Don't you mean that it is a claim about the absence of alternative possibilities (alternative to what is actual, that is)? I would rather say that det...
Yes, I must acknowledge that I had (mis)understood your argument to be much simpler than it actually is. But you are working from metaphysical assumpt...
Yes, the wording is defective. But I think TWOD may be making an argument similar to mine, targeting the very idea of universal determinism. In a way,...
Under that scenario our power of knowledge is indeed abolished since, if the belief that a cat is on the mat, say, would be forcefully inserted in us ...
A view similar to the one that you are expressing is called internalism about epistemic justification. It is the view that knowledge requires not only...
One could possibly be some sort of a compatibilist for the case of belief formation too (though I am usure if this resembles what TGW is thinking). Th...
Agents, I would have thought, are rational animals and thus belong to the category of substance (ousia). A state is a particular determination (in one...
One can distinguish two concepts, or two conditions, maybe, of freedom, called liberty of indifference and liberty of spontaneity. Liberty of indiffer...
That would be something worth acknowledging if all the choices that anyone makes in life are trivial and inconsequential. But this thesis more resembl...
You denied that there is any significant gradation in between the series of examples that I offered for your consideration: from being forcibly jailed...
I don't see an argument. There is just equivocation. If your premise is that any restriction in the scope of freedom, however tiny, is the same as the...
That would depend on the prison you have been forcefully put or born into. Have you been born in Alcatraz? Or in North Korea? Or in Norway? Or on Eart...
Forget about philosophy and philosophical theses, then. Let us stick to the ordinary senses of freedom at issue when we say (1) that jailed people are...
I've already acknowledged that people in prison may have the scope of their freedom severely restricted. This doesn't help you much in securing your w...
It's not controversial at all. One one natural reading of the claim, it's a truism. On another, more contentious, reading of the claims, it is quite d...
You lopsided view of "discussion" seems to me just as extravagant as your view of "coercion". In this thread, you mainly reasserted your disputed clai...
Yes, it also seems true to me that jailing someone severely restricts the scope of her freedom of action but doesn't necessarily obliterate it, or abs...
So, in your view it is simply true that having been born is akin to having been jailed, and you are inferring from this allegedly true premise the con...
Why? Is that meant as a philosophical thesis or a common sense truism? If the latter, then that would seem to depend on the nature of the jail. If you...
This view of freedom that you ascribe to compatibilists can be contrasted with a specific libertarian construal of the principle of alternate possibil...
Didn't we already go over that? You also say in the OP that "Unfortunately, life itself is such a coercive situation, since it is impossible to consen...
In the sense of "free" that is at issue in most debates about free will, determinism and responsibility, coercion doesn't negate freedom. To say of an...
This rather sounds to me like an attempt to redefine, or salvage, traditional legal categories in the framework of an utilitarian conception of justic...
You are arguing that we can't know whether an action is free as soon as the claim regarding its motive is open to challenge, of if we can't be certain...
It is still not remotely plausible to argue, on the basis of the ordinary usage of the word "coerced", for the idea that all our actions are coerced j...
You did not disambiguate in between the two possible interpretations of your argument that I highlighted. You have an heterodox view of coercion accor...
I sense a false dichotomy here: either one thinks for oneself or one slavishly attempts to interpret original thinkers without doubting anything that ...
(Note: I am quoting this from the OP, but I read the whole thread before responding) It is unclear to me why your ideas about coercion ought to troubl...
I don't understand this debate at all. It seems obvious to me that both primary and secondary literature are essential. Indeed, the only thing that tr...
Yes, it seems plausible to me too that, while we distinguish, in some contexts, the literal meaning of an expression from the metaphorical uses that c...
I think this overlooks an important difference. In another related paper, Haugeland explicitly disowns the label of "pragmatism". His account is meant...
There is one (possibly two) distinction that Haugeland makes and that you possibly missed, and another one that is merely implicit in Haugeland's disc...
I only am acquainted with two works on the topic. Yuval Dolev, Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives, MIT Press, 2007, is f...
No worry, and no hurry. The end of this month isn't a deadline either. The discussion about Brassier's paper spilled over the next couple months and t...
Yes, this raises issues regarding the ontological status of propositions (Fregean thoughts). But maybe this is a topic for another thread; or possibly...
That's because I understand "...is true" as predicated of a statement to be tenseless. The statement at issue is the statement expressed by us, in the...
On edit: If you will bear with me, I will make my main point more explicitly in the last paragraph below, also added on edit. The statement '"Smokey t...
I don't understand this. This last statement can't be derived from the disquotational shema where it is assumed that the mentioned sentence belongs to...
There being language users in the vicinity is not a feature of the circumstances that has any relevance to evaluating whether the English sentence "Sm...
Sorry for quoting myself, but I want to add this precision: The intended interpretation as a conjunction of subjunctive conditionals is equivalent to ...
The way it is used in the literature on the philosophy of language and theories of truth, the disquotational shema always is meant to express a bicond...
Michael and TGW, This sort of ambiguity about the individuation condition for sentences of a language can be circumvented with the use of the word "st...
I think there indeed is an additional premise that Michael is successfully articulating but that you keep ignoring, for some reason. The additional pr...
What circumstances would that be? Remember that philosophers who employ the disquotational schema (e.g. Tarskian truth theorists, disquotationalists, ...
Yes, it's true that nothing much hangs on the use of "refers to" here. But "refers to" usually is understood as a relation between singular terms and ...
It's unclear because it sounds like "this" is used to single out the language you are making claims about, not to specify the language in which you've...
Yes, that is quite correct, though I would be tempted to nitpick on behalf of Frege and say that they have the same truth conditions and hence referen...
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