Visual field content and the implications of realism
Say you're staring at a tree. You move about 180 degrees around the tree and stare again.
1. The content of your visual field changed,
2. but you're still looking at the same tree.
C1: Therefore, your knowledge of the tree is not derived from the content of your visual field
3. Knowledge of the tree is not apriori
Do you see a problem here? If so, how do you solve it?
1. The content of your visual field changed,
2. but you're still looking at the same tree.
C1: Therefore, your knowledge of the tree is not derived from the content of your visual field
3. Knowledge of the tree is not apriori
Do you see a problem here? If so, how do you solve it?
Comments (75)
There seem to be some missing premisses here. How do we know that 2 is true? How does C1 follow from 1 and 2? How does 3 follow from C1? What exactly do you mean by "apriori" in this context? What does it have to do with one's "visual field"? Where does realism come into play?
The narrative starts with "you move around the tree." 2 is a premise. Would you say we should not be confident that the narrative is possible or knowable?
But yes, I think one of the main questions suggested by the OP is: why do we think it's the same tree? The fact that it's posited in the beginning of the narrative isn't really enough to cover it. That narrative could just be a reflection of a misconception that needs clearing up.
The other questions you asked are also good ones. I'd like to spend more than a few seconds on them, though. So.. later. Thanks!
I agree with aletheist, every step here is tricky if you want to be picky and non-literary. I am reading David Wiggins on sameness and substance at the mo', have you ever delved there? Slow patient stuff.
In the narrative 'you' are assumed to remain the same you, a first puzzle. The tree changes as you pass it, but in such a slow way that we tend to discount the difference, just as we do with whether your movement and ageing changes you significantly. (I saw a recent theatrical enactment of Paul Auster's New York trilogy in which two identically-dressed actors played him, one emerging a moment after the other left, or the two co-existing on stage for a moment)
The sameness of you and of the tree and the style of their narrative is then, for me, in a different language-game from one in which one would talk of 'visual fields', and in those different language-games different standards of 'sameness' apply. So any confusion may be clarified by Great Uncle Ludwig's recourse to grammar in the widest sense. Or so a Wittgenstein-lover like me might argue :)
I started failing to understand you right along this part. Is talk of language games a particular language game?
I don't see how C1 follows. How did you know that you were looking at a tree in the first place, and what does it mean to "look at" at tree?
You "know" that you are looking at the same tree because you moved and the tree didn't. You also "know" that trees are three-dimensional, which means that they have multiple sides, so you simply moved to another side. But how do I "know" any of this if not by prior experiences (particularly prior visual experiences) with trees?
Presumably if realism is the case then that you're looking at the same tree is not just determined by one's language-game.
Good question. It's not because of the content of your visual field which simply contains grey and brown and greens, bright light and darkness.
It's not just colors, but also shapes arranged in a particular pattern. And isnt it the case that I'm comparing those patterns to those stored in memory to say that im looking at a tree?
C1 'knowledge not being derived from visual field' - 'percepts without concepts are blind'. If the brain wasn't performing all of that cognitive stitching and data integration, then you would be seeing a whole series of disconnected percepts - but the daemons in the background are busily integrating all of them into a holistic image.
'Knowledge of a specific tree' is not a priori, but knowledge that it is a tree is based on the knowledge of the class of things called 'tree' of which this or that tree is an instance.
Yes, but the knowledge of, meaning recognition of, or familiarity with, stable objects in an environment is displayed even by animals. There must be some actual basis upon which the "daemons" do the "stitching". meaning that such purported "sub-routines" cannot be merely arbitrary, no?
I think it's more existentialist than scientific. In fact the gist of the OP is existential. Maybe that means one can't actually approach it logically, but only by pointing. But the pointing is pointless where experience with trees and visual field content differs.
Hmm.
I think you're appealing to realism - the 'really existing' objects of perception. My current working hypothesis is that what is perceived by humans as real is inextricably connected with their perceptual and cognitive faculties. The world is 'external to us' in a common-sense kind of way - I certainly don't endorse solipsism. But in another sense, it's also a shared or consensus reality.
Years ago, I read Peter Berger's book 'The Social Construction of Reality' for a tutorial. At the time I was perplexed by the very idea that reality could be 'constructed' - 'do we put the stars in the sky?', I asked, rhetorically. But in the years since I have changed my view. This book is not really talking about 'nature' as such - nature is like the backdrop or canvas onto which our views of what is real (what matters, what we think we know, what is important) are projected. So it's not saying that the world is literally 'constructed' but is talking about the world more in the sense of the 'umwelt' or 'lebenswelt' - the ideational world in which we dwell as affective, thinking, beings.
