Luke

What makes these assumptions wrong? What argument supports your assertion that times are not "geographical places you can arrive at or depart from"? W...

It's based on what I've read of time travel paradoxes such as the Grandfather paradox. Isn't that just saying that we don't have the technology or kno...

Let's suppose I build a time machine and use it to travel to a time before my birth. What makes it impossible? I take it your view is based on the imm...

According to trusty Wikipedia: The idea of time travel is more easily understood in terms of time travel to a past or earlier time than the present ti...

What isn't natural for you to believe might be natural for someone else to believe (and vice versa). Again, by what criteria do you judge whether some...

I don't see how this addresses my previous post. Your OP question presupposes that some philosophy (or philosophising) is affectation while other phil...

Thanks, I see what you're saying now. However, although I agree that we naturally act without any doubt about what the "external world" is or whether ...

I don't understand the part after the comma. Are you saying: Proposing that certain views are affectations...validates what we do all the time?

Pragmatism is a broad topic, so I doubt that all philosophical discussions involving Pragmatism meet Ciceronianus' criteria for avoiding affectation. ...

I'm wondering whether there is any such philosophical discussion. Can you give an example of the topic of such a discussion?

What (or whose or what topics in) philosophy is not affectation, in your view?

What or who is this "other"? Other minds (i.e. everyone else) or just those who are different to us (those with whom we identify)? I don't think that ...

I read through Minar's paper. Here are my first impressions: There seems to be tension between 1) and 2) here. According to 1), Cavell does not accept...

I wasn’t talking about Hacker here. You said: I’m saying that those aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are not propositional but still conceptual. T...

@"RussellA" @"schopenhauer1" @"Paine" @"Fooloso4" @"Banno" @"Antony Nickles" I heard this lecture as a podcast yesterday. https://www.youtube.com/watc...

I don't find evidence in the linked paper that Hacker limits his interpretation of Wittgenstein to propositions. His interpretation might be grounded ...

I don't know, sorry.

For anyone interested, this is PMS Hacker's exegesis of PI 389:

Of course your mental image could be of anything and is not restricted to being an image of the Eiffel Tower. However, in order to rightly be called a...

Are you correcting yourself? If such a "correction" cannot be verified by others, then how can we be sure that it is a correction? You might tell me t...

Then why do you say the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, instead of saying the correction is made by linking the correct ...

This correction is not made by comparing or associating a mental image with an object, but by comparing or associating a name with an object. Sentence...

No.

You said earlier: "The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them". The point of my last post was tha...

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, and when they stand before the Arc de Triomphe their mental image i...

You said earlier that: Now you have made the qualification that the mental image is of the object except where the mental image is not of the object, ...

Was a comparison able to be made between the mental image and the Eiffel Tower? Or how was the mistake discovered? I find the introduction of "mental ...

I don't see how this relates to the idea of a superlikeness, or to sentence 3 in particular. If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiff...

It does make a difference, because you could be wrong. You might think you've taken a photo of the Eiffel Tower when you've actually taken a photo of ...

In that case, sentence 2 is true. Why do you say W rejects it? Cannot see what?—Something else? That would make sentence 3 true. Why do you say W reje...

In order for your assertion to be true, the point of PI 389 must be to reject claims 1, 2 and 3. If it can be shown that W does not reject one of thes...

Yes, although we disagree over our reading of the third sentence of PI 389 in particular. You stated earlier: I am interested in why you think the int...

Except that you changed your original statement from 'if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a picture of Y' to 'if you mistake X for Y...

You said that if you mistake X for Y then your mental image of X is a picture of Y. I don’t understand what it means for someone to mistake their ment...

My position is that W is using “picture” (as a noun) with a consistent meaning throughout the text. As I said earlier, I acknowledge that, in the earl...

In order for you to read Wittgenstein as saying that a mental image is a picture before one's mind at PI 6, PI 37 and PI 73, you must acknowledge that...

I acknowledge that Wittgenstien uses the phrase "a picture (of X) before/in one's mind" synonymously with a mental image here. However, when I asked y...

Here is Hacker's reading of PI 280:

Right but your mental image is not a picture, because others cannot access your mental image like they can access a picture. Your mental image does no...

But how do others access your mental image?

He contrasts the picture to the mental image. He does not call it a mental picture. His question is about the content of the experience of imagining. ...

How does your mental image inform others of anything? Why only an approximation? In PI 280 is it a painting of the painter’s mental image or of the st...

I don’t disagree, but I think it’s a mistake to call the mental image a picture. The mental image is not a representation and it cannot inform others.

Thanks for clarifying. Is this also how he is using “picture” at PI 389? If not, how can you tell? And how can you tell he means a mental picture or d...

I initially asked whether you agreed that "the content of the picture/description is the same regardless of whether it is a public object or whether i...

This appears inconsistent with what you quoted and said earlier: Doesn't "picture" mean the same here? If you are saying that the mental image or imag...

In case it was unclear, I made some concessions to your reading in my previous post. I now agree that a mental image can be a picture, but on the prov...

I'm not questioning whether the content of the experience of imagining can be a description. On my view, as stated in my previous post, what Wittgenst...

This is consistent with his defintion of a mental image at PI 367: Note that he distinguishes between a mental image and its description at PI 367. So...