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Marchesk

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The continuous experience, unless you want to break perceived time down into atoms.
November 07, 2020 at 07:18
The coffee not being sugared is a chemical fact. The coffee not tasting sweet is the experience. You're equivocating here.
November 07, 2020 at 07:17
Why suppose it needs to be broken down into instances? Our experiences change all the time. But it does depend on the experience. Focus on one of the ...
November 07, 2020 at 07:07
Because some of them are properties of perception. Three people are in a room. It feels cold to the first, warm to the second and just right for the t...
November 07, 2020 at 07:02
iIts inherent in the subjective differences between individuals. Thus why we recognize that people have different tastes. “Oh, so coffee tastes good f...
November 06, 2020 at 21:35
Even if so, we can’t communicate what it’s like, so we can’t know that from the functioning of a bat or robot. Unless it’s the same as ours. Bat sonar...
November 06, 2020 at 20:55
Yes, but one could suppose, like Chalmers has, that qualia is tied to function, or rich information streams, via some non physical scientific law.
November 06, 2020 at 20:52
I’m building on the foundation that there is a way things seem to us. How we express this in language, and which terms work is a secondary matter. The...
November 06, 2020 at 20:02
So just because I’m tasting the coffee doesn’t mean there is a taste of coffee? Just because I see a color illusion, doesn’t mean there is a color ill...
November 06, 2020 at 19:30
I’m not sure how to parse this.
November 06, 2020 at 19:17
At the end of all this discussion, however successful Dennett is in his intuition pumping, I wish to preserve the what it’s like. That is the one aspe...
November 06, 2020 at 18:41
How would you have a preference if the coffee didn’t taste like something to you? I wonder if @"Banno" really is wanting to go this far. Seems like it...
November 06, 2020 at 18:34
An existence claim. You can’t have movie preferences without movies.
November 06, 2020 at 17:44
You can't tell a blind person what it's like to see color, no matter the words you use. There is something inexpressible for sensory modalities. Which...
November 06, 2020 at 11:17
This is what David de Leon has to say in response to not being able to tell whether the quale of the coffee taste has changed (or surgically altered),...
November 06, 2020 at 11:03
Good point. I forget about that. There is something it's like which is being changed. Similar to your statement that illusions make a noticeable diffe...
November 06, 2020 at 09:39
Intution pumps 8-12 look like we don't have direct access to previous qualia such that we can answer the question, Just the memory of them. And memori...
November 06, 2020 at 09:20
We have this from late in the article: This illustrates Dennett's denial most vividly. A difference in conscious experience could be nothing more than...
November 06, 2020 at 08:55
Maybe so, and it's even worse as we get farther away from our biology, such as when Data tastes wine.
November 06, 2020 at 08:28
So why were you tempted to agree that science needed to modify our nervous system in order for us to know?
November 06, 2020 at 08:21
Or at least, that's what the abstracted third-party account tells us, according to Dennett's setup. Doesn't change my first person experience.
November 06, 2020 at 08:18
I should have added that science can't tell us that that bat necessarily has a sonar sensation, only whether it has recognizable neural structures (by...
November 06, 2020 at 08:16
Qualia are the resulting sensations that consciousness is made up of. But we only know that from first person experience. Solpsism is a difficult posi...
November 06, 2020 at 08:07
@"Banno"@"Creative"@"Isaac"@"fdrake" Regarding privacy, one might say our mental activity is not radically private, in that an advanced enough science...
November 06, 2020 at 08:05
I think a problem here is supposing that qualia is supposed to be able to tell us something about our neurology. But maybe the qualia is just the resu...
November 06, 2020 at 07:58
Here is the crux of the matter, for me anyway. Dennett does not think the appearance of having sensations can be considered qualia in any meaningful s...
November 06, 2020 at 07:42
A series of intuition pumps meant to walk the reader through disabusing them of the intuition that conscious experience has any sort of qualia-like pr...
November 06, 2020 at 07:37
Having finished rereading Quining Qualia, I'll answer the question one post at a time. That conscious experience is the dispositional, relational and ...
November 06, 2020 at 07:33
Yes.
November 06, 2020 at 04:49
Au contraire, it is the qualophobes who discard experence for the functional, dispisotional properties of the process.
November 06, 2020 at 01:49
The various color, sound, taste sensations, but those are words used in language, so naturally you will complain that I'm using language.
November 06, 2020 at 01:46
Just want to point to out again that about a third of elgible voters didn’t vote, so Trump really has a little less than a third of the country’s supp...
November 05, 2020 at 23:55
Must be.
November 05, 2020 at 22:37
I don’t care whether we use qualia, I just don’t agree with Dennett’s quining the phenomenonal in total, such that the seeming isn’t really. But sure,...
November 05, 2020 at 22:24
[ Dennett also thinks being a collection mindless robots forming a meme machine does no real harm to free will, consciousness or intentionality.
November 05, 2020 at 22:15
Also only 1 2 3 4 5 6 Votes
November 05, 2020 at 22:12
Yes.
November 05, 2020 at 22:07
We can call the appearance that if you prefer it to qualia. It doesn’t remove the what it’s like or seems to each of us. I will answer your three ques...
November 05, 2020 at 21:57
I guess, for perception anyway. What’s important is the appearance, not my muddled attempt to answer you.
November 05, 2020 at 21:30
I might be equivocating on Locke here, but the primary ones are taken to be related to the objective ones. We see a shape extended in three dimensions...
November 05, 2020 at 21:27
Well actually it would be better to say the entire experience is qualia, in that’s how a keyboard appears, but certain properties such as shape or ref...
November 05, 2020 at 21:21
You want me to remove all the properties of language and then report my experiences to you? They aren’t linguistic. The language is just a reference.
November 05, 2020 at 20:38
Something that can’t be communicated, apparently. Insert Luke’s comment on showing here.
November 05, 2020 at 20:34
Thoughts I hear in my head. Or see in my imagination. Or remember with whatever sensory modality. Since we’re both human, we have similar enough exper...
November 05, 2020 at 20:32
Qualia are the secondary qualities of perception. They’re not properties of chairs.
November 05, 2020 at 20:28
One wonders what Dennett means by unspoken thoughts. Surely not “inner dialog”?
November 05, 2020 at 20:25
As much as I do for the external world. And yes, you don’t know that I see the same thing without verification of some sort.
November 05, 2020 at 20:14
I’m self-reporting to you. I don’t require a self-report of my own experiences. But I do need it for others. Thus the privacy of experience. Now if yo...
November 05, 2020 at 20:12
Not to me it isn’t. Maybe you’re a p-zombie?
November 05, 2020 at 19:56
The appearance or the seeming. It appears that I see color, feel pain, etc. it’s those sensations.
November 05, 2020 at 19:54