You may already be aware, but there is a new project into which these claims are "being wove", which is sometimes referred to as the "New Wittgenstein...
I said that his use of "ethics" at PI 77 was in a manner consistent with the views he presented in the Tractatus, which you quoted in your post just a...
Of course. So are you. We each have an understanding of the (linguistic) terms "ethics" and/or "moral philosophy". Sure, maybe. Do you have any textua...
I don't see where the last question enters into it. I was criticising your point or assumption that the solipsist and non-solipsist have a shared unde...
What hypocrisy? I don't see why the non-solipsist would not "demand it of himself", or admit to a known shared understanding of the word "exist". But ...
Is it not inconsistent for the solipsist to acknowledge that they share an understanding of what it means to exist with another person/mind, and to cl...
From what I have read - which is not insubstantial - about the resolute reading of the Tractatus, I find that it raises more questions than it answers...
Where does the PI "morally implore us" to do anything at all; any of this? Do you want to say that any advocation/teaching of the right way to do some...
If "an ethic" can be used to apply to any course of action, then I would agree. However, I find that use of the phrase to be excessively general. I do...
I don't believe that the later Wittgenstein would consider there to be a "final solution" to the problems of philosophy. That implies that such a solu...
Thanks. Also, I think the point you were making earlier about pictures was Witt's move away from the Picture theory of language (aka the picture theor...
You posited the relation to begin with, so you tell me. Again, it was your presupposition that the existence of relations must cause changes in the wo...
This is so confused. It implies that no two things can ever be related, and that Plato cannot love Socrates. Of course if a relation requires another ...
I was actually just following your usage. This is a false dilemma. C does not need to ontologically exist in order to relate A to B. Take an internal ...
I'm unclear on your point with regards to the Tractatus. Why are you raising the issue of Bradley and external relations? Is it for historical interes...
Sure, I just thought that 2.15 (and 2.151) might better demonstrate that Wittgenstein held relations to be a part of both the picture and the world; o...
Admittedly, I haven’t been paying close attention, but are you assuming that if external relations exist then they must be individuals? Isn’t that a c...
Doesn't this contradict what you said earlier, that the sensation of pain "enters the picture"? Are you saying that "pain" is or is not a noun? You ap...
I take your point, and that almost completely clarifies my confusion here - thanks. However, according to W: This indicates that pain itself is "a Som...
Yes. It wouldn't make any difference if our visual impressions of red were different, as long as we both called it "red". The whole point is moot, mea...
If it "doesn't latch onto the inner thing in terms of meaning", then why would the disconnect "eventually show up in our uses of the concept". Meaning...
This seems at odds with the rest of your post. If this is true, then I don't understand why you would also say: If our concepts do not need "some inne...
I thought it was an interesting question. Can we even talk about experiences or sensations in subjective terms? Or is doing so “running up against the...
The phrase "public experience" strikes me as an incoherent concept, at least in terms of subjective experiences. Wittgenstein would probably say inste...
I don't believe that what appears to be the case is evidence that it is actually the case. Otherwise, it follows that the Earth is flat, that the Sun ...
There’s no illusion that the world is flat? You have just accounted for the illusion that the world appears flat even though it’s a giant ball and isn...
I don't see how you conclude not-p when you are strongly arguing for q. For example: If p, then q. You are strongly arguing for q. Therefore, you are ...
Let’s go back to your argument: If materialism is true then our impressions of presentness are inaccurate. And if our impressions of presentness are a...
Yeah that’s making my point: accepting the appearances wrt presentness leads to idealism. Materialism does not accept the appearances, right? Which on...
Okay, q = “our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate”. q does NOT = “The default is that…” Is materialism the default? No. What our...
No, I gave up because you refused to acknowledge what I was saying. I'll try once more. I realise that is what you are presupposing. But is there a re...
I have said that the present moment needn't coincide with the occurrence of an event, but could instead coincide with our awareness of the event. If t...
Your conception of accuracy is entirely based on the presupposition that the present time is equated with the occurrence of the event at t1. If you'd ...
That doesn't answer why t1 must be the present moment. Why must the present time be equated with the occurrence of event p instead of when I am aware ...
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