You see, scientific realism breeds into us this notion that the 'scientific picture' of the world is what is 'really there', from which we derive a notion of the vast cosmos, described by modern astronomy, into which we have emerged by evolutionary processes. That vast and empty cosmos is nowadays felt by us to be what is real, and science the means by which more and more of that is disclosed. So in this world-picture, we pretend that the world that exists without anyone in it is somehow 'the real world'. I'm sure that is a very strong intuition for many.
But that overlooks the point about how our worldview is actually 'constructed' - in the sense Berger means above.
Footnote: this was co-written with Thomas Luckmann, a German who was also interested, like you I think Wayfarer, in religion :) I'm afraid I've never read anything by him other than 'Social Construction' but he was once well-known for 'The Invisible Religion', a view that religiosity permeated much of our social action in under-recognized ways.
"Perceptual and cognitive faculties" certainly condition how things are perceived. A bee and a human will not perceive a flower in the same way. But we have every reason to think they both perceive the same "object", don't we?
Do you believe that "perceptual and cognitive faculties" (whatever those might actually be) create or determine the content of experience and not merely its form? Do they exhaustively "construct" experience? If so what is it that "constructs" them?
Interesting - and indubitably true, in my opinion. A great recent book on that is The Theological Origins of Modernity.
Quoting John
That's 'representative realism' and the common-sense view (derived ultimately from Locke). In a common-sense way, it is true. But how would you perceived the flower independently of how a human perceives it? It appears a certain way to you, but the mind is inextricably involved in 'creating' the flower, from the elements of perception that are received from it, and then integrated into the unitary object, 'flower'. This really is how consciousness operates - it consists of a whole sequence of micro-perceptions called 'saccades' which the mind/brain integrates into a whole. So when seen like that, esse truly is percipe, just as Berkeley said.
I can anticipate an objection to that: 'you mean, when I close my eyes, or am not seeing "the flower", it no longer exists?'
The answer is: You think that I'm saying that things come into, and go out of, existence, depending on whether they're perceived or not. But this is simply the imagined non-existence of an object of perception. You're imagining it going out of existence, or not being there, when it is not being perceived. But that too to is an imaginative construction, it's 'imagined non-existence'.
What I'm arguing is that whatever we can say of an existing object, is always predicated on our (human) notion of existence, to which the mind is a fundamental contributor. There is always an implicitly subjective element or ground, in the act of perception. Now realism believes that we can view 'the Universe' as if it exists entirely separately and apart from our perception of it. But that is only true to a certain point, it is not the absolute truth it is nowadays assumed to be.
That's a nonsensical idea that I was in no way suggesting. It would be better if you stuck to addressing what I actually wrote.
Nothing you say here addresses the issue at all as far as I can see. Not to be impolite, but it seems to me you have just gone off on your pet tangent instead of paying attention to the issue.
In any case, what you asked is whether the bee and the human see the same flower, right? So to determine that, you would have to see the object independently of how either of them see it.
This is where you make your mistake. I haven't said we can "determine" (in the sense of 'prove' or be 'absolutely certain of') whether other animals see the same objects we do, that is you own projection. I have said we have every reason to believe it. This is because, as per this example ( and there are countless others) everything we know about bees and flowers is consistent with the idea that their interest in them is stimulated by the presence of the nectar they extract from them. It seems obvious that they can recognize flowers as sources of nectar (not self-consciously of course) just as we do, since they don't spend their time confusedly trying to extract nectar from random objects.
You didn't attempt to address my question about whether you think that "perceptual and cognitive faculties" exhaustively create or construct the content (as opposed to merely determining the form) of experience, either. And that is the very question which poses the most difficulty for your position.
Your post addresses a strawman of what I have been saying; it goes to an irrelevant question, treating that irrelevant question as relating to an assertion you purport (incorrectly) that I have been making. My criticism of it has nothing to do with its depth, but rather has to do with its relevance.
I have no problem with your support for your position. But if you tendentiously distort what I say through its lens, and thereby fabricate figures of straw to knock down to your own satisfaction, instead of addressing what I have said with arguments relevant to the content of what I have said, then don't expect me to be pleased about it. It makes me feel as though I have wasted my time writing.
No. Such an account is absurd because any knowledge or observation is an experience.
If anyone is to understand anything, including what bees or other human see, it is done through their veiwpoint.
The objective is not grasped in transcending veiwpoint, but rather in being viewpoint. All truths (i.e. objective) are known in the subjective.
