Janus

The common, perhaps it could be said universal, understanding of truth is simply "accordance with actuality". That's the basic idea, but of course in ...

:lol: :cool:

I think I can see your reasoning in the rest of your post not quoted above. If I understand you aright, you are saying that since our very notion of i...

Right, they don't constitute evidence for anything, if the premises are not certain to be true, but they do constitute proof within the context of the...

Of course evidence is such on account of inference; inductive or abductive inferences are not certain, and hence do not constitute proof. Deductive in...

Justified cannot mean proven. When it comes to empirical beliefs, nothing we consider ourselves justified in believing can be proven. The provenance o...

I don't think you can claim to follow the traditional formulation, because your understanding of what constitutes justification and truth is not in ac...

Thanks, grist for the mill; and I don't expect anything to be cut and dried when it comes to Kant. It seems to me the transcendental/ empirical dichot...

That's a good passage, very much in accord with how I view it. I bought Rouse's book, but haven't found time, or space in my reading agenda, to begin ...

When I wrote "something" I did not have sense objects in mind; I think that should have been obvious. So your objection that "we do not see, or sense ...

Then, how do, or could, we know that something is knowledge, according to you? (A concise, short-winded answer will do just fine).

Thanks, if I can find the time, I'll take a look at the David Lewis paper. @"Isaac" @"Moliere" I think it is an inescapable entailment in Kant's philo...

:up:

:up: Sounds good, I'm gonna try it...

WTF?

But isn't truth infallible in the sense of its being incapable of being false? Your reference to Cartesian certainty suggests to me that we may be tal...

I seem to remember reading Kant where he says that if there are representations, then there must be something that is represented. I had interpreted t...

No, you do. Or at least I don't feel I've won anything.

Yes it is. See I can play that stupid game too.

Now this is in agreement with the idea of noumena, which are understood to be affecting us, but not in any way dependent on descriptions (conceptualiz...

Yes, you have given so little to work with when it comes to just what you are wanting to say, beyond bare assertion and aspersion, Remember I've claim...

I find it amusing to supplement passive insult with active? With no explanation of what you take Isaac's conception of "hidden states" to be...see the...

It's funny; I pictured you crying in your beard, but no matter, as the saying goes: "ignorance is bliss".

:up:

You have nothing to say to my response? As to whether or not the hidden states are hidden from perception, I would say that depends on how you define ...

How we model whatever we are sensorially affected by is hidden, since there is no way to definitively link our conceptualizations with what is pre-con...

Yeah, I didn't think you could explain it; just a tendentious characterization, which is the sort of thing I've come to expect from you. It's a shame;...

Easy to assert: can you explain the difference? By the way; you're jumping to conclusions as usual: I haven't claimed they are the same; I'm asking ab...

This doesn't seem to be saying anything cogent; can you explain further?

What do you see as being a significant difference between the "hidden states" that give rise to our models or collective representations, and the noum...

I prefer to say that the world is a collective representation... which is constantly changing. The ways of representation are manifold. The events sur...

:up:

Right, so the example was remembering after a long time something I have forgotten. Is my remembering it the criterion for saying that I knew it all a...

The thing is there are probably many facts I have learned which I cannot remember, and continue to be unable to remember, let's say even for many year...

That's your definition of those terms. Mine is different: I'd say to expect something will happen is to believe it will happen. Of course, if in the m...

Is an expectation not a kind of believing? Is there a salient difference?

I think both are right: that is, we do think of knowledge as relatively persistent, and also that it is not as ephemeral as perception. But then the s...

Right, but then that raises two questions; firstly do thinking and using concepts require language? If the answer is yes, then presumably if the lion ...

The lion is an eater of flesh as many of us are. The lion is active sometimes and rests at others. The lion sleeps and perhaps even dreams. The lion s...

Are you thinking of knowing how or knowing that or both. And then what about knowing with: the knowing of familiarity? It seems to me all of these are...

The idea of switching from knowing where Tim was going to not knowing and back to knowing again does not seem problematic to me. Why should possession...

I would say that in the former kinds of cases, they don't know, but merely believe that they know. Remember that saying certainty is necessary for kno...

Ah, I thought that might possibly be the case; very subtle!

Whatever you put into a sewer, what you get out is sewage, Is that really the analogy you were looking for?

I am mindful that we are talking about ideas in the form of words when we talk about belief or knowledge. We have common usage, to be sure, but just w...

I don't share your optimism. We know in the sense of being familiar with what pre-linguistic human experience might be like if we pay attention to our...

Yes, that's it precisely! We have experiential access to what gives rise to the models we call "the neighbourhood"; the neighbourhood itself is never ...

Since it is always we who imagine or posit this or that about what we think or imagine animals might experience, can we avoid anthropomorphism?

I'm not suggesting that we can say nothing at all about our pre-linguistic experience; after all it is our experience. I believe we can understand it ...

No, I'm not; I'm just saying what we all know; that we know, in the most basic sense, pre-linguistic sensory experience, which our language cannot cap...