Banno

"Arrrgh" is true IFF bloody arthritis.

I wrote a thread on that somewhere... Ah, here it is!

I disagree. Can you see why, after reading this thread?

The story would be coherent, but not the scheme.

The dolphins are worth considering. They show langauge-like behaviour. The task then would be to find instances of that behaviour to which we could at...

SO I hope I've shown that the centre of the argument is about truth and translation rather than common coordinate systems, although of course the two ...

This is a thread about Davidson. I've enough to do with just that. I get a bit pissed off with folk - not you, of course - who think philosophy is eas...

Intensionality. Not the same thing.

Charity here is not compassion. It's a fucking hammer.

Perhaps it's just that I would not call using logic an ability... It's just beinh coherent. As for what's innate, I'll leave that tot he psychologists...

Yeah. Have you read the article?

Glad to hear it. But sometimes...

Yep. Language is how we live our lives, and all this analysis is pretty much irrelevant, a jigsaw puzzle, a distraction... Or for me at the moment, pr...

Thanks. Davidson's approach is intrinsically extensional. He does this of course to simplify the discussion; but moreover, he elsewhere goes to great ...

He said something like that? And yet in Two Dogmas, he rejects the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. You version of Quine does ...

Not sure I follow you. Um, actually, I am sure I don't follow you.

Davidson makes pretty much the same point as you, in dividing conceptual schemes into those that organise stuff and those that fit stuff. Yours is of ...

SO let's now apply convention T to conceptual schemes. We saw that any conceptual scheme worthy of the title must be true. What we want to know is if ...

So, any conceptual scheme worthy of consideration will be true. What, then, can we say about being true? T-sentences present a bare minimum It's prett...

He's equivocating the use of the word make. It's one of the many jokes he scatters through the text, like the use of the phrase "true to the facts" at...

T-sentences are central to the way Davidson treats truth, and indeed meaning. So an incommensurable conceptual schema will have to be both true and no...

This discussion continues here.

Yep. Davidson was Quine's student, and is considered to be continuing Quine's program. Dang, dropped my slide. that's the trouble with glass. Not a go...

Then we have the stuff sorted by how we interact with it - how it fits. Davidson argues that to fit is to be true. Pretty simple. And this is the bit ...

So we have a distinction between stuff, and language as sorting that stuff by organising it. Conceptual schema would then be the sorting. So incommens...

So Davidson comes to consider a definition of language and conceptual schemes that is not reliant on translation; that there is stuff, the stuff needs...

Davidson appears to take analytic-synthetic and scheme-content to be much the same distinction here. I don't quite follow that. But I will happily joi...

After a quote from Feyerabend he considers what would be involved in the case where the content was held firm while the conceptual scheme changes, and...

Davidson then makes an interesting distinction between two sorts of possible worlds... In one, we alter what is the case in this world in order to con...

Davidson goes off in search of a way to analyse translation. He's heading to T-sentences, but he takes his time. There's a brief mention that being ab...

I read the stuff about scheme-content dogma as another side-issue, part of the set up for the discussion of the implications of T-sentences.

And that's why Davidson does not use that argument, but only mentions it here as a conclusion.

Can translation fail totally? There's then a glorious compression of Davidson's conclusion into a single sentence, containing no less than four negati...

So we find, if we accept these considerations, that language cannot be set aside unless one also sets aside ones conceptual scheme; we find ourselves ...

Davidson takes a paragraph to set aside mystical considerations. He seems to find them incoherent.

He then proposes that translation provides a way to compare conceptual schema. Not translation merely from one language to another, since folk with di...

SO Davidson sets up a paradox. On one hand is the notion that there are points of view so radically different as to be incomparable. On the other, we ...

Davidson gives examples of impressively different descriptions, but notes that these differences are set out in a single language. This presages the s...

The first few paragraphs, then. Davidson begins by characterising the notion of conceptual scheme he wishes to critique. A conceptual scheme is such t...

Maybe tomorrow.

:up:

Yep.

Mystical, hidden stuff... how do we talk about that?

That's the presumption.... yes.

Hm. I've seen more convincing arguments... Is this any more than a play on "basis"?

This looks promising... But not right now.

You are talking about models of perception, yes? The notion that an organism builds an internal image of what is around it, in order to better choose ...

It's good to see some serious treatment of an interesting argument going on. thanks, @"fdrake", for your summary. Yes; this is what those who take con...

But if there isn't one, and there aren't more than one... the only thing left is none.