Determining an objective without how we see or understand is exactly what we must not do. If we are to understand what another sees, we need our own experience. We need what we see to contextualise the experience of the other (e.g. I see I red flower. When the bees looks at it, they see... ). Our experience of what the other sees or understands (e.g. Wayfarer sees a red flower like me) is also required.
Objectivity is found within subjectivity, not in escaping supposed binds of experience.
But I'm really not intending to do that. I am arguing against naturalism, which is bound to be confronting. I'm not 'distorting' what you're saying, I'm challenging it from another perspective which I don't think you will have considered.
Quoting John
As I said right at the outset - that is perfectly true, in a common-sense way. You're simply taking the naturalist perspective in saying that, and there is nothing the matter with it. But consider the actual question in this thread, which is 'the nature of knowledge' itself. That is not a naturalistic question, because it's not a question about what is in nature, but how the mind itself receives and understands impressions. It's philosophy, not naturalism.
Quoting John
So 'content' means 'ontology', right? You're asking, does perception actually constitute the inner workings, the substance, of the object of perception?
Again, from a naturalist perspective - here I am, biologist in the field, surveying the wildflowers of Blue Mountains. They are each classified according to their genus, species, and so on. And all of those facts really do exist, they are part of our shared experience as humans, aside from being part of the science of botany.
But again, in this debate, flowers are merely a token or a stand-in for the general idea of 'the object of experience'. In such debates as these, we're considering the nature of knowledge itself, not the objects of natural science or philosophy. That's what makes it a question of a different order.
One of the few things I know about Kant is that he said he was an empirical realist AND a transcendental idealist. That is how I see things also. I don't doubt the veracity of experts in the empirical sciences. For instance a botanist will know all manner of things that I don't about flowers. So what I'm concerned with is not the 'substance' of the flowers, what they consist of, or empirical facts about them, but how the mind draws together all of the knowledge about flowers, with the sensory data, and so on, and 'creates' the 'experience of the flower' as a coherent object of knowledge.
Those who automatically see the world from a representative realist perspective might feel somewhat threatened by this, because it is questioning what we normally take for granted about the nature of perception and reality. That is why I think you're reacting against this line of argument. But here we're considering metaphysical (and meta-cognitive) questions.
So, I'm not 'attacking a straw man', I'm criticizing what a great number of people will take for granted, as being an obvious or natural fact about existence. That is what I think you're objecting to.
Most people are by instinct 'transcendental realists', whereas I tend towards dualism.
This is a good point. Why do we think that the tree is the same tree, from one moment to the next? We know that the tree is undergoing small changes with every moment of passing time, so why should we call it the same tree? We assume that it is the same tree, but we don't actually know that it is the same tree, this is just an assumption. This is the ontological status of the continuity of substance, we assume that substance has continued existence, but we do not actually know this, because the assumption cannot be justified due to the fact that changes are constantly occurring.
I would suggest a third view that integrates the subjective and objective without transcending the senses. That would be Aristotle's immanent realism.
That looks like realism about universals, not a position on the subjective/objective distinction.
Maybe I'm missing something?
This, to "concede the existence of matter", is what I refer to in my post above, as an assumption. The existence of matter is assumed, it is not "known", because it is not justified.
Notice how Kant describes this as being directly derived from self-consciousness. The idea of "matter", as that which substantiates the temporal continuity of existence (the temporal continuity of substantial existence), is derived from one's own experience of a self which has continuous existence in time. One's experience of one's own continuous existence in time is what warrants the assumption of "matter", which is a projection of this continuity into the assumed thing itself, validating the thingness (objectivity) of the thing itself.
The problem though, is that it may be the case, that this experience of a "self" with continuous existence in time, may only be provided for by the fact that the self is living (the soul of the individual). Now we have "the soul" which is the essence of this temporal continuity, so the assumption of "matter", as the basis for temporal continuity in the thing itself, stands alone as entirely unwarranted and unjustified. The dualist now needs to revisit this concept, because there is no apparent reason to "concede the existence of matter". That's what Berkeley demonstrated.
Universals - I don't think universals exist, but they determine the ability to classify and categorise according to form and type. In that sense, they're real, but not real as existing things in some abstract of ghostly 'domain'. All of that confusion arises from our unthinking habit of 'objectification', which is to posit every existing thing as something 'other to myself'. Whereas universals, logic, math, and so on, are constitutive of the operations of the mind; they're neither 'out there' nor purely 'internal to the mind', because they are predictive with respect to phenomena.
