a belief, and holding something to be true.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Indeed.
No. Checking to see if a belief is true is checking on the belief. Checking on the belief is thinking about the belief. Thinking about the belief requires language.
A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true.
Quoting Janus
There are some crucial distinctions to be drawn and maintained when discussing belief.
If Jack wants to know what time it is, and he unknowingly looks at a clock that has stopped working at 3 o'clock, and by coincidence it was 3 when he looked, then Jack will believe it is 3 o'clock. But that's not the end of the story here regarding Jack's relevant belief, for belief is not equivalent to a single statement/proposition that can severed and isolated from the individual's worldview as a means for examination. That's what convention does and has done. It's been a mistake to do so, for beliefs are far more entwined with one another, and sometimes when we sever them, we do so at the peril of our own understanding. Russell's clock shows this well.
Jack also believed that that stopped clock was working, but clearly did not believe that "the stopped clock is working" is true. So, he did not have an attitude such that he held that proposition to be true, but he clearly must have believed that that clock was working, otherwise he could not have arrived at the belief that it was 3 o'clock. Change the time on the stopped clock in the example, and what I'm saying becomes undeniable.
This poses significant issues for the notion of belief as propositional attitude, for the belief when put into propositional form, would not be held as true by the believer. However, it would be if and when Jack became aware of his mistake(his own false belief). If it was pointed out to Jack, he would certainly agree that he had believed that the broken clock was working.
If you say it this way, it works:
Jack believed that the clock was working and believed that "the clock is working" is true. Your insertion of the adjective 'stopped' muddies the waters: it adds a perspective: it adds the perspective of some X that knows the clock is stopped.
(Again, I won't be hurt if you don't want to engage. If I can't play with others I'm content to play with myself :sweat: )
Form is being used in two ways in this discussion:
I've said:
The form of a proposition is: subject-predicate.
and
A languageless proposition takes the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships.
In the second statement the expression "takes the form" is confusing in light of the previous usage of the word "form." It might be clearer to say: the content of a languageless proposition is images....etc
But I'm not sure it's correct to say a proposition has content.
I'm backing up until I understand what a proposition is.
I'm still a bit confused about it, namely whether it's correct to try to divide it into form and content. Something circular might be happening there.
In short, I don't think I have much to contribute to your more in-depth discussion.
Here you make a knowledge claim about the psychology of the cat. You say: I know that the mind of a cat is such that it's unable to check on a belief.
That's speculative animal psychology presented as knowledge.
I'm beginning to think it's a mistake to talk about the minds of languageless creatures as though we have knowledge of them; as though things can be said about them. It might be more appropriate to have recourse to silence here.
We are thinking about belief here. So, the meta-perspective is par for the course. It's not a flaw, it's a feature of our doing so. We can know that Jack's belief is false without Jack knowing it. Moore's paradox is also relevant here, for the exact same reasons. The task at hand is an accurate accounting practice of another's belief. When another's belief is false, they do not - cannot - know that much. We can.
That said...
Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working?
I see what you're saying but it seems to me that the meta-perspective is the problem. I'm not sure what the solution is.
Would you like to see the basic ontological arguments/framework grounding the claims regarding language less belief? We were heading there earlier, but then you changed your line of pursuit. No problem from here. You're free to do as you please, of course.
Do you see that I've just negated the notion of Jack's belief being equivalent to Jack's attitude towards that belief, when that belief is put into propositional form?
:smirk:
Yeah, I see that. It's clear.
Sounds interesting, I'd like to see it.
There's much to be read here
Influence? The scope is far too broad to say. Some influence is unknown as well.
:wink:
There are arguments made throughout that thread. It's been quite a while since I've read it, but I am confident that the outline could be put to good use here, for I'm rather certain that it's past use has influenced my contributions.
I'm curious what Banno has to say, if anything, about the broken clock example.
As am I.
There we have it. It's all twaddle. :smile:
"Twaddle" is a nice word. :smile:
Quoting Janus
I made the same observation a while ago.
Hi there. I've been enjoying reading your clear and detailed commentary on the debate.
