You are so busy repeating the argument that you haven't seen how it has been shredded. "People like us". A foetus is not a "people like us". It's just...
Again, if someone thinks that kicking the pup is fine, then I wouldn't say they have a different preference to me in the way I like vanilla and they l...
Only in showing that any such account that replaces good with something else must miss the point. Moore's open question ought be used far more often t...
It's often attributed to Wittgenstein. pointed out that If someone thinks that kicking the pup is fine, then I wouldn't say they have a different pref...
A common analysis, and one I have much sympathy for. Indeed if you had asked me a month or two ago I might have agreed. But as @"Moliere" suggests, I'...
Of course. But that does not avoid the issue I set out above: That is, emotivism fails to account for the commonplace notion that moral statements are...
SO I think we will agree that kicking a pup is wrong - not just a push with the side of your foot, but perhaps a proper punt... I suggest that it is a...
Then you seem to be in the rather odd position of claiming, say, that it is wrong to kick a puppy, but that it is not true that it is wrong to kick a ...
SO, @"Terrapin Station" hasn't grasped the open question argument, or has grasped it but honestly thinks his preferences decide what is good and what ...
If you define morality thus, then morality can be wrong. The question: are the rules for acceptable/unacceptable behaviour always good? And again, the...
But making it a "we" doesn't help... so far as I can see: We can be right and they can be right, even if our views contradict one another. @"creatives...
Both... It seems that Moore might say that a moral statement can be both true and an expression of what one thinks we ought do. Contrast that with tho...
Contrast to those who say good is subjective. If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one an...
That's shit. You use the euphemism "people like us" to refer to what has moral standing; I use "person". Then you reduce the worth of "People like us"...
I don't see how you can say that it is not about persons, and about persons, at the same time. hence: It's not immoral to kill what is human. If it we...
The problem is not with science, but with philosophical musing. If that were so, then anything would do. But it doesn't. You can't make an iPhone from...
Time to bring Moore back? Perhaps the mistake is in describing moral sentiment as a feeling. This is most to the fore when what you want is not what y...
You use "people like us" to hide personhood. It's the killing of a person that is wrong, not the killing of a human. Hence, it is acceptable to switch...
Yes, that's what the argument pretends. But P1 assumes the foetus is a person; or the argument fails by illicitly deriving an ought from an is. Your i...
This stands. The FOV argument has ben shown to be in error. (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/250662) The notion of predictable conse...
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