None of what you have said is relevant, as I see it. I am well familiar with all those old arguments and interpretations of Kant, and so on. I am not concerned about the question of naturalism vs supernaturalism at all here; that is an entirely separate, or rather, further question.This thread is about whether we see the same tree when we move around it, and if so, how we know that; and by extension whether others, including animals see the same objects we do.
All our experience tells us that we do see stable objects and that others see the same objects. If this is right, then there is the further metaphysical question as to how this is possible. Is there a collective mind we share with animals? Are objects stable because God thinks them? Or is it the case that objects simply have an independent physical existence and that we are able to see and make sense of them despite the fact that we are unable to explain how we do that?
Your only argument against the idea that, whatever the explanation might be; objects are stable or more or less invariant seems to be: "yes, but that is only true in a "common sense" kind of way". So, tell me in what other way it is not true that we see the same objects (apart from the obvious one that objects are always imperceptibly changing).
Starting a post like that disinclines me to respond further, so, pass.
When the going gets tough, eh...
Come on, what you wrote was patronizing inasmuch as you should know by now I am familiar with all that stuff, and yet seem you offer it in a condescendingly didactic spirit as if I have never thought of it or come across it. I don't mind you attacking savagely anything I say as long as you do it with rigorous and relevant argument. I don't take any of this stuff personally; and I don't expect others to either.
Going back to the OP:
I don’t believe any visual field content could be experienced if fully devoid of a simultaneous convergence with some sensed meaning. By “meaning” I don’t necessarily intend a significant conscious value available to linguistic contemplation; instead, I intend any sensation of qualitative nature that is relative to context. And this context always includes the respective sentient being aware of the given phenomena.
The sensed meaning will not obtain from the phenomena one is immediately aware of. The tree, for example, does not innately hold within it “a place to mark territory” for a feline, canid, or bear, “a place to live and find food in” for a squirrel, or “something hard to avoid while skiing” for a human. Acknowledgedly, what has been listed are only a few of the more explicit meanings that pertain to only a few different types of sentient being.
Instead, the sensed meaning obtains from the respective sentient being innately. Even when it is developed through past experience, this past experience has itself gained value from interaction with the innate mental propensities of the sentient being concerned.
One could take a Kantian-like approach as regards at least the most generalized innate meanings, could rely upon genetic inheritance of innate cognitive processes, or, as I uphold, could view the two aforementioned perspectives to be metaphysically co-dependent to a large extent.
With that stated as background, my resolution then is that the sameness of the tree is an apriori meaning in humans (as well as some other lifeforms) that obtains given the right stimuli. But this meaning of sameness is a cognitive meta-process that applies to the particulars of less abstract meanings and phenomena. Hence, this sameness of tree as object, while being apriori, has no bearing on the concrete instantiation of a tree experienced in the visual field—the particularities of the latter being a posteriori.
To me this resolves the issue without affecting the stance of indirect realism.
So the point I'm making, is that if it is a faculty of the mind which is creating a unified whole, being referred to as "the tree" here, we are not justified in the claim that the tree itself is a unified whole. The ancient, historic position is that the tree itself is in fact a unity, and this unity has a describable form. So no matter what your perspective is, that form is the same. But the principles of logic dictate that if the form changes, it cannot be "the same" tree. Modern physics, which notes that objects are continually changing, and especially relativity theory, deny the possibility that the tree could have one united, describable, form. That is why I say that the claim that there is "the tree", which itself is a unified whole, is unjustified.
Aristotle met the same problem in his day, with sophists denying the reality of being in favour of "becoming". His resolution was to assign the identity of the thing to its matter rather than to its form. This allows that the identified thing does not necessarily have a specific form which can be described, the form is actively changing. The identified thing is constantly changing, so it is not identified as the thing which it is, by its form. He posits matter, and the identity of the thing is transferred to its matter, rather than its form, and matter provides an assumed temporal continuity of existence, regardless of changes to the form. Therefore the unity of the object's existence is found in its temporal extension rather than its spatial form.
Quoting John
Maybe your experience tells you that, but science tells us that what appears to be a stable object is in fact not stable at all. It is actually very active, interacting with electromagnetism for example. And what you see is this interaction, not a stable object. Science and reason are much more reliable than our senses, and that's why throughout the history of human existence, philosophers have been skeptical of what sense experience gives them. This doubt inspires reason and science to determine the true nature of things.
Quoting John
Don't you agree that there is no point in going on to consider the consequences of "if this is right", prior to determining whether or not this is right. There is no point in asking why there are stable objects, until we determine that there actually are stable objects. If science is telling us that what appears to be a stable object is actually a whole lot of activity, then how is this appearance of a stable object created by the human sensory system? And your question of why there is stable objects becomes a question of why does the human sensory system create stable objects.