This subject is fascinating but I don't know a lot about it. I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition is. I was looking at Moore's explanation:
In the one case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice two are four; in the other case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice four are eight… Now by a proposition, I mean the sort of thing which is apprehended in these two cases…. I hope it is plain that there certainly are such things as propositions in this sense.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/
Your definition seems clear to me. If you have time I would like to ask you a few questions about your understanding of a proposition.
Can you explain in what way your explanation of a proposition (bolded above) is similar to and different from Moore's explantion?
Is it correct or reasonable to say a proposition has a form and a content?
In understanding a proposition, is it important to draw a distinction between the statement and what is apprehended in the statement?
Thank you! :smile:
Are you saying that Jack did not believe that the stopped clock was working?
Jack believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was one that had stopped. Jack believed that a stopped clock was working.
Which premiss are you denying?
I am denying that it makes sense to say that Jack believed a stopped clock was working, because there is a fatal ambiguity in that way of describing the situation. Jack believed, or better, simply assumed in that moment, that the clock was not stopped. If he was asked whether he believed the clock was running, and if he was a sensible fellow, he would say "Give me a minute or so and I'll tell you".
And a very sensible observation it is, I think.
Was the clock he believed to be working not stopped?
As I said he just assumed in that moment, in passing, that the clock had not stopped. So, I don't think it is really accurate to say that he believed the clock was working, because if he had thought about it, he probably would have realized that he couldn't know it was working unless he hung around for a bit to check. So there is "believing", and then there is believing, so to speak.
So, Jack looked at a clock that he did not believe to be working in order to tell time?
There it is!
If he had thought about his belief that that particular clock was working...
Why would he do that? He wasn't engaged in a metacognitive endeavor. He was wondering what time it was. We do not go around second guessing such things as whether or not all our clocks are running when we look to them to know what time it is. We believe that they're working, unless there is some blatant-in-our-face-reasons to doubt that.
Where's the ambiguity? We're talking about a particular clock, a particular person, and a particular belief that that person has about that particular clock.
We do not know that that clock is broken. We do not believe that that clock is broken. We believe that that broken clock is telling us the right time.
If we knew it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!
If we believed it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!
We believed it was telling us the right time, because we believed that that particular stopped clock was working!
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Yeah. That's odd to me. Not the word. The word I've seen and used. Odd that Banno would object to such a clear cut case.
You're playing with substitution in an intensional (with the "s" - non-extensional...) context.
One cannot guarantee that substituting coreferential terms within belief statements, or other propositional attitudes preserves truth value. Lane believed that Superman has X-ray vision, but not that Kent had X-ray vision.
You are going to have to do some work to get your head around the relation between intension and intention.
What is clear cut is that you are diddling the grammar.
I didn't track far along the thread but from the first argument:
As you can break down your content of belief, so can I the proposition - that a certain statement about either the mouse, the tree, or the spatiotemporal relation is true or false - and as far as your atomization of content can go so can the proposition.
The interesting part that you mentioned is that belief does not require naming, but does proposition? I don't know.
The simplest explanation is the best, assuming there is no loss in explanatory power.
What I've presented here is as easily understood as it is explained. It's true and verifiable. It is impossible to believe that it's three o'clock after having looked at a clock that says so without believing that that clock is working. The same holds good of looking at and believing stopped clocks.
If when Jack looked at the clock he had no awareness of a belief, do we still call this believing?
I see no reason to suppose that in order to have a belief one must be aware of the fact that they do. Not all belief anyway. Let's say Jack became aware of how he had luckily arrived at his true belief that it was three o'clock by virtue of having the fact that he believed that that stopped clock was working explained to him in those terms. If asked, he would certainly agree that he had believed that that particular stopped clock was working. How else would he come to believe that it was three o'clock after looking at it?
I'm just at a complete loss to explain how any objection to this makes sense in light of what I've put forth here. It's as if the simplest of adequate explanations for some of the simplest beliefs can no longer be understood as a result of placing far too much unquestioned faith in some of the conventional accounting (mal)practices historically and currently used for taking an account of belief.
We can and do have some beliefs without knowing that we do...
It would help if you just stopped avoiding my question and answer it. What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
But I thought you were asserting that a proposition is a subject and predicate. I've been saying that a proposition is scribbles or the sound of spoken words, or braille, or the movement of hands in sign language. It's like we're arguing whether or not the table is made of atoms or molecules. What is the table made of - atoms or molecules? What is a proposition made of - scribbles and sounds or subjects and predicates?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm You can contribute an answer to my question above that I've asked several times now and you've avoided it. It makes me think that you aren't interested in being intellectually honest.
