This, after I had explained only yesterday how we can give such sentences a truth value using free logic. And of course, the example is a common one i...
But I won't be defending this at any length as an alternative. I don't need to present a detailed alternative in order to address the issues with the ...
Perhaps the most useful way to see it is Davidson's, Pat believes the tree is an oak. Quintin believes that. But of course this is not without its own...
As I understand it, ? grass is green I think this is the mouth of your rabbit hole. You do entertain propositions without judging them. You can think ...
If the thought cannot be isolated from the act of thinking, then Quentin thinks that Pat thought the Oak was shedding. But the thought cannot be isola...
Supose the grass is the lawn. The it follows from q by substituting lawn/grass that the lawn is green. And this is correct. But if we substitute lawn/...
This is a good explanation. There is more to be said here. The spider's conceptual scheme is not just it's experiences, but the beliefs it forms as a ...
Excellent OP. I hope we can use it to bring out some of the subtly of On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Someone who agrees with Davidson can ag...
This badly misrepresents not only my view, but those of Russell, Quine and Donnellan. has a history of this sort of thing. Perhaps Leon's post is in t...
Sure. Magic reactors. Point being increased demand will increase price while any "catch up" occurs, so consumers will be paying more for their electri...
Nothing quite along those lines. If you are interested in my opinion see Nothing to do with Dennett's quining qualia Not a short thread. Not a topic t...
A range of things from utterances through to propositions. What's important here is that we pull those out of their intensional context so that they c...
Yes! That's it! :wink: Just to be sure, this is an excellent thread, in that, that he is taken seriously is itself the puzzle. I am missing something ...
The F-word has little use, as can bee seen in this thread. But Trump does fit Paxton's list. That'll do for now. Well, not any more, over where you ar...
Well, I don't agree. Rather, for Quine, reference does work, but holistically, not in individual cases. I doubt Quine would disagree. The context is s...
Well, yes, but I don't think it the best way that this stuff could be said. When I say that Truman exists because someone is Truman, I'm not refering ...
Well, then ~(Athena = Piece). I see your solution as rejecting this, since for you there is no individual Athena or Piece, but only descriptions of th...
I guess I'm not seeing the problem you want to solve, or perhaps i think it was solved by Kripke. The reasons that Quine had for dropping individual c...
Well, if not then A statement like ?xP(x) would trivially be true, because there are no x to contradict it. And ¬?x?P(x) would be equivalent to ?x?¬P(...
Sure we do. When you try to understand what it is that someone is referring to in using a name, how confident can you be that you have it right? Or, a...
Ok. That the domain is not empty is a presumption for first order logic anyway, (a point that I suspect Leon has not appreciated). And I'm confident t...
Not following that. Unless you are saying that ?(x)fx says there is at least one thing and one thing is f - ie, that the domain is not empty. That mig...
Except that f(x) says nothing, while ?(x)fx says that something has the property f. So if we drop the distinction between free and bound variables, we...
Wouldn't that just mean that any non-constant was free, and so free variables would just be variables? That'd just be dropping the distinction between...
Sure. And "Pegasus =" is also a predicate, not an equivalence. So we have two ways of parsing "x is Pegasus". As an equivalence, x=p, which is a two-p...
What I said should be read as a general critique of some forms of phenomenological method. In so far as Rödl is dependent on such a method his argumen...
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