I did say "more or less invariant". Objects are obviously stable enough that we can recognize and speak about them, and we routinely observe others, including animals, responding to them too. Just think about throwing a ball for your dog.
Immanent realism reframes the relationship between subject and object. We don't perceive appearances, we perceive things. But an objective representation (or abstraction) of things also depends on our physical sensory systems.
Thus we ordinarily perceive red apples as things in the world that exist independently of us, but their representation as red apples nonetheless depends on our physical sensory systems - other creatures could potentially perceive and represent them differently. So objective representation has a domain of applicability - there is no intrinsic or transcendent representation of things.
Don't sweat it. Sorry for being such a pain. But, to respond to your point: what this particular debate is about is 'transcendental realism'. You're arguing that sensory impressions have real, invariant objects - real flowers, real trees, real whatever. I was challenging that with reference to Kant's 'critique of reason'. The fact that you keep dismissing it, or say that I'm attacking a straw man, or that it's irrelevant, means either I'm not explaining it, or you're not seeing the point of the argument. Hence, when you say that what I had posted was 'irrelevant', I couldn't see the point in trying to say it all again. That is where I'll leave it for now.
The trouble with that is logic is the ultimate other to oneself. Is 2+2=4 only true because it is of me? Clearly not. Even as I know it (or do not know it), it is other to myself, to my experience. If I were dead, were never born or didn't learn 2+2=4, it would still be true.
A tree, rock, colour or person is no different. All of them are other to me and, regardless of if I knew them or not, they are themselves. To be other me is for something to have its own existence, not an empirical matter of what states I know, but a metaphysical one which defines something regardless of whether I know about it-- a viewpoint or subjectivity which is regardless of whether I think about it or not.
The idealist objection to the realist argument is actually missing the point. To say: "How do you know it's there when you don't observe it?" treats the question as if it is empirical, as if the realist was making the crass and ignorant argument our world always took on the forms we have observed.
This is not really the case.
Most of the the time, the realist is making a point of metaphysics: they're pointing out the things they observe are not them. The rock? It's it own object, no matter how much they might know it by their own experience-- for the rock to be itself (including all the forms it takes) does not depend on them (or any one else) experiencing it.
Like 2+2=4, the truth of a rock stands steadfast above the whim of finite human experiences. If humans are dead, the rock may still exist (depends entirely on if the rock itself ceases or not) and its meaning (all of its expressions, past, present and future) remains untouched.
The realist argument isn't that the world must always exist as we observe, it's the existence of other things (including things we perceive) is not our own, so we cannot treat our own destruction as the end of everything we've experienced.
Since I am not the rock, my death does not mean the rock's death. How does the rock exist after I die? Well, obviously I can't observe it. But the point was never an empirical justification the rock must always be how I perceived it. Only that, given the rock is not me, my death doesn't mean its death. In the world, the rock I perceived may still exist, and it may still have the form I saw. The truth that such a rock exists does not depend on my experience.
The problem with Kant's critique is it dismisses John's approach out of hand.
John's argument holds that there are, for example, real tree and flowers. Not that, somehow, all objects are invariant or unchanging, but people that perceive others things as they are (e.g. balls, trees, dogs, etc.). John's argument is treating form like an expression of the thing-itself. The dog, for example, is itself how we perceive it, in addition to expressing many other forms.
Kant's approach is entirely dismissive of John's argument. It treats form as if it's entirely a fiction of the individual's experience, rather than being defined by the other object itself.
I think where my puzzlement starts is that I had thought you were well aware that I am adequately familiar with Kant's conceptions of Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism. I mean I was pretty Kantian in my thinking for years when I first began conversing with you on the other two forums (Philosophy Club and PF). You don't remember all those arguments with Spectrum on the PC?
Actually, though, I wasn't reading this thread as being primarily concerned with the question of transcendental realism but rather as asking the question about exactly what constitutes the empirical realism of objects. (As an interesting aside Kant himself advances a transcendental realist position in the Opus Postumum according to Beth Lord).
Yes, Kant's arguments in the CPR do reject Transcendental Realism, but he later addressed that problematic weakness in his position, firstly in the CJ and then more strongly in the Opus Postumum, according to Beth Lord in Kant and Spinozism.
But the tree does change, with each passing moment of time it is a little different. And since it is impossible for you to hold perspective A and perspective B at the very same time, then in the time that it takes for you to change from one to the other, the tree has changed. If the tree has changed, then logically it cannot be the same tree.