Does a table take the form of an arrangement of atoms, or is the content of the table an arrangement of atoms? What state-of-affairs are you trying to show is the case? Is there a difference?
What form do correlations take? Correlations between what?
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
You're confusing the belief with the report/statement of the belief. Are we checking if the belief is true, or the report of the belief is true? Do we believe a belief is true, or do we believe a report of a belief is true?
What does it mean to believe something if not to have some degree of certainty (that something is true as opposed to false)? What does it mean to hold a belief - that you acknowledge that the belief exists, is true, have it in your hands, or what?
Saying that there is a difference is different than showing the difference. I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true? Can you hold things to be true that are not beliefs? If so, then describe the difference between holding beliefs to be true and holding other things to be true.
All I'm getting from you and Banno is a lot of words but no examples to show what you mean.
Quoting creativesoul
Thinking does not require language. It requires images, sounds, feelings, etc., of which language is a part of (scribbles and voices). You need language to report a belief, not check a belief. You need observations to check a belief.
Read the opening and second posts in the debate.
The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.
The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true.
How about this:
First, lets substitute 'a' for 'the'.
Jack believes a stopped clock is working.
What is Jack's belief about? We have to say: A stopped clock.
Can Jack have a belief about a stopped clock if he doesn't know that he's looking at a stopped clock?
In other words: even though the clock is stopped, Jack's belief isn't about - a stopped clock.it's about a clock.
Do the perceptions of the believer play any role in the formation and formulation of his belief?
In other words: your statement about Jack's belief is incorrectly formulated because it elides the mental parameters of Jack's belief.
Belief is, at least in part, a psychological thing: to be accurate, the formulation of a person's belief must be to some extent informed by his perceptions.
eh
I'm on about Jack still so I'll put this here. Jack is a lubricating friend. (Gay daygadfly still choking.)
Jack believes a stopped clock is working.
A first question: What does Jack know about his belief? A second question: What does your account of Jack say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?
To my view the two should match. If the two fail to match something must be amiss in your account as there can be nothing amiss in what Jack knows about his belief. Only in the denotations, connotations and suggestions of your account (languge can be very - suggestive) can there be something amiss.
So:
What does Jack know about his belief?
He knows there is a clock.
What does your account say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?
He knows there is a stopped clock.
No match.
So: The word 'stopped' should not be included in your account of Jack's belief.
It's tacked-on, extraneous, and supports your argument. When you see something that looks tacked-on, extraneous, at the center of an argument it's wise to beware of that thing. The words want to play games and we want to play with them.
Since this is to no one and no one will ever read it I want to say that this is about wisdom not about winning if this is philosophy we're at here I want to sit Marcus and Jack side-by-side and see if a philosophical dialogue can express a nobility of mind. Marcus is also a philosopher.
Ergo, I believe that the content of belief is not propositional!
S (a person) knows P (a proposition) iff
1. S believes P
2. P is true
3. P is justified
When (1) S believes P it means, for S, P is true or S thinks P is true.
The JTB theory of knowledge:
S knows P iff
1. S thinks P is true (S believes P)
2. P is true
3. P is justified
The content of belief is propositional for the simple reason that only propositions can be true.
I've seen no good reason for denying that we can. Available evidence proves we do. I would venture to say that surveys would show us that it happens far too frequently to deny without sticking our heads in the sand.
Here's my question to anyone who denies this much...
What reasoning and/or justificatory ground could we possibly offer for doubting that we can look at a stopped clock and mistakenly believe that it is working? Surely, we do not surmise such a counterintuitive thought based upon the fact that we do not know it has stopped. That's makes no effin sense at all. As if we must know that a clock is not working in order to believe that it is?
That's patent nonsense. Reductio ad absurdum.
Jack believed that a stopped clock was working. His belief was about a stopped clock, despite the fact that he did not know it had stopped. We cannot say the same about ourselves...
Cue Moore's paradox...
