That depends. If it's the disquotational shema (or the homophonic case for the T-shema) that is at issue, then, yes, the sentence mentioned is the sam...
Yes, if you settle on a specific language, whatever this language might be, then the material equivalence holds. But then it can't be interpreted as a...
Obviously, you overlooked my explicit qualifier "by us". This is always assumed by the logicians and philosophers of language who make use of the disq...
Yes, I think we can agree that in the distant past, when there weren't any language users around, and hence there were no rules governing the use of t...
No, that's not what I meant to imply. That dinosaurs were walking the Earth is both a fact and the content of a true judgment. The content of the judg...
There is a crucial disanalogy that you are overlooking. Correctly following the recipe for a velvet cake ensures the production of a velvet cake, let ...
It seems to me that you and TGW may be making too much of that. Even though one sentence has an English expression as its grammatical subject, it ment...
Yes, I agree with Michael. Judgments that are true at the time when they are judged or expressed are true at all times. If one correctly judges at one...
That's exactly right. But notice that it doesn't follow that in all cases where "Smokey the cat is on the mat" is (or would be) true in some other lan...
Yes that's correct so long as you hold fixed the range of actual+counterfactual (i.e. 'possible') circumstances in which the implication sign can be i...
Rather than focus exclusively on what it looks like, you ought to focus a little more on how it is used. Remember that it is you yourself who introduc...
Yes, I agree with Marchesk, and with Searle, that an ability merely to respond to external stimulations in accordance with algorithmic rules can't, in...
I think this may clash a little bit with intuition not because it contradicts common sense but rather because it doesn't mesh well with the way propos...
I am using "thought" in the same way Frege is, to signify what is thought, which is the content of an assertion expressing it. What is thought -- the ...
You don't actually have to tie up the truth of an assertion, or of the linguistic expressions of a thought (that may have a force different than that ...
There is a good critical opinion piece on CNN, written by Carolyn Shapiro, regarding Scalia's legacy, not in respect of his specific decisions, but ra...
Only if you insist on reading "?" to signify material implication. And this is a rather bad misconstrual of the significance of the T-shema instantiat...
Yes, if, in fact (i.e. in the actual world) "X" and "Y" are synonymous, and hence have the same referent (Bedeutung) and the same Fregean sense (i.e. ...
As I explained, just because the connective "if and only if" is used doesn't entail that the conditionals used signify material implications rather th...
In that case your example doesn't have anything to do with the T-shemas that occur in a Tarskian truth theory, and so it's unclear why you attempted t...
You are reading the T-shema in the wrong direction (from left to right rather than right to left) because the T-shema arises in the context of a truth...
Your conditional seems to run the wrong way. It is because we know that (and only as long as we know that) horses are equine animals (assuming "are" h...
OK. You don't mean "recursive". You mean "self-referential". In that case, sure, if the sentence is allowed to claim of itself that it is to be unders...
The above statement may be true as written in 'this language', but it is false as written in English. Compare: (1) Given that Germans put verbs at the...
Even with the provision of this explicit disclaimer, as I explained, the counterfactual conditional statement still is nonsense since the truth of the...
Yes, it would work in New English as used by New English speakers. But then you have to specify in advance that, when you are stating such a shema, yo...
Renewing Philosophy, HUP, 1995, and The Threefold Chord, Columbia UP, 2001 provide useful statements of his mature philosophy. The book Hilary Putnam,...
That's because the way you are reading it, as applied to the description of counterfactual linguistic stipulations (e.g. a hypothetical language as us...
They state truth conditions -- i.e. in what conditions the sentence mentioned on the left hand side is true. The sentence used on the right hand side ...
This is confused because the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side of the T-shema doesn't stipulate anything. Rather the whole T-shema expresses on...
This might be true in relation to some language where "rabbits" is used to refer to what we are referring to, in English, with the phrase "equine anim...
I wouldn't mind discussing that. But it's worth noting that Putnam has, meanwhile, distanced himself significantly from his earlier accounts of "inter...
That's because in the second shema -- (2) -- the sentence mentioned on the left has no incidence whatsoever on the meaning of "cheveaux" and "animaux ...
The shema that Michael is making use of is the the T-shema used by Tarski to give a recursive definition of the predicate "... is true" for a given fo...
Michael, It seems to me everybody in this thread, including you, agree on 90% of the basic underlying assumptions regarding the conventional element i...
This rather reminds me of the end of the movie The Beyond, directed by Lucio Fulci. This film is rather cheesy and often ridiculous, though a cult cla...
(Continued from my previous post) Sellars wasn't alone in defending such a notion of synthetic a priori truths that aren't pure, in the Kantian sense,...
Can there be true and meaningful synthetic a priori statements? Haugeland's view about objective perception illuminates this question, I think. There ...
Indeed. Michael earlier remarked that we teach children how to respond appropriately to linguistic inputs. He meant to analogize this with the action ...
One response to Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment is the system reply. Another one is the robot reply. Those two responses are quite different ...
Yes, but does this competence with symbol manipulation constitute understanding? That you are able to manipulate the symbols in accordance with rules ...
If anything ought to be called Haugelans' core principle, in relation to the thesis defended in Pattern and Being, it seems to me that it might be the...
This is a followup to this post in which I was intending to show that laws** purportedly governing "things-in-themselves" are unintelligible, unlike t...
The interlining within the message paragraphs seem cramped to me. I am usure if this is related to paragraph style or the default font, but the interl...
Please go on! I'm rather busy at the moment but will try to complete my followup later today. My argument also is harder to articulate than it had see...
Let me jump in right away and elaborate on a specific but rather central point Haugeland makes in Pattern and Being. To perceive an object in the worl...
Note to readers of Haugeland's Pattern and Being: Haugeland discusses briefly Conway's Game of Life, which had been used by Dennett to illustrate patt...
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