Furthermore, the special theory of relativity indicates that any true description of the reality of what exists, is different and even contradictory from one perspective to another. These differences between what is the true reality from one perspective, and what is the true reality from another perspective, are supposed to be able to be made consistent with one another through the use of mathematical equations. But that only hides the contradictions within the assumed nature of time, allowing a multitude of "times", for a multitude of true realities, from a multitude of perspectives. This results in the conclusion that time is not real.
The op indicates a logical problem with referring to "the same tree", when being observed from different perspectives. If you think that it is "more or less" the same tree, then I guess there is no problem for you.
You exist. The tree exists. OK? Otherwise it would be meaningless to say that you were looking at the tree.
If you want to say that you or the tree are illusory..ok. The question in the OP isn't directed at you.
Something other than visual content is included in the basis of belief in the tree. What is that other thing?
Thus if there is a general understanding of how that tree changes in time then it is not the tree that has changed but your perception of how time changes that tree.
You do indeed have a very valid point. But time was out of the question.
I am still not sure where you are going with this. Something other than visual content is the sole basis of a blind person's belief in anything.
Where this particular disagreement started was:
Quoting John
to which I responded, in part:
Quoting Wayfarer
That was what was described as 'nonsensical' and 'not addressing the point'.
In this brief exchange, what the phrase 'the same "object"' means, is precisely what the thing must be 'in itself' - independently of who or what is perceiving it.
Quoting John
The point about 'transcendental realism' is exactly that it posits that there is an object over and above appearance, and that object is the real object. The counter to that is that no matter how we analyse the object, what it is to us is always an appearance.
In fact Kant explicitly recognises the fact that there must be an external reality in his Refutation of Idealism. But the key point is, that even though a so-called 'external reality' is recognised, it is still grounded by and in the cognitive and intellectual faculties i.e. does not truly exist independently of the perception of it.
The reason I said it was nonsensical is that the idea of a human (me) perceiving a flower "independently of how a human perceives it" is just that: nonsensical.
The reason I said it was irrelevant was that I hadn't nonsensically claimed or even implied that humans could do any such thing. That a bee and a human see the same object (albeit probably in very different ways) does not require that I or any other human must be able to perform the self-contradictory act you suggested.
The phrase "the same object" does suggest that it is something in itself; for it to be such is the logical condition for it being able to be reliably perceived as that object and no other by multiple percipients. That is what 'empirically real' means; it means that objects have empirically real attributes and qualities that may be perceived by any suitably equipped percipient. That objects have such attributes and qualities is attested to constantly by our experience. That's why I asked you the question as to whether you believe that the common nature of our perceptual and cognitive faculties by itself is sufficient to explain, not just the form of our perceptions, but the unique content, that is the content unique to particular objects, as well. That is the question that highlights the difficulty for your position; and you still have made no attempt to address it.
It seems obvious to me that the qualities and attributes of objects are dependent on our faculties of perception and cognition only in respect of the forms of their appearance. A bee may see a flower very differently than a human because its eyes and body size are very different, and even the ways that two humans see a flower will probably be somewhat different due to individual variations, but will still be far closer to one another's than the bee's. So the object itself must contribute something to our perception of it; and we must think it is its unique qualities that allow us to collectively identify it as that object and no other.
So, this is transcendental realism; but it is not saying that the object in itself is absolutely the same thing as the object as perceived; on the contrary the two are logically distinct. The point is that the object must be something in itself; that it be so provides one of the conditions for the possibility of any perception of it. Our perceptual and cognitive apparatuses are another condition for the perception of it; but when you think about it it seems obvious that the former also must be transcendentally real in order to provide a necessary part of the explanation of the empirical reality of perceived objects.
Things must be transcendentally real in some way or another; as I said before, either as ideas in God's mind, material actualities, ideas in a collective mind, aggregations due to collective karma or something else. The point about something being transcendentally real is not to say exactly what it is (that is its empirical reality) but to say that it is not dependent on being perceived by anyone. Actually, that is a condition of a thing's empirical reality as well; so it is not as though there are two realities, but rather one reality considered from two different perspectives; the empirical and the transcendental.
What I suggested was not 'self-contradictory' but the direct implication of the statement that the bee and the human see 'the same thing'. In order to say that, you have to be able to see 'the thing' from outside the human cognitive framework; you have to see 'the thing' as it really is, independent of any act of perception, whether human or insect.
What is the basis of something being identified as 'the same' or 'different', if it is not the apprehension of its identity - that 'this' and 'that' are the same? And where does that identification take place, if not in the mind of the observer? The mind provides that continuity, context, identification - the whole framework within which the judgement of 'same and different' is made.