The reason 'why' we can say that it is raining outside, and that another person does not believe it but we cannot say the same thing about ourselves is simple. We cannot know when we're mistaken unless the mistake is somehow pointed out to us and/or otherwise brought to our attention. It always takes another, in some way shape or form, to show us our mistakes. Another's explanation is necessary for us to become aware of our own false belief.
Occam's razor applies.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
See if this helps at all...
Jack does not know that the clock he believes to be running has stopped. Jack does not know that his belief about the broken clock is false. We do.
Are you saying that Jack should know that the clock is broken in order to believe it is working?
Surely not.
No. I'm not.
I'm saying one thing:
Your account of Jack's belief should reflect what Jack knows about his belief.
If you disagree, that's okay. But my wording is what I mean and your wording isn't what I mean.
I'm comparing your account to what your account is said to be taking account of and saying your account isn't taking account of what your account is said to be taking account of.
Believing that a stopped clock is working is no different in that regard. We can know Jack's belief is false. Jack cannot. The clock was stopped. His belief was about that stopped clock. He did not know it was stopped. Hence, otherwise he would not be able to believe that it was working.
It's not that difficult to understand...
Is it?
Jack's belief is false. Jack does not know that. My account of what Jack knows about his belief does reflect what he knows about his belief, as well as what he doesn't.
Should your account of Jack's belief reflect what he doesn't know about his belief?
I'd be interested in seeing some sort of logical argument from you that supports the otherwise gratuitous assertions. I've already provided the same.
It should if Jack's belief is false.
So that's where we disagree. That's a fundamental disagreement.
Jack is an interesting case. :smile:
So you're including what you know about Jack's belief in your account of Jack's belief. What justification do you have for doing that?
Mary believes the red sky is blue.
Who in this case knows the sky is actually red? It's the omniscient narrator. Why should the omniscient narrator be included in an account of Mary's belief?
Adding that adjective just seems to dizzy up the logic so I think it's a mistake. It's a fun puzzle. :smile:
I'm sure you know more about the burden of proof than I do. If you want to include this tricky adjective in your account of Jack's belief, is the burden on me to prove you shouldn't? Or is the burden on you to justify the inclusion?
That's one way to put it. It's not the job of common language to take proper account of propositional logic. If common language talks about things that propositional logic is incapable of, then we ought not fault the common language, for common language is not the accounting practice that has been found lacking...
I'm the one making the positive assertion. The burden of proof is mine. Should you say I'm wrong, the burden of showing how is on you. I've more than satisfied my burden.
And folks who come here and read the exchange will make that determination. :smile:
If your side of this debate became orthodoxy, what would the implications be for this branch of philosophy?
Why would what I know about Jack's belief not be included in my account thereof? It's my account afterall.
The position I've been putting forth spans several branches.
And the implications?
Scope could not be much broader.
The implications become known only as a result of critically assessing the aforementioned positions in light of what I've been arguing. I've done much of the work already here, in this thread. Moore. Gettier. Russell. All three simplified while adding some much needed clarity. Occam's razor applies.
If that is the case, then it is also the case that either language less creatures cannot have belief or propositions do not need language. Seems to me that a proposition is what is being proposed. We always propose things using language. So, holding that the content of belief is propositional leads one to the conclusion that language less creatures cannot have belief.
That conclusion is false. Language less animals can have belief. So...
Either propositions do not require language, which they do, or it is not the case that belief content is propositional. It is not the case that all belief content is propositional.
If you say so...
There is no part in the entire debate that explains the difference between holding something to be true and holding a belief.
Who decided that it would be a good idea for you and Banno to debate this topic? There is no debate when the debaters constantly talk past each other.
Quoting creativesoul
:roll: Look up the definition of "believe", creative, and you will find that it means to hold something to be true which means that propsitions are not necessary to hold something as true.
What use is holding a belief?
Do we agree that scribbles are images? If you can hold some images to be true, why not other images - like a mouse behind the tree? You're making a special case for certain images as holding truth. Why?
Quoting creativesoul
Which contradicts what you said above. If it is impossible believe in a falshood then believing is always holding something to be true.
Just to restate my rebuttal concisely:
Jack believes X. (Jack believes a clock is working.)
Your account of Jack's belief suggests Jack believes Y. (Jack believes a stopped clock is working.)
Which account is true?
Is it just any clock, or it is one that stopped?
The account that most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes.
So let's ask Jack what he believes.
