Aye. This is back to the first 10 pages or so. (1) There are no qualia as they are commonly theorised or intuited. (2) People do not have minds, sensa...
I remember reading somewhere that 0 didn't make a whole lot of sense to Greek mathematicians because they didn't think of magnitudes in the same way. ...
You know, there are lots of concepts that a zero can refer to. Not all of the mathematical "ideas" associated with 0 are associated with it being the ...
"Nothing is bigger than infinity" means "There is no number which is bigger than infinity", the "nothing" there works as a quantifier. It doesn't mean...
None of the staff pocket rubles, we give our generous KGB funding to anti-Russian internet troll farms to undermine the legitimacy of Western democrat...
I think whether it's rational or not depends less on what someone does, but why someone does it. If someone's utility function is "negligible cost for...
People's utility functions with the lottery can't resemble expected gain, then. Assuming it's a monetary return required, the cost of investing in any...
Discrimination (putting things in explanatorily useful categories based on their characteristics) of perceptual stimuli into the types we perceive the...
Yes. Here's the thing: seeing this as a cup, feeling that as hunger - the identification/categorisation/discrimination is a process component of it, o...
I don't think that an identity between mental content and signifiers of mental content is required for the intentional stance (as I've understood it)....
@"Luke", @"Isaac", @"Kenosha Kid" This is mostly taken from here, Dennett's summary of his Intentional Stance book. I think the role mental entities p...
Imagine that only Spinozists have the conatus - a will/power to survive, grow, adapt. Let's say I'm a Spinozist and you're not, and I start telling yo...
It's not condescending to wonder and study the differences between people. The condescending thing is claiming that people who disagree with you over ...
I've told you this before: it's extremely patronising to assume people aren't conscious in the way you are. It's also highly implausible that there ar...
Would you accept yes/no questions about matters of taste as counter examples? Or are they irrelevant to you? If you ask people "Do you like Marmite? Y...
Yes, that's what I meant. I chose "perceptual relationship" over "perception" because it seems to me I have many perceptual relationships but only one...
Ah. I hope so! I was wondering if we'd get into experiential spatiality stuff (proximity, the experiential aspects of place etc) as a result of @"Andr...
I don't think they must in general. I imagine it depends on the account. I've found references for people that don't (there are apparently people that...
Since you're going over what I see as travelled ground in thread, I'll link you posts I've made in the discussion that I see as relevant: See here,her...
That seems to be Dennett's position regarding mental content to me too. Up to some wrangling on that "responsibility" relationship anyway! Also @"Luke...
About mental content? Roughly the idea that the content of mental states of an agent is differentiated by that agent's (history of) agent-environment ...
"Denying resolutely the existence of something which seems important" (paraphrase) seems to me much different from, say, saying that convention T suff...
When you say the appearance seems some way to us, what do you mean? Here is what it seems to me you mean: (1) Appearances are secondary qualities. In ...
What do you mean by deflation? Considering the article never uses the word, it needs explaining. :up: Okay, what do you mean by externalism here? Agai...
Okay. Take me through this. If what's important is the appearance, how is the appearance distinguished from the relational properties of sensation cau...
Can you please break down an experience you've had and show me/us which bits are qualia and which aren't? Or how qualia apply to it? Describe your key...
(1) What is Dennett's argument in Quining Qualia? (2) How do you think he argues for that position? (3) In what sense is Quining Qualia an argument fo...
(1) What do you think Dennett's position is in Quining Qualia? (2) How do you think he argues for that position? (3) How does that relate to the maxim...
It should be pretty obvious how to productively engage in a reading group thread. A combination of text exegesis, contextualising that argument in the...
Oh it's a clusterfuck unfortunately. Most of the discussion derailed into Dennett's broader points. And it's not really a discussion of them either, i...
And why do you think he is equivocating between those things? Do you think Dennett thinks conscious experience is 3rd person data? Or that 3rd person ...
That "not really", presumably the additional part is phenomenal consciousness. If nothing less than phenomenal consciousness will do for that objectio...
It's a clear misreading. I tried to open up that line of discussion on page 3, that post concerns trying to locate what a quale is and the ambiguities...
A bunch of things, as I read him: (1) The idea that qualia are experienced. Disentangling "I tasted the tea", taste there is a relation, from "I had a...
If you want to talk about whether the properties of experience are appropriate to distinguish from functional properties/"extrinsic relational propert...
@"Luke" The denial of double transduction looks to me to be the same issue discussed here, whether it's appropriate to conceive of perception itself w...
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