Quoting John
That is not in dispute. At issue is the reality of the object, whether or in what sense it is real apart from its appearance as phenomena. If you say it is real apart from those appearances, then you have to be able to see it apart from any experience of it, as it is 'in itself'. That is what is at issue.
Quoting John
Or what? What is the penalty of their not being 'transcendentally real'? What if they are 'consistent appearances'?
Consider physics - and no, I don't want to drag the thread into Schrodinger's Cat territory. But this is why Adam Frank relates this anecdote in his recent essay on this question, Minding Matter:
That is related to the attitude called 'instrumentalism', which is that science doesn't perceive entities, but makes measurements, which are predicable and reliable. But another thing this tells us that when you minutely analyse and dissect the elements of the putative object of perception, there is nothing at bottom which retains its identity. There is no physical essence or substance at the bottom of it.
Quoting John
But if 'exactly what it is' is only an empirical reality, then what is it? It has an unknowable essence or source.
This is incorrect. We don't say of things only what we can "see". We infer that objects are real apart from their appearances, because it is necessary for them to be so in order for us to be able to see and refer to the same things, form one person and one minute to the next.
As far as we know there is no causal connection between your seeing of an object and any one else's seeing of an object. I might die, for example, but all the particular objects in the kitchen will still be there just the same for my family. Or, as our everyday experience make it seem obvious, if the whole family moves away and leaves the house with all its contents behind; anyone coming into the house will see just that unique set of contents and no other.
Or, for another example, say you lost your mobile phone in the bush. If anyone finds years later they will be able to identify it as an iPhone, or whether brand and model it is. They will be able to read its serial number and that number will not have changed. Do you believe that? If that is so then how could the stability of its identity and serial number remained invariant absent its being seen by anyone if they were dependent on human perception?
We cannot even begin to imagine how perceptual and cognitive faculties could determine the content of experience. That it is reasonable to infer that they do determine the form of experience is not at issue. I think this is the distinction you are not seeing, or at least failing to deal with. Kant saw that his arguments in the CPR did offer any explanation for the content of experience, and that is why he later ( according to Beth Lord) changed his mind and became a transcendental realist.
Quoting Wayfarer
If they are "consistent appearances" they would still qualify as being transcendentally real, because the consistency of their appearance is obviously, it certainly seems, not dependent on anyone's perception or experience.
All appearance depend on perception.
I can see where our disagreement is. You're simply saying, look, I close my eyes, or die, or whatever, and the whole universe doesn't simply vanish.
Basically it is the same objection as Samuel Johnson's to Berkeley:
Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson
You are conflating two ideas: the correct (by definition) idea that all appearances are correlated with perceptions, with the incorrect idea that the consistency of appearances depends (entirely) on perception. There also seems to be a conflation of acts of perception with the 'machinery' of perception.
Attempting to dismiss my arguments by equating them with Johnson's unargued 'refutation' is too cheap.
If you think the consistency of appearances can be exhaustively explained in terms of human perception, then please present an explanation.
Interestingly, Berkeley recognized this problem and the lynchpin of his position that "esse est percipi" is that the consistency of appearances is due to their objects being held in God's mind. This is equivalent to objects being created by God, and if this were the case then the objects would still be transcendentally real insofar as they would be independent of human perception.
I think time is very relevant. The reason why one side of the tree is a different perspective from the other side of the tree, as stated in the op, is that the observer cannot be at both sides of the tree, at the same time. That's what defines it as a different perspective. So when the op is referring to different perspectives, what is being referred to is different places, which is determined as where the same observer cannot be at the same time.
So I think my point remains as relevant. If an observer could be at both sides of the tree, at the same time, this individual could confirm that it is the same tree being observed, knowing that no time has passed between the observation at point A, and the observation at point B, observing from both perspectives at the very same moment. Therefore no changes could possibly have occurred to the tree between the observation at point A and the observation at point B, and it is confirmed as the same tree.
No, it isn't. It is exactly what you've been arguing. It's not a pejorative comparison. I would say the vast majority of people agree with Johnson.
Quoting John
'Being perceived by God', I would have thought it better expressed. In any case, that is one of the facets of Berkeley's philosophy that I don't think I understand, or at any rate don't agree with.
Quoting John
My argument is always that what we take to be real has an irreducibly subjective element, i.e. there are no objects that exist 'sui generis', in their own right, independently of cognition. Per Kant, I think space and time themselves are in some real sense subjectively constructed.
