It seems to indicate that a person will not have visual imagery in their dreams if they have not had sufficiently recent visual perceptions (edit: I g...
You can have coloured features in dreams without the same flavour and intensity of sensorimotor feedbacks we have when conscious, that's not quite the...
The thing with colour etc being characterised as extrinsic relational properties means they don't collapse down to either being subjective or objectiv...
Fascism - to a decent approximation paligenetic ultranationalism, an ideology of restoration/rebirth (palingenetic) of a superior mythologised nation/...
With sufficient pedantry, what demarcates the steps of the "iterations" of perceptions would also vary too, no? There's no guarantee that update steps...
Aye. I imagine that the kind of accounts philosophically split along two lines: (1) How are perceptual features formed? (2) What is the phenomenal con...
It is tricky. The nascent way we split up phenomena and describe them isn't a neutral process of observation and recording with respect to the topic o...
I guess I'll take you both at your word that you're not prepared to discuss it seriously and leave it at that. I wish you would've saved us some time ...
You responded to a series of reasoned posts with an insult, an appeal to self evidence (self evident to you) and a bare assertion. Make an argument en...
Also consider this bit from the essay: Adding "subjective" to something has an uncanny way of moving it into someone's head. Edit: as an analogy, "isn...
I don't think so? The problem with the "subjective state" isn't the "state" it's the "subjective". Similarly with "private state", it's not the "state...
Also @"jamalrob" because perceptual intermediaries. Why not? It's a question of what the "object of perception" refers to. Earlier in my discussion wi...
Double post because of the notification bug, and I think this is an important clarifying point in my dispute with @"Kenosha Kid". Yes! I'm coming at t...
That's what the article is criticising though, if they're not pre-existing objects, they solely permeate the "conscious apprehension" as objects with ...
the least big it could've been, the least big. nobody could've prepared for this, you think democrats would've done better sticking with the WHO? chin...
The problem is breaking off that last stage, AND is made available to that same person's consciousness? What is made available to the person's conscio...
Let me rephrase, there is a big difference between saying that a person has a sense datum/experiential entity with a given structure that only they ha...
I'm trying to highlight that the article is criticising privacy in the same way it's criticising other alleged aspects of qualia. There's a big differ...
Here's the thing I don't get; if you've removed the ineffability, the difference between first person and third person epistemic standards, you've rem...
Tried to get at this tension here and here here. Maybe a decent analogy is: If I write this program for my computer: addit=function(x,y){ thesum=x+y r...
I think you're pretty off the mark here exegetically @"Kenosha Kid", If you are wondering about something which may be or fail to be "immediate", "int...
The difference between a property of an object and an object is pretty big. "3 is prime" says the property "is prime" applies to 3, whereas "is prime"...
@"Kenosha Kid" too, as this post is talking about problems with the qualia concept, previous post I made that this post is elaborating upon. The impul...
Aye. I read it as an illustration of the kind of thinking that prepares someone to start parsing their experiences in terms of qualia. Another way of ...
@"Luke" Yes! "Perceptions as pictures viewed by the mind. Qualia as picture properties." is the view I think's being criticised. Intuition pump (1) ab...
Qualia as experiential objects with intrinsic (non-relational) properties are MMP's target of criticism in the opening sections of Phenomenology of Pe...
Whether qualia are appropriate to describe internal states, and indeed what the phenomenal structure of those internal states is, is a distinct proble...
Back to qualia, then. Whether it's right to claim that qualia do not exist, at least as they are theorised/described intuited, is going to turn on how...
I don't think it's the same as behaviourism in general. If behaviourism is characterised by the claim that there are no internal states of any sort, t...
Read the links I provided, then. I did bother to reference the post, but I appreciate that it was very dense and relied upon familiarity with the term...
Nah. I'm an eliminativist towards qualia because how they're used seems to me to commit their user to an account of perception which relies upon a per...
I had the self refutation objections in my head. The other thread's OP link has Strawson explicating a version of it. (1) Eliminativism towards (class...
AFAIK that's part of his intentional stance idea. Say if you put an expression which always evaluates as true as the terminating-when-false condition ...
Third option; which I take to be Dennett's (then we can get back to the thread). (1) People feel stuff. (Dennett agrees) (2) There are theoretical acc...
I think calling qualia sense data is an equivocation, or at least non-standard use: SEP on qualia and sense data. At best, a sense datum has propertie...
Works in some way. As signalled by the scarequotes. How? What is that way? Is there more than one way? - That space of questions is (allegedly) left t...
What's an an intuition pump? The purpose of an intuition pump is to challenge an intuition about a claim. It isn't a formal refutation, knock down arg...
Relevant to what? You're better off asking @"Isaac" about neurology things. Attention reference: I'm sure you've seen this experiment regarding attent...
@"Pfhorrest"'s points in it were good for a broadly sympathetic construal of the qualia concept in a (reasonably) theory neutral way. I tried to write...
There's a very long discussion here which might help a bit. About qualia, not specifically about Dennett. If you refuse to bracket what is self eviden...
Let's assume that's true: (1) It still might be that exploring our phenomenal/experiential states rigorously leads us to doubt the folk theoretic noti...
Lots of talk about eliminativism and gotcha games around it, not much talk about the dispute. Regarding "direct acquaintance" with "fundamental qualit...
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