Luke

What does "not-P is true" mean according to the deflationist?

One can believe that they approve of P? Is it "in fact" you approve of not-P? Or "in fact" not-P despite your approval of P?

But, again, the last word in the statement is not an endorsement! What makes not-P true is that there are no plums in the icebox, not that you are dis...

Fine, let me translate it properly. This can be translated as: you can believe you endorse P although you endorse not-P? What you are failing to notic...

You said earlier: So if "is true" does the work of simply endorsing P, then wrt your statement: This can be translated as: you endorse P although you ...

What does the second instance of "true" mean in the statement above?

If "true" means only "endorsing P", then that's all there is to the truth. Therefore, how can a justified belief be false? In what sense could we "sti...

Yes. But how do you reconcile that with this:

But where you said: That's not about endorsing P. That's about P being true or false regardless of our endorsement. Therefore, "true" does not mean "e...

I don't think that any theory of truth must make use of truth conditions. You said: What I'm "missing" is why you used a truth-conditional T-sentence ...

Are you suggesting that deflationists have a theory of meaning rather than truth? I don't see how this is relevant to the present discussion. Also, if...

I agree that "true" has a conventional use(s). I believe that, according to the deflationary view, the word "true" is typically used to demonstrate as...

Then it’s not about our use of the word “true”?

But not always. "There are plums in the icebox" could also be used as a conjecture, or to deceive, or as a metaphor, or in other ways. It is only if t...

Okay, but it’s not part of my argument (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/730759) at all. I assume that truth bearers are meaningful a...

Let's call you a correspondence theorist, then. But truth bearers are already meaningful. You are now creating further issues by drawing a distinction...

To expand further on this, the deflationary theory says that the meaning of a true sentence is just a fact of the world. Or, as @"Pie" says: If so, th...

Yes, it's true that snow is white for the correspondence theorist due to the facts of the world. I'm not sure for what reason a deflationist would say...

I disagree. If "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" for a large class of cases, then the same or similar can probably be said for the me...

According to the SEP, Tarski is not a deflationist: As I understand it, nothing in the deflationist's theory of truth "hits the bitumen of the world"....

I lost sight of it myself. What got me into the discussion was @"Pie"'s position as stated in the OP: I have difficulty accepting that if a propositio...

And my saying that "p makes q true" needn't commit me to a causal implication either. Yes, as I've explained more than once, I was using the term "tru...

Possibly the same thing it's doing in your quote from Davidson, where he refers to "the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions ...

None of these. As I mentioned earlier, my use of the term "truthmaker" did not have the truthmaker theory in view. As far as I can tell, the problem w...

I have variously referred to “reasons for why we say that a statement is true or false” which Isaac took issue with; “what makes a statement true or f...

Are you talking about the world in itself? I could be wrong, but I think that’s different to @"Pie"’s post-Kantian views on the topic. Also, what you ...

I assume there is some criteria by which we judge a statement to be either true or false. You agree that this criteria is not the statement itself. Ar...

Why do you say that’s wrong? This is what I have been guarding against from the beginning. If it were the statement itself that makes a statement true...

I’m not sure whether I’m using the term in accordance with truthmaker theory; I used it only as an expedient for “that which determines whether a stat...

I’d just like to maintain some separation between the way things are in the world and our statements about the way things are in the world, because we...

Of course. It could be false.

I don’t deny that it’s already conceptual. I just don’t see how it follows that there are no truthmakers or that the correspondence theory of truth is...

You could also check the icebox for plums. I later started speaking about ‘our’ reasons for saying that a statement is true or false.

Yes, look in the fridge and see if the statement about the plums corresponds with what we find in there. I don’t recall that being a reason you gave…

Is this in reference to Gettier examples? There is still some reason why we would ultimately say that the statements are true or false, and it still l...

Because yours don’t seem like the sort of reasons we would use to decide whether “there are plums in the icebox” is true or false.

No, you seem to have lost track of the discussion. We were talking about the reasons why we would say that a statement is true or false, not how to be...

Correspondence. “There are plums in the icebox” is false because I looked in there and found none - is a better reason imo than wanting something for/...

These are not the main reasons I would think of for our saying e.g. that “snow is white” is true, or that “there are plums in the icebox” is false.

The correspondence and coherence theories of truth both theorise about what does. It seems to me that the deflationary theory is not inconsistent with...

That is, it’s false that any statement is false. :cool: Fine, but it’s not much of a theory of truth if it doesn’t offer an account of what makes a st...

No, all statements are true, including this one.

There must be a reason that not all statements are true, no?

I didn’t mean to imply truth was a property. If the deflationary theory takes truth for granted, then it leaves unexplained what makes a sentence true...

My point was they do the same thing only if it’s true; if its truth is first acknowledged. Is that an issue for the deflationary theory? I don’t know....

I’m trying to get clear on your use/mention analogy. Is this correct: Mention = “It’s true that P” Use = “P” Is that it? But I don’t imagine that the ...

This seems problematic. If sentences in use are the world, then they cannot also be about, or descriptive of, the world. If there is no distinction be...

Okay, then I guess it “colours” your position, too. That says little more than that we disagree. I’ve already provided a response stating why I disagr...

Please point me to where he says anything about "why we abandon our ordinary criteria" or about "thinking we can have a defendable system of how to pr...

I could provide a dictionary definition if you like, to show how people typically use these terms: I would say that Wittgenstein speaks of right and w...