Again, Johnson's "refutation" is not an argument. The opinion that the vast majority of people agree with Johnston is not relevant to the argument and is not an argument for or against, either. If anything, if it is true, it might support an argument that people think that objects simply persist because it is in accordance with all of their experience, and it is the simplest explanation for the consistency of appearances. You have no way of knowing that objects do not simply persist independently of human perception (whatever the metaphysical explanation for that might be). So, if you want to reject it you need to come up with a more convincing alternative.
Quoting Wayfarer
If you don't agree with that "facet" then you don't agree with Berkeley's philosophy, period. As I said, it is the lynchpin and without it his philosophy loses all force of explanation and persuasion. A metaphysics needs to explain our everyday common experience, not deny it.
Quoting Wayfarer
But, can't you see that this is just an opinion, and not an argument at all?
To be honest, I am losing interest since you seem to be unable, or at least unwilling, to present anything but reiterated assertions.
The fact that 'what we take to be real has an irreducibly subjective element' is not mere assertion, it builds on the argument in this thread.
In any case, and yet again, I am arguing against the implicit assumption of the 'mind-independent' nature of reality, that the Universe exists, in the way that we understand it, absent our observation of it. This doesn't mean that, absent our observation, there is no universe, but that the kind of existence, if any, that it has, absent the organising capabilities provided by the mind, is completely unknowable and incoherent. It's part of a coherent argument, which you continue to call 'irrelevant' or 'a strawman', or regard as a personal slight. So you accuse me of 'distorting' what you say, whilst persistently misrepresenting what I say. Maybe it is time to quit!
Quoting John
There are aspects of Berkeley's philosophy I accept, and aspects that I don’t. I suppose I should read his account of what ‘perceived by God’ means again, but I solve the problem another way altogether. This is that human consciousness – what we know of the world – is collective. We agree inter-subjectively on all of those aspects of experience which are proven to be regular - which is what scientific laws and numerical analyses describe. All of those aspects of experience can serve as the basis for scientific prediction, without thereby agreeing that the objects of scientific analysis are ‘mind-independent’ or ‘self-existent’.
There’s a physicist by the name of Richard Conn Henry who reached a very Berkeleyian view of science purely and simply through physics itself. He put a cat amongst the pidgeons by publishing an opinion piece in Nature – Nature! - called ‘This Mental Universe’. It’s well worth reading in this context, as it is, as I say, very like Berkeley, sans reference to God.
Our taking something to be real has an irreducibly subjective element. But that which we take to be real does not necessarily have any element of human subjectivity in it. For example, we take the existence of the Dinosaurs to have been real, and since humans did not yet exist, there could have been no human subjective element in that purported reality.
I agree with you that the kind of existence the Universe has in itself is indeterminate, but that does not mean it is not real. If it has any existence at all, whether as aggregations of energy, or thoughts in God's mind, or in a collective 'world soul' or whatever, then that existence must be real, otherwise it would not be an existence at all, but a fiction. Also it seems that the order we find in the world is not merely the product of our minds (although it is also that) but the product of something transcendental to our minds. Our minds themselves must be products of something transcendental to them; otherwise they would be totally transparent to us.
And nothing I have said is intended as a "personal slight"; I argue against and attempt to refute and reject ideas, not people.
I'll take a look at the paper you recommended when I get some time and tell you what I think of it, but I will say this in anticipation; I doubt the paper will argue that the universe is a product of human mentality; but rather that consciousness or mind or thought or experience is somehow inherent in reality; and I have no issue with this idea at all.
It's no problem for me. I accept change as real. I expect that all my acquaintances will be different each time I meet them. This helps me in my efforts to remain stoic. Without this expectation, some of these differences might upset me.
Quoting John
As I said earlier, in response to wayfarer's quote from Kant, there is an assumed continuity which allows us to say that a person remains the same person. I derive this idea continuity directly from my experience of self-consciousness, as Kant described in that quote. The problem which I described is that this idea of continuity is derived only from my living experiences, such as memory, so I cannot justify assigning continuity to non-living, inanimate matter. I can project this continuity towards other human beings, and living creatures, assume that they continue to be "the same" being through experiences like memories, because they're alive just like me, but to extend this to inanimate matter is unjustified. That's the point I made, the continuity of existence of matter is an assumption which is unjustified.
You said "reasonable inferences." I'm not trying to advance a thesis here. I'm asking. Do you picture reasonable inferences as something other than a sort of processing or manipulation of ideas?
What allows you to say the tree in your backyard is the same tree? Or, if you count the tree as a "living creature", then what allows you to say the mountain you can see out of your kitchen window every morning as you eat you breakfast is the same mountain, as opposed to any other mountain, each time you see it as it was all the other times you have seen it?