The interlocutor might come to believe sentence 1 based (partly) on sentence 2, but I still don't consider PI 389 to be a rejection of sentence 2. It'...
Right, but earlier you said: Now you are saying that claim 2 is not rejected. And, as I said earlier: So I agree with what you say here; that he rejec...
I agree. That’s not what I said. I said it follows from the rejection of a) the fact that there is not a necessary correspondence between a picture an...
Sentence 2 states: This tells us that there is not a necessary correspondence between a picture and its object (or “what it is supposed to represent”)...
Allow me to be more clear. I will number the sentences of PI 389 and state which I think Wittgenstein agrees and disagrees with: 389. 1. A mental imag...
Yes, but you provided a counterexample to this: Therefore, I take it you disagree with the interlocutor's statement that "A mental image must be more ...
I don't see why the mental image must correspond to any object. As I understand it, the mental image is just whatever its content is; whatever the ima...
Then the mental image would be an image of the two blurred events and of nothing else. The mental image would be singular even if it was of two blurre...
Wittgenstein defines a mental image at 367: This indicates that a mental image is what one imagines at a particular time, and the description will des...
On your reading, a picture can be synonymous with a mental image. Your reading therefore seems inconsistent with Hacker's reading (who warns against c...
To clarify, you think it's right that it's not a picture theory in the PI? I think I understand Hacker's exegesis now as simply saying that we should ...
I don't believe it would be a picture theory per se, since now "we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our ...
A second ago you were asking about getting outside of one's own representation. Now you are asking about getting outside of everyone's representations...
If the practice called "following the rule" wasn't outside of one's own representation, then there would be no difference between thinking one was fol...
To begin with, those who teach you the rules, the game or the language "decide" - that is, show you what the practice is or how to play. Later, other ...
It doesn't matter how it is "internalized". That is irrelevant to following the rule. What? I don't. What's internalized (or internal) is the beetle, ...
Individual confirmations of what are the rules and cultural ideas are not hidden and private; they are expressed publicly. One's public expression can...
As I said: other people. Other people such as the parents and teachers and others who taught you many of the rules and the games and the language. If ...
It's not a metaphysics of entities. What is public does go beyond the individual. That's what "public" means (as an adjective), or is at least its one...
Internal understanding counts to the extent that it can be demonstrated externally. We say that a person understands something to the extent that they...
This is why I emphasised the distinction between meaningfulness (significance) and word meaning (definition, sense) in my previous post, where I said:...
I have been foolishly following you down this rabbit hole. @"Banno" has pointed out what's important here: That is, your individual or private concept...
That's just quibbling over the definition. It's not like you meant something entirely different, like a hammer or like definition ii). This is where f...
In the context of this discussion about PI and language-games, I presume that your concept of "slab" is the same as mine, referring to one of the buil...
Typically, we don't each play our own individual language-games. It isn't that I have my own concept of slab and you have yours. You either learn to u...
I think there is abundant evidence in PI that Wittgenstein situates language use within the world among a community of speakers, and so there is defin...
Technically, you should say that most people only know about dinosaur fossils by description, not by acquaintance. I don't believe anyone knows about ...
The word "unicorn" refers to the definition of the word "unicorn"? Why don't all words do this? If the existence of the word is dependent upon the exi...
How does that follow? You say that there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world (i.e. whether there are slabs ...
That does not follow. I said that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, just as the meaning of the word "unicorn" ...
That's true. The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world. Lan...
It depends what you mean by "gets its meaning from". This seems to suggest that names have their meanings bestowed upon them by the objects they refer...
Referentialism says that pointing out an object in the world is the only use a word can have. Wittgenstein says that words can also have other uses. A...
Mustn't the child point to a table, i.e. "an object in the world", in order to "successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling"?...
Wittgenstein is critical of Augustine's picture of language for failing to consider that words can have other possible uses besides naming objects (as...
I'm inclined to say that 2) is the correct reading, but I don't think there's any real distinction between 1) and 2). In short, because all use - incl...
Wittgenstein never says this. He says that the meaning of the word "five" was not in question in the shopkeeper scenario; not that it has no meaning. ...
I'm not sure what you mean by "explaining language", but I don't see why it cannot be both. That is, Wittgenstein does provide "a window to see that e...
I don't disagree that "Ouch!" is a sentence. What I disagree with is your assertion that "ouch" is a noun and/or the name of a behaviour. Given your a...
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