Marchesk

Alright, so can Mary's Room be recast to ask why there is something more to the physical world than knowing all the facts? That's what all the critici...

How does it help? Those people won't be gunning down elephants in the future. It makes me that mad because it's human selfishness gobbling up the plan...

Being able to remember and recognize red sounds like knowledge. We do use "know" to mean experiential in addition to propositional knowledge. Remember...

I certainly feel that if you're going to gun down a bunch of endangered animals just for some tusks that you deserve the same in return. Intellectuall...

If you came across a herd of elephants, all dead including the babies, machined gunned by poachers simply for the ivory, the proper emotional response...

How does truth fit into this? Are there no longer sentences with truth values that depend on states of affairs? If I state, "The Milky Way Galaxy has ...

It certainly was around for a long time before us. Plenty of organisms on this planet would do fine in our absence.

Literally speaking, you're right. But there are the people who will be born, and that involves a choice.

Yeah, since we already exist. But what about the potential future people who haven't been born? Isn't that what OP is talking about?

That's an extreme form of nominalism where humans create similarity among particulars in a totally ad-hoc fashion. But that's not how it works. We per...

The groceries are mystical in this scenario. You cannot speak of where they came from, and they help illuminate language as game between spouses over ...

We can ask why stochastic models work for certain physical phenomenon. Does the indeterminism of QM represent our ignorance, or something fundamental ...

That looks like realism about universals, not a position on the subjective/objective distinction. Maybe I'm missing something?

Man is the Measure with some postmodern deconstruction

Right, I don't see it as an abuse of language that creates philosophical problems that otherwise wouldn't exist, although that could be the case in so...

Which is also interesting, because he does get accused of being a solipsist, or espousing some form of solipsism: "I am my world." "The limits of lang...

That's fine and good, but how is this a criticism of philosophical discussion? It seems only to critique philosophers who were constricting language u...

But it's not a fair criticism, because every field of specialty will adopt terms that have a specific meaning in the field. The reason philosophers do...

That's very well put, but all it seems to be saying is that sometimes we're not interested in the truth value of a stated proposition, or its boundary...

It can be, like with the wife raining example. But if I'm asking a philosophical question, presumably I'm puzzled by some aspect of being, not trying ...

That has always seemed prima facie absurd to me. Now maybe some philosophical problems can be cured by understanding language as a game. Sorites would...

Is this just because language is flexible and somewhat arbitrary in how we use (or abuse) it's symbols? We can have a huge debate on free will, and th...

Ah, but what if your wife agrees with you because the weather report said it would rain today, but there's no water falling from the sky at all? Would...

That's an interesting conclusion. I would say it's compatible with McGinn's cognitive closure. Funny, because Dennett really doesn't like cognitive cl...

Following up on that, if I can want to know whether it's actually raining outside, which can be had by going outside without any language at all, I mi...

Except that he does mention "the world" sometimes in a way that suggests it's independent of a language: This would entail an abandonment of propositi...

Kind of like how the sun rises and sets in ordinary language, but astronomy would talk about the rotation of the Earth? The point being that ordinary ...

Then what would be direct realism for propositions? That propositions reach out into the world and touch objects? Or that objects are in propositions?

There's several problems here. First, Wittgenstein is using a metaphor based on vision, which would be to picture or mirror reality. Metaphors are use...

Sure, but what if I ask whether green is a property of the apple? Why do we care? Because we want to be able to get at an objective view of the world....

Do you think information has an objective, mind-independent existence? I have my doubts. I think maybe the mind creates information about the world. T...

By pushing the dirt under the rug of analyzing language, or brushing it into the closet of the mystical. But he did have a lasting influence, and made...

It is an alternative, but it prevents us from speaking of the world when humans aren't around, which would be most of the time, since humans only occu...

That works for perception, but what about dreaming or imagination? What if your visual cortex is stimulated by a magnet or electrode and you see color...

If in the future we fully simulate vision, would the software have color experiences? Is there a way of arranging the bits such that they are consciou...

A physical pigment of what, though? I take it you don't think rocks have color experiences. That would be panpsychist.

So then where is the color we experience? Is it identical with some biological process, or does color supervene on the entirety of visual perception?

The argument is really simple, actually. Physical concepts are objective. Conscious concepts are subjective. It really goes back to Locke and his prim...

Here I might disagree. The reason we can talk meaningfully about our experience of red apples is because we have red experiences. It's true that our v...

I've read Chalmer's entire book on consciousness, a couple of his papers, and seen several videos of him talking about consciousness, so I have a pret...

But they do deny the inner, private part. Experiences can be individual, but not inner or private. Right, but quining qualia amounts to redefining con...

That just means is there something fundamental the world is made up of, like water, matter, math, ideas, etc. If so, is there a way we can know this t...

I feel like he's not the only philosopher who had a poor theory of mind. What is your view on language, subjectivity and the ability to communicate ou...

I think Wittgenstein was wrong about the beetle in the box. We can somewhat share our subjective experiences because we have them in common by virtue ...

If this were the case, then we'd be able to share color experiences with people blind from birth, and what's it's like to be a bat would have no meani...

Right, well if we asked why water has the properties it does, we can see why this is so from the chemistry and physics of water. But if we asked why c...

A metaphysical position would be something like what the world ontologically consists of and how we know that.

Hahah, David Brin tells a circular version of that, starting and ending with the physicist. Maybe it is math all the way down. Still leaves the mental...

There wouldn't be, but those facts would be either reducible to physical facts, or they would be emergent/supervenient on the physical facts. The phys...

Here is the part of the colors episode that discusses Homer: Why isn't the sky blue?