Do we say:
"Hey Jack, what do you believe about this clock?"
Or do we say:
"Hey Jack, what do you believe about this stopped clock?"
And what does Jack say?
"I believe that clock is working"?
or
"I believe that stopped clock is working"?
Which version most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes?
The philosophical debate about propositions starts (or should start) from some strong intuitions that should be readily acknowledged by all competent speakers. That doesn’t mean that they are rationally justified, it simply means that philosophical accounts are supposed to neither deny nor underestimate the strength of these intuitions, but to take them as a starting point for their analysis and explanations. Here are at least some strong intuitions:
1. All the following statements say “the same” in different languages:
That apple is on the table (in English)
La pomme est sur la table (in French)
Der Apfel ist auf dem Tisch (in German)
2. All the following statements are about “the same” based on name/description coreference (I.e. “that red apple” and “that Fuji apple” co-refere to the same apple):
That red apple is on the table
That Fuji apple is on the table
3. All the following statements report different types of attitude from different subjects toward “the same”:
Jim sees that apple is on the table
Sally states that apple is on the table
Jack believes that apple is on the table
Cindy does not believe that apple is on the table
Billy hopes that apple is on the table?
Alice orders that apple should be on the table
4. In any belief ascription (e.g. “Jack believes that apple is on the table”), what the belief is about is “the same” as what the statement (related to the belief ascription’s subordinate clause) is about (e.g. “that apple is on the table”)
What is “the same” in all 4 strong intuitions? “Propositions” some/many/most philosophers say, but this is a theory-laden notion and it depends on the theory of proposition one supports (I would suggest you to read Frege’s “Sense and reference” to have a better grasp on the issue).
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Well, I’m not very familiar with his views (which he also revised over time) so I’m not sure how to answer. As far as I’ve understood, Moore initially takes propositions to be mind-independent abstract entities (a view that was probably inspired by Frege’s views) that constitute the objects of our thoughts and the meanings of our statements. My understanding of meaning (in semantics) is highly influenced by Wittgenstein’s views (as reported in his “Philosophical Investigations”), so for me meanings are not mind-independent abstract entities, but rules that present themselves in the course of actual and contextual linguistic practices: this implies that meanings are neither mind-independent, nor practice independent, besides they are not “objects” of thought since they regulate how we think about “objects”, they kind of operate in our thinking when we think more than being things that we consult in order to think.
So “proposition” for me is just a notion that we use for an a-posteriori semantic/logic formalisation of our language, in the same way we use the notion of “name” and “verb” for an a-posteriori grammar formalisation of our language.
That gives me a nice place to start. I'll have a look at Sense and Reference.
He does not believe the propositional form of the belief that he actually holds about a broken clock. That's the whole point of showing how that practice fails. Hence, the earlier allusion to Moore's paradox...
Okay folks, it's been a fun couple weeks, but I've got more productive things in life to do. Will be spending much much less time around here.
Be well to all...
:flower:
You too!
I hope you'll continue to consider the possibility that your account of Jack's belief is not what Jack's belief is actually about.
Have a good one. :smile:
creativesoul's ideas about belief ascriptions sound not only preposterous (and justifiably so for me), but also very dangerous: e.g. imagine some christian reported the belief of a high muslim mufti as “he believes that Allah is Jesus” because christians take Jesus to truly co-refere to god. And it doesn't matter if christians' religious beliefs are truly true, because as long they believe they are, they are allowed to make belief ascriptions the way creativesoul is suggesting. Indeed belief ascriptions are second order beliefs, and also description/name coreference is matter of belief, that is why we can't simply overlook de dicto belief ascriptions. De re belief ascriptions, are only apparently so, and when we use them appropriately this becomes more evident.
Quoting neomac
Quoting neomac
We cannot conclude Jack believed that the Fuji apple was on the table - he might have thought it a Jonathan. We cannot always substitute into belief statements and preserve their truth value.
Quoting creativesoul
What Creative put into propositional form is not Jack's belief. Jack believed that: the clock was working; Jack believed that: the clock showed 3:00 o'clock. The clock was broken. Because we cannot substitute within the scope of a belief statement salva veritate, it is not implied that Jack believed the broken clock was broken.
The supposed criticism of the propositional structure of belief is muddled.