Banno

SO what do you make of this: Kripke has not rid us of problems associated with transworld identity, for as your quote shows there may be issues with r...

But all you do is push stuff off the table. If you will not engage, I can't see how this will be any fun. Where did Frank go astray?

I'm not sure there is any point. @"Frank" hasn't worked out that we can't step in the same river even once, and yet it is the same river. You say you ...

as you are the chap who made the funniest retort in web history, I forgive you.

You're all idiots. Go back to work.

What?

Fine.

Much.

That doesn't work.

What do you think it is?

No more than if you stipulated that 2+2=5

Can anyone provide an example of a possible world or counterfactual situation that is not stipulated?

Far from being useless, I'm advising you and those here about to listen to Sam; certainly he will be a better guide than MU.

Says MU of the chap who has added the most, and the most cogent, stuff on Wittgenstein in this forum...

Here, here.

So what's the problem? Here's how I read it. Some folk say that there is a problem in identifying individuals in other possible worlds. Kripke points ...

I've no idea what you are asking.

What profound philosophical questions? We just stipulate, then work out the consequences as needed. Generally, we don't draw attention to the sun not ...

Let's see how Kripke teases out the consequences of that simple suggestion.

I should have noted this earlier: Certainty is a type of belief, not a type of knowledge.

'Cause we are about to start looking at contingent a priori truths. Here's were it gets interesting. A truth is a priori if it is known without referr...

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation?

I've just no clear idea of what you mean here: My bolding.

Cheers. I read Kripke as setting up a grammar that allows coherent discourse on modal issues. Hence it is especially important to recognise the way he...

And, p.49.

p.48(n.)

p.48

p.48.

Sittin' here puzzlin' over how you managed to get things so wrong, again.

Yep. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/230677

so what do you make of this, @"Posty McPostface"?

That's what Kripke avoids; one is not obliged to observe some possible world and identify an individual (a "counterpart") with some arbitrary degree o...

This is perhaps best seen as a grammatical point. It is a rejection of an argument that might go as follows: We cannot suppose that Moses could not ha...

...as opposed to the idea that we see possible worlds at a distance - through a lens, darkly. See p.44

Just that the possible world is built by our stipulation. Suppose that Moses did not lead the Israelites out of Egypt... The very act of making the su...

Well, what sort of thing is an essential property? If one supposes that there are essential properties, and that these are what distinguish one indivi...

SO the point here is that what is a priori are things we know; it's an epistemological notion. But that necessity is a metaphysical notion - it's nece...

Perhaps it is a bit tedious, but to steal from Wittgenstein, all we have done so far is to put the pieces on the board; the game hasn't quite started ...

Kripke is setting up the pieces for the forthcoming game. He intends to use the terms sorted here in particular ways. He is taking the formality of hi...

Goldbach's conjecture is that every integer greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers. It is (presumably) either true, and necessarily true, or i...

And the next step - or few steps - in N&N is to seperate the a priori from the necessary. Kripke points out that the traditional view, that a priori s...

There's a need for something like a suspension of critique t to get at what is being said in a philosophical work.

Not a bad first guess. Perhaps a name attains a meaning when it has associated with it a definite description, such that only the individual concerned...

Let's clarify the difference between a rigid designator and a definite description. A definite description is (supposedly) a predication that picks ou...

Sure. Do you want me to say proper definite description, just to be clear? I think I will just continue to take it as read.

Objects have meaning?

Let's take it slowly. My bolding. Consider pp. 31-33, where Kripke points to a difference between a name having a meaning, and a name singling out its...

Go on then.

Some of my own writing on Family Resemblance: For a while I had much sympathy for Searle's approach (p.31), defending it using baptism; not too far fr...

Examples to be considered... First, the afore mentioned man who does not have a glass of champaign. Second, Dartmouth, which one succeeds in referring...